Staying Sane

Valdai Discussion Club Report
Staying Sane
in a Crumbling World
Oleg Barabanov, Timofei Bordachev,

Yaroslav Lissovolik, Fyodor Lukyanov,
Andrey Sushentsov, Ivan Timofeev
valdaiclub.com
#valdaiclub May 2020
The views and opinions expressed in this position paper
are those of the authors and do not represent the views
of the Valdai Discussion Club, unless explicitly stated
otherwise.
ISBN 978-5-907318-06-9
© The Foundation for Development and Support of the

Valdai Discussion Club, 2020
42 Bolshaya Tatarskaya st., Moscow, 115184, Russia

About the Authors
Oleg Barabanov
PhD (Doctor) in Political Science, Professor of the Russian Academy of
Sciences, Programme Director at the Valdai Discussion Club, Scientific
Director of the European Studies Institute, MGIMO University
Timofei Bordachev
PhD in Political Science, Programme Director at the Valdai Discussion
Club, Academic Supervisor of the Centre for Comprehensive European
and International Studies, Higher School of Economics
Yaroslav Lissovolik
PhD in Economics, Programme Director at the Valdai Discussion Club,
Member of the Government Expert Council, Member of the Bretton
Woods Committee
Fyodor Lukyanov
Head of the Writing Team, Research Director of the Valdai Club
Foundation, Editor-in-chief of the Russia in Global Affairs Journal,
Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defence
Policy, Research Professor at the Higher School of Economics
Andrey Sushentsov
Club, Director of the Institute for International Studies and the
Laboratory of International Trends Analysis, MGIMO University
Ivan Timofeev
Club, Director of Programmes at the Russian International Affairs
Council
Contents
3 About the Report
5 The Genesis of the Crumbling World

The future of the state
The erosion of institutions
The crisis of conventional ideologies
The advent of ethical pluralism
Lack of prospects for speculative economy
9 The Growing Anarchy and Risk of a New Bipolarity
14 The Great Equaliser
18 Safety Net
21 Special Responsibility and a Moral Imperative

Staying Sane in a Crumbling World 3
About the Report

Two years ago, the Valdai Club issued a report, titled “Living in a Crumbling
World”, in which it suggested that multilateral cooperation is on the decline. Any
crisis of international institutions leads to increasing anarchy – each state is left
to rely on itself to solve the problems of survival. The developments of 2020 so
vividly confirmed this hypothesis that they surprised even the authors themselves.
COVID-19 is a temporary phenomenon, like all pandemics. However, what was
happening became a catalyst for processes that had been brewing for a long time.
A sovereign state remains the only institution capable of acting in an organised

and efficient manner. The illusion that the state may disappear from world politics,
giving way to trans-boundary supranational entities, has finally been dispelled.
The role of the state is also increasing in the economy – in the dispute between
public and market interest, the balance is shifting towards the former. Timely
responses to non-economic shocks, which are provided by the state and not by the
market, are becoming an important economic indicator. Though the economy is
global, the politics are still international.
The familiar ideological schematics, especially with respect to the “democracy

vs. authoritarianism” dichotomy, have lost their meaning. The crisis has shown
that the capacity of states is determined by a different coordinate system. It is
more connected with culture and tradition than with political structure. Ethical
pluralism – the absence of a “correct” set of values, which everyone should follow –
will be one of the main notions of the coming period.
The era of the “liberal world order” (late 1980s – mid 2010s) is over. It was based
on a military balance of power, inherited from the Cold War period, as well as a set
of standards and freedoms that provided relatively equitable access to the benefits
of globalisation for those who agreed to abide by these standards. The experiment
failed because it provided for the dominance of a certain group of countries, and
this was perceived as unjust by others.
The “showdown” of international institutions reduces the future to two basic

options. Under one scenario, the most important institution from the previous
4 Valdai Discussion Club Report May 2020
world order (the UN) could be preserved and enhanced with the addition of a new
functional infrastructure. The other would see the reintroduction of bipolarity,
the clash of two giants (the USA and China), but much more ferocity than that
observed during the Cold War. The US-China confrontation will not reproduce the
stable United States – Soviet Union model of the second half of the 20th century.
There will be an irreconcilable competition among a different set of players amid
completely different international conditions. Nuclear weapons remain the main
factor protecting the world from a global military catastrophe. But its deterrent
potential is not unlimited, and it will be affected by the further degradation of
institutions.
The erosion of political structures is compounded by social shifts. An awareness

