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Syndicated Loans
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Steven A. Dennis
California State University at Fullerton
Donald J. Mullineaux
University of Kentucky
Abstract
This paper analyzes the market for syndicated loans, a hybrid of private and
public debt, which has grown at well over a 20 percent rate annually over the last
decade and totaled over $1 trillion in 1997. While loan sales have been heavily
researched, there has been little work on syndications, which differ in character
from sales. We present empirical evidence that the extent to which a loan can be
syndicated increases as information about the borrower becomes more
transparent, as the syndicate’s managing agent becomes more “reputable,” as
the loan’s maturity increases, and as the loan lacks collateral. The lead manager
holds larger proportions of information-problematic loans in its own portfolio.
Loan syndications, like loan sales, appear to be motivated, in part, by capital
regulations, but the liquidity position of the agent bank does not influence its
syndication behavior. Activity in the syndication market is broadly consistent with
Diamond’s (1991) “life-cycle” model of borrower choice, but our results also
support the view that contract characteristics and reputation can serve as
“substitutes” for information in the debt market.
Contact:
Donald J. Mullineaux
Gatton College of Business and Economics
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506-0034
Phone: (606) 257-2890
Fax: (606) 257-9688
E-mail: mullinea@pop.uky.edu
Syndicated Loans
borrower choice between private and public debt. A consensus view suggests
that a critical factor driving the choice is the character and quality of the
(commercial paper and bonds) as the quality of the information about the firm
successful debt repayments. Carey, Prowse, Rea and Udell (CPRU, 1993)
through venture capital, bank loan finance, private placements, and the public
debt markets as information and collateral become increasingly available and the
debt contracts vary systematically. Bank loans tend to be relatively short term,
public-debt contracts are longer term, involve relatively loose covenants, and are
and Loeys (1988), Berlin and Mester (1992), and Rajan and Winton (1995).
involve overlap between the public and private markets. They focus primarily on
1
private placements, which involve lenders who are intermediaries (typically
insurance companies) and contracts that have relatively strict covenants and
Like public debt, however, private placements are issued in large amounts by
sizable firms at fixed interest rates, and sales of these debt claims to investors
placement financing has no effect on the equity returns to the borrowing firm,
and private debt is syndicated loans. Syndication involves the sale of a relatively
private placement typically is the sale of a “whole” debt contract to a single lender
In principle, any loan could be syndicated by any financial institution that acts as
a loan originator. In practice, only certain kinds of loans and certain types of
characteristics of the borrower, of the lender, and the loan contract itself can play
some role. By sorting out these influences empirically, we hope to: (1) provide
resolving them in financial contracting and (2) specify where syndicated loans “fit”
2
An analysis of syndicated loans also may provide indirect evidence
Berger and Udell (1995), Petersen and Rajan (1994), and Cole (1998) provide
When borrowers seek multiple loans from the same bank over time, a repayment
history accumulates and the lender forms a more extensive and dynamic
based (e.g., payroll) services, the information set becomes still broader and
deeper. Berger and Udell (1995) find that interest rates and collateral
relationship, while Petersen and Rajan (1994) provide evidence that dependence
on trade credit decreases with the length of a relationship. Cole (1998) finds that
the probability a small business will receive credit increases in the presence of a
loan, the elements that facilitate establishing and deepening a relationship are
less likely to be present. While the lead bank may have some form of
relationship with the borrower, this is less likely to be the case for participating
members. Since the buyer of the syndicated loan cannot rely on relationships
with the borrower as a substitute for other mechanisms that resolve agency
3
problems, evidence that certain loan contract characteristics play a different role
market. Section II specifies a model that identifies the various factors which
provides estimates of the model and interprets the results. Section IV provides
some conclusions.
