mlb78, Phj196007v27i3p05
mlb78, Phj196007v27i3p05
mlb78, Phj196007v27i3p05
By WILLIAM J. MCKENNA*
The ancestor of the modern state income tax was the colonial
faculty tax. This was not, however, a true income tax. It was a
*William J. McKenna received his doctorate in Political Science from the
University of Pennsylvania. He is now an Assistant Professor in the De-
partment of Economics at Temple University.
291
292 PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY
tax upon the assumed income of property. The colonial tax listers
merely assessed the owners of property at fixed amounts of in-
come. The measure of income was property itself and not actual
personal income. Other colonial faculty taxes were simply taxes
on the assumed earnings of classified occupations. They were,
therefore, arbitrary in character.
Pennsylvania first adopted the faculty tax in 1782.1 The as-
sessors and their assistants rated occupations at an assumed in-
come. Evidence of religious toleration and concern for the
economic plight of "ministers of the Gospel of all denominations"
is found in the fact that they were exempt from the faculty tax
of 1782.
Later, in 1785, the exemptions of the 1782 law were broadened
to include mechanics and manufacturers.2 Evidently the exemp-
tion of these added classes was not too acceptable, for they were
denied exemption in the faculty tax act of 1799.8 The desire to
subject all groups to taxation resulted in the ending of the exemp-
tion of ministers and schoolmasters by the faculty tax law of 1817.4
The faculty tax laws, although they left to the discretion of
the assessor the actual tax to be levied, provided fixed minima
and maxima depending upon the category taxed. Thus, the faculty
tax act of 1785 provided a minimum of twenty-five cents and a
maximum of $10.00. In actual practice, the faculty tax laws in
the period of 1782 to 1842 were spasmodically enforced and
yielded an inconsequential total revenue.
In the 1830's many of the states embarked on a series of internal
improvements which resulted in the accumulation of a substantial
debt. Pennsylvania was no exception to this trend, and in fact
found itself with an unprecedented debt, and heavy interest
charges. The cost of the state government had risen from $453,000
in 1820 to $6,357,000 in 1830, and it rose to $7,279,000 in 1840.5
In August, 1842, Pennsylvania defaulted on its bonds (after twice
Since 1920 there have been several attempts to revise the Penn-
sylvania Constitution of 1874 by holding a constitutional conven-
17 Opinion dated July 8, 1919. (Report and Official Opinions of the At-
torney general of Penisylvantia, 1919-1920, 90.)
"The Commission on Constitutional Amendment and Revision, Journal
of Proceedings (Harrisburg, 1920), I, 720-721, 723-724.
THE INCOME TAX IN PENNSYLVANIA 299
tion."`i The court also held that a tax upon income from property
is a property tax and not an excise tax and, therefore, requires
uniformity. The court, however, refused to rule that a tax upon
personal income is a tax upon property and rejected the per-
sonal income tax on the basis that classes of incoMe&4 created
by the 1935 income tax law were a "pretended classification"
and were, therefore. "unjust, arbitrary, and illegal." As a justifica-
tion for this view the court cited the case of Copes Estate"
which held unconstitutional a tax levied on inheritance by classify-
ing inheritance taxes according to the amount of inheritance.
A severe blow was given to the graduated income tax move-
ment in Pennsylvania by the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in the Kelly case and by the subsequent rejection in 1937
of the proposed graduated inconme tax amendment.
Ibid.
k Classes were: under $20,000; $20,000 to $100,000; and in excess of
$100,000.
3 191 Pa. 122.
income tax. The state would be faced with the necessity of re-
placing the local revenue that would be lost through the state in-
come tax. This might be done by: (1) a saving clause which
would permit the local units to retain the income tax in addition
to the state income tax; (2) returning to the local units the
revenue lost by dropping the local income tax; (3) authorizing
the raising of present real estate and other local taxes; (4) au-
thorizing new local taxes; (5) increasing state grants to local
units; or (6) absorption by the state of some of the functions of
local government.
Each of the above has its difficulties, and these difficulties will
increase as more and more local units of government adopt the
income tax. A state-levied uniform income tax would have the
advantage of centralized collection and distribution. Such a state-
wide uniform income tax might be regarded as an interim measure
until the voters have an opportunity to vote on a graduated income
tax amendment.
THE FUTURE
9. The income tax is easy to collect, and taxes the income source
directly.
10. The income tax is not shiftable.
11. The yield is high, and there are few evasions or delinquencies.
12. The rates are easy to establish.
13. The income tax reaches those with little or no taxable property.
It is also a just and fair principle that the voters be given a
chance, in view of the changes that have occurred in recent years
in the functions and costs of government, to vote on an income
tax amendment that will present a clear yes-or-no choice in
respect to the adoption or rejection of a graduated income tax.
The only alternatives to some form of income tax are: the in-
crease and broadening of the sales tax, new forms of taxes (such as
parimutuel betting), increase in corporate income and other taxes.
motor vehicle taxes (these can and should be considerably in-
creased), per capita taxes, increase in cigarette and tobacco taxes,
and a series of "nuisance taxes." Another approach would be the
reduction of state expenditures. curtailment of certain functions,
and a limitation of new functions and services. This approach will
probably not be tried. Therefore, some form of personal income
taxation appears the only remaining choice.
SUMMARY