of threats can counterbalance the main distinguishing positive features of the
previous era: first of all, the new quality of mass mobility achieved in the current
century. The globalised world is turning from a “society of limitless possibilities”
into a “society of unlimited risk”. Continuous risk may necessitate global solidarity,
but this contradicts human instincts. The principle of “every man for himself” and
the demand for enclosure from outside influence can become imperative.
The tendencies towards de-globalisation that appeared years ago take distinct
forms. Rational calculations indicate the need to strengthen global cooperation to
solve economic problems. But the solutions cannot be achieved only through the
demonstration of the their necessity. Before the states get convinced to come to
the certain settlement, the maximum that the leading economies are able to agree
on is to try to minimise damage to others when taking measures to provide for their
own salvation.
No matter what scenario the global economy plays out after the pandemic, an excess
of resources will be replaced by a deficit, and a toughening in the struggle for them is
inevitable. In the least favourable course of events, the norm will be “international
political Darwinism”, the most archaic version of international relations.
New forms of global moral responsibility will be needed to reduce threats arising from
the objective difference in the balance of power of those seeking resources, which
“will not be enough for everyone”. So, we repeat, the choice is simple: preserving
the UN as an institution that has proved its ability to maintain peace and, in spite of
everything, is the highest possible form of cooperation in international relations,
or a pullback into a fierce struggle that is guided not by reason but by instincts. The
permanent members of the Security Council, possessing special privileges since
the creation of the UN, have a special responsibility to the whole world to ensure
that the second scenario does not become a reality.
The Genesis
of the Crumbling World
The world has been living in a state of shock since spring 2020. Hardly
anyone could have anticipated the events that resulted in lockdown orders for
billions of people, brought the global economy to a standstill and rendered
most of the international organisations irrelevant. The international community
was not motivated to coordinate its efforts effectively during the COVID-19
pandemic. The imbalance between the causes and the effects is striking. What
seemed a fairly ordinary virus with a relatively low fatality rate seriously affected
the interconnected world in almost all its aspects.
Just like any pandemic, COVID-19 will not last forever. However, it will
serve as a catalyst for disruptive changes in spheres with no immediate link
to this virus. The world has accumulated a great number of problems, so a trigger
was all it took to plunge the world into crisis.
Since 2014, the Valdai Discussion Club has been releasing annual reports
on the state of the international politics and global economy. The barometer
indicated that a storm was brewing amid a narrowing range of possibilities.
Calls to set common rules of the game subsided, replaced by an understanding
that coordinated norms would not materialise, while future stability would
depend on the ability of the players involved to impose rational self-restraints.
The 2018 report, Living in a Crumbling World1, drew the biggest

response, in part due to its key metaphor: “Today’s world order still stands but
has begun to crumble before our eyes. Its framework is deforming into a twisted
skeleton of a once strong structure. That edifice was erected after 1945 – that
is, following the second phase of the destruction that had its beginnings
in 1914. The great powers had learned from their previous failure to establish
peace during the interim between the two world wars. They managed to agree
on a system that would prevent disagreements from escalating out of control.
This is the model that is now in serious crisis.”
At the time, we were accused of excessive alarmism: despite the obvious

problems in global politics, dismantling institutions rather than transforming
1
Living in a Crumbling World. Annual report, 2018. Valdai Discussion Club website. URL: https://valdaiclub.
com/a/reports/living-in-a-crumbling-world/.
them was deemed unreasonable. The following idea was widely decried: “The
world has now passed a critical juncture with regard to the formation of an
effectively functioning international order based on global governance. That
is, the world is now moving in a different direction. It has slipped into a clear
and undeniable trend of unilateral decision-making. And, although this process
is essentially unmanageable, we must strive to understand its consequences.”
The scale of the crisis induced by the pandemic can be attributed

to the fact that it was in perfect alignment with the trends that took shape
long before China reported its first infection case. Social distancing and
isolation are the only effective remedies. This is simply how nature works. One
cannot fail to be impressed by how everyone was mentally prepared to follow
urgent policies to barricade themselves from the outside world. The ideas
and rhetoric that have been polluting international relations over the past 30
years instantly faded away, signalling an end to what seemed like unsolvable
disputes and answering a number of essential questions.
The future of the state

