McKinsey On Risk Number 10
McKinsey On Risk Number 10
McKinsey On Risk Number 10
on Risk
New risk challenges and enduring
themes for the return
Editorial Production:
Roger Draper, Gwyn Herbein,
LaShon Malone, Pamela Norton,
Kanika Punwani, Charmaine Rice,
Dana Sand, Sarah Thuerk, Sneha
Vats, Pooja Yadav, Belinda Yu
Table of contents
Risk culture
Derisking
2
Introduction
The tenth issue of McKinsey on Risk arrives as spirits, battered by public-health and economic hardships, have been lifted by
the appearance of COVID-19 vaccines. Vaccines are beginning to reach priority and vulnerable populations, such as healthcare
workers and long-term care residents. Governments and institutions are promising ever-wider distribution in the months
ahead. Serious questions remain about production timelines and the completeness of vaccine delivery. For most economies,
epidemiological uncertainty is the main factor complicating the conditions of return. Yet nations, sectors, companies, and
individuals have endured different challenges and will travel different recovery paths, depending on the damage done.
At the far end of the pandemic tunnel, some economies are demonstrating vibrant life. In other regions, the time for countries
and organizations to grow again approaches at varying speeds. Those that prepare will benefit, as our lead article on the
“emerging resilients” reveals. In the last recession, companies able to take thoughtful actions to balance growth, margin, and
optionality separated themselves quickly from less resilient peers. Coming out of the current recession, which companies
are poised to achieve “escape velocity”? Our authors—some of McKinsey’s most influential leadership voices—discuss the
dynamic business landscape while pointing to a venerable metric that can help companies adjust for the needed balance.
Taken as a whole, these discussions present McKinsey’s latest thinking and recommendations on risk and resilience—including
optimal strategies and necessary transformative actions. Resilience as a business concept took on significance during
the financial crisis of 2008–09. As cyclical stress levels rose in the global economy, challenges were magnified and new
uncertainties were generated. Faced with proliferating risks and spiking volatility, organizations began to realize the need for
dynamic risk management, by which serious threats can be prioritized and addressed as they arise.
Today, as companies emerge from the pandemic-triggered economic crisis, risk organizations face extraordinary
discontinuities on top of more familiar ongoing challenges. The highly complex risk landscape is marked by an accelerating
digital revolution; massive environmental, regulatory, and industry changes precipitated by the changing climate; and rising
stakeholder expectations about corporate behavior. Cost pressures, furthermore, mean that organizations must make
significant, simultaneous improvements in risk efficiency and effectiveness.
In pursuit of these improvements, companies in all industries are applying advanced quantitative capabilities to support faster
operational decision making. Most are launching digital and analytics transformations—digitizing services and processes,
increasing efficiency with agile approaches and automation, improving customer engagement, and capitalizing on new
analytical tools. The present crisis is also creating a moment in which financial institutions can rethink their entire model
landscape and model life cycle. Artificial intelligence, which promises to redefine how businesses work, is already marshaling
the power of data to transform a range of business activities and functions.
The inevitable consequences of all this innovation are elevated risk profiles, which many existing organizational approaches are
incapable of addressing systematically. The following discussions illuminate the most compelling risk issues that companies
in all sectors and geographies are confronting. Here, readers will find deep industry insight and structured risk-management
approaches that are helping leaders build risk capabilities, strengthen institutional resilience, and navigate through this crisis
toward restored performance.
Let us know what you think, at [email protected] and on the McKinsey Insights app.
Thomas Poppensieker
Chair, Risk & Resilience Editorial Board
XXXXXXXXXXXXX 3
Risk and
resilience
5 The emerging
resilients: Achieving
‘escape velocity’
12 Resilience in a crisis:
Interview with Professor
Edward I. Altman
26 A fast-track risk-management
transformation to counter the
COVID-19 crisis
5
In 2019, McKinsey asked companies to prepare for protected sectors of healthcare, pharmaceuticals,
the possibility of a recession. Of course, we had no and technology, companies are seeing moderate
idea then that the COVID-19 pandemic would be the declines in revenue. Heavily affected sectors
trigger, nor that the recession would cut as deeply have experienced revenue declines of between
as it has. But it was clear then that the foregoing 25 percent and 45 percent. These include
growth cycle was already of unusual duration. The transportation and tourism, automotive, and oil
pace was slowing, furthermore, and the potential and gas—sectors containing some of the largest
for shocks was greater than for renewed growth. In employers in Europe and the United States.
the same article, we discussed what top-performing
companies had done in the previous downcycle, the We recognized that this downturn was driving
financial crisis of 2008–09. We looked at 1,500 stress into the economy at a much faster rate than
public companies in Europe and the United States, was experienced in the financial crisis of 2008–09.
analyzing performance on a sector-by-sector basis. To measure the extent and speed of the damage,
Companies in the top quintile of their peers through we wanted a sounder guide than stock-market
that crisis were dubbed the “resilients.” performance. An investigation of the companies in
our database using the “Altman Z-Score” yielded
Once economic and business results of the second promising results. This measurement was developed
quarter of 2020 became known, we began to hunt in 1968 by Edward I. Altman, now a professor
for the clues that were contained in nearly 1,500 emeritus of Finance at New York University’s Stern
earnings releases across Europe and the United School of Business. It is an equation originally
States. This article seeks to understand whether designed to predict the probability of corporate
the shape of the next class of resilients is visible bankruptcy. A company’s Z-Score goes up if it has a
in the data, and what lessons this would hold for well-established ability to grow margins (measured
companies within each sector. as EBIT1/assets) while increasing revenues
(measured by revenue/assets) and maintaining
optionality (measured by retained earnings/assets).2
The present downcycle: Six times faster
than the previous one We calculated the Z-Scores for approximately 1,500
Today, we are in the middle of the deepest European and North American companies in our
recession in living memory. As pandemic-triggered database for both the last downcycle (2008–09)
lockdowns took hold around the world in early 2020, and the current one. We used three categories
3
economies contracted quickly. The International in the results: “good standing,” “gray zone,” and
Monetary Fund and World Bank foresee a global “experiencing stress.” 4 The Z-Scores revealed that
contraction in economic output in 2020 of in the financial crisis of 2008–09, 30 percent of
around –5 percent; the Organisation of Economic companies moved to a higher-stress category by
Cooperation and Development estimates an even 2009, compared with where they were in precrisis
worse result, at –7.6 percent. At any rate, the drop 2007. Only 3 percent of observed companies
will far exceed the last global contraction, which was improved their standing. By comparison, in 2020, 25
–1.7 percent in 2009. percent of companies had moved to a higher-stress
category and 3 percent improved. The dynamics
The distress has hit all industry sectors, some of 2009 and 2020 differ in one glaring respect: in
harder than others. Yet even in the relatively the last recession, this movement occurred over 18
1
Earnings before interest and taxes.
2
Our research used a common form of the Z-Score, whose weighted determinants are as follows: Z = 1.2X1 + 1.4X2 + 3.3X3 + 0.6X4 + 1.0X5,
where X1 = working capital/total assets, X2 = retained earnings/total assets, X3 = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets, X4 = market
value equity/book value of total liabilities, X5 = sales/total assets, and Z = overall index. Edward I. Altman, “Predicting financial distress of
companies: revisiting the Z-Score and ZETA® models,” Leonard N. Stern School of Business, July 2000, stern.nyu.edu.
3
Some companies were excluded from results because data or financial reports were unavailable at the time or because they were extreme
industry outliers.
4
These were the titles of Professor Altman’s original categories except for “experiencing stress”; we substituted that title for his original,
“headed for bankruptcy,” since our research is not focused on bankruptcy.
Web <2020>
Exhibit 1
<COVID-Resilients>
Exhibit <1> of <4>
Corporate stress
Corporate stress is
is now
now at
atthe
thesame
samepoint
pointas
asititwas
wasininthe
the2009
2009trough,
trough,arriving
arriving
in only months versus two years.
in only months versus two years.
Corporate stress by Altman Z-Score, % ● Took on stress ● Stayed roughly same ● Reduced stress
(n = 967) (n = 1,300)
● In 2 quarters, 2020 recession has caused stress equal to that in 2008–09 recession
● Companies in good standing or gray zone in 2019 were experiencing stress by 2020
Note: Figures may not sum to 100%, because of rounding. For 2020 vs 2019 analysis, companies without reported financials for Q2 2020 were excluded. For
2020 vs 2019 and 2009 vs 2007 analyses, financial institutions, utilities, and some other companies, including those with Z-Scores of >10 or <–10, were
excluded. Good standing: Z-Score >3.0; gray zone: Z-Score 1.8–3.0; experiencing stress: Z-Score <1.8.
Source: S&P Capital lQ; McKinsey analysis
Web <2020>
<COVID-Resilients>
Exhibit 2
Exhibit <2> of <4>
The Altman
The AltmanZ-Score
Z-Scoreisisaa better
better leading indicator
indicator of
of company
company strength through
through
a crisis than is stock-market performance.
stock-market performance.
Excess shareholder return, 2007–11, %
Companies grouped by market performance (TSR¹) in Companies grouped by Altman Z-Score movement,
the trough of the 2007–09 financial crisis (Q1 2009) 2007–09
20 20
10 10
0 0
–10 –10
–20 –20
Top Quintile Quintile Quintile Bottom Top quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile Bottom
quintile by 2 3 4 quintile by Altman 2 3 4 quintile
TSR in Q1 Z-Score,
2009 2007–09
¹Total shareholder return (TSR) for Q1 2009 was calculated as an average of medians for each industry sector of ~1,000 companies in total; excess shareholder
return over the 2007–11 period was derived by subtracting the median of TSR for each industry sector with actual TSR for each company.
Source: S&P Capital lQ; McKinsey analysis
5
Working capital and market equity value were part of Professor Altman’s original score; for the purposes of our research we included the
former determinant as part of optionality and recognized that the latter, market value, is externally driven and ultimately a product of the
other factors.
— Margins. The gap in margins between the — Optionality. The emerging resilients—and
emerging resilients and the rest of their peer companies overall—seem to be leaving less
group is striking. The typical emerging resilient optionality on the table today compared with
in 2020 has increased the EBITDA6 margin by what happened in the last cycle. Retained-
5 percent while the rest have lost –19 percent earnings growth for emerging resilients is 11
by this measure, a gap of nearly 25 percent. The percent today, whereas it was 30 percent at
difference is much greater than the EBITDA- the time of the 2009 recessionary trough. For
margin gap was among the resilients in the nonresilients, the optionality measurement is
last recession. This would suggest that today’s 1 percent in this cycle, while it was 6 percent in
margin leaders will dominate their sectors more the last.
firmly coming out of this recession.
Web <2020>
Exhibit 3
<COVID-Resilients>
Exhibit <3> of <4>
Resilient
Resilient companies
companiesdemonstrate
demonstratebalanced
balancedperformance
performanceininmargin,
margin,growth,
growth,
and optionality.
Change in EBITDA1 margin, growth, and optionality, resilients vs nonresilients,2 in last and current recessions
Margin: EBITDA margin Growth: revenues Optionality: profits retained for reinvestment
11
6 7
4 5
–1 1
–5
–13
–16 –17
6
Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization.
Web <2020>
Exhibit 4
<COVID-Resilients>
Exhibit <4> of <4>
Balanced performers
Balanced performers across
acrossmargin,
margin, growth,
growth, and
and optionality are more
optionality are more likely
likelyto
to
emerge as resilients than are top performers in only one metric.
emerge as resilients than are top performers in only one metric.
Composite ranking of company grading on margin, growth, and optionality
Share of Probability of being in
total, % emerging resilients, % Margin Growth Optionality Typical grade¹
(A in 1 metric and C in at
24 23 A C C Mixed or spiky
least 1 metric)
Cindy Levy is a senior partner in McKinsey’s London office, Mihir Mysore is a partner in the Houston office, Kevin Sneader
is McKinsey’s managing partner and is based in the Hong Kong office, and Bob Sternfels is a senior partner in the
San Francisco office.
The authors wish to thank Sumit Belwal, Jeffrey Caso, Martin Hirt, Peeyush Karnani, Jagbir Kaur, Kevin Lackowski, and
Sven Smit for their contributions to this article.
