认知领域的脆弱性 (英文)
认知领域的脆弱性 (英文)
认知领域的脆弱性 (英文)
Paul Ottewell
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
The Disinformation Age
Toward a Net Assessment of the United Kingdom’s Cognitive
Domain
Paul Ottewell1
https://doi.org/10.36304/ExpwMCUP.2022.03
Abstract: This article analyzes the territory in which the battle of strategic
Kingdom, Russia and China. These are: (1) the maturity of cognitive warfare
doctrine; (2) the ease with which cognitive warfare can be waged vice
defended against; and (3) that illiberal states enjoy greater freedom of
with implications for the latter’s security. Scholars and practitioners facing
Captain Paul Ottewell is a Royal Navy warfare officer. He holds a bachelor’s degree in
computer science from the University of Manchester and a master’s degree in defence
studies from King’s College London. His research area of interest is computational
disinformation. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do
not necessarily reflect the opinions of Marine Corps University, the U.S. Marine Corps, the
Department of the Navy, the U.S. government, or the government of the United Kingdom.
of the state. During the past three decades, the cyber domain has
deception of the masses. This article examines the growing threat to the
leads to.
propaganda is subjected.5
effective and low risk since such activity is sufficiently ambiguous and
5. Efficiency. Even inexpert actors can rapidly create mass effects in the
and cheaper now than it was before the invention of the social
networking websites.
Kingdom and two of its great power competitors: Russia and China. Both
that China and Russia are both outmaneuvering the United Kingdom in the
security strategy are profound: the United Kingdom must confront how to
This article adopts the model proposed by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver,
this work is the population of the United Kingdom and their elected
representatives in Parliament.
social media and its implications for security has been scarce by
international order, protect its cognitive domain and deter malign activity
question lies in the domain of grand strategy. This article offers a first step
connected agendas through which issues escalate until they “command the
Marc Howard Ross introduced the formal agenda as “the list of items which
public agenda as “all issues which (1) are the subject of widespread attention
of the public; and (3) are the appropriate concern of some governmental
injustice, must undergo to achieve a place on the public agenda and ascend
domain is sufficiently novel that neither academia nor the military has yet
definitions suffer from a negative bias that ignore the possibility that
order. A collective but contested term for the liberal democratic world order
that emerged following World War II, some scholars argue that it grossly
as shorthand for the status quo. The rules-based international order is the
and other mechanisms that foster collaboration and help resolve disputes
between states.”16
the rules-based international order and/or with the legitimacy of the order
itself is relevant to what follows. Classical realists argue that there are two
maintenance of the global order are known as status quo states. Those who
are unsatiated by the current global order, who “share a common desire to
overturn the status quo order—the prestige, resources, and principles of the
means of communication:
puts it, strategy is “the art of creating power.”21 Therefore, an analysis of the
relative power balance between parties now and into the future is an
that measures of power are only relevant when taken relative to another
decisively.22
Trying to conduct case studies at the state level is fraught with potential for
policy, it is likely that examples exist of actions that both support and
Being an exploratory study, the conclusions of this article will lack the
base.
more insightful.
tenet of its foreign policy, not a tangible real-world artifact. It can change as
ideas.
~ Victor Hugo25
balance of power has changed over time, and looks ahead to consider what
might happen if the United Kingdom does not change its current policy
base.26
status quo state. The nation’s ruling party describes its vision of the United
system that this country helped to build and one that this Government are
the world as a single complex network of supply chains and trade arteries”
serving China’s interests.30 Xi’s vision includes the spread of the Chinese
model abroad, given his argument that it “offers a new option for other
cognitive domain. Contests in this domain differ from those in the more
Skripal and his daughter Yulia were the victims of the first offensive use of
nerve agents in mainland Europe since World War II. The attack took place in
would later show that these accounts were part of a sophisticated and
that integrates state media, social networking websites, and both overt and
the social media posts of Chinese diplomats based in the United Kingdom.
Together, the network was responsible for nearly half of online engagement
with the Chinese ambassador’s posts on Twitter.35 The top 1 percent of so-
protect the positive image that it seeks to present to the world. Two
active competition with two revisionist great power nations who possess the
capability and the intent to subvert the rules-based international order via
media is falling while younger adults are increasingly using social media as
equipped to apply critical thinking to the news they consume, the digitally
illiterate are the soft underbelly of the United Kingdom’s cognitive domain.
2019, the proportion of Britons reporting that they trusted most of the news
most of the time fell from 50 to 40 percent.42 Trust in the Fourth Estate (the
democracy. If the light that journalism shines on threats cannot reach the
daily.43 Though “the camera cannot lie” has never been true, images and
the average viewer remains just able to distinguish deepfakes from the real
some viewers uncertain of whether what they saw was genuine or not.44
influence campaigns.”45
Consequently, a battle could be lost without a shot being fired. The more
likely outcome is that the cognitive domain will become a common—if not
pursue their revisionist agendas. Contest there is cheap, deniable, and falls
Key Asymmetries
examines how the parties are pursuing the competition in the United
maneuver.