A sovereign state is the only institution capable of acting in a relatively
organised and effective manner. We have pointed to the resurgence of the state
in international politics in a number of Valdai Club reports, or, to be more
precise, on how the illusion of the state’s fading role in international affairs
fell apart.
Neither transnational corporations, nor international organisations or

any other actors can work on solving a problem of a universal scale, while
also managing its consequences, from a frozen economy to ensuring that order
is respected on the streets. It is to the state that people look up to in times
of crisis, expecting it to deliver on its mission to provide for their security and
well-being. In fact, they have nowhere else to go. This leads to the situation
when the economy is global but the politics are still international.
The erosion of institutions

Faced with this problem, a number of international institutions proved
to be irrelevant. The purposes they were designed to achieve are out of touch with
reality. The interaction that actually took place was bilateral, on a state-to-state
level. There was a deficit of mutual assistance even within homogenous blocs
of countries. NATO did not play any role at all, even though China’s experience
showed that the military can be useful. The pandemic shock cast a shadow over
solidarity within the European Union, relegating to the background the “common
values” that are so frequently discussed at various international forums. A serious
crisis breaking out was enough to almost eradicate humanitarian issues from
the international agenda.
The crisis of conventional ideologies

The COVID-19 pandemic cast the autocracy-democracy dichotomy into
the spotlight, pitching personal responsibility and solidarity within a democracy
against oppression and lack of transparency under authoritarian rule, or,
inversely, the effectiveness of centralised rule against the sloppiness of an
“open society.” However, as before this proved to be a false counterposition.
Judging by the experience of various countries in combating the disease,

a number of factors rather than simply the political regime determined
the effectiveness of the response by the government and society to the challenge,
not least culture and traditions that vary from one country to another.
Every state has its own status quo, meaning that it is futile to make any
attempt to rely solely on the political factor to come up with a generic response
model, or specific models for authoritarian and democratic regimes.
The advent of ethical pluralism

Pluralism is a side product of the radical change the world is going
through with the emerging diversity of political and strategic cultures,2 while
totally excluding the option of bringing them under a common denominator.
There is no “one and only” ethical platform behind the political decisions.
The concept of being on the “right side of history,” which has been
gaining traction over the past several decades, assumed that the social model
based on liberal democracy and a market economy was the ultimate moral
and ethical truth and that all other countries were destined to adopt it sooner
2
See The Rise of Rimland: The New Political Geography and Strategic Culture report, 2018. Valdai Discussion
Club website. URL: https://valdaiclub.com/a/reports/rise-of-rimland/.
or later. Without going too deeply into the debate over the strong and weak
points of this model, it can be argued that this model failed to prove that it
could be effective at a universal scale. The series of crises that culminated with
the COVID-19 pandemic showed that countries tend to rely on their own social
and cultural experience to find a way out, while attempts to apply alien recipes
only make things worse. Therefore, countries cannot be guided by a single set
of criteria for understanding international processes and situations, rather
each country shapes its policy based on its own ethical norms that cannot be
regarded as being right or wrong. They are just different from one another.
Lack of prospects for speculative economy

The epidemic accentuated the gap separating public and real
economics. In a normal situation, people rely on economic growth figures,
as well as a variety of indices and rankings, compiled for any possible
occasion, to gauge economic performance. However, COVID-19 showed
that growth cannot be equated with development. Impressive indicators
in flashy presentations for investors are not tantamount to having a reliable
healthcare system and good governance.
Once again, this pitches the interests of the market and the public
against each other. What kind of a healthcare system do we need? From
the market’s perspective, spending too much on improving healthcare seems
excessive and calls for cuts. In the unlikely event of a crisis, even an extremely
developed healthcare system would still end up being overwhelmed.
The same applies to other institutions, including education, research, social
insurance and the military. As a result, the available resources, as well as
the specific notions of what is needed and appropriate here and now, serve
as the utility criteria. Resilience to various kinds of shock becomes a major
economic indicator.
This leads the state to expand its role in the economy, while
the economic theory that dominated the liberal world order preached
minimising state interference. Today, decentralised and privatised healthcare
systems have found themselves unable to cope with a disaster of this
scale, leading governments to gradually take the healthcare systems under
their control, sometimes openly and expediently, as was the case in Spain.
Generous government subsidies offered to major companies imply that
these companies will be more accountable to the government for how this
money is spent. During post-crisis recovery corporations in various sectors
could be covered by this approach.
All of the above does not mean that the fundamental questions about
the functioning of the state, society and the economy have been settled once
and for all in favour of dirigisme. This is an ongoing debate, and the dominant
narrative will shift depending on the historical period.
However, one thing is quite certain: this is the end of the liberal world
order, an era that lasted from the late 1980s to the mid-2010s. The answers that
were given during this period are no longer relevant.
The Growing Anarchy