12
Professor Edward I. Altman of the Stern School of That was the path, in my view, that gave GM its main
Business, New York University, is a leading expert chance of survival. They were really on the brink
in credit and debt. He has written or edited two at that time, having hemorrhaged $2 billion per
dozen books and more than 160 articles on finance, month for several months. I was not very popular
accounting, and economics. He is also the creator of at that hearing. Congress did not want to hear my
the Altman Z-Score, developed originally as a means “B word”—bankruptcy; they preferred the other
of predicting bankruptcy probabilities. McKinsey one, bailout. The House voted for a bailout, but the
researchers successfully used the Z-Score to test Senate voted against it. President Bush eventually
company resilience through a crisis.1 We spoke with bailed out GM and Chrysler under the funding that
Professor Altman about how executives can best Congress had given for financial institutions (using
face financial stress in times of crisis. GMAC as the entry point).
McKinsey: The Z-Score has had a variety of But the bailout didn’t work. Six months later, under
practical applications. Do any stand out as the Obama administration, GM filed for bankruptcy
particularly helpful? Have any applications of the and received about $50 billion in debtor-in-
model surprised you? possession loans, exactly as I had predicted should
happen. The rest is history. GM survived and is now
Professor Altman: I didn’t know of McKinsey’s use an investment-grade company. That status may
of the Z-Score to indicate resilience. Interestingly, be a stretch, but it is certainly a solvent company
you found it useful in gauging firm performance with operations globally, and much healthier today
before and after a crisis. Banks have used the because of going bankrupt, not despite it.
model in making lending decisions, and some use
it to complement their own internal-ratings-based Finally, an application that really surprised me is the
models for expected loss provisioning under the use of the Z-Score by managers to make strategic
Basel rules. It is also used by investors in making decisions. In 1981, I learned of a turnaround
bond or stock purchases. I was surprised, for strategy used by the CEO of a large manufacturer of
example, that several investment banks have used precision equipment in which he simulated business
the Z-Score as one of several criteria they apply to decisions like selling assets, reducing personnel,
customers. Some investment banks offer a basket consolidating locations, paying back some debt. He
of common stocks with the highest Z-Scores and plotted the effects of each simulated decision on
sell short the lowest. That came as a surprise—that the firm’s Z-Score. No action was taken that would
the Z-Score was generating profit for investment depress the Z-Score, at least in his estimation. And it
banks selling a structured product. was amazingly successful.
I used the model in my testimony in December 2008 McKinsey: Professor Altman, you have studied
before the US House Finance Committee, at the the credit market for years. What fundamental
onset of the financial crisis. The hearing would help changes have you observed? Today, we see many
determine whether General Motors and Chrysler alternative financing instruments, and high-yield
would receive government bailouts. The Z-Score bonds have gained steam as well. Would you
model showed very clearly that GM was heading for say that the Z-Score can account for such new
bankruptcy. I recommended against a bailout for GM developments? Has it proved timeless as a tool
and in favor of restructuring under Chapter 11. for measuring credit risk? Should we do anything
1
McKinsey’s results were published in an article by Cindy Levy, Mihir Mysore, Kevin Sneader, and Bob Sternfels, “The emerging resilients:
Achieving ‘escape velocity’,” October 6, 2020, McKinsey.com. The authors used a common form of Professor Altman’s Z-Score, with the
following weighted determinants: Z = 1.2X1 + 1.4X 2 + 3.3X3 + 0.6X4 + 1.0X5, where X1 = working capital/total assets, X 2 = retained earnings/total
assets, X3 = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets, X4 = market value equity/book value of total liabilities, X5 = sales/total assets, and
Z = overall index. Edward I. Altman, “Predicting financial distress of companies: Revisiting the Z-Score and ZETA® models,” Leonard N. Stern
School of Business, July 2000, stern.nyu.edu.
Edward I. Altman is the Max L. Heine Professor of Finance, emeritus, at the Stern School of Business, New York University,
and director of research in credit and debt markets at the NYU Salomon Center for the Study of Financial Institutions. This
interview was conducted by Jeffrey Caso, an expert in McKinsey’s Washington, DC, office; Peeyush Karnani, a senior expert
in the New York office; and Mihir Mysore, a partner in the Houston office.
© Cokada/Getty Images
18
Beyond the profound health and economic management maturity varies across industries
uncertainty of our current moment, catastrophic and across companies. In general, banks have the
events are expected to occur more frequently in most mature approach, followed by companies in
the future. The digital revolution, climate change, industries in which safety is paramount, including
stakeholder expectations, and geopolitical risk will oil and gas, advanced manufacturing, and
play major roles. pharmaceuticals. However, we believe that nearly all
organizations need to refresh and strengthen their
The digital revolution has increased the availability approach to risk management to be better prepared
of data, degree of connectivity, and speed at for the next normal. The following discussion
which decisions are made. Those changes offer describes the core of dynamic risk management and
transformational promise but also come with outlines actions companies can take to build it.
the potential for large-scale failure and security
breaches, together with a rapid cascading of
consequences. At the same time, fueled by digital The core of dynamic risk management
connectivity and social media, reputational damage Dynamic risk management has three core
can spark and spread quickly. component activities: detecting potential new
risks and weaknesses in controls, determining
The changing climate presents massive structural the appetite for risk taking, and deciding on the
shifts to companies’ risk-return profiles, which will appropriate risk-management approach (Exhibit 1).
accelerate in a nonlinear fashion. Companies need to
navigate concerns for their immediate bottom lines Detecting risks and control weaknesses
along with pressures from governments, investors, Institutions need both to predict new threats and
and society at large. All that, and natural disasters, to detect changes in existing ones. Today, many
too, are growing more frequent and severe. companies maintain a static and formulaic view of
risks, with limited linkages to business decision
Stakeholder expectations for corporate behavior making. Some of these same companies were
are higher than ever. Firms are expected to act caught flat footed by the COVID-19 pandemic.
lawfully but also with a sense of social responsibility.
Consumers expect companies to take a stand on In the future, companies will require hyperdynamic
social issues, such as those fueling the #MeToo identification and prioritization of risks to keep pace
and Black Lives Matter movements. Employees with the changing environment. They will need to
are increasingly vocal about company policies and anticipate, assess, and observe threats based on
actions. Regulator and government attention is disparate internal and external data points. Dynamic
reflecting societal concerns in areas ranging from risk management will require companies to answer
data privacy to climate change. the following three questions:
An uncertain geopolitical future provides the — How will the risk play out over time? Some risks
backdrop for such pressures. The world is more are slow moving, while others can change and
interconnected than ever before, from supply chains escalate rapidly. Independent of speed, risks
to travel to the flow of information. But those ties can be either cyclical and mean reverting or
are under threat, and most companies have not structural and permanent. Historically, most
designed robust roles within the global system that firms have focused on managing cyclical, mean-
would allow them to keep functioning smoothly if reverting risks, like credit risk, that go up and
connections were abruptly cut. down with macroeconomic cycles. Historically,
the fundamental long-term economics of
Companies require dynamic and flexible risk business lines have held firm, requiring only
management to navigate an unpredictable future tweaks through the cycle. Credit risk in financial
in which change comes quickly. The level of risk- services is an example of such a risk. However,
3 core components of
dynamic risk management
the traditional principles of trajectory and and society at large—and what that means
cyclicality of risks are increasingly becoming to them. The COVID-19 pandemic has had a
less relevant. The global economic shock caused direct impact on most companies but has also
by the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated meaningfully shifted the global economy and
that many companies were not prepared for societal terrain. Companies should consider
events with profound and long-lasting impact whether they have the controls, mitigants, and
that could fundamentally change how business response plans in place to account for worst-
is conducted. case-scenario, systemic risks. For example, as
companies house more personal data, the risks
— Are we prepared to respond to systemic associated with data breaches become more
risks? In today’s world, risk impact can go well systemic, with the potential to impact millions of
beyond next quarter’s financial statements to customers globally. These firms need to consider
have longer-term reputational or regulatory proactively how to protect against and react
consequence. Institutions must also consider to such breaches, including by working with
whether the event triggering the risk has broad external stakeholders, such as customers, law-
implications for their industry, the economy, enforcement agencies, and regulators.
Another area in which advanced analytics can Risk managers will also need strong understanding
capture significant value is in the predictive of data, analytics, and technology, which are driving
detection of risk. One railway operator applied shifts in how most companies operate—a trend only
Web <2020>
Exhibit 2
<RiskManagement>
Exhibit <2> of <2>
Dynamicand
Dynamic andintegrated
integrated risk
riskmanagement,
management, which
which includes
includes the
the ability
ability to
to detect
detect
risks, determine appetite,
risks, determine appetite, and decide on action, is growing ever more critical.
decide on action, is growing ever more critical.
Reset aspiration Establish agile Harness power of Develop risk Fortify risk culture
for risk risk-management data and analytics talent for future
management practices
Move risk from Authorize cross- Digitize transaction Develop new Build true risk-culture
prevention and functional teams workflows; use data to capabilities and ownership in front
mitigation to to make rapid expand view of risk expanded domain line; hold executives
dynamic strategic decisions in characteristics; deploy knowledge to accountable for
enablement and business, algorithms to enable support full cultural failings; link
value creation innovation, and better error detection, understanding of risk culture with daily
risk management more accurate risk landscape business activities
predictions, and and outcomes
microsegmentation
Ritesh Jain is an associate partner in McKinsey’s New York office, Fritz Nauck is a senior partner in the Charlotte office,
Thomas Poppensieker is a senior partner in the Munich office, and Olivia White is a partner in the San Francisco office.
by Javier Martinez Arroyo, Marc Chiapolino, Matthew Freiman, Irakli Gabruashvili, and Luca Pancaldi
© Artpartner-images/Getty Images
26
Before the coming of the pandemic, banks More specifically, to win in the next normal, the
had been reducing the complications and costs risk-management function must make itself more
that arose over the years as they dealt with efficient and effective—something high-performing
escalating regulations and emerging risks by adding risk organizations have already done. We have
policies, processes, and people to their risk and prioritized six specific moves risk organizations
compliance functions. must make:
1
As measured by 2019 Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) ratings and corrected for the impact of scale.
Web <2020>
<RiskManagement>
Exhibit
Exhibit <1>1 of <6>
Some risk-managementactivities
Some risk-management activitiesappear
appeartotobebemore
morefixed
fixedand
andsuitable
suitablefor
for
economies ofscale.
economies of scale.
Total cost of risk management by activity and size of bank
MORE VARIABLE
Credit decisioning
400
Fully variable activity²
Operational risk
The larger the
Risk-function management bank, the higher
300 the proportion of
Cost of risk- Model risk management risk-management
management cost in the activity
activities, as a percentage
index¹ Enterprise risk management of all bank
full-time
Credit data, analytics, and reporting equivalents
200
Credit-risk-model development
Risk technology
Risk-management functions
Risk-management functionscan
cantake
takeaction
actionin
insix
sixareas
areasto
torealize
realizeproductivity
productivity
gains of 30 percent
percent or
or more
more in
in a matter
matter of
of months.
months.
Productivity opportunity, % difference between top and median performers
~30 ~30
~25
~20
~15
To mitigate the increased potential for fraud documents instead of 50 and reserve the more
that typically accompanies changes in this intensive scrutiny for less prominent or smaller
area, automated banks must also improve enterprises. Other methods to rework corporate
their controls. underwriting processes include defining credit
limits by company type or industry (rather than
— Simplify corporate-credit underwriting. Banks on a deal-by-deal basis) and creating a special-
can streamline underwriting that cannot be case system to handle the most complex or
automated, because of the counterparty’s size urgent requests.
or the complexity involved, by reducing the
credit-application documentation and analysis 2. Enhance monitoring
required. For large, well-established, or public The widespread economic fallout from COVID-
companies, risk managers could review a dozen 19 has forced risk managers to rethink how and
Web <2020>
Exhibit 4
<RiskManagement>
Exhibit <4> of <6>
To reduce credit-risk
To reduce credit-risk losses
lossesand
andboost
boostmonitoring,
monitoring,banks
bankscan
cancategorize
categorize
financial flows to leverage transaction
financial flows transaction data.
data.
Small and medium-size enterprise (SME) transactions by category, % of total transactions
Inflows Outflows
Internal self-transfers 14
100
Payments by check 7
Internal self-transfers 14
Other categorized 12
100
Payments by check 6 Uncategorized 4
risks. The new structures sometimes overlap with testing, and monitoring. We estimate that if
ongoing work or obscure its importance. risk functions adopt both centers of excellence
and agile methodologies, they can increase the
To ensure that risk functions are structured in the efficiency of the centralized activities by 10 to
most effective way, they can examine four key 20 percent and save up to 20 percent of their
organizational elements: outsourcing costs. A number of the 20 largest
North American banks have already created
— Clarify roles and responsibilities for all three centers of excellence that report directly to a
lines of defense. Regulatory scrutiny of risk chief risk officer. Many of these groups focus on
practices led many institutions to add controls data, analytics, and reporting.
