1.) G.R. No.

11263             November 2, 1916

ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant-appellee.

Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and Felix Socias for appellant.

Sanz, Opisso and Luzuriaga for appellee.

TRENT, J.:

This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile. From a judgment
sustaining the defendant's demurrer upon the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of
action, followed by an order dismissing the case after the plaintiff declined to amend, the latter appealed.

It was urged in the first instance, and the court so held, that the defendant cannot be compelled to support the
plaintiff, except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or separation from
the defendant.

The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and immediately thereafter established
their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month, when the plaintiff returned
to the home of her parents. The pertinent allegations of the complaint are as follows:

That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of her that she
perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands
of the defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation; that the defendant,
since that date had continually on other successive dates, made similar lewd and indecorous demands on
his wife, the plaintiff, who always spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the defendant
and induce him to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and different
parts of her body; and that, as the plaintiff was unable by any means to induce the defendant to desist from
his repugnant desires and cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and
take refuge in the home of her parents.

Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner and with the solemnities established by General
Orders No. 68, in so far as its civil effects are concerned requiring the consent of the parties. (Garcia vs. Montague,
12 Phil. Rep., 480, citing article 1261 of Civil Code.) Upon the termination of the marriage ceremony, a conjugal
partnership is formed between the parties. (Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion, 16 Phil. Rep., 137.) To this extent a
marriage partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract. But it is something more than a mere contract. It is a new
relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general
law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties, and obligations. Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance
of which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any
shorter period by virtue of any contract they may make .The reciprocal rights arising from this relation, so long as it
continues, are such as the law determines from time to time, and none other. When the legal existence of the
parties is merged into one by marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled by the state or government upon
principles of public policy for the benefit of society as well as the parties. And when the object of a marriage is
defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the
community, relief in some way should be obtainable. With these principles to guide us, we will inquire into the status
of the law touching and governing the question under consideration.

Articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code are not in force in the Philippine Islands (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep.,
34). Articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870, in force in the Peninsula, were extended to the Philippine
Islands by royal decree on April 13, 1883 (Ebreo vs. Sichon, 4 Phil. Rep., 705). Articles 44, 45, and 48 of this law
read:
 ART. 44. The spouses are obliged to be faithful to each other and to mutually assist each other.

ART. 45. The husband must live with and protect his wife. (The second paragraph deals with the
management of the wife's property.)

ART. 48. The wife must obey her husband, live with him, and follow him when he charges his domicile or
residence.

Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraph, the court may for just cause relieve her from this
duty when the husband removes his residence to a foreign country.

And articles 143 and 149 of the Civil Code are as follows:

ART. 143. The following are obliged to support each other reciprocally to the whole extent specified in the
preceding article.

1. The consorts.

xxx     xxx     xxx

ART. (149) 49. The person obliged to give support may, at his option, satisfy it, either by paying the pension
that may be fixed or by receiving and maintaining in his own home the person having the right to the same.

Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to give support shall cease. The failure of the
wife to live with her husband is not one of them.

The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix the duties and obligations of the
spouses. The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each other. The husband must live with and protect
his wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband and follow him when he changes his domicile or residence,
except when he removes to a foreign country. But the husband who is obliged to support his wife may, at his option,
do so by paying her a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining her in his own home. May the husband, on
account of his conduct toward his wife, lose this option and be compelled to pay the pension? Is the rule established
by article 149 of the Civil Code absolute? The supreme court of Spain in its decision of December 5, 1903, held:.

That in accordance with the ruling of the supreme court of Spain in its decisions dated May 11, 1897,
November 25, 1899, and July 5, 1901, the option which article 149 grants the person, obliged to furnish
subsistence, between paying the pension fixed or receiving and keeping in his own house the party who is
entitled to the same, is not so absolute as to prevent cases being considered wherein, either because this
right would be opposed to the exercise of a preferential right or because of the existence of some justifiable
cause morally opposed to the removal of the party enjoying the maintenance, the right of selection must be
understood as being thereby restricted.

Whereas the only question discussed in the case which gave rise to this appeal was whether there was any
reason to prevent the exercise of the option granted by article 149 of the Civil Code to the person obliged to
furnish subsistence, to receive and maintain in his own house the one who is entitled to receive it; and
inasmuch as nothing has been alleged or discussed with regard to the parental authority of Pedro Alcantara
Calvo, which he ha not exercised, and it having been set forth that the natural father simply claims his child
for the purpose of thus better attending to her maintenance, no action having been taken by him toward
providing the support until, owing to such negligence, the mother was obliged to demand it; it is seen that
these circumstances, together with the fact of the marriage of Pedro Alcantara, and that it would be difficult
for the mother to maintain relations with her daughter, all constitute an impediment of such a nature as to
prevent the exercise of the option in the present case, without prejudice to such decision as may be deemed
proper with regard to the other questions previously cited in respect to which no opinion should be
expressed at this time.

The above was quoted with approval in United States and De Jesus vs. Alvir (9 Phil. Rep., 576), wherein the court
held that the rule laid down in article 149 of the Civil Code "is not absolute." but it is insisted that there existed a
preexisting or preferential right in each of these cases which was opposed to the removal of the one entitled to
support. It is true that in the first the person claiming the option was the natural father of the child and had married a
woman other than the child's mother, and in the second the right to support had already been established by a final
judgment in a criminal case. Notwithstanding these facts the two cases clearly established the proposition that the
option given by article 149 of the Civil Code may not be exercised in any and all cases.

Counsel for the defendant cite, in support of their contention, the decision of the supreme court of Spain, dated
November 3, 1905. In this case Don Berno Comas, as a result of certain business reverses and in order no to
prejudice his wife, conferred upon her powers to administer and dispose of her property. When she left him he gave
her all the muniments of title, mortgage credits, notes, P10,000 in accounts receivable, and the key to the safe in
which he kept a large amount of jewels, thus depriving himself of all his possessions and being reduced in
consequence to want. Subsequently he instituted this civil action against his wife, who was then living in opulence,
for support and the revocation of the powers heretofore granted in reference to the administration and disposal of
her property. In her answer the wife claimed that the plaintiff (her husband) was not legally in a situation to claim
support and that the powers voluntarily conferred and accepted by her were bilateral and could not be canceled by
the plaintiff. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff the defendant wife appealed to the Audencia
Territorial wherein, after due trial, judgment was rendered in her favor dismissing the action upon the merits. The
plaintiff appealed to the supreme court and that high tribunal, in affirming the judgment of the Audencia Territorial,
said:

Considering that article 143, No. 1, of the Civil Code, providing that the spouses are mutually obliged to
provide each other with support, cannot but be subordinate to the other provisions of said Code which
regulates the family organization and the duties of spouses not legally separated, among which duties are
those of their living together and mutually helping each other, as provided in article 56 of the aforementioned
code; and taking this for granted, the obligation of the spouse who has property to furnish support to the one
who has no property and is in need of it for subsistence, is to be understood as limited to the case where, in
accordance with law, their separation has been decreed, either temporarily or finally and this case, with
respect to the husband, cannot occur until a judgment of divorce is rendered, since, until then, if he is
culpable, he is not deprived of the management of his wife's property and of the product of the other
property belonging to the conjugal partnership; and

Considering that, should the doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it would allow married persons to
disregard the marriage bond and separate from each other of their own free will, thus establishing, contrary
to the legal provision contained in said article 56 of the Civil Code, a legal status entirely incompatible with
the nature and effects of marriage in disregard of the duties inherent therein and disturbing the unity of the
family, in opposition to what the law, in conformity with good morals, has established; and.

Considering that, as the spouses D. Ramon Benso and Doña Adela Galindo are not legally separated, it is
their duty to live together and afford each other help and support; and for this reason, it cannot be held that
the former has need of support from his wife so that he may live apart from her without the conjugal abode
where it is his place to be, nor of her conferring power upon him to dispose even of the fruits of her property
in order therewith to pay the matrimonial expenses and, consequently, those of his own support without
need of going to his wife; wherefore the judgment appealed from, denying the petition of D. Ramon Benso
for support, has not violated the articles of the Civil Code and the doctrine invoked in the assignments of
error 1 and 5 of the appeal.

From a careful reading of the case just cited and quoted from it appears quite clearly that the spouses separated
voluntarily in accordance with an agreement previously made. At least there are strong indications to this effect, for
the court says, "should the doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it would allow married persons to disregard the
marriage bond and separate from each other of their own free will." If this be the true basis upon which the supreme
court of Spain rested its decision, then the doctrine therein enunciated would not be controlling in cases where one
of the spouses was compelled to leave the conjugal abode by the other or where the husband voluntarily abandons
such abode and the wife seeks to force him to furnish support. That this is true appears from the decision of the
same high tribunal, dated October 16, 1903. In this case the wife brought an action for support against her husband
who had willfully and voluntarily abandoned the conjugal abode without any cause whatever. The supreme court,
reversing the judgment absolving the defendant upon the ground that no action for divorce, etc., had been instituted,
said:
 In the case at bar, it has been proven that it was Don Teodoro Exposito who left the conjugal abode,
although he claims, without however proving his contention, that the person responsible for this situation
was his wife, as she turned him out of the house. From this state of affairs it results that it is the wife who is
party abandoned, the husband not having prosecuted any action to keep her in his company and he
therefore finds himself, as long as he consents to the situation, under the ineluctable obligation to support
his wife in fulfillment of the natural duty sanctioned in article 56 of the Code in relation with paragraph 1 of
article 143. In not so holding, the trial court, on the mistaken ground that for the fulfillment of this duty the
situation or relation of the spouses should be regulated in the manner it indicates, has made the errors of
law assigned in the first three grounds alleged, because the nature of the duty of affording mutual support is
compatible and enforcible in all situations, so long as the needy spouse does not create any illicit situation of
the court above described. lawphil.net

If we are in error as to the doctrine enunciated by the supreme court of Spain in its decision of November 3, 1905,
and if the court did hold, as contended by counsel for the defendant in the case under consideration, that neither
spouse can be compelled to support the other outside of the conjugal abode, unless it be by virtue of a final
judgment granting the injured one a divorce or separation from the other, still such doctrine or holding would not
necessarily control in this jurisdiction for the reason that the substantive law is not in every particular the same here
as it is in Spain. As we have already stated, articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code in force in the Peninsula are not in
force in the Philippine Islands. The law governing the duties and obligations of husband and wife in this country are
articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870 .In Spain the complaining spouse has, under article 105 of the
Civil Code, various causes for divorce, such as adultery on the part of the wife in every case and on the part of the
husband when public scandal or disgrace of the wife results therefrom; personal violence actually inflicted or grave
insults: violence exercised by the husband toward the wife in order to force her to change her religion; the proposal
of the husband to prostitute his wife; the attempts of the husband or wife to corrupt their sons or to prostitute their
daughters; the connivance in their corruption or prostitution; and the condemnation of a spouse to perpetual chains
or hard labor, while in this jurisdiction the only ground for a divorce is adultery. (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3
Phil .Rep., 34, 45.) This positive and absolute doctrine was announced by this court in the case just cited after an
exhaustive examination of the entire subject. Although the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States and the judgment rendered by this court was there reversed, the reversal did not affect in any way or weaken
the doctrine in reference to adultery being the only ground for a divorce. And since the decision was promulgated by
this court in that case in December, 1903, no change or modification of the rule has been announced. It is,
therefore, the well settled and accepted doctrine in this jurisdiction.

But it is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is equivalent to granting divorce or separation, as it
necessitates a determination of the question whether the wife has a good and sufficient cause for living separate
from her husband; and, consequently, if a court lacks power to decree a divorce, as in the instant case, power to
grant a separate maintenance must also be lacking. The weakness of this argument lies in the assumption that the
power to grant support in a separate action is dependent upon a power to grant a divorce. That the one is not
dependent upon the other is apparent from the very nature of the marital obligations of the spouses. The mere act of
marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife. This obligation is founded not so much
on the express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an
obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not permit him to
terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. A judgment for
separate maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal
sense of the term, but rather a judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the
sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and the purity of the wife; as
where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting her. The pro tanto
separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an impeachment of that public policy by which
marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger policy overruling a weaker one;
and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a means of preserving the public peace and morals may
be considered, it does not in any respect whatever impair the marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife in
the situation of a feme sole.

The foregoing are the grounds upon which our short opinion and order for judgment, heretofore filed in this case,
rest.
2.) G.R. No. L-17014             August 11, 1921

MARIANO B. ARROYO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DOLORES C. VASQUEZ DE ARROYO, defendant-appellee.

Fisher & DeWitt for appellant.

Powell & Hill for appellee.