Russia and China both have established doctrines for waging cognitive
“interprets ideas about war, and how they affect its conduct and its
strategic culture, the Russian military has updated it for the Information
NATO member states and the command structure of the alliance itself, with
three sources. The first is the co-option of the internet, in particular social
this work that Russia has been able to supercharge the third engine of
back to Vladimir Lenin, the first leader of the Soviet Union. Russia has since
updated it for the digital age. Today, active measures include overt (white)
International and covert (black) information warfare through troll farms and
botnet factories.
evidence of absence. The same report found that the government of the
public and security establishment to learn the extent that malign actors
more than it does the specific “what.” The latter is the realm of reflexive
control theory. This guides the Kremlin’s choice of what reality it wishes its
target audience to perceive. Like active measures, it has evolved through the
decades, with roots in the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin, but its fruits lie
own best interests. At its heart, reflexive control pursues control of the
pursuit of its foreign policy ends. Should the Kremlin successfully exercise
reflexive control over another state’s vox populi, however temporarily, this
To Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu, this is the most skillful strategy of
Rather than try to co-opt Western social media to deliver its messaging
United Kingdom has to date been modest. The international satellite news
universities, but its most prolific presence is via Twitter from its diplomatic
exploiting is the lack of reciprocity. In 2020, the World Press Freedom Index
number 177.60 Simply put, neither British journalists nor British diplomats
enjoy the same freedom to participate in the public discourse in China that
the end of the Cold War and the rapid growth of the internet, state use of
capability is fraught with difficulty for liberal democracies, this does not
domain is vital ground for the correct functioning of democracy itself. So,
while the United Kingdom has no published doctrine for the cognitive
situation in the territory it had formerly held.64 The British Army’s 77th
in a 2018 Joint Concept Note known as JCN 2/18. This document describes
the United Kingdom as being threatened in the cognitive domain and sets
out actionable steps that the national security enterprise could take in
Yet, the first print run of this document was pulped following an objection
against gunpowder.”69
Defence, Development and Foreign Policy in March 2021. Like JCN 2/18, the
demands of the integrated review. While the report cited Russia and China’s
societies, the government of the United Kingdom has not yet committed to
integrated review not lead to the development of the thinking and capability
Defending against It
against. The party with the greatest strategic patience has the advantage.
This is an asymmetry with two axes. The first relates to audience sensing:
the quest for one that delivers results. The second axis relates to tenacity:
the defending state must prevail over every attempt to influence its
common aim is to focus intervention efforts where they will have the most
studies by the Rand Corporation and the Atlantic Council both identified “the
influence the vox populi in either state. Therefore, it can be concluded that
The term target audience is not helpful since it presumes the deceptive
whom their message will be seen and the course that its viral spread will
take. This may be so in electoral campaigns that, quite legally, use features
like Facebook’s lookalike audiences, but Russian methods are more akin to a
target is. The former provides a tangible locus for action to either prevent
may provide insight into the aggressor’s desired outcome, but this may also
campaign has the relative freedom of measuring, testing, and adjusting the
the targeted state cannot afford to wait until the public agenda has shifted,
since by then the damage is done. Its challenge of monitoring sentiment and
infection control is to prevent it taking hold in the first place: digital literacy
missing the opportunity to equip its citizenry for life with digital literacy skills
and ideas. Hitherto, the government of the United Kingdom has left
China’s approach is the polar opposite, featuring tight central control and
all forms of media protects the Communist Party of China from the
galvanizing effect that social networking websites can have when citizens
cognitive domain that London does not enjoy in mainland China. Whereas
China, when compared with the government of the United Kingdom, the
diplomacy.
protagonist states. The examination of each begins with Russia.77 While its
estimated 91 million users enjoy largely unfettered access to the internet via
some 3,500 internet service providers, the Russian state has shifted
problems. First, the Russian security services lack the technical means of
among Russians stays the state’s hand in simply blocking them for fear of
2019.80 Critics fear that the new laws codify state censorship of the internet.
of Russia from the global internet. If Moscow can implement this legislation
providers may only share stories that have been published by the state
In addition to its strict regulation of all media, China has designed and
its heart. The Golden Shield Project, known colloquially as the “Great Firewall
its domestic internet very lightly. This looks set to change. Parliament is
consulting on an Online Safety Bill that, if passed into law, would hand
Office of Communications.86 The bill would impose many new legal duties
harm. Contentiously, the bill extends these duties to include protection from
most significant change in the role of the state over free speech since 1695,”
printed material before publication.87 The bill seeks to balance new duties
toward the individual with new duties toward public goods, in particular its
billion USD.90 However, until and unless Parliament passes the bill into law,
sensitivity of the subject, the nation’s policy and capability toward cognitive
warfare is not in the public domain and is therefore beyond the reach of
not feature in the United Kingdom’s most recent National Cyber Security
Strategy nor has the issue been the subject of a specific inquiry by the House
Cyber Force in October 2019.93 From what is known about this force, it is not
clear whether its mandate will extend beyond scientific and technical cyber
Major Uncertainties
Second, without intervention from the state, the pace at which digital
unknown. If swift, then this would reduce the salience of cognitive warfare in
security terms.