and Risk of a New Bipolarity
From the perspective of world politics, the end of the Cold War
led to the establishment of rules and customs that ensured a relative
“harmony of interests”, giving everyone a fair share in the proceeds from
globalisation. This, along with the fact on the global level the military
status quo inherited from the Cold War remained in place, brought about
a set of rules designed to encourage international cooperation and
restrain the egocentric aspirations that are inherent to any country. This
international framework was regarded as the pinnacle in the centuries-
long evolution of global politics. Closing so many borders, freezing contacts
and curtailing cooperation amid the pandemic are nothing less than an
outright assault on one of the cornerstones of international politics that
took several centuries to crystallise. Tension has been mounting for quite
a while, so this destructive blow did not necessarily come about as a result
of the spread of the coronavirus. COVID-19 became a trigger that set off
an avalanche.
There is now hope among politicians and intellectuals that the Third
World War will play out in its “softer” version in the form of the pandemic and
the global economic crisis, levelling the playing field, and enabling the world
to turn the page, leaving all the accumulated imbalances behind. There is every
reason to believe that this will not be the case. In a crumbling world, countries
will have to face up to regular shocks of this kind. Moreover, they could become
a routine, albeit dramatic, occurrence.
It is quite natural that the response to these developments

primarily focuses at the national level. The least that nation states
can do is assume responsibility towards their own citizens. Imagining
a common response is impossible, even for the European Union, which
is an example of the most advanced international cooperation. Incidentally, it
was this international association of countries that was the first to show signs
of strain, despite the fact that in the pre-pandemic era its members achieved
utmost perfection in shaping relations between them. However, in doing so
they pursued a specific objective. Cooperation and mutual assistance become
inoperable when the most influential members of the community no longer
need to cling to their dominance. The problem is not that the attitude adopted
by the states is natural (as is the case now), but that they had excessively inflated
expectations of how their cooperation would work out. The state, by definition,
constitutes the highest and the most responsible form of social organisation.
There is simply no other institution that could play this role. It is at a time
of crisis that everyone suddenly rediscovers this, although even during calmer
periods the state remains the inevitable bedrock of the world order.
That said, the failure of the experiment with the liberal world
order could be a huge step backwards for humanity in terms of its ability
to promote closer political ties between various communities (states).
The post-crumbling world faces a clear choice. It can opt for a simple solution
in the form of a revisited bipolarity, or for a more complex solution consisting
of preserving the cornerstone of the past arrangement (the UN) and using it as
the foundation for building a new and effective infrastructure. Under the first
scenario, what remains of the institutions inherited from the past era would
perish, while the standoff between the two superpowers could dwarf the Cold
War confrontation. However, if we take the second path, there is a chance that
civilised communication channels would remain in place.
Since both scenarios are possible, focusing on the diplomatic front could
provide a suitable path towards a solution. We have to be mindful of the fact
that hardball negotiations and power politics underpin the effectiveness
of international organisations and their ability to provide for the interests
of the parties involved with relative justice. The attacks by the United States
against the WHO in April 2020 should not be regarded as insane or destructive,
but rather as an attempt to put a halt to the shifts resulting from the build-up
of China’s interests to the detriment of the US.
The most acceptable option for rebuilding the world order would
be to strengthen the UN Security Council as the “world government” with
a mandate to decide on the questions of peace and war that are essential
for the survival of states. The Security Council is the most representative
international body in terms of the aggregate power of its members. It
derives its legitimacy from the military might of its members, as well as
international law.
However, there is a major obstacle in the form of the continuing shifts