Corporation, reports that loan syndication volume hit a record high $888 billion in
roughly 23 percent.2 In 1997, loan syndications exceeded $1 trillion for the year
financings in 1996 were employed largely for general corporate purposes (49.5
percent) and for debt repayment (33.5 percent), which represents a considerable
shift from the late 1980’s when syndicated loans were used primarily to finance
mergers and acquisitions and leveraged buyout activities. The rapid growth in
volume has been accompanied by declining spreads and fees. In 1996, the
4
compared to 130 basis points in 1992. Average fees were lower by about 10
basis points over the same period. Buyers of syndicated credits included
other institutional funds managers. The American Banker (November 18, 1997)
reports that over $14 billion of loans were syndicated in 1997 through the
The syndication market has grown significantly more than the private-
begun to converge with the junk bond component of the public debt market in
commercial and investment banks for syndication share and the increasing
Securities Data Company reports that among the top 25 managing agents in the
first ten months of 1997, investment banks had 18 percent market share,
5
compared to 5 percent over the same period in 1996 (American Banker,
differ from loan sales. A loan sale typically involves a “participation contract”
which grants the buyer a claim on all or part of a loan’s cash flows. The buyer of
the buyer of a public debt contract. In a syndication setting, each bank is a direct
lender to the borrower, with every member’s claim evidenced by a separate note,
although there is only a single loan agreement contract. One lender will typically
act as managing agent for the group, negotiating the loan agreement, then
coordinating the documentation process, the loan closing, the funding of loan
advances, and the administration of repayments. The agent collects a fee for
these services.
The syndicate members typically will have less interaction with the
borrower than the lead bank over the life of the loan. Consequently, the benefits
operative for the participating members, save for relationships based on prior
Regulators limit the maximum size of any single loan to a portion of the bank’s
6
also may reflect a voluntary diversification motive, a mechanism for managing
interest rate risk, or a strategy for enhancing fee income. Participating banks
costs. Pennachi (1988) suggests that loan purchasing banks may have funding
which it may commit to fund an entire loan facility, or alternatively some portion
thereof, with a promise to use “good faith efforts” to arrange commitments from
other lenders for the remainder. If the agent commits for the entire amount, the
loan can be syndicated after it is closed, to the advantage of the borrower in the
sense that the funds are received more promptly.3 Otherwise, the loan must be
sign a confidentiality agreement. The agent typically will meet with prospective
members to explain the terms of the credit, describe the borrower’s business and
questions.
The agent bank negotiates and drafts all the loan documents, but
syndication occurs prior to closing. The participants are not generally involved in
7
agent bank attempts to satisfy the potentially competing objectives of the
The agent bank also facilitates the administration of the loan, typically
acting as a middleman for draws upon and repayment of the loan. The agent
loan documents, and in the case of a secured loan, holds all pledged collateral
members. The agent bank collects a fee for its services, which typically falls in
transactions, the roles of the agent are divided among several institutions. A
“lead bank” negotiates the documents, puts together the syndicate, and closes
collateral backing the loan. Fees are split in the case of multiple agents.
designates the agent bank and will provide for its removal under specified
conditions. The language typically exculpates the agent from any potential
liability to the syndicate members except where it results from “gross negligence
presence of a fiduciary duty on the part of the agent, attorneys typically counsel
the agent to administer the credit in good faith and exercise prudence and
event of default, typically the agent will seek the prior advice of the member
8
banks. Indeed, the loan agreement will identify which decisions require the
required for any reduction in principal, interest or fees or for extensions of any
terms of the credit. In brief, the syndicate participants delegate some monitoring
both adverse selection and moral hazard. The agent bank may possess
time customer, the originating agent bank may have obtained idiosyncratic
originating bank has an incentive to syndicate those loans on which its “inside
participant banks.
As Gorton and Pennachi (1995) and others have noted, sales of loans
also generate potential moral hazard problems, since the seller has less
incentive to monitor once the loan is removed from the balance sheet.
Monitoring is a costly activity, but after the sale of a loan the benefits accrue to
the buyer rather than the loan originator. The moral hazard problem is potentially
less severe in the case of a loan syndication than a loan sale, since the
9
purchasing bank in a syndication holds a note against the borrower and has the
delegated some monitoring responsibilities to the agent bank, in the sense that
some instances, the agent bank will syndicate the entire amount of a loan facility.