STREET, J.:

Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vasquez de Arroyo were united in the bonds of wedlock by marriage in the year
1910, and since that date, with a few short intervals of separation, they have lived together as man and wife in the
city of Iloilo until July 4, 1920, when the wife went away from their common home with the intention of living
thenceforth separate from her husband. After efforts had been made by the husband without avail to induce her to
resume marital relations, this action was initiated by him to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live
with him as a dutiful wife. The defendant answered, admitting the fact of marriage, and that she had left her
husband's home without his consent; but she averred by way of defense and cross-complaint that she had been
compelled to leave by cruel treatment on the part of her husband. Accordingly she in turn prayed for affirmative
relief, to consist of (1) a decree of separation; (2) a liquidation of the conjugal partnership; (3) and an allowance for
counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. Upon hearing the cause the lower court gave judgment in favor
of the defendant, authorizing her to live apart from her husband, granting her alimony at the rate of P400 per month,
and directing that the plaintiff should pay to the defendant's attorney the sum of P1,000 for his services to defendant
in the trial of the case. The plaintiff thereupon removed the case with the usual formalities by appeal to this court.

The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence before him, reached the conclusion that the husband was more
to blame than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient justification for her
abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of marital relations with him. We have carefully
examined and weighed every line of the proof, and are of the opinion that the conclusion stated is wholly untenable.
The evidence shows that the wife is afflicted with a disposition of jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated
degree; and to his cause are chiefly traceable without a doubt the many miseries that have attended their married
life. In view of the decision which we are to pronounce nothing will be said in this opinion which will make the
resumption of married relations more difficult to them or serve as a reminder to either of the mistakes of the past;
and we prefer to record the fact that so far as the proof in this record shows neither of the spouses has at any time
been guilty of conjugal infidelity, or has given just cause to the other to suspect illicit relations with any person. The
tales of cruelty on the part of the husband towards the wife, which are the basis of the cross-action, are in our
opinion no more than highly colored versions of personal wrangles in which the spouses have allowed themselves
from time to time to become involved and would have little significance apart from the morbid condition exhibited by
the wife. The judgment must therefore be recorded that the abandonment by her of the marital home was without
sufficient justification in fact.

In examining the legal questions involved, it will be found convenient to dispose first of the defendant's cross-
complaint. To begin with, the obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife is a duty
universally recognized in civil society and is clearly expressed in articles 142 and 143 of the Civil code. The
enforcement of this obligation by the wife against the husband is not conditioned upon the procurance of a divorce
by her, nor even upon the existence of a cause for divorce. Accordingly it had been determined that where the wife
is forced to leave the matrimonial abode and to live apart from her husband, she can, in this jurisdiction, compel him
to make provision for her separate maintenance (Goitia vs. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil., 252); and he may be required
to pay the expenses, including attorney's fees, necessarily incurred in enforcing such obligation,
(Mercado vs. Ostrand and Ruiz, 37 Phil., 179.) Nevertheless, the interests of both parties as well as of society at
large require that the courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance
of the wife, for this step involves a recognition of the de facto separation of the spouses — a state which is
abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all concerned. From this consideration it follows that provision should not
be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued cohabitation of the pair
has become impossible and separation necessary from the fault of the husband.
In Davidson vs Davidson, the Supreme Court of Michigan, speaking through the eminent jurist, Judge Thomas M.
Cooley, held that an action for the support of the wife separate from the husband will only be sustained when the
reasons for it are imperative (47 Mich., 151). That imperative necessity is the only ground on which such a
proceeding can be maintained also appears from the decision in Schindel vs. Schindel (12 Md., 294). In the State of
South Carolina, where judicial divorces have never been procurable on any ground, the Supreme court fully
recognizes the right of the wife to have provision for separate maintenance, where it is impossible for her to continue
safely to cohabit with her husband; but the same court has more than once rejected the petition of the wife for
separate maintenance where it appeared that the husband's alleged cruelty or ill-treatment was provoked by the
wife's own improper conduct. (Rhame vs. Rhame, 1 McCord's Chan. [S. Car.], 197; 16 Am. Dec., 597;
Boyd vs. Boyd, Har. Eq. [S. Car.], 144.)

Upon one occasion Sir William Scott, pronouncing the judgment of the English Ecclesiastical Court in a case where
cruelty on the part of the husband was relied upon to secure a divorce for the wife, made use of the following
eloquent words, — which are perhaps even more applicable in a proceeding for separate maintenance in a
jurisdiction where, as here, a divorce cannot be obtained except on the single ground of adultery and this, too, after
the conviction of the guilty spouse in a criminal prosecution for that crime. Said he:

That the duty of cohabitation is released by the cruelty of one of the parties is admitted, but the question
occurs, What is cruelty? . . .

What merely wounds the mental feelings is in few cases to be admitted where they are not accompanied
with bodily injury, either actual or menaced. Mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of
language, a want of civil attention and accommodation, even occasional sallies of passion, if they do not
threaten bodily harm, do not amount to legal cruelty: they are high moral offenses in the marriage-state
undoubtedly, not innocent surely in any state of life, but still they are not that cruelty against which the law
can relieve. Under such misconduct of either of the parties, for it may exist on the one side as well as on the
other, the suffering party must bear in some degree the consequences of an injudicious connection; must
subdue by decent resistance or by prudent conciliation; and if this cannot be done, both must suffer in
silence. . . .

The humanity of the court has been loudly and repeatedly invoked. Humanity is the second virtue of courts,
but undoubtedly the first is justice. If it were a question of humanity simply, and of humanity which confined
its views merely to the happiness of the present parties, it would be a question easily decided upon first
impressions. Everybody must feel a wish to sever those who wish to live separate from each other, who
cannot live together with any degree of harmony, and consequently with any degree of happiness; but my
situation does not allow me to indulge the feelings, much less the first feelings of an individual. The law has
said that married persons shall not be legally separated upon the mere disinclination of one or both to
cohabit together. . . .

To vindicate the policy of the law is no necessary part of the office of a judge; but if it were, it would not be
difficult to show that the law in this respect has acted with its usual wisdom and humanity with that true
wisdom, and that real humanity, that regards the general interests of mankind. For though in particular cases
the repugnance of the law to dissolve the obligations of matrimonial cohabitation may operate with great
severity upon individual, yet it must be carefully remembered that the general happiness of the married life is
secured by its indissolubility. When people understand that they must live together, except for a very few
reasons known to the law, they learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which they know cannot
shake off; they become good husbands and good wives form the necessity of remaining husbands and
wives; for necessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties which it imposes. . . . In this case, as in many
others, the happiness of some individuals must be sacrificed to the greater and more general good.
(Evans vs. Evans, 1 Hag. Con., 35; 161 Eng. Reprint, 466, 467.)

In the light of the considerations stated, it is obvious that the cross-complaint is not well founded and none of the
relief sought therein can be granted.

The same considerations that require the dismissal of the cross-complaint conclusively prove that the plaintiff,
Mariano B. Arroyo, has done nothing to forfeit his right to the marital society of his wife and that she is under an
obligation, both moral and legal, to return to the common home and cohabit with him. The only question which here
arises is as to the character and extent of the relief which may be properly conceded to him by judicial decree.
The action is one by which the plaintiff seeks the restitution of conjugal rights; and it is supposed in the petitory part
of the complaint that he is entitled to a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to return to the
conjugal home and live with him as a wife according to the precepts of law and morality. Of course if such a decree
were entered, in unqualified terms, the defendant would be liable to attachment for contempt, in case she should
refuse to obey it; and, so far as the present writer is aware, the question is raised for the first time in this jurisdiction
whether it is competent for the court to make such an order.

Upon examination of the authorities we are convinced that it is not within the province of the courts of this country to
attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the
property rights of one of the pair are invaled, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are
disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the
restitution of the purely personal rights of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose
than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and the experience of these countries where the court of
justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely
questionable. Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal
rights at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it that court would make a
mandatory decree, enforcible by process of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live
with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt
bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon vs. Weldon (9 P. D., 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen,
President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the
English law on the subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence,
equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse,
but could not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment against the practice,
the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of
conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an
order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.

In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can discover, has ever attempted
to make a peremptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife
was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The
decision referred to (Gahn vs. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana
similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not
been fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation
by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148.)

In a decision of January 2, 1909, the supreme court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order of the Audencia
Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do
so, to make a particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her
husband, as administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from
the property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11.) but it does not appear that this order
for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that
would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not appear that her
disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.

We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is entitled to the unconditional and absolute
order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint; though he
is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has presented herself without sufficient cause and
that it is her duty to return.

Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to the original complaint and the cross-bill, it is
declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the marital home without sufficient cause; and
she is admonished that it is her duty to return. The plaintiff is absolved from the cross-complaint, without special
pronouncement as to costs of either instance. So ordered.
3.) G.R. No. 139789. May 12, 2000

ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE and JANE
DOE, respondents. Mesm

G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000

POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss? The answer is
no. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of
habeas corpus.

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a
1 

person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. Slx

2 

"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the
prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his capture and detention, to do, submit to, and
receive whatsoever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf." 3

It is a high prerogative, common-law writ, of ancient origin, the great object of which is the liberation of those who
may be imprisoned without sufficient cause. It is issued when one is deprived of liberty or is wrongfully prevented
4 

from exercising legal custody over another person. 5

The petition of Erlinda K. Ilusorio is to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution dismissing the
6  7  8 

application for habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio and enforce
consortium as the wife.

On the other hand, the petition of Potenciano Ilusorio is to annul that portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals
9 

giving Erlinda K. Ilusorio visitation rights to her husband and to enjoin Erlinda and the Court of Appeals from
enforcing the visitation rights.

The undisputed facts are as follows: Scslx

Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.

Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many
years, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club.

On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a period of
thirty (30) years. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta
Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club
when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.

Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6) children, namely: Ramon Ilusorio (age 55); Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner
(age 52); Maximo (age 50); Sylvia (age 49); Marietta (age 48); and Shereen (age 39).

On December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from the United States, he stayed with Erlinda for about five (5)
months in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin), alleged that during this time, their mother gave
Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor in
New York, U.S.A. As a consequence, Potenciano’s health deteriorated.

On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City a petition for guardianship over the
10 

person and property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired
judgment.

On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo
City and instead lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati. Slxsc

On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of
lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that respondents refused petitioner’s demands to see and visit her husband
11 

and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City.

After due hearing, on April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered decision the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, judgment is hereby rendered:

"(1) Ordering, for humanitarian consideration and upon petitioner’s manifestation, respondents Erlinda K. Ilusorio
Bildner and Sylvia Ilusorio-Yap, the administrator of Cleveland Condominium or anywhere in its place, his guards
and Potenciano Ilusorio’s staff especially Ms. Aurora Montemayor to allow visitation rights to Potenciano Ilusorio’s
wife, Erlinda Ilusorio and all her children, notwithstanding any list limiting visitors thereof, under penalty of contempt
in case of violation of refusal thereof; xxx

"(2) ORDERING that the writ of habeas corpus previously issued be recalled and the herein petition for habeas
corpus be DENIED DUE COURSE, as it is hereby DISMISSED for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the
subject of the petition.

"SO ORDERED." 12

Hence, the two petitions, which were consolidated and are herein jointly decided.

As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which
13 

the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continues to
be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the
restraints are not merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has
later become arbitrary. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as
14 

the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Jksmä â Ó

15 

The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint,
and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. 16

To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of
action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.
17  18

The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s
liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or
under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on
age or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.

After due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no unlawful restraint on his liberty.

The Court of Appeals also observed that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio did not request the administrator of the
Cleveland Condominium not to allow his wife and other children from seeing or visiting him. He made it clear that he
did not object to seeing them.
As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s mental state, the Court of Appeals observed that he was of sound and alert mind,
having answered all the relevant questions to the satisfaction of the court.

Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial choices
revolve on his residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to some
of his family members but these are choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano. He made it clear before the
Court of Appeals that he was not prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration, and
absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have no reason to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.

With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation
rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run
against his fundamental constitutional right. Esä m

The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where
Erlinda never even prayed for such right. The ruling is not consistent with the finding of subject’s sanity.

When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also emphasized that the same shall be enforced under
penalty of contempt in case of violation or refusal to comply. Such assertion of raw, naked power is unnecessary.

The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the
right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to
do so without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.

No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be
enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a
matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice.

WHEREFORE, in G. R. No. 139789, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit. No costs.

In G. R. No. 139808, the Court GRANTS the petition and nullifies the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it
gives visitation rights to respondent Erlinda K. Ilusorio. No costs.
4.) G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the
Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's
effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this
ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case
of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision
in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his
frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to
resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision  of 1

the Court of Appeals  in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional
2

Trial Court of La Trinidad,  Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to
3

Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The Facts

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition
for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and
Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church  in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was
4

born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a
father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he
depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances,
resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in
Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a
very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from
her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and
their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically
incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some
individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have
their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from
the start.