(and the jobs associated with them) haphazardly,
with limited clarity about who does what. Some — Rationalize risk governance and policies. To
banks switched oversight for technology and focus on what matters most, banks should
cyberrisk from the risk function to a technology consider streamlining their downstream
group and then back to the risk function—moves procedures and policies. Reducing the number
that not only sowed confusion about roles of committees, for example, can not only
and responsibilities but also created potential improve focus, accountability, and lines of
gaps in coverage and duplicate responsibilities. escalation but also save executives’ time. It’s
Banks can improve efficiency by mapping out not uncommon for midsize and large banks to
the duties of the front line, the risk organization, have thousands of risk and compliance policies
and internal audit departments to identify gaps, spawning dozens of procedures, which in turn
fix overlaps, and ensure accountability. A clearer influence processes and the design of controls.
organizational chart could result in cost savings If banks structure their policies to focus on the
of up to 5 percent. areas of highest risk, they can remove needless
red tape. We have seen institutions eliminate up
— Centralize shared resources and add agile to 30 percent of their policies while improving
practices. Risk managers can move these the quality of the rest, reducing costs and
haphazardly added activities and staff into efforts associated with policy administration
centers of excellence—both virtually and and management. Institutions undertaking
physically—which handle common activities such a transformation may find that they could
such as risk data and analytics, reporting, adjust or rewrite nearly all of their policies to
Web <2020>
<RiskManagement>
Exhibit 6
Exhibit <6> of <6>
Touch time for loans • Ratio of STR/ • Qualitative/ • Percentage • Number of • Number of models
• Auto SAR¹ filings to quantitative of time spent risk reports by tier/category
• Credit cards alerts breakdown of on low-value (eg, internal ratings,
• Personal lending KRIs² activities (eg, • Average stress test, internal
• Mortgage or home- • Ratio of alerts to sourcing, cost per capital needs)
equity line of credit STRs • Percentage of processing, report
• Commercial under- automated KRIs quality • Number of models
writing, up to $5 million • Average time to (gathered through assurance) • Average managed by
• Commercial under- clear alert system checks) cost per modeler
writing, up to $5 million • Number of report
adjudication • Ratio of nonalerts • Percentage of teams category • Number of models
• Wholesale to investigation controls tested performing managed by model
personnel within centralized data-related • Report validator
Straight-through utility activities frequency
processing • Know-your- • Percentage of
• Auto customer • Number of • Average models reviewed
• Credit cards personnel as required risk report per year
• Personal lending percentage of assessments length
•Mortgage (assisted total anti–money • Number of model-
lending) laundering • Percentage of fully risk corrective
personnel automated controls actions issued in
• Commercial, up to
past year
$2 million
Javier Martinez Arroyo is a partner in McKinsey’s Paris office, where Marc Chiapolino is a partner; Matthew Freiman is a
partner in the Toronto office, Irakli Gabruashvili is a consultant in the New York office, and Luca Pancaldi is a partner in the
Milan office.
The authors wish to thank Philipp Härle, Holger Harreis, and Olivia White for their contributions to this article.
by Richard Higgins, Grace Liou, Susanne Maurenbrecher, Thomas Poppensieker, and Olivia White
© Aaaaimages/Getty Images
39
The COVID-19 pandemic has created a time of assumptions about risk that individuals hold within
unprecedented change for both public and private the organization; risk practices are the daily actions
organizations across the globe. Executives and that determine the effectiveness of risk management;
boards have had to move quickly to address threats contributing behavior comprises the collective
and seize opportunities, all while continuing to actions that build risk attitudes. Ideally, these actions
protect employee and customer health and safety will be systematic and deliberately intended to
and evolving to adopt new digital and work-from- strengthen individuals’ risk attitudes, with desired
home norms.1 risk behavior built into everyday functioning.
Risk and integrity culture refers to the mindsets and Concrete definition
behavioral norms that determine how an organization Companies that seek to understand risk culture
identifies and manages risk. In this challenging can best begin by establishing concrete, detailed
and highly uncertain moment, risk culture is more definitions. They should clearly spell out the specific
important than ever. Companies cannot rely on elements of risk culture to set aspirations and
reflexive muscles for predicting and controlling measure progress. For example, we define ten
risks. A good risk culture allows an organization to dimensions of risk culture, based on a wide range
move with speed without breaking things. It is an of experiences with companies across all major
organization’s best cross-cutting defense. industries, and incorporating close study of a range
of real-world risk-culture failings (Exhibit 1).
Beyond today’s travails, a strong risk culture is a
critical element to institutional resilience in the Systematic measurement
face of any challenge. In our experience, those Once risk and integrity culture is defined,
organizations that have developed a mature risk measurement can begin. Leading companies
and integrity culture outperform peers through assess themselves systematically, looking at
economic cycles and in the face of challenging mindsets, practices, and behavior.
external shocks. At the same time, companies with
strong risk cultures are less likely to suffer from self- This assessment is often based on interviews
inflicted wounds, in the form of operational mistakes among units and functions, then followed by a more
or reputational difficulties, and have more engaged comprehensive organization-wide survey.
and satisfied customers and employees.
The survey will typically include 20 to 30 questions
This article explores the steps involved in setting up that measure performance against the elements
an effective risk-culture program, when to launch of risk culture (covering mindsets, practices, and
such a program, and the factors we have found to be behavior) and will set the organization-wide
critical for long-term success. baseline. The team can complement results
with qualitative insights gleaned from follow-up
interviews to provide further detail on the particular
Understanding and measuring strengths or weaknesses revealed, and help
risk culture uncover their root causes.
The starting point for most organizations looking to
improve their risk culture is to diagnose the current Instead of using a dedicated risk and integrity
state. Organizations that have built strong risk and survey, many organizations falter by relying on a
integrity cultures seek to understand (and then combination of employee-engagement surveys,
address) three mutually reinforcing drivers: risk focus groups, and analyses of incidents and
mindsets, risk practices, and contributing behavior. near-misses to measure their risk culture. Each
of these tools can bring useful results when used
Risk mindsets can be understood as the set of with sufficient rigor. However, typical employee-
1
Aaron De Smet, Elizabeth Mygatt, Iyad Sheikh, and Brooke Weddle, “The need for speed in the post-COVID-19 era—and how to achieve it,”
September 9, 2020, McKinsey.com.
Transparency Respect
engagement surveys contain only a few relevant risk culture. While maturity levels across different
questions and therefore do not usually uncover dimensions matter, outliers (both strengths and
enough insight to create an effective measure. weaknesses) or areas of change where a survey
These approaches, furthermore, do not provide is repeated over time tend to drive the greatest
a view over time or ready comparisons between insights for an organization. Differences among
organizational units. units, functions, geographies, and tenure levels can
also be illuminating.
We believe that a dedicated survey is an
indispensable tool for obtaining a broad measure In one example of this process, a government-
of a company’s risk culture. It is the only way to owned corporation held a series of town-hall
set a true initial baseline. A comprehensive survey meetings to share the results of its risk-culture
creates hard data, comparable across divisions, survey. The town halls were the first active
geographies, and roles; with repeated use, it communications on risk culture and demonstrated
traces trends through time. The results allow to employees a new openness. The comparative
fact-based conversations about risk culture, data shared showed divergent strengths
fostering engagement while deepening executive- and weaknesses, which stimulated strong
level understanding. interdepartmental conversations in what was a
traditionally siloed organization.
Sharing results
Once an initial baseline is developed, the results As a second example, a high-performing financial
should be shared with leadership teams and the institution created tailored readout packs for a series
broader organization. Transparent results are an of thoughtful discussions between the chief risk
important first step in increasing the focus on officer and the leader of each major line of business
Web <2020>
<Strengthening institutional risk and integrity culture>
Exhibit 2of <2>
Exhibit <2>
The ‘influence
The ‘influence model’
model’ defines four dimensions of risk-culture-change
dimensions of risk-culture-change
programs, ensuring that a breadth of approaches
approachesare
areused.
used.
Capability building
“I have the skills to behave “Systems reinforce “I know what I need to “I see my leaders
in the new way” desired change” change, and I want to do it” behaving differently”
Employees are coached to The organization appoints When things go wrong at a Leaders share risk
consider client needs plus senior leaders with the competitor’s, the company knowledge that supports
other business concerns right expertise to considers how to change decisions and actions
Employees receive training understand and manage its approach Leaders demonstrate
on available communication risks Internal communications appreciation when
channels, both formal and Systems and processes are prominently feature employees raise mistakes,
informal, to identify and in place to quickly identify success stories of change rather than avoiding the
escalate risks potential policy or guideline across different employee issue or penalizing the
Top management is breaches tenures employee
coached on communication The organization Workshops with a cross Leaders expect and
methods for discussing compensates and section of staff are used to encourage people to
risks promotes people to brainstorm improvement challenge their views and
encourage them to act in opportunities around risk decisions
the organization’s best Leaders systematically and
long-term interests effectively communicate
key risks faced by the
business as well as
mitigation approaches
Richard Higgins is an associate partner in McKinsey’s Sydney office, Grace Liou is an associate partner in the Seattle office,
Susanne Maurenbrecher is an associate partner in the Hamburg office, Thomas Poppensieker is a senior partner in the
Munich office, and Olivia White is a partner in the San Francisco office.
The authors wish to thank Tom Martin and Ishanaa Rambachan for their contributions to this article.
46
In normal times organizations face numerous human-caused disasters. Effective action saved
uncertainties of varying consequence. Managers many; others spiraled downward.
deal with challenges by relying on established
structures and processes. These are designed to Existential crises subject organizations to
reduce uncertainty and support calculated bets both extreme uncertainty and severe material
to manage the residual risks. In a serious crisis, consequences; they are often new and unfamiliar
however, uncertainty can reach extreme levels, and and can unfold quickly. In business terms, the
the normal way of working becomes overstrained. present crisis more closely resembles economic
At such times traditional management operating crises of the past. In the financial crisis of
models rarely prove adequate, and organizations 2008–09, for example, many organizations were
with inadequate processes can quickly find simultaneously affected. Qualitatively, however, the
themselves facing existential threats. present crisis is far more severe.
Uncertainty can be measured in magnitude The COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting
and duration. By both measures, the extreme economic recession have affected most large
uncertainty accompanying the public-health organizations around the world. Managers
and economic damage created by the COVID-19 continue to scramble to address rapidly developing
pandemic is unprecedented in modern memory. changes in the public-health environment, public
It should not be surprising, therefore, that policy, and customer behavior. And then there is the
organizations need a new management model to economic uncertainty. The severity and speed of
sustain operations under such conditions. The the crisis is reflected in the International Monetary
magnitude of the uncertainty organizations face Fund’s (IMF) projections for US GDP growth. After
in this crisis—defined partly by the frequency and an estimated GDP expansion of 2.2 percent in
extent of changes in information about it—means 2019 (year-on-year), the US economy, in the IMF’s
that this operating model must enable continuous view, was expected to grow at a rate of 2.1 percent
learning and flexible responses as situations in 2020 (forecast of October 2019). With the
evolve. The duration of the crisis, furthermore, onset of the pandemic, the IMF quickly shifted its
has already exceeded the early predictions of many estimate into contraction, of –5.9 percent in
analysts; business planners are now expecting April 2020, revised to –8.0 percent in June. The
to operate in crisis mode for an extended period. latest estimate (October 2020) is less severe at
Leaders should therefore begin assembling the –4.3 percent, but this would still be the worst result
foundational elements of this operating model in many decades. The forecasting institution
so that they can steer their organizations under foresees the world economy shrinking at a rate
conditions of extreme uncertainty. of –4.4 percent in 2020, after having grown
2.8 percent in 2019 (estimate).1
Understanding extreme uncertainty
Due to the severity of this crisis, many organizations Uncertainty levels from recent global shocks do not
are in a struggle for their existence. An existential approach those of the present COVID-19-triggered
crisis puts at stake the organization’s survival in crisis. The IMF’s GDP contraction forecast for 2020
recognizable form. Readers can probably call to is more than double the estimated contraction
mind numerous individual companies that faced that took place in 2009, the worst year of the
such crises in the recent past. The crises may have earlier global financial crisis. As measured by
been touched off by a single catastrophic incident the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, a metric
or by a series of failures; the sources are familiar— developed jointly by researchers at several US
cyber breaches, financial malfeasance, improper business schools, uncertainty on a daily basis
business practices, safety failures, and natural or has been elevated for nearly 200 days’ running.
1
World economic outlook, October 2020: A long and difficult ascent, International Monetary Fund, October 2020, pp. 141–42, imf.org.