members are quite similar in nature to those which have been used to motivate
Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) for a survey of this “existence” literature). How
are these similar problems overcome in the context of loan syndications? And
what do the “solutions” to these problems imply about where syndications “fit” in
when a loan can be syndicated include the characteristics of (1) the borrower, (2)
motives for syndications and addresses the issue of whether managing agents
are likely to “exploit” the syndicate member banks. She reports that the capital
position of the agent bank is a major factor affecting syndication activity and
suggests that diversification is the primary motive for syndication. Using bank
10
examiner ratings for the syndicated loans in her sample, Simons finds that
quality, but Simons suggests “these loans may look less attractive to participants
even before they are criticized by examiners “ and that “the lead banks concern
with maintaining their reputations in the marketplace may lead them not only to
avoid abuses, but to promote risky loans even less aggressively than safe loans”
(p. 49). We investigate these and other issues more broadly and systematically
loan is likely to be syndicated and, if so, to what extent. Our dependent variable,
of Gorton and Pennachi (1995), who examine the proportion of a loan that is
sold. Their sample consisted strictly of loans sold, however. Our sample
motives for selling and on the scope of the agency problems associated with
are a critical part of the model, as are variables that represent potential solutions
11
to these problems. Some of the latter variables may be captured in certain
Similarly, certain characteristics of the agent bank may affect the syndication
the sense that a seller’s ability to market loans depends on the buyer’s
perception of the seller’s incentive to monitor. Pennachi argues that when the
conditions, banks will sell or securitize higher-quality assets and retain lower-
suggesting that it is less costly for a bank to monitor a loan that it has originated
compared to a loan that it has purchased. The implication of this research is that
and interpret) have higher syndication potential than loans involving “opaque”
loan transaction, including the existence of a public credit rating (either a bond
firm, and the annual sales of the borrower in the year the loan closed. We argue
that information is likely to be more transparent when the borrower has a credit
12
rating or is a listed firm or when the borrower is large (as reflected in annual
Certain characteristics of the loan itself may affect the agent bank’s
agency costs or because it influences the perceived value to the buyer for non-
agency related reasons. The maturity and the status of the loan with respect to
collateral are two such characteristics. A number of potential channels exist that
might affect a loan’s syndication potential and the likely impacts are not uni-
directional.
syndicate members, then keeping loan maturity short could serve to minimize
such a prospect. Short-term loans involve less opportunity for the agent bank to
shirk, for example, and short maturities are likely to involve frequent requests for
renewals, which triggers more frequent monitoring of the borrower and the agent
by the syndicate members. Gorton and Pennachi (1989) argue that “banks are
loan “strips,” which are short-term segments of longer-term loans (p. 130). The
reason is that the selling bank intends to resell the strip on the date it matures to
avoid having to fund it. These arguments suggest that lengthening a loan’s
maturity would reduce its potential for successful syndication. On the other hand,
frequent renewals also increase the overall (and duplicative) monitoring costs for
the set of syndicate banks. Diamond (1984) demonstrates how the avoidance of
13
duplicative monitoring costs helps provide a rationale for the existence of
which minimizes interest rate risk, syndicate members might prefer longer-term
opportunity for the originating bank to extract rents from borrowers on the
the case, managing agents would prefer to hold larger proportions of such loans
in their own portfolios to avoid sharing such rents with syndicate members. If
potential. We include the loan’s maturity as a variable in our model, but the likely
a loan’s syndication potential. When a loan is fully secured, the quality of the
reduces the sensitivity of the loan’s cash flows to any information differences
between the agent and syndicate member banks, suggesting that the presence
of collateral would raise the likelihood that a loan could be syndicated. On the
other hand, Berger and Udell (1990) demonstrate that collateral typically is
associated with riskier loans. This suggests that collateral could serve as a
signal that a particular loan involves a high degree of opaque information. Rajan
14
and Winton (1995) demonstrate formally that collateral is more likely to be
private debt will be correlated with financial distress at the firm level and poor
business conditions at the aggregate level, both of which have empirical support”
(p. 115-16). These arguments suggest that the presence of collateral should
reduce the prospects of syndicating a loan. We include a dummy variable for the
presence of collateral in our model, but again we are agnostic about its sign.