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as
husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's
strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to
perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle
their finances.

During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:

1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine,
Manila;
 2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29,
1986;

3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;

4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;

5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;

6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.

Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and
Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist
of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1."
Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.

On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was
denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.

The Issue

In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation
of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect
application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the
most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."

In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied  heavily on the trial court's findings "that the
5

marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it
sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize
the application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:

As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range of

mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the
marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in
the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and
considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very
objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.

In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding
the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions
thus made.

Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of
their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of
performing such marital responsibilities and duties."

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals  this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological
6

incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo
Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of
Manila,  Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
7

antecedence, and (c) incurability."

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (nor physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each
other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability.
The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not
psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified: 8

COURT

Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it

is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q There is no hope for the marriage?

A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.

Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for
each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?

A Yes, Your Honor.

The Court has no more questions.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological
incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure
to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative,
homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent
psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the
beloved.

During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law
and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial
courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V.
Cruz,  Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
9

Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno,   a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this
10

occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral
argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the
fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,   recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
11

marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code   echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes the permanence,
12

inviolability and solidarity

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,   nevertheless such root cause must be
13

identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified
psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must
show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need
not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may
be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by
the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in
1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.  14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious
faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given
to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically
invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while
remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the
same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in
the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes
even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of
Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
5.) G.R. No. 122134             October 3, 2003

ROMANA LOCQUIAO VALENCIA and CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, petitioners,

vs.
BENITO A. LOCQUIAO, now deceased and substituted by JIMMY LOCQUIAO, TOMASA MARA and the
REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF PANGASINAN, respondents.

x----------------------------x

CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, petitioner,
vs.
BENITO A. LOCQUIAO, now deceased and substituted by JIMMY LOCQUIAO, respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The Old Civil Code and the Old Code of Civil Procedure, repealed laws that they both are notwithstanding, have not
1  2 

abruptly become mere quiescent items of legal history since their relevance do not wear off for a long time. Verily,
the old statutes proved to be decisive in the adjudication of the case at bar.

Before us is a petition for review seeking to annul and set aside the joint Decision dated November 24, 1994, as well
3 

as the Resolution dated September 8, 1995, of the former Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals in two
4  5 

consolidated cases involving an action for annulment of title and an action for ejectment.
6  7

Both cases involve a parcel of land consisting of 4,876 square meters situated in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. This land
was originally owned by the spouses Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao, as evidenced by Original Certificate of
Title No. 18383 issued on October 3, 1917 by the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan.
8 

On May 22, 1944, Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao executed a deed of donation propter nuptias which was
written in the Ilocano dialect, denominated as Inventario Ti Sagut in favor of their son, respondent Benito Locquiao
9 

(hereafter, respondent Benito) and his prospective bride, respondent Tomasa Mara (hereafter, respondent
Tomasa). By the terms of the deed, the donees were gifted with four (4) parcels of land, including the land in
question, as well as a male cow and one-third (1/3) portion of the conjugal house of the donor parents, in
consideration of the impending marriage of the donees.

The donees took their marriage vows on June 4, 1944 and the fact of their marriage was inscribed at the back of
O.C.T. No. 18383. 10

Herminigildo and Raymunda died on December 15, 1962 and January 9, 1968, respectively, leaving as heirs their
six (6) children, namely: respondent Benito, Marciano, Lucio, Emeteria, Anastacia, and petitioner Romana, all
surnamed Locquiao . With the permission of respondents Benito and Tomasa, petitioner Romana Valencia
11 

(hereinafter, Romana) took possession and cultivated the subject land. When respondent Romana’s husband got
12 

sick sometime in 1977, her daughter petitioner Constancia Valencia (hereafter, petitioner Constancia) took over,
and since then, has been in possession of the land. 13

Meanwhile, respondents Benito and Tomasa registered the Inventario Ti Sagut with the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Pangasinan on May 15, 1970. In due course, the original title was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer
14 

Certificate of Title No. 84897 was issued in the name of the respondents Benito and Tomasa.
15 

On March 18, 1973, the heirs of the Locquiao spouses, including respondent Benito and petitioner Romana,
executed a Deed of Partition with Recognition of Rights, wherein they distributed among only three (3) of them, the
16 

twelve (12) parcels of land left by their common progenitors, excluding the land in question and other lots disposed
of by the Locquiao spouses earlier. Contained in the deed is a statement that respondent Benito and Marciano
Locquiao, along with the heirs of Lucio Locquiao, "have already received our shares in the estates of our parents, by
virtue of previous donations and conveyances," and that for that reason the heirs of Lucio Locquaio were not made
parties to the deed. All the living children of the Locquaio spouses at the time, including petitioner Romana,
confirmed the previous dispositions and waived their rights to whomsoever the properties covered by the deed of
partition were adjudicated. 17

Later on, disagreements among five (5) heirs or groups of heirs, including petitioner Romana, concerning the
distribution of two (2) of the lots covered by the deed of partition which are Lots No. 2467 and 5567 of the Urdaneta
Cadastral Survey surfaced. As their differences were settled, the heirs concerned executed a Deed of Compromise
Agreement on June 12, 1976, which provided for the re-distribution of the two (2) lots. Although not directly involved
18 

in the discord, Benito signed the compromise agreement together with his feuding siblings, nephews and nieces.
Significantly, all the signatories to the compromise agreement, including petitioner Romana, confirmed all the other
stipulations and provisions of the deed of partition.
19

Sometime in 1983, the apparent calm pervading among the heirs was disturbed when petitioner Constancia filed an
action for annulment of title against the respondents before the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan. The record
20 

shows that the case was dismissed by the trial court but it does not indicate the reason for the dismissal.21

On December 13, 1983, respondent Benito filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan
a Complaint seeking the ejectment of petitioner Constancia from the subject property.
22 

On November 25, 1985, the Municipal Trial Court rendered a Decision, ordering the defendant in the case,
23 

petitioner Constancia, to vacate the land in question.

Petitioners Romana and Constancia countered with a Complaint for the annulment of Transfer Certificate of
24 

Title No. 84897 against respondents Benito and Tomasa  which they filed with the Regional Trial Court of
25 

Pangasinan on December 23, 1985. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of the transfer certificate of title was
fraudulent; that the Inventario Ti Sagut is spurious; that the notary public who notarized the document had no
authority to do so, and; that the donation did not observe the form required by law as there was no written
acceptance on the document itself or in a separate public instrument. 1a\^/phi1.net

Meanwhile, the decision in the ejectment case was appealed to the same RTC where the case for annulment of title
was also pending. Finding that the question of ownership was the central issue in both cases, the court issued
an Order suspending the proceedings in the ejectment case until it shall have decided the ownership issue in the
26 

title annulment case.

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dated January 30, 1989 dismissing the complaint for annulment of title on
27 

the grounds of prescription and laches. It likewise ruled that the Inventario Ti Sagut is a valid public document which
transmitted ownership over the subject land to the respondents. With the dismissal of the complaint and the
confirmation of the respondents’ title over the subject property, the RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC in
the ejectment case . 28 

Dissatisfied, petitioners elevated the two (2) decisions to the respondent Court of Appeals. Since they involve the
same parties and the same property, the appealed cases were consolidated by the appellate court.

On November 24, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision affirming the appealed RTC decisions.
The appellate court upheld the RTC’s conclusion that the petitioners’ cause of action had already prescribed,
considering that the complaint for annulment of title was filed more than fifteen (15) years after the issuance of the
title, or beyond the ten (10) - year prescriptive period for actions for reconveyance. It likewise rejected the
petitioners’ assertion that the donation propter nuptias is null and void for want of acceptance by the donee, positing
that the implied acceptance flowing from the very fact of marriage between the respondents, coupled with the
registration of the fact of marriage at the back of OCT No. 18383, constitutes substantial compliance with the
requirements of the law.

The petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution dated
29  30 

September 8, 1995. Hence, this petition.

We find the petition entirely devoid of merit.

Concerning the annulment case, the issues to be threshed out are: (1) whether the donation propter nuptias is
authentic; (2) whether acceptance of the donation by the donees is required; (3) if so, in what form should the
acceptance appear, and; (4) whether the action is barred by prescription and laches.

The Inventario Ti Sagut which contains the donation propter nuptias was executed and notarized on May 22, 1944.
It was presented to the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan for registration on May 15, 1970. The photocopy of the
document presented in evidence as Exhibit "8" was reproduced from the original kept in the Registry of Deeds of
Pangasinan. 31

The petitioners have launched a two-pronged attack against the validity of the donation propter nuptias, to wit: first,
the Inventario Ti Sagut is not authentic; and second, even assuming that it is authentic, it is void for the donee’s
failure to accept the donation in a public instrument.

To buttress their claim that the document was falsified, the petitioners rely mainly on the Certification dated July 9,
32 

1984 of the Records Management and Archives Office that there was no notarial record for the year 1944 of
Cipriano V. Abenojar who notarized the document on May 22, 1944 and that therefore a copy of the document was
not available.

The certification is not sufficient to prove the alleged inexistence or spuriousness of the challenged document. The
appellate court is correct in pointing out that the mere absence of the notarial record does not prove that the notary
public does not have a valid notarial commission and neither does the absence of a file copy of the document with
the archives effect evidence of the falsification of the document. This Court ruled that the failure of the notary
33 

public to furnish a copy of the deed to the appropriate office is a ground for disciplining him, but certainly
not for invalidating the document or for setting aside the transaction therein involved. 34

Moreover, the heirs of the Locquaio spouses, including petitioner Romana, made reference in the deed of partition
and the compromise agreement to the previous donations made by the spouses in favor of some of the heirs. As
pointed out by the RTC, respondent Benito was not allotted any share in the deed of partition precisely because he
35 

received his share by virtue of previous donations. His name was mentioned in the deed of partition only with
respect to the middle portion of Lot No. 2638 which is the eleventh (11th) parcel in the deed but that is the same
one-third (1/3) portion of Lot No. 2638 covered by O.C.T. No. 18259 included in the donation propter
nuptias.  Similarly, Marciano Locquiao and the heirs of Lucio Locquiao were not allocated any more share in the
1awphi1.nét

deed of partition since they received theirs by virtue of prior donations or conveyances.

The pertinent provisions of the deed of partition read:

That the heirs of Lucio Locquiao are not included in this Partition by reason of the fact that in the same manner as
we, BENITO and MARCIANO LOCQUIAO are concerned, we have already received our shares in the estate of
our parents by virtue of previous donations and conveyances, and that we hereby confirm said dispositions,
waiving our rights to whomsoever will these properties will now be adjudicated;

That we, the Parties herein, do hereby waive and renounce as against each other any claim or claims that we may
have against one or some of us, and that we recognize the rights of ownership of our co-heirs with respect to
those parcels already distributed and adjudicated and that in the event that one of us is cultivating or in
possession of any one of the parcels of land already adjudicated in favor of another heir or has been
conveyed, donated or disposed of previously, in favor of another heir, we do hereby renounce and waive our
right of possession in favor of the heir in whose favor the donation or conveyance was made
previously. (Emphasis supplied)
36 

The exclusion of the subject property in the deed of partition dispels any doubt as to the authenticity of the
earlier Inventario Ti Sagut.
This brings us to the admissibility of the Deed of Partition with Recognition of Rights, marked as Exhibit "2", and
the Deed of Compromise Agreement, marked as Exhibit "3".

The petitioners fault the RTC for admitting in evidence the deed of partition and the compromise agreement on the
pretext that the documents "were not properly submitted in evidence", pointing out that "when presented to
respondent Tomasa Mara for identification, she simply stated that she knew about the documents but she did not
actually identify them."
37

The argument is not tenable. Firstly, objection to the documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally
offered. Since the petitioners did not even bother to object to the documents at the time they were offered in
38 

evidence, it is now too late in the day for them to question their admissibility. Secondly, the documents were
39 

identified during the Pre-Trial, marked as Exhibits "2" and "3" and testified on by respondent Tomasa. Thirdly, the
40 

questioned deeds, being public documents as they were duly notarized, are admissible in evidence without further
proof of their due execution and are conclusive as to the truthfulness of their contents, in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. A public document executed and attested through the intervention of the
41 

notary public is evidence of the facts therein expressed in clear, unequivocal manner. 42

Concerning the issue of form, petitioners insist that based on a provision of the Civil Code of Spain (Old Civil Code),
43 

the acceptance by the donees should be made in a public instrument. This argument was rejected by the RTC and
the appellate court on the theory that the implied acceptance of the donation had flowed from the celebration of the
marriage between the respondents, followed by the registration of the fact of marriage at the back of OCT No.
18383.