Overcoming challenges
Existential To increase the odds that a new operating model
crises
Short will be effective today, managers must ensure that
it addresses the problems of operating under highly
Low High
uncertain conditions. The COVID-19 operating
Source: McKinsey analysis environment requires that managers reexamine their
2
“US monthly EPU index,” Economic Policy Uncertainty, policyuncertainty.com.
collective thought processes and challenge their rate of transmission of COVID-19 (R0) are central
own assumptions. Failure to do so will create the to forming a view on the likely impact of the
risk of serious errors. Here are some of the pitfalls disease: even a tiny uptick in the reproduction
managers will likely encounter: number can create a dramatic increase in
the expected infection and mortality rates
— Optimism bias. Since managers and their and radically change expectations of likely
organizations have never seen anything like this government measures and consumer behavior.
crisis, existing heuristics learned from years
of management might not apply. One common — Wrong answer. In addition to the instability of
problem is that managers experience optimism information, leaders must also be sensitive to
bias, both individually and collectively. They will be the possibility that information they thought was
inclined to bring forward the date of an expected clear and certain could turn out to be wrong.
revenue rebound or minimize the duration of Managers cannot take their own assumptions
expected business closure. Simply, managers as facts, since new information could emerge
cannot or will not believe how bad the situation that invalidates them. Assumptions and
could get, and the organization ends up planning understanding need to be regularly revisited
for a much milder scenario than transpires. and revised as necessary, as part of the
organization’s practice of continuous learning.
— Informational instability. Information is unstable The operating model must be able to absorb
in the COVID-19 pandemic. Epidemiological data initial wrong answers and override them quickly;
are constantly shifting: infection and mortality organizations can even encourage managers to
rates, the proportion of asymptomatic cases, look for opportunities to update assumptions.
the intensity and effectiveness of testing, the
length of the infectious period, and the extent — Paralysis by analysis. Confusing and ever-
and duration of immunity after infection. The changing data can cause managers to delay
problem extends to poor or missing economic decisions as they search for more analytical
data whose reliability has been affected by the rigor. They may never find it, given the extent
speed and severity of change. Conventional of the crisis we are in. Delayed decision making
business strategy is most often based on is not advisable in a crisis as fast moving and
assumptions about a probable course of events. severe as the COVID-19 pandemic. Delay is
In today’s crisis, a single “most likely” planning in itself a decision, since taking no action has
scenario is unachievable. The sensitivity of consequences—for example, a continued,
statistical models to relatively small changes unchecked spread of the virus. Managers should
in assumptions on key variables creates even rather act on what they do know, and adapt their
greater hazard. For example, projections of the strategy as new information becomes available.
Patrick Finn is a senior partner in McKinsey’s Detroit office, Mihir Mysore is a partner in the Houston office, and
Ophelia Usher is an expert in the Stamford office.
This article was a collaborative effort by Kevin Buehler, Marco Carpineti, Erwann Michel-Kerjan,
Fritz Nauck, and Lorenzo Serino, representing views from McKinsey’s Risk Practice.
© DNY59/Getty Images
54
As COVID-19 continues to threaten lives, and product leaders are contemplating future
communities, and industries around the world, insurance solutions—including public–private
insurers face profound disruptions. Uncertainty insurance partnerships—that would enable insurers
abounds. No one knows when the crisis will truly to remain relevant to their customers.
end, when safe vaccines will be used at scale, or
whether they will stop the pandemic for good. Its Our research shows that the industry’s returns to
ultimate impact on public health and the global shareholders since the beginning of the year were
economy will be measured in the months and years down by 19 percent at the end of October 2020. In
to come. mid-June they had been down by 23 percent—the
sharpest drop in recent memory and deeper than
Underwriters are struggling to calculate their those recorded in many other industries (Exhibit 1).
exposure to pandemic-generated vulnerabilities.
Economists are trying to anticipate the direct and With regard to current business impact, insurers
indirect impact of massive new government debt. will experience pressure on retention rates and
Managers are wondering how long people can margins as customers shop for lower prices. The
work productively from home and maintain healthy impact on claims will vary by line of business: auto
organizational and risk cultures. And in a long- claims may decline because people are driving less
lasting low-interest-rate environment, strategists at the moment, but homeowners’ claims could rise as
Web <2020>
<RiskInsurance>
Exhibit 1 of <2>
Exhibit <1>
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
policyholders work from home. Investment income and assure the chief executives and boards that
will continue to suffer as interest rates stay low, and companies are achieving a proper risk-management
life and annuity carriers will be hardest hit. We also balance. In approaching heightened risk levels,
believe that the pandemic’s full impact on economies CROs aim to limit the downside danger but also
around the world will be felt through 2022. enable the business to make the necessary risk–
reward trade-offs to capture the upside. It is a
The pandemic-related challenges intersect with delicate balance.
cost-reduction and efficiency pressures. These were
intense before the pandemic struck, as discussed For a long time—and especially as a consequence
in McKinsey’s recent state-of-the-industry reports of the financial crisis of 2008–09—the CRO role
on P&C¹ and on life.² Legacy IT systems and, in in financial services was regarded as a necessary
some cases, lagging digital capabilities are growing response to regulatory pressure, to provide required
impediments, as the COVID-19 environment controls and guardrails. Today, the importance of
pushes many more customers toward digital-first the CRO role has outgrown this conception, and that
relationships. Insurers, reinsurers, and brokers that is a good thing. Many CROs are working with CEOs,
made bold moves into digital years ago are now executive teams, and boards, stepping forward in
harvesting the benefits of their investments. Others this crisis and taking the opportunity to shape the
need to catch up in a hurry. future of the organizations they serve. Over the past
few months, we have been listening to leaders of
Given the profound uncertainties and their varying insurers of all sizes around the globe—CEOs, board
impact across business lines, insurers must commit members, CFOs, HR heads, as well as CROs. One
strongly to risk-oriented, structured decision- insight that has emerged is that the CRO role as
making approaches. We believe it is time for chief risk manager has continued to evolve. CROs are
risk officers (CROs) to step up to this challenge. With engaged in the most difficult decisions, providing
their help, the industry can reinvent itself to stay top management with perspectives and guidance
relevant to customers and attractive to investors. on strategic business risks—when to take them and
for which expected financial, organizational health,
and reputational rewards.
The CRO and the evolution of the
insurance industry Unsurprisingly, therefore, leading insurers are
CROs for leading insurers are playing a critical role investing more in their risk-function capabilities.
in the present risky and uncertain environment. At a recent CRO roundtable with 25 leading North
They have risk oversight of activities conducted American insurers, 95 percent of the participants
by the first line (business and corporate functions) indicated that demand for the services of the risk
1
Sylvain Johansson, Andy Luo, Erwann Michel-Kerjan, and Leda Zaharieva, “State of property & casualty insurance 2020: The reinvention
imperative,” April 2020, McKinsey.com.
2
“Life insurance and annuities state of the industry 2018: The growth imperative,” October 2018, McKinsey.com.
3
Salim Hasham, Shoan Joshi, and Daniel Mikkelsen, “Transforming approaches to AML and financial crime,” September 2019, McKinsey.com.
4
Richard Higgins, Grace Liou, Susanne Maurenbrecher, Thomas Poppensieker, and Olivia White, “Strenghtening institutional risk and integrity
culture,” November 2020, McKinsey.com.
Web <2020>
<RiskInsurance>
Exhibit 2 of <2>
Exhibit <2>
Stress testinglinks
Stress testing linksscenarios
scenariostotothe
thekey
keyprofit-and-loss
profit-and-loss factors
factors of of underwriting
income.
underwriting income.
Sanitized auto-insurance dashboard example, impact of factors on P&L metrics
Frequency Distance N1 N2
(driving driven
accidents)
Driving N/A N/A
behavior
Kevin Buehler is a senior partner in McKinsey’s New York office, where Marco Carpineti is a consultant and Lorenzo Serino is a
partner; Erwann Michel-Kerjan is a partner in the Philadelphia office, and Fritz Nauck is a senior partner in the Charlotte office.
The authors wish to thank Abhishek Anand for his contributions to this article.
63
The COVID-19 crisis is dramatically highlighting organizations and policy makers discussed the
the potential impact of high-consequence, low- danger on the global stage. Many organizations
likelihood risks. Low but never zero: that is the accounted for it in their enterprise-risk-management
probability of risks such as a viral epidemic (ERM) frameworks as a high-consequence, low-
ballooning into a pandemic that costs millions likelihood event. Some organizations, especially
of lives and shuts down economies across the in the healthcare and travel sectors, even had
globe. The chances of an extraordinary regional firsthand experience with the SARS pandemic in
catastrophe, whether naturally occurring or 2003. Nonetheless, companies were by and large
human-caused, are similar, as are the disastrous unprepared for COVID-19. More than 50 billion-dollar
effects. A severe earthquake, a massive oil spill, or companies have filed for bankruptcy in 2020 in the
a nuclear accident can result in heavy loss of life, United States alone. As Exhibit 1 shows, furthermore,
ecological damage, and financial loss for countries the pandemic’s adverse economic effects have
and companies. varied widely by industry sector.
The relative improbability of such events well Some high-consequence, low-likelihood risks have
illustrates the decision makers’ dilemma: which to do with business strategy, such as those posed by
of them should their organizations plan for? The the digital disruption; operational risks are another
danger of a pandemic was not unknown. Health category and include serious quality-control failures
Web <2020>
PreparingForRisk
Exhibit 1 of 3
Exhibit 1
The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States varies widely by
The impact
industry of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States varies widely by
sector.
industry sector.
Year-over-year change in real GDP for selected industries, 2Q 2019 to 2Q 2020,1 %
Accommodations Arts,
Finance and Transportation and food entertainment,
insurance Construction Retail and warehousing services and recreation
0
–7
–9
–23
–45
–60
1
Ron Miller, “How AWS came to be,” Tech Crunch, July 2, 2016, techcrunch.com.
2
A aron De Smet, Gregor Jost, and Leigh Weiss, “Three keys to faster, better decisions,” McKinsey Quarterly, May 2019, McKinsey.com.
3
Amit S. Mukherjee, “The fire that changed an industry,” InformIT, October 1, 2008, informit.com.
4
Michael Watkins and Max Bazerman, “Predictable surprises: The disasters you should have seen coming,” Harvard Business Review, April
2003, hbr.org.
The disaster you could have stopped: Preparing for extraordinary risks 65
floods, financial fraud, economic recessions, oil the whole company is situated along the vertical
spills, and other catastrophes, whether natural axis and the decision makers’ level of certainty
or human-caused. Decision makers should about the impact is situated on the horizontal axis.
prioritize these potential threats, making big bets High placement on the vertical axis means that
on those that would precipitate an existential the company’s existence would be threatened if
crisis for their organization. this risk occurred—or the company would miss a
massive opportunity. Low vertical-axis placement
Understanding the potential impact of such events means that the impact or opportunity would be
is the first step for decision makers in reducing the limited or isolated. The vertical axis allows senior
chance that a particular event results in an existential decision makers to distinguish risks that require
crisis. The likelihood does not matter for these board- and CEO-level attention from those that can
risks—they are all unlikely, according to traditional be managed at a lower level. These risks will vary
ERM programs. Once scored by ERM, they all land in significantly by company and industry sector. For
the same low-likelihood corner. However, the impact example, the impact of COVID-19 is varied according
on the organization does matter. Not all the risks are to a company’s ability to conduct operations and
equal: some would create an existential crisis while serve customers with employees working remotely.
others would not. Thus decision makers need a way
to distinguish among these high-consequence, low- A risk placed to the right on the horizontal axis
likelihood risks. means that decision makers are relatively certain of
its scope and intensity; leftward placement signals
doubt about the risk’s reach and impact. Using
Identifying the most important risks the horizontal axis, decision makers recognize
To identify and define the most important risks, we the differences between familiar risks with known
recommend using a two-by-two risk grid (Exhibit impact and risks that they are still investigating.
2). In this plan, the potential impact of an event on The placement of low-certainty risks will shift as
decision makers learn more about the potential risk.
Exhibit 2
Organizations must
Organizations mustplan
plan for
for predictable
predictablesurprises—events
surprises — events that
that would
would pose
pose an an
existential crisis.
existential crisis.