If the agency problems between the agent and syndicate members are
potentially significant, another factor that could attenuate these problems is the
and Smith (1986)], and the abnormal stock price response to loan agreement
same firm. In addition, the “investment banker may also identify an informed
client base for the firm’s stock which is also a durable transaction-specific asset”
(reputation) should have lower costs in syndicating loans than banks that have
15
eschewed such investments. Gorton and Haubrich (1990) argue that the
reputation of the selling back may replace the selling bank’s equity as the
specific investments. Using data from a period prior to that used in our
who enter into multiple syndicates with this lead bank. We use this variable as
the agent bank. We hypothesize that a loan can be more readily syndicated
when the lead bank has a higher credit rating. In addition, we include a dummy
variable equal to one if the loan originator is a bank and zero for non-banks, as
another reputational factor. Non-banks are relatively recent entrants into the
16
and Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel (1995) provide evidence that non-banks
We also include two different measures of the scale of the loan facility in
our model. The first is simply the size of the loan in dollars and the second is the
loan-facility size divided by the equity capital of the agent bank. As either of
other variables relating to the managing agent bank which have been utilized in
empirical studies of loan sales, such as Pavel and Phillis (1987). Among these
are the rate of growth in the loan portfolio over the most recent 12 months, the
charge-off ratio for total loans, and the ratio of non-current loans to total loans.7
The loan-growth variable is a rough measure of the extent to which the agent
associated with an increased prospect for syndication, other things equal. The
other two variables are measures of overall loan quality in the agent bank
portfolio. Increases in these ratios could reduce the likelihood that the originator
Many studies, including Berger and Udell (1993) and Pennachi (1988),
have suggested that regulatory requirements for bank capital may induce banks
to sell loans. Selling loans without recourse or syndicating loans results in their
17
removal from the originating bank’s balance sheet. Commercial loans are
the ratio of equity capital to total assets and the ratio of equity capital to risk-
adjusted assets (the Tier I capital ratio) in the year the loan is syndicated. If loan
ratios should reduce the prospect that a given loan will be syndicated.
form:
asymmetries and is equal to one if the borrower has a public bond rating and
dummy variable equal to one if the facility is collaterallized and zero otherwise,
transactions for each originating agent bank based on activity in the pre-sample
period, BANK is a dummy variable equal to one if the managing agent is a bank
and zero otherwise, and FACSIZE is the dollar amount of the loan facility. The
be positive, while the signs of the MATURITY and SECURED coefficients are
we employ CPRATE (one if the borrower has a commercial paper rating and zero
18
listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ stock exchanges and zero otherwise,
and SALES which reflects the annual sales of the borrowing firm in the year of
the agent bank. The coefficient of BANKRATE should be positive; the higher the
credit rating of the agent, the larger will be the proportion of its loans that can be
managing agent bank in the year the loan is syndicated. These include:
charged off to total loans; NCURRENT, the ratio of non-current loans to total
loans; EQUITY, the ratio of equity capital to total assets; and TIER I, the ratio of
syndicated should increase with LNGROWTH, which proxies for the degree the
agent is liquidity constrained, and should decline with the remaining three
variables, which measure the quality of the overall loan portfolio and the degree
19
III. Estimates of the Model
individual loans, we employ data from a private database compiled by the Loan
30,000 loan facilities involving some 2,500 lenders. Much of the data gathered
filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, but LPC also reports deals
obtained from direct research at the lending banks. LPC attempts to confirm the
data from SEC filings with senior management at the lender and reports when a
could identify either the managing agent’s share or the percentage of the loan
who lacked a senior, unsecured S&P credit rating. About 93 percent of the non-
syndicated loans went to unrated companies. Even larger proportions of the loan
facilities were with firms who lacked commercial-paper ratings. Roughly half of
the loan transactions are with publicly-listed firms. A larger proportion of the non-
20
syndicated loans are secured, although the majority of loans involve collateral in
both classes. Banks originated a larger proportion of the syndicated loans (97%)
than the non-syndicated facilities (86%). Not surprisingly, syndicated loans are
much larger than non-syndicated ones and are more likely to be originated with
larger firms. The magnitudes of the differences are roughly the same for means
and medians. The mean maturity of the syndicated loans is almost 50 percent
larger than the average for non-syndicated loans and the median is twice as
large.8 Table 1 also shows the average share held by a managing agent in a
zero means the entire amount of the loan was syndicated. Roughly 50 percent of
million. Prior approval from the borrower for assignments is required in roughly
assignments is required 45 percent of the time in our sample. The majority of the
loans in our sample are for general corporate purchases, working capital, or debt
syndicated loans with respect to loan purpose or loan type. A strong majority of
doubly censored Tobit model (since the dependent variable is censored at 0 and
100 percent.) The results of the base case model are presented in Table II.