The petitioners, the appellate court and the trial court all erred in applying the requirements on ordinary donations to
the present case instead of the rules on donation propter nuptias. Underlying the blunder is their failure to take into
account the fundamental dichotomy between the two kinds of donations.

Unlike ordinary donations, donations propter nuptias or donations by reason of marriage are those "made before its
celebration, in consideration of the same and in favor of one or both of the future spouses." The distinction is crucial
44 

because the two classes of donations are not governed by exactly the same rules, especially as regards the formal
essential requisites.

Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a public instrument in which the property
donated must be specifically described. However, Article 1330 of the same Code provides that "acceptance is not
45 

necessary to the validity of such gifts". In other words, the celebration of the marriage between the beneficiary
couple, in tandem with compliance with the prescribed form, was enough to effectuate the donation propter nuptias
under the Old Civil Code.

Under the New Civil Code, the rules are different. Article 127 thereof provides that the form of donations propter
nuptias are regulated by the Statute of Frauds. Article 1403, paragraph 2, which contains the Statute of Frauds
requires that the contracts mentioned thereunder need be in writing only to be enforceable. However, as provided in
Article 129, express acceptance "is not necessary for the validity of these donations." Thus, implied
acceptance is sufficient.

The pivotal question, therefore, is which formal requirements should be applied with respect to the donation propter
nuptias at hand. Those under the Old Civil Code or the New Civil Code?

It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not later
statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect. Consequently, it is the Old Civil Code
46 

which applies in this case since the donation propter nuptias was executed in 1944 and the New Civil Code took
effect only on August 30, 1950. The fact that in 1944 the Philippines was still under Japanese occupation is of no
47 

consequence. It is a well-known rule of the Law of Nations that municipal laws, as contra-distinguished from laws of
political nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty. This Court specifically held that during the Japanese
48 

occupation period, the Old Civil Code was in force. As a consequence, applying Article 1330 of the Old Civil Code
49 

in the determination of the validity of the questioned donation, it does not matter whether or not the donees had
accepted the donation. The validity of the donation is unaffected in either case.
Even the petitioners agree that the Old Civil Code should be applied. However, they invoked the wrong
provisions thereof.
50 

Even if the provisions of the New Civil Code were to be applied, the case of the petitioners would collapse just the
same. As earlier shown, even implied acceptance of a donation propter nuptias suffices under the New Civil Code. 51

With the genuineness of the donation propter nuptias and compliance with the applicable mandatory form
requirements fully established, petitioners’ hypothesis that their action is imprescriptible cannot take off.

Viewing petitioners’ action for reconveyance from whatever feasible legal angle, it is definitely barred by
prescription. Petitioners’ right to file an action for the reconveyance of the land accrued in 1944, when the Inventario
Ti Sagut was executed. It must be remembered that before the effectivity of the New Civil Code in 1950, the Old
Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) governed prescription. Under the Old Code of Civil Procedure, an action for
52 

recovery of the title to, or possession of, real property, or an interest therein, can only be brought within ten years
after the cause of such action accrues. Thus, petitioners’ action, which was filed on December 23, 1985, or more
53 

than forty (40) years from the execution of the deed of donation on May 22, 1944, was clearly time-barred.

Even following petitioners’ theory that the prescriptive period should commence from the time of discovery of the
alleged fraud, the conclusion would still be the same. As early as May 15, 1970, when the deed of donation was
registered and the transfer certificate of title was issued, petitioners were considered to have constructive
knowledge of the alleged fraud, following the jurisprudential rule that registration of a deed in the public real estate
registry is constructive notice to the whole world of its contents, as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included
therein. As it is now settled that the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of property allegedly registered
54 

through fraud is ten (10) years, reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title, the action filed on
55 

December 23, 1985 has clearly prescribed.

In any event, independent of prescription, petitioners’ action is dismissible on the ground of laches. The elements of
laches are present in this case, viz:

(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation that led to
the complaint and for which the complainant seeks a remedy;

(2) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, having had knowledge or notice of defendant’s conduct and
having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;

(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on
which he bases his suit, and

(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not
held barred. 56

Of the facts which support the finding of laches, stress should be made of the following: (a) the petitioners Romana
unquestionably gained actual knowledge of the donation propter nuptias when the deed of partition was executed in
1973 and the information must have surfaced again when the compromise agreement was forged in 1976, and; (b)
as petitioner Romana was a party-signatory to the two documents, she definitely had the opportunity to question the
donation propter nuptias on both occasions, and she should have done so if she were of the mindset, given the fact
that she was still in possession of the land in dispute at the time. But she did not make any move. She tarried for
eleven (11) more years from the execution of the deed of partition until she, together with petitioner Constancia, filed
the annulment case in 1985.

Anent the ejectment case, we find the issues raised by the petitioners to be factual and, therefore, beyond this
Court’s power of review. Not being a trier of facts, the Court is not tasked to go over the proofs presented by the
parties and analyze, assess, and weigh them to ascertain if the trial court and the appellate court were correct in
according them superior credit in this or that piece of evidence of one party or the other. In any event, implicit in the
57 

affirmance of the Court of Appeals is the existence of substantial evidence supporting the decisions of the courts
below.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the assailed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

6.) G.R. No. L-27939             October 30, 1928

FORTUNATA SOLIS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MAXIMA BARROSO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Mabanag and Primicias, Emiliano A. Ramos and Eugenio S. Estayo for appellants.
Turner, Rheberg and Sanchez for appellee.

AVANCEÑA, C. J.:

The spouses Juan Lambino and Maria A. Barroso begot three children named Alejo, Eugenia and Marciana
Lambino. On June 2, 1919 said spouses made a donation of propter nuptias of the lands described in the complaint
in favor of their son Alejo Lambino and Fortunata Solis in a private document (Exhibit A) in consideration of the
marriage which the latter were about to enter into. One of the conditions of this donation is that in case of the death
of one of the donees, one-half of these lands thus donated would revert to the donors while the surviving donee
would retain the other half. On the 8th of the said month of June 1919, Alejo Lambino and Fortunata Solis were
married and immediately thereafter the donors delivered the possession of the donated lands to them. On August 3,
1919 donee Alejo Lambino died. In the same year donor Juan Lambino also died. After the latter's death, his wife,
Maxima Barroso, recovered possession of the donated lands.

The surviving donee Fortunata Solis filed the action, which is the subject matter of this appeal, against the surviving
donor Maxima Barroso and Eugenia and Marcelina Lambino, heirs of the deceased donor Juan Lambino, with their
respective husbands, demanding of the defendants the execution of the proper deed of donation according to law,
transferring one-half of the donated property, and moreover, to proceed to the partition of the donated property and
its fruits.

The court rendered judgment based upon article 1279 of the Civil Code granting plaintiff's prayer and ordering the
defendants to execute a deed of donation in favor of the plaintiff, adequate in form and substance to transfer to the
latter the legal title to the part of the donated lands assigned to her in the original donation.

We are of the opinion that article 1279 of the Civil Code, relating to contracts, is not applicable to the present case.

We are concerned with a donation propter nuptias, which, according to article 1328 of the Civil Code, must be
governed by the rules established in Title II, Book III of this Code, on donations (articles 618 to 656), Article 633
provides that in order that a donation of real property may be valid, it must be made in a public instrument. This is
the article applicable to donation propter nuptias in so far as its formal validity is concerned. The only exceptions to
this rule are onerous and remuneratory donations, in so far as they do not exceed the value of the charge imposed,
which are then governed by the rules on contracts (art. 622), and those which are to take effect upon the donor's
death, which are governed by the rules established for testamentary successions (art. 620).

We have, therefore, a donation propter nuptias which is not valid and did not create any right, since it was not made
in a public instrument, and hence, article 1279 of the Civil Code which the lower court applied is not applicable
thereto. The last named article provides that, should the law require the execution of an instrument or any other
special form in order to make the obligations of a contract effective, the contracting parties may compel each other
to comply with such formality from the moment that consent has been given, and the other requirements for the
validity of the contract exist. Suffice it to state that this article refers to contracts and is inapplicable to the donation in
question which must be governed by the rules on donations. It may further be noted, at first sight, that this article
presupposes the existence of a valid contract and cannot possibly refer to the form required in order to make it valid,
which it already has, but rather to that required simply to make it effective, and for this reason, it would, at all events,
be inapplicable to the donation in question, wherein the form is required precisely to make it valid.  1awph!l.net

But the lower court states in its judgment that the present donation is onerous, and pursuant to article 622 of the
Civil Code must be governed by the rules on contracts. This opinion is not well founded. Donations for valuable
consideration, as may be inferred from article 619 of the Civil Code, are such as compensate services which
constitute debts recoverable from the donor, or which impose a charge equal to the amount of the donation upon
the donee, neither of which is true of the present donation, which was made only in consideration of marriage. The
lower court insists that, by the fact that this is a donation propter nuptias, it is based upon the marriage as a
consideration, and must be considered onerous. Neither is this opinion well founded. In donations propter nuptias,
the marriage is really a consideration, but not in the sense of being necessary to give birth to the obligation. This
may be clearly inferred from article 1333, which makes the fact that the marriage did not take place a cause for the
revocation of such donations, thus taking it for granted that there may be a valid donation propter nuptias, even
without marriage, since that which has not existed cannot be revoked. And such a valid donation would be forever
valid, even if the marriage never took place, if the proper action for revocation were not instituted, or if it were
instituted after the lapse of the statutory period of prescription. This is, so because the marriage in a
donation propter nuptias is rather a resolutory condition which, as such, presupposes the existence of the obligation
which may be resolved or revoked, and it is not a condition necessary for the birth of the obligation.

The judgment appealed from is reversed and the defendants are hereby absolved from the complaint, without
special pronouncement of costs. So ordered.
7.) G.R. No. L-26270            October 30, 1969

BONIFACIA MATEO, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
GERVASIO LAGUA, ET AL., respondents.

Pedro P. Tuason for petitioners.

Isaiah Asuncion for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals (In CA-G.R. Nos. 30064-R and 30065-R), raising
as only issue the correctness of the appellate court's reduction of a donation propter nuptias, for being inofficious.

The established facts of this case are as follows:

Cipriano Lagua was the original registered owner of 3 parcels of land situated in Asingan, Pangasinan, referred to
as Lot No. 998, with an area of 11,080 sq.m., more or less and covered by O.C.T. No. 362; Lot No. 6541, with an
area of 808 sq.m., more or less, covered by O.C.T. No. 6618; and Lot No. 5106, with an area of 3,303 sq.m.,
covered by O.C.T. No. 8137. Sometime in 1917, Lagua and his wife Alejandra Dumlao, in a public instrument,
donated Lots 998 and 6541 to their son Alejandro Lagua, in consideration of the latter's marriage to Bonifacia
Mateo. The marriage was celebrated on 15 May 1917, and thereafter, the couple took possession of the properties,
but the Certificates of Title remained in the donor's name.

In 1923, the son, Alejandro, died. His widow, Bonifacia Mateo, and her infant daughter lived with her father-in-law,
Cipriano Lagua, who then undertook the farming of the donated lots. It seems that at the start, Cipriano Lagua was
giving to Bonifacia the owner's share of the harvest from the land. In 1926, however, Cipriano refused to deliver the
said share, thus prompting Bonifacia to resort to the Justice of the Peace Court of Asingan, Pangasinan, from where
she obtained a judgment awarding to her possession of the two lots plus damages.

On 31 July 1941, Cipriano Lagua, executed a deed of sale of the same two parcels of land in favor of his younger
son, Gervasio. This sale notwithstanding, Bonifacia Mateo was continuously given the owner's share of the harvest
until 1956, when it was altogether stopped. It was only then that Bonifacia Mateo learned of the sale of the lots to
her brother-in-law, who had the sale in his favor registered only on 22 September 1955. As a consequence, TCT
Nos. 19152 and 19153 of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan were issued to Gervasio.

Bonifacia Mateo and her daughter, Anatalia, assisted by her husband, Luis Alcantara, went to the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan (Civil Case No. T-339), seeking annulment of the deed of sale in favor of Gervasio Lagua
and for recovery of possession of the properties. On 3 January 1957, judgment was rendered in the case —

... declaring the sale executed by Cipriano Lagua in favor of the other defendants, Gervasio Lagua and
Sotera Casimero, as null and void and non-existent; ordering the Register of Deeds for the Province of
Pangasinan, to cancel Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 19152 and 19153; condemning the defendants to
pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs the sum of P200.00; ordering the defendants Gervasio Lagua and
Sotera Lagua to vacate and deliver the possession over the two parcels of land to the plaintiffs, and to pay
the costs of this suit.

The decision became final, and Bonifacia Mateo, and her daughter, Anatalia Lagua, were installed in possession of
the land.