High-consequence, low-likelihood risks can be plotted according to scope and certainty of impact
Whole company,
High certain impact:
predictable
surprises
Scope of
impact
Risk threshold
Low
Low High
Level of certainty
about impact
The disaster you could have stopped: Preparing for extraordinary risks 67
Different companies, same risk, different impact
The exhibit demonstrates how pairs of with several sources of raw materials and fashion items that are stable from year
companies with much in common and some several manufacturing sites. Electronics to year. The other sells trendy fashion
differences would assess the same risk on company B has a leaner supply-chain items that have a life cycle of eight weeks,
the risk grid. model. If the two companies are assessing after which they lose their customer
the risk of a pandemic, electronics appeal. Imagine these two companies are
The first scenario shows two electronics company B is at greater risk of a whole- assessing the risk of a labor strike in the
companies with the same value proposition company disaster, and the greater risk is major US port they share where their items
and different operating models. They shown in the risk grid. arrive from Asia. If the clothing items of
make the exact same product for the same trendy fashion company C are stuck in a
customers. The main difference between Scenario two shows two retail companies port for months, the items become virtually
them is their supply chain. Electronics with different business value propositions. worthless. Customers are not interested
company A has a resilient supply chain One sells traditional men’s and women’s in last quarter’s fashions. The traditional
Web <2020>
PreparingForRisk
Exhibit
Exhibit 3 of 3
The same
same risk
risk will
will have a different
different impact
impacton ondifferent
differentcompanies,
companies,depending
dependingon culture, supply
on culture,
chain, supplyand
financials, chain,
otherfinancials, and other characteristics.
characteristics.
Customer loyalty
Brand identity
Supply-chain resilience
Psychological safety1
Inventory durability
Financial stability
1
The freedom to raise mistakes and problems without fear of repercussions.
Organizations can sometimes survive existential their risk grid based on the size and certainty of their
crises, though with diminished value. But crises impact on the company’s core value.
and missed opportunities can also cause an entire
organization to fail. It is therefore important Avoiding bias in your risk grid
for decision makers to consider all types of high- When identifying the risks of greatest consequence,
consequence, low-likelihood risks. By measuring decision makers need to avoid optimism bias—a
the impact on the core, they can differentiate view that tends to see more positive outcomes than
among them, illuminating the particular issues that the evidence warrants. Confirmation and anchoring
are of highest importance to the organization. bias also reduce predicted impact—through
assumptions that future threats will recapitulate
Conducting a ‘premortem’ for risk events those of the past.
The premortem exercise is a technique decision
makers can use to identify which predictable Biases can be partly neutralized by a healthy
surprises would have serious consequences on organizational culture in which people are
their organization. It involves a thought exercise rewarded for speaking up, sharing dissenting
in which the core value proposition is assumed to ideas, and listening to others’ voices. For such
have been damaged or destroyed. Decision makers a culture to thrive, people must feel completely
then consider all the possibilities that could have secure in sharing their views. Without that personal
led to this, with help from risks experts who have security, important risks might go undiscovered.
been warning about the potential for such events. Whistleblowers, furthermore, must be protected
Missed opportunities should also be considered. A and their concerns investigated—especially when
diversity of perspectives and the quality of debate the risks in question are those that could cause
are essential conditions for making high-quality, physical harm—such as catastrophic accidents
big-bet decisions quickly. To obtain perspectives due to product-safety failures.
of sufficient diversity, especially for external risks,
organizations sometimes need to bring in experts. Impact measurement
For example, an insurance company might bring The goal is to create a risk grid where the
in hydrologists and climate-change scientists to predictable surprises that could destroy the
consider how their exposure to flood risk might be organization are measured according to impact.
evolving. Once these “whole-company risks” have Their probability is not in question here, since
been identified, decision makers can plot them on all of these risks are considered low likelihood.
The disaster you could have stopped: Preparing for extraordinary risks 69
However, an organization’s confidence in its impact them; in another approach, leaders are chosen and
assessments does matter. Once the risks are assigned to explore these questions and monitor
mapped on the vertical axis (severity of impact), the organization for ideas. Whatever method an
decision makers must continue to probe them. organization chooses, the outcome should be a
range of potentially effective actions for decision
On the horizontal axis (certainty of impact), risks makers to consider.
positioned to the left (low certainty) could shift
position as more about them is learned. For those From the lists, leaders should identify actions that
risks situated farther to the right on this axis, their could reduce the impact of several risks at once.
higher certainty of impact signals to the board and Those that would reduce harm significantly in the
the CEO that mitigating these risks will require here and now can be taken as no-regrets moves;
investment (big bets). others can be designated as trigger-based decisions,
to be taken when certain conditions occur.
Fritz Nauck is a senior partner in McKinsey’s Charlotte office, Ophelia Usher is an expert in the Stamford office, and Leigh
Weiss is a senior expert in the Boston office.
The authors wish to thank Aaron De Smet and Mihir Mysore for their contributions to this article.
The disaster you could have stopped: Preparing for extraordinary risks 71
How the voluntary carbon
market can help address
climate change
The voluntary carbon market is gaining momentum and plays an
increasingly important role in limiting global warming. Here’s how.
This article was a collaborative effort by Christopher Blaufelder, Joshua Katz, Cindy Levy,
Dickon Pinner, and Jop Weterings.
© Getty Images
72
As business leaders set increasingly ambitious standards such as Gold Standard and Verified
commitments to reduce global greenhouse-gas Carbon Standard (VCS)—credits can be issued.
(GHG) emissions, a market is developing that can The impact of a carbon credit can only be
help to achieve them by supplementing companies’ claimed—that is, counted toward a climate
efforts to reduce their own emissions. This is the commitment—once the credit has been retired
rapidly growing market for voluntary carbon credits. (canceled in a registry), after which it can no
longer be sold. A carbon credit is considered a
Carbon credits (often referred to as “offsets”) “voluntary carbon credit” when it is bought and
have an important dual role to play in the battle retired on a voluntary basis rather than as part of
against climate change. They enable companies to a process of compliance with legal obligations.
support decarbonization beyond their own carbon
footprint, thus accelerating the broader transition The proceeds from the sale of voluntary carbon
to a lower-carbon future. They also help finance credits enable the development of carbon-
projects for removal of carbon dioxide from the reduction projects across a wide array of project
atmosphere—delivering negative emissions, which types. These include, among others, renewable
will be needed to neutralize residual emissions that energy; avoiding emissions from fossil-fuel-
will persist even under the most optimistic scenarios based alternatives; natural climate solutions,
for decarbonization. However, while the voluntary such as reforestation, avoided deforestation, or
carbon credit market is currently experiencing agroforestry; energy efficiency; and resource
significant momentum, it is still relatively small. recovery, such as avoiding methane emissions from
The recently launched report by the Taskforce on landfills or wastewater facilities.
Scaling Voluntary Carbon Markets aims to create
a blueprint for solutions that could help overcome While most of the projects types that include
obstacles to its further growth. (For more about renewable energy, avoided deforestation, and
the taskforce, which McKinsey supports as a resource recovery focus on avoiding carbon
knowledge partner, please read our article "Scaling emissions, others, such as reforestation, focus on
voluntary carbon markets to help meet climate removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.
goals."¹) This article will explain how carbon credits This is a meaningful difference, illustrating the
work and how they can help in the global effort to dual role voluntary carbon credits can play in
address climate change. addressing climate change:
¹Christopher Blaufelder, Cindy Levy, Peter Mannion, Dickon Pinner, and Jop Weterings, “Scaling voluntary carbons markets to help meet climate
goals,” November 2020, McKinsey.com.
²Emissions that can only be eliminated at prohibitive cost or that cannot be eliminated with existing technology.
How the voluntary carbon market can help address climate change 73
Criteria for carbon credits
Carbon credits should represent emission reductions or carbon dioxide removals that are:
— real and measurable—realized and not projected or planned, and quantified through a recognized methodology, using
conservative assumptions
— permanent—not reversed; relating to projects with a reversibility risk such as forestry projects, which could suffer from fire,
logging, or disease; here, comprehensive risk mitigation and a mechanism to compensate for any reversals need to be in place
— additional—would not have been realized if the project had not been carried out, and the project itself would not have been
undertaken without the proceeds from the sale of carbon credits
Additionally, it is important that appropriate safeguards are in place to ensure projects comprehensively address and mitigate all
potential environmental and social risks.
In a recent analysis, we found that at least 5 words, the target needs to be in line with the
gigatons of negative emissions will be needed level of decarbonization required to limit global
annually to reach net-zero emissions by 2050. warming to well below 2 degrees Celsius above
These could be realized through a combination preindustrial levels at a minimum—and ideally be
of natural climate solutions such as reforestation in line with a 1.5-degree pathway, which scientists
(for example, sequestering carbon in trees) and estimate would reduce the odds of initiating
nascent technology-based carbon capture, use, the most dangerous and irreversible effects of
and storage solutions such as direct air capture climate change. For setting such a target, the
with carbon storage (DACCS), and bioenergy Science Based Targets initiative has developed
with carbon capture and storage (BECCS). methodologies, which have been already adopted
Voluntary carbon credits can help finance the by more than 1,000 companies, including many
scale-up of these solutions. leading multinationals. To achieve the required
emissions reductions, companies can pull levers
such as improving energy efficiency, transitioning
The role of voluntary carbon credits in to renewable energy, and addressing value-chain
corporate climate commitments emissions.
A credible corporate climate commitment begins
with setting an emissions reduction target that As a next step, a company may commit to a
covers both a company’s direct and indirect GHG target that involves the use of voluntary carbon
emissions: if a company does not already have credits—either to compensate for emissions that it
an emissions baseline from which to set a target, has not been able to eliminate yet or to neutralize
creating one is a necessary first step. Aligning such residual emissions that cannot be further
a target’s ambition level with the latest climate reduced due to prohibitive costs or technological
science is widely seen as best practice. In other limitations. These types of targets come with
³We estimated the voluntary carbon market size based on five standards: VCS, Gold Standard, Climate Action Reserve, American Carbon Registry,
and Plan Vivo. We excluded ARB-eligible credits and Gold Standard–labeled Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) used for meeting compliance
targets.
In the context of corporate target setting, “carbon neutral” refers to offsetting all unabated greenhouse-gas emissions through
the application of carbon credits to a given part of an organization’s footprint (for example, company-level, activity-level,
product-level), usually on an annual basis. The term carbon neutral is typically used to cover other greenhouse gases as well;
relevant standards, such as PAS2060, clearly specify carbon neutral’s scope as including carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e)
emissions, beyond just carbon dioxide.
“Climate neutral” is often used interchangeably with carbon neutral, but it places more of an emphasis on covering greenhouse
gases beyond carbon dioxide. In addition, it can include climate impacts other than greenhouse-gas emissions, for example,
radiative forcing from aircraft contrails.
While the exact definition of “net zero” is still being debated, it is considered a forward-looking commitment requiring companies
to reduce their emissions and balance remaining (residual) emissions by a given target year. There is an emerging view among
stakeholders, including nongovernmental organizations and corporate climate leaders, that a credible net-zero target requires
reducing emissions in line with the latest climate science and neutralizing residual emissions (at net zero) using carbon dioxide
removals (not carbon credits from emissions avoidance/reduction projects).
Finally, both “carbon negative” and “climate positive,” which are used interchangeably, have not yet been clearly defined, but
they imply going beyond the targets described above to make a net-positive impact on our climate.
How the voluntary carbon market can help address climate change 75
Exhibit
Thevoluntary
The voluntarycarbon
carbon market
market hashas grown
grown significantly
significantly in recent
in recent years. years.
Voluntary carbon market, millions of metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent Issuances Retirements
200
150
100
50
0
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
(estimate)
Note: We estimated the voluntary carbon market size based on 5 standards: Verified Carbon Standard (VCS), Gold Standard (GS), Climate Action Reserve (CAR),
American Carbon Registry (ACR), and Plan Vivo. We excluded ARB-eligible credits and Gold Standard–labeled CERs used for meeting compliance targets.
Data were retrieved from aforementioned registries on December 2, 2020, for YTD volumes up until the end of November (ie, 150 million tCO2e of issuances
and 81 million tCO2e of retirements). We projected volumes for full-year 2020, based on extrapolation in line with historical seasonality (past 5 years), and did
not adjust for any COVID-19 related impacts on seasonality patterns.