21
borrower sales is significant only at the .10 level and only when BANKRATE is
transparent. When the information set is opaque, the agent holds a larger
proportion of the loan in its portfolio, perhaps in part as a signal regarding the
“quality” of the credit. Sales appears to be a weak proxy for the information
The coefficient of the loan’s maturity is positive and significant at the .01
opportunities to extract rents from borrowers in the renewal stage when favorable
information is revealed. Our findings are not consistent with the notion that short
significant at the .01 level, suggesting that agents are able to syndicate smaller
reduce the sensitivity of a loan’s value to the character of the information that
supports it, collateral also can serve as a signal of a higher level of risk. In the
22
The variables which serve as proxies for the reputation of the managing
agent are all positive and significant at either the .01 or .05 level, suggesting that
many researchers have claimed. The proportion of a loan that can be syndicated
the agent’s credit rating improves, and as the agent is a bank rather than a non-
banking institution. These results suggest that certain managing agents have
to syndicate loans. Our results are also similar to those of Billett, Flannery and
Garfinkel (1995), who found that the identity of the lender affects the size of the
managing agent bank also influences the amount of a particular loan that can be
syndicated.
Finally, the size of the loan facility is a significant factor in determining the
proportion of a loan that is syndicated. The larger the loan, the larger the
Table III reports the results of the estimation of the bank-only model,
that agent banks are not generally motivated by liquidity constraints in their
23
coefficient of the charge-off ratio is likewise generally insignificant, suggesting
that a higher level of “bad loans” in the agent bank’s portfolio does not inhibit its
capacity to syndicate. When instead the ratio of non-current loans to total loans
is included in our regressions, its coefficient is significant (at the .01 level) in one
of two cases and has a positive sign, suggesting that agent banks syndicate
larger proportions of commercial loans when the overall quality of the loan
portfolio deteriorates. Again, evidence implies that the credit quality of the
managing agent bank’s overall portfolio does not inhibit its capacity to
syndicate.10 Both measures of capital adequacy at the agent bank have negative
and significant coefficients, suggesting that agents which are capital constrained
are likely to syndicate larger proportions of their loans. These results are similar
to the findings in Simons (1993) for syndications and Pavel and Phillis (1987) for
loan sales and are consistent with the “regulatory tax hypothesis” in the loan
sales literature [Berger and Udell (1993)]. All of the variables in the base-case
model remain significant when these additional variables are included and each
maintains its original sign. In broad terms, our evidence suggests there are
some similarities and some differences in the factors that drive loan syndications
In this paper, we have analyzed one of the most rapidly growing sectors of
the financial system, the market for syndicated loans. The volume of syndicated
24
lending in 1997 was over 8 times the amount of new junk-bond issues. Our main
objective was to identify the factors that enhance the prospects that an individual
borrower, the managing agent, and the loan contract itself all are of some
relevance. In particular, the better the quality of the information about the
larger is the proportion of its debt that can be syndicated. This confirms the now
standard view that the scale and scope of information asymmetries is relevant to
where and how a firm finances. We also found evidence that the reputation of
agent’s own credit rating, can attenuate some of the agency problems that
adhere in loan syndications. While many authors, such as Gorton and Haubrich
(1990) and Gorton and Pennachi (1989) have suggested that reputation might
resolve moral-hazard problems in the loan sales market, our evidence confirms a
mechanism for resolving agency problems in debt contracting. While the context
with the borrower, participatory banks can and do rely on relationships with the
25
economics has suggested, for example, that keeping contractual relations brief
suggests that short-term loans should be more readily syndicated. Our evidence
syndicate larger proportions of a given loan. Two reasons suggest why this may
maturities are lengthened, the scale of these duplicative costs is reduced and the
reason why longer-term maturity loans may be more heavily syndicated is that,
opportunity for the lender to extract rents from the borrower at the contract
members might prefer to share in any such rent creation, they cannot
contractually commit the agent to re-syndicate such loans at the renewal stage.
rent extraction will be held in the managing agent bank’s portfolio. The fact that
longer-maturity loans are more likely to be syndicated implies that the loan
between the agent and members is collateral, since pledging an asset to secure
26
contracting parties. This logic implies that secured loans should be more readily
signal that information about the borrower tends to be more opaque than
collateral might also signal the absence of an on-going relationship between the
borrower and the lead bank. Berger and Udell (1995) report evidence that
characteristics rather than the loan’s characteristics. Our results for the collateral
behavior as evidence shows it does in the loan sales market. Nor does the
overall credit quality of the managing agent’s portfolio matter much for
syndications.