On 18 August 1957, the spouses Gervasio Lagua and Sotera Casimero commenced in the Justice of the Peace
Court of Asingan, Pangasinan, an action against Bonifacia Mateo and her daughter for reimbursement of the
improvements allegedly made by them on Lots 998 and 6541, plus damages. Dismissed by the Justice of the Peace
Court for being barred by the judgment in Civil Case No. T-339, therein plaintiffs appealed to the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. T-433. At about the same time, another
case was filed, this time by Gervasio Lagua and Cipriano Lagua, for annulment of the donation of the two lots,
insofar as one-half portion thereof was concerned (civil Case No. T-442). It was their claim that in donating the two
lots, which allegedly were all that plaintiff Cipriano Lagua owned, said plaintiff not only neglected leaving something
for his own support but also prejudiced the legitime of his forced heir, plaintiff Gervasio Lagua.

Being intimately related, the two cases were heard jointly. On November 12, 1958, while the cases were pending
final resolution, plaintiff Cipriano Lagua died. On 23 December 1960, the court rendered a single decision
dismissing Civil Case No. T-433 for lack of cause of action, plaintiffs spouses Gervasio Lagua and Sotera Casimero
having been declared possessors in bad faith in Civil Case No. T-339 and, therefore, not entitled to any
reimbursement of the expenses and improvements put up by them on the land. The other suit, Civil Case No. T-442,
was, likewise, dismissed on the ground of prescription, the action to annul the donation having been brought only in
1958, or after the lapse of 41 years. Defendants' counterclaims were similarly dismissed although they were
awarded attorneys' fees in the sum of P150.00.

Plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. Nos. 30064 and 30065-R). Said tribunal, on 18
March 1966, affirmed the ruling of the trial court in Civil Case No. T-433 denying plaintiffs' claim for reimbursement
of the improvements said to have been made on the land. In regard to the annulment case (C.F.I. No. T-442),
however, the Court of Appeals held that the donation to Alejandro Lagua of the 2 lots with a combined area of
11,888 square meters execeeded by 494.75 square meters his (Alejandro's) legitime and the disposable portion that
Cipriano Lagua could have freely given by will, and, to the same extent prejudiced the legitime of Cipriano's other
heir, Gervasio Lagua. The donation was thus declared inofficious, and defendants-appellees were ordered to
reconvey to plaintiff Gervasio Lagua a portion of 494.15 square meters to be taken from any convenient part of the
lots. The award of attorneys' fees to the defendants was also eliminated for lack of proper basis.

Bonifacia Mateo, et al., then resorted to this Court, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it
ordered them to reconvey a portion of the lots to herein respondent Gervasio Lagua. It is petitioners' contention that
(1) the validity of the donation proper nuptias having been finally determined in Civil Case No. T-339, any question
in derogation of said validity is already barred; (2) that the action to annul the donation, filed in 1958, or 41 years
after its execution, is abated by prescription; (3) that a donation proper nuptias is revocable only for any of the
grounds enumerated in Article 132 of the new Civil Code, and inofficiousness is not one of thorn; and (4) that in
determining the legitime of the Lagua brothers in the hereditary estate of Cipriano Lagua, the Court of Appeals
should have applied the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889, and not Article 888 of the new Civil Code.

Petitioners' first two assigned errors, it may be stated, are non-contentious issues that have no bearing in the actual
controversy in this case. All of them refer to the validity of the donation — a matter which was definitively settled in
Civil Case No. T-339 and which, precisely, was declared by the Court of Appeals to be "beyond the realm of judicial
inquiry." In reality, the only question this case presents is whether or not the Court of Appeals acted correctly in
ordering the reduction of the donation for being inofficious and in ordering herein petitioners to reconvey to
respondent Gervasio Lagua an unidentified 494.75 square-meter portion of the donated lots.

We are in accord with the Court of Appeals that Civil Case No. 442 is not one exclusively for annulment or
revocation of the entire donation, but of merely that portion thereof allegedly trenching on the legitime of respondent
Gervasio Lagua;1 that the cause of action to enforce Gervasio's legitime, having accrued only upon the death of his
father on 12 November 1958, the dispute has to be governed by the pertinent provisions of the new Civil Code; and
that a donation proper nuptias property may be reduced for being inofficious. Contrary to the views of appellants
(petitioners), donations proper nuptias (by reason of marriage) are without onerous consideration, the marriage
being merely the occasion or motive for the donation, not its causa. Being liberalities, they remain subject to
reduction for inofficiousness upon the donor's death, if they should infringe the legitime of a forced heir.2

It is to be noted, however, that in rendering the judgment under review, the Court of Appeals acted on several
unsupported assumptions: that the three (3) lots mentioned in the decision (Nos. 998, 5106 and 6541) were
the only properties composing the net hereditary estate of the deceased Cipriano Lagua; that Alejandro Lagua and
Gervasio Lagua were his only legal heirs; that the deceased left no unpaid debts, charges, taxes, etc., for which the
estate would be answerable.3 In the computation of the heirs' legitime, the Court of Appeals also considered only the
area, not the value, of the properties.

The infirmity in the above course of action lies in the fact that in its Article 908 the new Civil Code specifically
provides as follows:
 ART. 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be
considered, deducting all debts, and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will.

To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the testator that are
subject to collation, at the time he made them.

In other words, before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is
necessary that certain steps be taken first. The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting an
payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death;
then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitimes of
the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation
had prejudiced the legitimes. Certainly, in order that a donation may be reduced for being inofficious, there must be
proof that the value of the donated property exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the donee's share as
legitime in the properties of the donor.4 In the present case, it can hardly be said that, with the evidence then before
the court, it was in any position to rule on the inofficiousness of the donation involved here, and to order its reduction
and reconveyance of the deducted portion to the respondents.

FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals, insofar as Civil Case No. 442 of
the court a quo is concerned, is hereby set aside and the trial court's order of dismissal sustained, without prejudice
to the parties' litigating the issue of inofficiousness in a proper proceeding, giving due notice to all persons interested
in the estate of the late Cipriano Lagua. Without costs.
 8.) [ G.R. No. 188666. December 14, 2017 ]
SPOUSES JUAN AND ANTONINA CANO, ROLANDO CANO AND JOSEPHINE "JOSIE" CANO-
AQUINO, PETITIONERS, V. SPOUSES ARTURO AND EMERENCIANA CANO, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. No. 190750, December 14, 2017]

SPOUSES JUAN CANO AND ANTONINA SORIANO-CANO, PETITIONERS, V. SPOUSES

ARTURO CANO AND EMERENCIANA DACASIN, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
These consolidated Petitions for Review involve a dispute over possession and ownership of a parcel of land located in the Barrio of
Palaming, City of San Carlos, Pangasinan. Petitioners Juan and Antonina Cano anchor their claim upon a donation propter
nuptias allegedly made by Feliza[1] Baun in their favor in 1962. Respondents Arturo and Emerenciana Cano, on the other hand, claim
that they purchased the land from Feliza in 1982 and caused the annotation of the Deed of Absolute Sale on the Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 62276 covering the property.
The Petition in G.R. No. 188666 assails the Decision[2] and the Resolution[3] of the Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 104200, which affirmed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Resolution[4] ordering petitioners to vacate the property and
surrender possession thereof to respondents. Meanwhile, the Petition in G.R. No. 190750 questions the CA Decision[5] and the
Resolution,[6] which affirmed the RTC Decision[7] confirming respondents' ownership of the property. The factual background and the
proceedings held in each case will be discussed in turn.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
G.R. No. 188666
(Ejectment Case)
On 16 November 1999, respondents filed a Complaint for Ejectment with Prayer for Injunction[8] against petitioners on the basis of a
Deed of Absolute Sale[9] executed in the former's favor by Feliza, the registered owner of the property. Immediately after the sale,
respondents allegedly (1) took possession of the land;[10] (2) employed a relative to act as caretaker thereof;[11] and (3) received the fruit
of the mango trees planted thereon.[12]

Respondents also asserted that they benevolently allowed petitioners to take actual possession of the property after the sale because
the parties were all blood relatives.[13] This peaceful arrangement continued until 3 October 1999, the day petitioners allegedly harassed
and threw stones at the individuals hired by respondents to spray the mango trees with chemical fruit inducers.[14] This act of ingratitude
supposedly prompted respondents to send petitioners a demand letter to vacate the property.[15]

Because the demand to vacate went unheeded, respondents filed an ejectment complaint before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) of San Carlos City, Pangasinan.[16] They prayed for (a) an order directing petitioners to vacate the property and pay moral
damages and attorney's fees to the former;[17] and (b) an injunction to restrain petitioners from performing acts that would disturb or
harass respondents or the latter's agents in violation of their right of ownership and possession over the property.[18]

In an Answer with Affirmative and/or Special Defenses and Counterclaim,[19] petitioners denied the allegations in the Complaint. They
claimed ownership of the property on the basis of (1) a donation propter nuptias[20] executed in their favor by Feliza on 30 May 1962;
and (2) their continuous possession of the land since they were born, or for more than 63 years at the time of the filing of the suit for
ejectment.[21] They also asserted that the Deed of Absolute Sale cited by respondents was a falsified instrument.[22]

The MTCC Ruling

In a Decision[23] dated 21 February 2000, the MTCC dismissed the Complaint for lack of merit. Citing an Ocular Inspection Report
submitted by the sheriff who investigated the disputed property, the court noted that three semi-concrete houses owned by petitioners,
as well as several mango trees, were standing on the land. These improvements were considered as evidence of laches on the part of
respondents and justified the dismissal of the Complaint:

Plaintiffs['] failure to raise a restraining arm to the defendants' introduction of several improvements on the disputed property in a span
of almost eighteen (18) years is simply contrary to their claim of ownership.

Thus, the plaintiffs['] long inaction or passivity in asserting their alleged rights over the disputed property will preclude them from
recovering the same under the equitable principle of laches.

xxxx

If, indeed the plaintiffs are very assertive of their claim of ownership over the disputed property, they should have filed a judicial action
for recovery of possession or ejectment before or at the time of the construction of two (2) additional houses of defendant Juan Cano's
children, namely defendants Rolando Cano and Josie Aquino, and NOT merely paying realty taxes and securing Tax Declarations, only
on December 22, 1999 considering that tax receipts and tax declarations are only prima facie evidence of ownership and possession
(Heirs of Leopoldo Vencilao, Sr., et al. vs. CA, April 1, 1998).[24]
As to the issue of ownership, the MTCC ruled in favor of petitioners. It upheld the validity of the donation propter nuptias in view of the
absence of a declaration by a proper forum that the instrument was null and void[25] and the lack of evidence that Feliza was indeed
incapable of signing her name on the instrument of donation.[26]
The following circumstances were likewise deemed consistent with the claim of ownership by petitioners: (a) their payment of realty
taxes on the property; (b) the continued registration of the title to the property in the name of their mother, Feliza; and (c) the execution
of the donation propter nuptias prior to the Deed of Sale.[27]

The RTC Ruling

While the RTC initially affirmed the MTCC Decision and considered the claim of respondents barred by laches,[28] it subsequently
reversed its own ruling. In a Resolution dated 27 May 2008,[29] the RTC declared respondents as the true owners of the property on
account of the registered Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor. This instrument was considered as evidence of a preferred right as
against petitioners' claim based on an unregistered donation propter nuptias:

The Court notes that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed in favor of plaintiffs-appellants over the portion pertaining to Felisa Baun is
registered on the title itself. This registration is proof of their ownership over the land, the purpose of which is to quiet title to land and to
put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title. Not only that, the annotation on the said title says that that portion pertaining
to the share of Felisa Baun is tenanted by plaintiff-appellant[,] Arturo Cano. Clearly, plaintiff-appellant, before and at the time he was
ousted by the defendants-appellees, was in possession of the property, first as a tenant prior to 1982 and as the owner thereof from
1982 onwards.