Source: ACR; CAR; GS; Plan Vivo; VCS
record this year, with issuances and retirements Natural climate solutions (NCS), a category including
both growing by approximately one-third compared project types such as reforestation, avoided
with 2019. After years of declining prices (from deforestation, improved forest management, and
an average price of around $7 per ton in 2008 to agroforestry, have grown faster than any other
around $3 per ton in 2019⁴) due to supply outpacing project category and contributed significantly to the
demand, we expect average prices to go up in the voluntary carbon market’s growth trajectory. From
near to medium term, mainly due to strong demand 2016 to 2019, issuances within this category more
growth especially for higher-cost project types than doubled every year, on average—and in 2019,
such as reforestation and carbon dioxide removal NCS accounted for 53 percent of total issuances.
projects more generally (see sidebar “Issuances Meanwhile, retirements in this category have also
and retirements”). While still relatively small, the rapidly grown (close to 50 percent per year, on
voluntary carbon market is experiencing significant average). We believe this trend could be the result
momentum and its impact (and future potential) is of increased awareness of NCS’s potential (they
getting more and more attention. can deliver one-third of the emissions reductions
To analyze the voluntary carbon market, we focus on two metrics: issuances and retirements, which together give a good idea
of market dynamics. Issuance volume is a proxy for supply, as it represents voluntary carbon credits issued by a standard (for
example, Gold Standard, VCS) upon the successful verification of emission reductions or carbon dioxide removals realized by a
certified carbon-reduction project. Retirement volume is a proxy for demand, as it represents voluntary carbon credits bought
and canceled in a registry, preventing the onward sale of the certificates. Only upon retirement can the buyer in whose name
the credit was retired claim its impact (that is, count the credit toward a climate commitment).
needed to align with the Paris Agreement between the progress of the carbon-reduction projects in
now and 2030⁵), a growing focus on carbon dioxide their portfolio. Stakeholders also regularly raise
removal (of which NCS is the most cost-effective questions about certain types of projects, such
and technologically proven method), and buyers’ as those related to additionality in large-scale
preference for co-benefits beyond climate-change renewable-energy projects; biodiversity in the
mitigation, such as biodiversity and impact on context of afforestation projects planting non-
local communities. native species and/or monocultures; leakage and
insufficient local-community engagement in the
case of avoided deforestation; or permanence of
What’s next: Challenges and natural climate solutions more broadly (see sidebar
opportunities “Additionality, leakage, and permanence defined”).
To accelerate the voluntary carbon market’s growth
trajectory and realize its full potential, it will be While reputable standards have implemented
important to address some significant challenges. safeguards to address these issues, the
These include the need to strengthen impact combination of insufficient transparency and
and quality assurance, to align stakeholders on continued stakeholder skepticism has led buyers
the criteria for credible use of voluntary carbon to demand a further strengthening of impact and
credits as part of an overall climate strategy, build quality assurance. As a result, we expect innovation
new market infrastructure, and reduce regulatory in measurement, reporting, and verification
uncertainty. We believe that implementing practices to accelerate over the coming years.
innovative solutions to these challenges could
unlock further growth. The recently launched Aligning stakeholders on credible use of
Taskforce on Scaling Voluntary Carbon Markets voluntary carbon credits
aims to create a blueprint for these solutions. There is currently no consensus among
stakeholders on what it takes to use voluntary
Strengthening impact and quality assurance carbon credits credibly as part of an overall climate
While reputable standards such as Gold Standard strategy. Therefore, companies may have different
and VCS certify projects’ adherence to the interpretations of the role voluntary carbon credits
requirements of their respective methodologies, could play in their journeys toward net-zero. Key
buyers typically have limited transparency on points of discussion include the extent to which
⁵ Bronson Griscom et al., “Natural climate solutions,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, October 2017, Volume 114, Number 44,
pp. 11645–50, pnas.org.
How the voluntary carbon market can help address climate change 77
Additionality, leakage, and permanence defined
A carbon-reduction project is considered “additional” when its impact (emission reductions and/or removals) would not have been realized
if the project had not been carried out, and that the project itself would not have been undertaken without the proceeds from the sale of
carbon credits. As technology costs continue to fall, a growing number of renewable-energy projects no longer need the proceeds from
the sale of carbon credits to be viable—a key reason why the criterion of additionality is particularly relevant in the context of renewable
energy projects. In response, standard bodies have started to phase out large-scale renewable-energy projects. For example, VCS no
longer certifies new, grid-connected renewable-energy projects unless they’re located in the least-developed countries.
Leakage occurs when a carbon-reduction project displaces emission-causing activities and produces higher emissions outside the
project boundary. For example, protecting a certain forest area may cause loggers to go elsewhere. Leakage risk can be mitigated by
strengthening project design as well as conservatively quantifying emission reductions and removals, making appropriate adjustments
for estimated leakage.
Carbon-reduction projects should realize permanent emission reductions and/or removals. Where projects have a reversibility
risk—such as forestry projects, which could suffer from fire, logging, or disease—comprehensive risk mitigation and a mechanism to
compensate for any reversals needs to be in place. It is common practice for standard bodies to include buffer provisions (requiring all
projects with reversibility risk to set aside a certain percentage of credits in a buffer or insurance pool). In the unfortunate event of a
reversal of emission reductions and/or removals (for example, due to fire or disease), credits from the buffer would be used to cover
the losses.
a company can rely on voluntary carbon credits could help increase liquidity and scale transactions,
versus reducing its own footprint; the type of credits provided that the quality of credits traded and
(for example, emissions avoidance/reduction versus integrity of market participants are ensured.
carbon dioxide removal) to use, and how their role
may evolve over time. There is a clear distinction Reducing regulatory uncertainty
between the role of voluntary carbon credits today The negotiations over the Paris Agreement’s Article 6,
and that which they will play when a company has all which introduces a new international carbon
but fully decarbonized its footprint and needs only market/mechanism, are ongoing. As a result, the
to neutralize its residual emissions. implications of Article 6 for the voluntary carbon
market are still unclear. Should voluntary purchases
Building new market infrastructure of carbon credits by private-sector actors help
Today, voluntary carbon credits are mainly traded countries achieve their post-2020 climate pledges
over the counter, resulting in limited transparency (which are referred to as nationally determined
on market data (for example, transaction volumes, contributions), or should they be incremental to such
price levels) and a paucity of reference data, which targets? Will governments continue to allow projects
was a key barrier to market growth in the past. to issue voluntary carbon credits? When is double-
Standardized, tradable products and contracts counting an issue, and how can that be avoided?
Christopher Blaufelder is a partner in McKinsey’s Zurich office; Joshua Katz is a partner in the
Stamford office; Cindy Levy is a senior partner in the London office; Dickon Pinner is a senior partner in
the San Francisco office; and Jop Weterings is director of environmental sustainability, based in the
Amsterdam office.
The authors wish to thank Alexis Depiesse, Damien Mourey, and Julian Vennekens for their contributions to
this article.
How the voluntary carbon market can help address climate change 79
Derisking
81 Derisking AI by design:
How to build risk management
into AI development
by Juan Aristi Baquero, Roger Burkhardt, Arvind Govindarajan, and Thomas Wallace
© Getty Images
81
Artificial intelligence (AI) is poised to redefine how In a previous article, we described the challenges
businesses work. Already it is unleashing the power posed by new uses of data and innovative
of data across a range of crucial functions, such applications of AI. Since then, we’ve seen
as customer service, marketing, training, pricing, rapid change in formal regulation and societal
security, and operations. To remain competitive, expectations around the use of AI and the personal
firms in nearly every industry will need to adopt AI data that are AI’s essential raw material. This is
and the agile development approaches that enable creating compliance pressures and reputational risk
building it efficiently to keep pace with existing for companies in industries that have not typically
peers and digitally native market entrants. But they experienced such challenges. Even within regulated
must do so while managing the new and varied risks industries, the pace of change is unprecedented.
posed by AI and its rapid development.
In this complex and fast-moving environment,
The reports of AI models gone awry due to the traditional approaches to risk management may not
COVID-19 crisis have only served as a reminder that be the answer (see sidebar “Why traditional model
using AI can create significant risks. The reliance of risk management is insufficient”). Risk management
these models on historical data, which the pandemic cannot be an afterthought or addressed only by
rendered near useless in some cases by driving model-validation functions such as those that
sweeping changes in human behaviors, make them currently exist in financial services. Companies
far from perfect. need to build risk management directly into their
Model risk management (MRM) in — Traditional MRM workflows are applications are very different from the
regulated industries such as banking is often sequential and require six to 12 traditional model types (for example,
currently performed by dedicated and weeks of review time after the model capital models, stress-testing models,
independent teams reporting to the chief development is complete, which delays and credit-risk models), and traditional
risk officer. While these firms have developed deployment. These workflows are not MRM approaches are not easily applied.
a robust MRM approach to improve the easily adapted to the agile and iterative
governance and control of their critical development cycles frequently used in — AI and machine-learning algorithms
models determining capital requirements and AI model development. are often embedded in larger AI
lending decisions, this approach is usually application systems, such as software-
not ideal for firms with different requirements — MRM is often focused more on as-a-service (SaaS) offerings from
or in less heavily regulated industries, for the traditional risk types (primarily financial vendors, in ways that are significantly
following reasons: risks, such as capital adequacy and more complex and more opaque
credit risk) and may not fully cover the than traditional models. This greatly
— MRM is typically based on a point-in- new and more diverse risks arising complicates coordination between
time model assessment (for example, from widespread use of AI such as those who review the model and
once every one to five years), which reputational risk, consumer and those who assess the application and
assumes that the models are largely conduct risk, and employee risk. platform (IT risk) or the vendor (third-
static between reviews. AI models learn party risk).
from data, and their logic changes — Some applications and use cases,
when they are retrained to learn from such as chatbots, natural-language
new data. For instance, a fraud model processing, and HR analytics, can
is retrained weekly in order to adapt to qualify as “models” under regulatory
new scams. definitions used in banking. But these
A large food manufacturer developed an party review of the model, which uncovered that the company needed to undertake a
analytics solution to forecast demand for several problems with the model, including broader initiative to embed risk management
each of its products across geographies in a critical data leakage. The model had into model development to prevent this
order to optimize manufacturing, logistics, accidentally included a feature that captured and other issues from recurring. The
and the overall supply chain. The new model the actual demand. Once the feature was manufacturer began the effort by creating
showed higher accuracy compared with the removed, the model accuracy dropped below new roles within the group to perform model
company’s existing expert-based approach. the existing expert-based approach. review, defining roles and responsibilities
for model checks throughout the modeling
But before the model was deployed, the This revelation led to a complete redesign of pipeline, and implementing standards for
manufacturer initiated an independent third- the model architecture and the realization development and documentation of analytics.
associated risk. They can move toward a safe and controls into their analytics-development processes
agile approach to analytics much faster than if (Exhibit 2):
they had to create a stand-alone control function
for review and validation for models and analytics — Ideation. They first work to understand the
solutions (see sidebar “An energy company takes business use case and its regulatory and
steps toward derisking by design”). reputational context. An AI-driven decision
engine for consumer credit, for example, poses
As an example, one of the most relevant risks of AI a much higher bias risk than an AI-driven
and machine learning is bias in data and analytics chatbot that provides information to the
methodologies that might lead to unfair decisions for same customers. An early understanding of
consumers or employees. To mitigate this category the risks of the use case will help define the
of risk, leading firms are embedding several types of appropriate requirements around the data and
Companies in industries that have been to produce higher-quality coal. The a centralized inventory for all analytics
running analytical models for decades company set up an analytics center of use cases and related information (such
under the scrutiny of regulators, such as excellence (COE), which discovered that as developer and owners); establishing
financial services, often have a foundation thousands of analytics use cases had a tiering system to identify the most
for moving to a derisk-by-design model. been developed and deployed across the material models; creating standards for
organization without any clear oversight, model development and documentation;
Organizations in industries that have creating risks for human health and safety, defining and implementing requirements
adopted analytics more recently and are financial performance, and company for model review and monitoring for all
less regulated (at least in the area of model reputation. models; and defining model-governance
outputs) will need to build their capabilities processes, roles,and responsibilities for all
nearly from scratch. In response, the COE appointed a model stakeholders across the modeling pipeline.
manager to oversee the model-governance These changes helped the organization
One large North American energy rollout across the organization. The take a giant step toward embedding risk
company initiated a multiyear analytics manager’s team identified six key priorities: management into the end-to-end process
transformation in order to improve the implementing a process to identify of model development.
efficiency of current assets—for example, models as they are developed; creating
sprint-based development approaches, relying But monitoring AI risk cannot fall solely on risk
more on developer testing and input from analytics managers. Different teams affected by analytics
teams, so they can focus on review rather than risk need to coordinate oversight to ensure end-to-
taking responsibility for the majority of testing and end coverage without overlap, support agile ways of
quality control. Additionally, they will need to reduce working, and reduce the time from analytics concept
one-off “static” exercises and build in the capability to value (Exhibit 3).
to monitor AI on a dynamic, ongoing basis and
support iterative development processes. AI risk management requires that each team
expand its skills and capabilities, so that skill sets
Exhibit 3
The responsibilities for enabling safe and ethical innovation with artificial intelligence span
multiple parts of the organization.