(1991) life-cycle model of borrower choice and with the notion that the locus of an
27
transparent will largely determine a borrower’s likely source of financing. As
CPRU note, Diamond’s model is highly theoretical and abstracts from differences
in the features of various financial contracts, such as maturity and the presence
of collateral and covenants. They argue that these features, and the dynamic
nature of information production at both the loan origination and the monitoring
which they characterize as appropriate for firms who are “less information
problematic” than borrowers who can access the public credit markets. Where
do syndicated loans fit on this continuum? Loan syndication also involves the
contracts sold in the public debt market and perhaps even somewhat more
syndicated loans in our sample involve collateral (75%) than in Kwan and
empirical support for the hypothesis that the character and quality of information
less than fully transparent, debt contracts tend to be marketed to investors with
28
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Diamond, Douglas, 1991, Monitoring and reputation: the choice between bank
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sheet?, Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance 4, 125-45.
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marketable assets, Journal of Monetary Economics 35, 389-411.
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30
Petersen, Mitchell and Raguraham Rajan, 1994, The benefits of lending
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FOOTNOTES
*The authors wish to thank Marcia Cornett, Mark Flannery, Chris James, Tony Saunders, and Joe
Sinkey for their comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
1
From a legal standpoint, private placements do not represent “underwritings,” with the exception
of certain private placements issued under SEC Rule 144A. CPRU (1993) argue that Rule 144A
commercial and industrial loans on U.S. bank balance sheets as of December 31, 1996 was
$783.2 billion, according to the Federal Reserve Bulletin. The syndication activity reported in
sign an “assignment and assumption agreement” in which the agent assigns the agreed upon
amount of its commitment to the member. Legally, this process is described as “novation,” which
31
represents an amendment to the original loan agreement. The borrower in turn delivers a note to
the member reflecting the assignment amount. Managing agents can establish a minimum
required assignment amount, which results in a limit on the number of banks in the syndicate.
Borrowers sometimes demand the capacity to approve the participating banks and, on occasion,
the managing agent will require that syndicate banks seek their approval if the member wishes to
subsequently assign their own interest to some other bank. Fox (1989) reports that post-closing
“bad faith” or “gross neglect.” Such claims are infrequent, but in 1989 Security Pacific Bank was
sued by 10 plaintiff banks, which held $67.6 million of its syndicated loans, on the grounds that
Security Pacific withheld information. The judge ruled in favor of Security Pacific (Forbes, May
27, 1991).
5
CPRU (1993) note that private placements facilitated by agents, rather than placed directly by
the borrower, involve a similar form of delegated monitoring. They claim that potential agency
problems are more severe in the post-closing stage, since lenders will likely replicate fully the due
diligence efforts of the agent. Simons (1993) claims that, although syndicate members are
expected to perform their own credit analyses rather than rely on representations made by the
agent, buyers typically will rely strictly on the loan documentation provided by the lead bank in
conducting such evaluations. This suggests the agency problems may be equally severe in both
mention” by examiners, but only 70 percent of loans rated “substandard” or “doubtful,” and 53
commercial loans as determinants of syndication behavior. Unfortunately, our data source, the
FDIC’s Institutional Directory Web Page, does not contain charge-offs or non-current loans by
loan type.
32
8
CPRU (1993) report that the average size of a private placement (in 1989) was $76 million with
a mean maturity of nine years. While our data cover a longer time horizon, the average facility
size for syndicated loans ($242 million) appears substantially larger than for private placements
agreements fail to produce the positive returns to borrower equity associated with non-syndicated
loan announcements. This result is similar to James’ (1987) findings for private placements.
33
Table I
Syndicated Nonsyndicated
Full Sample Loans Loans
Sample Size 3410 1526 1884
Loans to non-rated borrowers (senior, 2769 1016 1753
unsecured debt)
Loans to non-rated borrowers 3068 1251 1796
(commercial paper)
Loans to publicly-listed borrowers 1729 858 871
Number of secured loans 2766 1139 1627
Observations with bank/non-bank 3142/268 1478/48 1664/220
lenders
Borrower Sales: Mean/Median (Min/Max) $767m/$113m $1.5b/$337m $207m/$50m
(13,000/109b) (1m/109b) (13,000/14.6b)
Syndication information:
Agent Share: Mean (Min/Max) 32%
(0/90.7)
Assignment Minimum: Mean $7.5m
(Min/Max) (10,000/25m)
Company Consent for Assignment 661/865
(Yes/No)
Agent Consent for Assignment 679/847
(Yes/No)
Table II