Indeed, as provided under Section 51, 2nd paragraph, P.D. 1529, "the act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect
the [l]and insofar as third parties are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the
Registrar of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies." As between the two transactions, the donation and the sale,
respectively, concerning the subject parcel of land in the name of Felisa Baun, plaintiffs-appellants who have registered the sale in their
favor [have] a preferred right over the defendants-appellees who have not registered their title.[30]

The CA Ruling
On appeal,[31] the CA upheld the RTC ruling and declared that the registered transaction should prevail over the earlier unregistered
right:[32]

It is not contested that the property in question is a registered land with Original Certificate of Title No. 62276. It is also uncontested that
the sale in favor of respondents herein have been annotated on the title. On the other hand, the purported Donation Propter Nuptias in
favor of petitioners herein has not been annotated in the Title of the property subject of this case.

xxxx

Clearly, as between the Deed of Sale in favor of respondents herein that is annotated in the title and the donation in favor of petitioners,
the effective and binding transfer is that covered by the Deed of Sale.[33]
The CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners,[34] prompting them to file the Petition for Review in G.R. No 188666.
[35]

Proceedings before the Court

Before this Court, petitioners contend that the non-registration of the donation propter nuptias in their favor does not make their claim
inferior to that of respondents.[36] Citing Article 749 of the Civil Code, the petitioners argue that donations of immovable property are
considered valid so long as these are made in a public document.[37] They also claim that registration does not vest ownership over any
particular property, but is merely an evidence of title thereto.[38] Moreover, registration was supposedly unnecessary in this case,
because respondents were "manifestly aware of the petitioners' existing interest in the property, albeit not registered,"[39] as petitioners
were in possession of the property at the time it was allegedly purchased.[40]

Petitioners also emphasize that the donation propter nuptias was executed by Feliza 20 years before the alleged execution of the Deed
of Absolute Sale.[41] Assuming that she had agreed to the sale, this second transaction conveyed nothing to respondents.[42] Finally,
petitioners assert that even if the donation propter nuptias is assumed to be invalid, they still have a better right over the property as
they have already established their ownership by virtue of acquisitive prescription.[43]

In their Comment,[44] respondents deny the allegation that they were aware of petitioners' claim over the property at the time they
purchased it.[45] They also assert that after they had purchased the lot, they had the Tax Declarations transferred to their names, and
that they henceforth paid the realty taxes thereon up to the present.[46] Respondents likewise pray for the dismissal of the Petition for
raising factual issues that have already been resolved by the lower courts.[47]

During the pendency of G.R. No. 188666, a second Petition docketed as G.R. No. 190750 was filed before this Court. As will be
discussed, the second case involves the same property and the same parties, but pertains specifically to the issue of ownership.

G.R. No. 190750

(Quieting of Title Case)
The dispute in G.R. No. 190750 stemmed from a Complaint for Quieting of Title, Declaration of Nullity of Document, Ownership and
Damages[48] filed by petitioners with the RTC of San Carlos City, Pangasinan.[49] The suit was instituted while the ejectment case in G.R.
No. 188666 was pending.

In the Complaint, petitioners claimed absolute ownership over the subject property citing the donation propter nuptias executed in their
favour,[50] as well as their possession of the land since 1962. They further alleged that the quieting of title was necessary, because
respondents were claiming ownership of the same lot on the basis of a spurious and simulated deed of sale.
In their Sworn Answer,[51] respondents sought the dismissal of the Complaint on the following grounds: (1) failure to comply with a
condition precedent, i.e., the conduct of barangay  conciliation proceedings; (2) forum shopping; (3) laches; (4) prescription; and (5)
failure to state a cause of action.[52] They also asserted that the signature of Feliza on the instrument of donation was spurious,
considering that she did not know how to write and could only affix her thumbmark to legal documents.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[53] dated 27 May 2008, the RTC declared respondents the rightful owners of the property.[54] While affirming the validity of
both the donation propter nuptias made in favor of petitioners and the Deed of Absolute Sale presented by respondents, the trial court
declared that the sale prevailed over the donation because of the operative fact of registration.[55] The RTC explained:
The formalities required by law having been established on the two (2) documents (Donation Propter Nuptias for the plaintiffs and Deed
of Absolute Sale for the defendants), We now proceed to determine which between these documents prevails over the other. The Court
finds the right of the defendants superior over that of the plaintiffs.

Section 51, 2nd paragraph, P.D. 1529 provides, "the act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as
third persons are concerned and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Registrar of Deeds for
the province or city where the land lies.
It is settled in this jurisdiction that the maxim "Prior est in tempore. Potior est injure." (He who is first in time is preferred in right) is
observed in land registration matters. As between the two transactions, the donation and the sale, respectively, concerning the subject
parcel of land in the name of Felisa Baun, the defendants who have registered the sale in their favor have a preferred right over the
plaintiffs have not registered their title, even if the latter are in actual possession of the property involved.[56]
The RTC also noted that respondents presented sufficient evidence to prove their possession of the property since 1982, while
petitioners failed to submit proof in support of the latter's claim of ownership and occupancy:

Moreover, as established by evidence, the house on which plaintiffs stay was once the ancestral house of the family of Felissa Baun. It
was likewise the only house standing on the land in question until the dispute between the parties arose in 1999. The annotation on
TCT no. 62276 in 1982 that defendant Arturo Cano is the tenant of the subject parcel of land would show that indeed it was defendant
Arturo Cano who possessed and took care of the land prior to the said year until he purchased the same in 1982. Defendants, after the
sale[,] had declared the subject property for taxation purposes in their names. Likewise, from 1982 up to 2005, defendants religiously
paid the realty tax due from (sic) the subject property. Their possession however was disturbed in 1999, the year he was disallowed
entry by the plaintiffs. Aside from defendants' registered ownership over the parcel of land in question, the tax declaration and annual
tax payments bolster the fact of their ownership of the subject lot.

Plaintiffs on the other hand failed to present evidence that indeed they are the legitimate owners of the subject parcel of land. Except
for their present possession of the subject property, they and their children failed to present evidence that the subject land and the
improvements, particularly the houses standing thereon, are declared in their names. They also failed to present any documentary
evidence to prove payment of taxes due from the property.[57]
On the basis of its determination that respondents were the rightful owners of the property, the RTC declared that they had the right to
possess it.[58] Moreover, since petitioners were staying on the property by the mere tolerance of the real owners, the trial court ruled that
it was incumbent upon them to vacate the land[59] and to pay respondents for actual damages caused by the dispossession.[60]

The CA Ruling
Petitioners sought the reversal of the RTC Decision, but the CA dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.[61] The appellate court agreed
with the trial court's ruling that respondents were the rightful owners of the property, albeit on a different ground; that is, the invalidity of
the donation propter nuptias executed by Feliza in their favor:

The document captioned as Donation Property Nuptias does not show that plaintiffs-appellants, as the donees, accepted the subject
parcel of land as a gift from the donor. Neither have the plaintiffs-appellants presented any other document that would evidence such
acceptance and notification to the donor. Hence, it is our considered view that the ownership over the subject parcel of land did not
pass to plaintiffs appellants by reason of their failure to accept the donation as required by law. And, by necessary consequence,
considering that Felisa retained the ownership over the subject parcel of land, she can validly sell the same, as she did in 1982, in favor
of defendants-appellees.[62] (Emphases omitted)
The CA also emphasized that respondents were purchasers in good faith, as there was nothing in OCT No. 62276 itself or in the
circumstances of the sale that could have warned them that the property was being claimed by others:

[E]very person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of its certificate of title and the law will not oblige him to
go beyond what appears on the face thereof to determine the condition of the property. This rule applies to defendants-appellees who
are purchasers in good faith of the subject parcel of land. There was nothing in TCT No. 62276 or the circumstances surrounding the
subject parcel of land that could have warned or made them suspicious that other persons have a claim over the land. At the time they
purchased the subject parcel of land in 1982, the same remains covered by TCT No. 62276 in the name of Felisa, and her co-owners,
and the donation of the land by Felisa to plaintiffs-appellants does not appear in said TCT. Likewise, as the trial court found based on
the evidence on record, only the ancestral house of Felisa was standing on the subject parcel of land at the time the latter sold it to
defendants-appellees. In view thereof, the reliance of defendants-appellees on TCT No. 62276 when they purchased the subject parcel
of land is supported by law. We also find no defect in the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Felisa and defendants-appellees, which
effected the transfer of ownership of the subject parcel of land from the former to the latter.[63]
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Decision, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution dated 14 December 2009.[64]
Proceedings before this Court
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review before this Court[65] seeking the reversal of the above CA Decision and Resolution. They contend
that the CA erred in declaring the donation propter nuptias invalid on the ground of lack of acceptance by the donee. It allegedly made
that declaration even if the applicable provisions of the Civil Code did not impose that requirement.[66] They assert that since the
donation had been validly made, Feliza sold nothing to respondents in 1982, as she had already divested herself of ownership over that
same property in 1962.[67]
The Comment[68] filed by respondents on the Petition in G.R. No. 190750 raises substantially the same arguments as those found in
their Comment in G.R. No. 188666.
Consolidation of Cases
Considering that the two Petitions involved identical parties litigating over the same property, the two cases were consolidated by the
Court in a Resolution[69] dated 17 March 2010. Petitioners were thereafter ordered to file a consolidated reply to the Comments filed in
both petitions.[70]
In their Consolidated Reply,[71] petitioners point out that the two cases involve not only the issue of possession, but also of ownership.
[72]
 Consequently, they argue that the findings of the lower courts on possession were not controlling in this case.[73] They also reiterate
their arguments on the validity of the donation in their favor.[74]
ISSUES
The consolidated Petitions present the following issues for resolution:

(1) Whether the CA erred in nullifying the donation propter nuptias executed by Feliza in favor of petitioners because of the absence of
an express acceptance by the donee
(2) Whether the CA erred in declaring that respondents are the rightful owners of the property

(3) Whether the CA erred in awarding the possession of the property to respondents

OUR RULING
We DENY the Petitions.
While we disagree with certain pronouncements of the CA in respect of the validity of donations propter nuptias, we affirm its ultimate
conclusion that respondents are the rightful owners of the property and are consequently entitled to possession thereof.

Written acceptance and notification to the donor are

not required for donations propter nuptias executed
under the Civil Code.
Disposing of preliminary matter, we clarify our position with respect to the pronouncement of the CA in G.R. No. 190750 that the
donation propter nuptias executed in favor of petitioners was invalid.

In the CA Decision affirming the RTC ruling in the action for quieting of title, the appellate court invalidated the donation propter
nuptias because of petitioners' failure to comply with the formal requirement of acceptance. The CA explained:

When applied to a donation of an immovable property, the law further requires that the donation be made in a public
document and that the acceptance thereof be made in the same deed or in a separate public instrument; in cases where the
acceptance is made in a separate instrument, it is mandated that the donor be notified thereof in an authentic form, to be
noted in both instruments. The acceptance of the donation by the done is indispensable. Where the deed of donation fails to
show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is either not given to the
donor or else not noted in the deed of donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.

The document captioned as Donation Propter Nuptias does not show that plaintiffs-appellants, as the donees, accepted the subject
parcel of land as a gift from the donor. Neither have plaintiffs-appellants presented any other document that would evidence such
acceptance and notification to the donor. Hence, it is our considered view that the ownership over the subject parcel of land did not
pass to plaintiffs-appellants by reason of their failure to accept the donation as required by law. And, by necessary
consequence, considering that Felisa retained the ownership over the subject parcel of land, she can validly sell the same, as
she did in 1982, in favor of defendants-appellees. [75] (Emphases in the original)

We note that petitioners do not deny that they never accepted the donation in their favor. They insist, though, that acceptance of the gift
was not required, since the donation propter nuptias was executed on 30 May 1962, or while the Civil Code was still in effect.[76] Thus,
they contend that the CA erred in applying the ordinary rules of donation to the instrument herein,[77] when the applicable provisions
were in fact Articles 126 to 134 of the Civil Code.

We agree with petitioners on this point.

It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto.[78] The donation propter nuptias in this
case was executed on 30 May 1962,[79] while the provisions on such donations under the Civil Code were still in force and before the
Family Code took effect on 3 August 1988. The formal requisites for the validity of the donation should therefore be determined in
accordance with the following provisions of the Civil Code:

ARTICLE 126. Donations by reason of marriage are those which are made before its celebration, in consideration of the same and in
favor of one or both of the future spouses.

ARTICLE 127. These donations are governed by the rules on ordinary donations established in Title III of Book III, except as to their
form which shall be regulated by the Statute of Frauds; and insofar as they are not modified by the following articles.

ARTICLE 129. Express acceptance is not necessary for the validity of these donations.

In Valencia v. Locquiao,[80] we explained the effect of these Civil Code provisions on the formal requirements for donations propter
nuptias:

Unlike ordinary donations, donations propter nuptias or donations by reason of marriage are those "made before its celebration, in
consideration of the same and in favor of one or both of the future spouses." The distinction is crucial because the two classes of
donations are not governed by exactly the same rules, especially as regards the formal essential requisites.
xxxx

Under the New Civil Code, the rules are different. Article 127 thereof provides that the form of donations propter nuptias are [sic]
regulated by the Statute of Frauds. Article 1403, paragraph 2, which contains the Statute of Frauds requires that the contracts
mentioned thereunder need be in writing only to be enforceable. However, as provided in Article 129, express acceptance "is
not necessary for the validity of these donations." Thus, implied acceptance is sufficient.[81] (Emphases supplied)

Given that this old rule governs this case, it is evident that the CA erroneously invalidated the donation propter nuptias in favor of
petitioners. The absence of proof that the gift was accepted in a public instrument is not controlling, since implied acceptance - such as
the celebration of marriage and the annotation of this fact in the OCT[82] - must be deemed sufficient.