1
Artificial intelligence/machine learning.
— Create the conceptual design. Build on the — Adopt an agile engagement model. Bring
overarching principles to establish the basic together analytics teams and risk managers
framework for AI risk management. Ensure this to understand their mutual responsibilities
covers the full model-development life cycle and working practices, allowing them to solve
Exhibit 4
Both analytics and risk professionals will need to complement their traditional skill sets with
sufficient knowledge of the others’ function.
While AI applications can be developed efforts. This fragmentation created a host demonstrate that all AI risks were managed
in a decentralized fashion across an of challenges around key risk processes, through the development life cycle.
organization, managing AI risk should be including tracking and assessing
coordinated more centrally in order to be the risks of AI embedded in vendor The bank alleviated these issues by
effective. A major North American bank technologies, triaging and risk oversight establishing one multidisciplinary team
learned this lesson when it set out to of AI tools, building controls into AI model to define a clear target state of AI risk
create a new set of AI risk-management development involving multiple analytics management, build alignment across
capabilities to complement its existing groups, and operationalizing ethical stakeholders, clarify AI governance
risk frameworks. Intitially, multiple groups principles on data and AI approved by the requirements, and specify the engagement
began their own AI risk-management board. As a result, the bank struggled to model and technical requirements
conflicts and determine the most efficient training can build institutional knowledge of
way of interacting fluidly during the course of new model types. Teams with regular review
the development life cycle. Integrate reviews responsibilities (risk, legal, and compliance) will
and approvals into agile or sprint-based need to become adept “translators,” capable of
development approaches, and push risk understanding and interpreting analytics use
managers to rely on input from analytics teams, cases and approaches. Critical teams will need
so they can focus on reviews rather than taking to build and hire in-depth technical capabilities
responsibility for the majority of testing and to ensure risks are fully understood and
quality control. appropriately managed.
Juan Aristi Baquero and Roger Burkhardt are partners in McKinsey’s New York office, Arvind
Govindarajan is a partner in the Boston office, and Thomas Wallace is a partner in the London office.
The authors wish to thank Rahul Agarwal for his contributions to this article.
© MirageC/Getty Images
91
The economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic An optimized model landscape
have thrown into stark relief the significant As the economy begins to revive, organizations will
challenges facing banks’ financial models. Some likely be under budgetary stress. Differing priorities
models have failed in the crisis, an outcome that has will compete for fewer resources. Leaders will have
drawn attention to models generally. The causes of to make smart choices to realize model strategies,
the failure include not only COVID-19 effects but also investing efficiently and sustainably. Banks will
regulatory requirements and models’ increasing time likely seek to upgrade their modeling capabilities,
to market. Institutions are realizing that even models rationalize the model landscape, and streamline the
which have not been significantly affected by these processes for developing, monitoring, maintaining,
stresses are wanting in other ways. and validating models.
The present crisis is creating a moment in which Banks will have to manage trade-offs among
banks can rethink the entire model landscape and expected impact on capital, regulatory provisions,
model life cycle. The next S-curve for model risk costs to remediate issues, and capacity constraints.
management (MRM) includes new model strategies The objectives will be best served by avoiding
to address new regulation and changing business unnecessary complexity. As part of the effort to
needs. Models must become more accurate, so rationalize the model landscape, better models will be
banks need to recalibrate them more frequently and built—those that ensure regulatory compliance but
develop new models more rapidly. A sustainable are also more accurate and best serve the business.
operating model is needed, since monitoring,
validation, and maintenance activities must support Models will also be recalibrated and run more
the redevelopment and adjustment of models. The frequently. Some will be replaced by next-
solution will have to be designed to manage models generation models, an effort that will require
effectively over the long term. investment in technology and data initiatives to
serve the business. The development cycle for
The new strategy will require a top-down approach new models will be shortened, so that they can
to model development because the institution has to be deployed faster. To manage increasing costs,
be able to identify those changes that can be made banks will have to ensure that model development,
through overlays and those that need recalibration monitoring, and validation are performed efficiently.
and redevelopment. Once the model-development Banks also must demonstrate to regulators that
wave is complete, model validation, monitoring, and their model-management frameworks are robust
maintenance can be “industrialized”—conducted and that the impact of the crisis on models is being
in a methodical, automated manner, sufficient capably addressed.
for managing an increasing number of models.
High standards are needed for both model risk
management and regulatory requirements. The role of the model-risk-management
function
For the most part, quick solutions become Proactive MRM activities, aligned with both
unsustainable in the long run, for several reasons: business needs and risk-management objectives,
experience has shown that banks cannot rely on must be in place to prevent overgrowth of the model
expert judgment alone; many solutions address inventory. To ensure that the inventory is rational
temporary conditions (such as the effects of and effective, banks need to manage the model
government intervention or changes in customer landscape as a whole. They also need to ensure that
behavior); budgets are strained by the resources model quality is high. Gaining transparency to direct
needed to monitor, recalibrate, and develop or such efforts can involve deploying model workflow
redevelop the ever-increasing model inventory; and inventory tools, consistently applied model-
and finally, the short time periods in which the work risk-rating approaches, and regular monitoring of
must be done demand a more industrialized and model performance and use.
comprehensive approach.
for both development and validation. New Crucially, banks must develop a model strategy for
organizational structures should be established the coming years that meets these demands in a
to ensure cross-functional teams, career- and cost-efficient manner.
knowledge-development opportunities, rotation
programs, and an effective location strategy. As model-life-cycle processes are reimagined, the
A multidisciplinary team, with representatives ultimate goal is to bring about strategic change. But
from business, development, technology, and flexibility is built into the process, so progressive
validation, can be used to break down siloes and efficiency gains, such as technical solutions, can
meet the needs of various stakeholders. be made to capture near-term benefits until more
fundamental strategic programs are completed. For
— Ownership. Most organizations that have been automation, processes need to be standardized.
successful in optimizing their model landscape This is accomplished through a complete review of
have established clear model ownership and process maps, applying lean fundamentals.
defined roles for those model owners. This ensures
that the model-life-cycle process is integrated MRM should become the agency driving model
across the organization, with stakeholders efficiency. Modeling teams and business
interacting in a coordinated manner. Where model stakeholders will need to work alongside risk,
ownership has not been established, strong including the MRM and model-validation teams.
focus should be given to onboarding programs to Together they can fully utilize MRM frameworks
ensure the business understands its model risk to manage the increasing number of models
management responsibilities. efficiently—including newly developed and
redeveloped models as well as the monitoring and
validation conforming to the increasing level of
Streamlining and automation standardization and automation. The big lesson for
This perfect storm of model-inventory revisions and the new MRM framework is that it must establish
development presents organizations with a unique standards and standardize processes. This work is
opportunity to act strategically. The requirement essential for streamlining and automation.
is clear: institutions need to streamline the entire
model life cycle, including ideation, development, The increasing number of models poses a significant
implementation, validation, and monitoring. The challenge. These models must be validated within
objectives are to avoid future bottlenecks, support budgets but without eroding quality. Banks should
business continuity, and improve institutional therefore ensure a high-quality, independent model
performance, while minimizing risk and cost. review that is also cost-efficient.
Exhibit
Significant savings result from optimizing the model life cycle, especially in
Significantprocesses.
validation savings result from optimizing the model life cycle, especially
in validation processes.
Frank Gerhard is an associate partner in McKinsey’s Stuttgart office; Pedro J. Silva is a consultant in the London office, where
Thomas Wallace is a partner; Maribel Tejada is a senior expert in the Paris office.
The authors wish to thank Pankaj Kumar for his contribution to this article.
This article was a collaborative effort by Juan Aristi Baquero, Akos Gyarmati, Marie-Paule Laurent,
Pedro J Silva, and Torsten Wegner, representing views from McKinsey’s Risk Practice.
97
When the COVID-19 outbreak became a global sufficient computational power are imperatives.
pandemic, the volatility of financial markets hit its Indeed, “speed” is of the essence.
highest level in more than a decade, amid pervasive
uncertainty over the long-term economic impact. In response, some leading institutions have started
Calm has returned to markets in recent months, but to incorporate advanced techniques into their
volatility continues to trend above its long-term quantitative armories. In pricing, an area that has
average. Amid persistent uncertainty, financial experienced a spike in recent activity, several banks
institutions are seeking to develop more advanced are applying machine learning (ML) to enhance
quantitative capabilities to support faster and more traditional models—for example, by calibrating
accurate decision making. parameters more efficiently. In particular, banks
have used neural networks, a type of ML focused on
As financial markets gyrated in recent months, nonlinear and complex data relationships. Advanced
banks faced particular problems calculating machine-learning techniques can do the following:
value at risk (VAR) across asset classes. Many
institutions experienced elevated levels of VAR — speed up calculations, reducing operational
back-testing exceptions, leading to higher costs and allowing real-time risk management of
regulatory-capital multipliers. Increases of as much complex products
as 30 percent were reported, prompting regulators
to apply exemptions in some cases. There were — animate more complex models that may
also challenges with valuation adjustments, as currently be unusable in practice, and unlock
derivatives faced snowballing collateral calls more accurate valuations
and increasing funding costs. Where credit-
value-adjustment (CVA) risks were excluded from — generate high volumes of synthetic but market-
market risk models, CVA hedges sat “naked” on consistent data, helping, for example, to offset
the balance sheet, leading to significant uplifts in the disruptive impact of COVID-19-related
exposures, and therefore in risk-weighted assets market moves
(RWAs). One large US dealer was hit with a loss of
$950 million stemming from a valuation adjustment One way to implement neural networks is to apply
(XVA) in the first quarter of 2020. Elsewhere, rising them to pricing, where they can “learn” how to price
gap risk in illiquid securities catalyzed painful fair- vanilla calibration instruments under a given (possibly
value losses—as high as $200 million in the case of complex) model, and then act as pricing engines for
a major Europe-based bank. new model calibration. The approach obviates one of
the most significant challenges associated with ML,
In an unpredictable environment, financial modelers which is parameter interpretability. In this case, there is
were required to come up with solutions but were no interpretability issue because the network uses the
often stymied by inadequate models or the need original model’s parameters. This means that there is
for huge computational power that was not always no ML “black box,” and the key calibrated parameters
available. Given the speed of response required, can be interpreted in the original model’s context.
models in some cases were rendered unusable. The
inevitable result was an increase in risk exposures Neural networks can also support future-exposure
and opacity from valuations, sometimes in absolute modeling for valuation adjustments (Exhibit 1).
value and other times relating to the reason for
specific model outputs. The network can be trained on established samples,
such as those relating to the evolution of risk factors
An imperative to act and corresponding cash flows for the products being
Since forecasting institutions expect the global modeled. The additional efficiency provided by the
economy to have contracted by about 5 percent in network makes for improved accuracy and faster
2020, banks should aim to optimize their trading processing (Exhibit 2). That saves banks from using
books and risk positions. This ambition requires time-consuming nested Monte Carlo approaches
more accurate and timely valuations. With those and less accurate analytical approximations or “least
priorities in mind, more advanced models and squares”—style regressions.
Web <2020>
<Machine learning capital markets>
Exhibit
Exhibit 1 <2>
<1> of
Neural
Neuralnetworks
networkscan
cansupport
supportfuture-exposure
future-exposuremodeling.
modeling.
Problem: Future-exposure modeling is main bottleneck in Solution: Neural-network approach proposed to achieve
current valuation-adjustment models; portfolio-valuation all 3 goals at same time:
and risk calculations must be fast, accurate, and consistent 1. Perform portfolio-valuation and risk calculations via
with FO1-pricing models, but typical approaches fail to neural networks
meet all 3 goals at same time 2. Train neural networks using simulated risk-factor paths
and pathwise-evaluated cash flows—no extra cost to
Nested Monte Analytical approximations/ generate training sample
Carlo method LSM2-style regressions 3. Use differential regularization to optimize accuracy for
Fast both pricing and risk while achieving fast training
Accurate
Consistent with
FO-pricing models
1
Front office.
2
Least-squares method.