regulation can be achieved and sustained such that the networks are
The final unknown relates to the magnitude of the threat faced by the
will still be less than the damage it is inflicting on its own soft power with its
drift toward populism.94 The priority that the United Kingdom should afford
and threats. The former are defined as forthcoming events and/or trends
that can be turned to one party’s own advantage. The latter are events
soft power to seek consensus among its allies on developing the policy
The first threat is the trend toward declining political support for
democratic institutions. As Leila Alieva at the Foreign Policy Centre puts it,
of risks and dangers of moving farther away from what so far has
constituted the identity and core of the democratic states; stable institutions
international order.
that some form of collaboration between public and private sectors will be
in minutes. The public agenda itself is dynamic and constantly evolving. Yet,
live threat picture of the narratives flowing through and between the most
Conclusions
The aim of this study was to identify the competitive dynamics in the United
summarized thus:
doctrines for waging cognitive warfare. The United Kingdom does not,
which it faced with the Soviet Union in 1946, the beginning of a long Cold
War. On one front, the United Kingdom faces a malign, revanchist, and
global order to its lasting strategic advantage. With unipolarity giving way to
bipolarity, the great power competition between the global West and China
appears to be set for the long term.97 Russia is a danger to the United
delivery method for disinformation, both China and Russia are maneuvering
for security speech to parties outside the democratic franchise. While social
influence.
Recommendations
democratic ideals, this does not absolve the state of its responsibility to
capability.
calls for greater resilience to disinformation among the population, since the
digital literacy should join subjects such as reading, writing, and arithmetic
measures will pay dividends over generations. To meet the threat more
redress the balance. These may lie in other domains or may require new, or
new interpretations of, international law, but they should include measures
that extend the United Kingdom’s deterrence effect over its cognitive
domain. Actors that maneuver there against the United Kingdom’s interests
must face unacceptable costs for doing so. Seemingly, the only reason that
the United Kingdom is not pushing back reciprocally in its competitors’ own
cognitive domains is that it chooses not to. With sufficient technical skill and
Final Thoughts
domain is conceptually real. It is the maneuver space for the battle for
democracy.
domain. Both have the capability and demonstrated will to distract and
Institute for Statecraft puts it, when “people start to say ‘You don’t know
what to believe’ or ‘They’re all as bad as each other,’ the disinformers are
winning.”100
narratives, once lodged in a society’s hive mind, are tenacious and resilient,
defensive strategy than cure. To protect its democracy, the population of the
next war may be won or lost before the vanquished party even recognizes
that its interests are threatened. Liberal democracies must now choose
whether and how to prepare for that war if they are to be successful in
1
“Fake News, Free Speech, and Foreign Influence: The Smart Way the United States Can
Combat Disinformation,” Human Rights First, 8 March 2018.
2
Florian Zollmann, “Bringing Propaganda Back into News Media Studies,” Critical Sociology
45, no. 3 (2017): 329–45, https://doi.org/10.1177/0896920517731134.
3
Alan B. Lloyd, “Nationalist Propaganda in Ptolemaic Egypt,” Historia: Zeitschrift Für Alte
Geschichte 31, no. 1 (1982): 33–55.
4
Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, “The Rise of Social Media,” Our World in Data, 18 September 2019.
5
Christopher Wylie, Mindf*ck: Cambridge Analytica and the Plot to Break America (New York:
Random House, 2019), 14–15.
6
Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections (Washington, DC: Office of
the Director of National Intelligence, 2017); and Russian Influence and Interference Measures
Following the 2017 UK Terrorist Attacks (Cardiff, Wales: Cardiff University Crime and Security
Research Institute, 2017).
7
Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
8
Daniel P. Bagge, Unmasking Maskirovka: Russia’s Cyber Influence Operations (New York:
Defense Press, 2019), 31.
9
Bryan E. Denham, “Toward Conceptual Consistency in Studies of Agenda-Building
Processes: A Scholarly Review,” Review of Communication 10, no. 4 (2010): 306–23,
https://doi.org/10.1080/15358593.2010.502593; and Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder,
“The Politics of Agenda-Building: An Alternative Perspective for Modern Democratic Theory,”
Journal of Politics 33, no. 4 (1971): 892–915, https://doi.org/10.2307/2128415.
10
Roger Cobb, Jennie-Keith Ross, and Marc Howard Ross, “Agenda Building as a
Comparative Political Process,” American Political Science Review 70, no. 1 (1976): 126,
https://doi.org/10.2307/1960328.
11
The Copenhagen School is the body of research founded by international relations
theorist Barry G. Buzan. In his seminal work, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, written
with Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Buzan theorises the process by which security issues
become “securitized” and are thereby dealt with through exceptional measures such as
war. See Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, Security.
12
Paul Ottewell, “Defining the Cognitive Domain,” Over the Horizon, 7 December 2020.