We must clarify that the foregoing rule applies only to donations propter nuptias made prior to the Family Code (as in this case). At the
time, Article 129 of the Civil Code allowed acceptance of those donations to be made impliedly. Since that provision is no longer part of
the current Family Code, donations propter nuptias made thereafter are now subject to the rules on ordinary donations[83] including
those on the formal requisites for validity. As a result, donations of immovables under the Family Code, including those made by reason
of marriage, must now be expressly accepted by the donee in a public instrument.[84]

The CA correctly ruled that respondents are the

rightful owners of the property.
The validity of the donation propter nuptias executed by Feliza in favor of petitioners, however, does not detract from our ultimate
conclusion that respondents are the rightful owners of the property. On this point, we agree with the CA that the prior unregistered
donation does not bind respondents, who are innocent purchasers for value. Hence, it correctly declared them the rightful owners of the
subject property.

The unregistered donation propter nuptias does not

bind third persons.
Pursuant to Article 709 of the Civil Code, all rights over immovable property must be duly inscribed or annotated on the Registry of
Deeds before they can affect the rights of third persons. The provision states:

Art. 709. The titles of ownership, or other rights over immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of
Property shall not prejudice third persons.

The same rule is enunciated in Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1529, or the Property Registration Decree, specifically Sections 51 and
52 thereof, which provide:

SECTION 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner — x x x But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary
instn1ment, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land, shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall
operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, x x x.

SECTION 52. Constructive notice upon registration. Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument
or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where
the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering.
In Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, we explained the significance of the foregoing provisions to unregistered donations as follows:[85]
From the foregoing provisions, it may be inferred that as between the parties to a donation of an immovable property, all that is required
is for said donation to be contained in a public document. Registration is not necessary for it to be considered valid and
effective. However, in order to bind third persons, the donation must be registered in the Registry of Property (now Registry of
Land Titles and Deeds). Although the non registration of a deed of donation shall not affect its validity, the necessity of
registration comes into play when the rights of third persons are affected, as in the case at bar.
xxxx

It is undisputed in this case that the donation executed by Ignacio Gonzales in favor of his grandchildren, although in writing and duly
notarized, has not been registered in accordance with law. For this reason, it shall not be binding upon private respondents who did not
participate in said deed or had no actual knowledge thereof. Hence, while the deed of donation is valid between the donor and the
donees, such deed, however, did not bind the tenants-farmers who were not parties to the donation. As previously enunciated by
this Court, non-registration of a deed of donation does not bind other parties ignorant of a previous transaction (Sales vs.
Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 858 [1992]).[86] (Emphases supplied)

In this case, petitioners do not deny that the donation propter nuptias was never registered. Applying the rule laid down in Gonzales,
the conveyance of the property in their favor is not considered binding on third persons, who had no participation in the deed or any
actual knowledge thereof.[87] The Court is convinced that respondents fall within the scope of this rule.

The records of both the cases for ejectment and the quieting of title are bereft of evidence of respondents' participation in or actual
knowledge of the deed. In fact, petitioners never made that assertion in any of their submissions before the courts. Instead, they
focused on their claim that respondents were aware of the former's possession of the property.[88]

We emphasize, however, that in order for prior unregistered interest to affect third persons despite the absence of registration, the law
requires actual knowledge of that interest. Nothing less would suffice. As we explained in Pineda v. Arcalas,[89] mere possession of the
property is not enough:

True, that notwithstanding the preference given to a registered lien, this Court has made an exception in a case where a party has
actual knowledge of the claimant's actual, open, and notorious possession of the disputed property at the time the levy or attachment
was registered. In such situations, the actual notice and knowledge of a prior unregistered interest, not the mere possession of the
disputed property, was held to be equivalent to registration.

Lamentably, in this case, Pineda did not even allege, much less prove, that Arcalas had actual knowledge of her claim of ownership
and possession of the property at the time the levy was registered. The records fail to show that Arcalas knew of Pineda's claim of
ownership and possession prior to Pineda's filing of her third party claim before the Quezon City RTC. Hence, the mere possession of
the subject property by Pineda, absent any proof that Arcalas had knowledge of her possession and adverse claim of ownership of the
subject property, cannot be considered as equivalent to registration.[90]
In the absence of proof that respondents participated in the transaction, or had knowledge of petitioners' interest over the land at the
time the property was purchased in 1982, this Court must rule that they are not bound by the unregistered donation.[91] Hence, the
conveyance had no effect as to respondents.
Respondents are innocent purchasers for value.
The acquisition of the property by respondents must likewise be respected because they were innocent purchasers for value. They had
every right to rely on OCT No. 62276 insofar as it indicated that (1) one-fourth of the property was owned by Feliza; and (2) the land
was subject only to the encumbrances annotated on the title, which did not include the donation propter nuptias in favor of petitioners.
Our ruling is rooted in the general principle that persons dealing with registered land have the right to completely rely on the Torrens
title issued over the property.[92] Buyers are not required to go beyond what the certificate of title indicates on its face,[93] provided the
acquisition of the land is made in good faith, that is, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, the property.
Nevertheless, the protection granted by law to innocent purchasers for value is not absolute. In Lausa v. Quilaton,[94] the Court
explained:
Jurisprudence has established exceptions to the protection granted to an innocent purchaser for value, such as when the purchaser
has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would compel a reasonably cautious man to inquire into the status of the lot; or of
a defect or the lack of title in his vendor; or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of
the property in litigation.

The presence of anything that excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and
investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of the certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither be
denominated as innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith, and hence does not merit the protection of the law.

In particular, the Court has consistently held that that a buyer of a piece of land that is in the actual possession of persons other than
the seller must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in possession. Without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded
as a buyer in good faith.[95]
Here, petitioners maintain that they had prior physical possession of the land, and that they built permanent structures thereon even
before respondents' acquisition of the property from Feliza. Citing the findings of the MTC during the ocular inspection conducted in
G.R. No. 188666, petitioners argue that the permanent structures and the trees found on the disputed property prove their possession
thereof over a considerable period of time.[96] They insist that respondents cannot feign ignorance of these facts; hence, the latter
cannot claim to be innocent purchasers for value.[97]
We are not persuaded.

The Court notes that petitioners have failed to sufficiently establish their assertion. Notably, the RTC in both the cases for ejectment
and quieting of title declared that it was respondent Arturo Cano who was in possession of the property as a tenant prior to and at the
time of the sale in 1982, based on the annotation on the title to the property (OCT No. 62276).

In its Decision dated 27 May 2008, the RTC in G.R. No. 190750 dismissed the case filed by petitioners for quieting of title on the basis
of the following findings of fact:

x x x The annotation on TCT no. 62276 in 1982 that defendant Arturo Cano is the tenant of the subject parcel of land would
show that indeed it was defendant Arturo Cano who possessed and took care of the land prior to the said year until he
purchased the same in 1982. Defendants, after the sale[,] had declared the subject property for taxation purposes in their names.
Likewise, from 1982 up to 2005, defendants religiously paid the realty tax due from (sic) the subject property. Their possession however
was disturbed in 1999, the year he was disallowed entry by the plaintiffs. Aside from defendants' registered ownership over the parcel
of land in question, the tax declaration and annual tax payments bolster the fact of their ownership of the subject lot.
xxxx
x x x The Court further notes that prior to defendants' purchase of the land, they were the ones tilling the subject land as
tenants. Clearly, therefore, prior to 1982 and thereafter, defendants were in possession of the subject land as tenants and
thereafter as registered owners. Their possession, however, was disturbed in 1999 when plaintiffs, who as established are staying on
the subject lot upon the tolerance of the defendants were disallowed entry by the former.[98] (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, the RTC in G.R. No. 188666 ordered the ejectment of petitioners from the property, upon a finding that respondents
had been in continuous possession of the land even prior to their purchase thereof in 1982:

Not only that, the annotation on the said title says that that portion pertaining to the appellant, before and at the time he was
ousted by the defendants-appellees, was in possession of the property, first as a tenant prior to 1982 and as the owner thereof
from 1982 onwards.
xxxx

x x x Likewise, from 1982 up to 2005, plaintiffs-appellants religiously paid the realty tax due from the subject property. The
plaintiffs-appellants have explained on the observation of this Court that prior to the purchase plaintiffs-appellants were
already in possession at that time, being the tenants thereof. Their possession however was disturbed in October 3, 1999, the day
plaintiff-appellant Arturo was disallowed entry by the defendants-appellees. Aside from plaintiffs-appellants' registered ownership over
the parcel of land in question, the tax declaration and tax payments bolster the fact of their ownership of the subject lot.[99] (Emphases
supplied)
In their petition, petitioners allude to three semi-concrete houses and several trees currently standing on the land as evidence of their
possession thereof. However, they have failed to prove that these structures were already in place at the time of the sale in 1982. In
fact, the RTC and the CA in the case for quieting of title declared that the only house standing on the property was the ancestral house
of the seller, Feliza, when the Deed of Sale was executed. The RTC declared:
Moreover, as established by evidence, the house on which plaintiffs stay was once the ancestral house of the family of Felissa Baun. It
was likewise the only house standing on the land in question until the dispute between the parties arose in 1999.[100] x x x.
(Emphasis supplied)
This finding was affirmed by the CA in its Decision dated 30 September 2009:

At the time they purchased the subject parcel of land in 1982, the same remains covered by TCT No. 62276 in the name of Felisa, and
her co-owners, and the donation of the land by Felisa to plaintiffs-appellants does not appear in said TCT. Likewise, as the trial court
found based on the evidence on record, only the ancestral house of Felisa was standing on the subject parcel of land at the time
the latter sold it to defendants-appellees.[101] (Emphasis supplied)
We find no reason to overturn the foregoing factual findings.

It must be emphasized that the Petitions before us were filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As such, our mandate is limited to
only a review of errors of law.[102] It is not our place to analyze the factual findings of the lower courts and weigh the evidence all over
again.[103] At most, our inquiry should only pertain to whether these findings are sufficiently supported by evidence.
In this case, the determinations made by the CA and the RTC as to the party in possession of the property, and the structures standing
on the land at a specific point of time, are entitled to deference. These factual determinations are supported by the annotation on OCT
No. 62276, the tax declarations submitted by petitioners and other pieces of evidence that show that only the ancestral house of the
seller was standing on the land.

Considering that the factual findings of the lower courts are consistent with the evidence on record, we affirm their conclusion that
respondents are innocent purchasers for value who had no reason to investigate further or to go beyond what was stated in the OCT.
Having acquired the land in good faith, respondents' claim of ownership must be upheld.

Acquisitive prescription does not apply to registered

land.
The assertion of petitioners that they acquired ownership of the property by virtue of their open, continuous, adverse and exclusive
possession thereof for more than 60 years[104] is likewise untenable.
As early as 1902, when Act No. 496 created the Torrens system of registration, the law already declared that registered land cannot be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession.[105] This principle is currently found in Section 47 of P.D. 1529:
Section 47. Registered land not subject to prescriptions. No title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
It is undisputed that the subject property is registered land. Hence, even assuming that petitioners occupied it for a considerable period
after the sale, their possession could not have ever ripened into ownership.

Respondents are entitled to possession of the property.

In view of our ruling in favor of respondents on the issue of ownership, we likewise conclude that they are entitled to possession of the
land in question. They have the right to enjoy and dispose of it without limitations other than those imposed by law.[106]
Our ruling on ownership also renders immaterial the issue of tolerance raised by petitioners. Since their supposed title over the land -
based on the donation propter nuptias and on their claim of acquisitive prescription - has been defeated by the registered Deed of
Absolute Sale, petitioners clearly have no right to remain on the property. Regardless of whether or not their prior possession of the
property had been tolerated by respondents, it is evident that petitioners must now vacate the land.
Accordingly, we rule that the CA committed no reversible error in declaring respondents as the rightful owners of the land in the action
for the quieting of title; and in ordering petitioners to vacate the property in the ejectment case.

As a final point, the Court is aware that our ruling will affect the structures currently standing on the property, which petitioners claim to
own. Our decision may then engender certain issues of accession, particularly the right to reimbursement of expenses and payment of
damages. Unfortunately, these matters were not raised by any of the parties before this Court or any of the lower courts. The dearth of
evidence on this point likewise prevents us from making any pronouncement on the matter. These questions must perforce be dealt
with in another proceeding.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution dated 29 April 2009 and 3 July 2009,
respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 104200, and the Decision and Resolution dated 30 September 2009 and 14 December 2009,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 91587 are hereby AFFIRMED.
 9.) [G.R. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971.]

CORNELIA MATABUENA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PETRONILA CERVANTES, Defendant-

Appellee.