Source: Danske Bank SuperFly Analytics
Applying machine learning in capital markets: Pricing, valuation adjustments, and market risk 99
attention are valuations of level-3 assets, XVA • acquire continuous feedback on how new
calculations, profit-and-loss attributions (“P&L applications can fit into the wider organization
explains”), adaptations for Fundamental Review of
the Trading Book (FRTB), and stress testing. 3. Roll out at scale
Over time, sprints, prototypes, and quick wins
A “discovery phase” of an ML transformation will have accumulated sufficiently to create
could proceed as follows: the conditions for a more sustained machine-
learning rollout. Assuming a critical mass of use
• Identify concrete cases based on accepted cases, quant teams should move to integrate ML
criteria, such as the complexity of models, into a wider range of activities. They may begin
exposure in books, or computational with the front office and extend into risk, finance,
bottlenecks. For example, complex, hard-to- compliance, and research.
value derivatives such as structured callable
trades could be good targets. A plan to scale up the machine-learning program
could include the following activities:
• Size the estimated impact and align various
stakeholder groups. • strategic execution of identified priority use cases
• Create an action plan, including the effort and • continuous exploration of additional areas where
time required for implementing the identified ML could be relevant, such as anti–money
use cases. laundering, know your customer, or cybersecurity
Juan Aristi Baquero is a partner in McKinsey’s New York office, Akos Gyarmati and Pedro J Silva are consultants in the
London office, Marie-Paule Laurent is a partner in the Brussels office, and Torsten Wegner is an associate partner in
the Berlin office.
© Mike_Kiev/Getty Images
101
A bank was in the midst of a digital transformation, across industries and around the globe to better
and the early stages were going well. It had understand the scope of the issue.¹ While the
successfully transformed its development teams benefits of digitization and advanced analytics are
into agile squads, and leaders were thrilled with the well documented, the risk challenges often remain
resulting speed and productivity gains. But within hidden. From our survey and subsequent interviews,
weeks, leadership discovered that the software several key findings emerged:
developers had been taking a process shortcut that
left customer usernames and passwords vulnerable — D
igital and analytics transformations are widely
to being hacked. The transformation team fixed undertaken now by organizations in all sectors.
the issue, but then the bank experienced another
kind of hack, which compromised the security — R
isk management has not kept pace with
of customer data. Some applications had been the proliferation of digital and analytics
operating for weeks before errors were detected transformations—a gap is opening that can only
because no monitors were in place to identify be closed by risk innovation at scale.
security issues before deployment. This meant the
bank did not know who might have had access to — T
he COVID-19 pandemic environment has
the sensitive customer data or how far and wide the exacerbated the disparity between risk-
data might have leaked. The problem was severe management demands and existing capabilities.
enough that it put the entire transformation at risk.
The CEO threatened to end the initiative and return — Most companies are unsure of how to
the teams to waterfall development if they couldn’t manage digital risks; leading organizations
improve application-development security. have, however, defined organizational
accountabilities and established a range of
This bank’s experience is not rare. Companies in effective practices and tools.
all industries are launching digital and analytics
transformations to digitize services and processes, McKinsey has developed approaches and
increase efficiency via agile and automation, improve capabilities to address the challenges implicit
customer engagement, and capitalize on new in these findings. They include a new four-step
analytical tools. Yet most of these transformations framework to define, operationalize, embed, and
are undertaken without any formal way to capture reinforce solutions; supporting methodologies
and manage the associated risks. Many projects have to accelerate frontline teams’ risk-management
minimal controls designed into the new processes, effectiveness and efficiency; and a cloud-based
underdeveloped change plans (or none at all), and diagnostic assessment and tracking tool. This
often scant design input from security, privacy, and tool is designed to help companies better identify,
risk and legal teams. As a result, companies are assess, mitigate, and measure the nonfinancial
creating hidden nonfinancial risks in cybersecurity, risks generated and exacerbated by digital and
technical debt, advanced analytics, and operational analytics transformations at both the enterprise
resilience, among other areas. The COVID-19 and product level.
pandemic and the measures employed to control
it have only exacerbated the problem, forcing Fortunately, to take advantage of these approaches,
organizations to innovate on the fly to meet work- most companies will not have to start from scratch.
from-home and other digital requirements. They can apply their existing enterprise-risk-
management (ERM) infrastructures. This is typically
McKinsey recently surveyed 100 digital and used for financial and regulatory risks but can be
analytics transformation leaders from companies modified to be more agile and adaptable to meet the
1
The McKinsey Global Survey on digital and analytics transformations in risk management, 2020. The 100 participants were a representative
sample of companies from all geographic regions; nearly 89 percent have annual revenue of at least $1 billion. The companies spend, on
average, 12 percent of their IT budgets on digital and analytics transformations.
Web <2020>
<Derisking digital and analytics transformations>
Exhibit
Exhibit <1>1 of <6>
Transformation domains
Multichannel customer experience: Supply chain and procurement: Data transformation: unify data
redesign and digitize top customer digitally redesign and manage governance and architecture to
journeys end to end operations to improve safety, enable next-generation analytics
delivery, and costs
Digital marketing and pricing: Core-system modernization: achieve
revenue management, promotions- Next-generation operations: drive through refactoring or platform
dynamic B2B pricing, cross-selling step changes in efficiency through replacement
and upselling digitization, AI, advanced analytics,
and agile lean approaches Cloud and DevOps: migrate
Sales digitization: digital sales, applications to hybrid cloud and/or
remote-selling effectiveness Digital architecture: set up digital software as a service (SaaS) and
architecture combining application implement software development
New digital propositions: create programming interfaces (APIs), and IT operations (DevOps)
new revenue streams by building microservices, and containers
digital propositions, using next- Digital and analytics talent and
generation artificial-intelligence (AI) capabilities: acquire new talent
technologies to achieve cost savings and build capabilities at scale
One oil and gas company, for example, had to divide Transformations are becoming commonplace
its virtual private network to expand bandwidth across industries
so that all employees could have access to the Survey participants completed an average of six
corporate network from their homes. This caused transformations in the past three years, with a
slowdowns in patching on employee laptops, which range of objectives. More than 80 percent have
exposed the company to vulnerabilities commonly implemented at least one end-to-end customer
exploited by attackers. journey transformation, and 70 percent developed
new digital propositions and ecosystems.
A telecom company allowed its call-center staff Organizations are also changing their operating
to work from home, but it left specific policies up models to support the changes. Approximately
to team managers. The result was that 30 percent 80 percent of companies intend to shift up to
2
Juan Aristi Baquero, Roger Burkhardt, Arvind Govindarajan, and Thomas Wallace, “Derisking AI by design: How to build risk management into
AI development,” August 2020, McKinsey.com.
Web <2020>
<Derisking digital and analytics transformations>
Exhibit <2> of <6>
Exhibit 2
Risk-management maturity in digital and analytics is not related to IT spending.
Risk-management maturity in digital and analytics is not related to IT spending.
Average reported risk-management maturity by IT budget, scale 1–51
5
1
0–200 401–600 801–1,000 1,201–1,400 1,601–1,800
201–400 601–800 1,001–1,200 1,401–1,600 1,800+
IT budget, $ million
1
Question: At a company like yours, how mature are digital and analytics risk-management capabilities? Companies rated their risk-management capabilities
from 1 to 5, with 5 representing the most advanced in effectiveness and efficiency.
Source: McKinsey Global Survey on Digital and Analytics Transformations in Risk Management, 2020
Web <2020>
<Derisking digital and analytics transformations>
Exhibit 3 of <6>
Exhibit <3>
5
4
80 80 3
1–2
Average
60 60
40 40
20 20
0 0
Retrain Automate New Reengineer Redesign Did not
personnel processes tools processes organization use tools
Question: At a company like yours, how mature are digital and analytics risk-management capabilities? Companies rated their risk-management capabilities
1
Web <2020>
<Derisking digital and analytics transformations>
Exhibit
Exhibit 4 of <6>
<4>
The
The top
top risk-management
risk-management painpainpoint
pointisisin
inunderstanding
understandingthe
therisks
risksgenerated
generatedby
by a digital and analytics transformation.
a digital and analytics transformation.
Reported risk-management pain points,1 % of respondents
Issue with understanding risks and accountability Difficulty managing changes
Lack of sponsorship Problems with tools
1
Question: In your most recent digital and agile projects, what were the top five risk-management pain points?
Source: McKinsey Global Survey on Digital and Analytics Transformations in Risk Management, 2020
Web <2020>
<Derisking digital and analytics transformations>
Exhibit 5 of <6>
Exhibit <5>
Successful digital
Successful digitaland
andanalytics
analyticstransformations
transformationsneedneedaatailored
tailoredframework
frameworkto
to keep
keep pace
pace with
with a rapidly
a rapidly changing
changing digital-risk
digital-risk landscape.
landscape.
Current state
Cumbersome risk and compliance Challenges from second line are Inadequate tools for risk
reviews lead to frequent delay of perceived as convoluted and do identification, resulting in a lack
product launches not always lead to clear set of actions of appropriate transparency and
for front line guardrails
Transformed state
1 1 Define: articulate risks and hypothetical solutions for a given data and
analytics transformation (via diagnostic risk assessment, interviews,
review of metrics)
–40
–45
–75
–85
–90 –90 –90
–97
— Enterprise-risk-management and control In most cases, defining such roles will not require
partner organizations: Transformation-risk adding head count. Companies have found that
leads will work closely with the enterprise- existing team members are ready and eager to take
risk-management group and individual control on these responsibilities. They may need some
partner groups to ensure transformation training to become fully effective, but generally most
risks are accounted for at the enterprise level, team members are motivated to take on such training
and enterprise risks are considered at the simply because they know about the risks being
transformation level. generated or exacerbated in transformation activities.
— Transformation-risk manager: Risk managers Finally, companies will have to raise awareness
specialize in change risks and risks arising in of digital and analytics risks in the organization,
digital and analytics transformations. They work including with the executive team and board.
closely with transformation teams on the front Likewise, they must adequately incorporate digital
line and take part in designing risk controls from and analytics risk management into their formal
the early planning phases of the transformation. risk-governance models (see sidebar, “Snapshot of
a successful transformation”).
— Transformation sponsors: The sponsors of the
overall transformation should be on board during
the entire change process.
What does successful risk management formal risk assessment to identify and with a single source. Competencies, skills,
in a digital transformation look like? One mitigate risks using a best-of-breed risk- and qualifications are clearly defined for
bank successfully integrated risk controls management tool that covers different each risk-management role to inform the
into its digital transformation through a risk taxonomies. That tool digitally feeds requirement needed to build and retain a
systematic approach. A number of aspects derisking interventions into the work- strong risk-management talent pool.
in its approach stand out. management software backlogs of
product teams. Risk interventions then are In this bank example, risk management
The bank clearly defines all roles and pulled forward into product-team sprints is deeply embedded in all phases of
responsibilities, accountabilities, as capabilities and features in and of product development, including product
and oversight related to digital and themselves that enhance the product and road map planning, business review,
analytics risk management and creates extend its impact. release planning, and deployment. Other
a governance model across the lines of companies implementing digital and
defense. Risk generalists are involved early A risk and cybersecurity resource is analytics transformations should consider
in design processes—even sitting with integrated into the transformation-delivery adopting a similar model.
agile development teams as necessary. hub to ensure that risk is always part of the
Those leading the project conduct a conversation and that all risks are tracked
In the current business environment, digital and become more pervasive, the companies that will
analytics transformations are core to success. If capture the most long-term value from their digital
transformations go forward without the right risk- and analytics transformations are those that
management approach, however, companies simply manage to accomplish their target objectives while
trade one set of problems for another, potentially also systematically identifying, understanding, and
larger, set. As digital and analytics capabilities mitigating the associated risks.
Jim Boehm is a partner in McKinsey’s Washington, DC, office, and Joy Smith is an expert in the Philadelphia office.
The authors wish to thank Liz Grennan, Arun Gundurao, Grace Hao, Kathleen Li, and Olivia White for their contributions to
this article.
Cindy Levy
Global
[email protected]
Fritz Nauck
Americas
[email protected]
Gabriel Vigo
Asia
[email protected]
Gökhan Sari
Eastern Europe, Middle East, North Africa
[email protected]
Kevin Buehler
Risk Dynamics, Cyberrisk
[email protected]
Marco Piccitto
Risk People
[email protected]
Thomas Poppensieker
Corporate Risk; chair, Risk & Resilience Editorial Board
[email protected]
In this issue
The emerging resilients: Achieving ‘escape velocity’
Resilience in a crisis: An interview with Professor Edward I. Altman
Meeting the future: Dynamic risk management for uncertain times
A fast-track risk-management transformation to counter the COVID-19 crisis
Strengthening institutional risk and integrity culture
When nothing is normal: Managing in extreme uncertainty
A unique time for chief risk officers in insurance
The disaster you could have stopped: Preparing for extraordinary risks
How the voluntary carbon market can help address climate change
Derisking AI by design: How to build risk management into AI development
The next S-curve in model risk management
Applying machine learning in capital markets: Pricing, valuation adjustments, and market risk
Derisking digital and analytics transformations
January 2021
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