Alegre, Roces, Salazar & Sañez, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Fernando Gerona, Jr., for Defendant-Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE; DONATIONS BY REASON OF
MARRIAGE; PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING MARRIAGE;
APPLICABLE TO COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIP. — While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a
"donation between the spouses during the marriage", policy considerations of the most exigent
character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a
common-law relationship. A 1954 Court of Appeals decision Buenaventura v. Bautista, (50 O.G.
3679) interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the
law is, in the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit
donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; ‘porque no se
engañen despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno,’ [according to] the Partidas
(Part. IV, Tit. Xl, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale ‘Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur’ of the
Pandects (Bk 24, Tit. I, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the
same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without benefit of nuptials.
For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater
influence of one party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is
correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr.
1), it would not be just that such donations should subsist lest the condition of those who incurred
guilt should turn out to be better. So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law,
reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to
concubinage.

2. ID.; SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; SURVIVING SPOUSE; RULE WHERE A SISTER

SURVIVES WITH THE WIDOW. — The lack of validity of the donation made b~ the deceased to
defendant Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the
disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and the
defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March 28. 1962. She is therefore his widow. As
provided in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the
surviving sister to the other half.

DECISION

FERNANDO, J.:

A question of first impression is before this Court in this litigation. We are called upon to decide
whether the ban on a donation between the spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law
relationship. 1 The plaintiff, now appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister to the deceased Felix
Matabuena, maintains that a donation made while he was living maritally without benefit of marriage
to defendant, now appellee Petronila Cervantes, was void. Defendant would uphold its validity. The
lower court, after noting that it was made at a time before defendant was married to the donor,
sustained the latter’s stand. Hence this appeal. The question, as noted, is novel in character, this
Court not having had as yet the opportunity of ruling on it. A 1954 decision of the Court of Appeals,
Buenaventura v. Bautista, 2 by the then Justice J. B. L. Reyes, who was appointed to this Court later
that year, is indicative of the appropriate response that should be given. The conclusion reached
therein is that a donation between common-law spouses falls within the prohibition and is "null and
void as contrary to public policy." 3 Such a view merits fully the acceptance of this Court. The
decision must be reversed.

In the decision of November 23, 1965, the lower court, after stating that in plaintiff’s complaint
alleging absolute ownership of the parcel of land in question, she specifically raised the question that
the donation made by Felix Matabuena to defendant Petronila Cervantes was null and void under the
aforesaid article of the Civil Code and that defendant on the other hand did assert ownership
precisely because such a donation was made in 1956 and her marriage to the deceased did not take
place until 1962, noted that when the case was called for trial on November 19, 1965, there was
stipulation of facts which it quoted. 4 Thus: "The plaintiff and the defendant assisted by their
respective counsels, jointly agree and stipulate: (1) That the deceased Felix Matabuena owned the
property in question; (2) That said Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor
of Defendant, Petronila Cervantes over the parcel of land in question on February 20, 1956, which
same donation was accepted by defendant; (3) That the donation of the land to the defendant which
took effect immediately was made during the common law relationship as husband and wife between
the defendant-done and the now deceased donor and later said donor and done were married on
March 28, 1962; (4) That the deceased Felix Matabuena died intestate on September 13, 1962; (5)
That the plaintiff claims the property by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative
of the deceased by virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962 and had the
land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon’" 5

The judgment of the lower court on the above facts was adverse to plaintiff. It reasoned out thus: "A
donation under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil Code is void if made between the spouses during
the marriage. When the donation was made by Felix Matabuena in favor of the defendant on
February 20, 1956, Petronila Cervantes and Felix Matabuena were not yet married. At that time they
were not spouses. They became spouses only when they married on March 28, 1962, six years after
the deed of donation had been executed." 6

We reach a different conclusion. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation
between the spouses during the marriage," policy considerations of the most exigent character as
well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law
relationship. We reverse.

1. As announced at the outset of this opinion, a 1954 Court of Appeals decision, Buenaventura v.
Bautista, 7 interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code 8 speaks unequivocally. If the policy
of the law is, in the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit
donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; ‘porque no se
engañen despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno [according to] the Partidas (Part
IV, Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale ‘Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur’ of the
Pandects (Bk. 24, Tit. 1, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the
same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of
nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks
greater influence of one party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is
correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr.
1), ‘it would not be just that such donations should subsist, lest the condition of those who incurred
guilt should turn out to be better.’ So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law,
reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to
concubinage." 9

2. It is hardly necessary to add that even in the absence of the above pronouncement, any other
conclusion cannot stand the test of scrutiny. It would be to indict the framers of the Civil Code for a
failure to apply a laudable rule to a situation which in its essentials cannot be distinguished.
Moreover, if it is at all to be differentiated, the policy of the law which embodies a deeply-rooted
notion of what is just and what is right would be nullified if such irregular relationship instead of
being visited with disabilities would be attended with benefits. Certainly a legal norm should not be
susceptible to such a reproach. If there is ever any occasion where the principle of statutory
construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written, this is
it. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained. Whatever
omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied
by an adherence to its avowed objective. In the language of Justice Pablo: "El espiritu que informa la
ley debe ser la luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicación de sus disposiciones.’’ 10

3. The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes does
not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of
Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage
on March 28, 1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to
one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other half. 11

WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23, 1965 dismissing the complaint with costs is
reversed. The questioned donation is declared void, with the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro
indiviso heirs to the property in question recognized. The case is remanded to the lower court for its
appropriate disposition in accordance with the above opinion. Without pronouncement as to costs.
10.) G.R. No. 146683      November 22, 2001

CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner,
vs.
ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA. DE BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C. TABANCURA, DORIS C. TABANCURA,
LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN C. TABANCURA, RAUL A. COMILLE, BERNADETTE A. COMILLE, and
ABNER A. COMILLE, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioner Cirila Arcaba seeks review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with
modification the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in Civil Case
No. 4593, declaring as void a deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco T. Comille in her favor and
its subsequent resolution3 denying reconsideration.

The facts are as follows:

On January 16, 1956, Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No.
437-A located at the corner of Calle Santa Rosa (now Balintawak Street) and Calle Rosario (now Rizal Avenue) in
Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte. The total area of the lot was 418 square meters.4 After the death of Zosima on
October 3, 1980, Francisco and his mother-in-law, Juliana Bustalino Montallana, executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her share consisting of one-fourth (1/4) of the property to
Francisco.5 On June 27, 1916, Francisco registered the lot in his name with the Registry of Deeds.6

Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia Bellosillo,7 the latter's
cousin, Luzviminda Paghacian,8 and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, then a widow, to take care of his house, as well as the
store inside.9

Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila and Francisco. Leticia
Bellosillo said Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room,10 while Erlinda
Tabancura,11 another niece of Francisco, claimed that the latter had told her that Cirila was his mistress.12 On the
other hand, Cirila said she was a mere helper who could enter the master's bedroom only when the old man asked
her to and that Francisco in any case was too old for her. She denied they ever had sexual intercourse.13

It appears that when Leticia and Luzviminda were married, only Cirila was left to take care of Francisco.14 Cirila
testified that she was a 34-year old widow while Francisco was a 75-year old widower when she began working for
the latter; that he could still walk with her assistance at that time;15 and that his health eventually deteriorated and he
became bedridden.16 Erlinda Tabancura testified that Francisco's sole source of income consisted of rentals from his
lot near the public streets.17 He did not pay Cirila a regular cash wage as a househelper , though he provided her
family with food and lodging.18

On January 24, 1991, a few months before his death, Francisco executed an instrument denominated "Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos," in which he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A, consisting of 150 square meters, together with his
house, to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument. Francisco left the larger portion of 268 square
meters in his name. The deed stated that the donation was being made in consideration of "the faithful services
[Cirila Arcaba] had rendered over the past ten (10) years." The deed was notarized by Atty. Vic T. Lacaya, Sr.19 and
later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner .20

On October 4, 1991, Francisco died without any children. In 1993, the lot which Cirila received from Francisco had a
market value of P57,105.00 and an assessed value of P28,550.00.21

On February 18, 1993, respondents filed a complaint against petitioner 'for declaration of nullity of a deed of
donation inter vivos, recovery of possession, and damages. Respondents, who are the decedent's nephews and
nieces and his heirs by intestate succession, alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and the
donation inter vivos made by Francisco in her favor is void under Article 87 of the Family Code, which provides:
 Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage
shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family
rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage.

On February 25, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents, holding the donation void under
this provision of the Family Code. The trial court reached this conclusion based on the testimony of Erlinda
Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature of one "Cirila Comille." The documents were (1) an
application for a business permit to operate as real estate lessor, dated January 8, 1991, with a carbon copy of the
signature "Cirila Comille";22 (2) a sanitary permit to operate as real estate lessor with a health certificate showing the
signature "Cirila Comille" in black ink;23 and (3) the death certificate of the decedent with the signature "Cirila A.
Comille" written in black ink.24 The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered:

1. Declaring the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed by the late Francisco Comille recorded as Doc. No.
7; Page No. 3; Book No. V; Series of 1991 in the Notarial Register of Notary Public Vic T. Lacaya (Annex " A
" to the Complaint) null and void;

2. Ordering the defendant to deliver possession of the house and lot subject of the deed unto the plaintiffs
within thirty (30) days after finality of this decision; and finally

3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorney's fees in the sum of P10,000.00.

SO ORDERED.25

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered on June 19, 2000 the decision subject of this appeal.
As already stated, the appeals court denied reconsideration. Its conclusion was based on (1) the testimonies of
Leticia, Erlinda, and Cirila; (2) the copies of documents purportedly showing Cirila's use of Francisco's surname; (3)
a pleading in another civil case mentioning payment of rentals to Cirila as Francisco's common-law wife; and (4) the
fact that Cirila did not receive a regular cash wage.

Petitioner assigns the following errors as having been committed by the Court of Appeals:

(a) The judgment of the Court of Appeals that petitioner was the common-law wife of the late Francisco
Comille is not correct and is a reversible error because it is based on a misapprehension of facts, and
unduly breaks the chain of circumstances detailed by the totality of the evidence, its findings being
predicated on totally incompetent or hearsay evidence, and grounded on mere speculation, conjecture or
possibility. (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 243 and other cases; cited in Quiason, Philippine Courts and
their J urisdictions, 1993 ed., p. 604)

(b) The Court of Appeals erred in shifting the burden of evidence from the plaintiff to defendant. (Bunyi v.
Reyes, 39 SCRA 504; Quiason, id.)

(c) The Court of Appeals decided the case in away probably not in accord with law or with the applicable
jurisprudence in Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 20 SCRA 908, and Liguez v. CA, 102 Phil. 577, 584.26

The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied Art. 87 of the Family Code to the
circumstances of this case. After a review of the records, we rule in the affirmative.

The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, subject only to certain exceptions: (a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) where
there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) when the findings of the Court
of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence but is contradicted by the evidence on record; and G) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion.27 It appearing that the Court of Appeals based its findings on evidence presented by
both parties, the general rule should apply.

In Bitangcor v. Tan,28 we held that the term "cohabitation" or "living together as husband and wife" means not only
residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse. Cohabitation, of course, means more than
sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex. At the
very least, cohabitation is public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as
man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as such. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent
together, even if often repeated, do not constitute such kind of cohabitation; they are merely meretricious.29 In this
jurisdiction, this Court has considered as sufficient proof of common-law relationship the stipulations between the
parties,30 a conviction of concubinage,31 or the existence of legitimate children.32

Was Cirila Francisco's employee or his common-law wife? Cirila admitted that she and Francisco resided under one
roof for a long time, It is very possible that the two consummated their relationship, since Cirila gave Francisco
therapeutic massage and Leticia said they slept in the same bedroom. At the very least, their public conduct
indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to
husband and wife.

Aside from Erlinda Tabancura's testimony that her uncle told her that Cirila was his mistress, there are other
indications that Cirila and Francisco were common-law spouses. Seigfredo Tabancura presented documents
apparently signed by Cirila using the surname "Comille." As previously stated, these are an application for a
business permit to operate as a real estate lessor,33 a sanitary permit to operate as real estate lessor with a health
certificate,34 and the death certificate of Francisco.35 These documents show that Cirila saw herself as Francisco's
common-law wife, otherwise, she would not have used his last name. Similarly, in the answer filed by Francisco's
lessees in "Erlinda Tabancura, et al. vs. Gracia Adriatico Sy and Antonio Sy," RTC Civil Case No.4719 (for
collection of rentals), these lessees referred to Cirila as "the common-law spouse of Francisco." Finally, the fact that
Cirila did not demand from Francisco a regular cash wage is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver-
employee, but Francisco's common law spouse. She was, after all, entitled to a regular cash wage under the law.36 It
is difficult to believe that she stayed with Francisco and served him out of pure beneficence. Human reason would
thus lead to the conclusion that she was Francisco's common-law spouse.

Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband
and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco in favor of
Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.