in the global balance of power and the accelerated advance towards a new
bipolar world order based on the confrontation between the United States
and China. This scenario would be a threat to both liberal and alternative (for
example, the BRICS) institutions, since it would require everyone to take sides.
It is also the most likely one. Other countries, especially middle powers and
small states, would experience much harsher treatment in a bipolar world in its
most probable US-China manifestation, even compared to the period marked by
attempts to build a unilateral world order.
The prospects of the emergence of a new bipolar world order

were discussed in a number of Valdai Club reports. We believe
this scenario to be quite plausible. However, in 2018 and
2019 we were increasingly inclined to consider that even this
kind of order can hardly be achieved. We argued that there
will be a “world without poles… a crisis scenario that leads
not so much to a new balance as to an all-out reset of the
institutions, power, production modes, and international
relations.” We could face a situation when the two options
would not be mutually exclusive.
Even if the international community comes up with coordinated

responses, this would not resolve fundamental issues. In fact, everyone has
grown used to the existing world order, and its crumbling is a challenge for
Russia and India to the same extent as it is for the United States and Europe.
Both Moscow and New Delhi were eager to improve the world order and
eliminate unfairness in the treatment of their interests. However, they did not
intend to dismantle it or make any revolutionary changes. At the same time,
the failure of the liberal world order is not a problem for China, even though
it probably benefitted the most from it. Today, China like no other power has
the resources to reshape the world order as it sees fit.
China’s ambition and confidence have been on the rise due

to the progress in battling the pandemic, naturally prompting many other
states to follow its lead as a country that succeeded in neutralising threats
to its population, and even in helping other nations. The United States
shows no sign of being able to move beyond straightforward competition as
the main development driver. It will have to reconsider its place in the world
and scale back its ambition, while China is moving in the opposite direction.
The greatest threat to international security lies in the fact that the two are
headed in opposite directions.
Confrontation in various spheres, as well as attempts to gradually

remove China from the essential production chains could bring about a conflict.
Today, China dominates (and in some sectors monopolises) the production
chains of a number of leading Western corporations. Having found themselves
in the midst of the US-China trade war, some US companies have already
started looking for alternatives. With the pandemic, the confrontation reached
a new height: the simmering information war with the two countries accusing
each other of artificially creating the coronavirus could have a toxic effect
on international relations in the near future.
To some, bipolarity may seem a familiar scenario and not the worst one.
After all, the world did not fall apart during the Cold War. This is a dangerous
illusion, however. The standoff between the US and China is a far cry from
the stable model of relations developed by the United States and the Soviet
Union in the second half of the 20th century. It is better described as an
irreconcilable confrontation with new forces at play in a totally different
international environment. Today’s world is too complicated for a return
to the situation prevailing in 1945-1990 when the existing international
political framework took shape. At that time, each of the two conflicting
superpowers was at the centre of their own political and economic orbits,
existing under specific laws. The two worlds came into contact only when
they competed for territories, i.e., on the periphery. The clash between them
focused on the social order, development priorities and lifestyle, which are
ethical categories, rather than military, political or even economic matters.

In fact, the whole system was structured around these ethical norms.
Today, there is a stark cultural difference between the main opponents,

while they are closely linked by the globalised market economy and are part
of it. They are close to parity in terms of their capabilities. Therefore, what
we are witnessing is a throwback to the period on the eve of the First World
War, marked by competition arising from imperialistic aspirations, rather than
a return to the relatively structured Cold War period, especially considering
the questionable ethical principles underpinning the aspirations of those
seeking to ascend to leadership. Neither China nor the US can match the moral
power (allure) of the USSR and the West during the Cold War, they do not offer
any obvious alternatives.
Nuclear capability remains the main factor preventing the world

from sleepwalking into a global military disaster. It is a great, albeit limited,
deterrent. So far, war (meaning the use of military force to resolve differences)
seems less likely than during any other period in human history. But as we get
used to living in a crumbling world, this factor of stability could be affected
by the degradation of cooperation frameworks. Consequently, from a political
standpoint it is essential that falling into a state of primitive anarchy does not
become a habit.
We described anarchy as a new (revived) model of

international relations in the 2019 annual Valdai Club report,
Time to Grow Up, or the Case for Anarchy. In this paper, we
emphasised that anarchy is a natural state of international
relations. While it does aggravate risks, they can be offset
by actors showing more responsibility and understanding
that anything they do would be met with retaliation,
prompting them to consider their own capabilities and the
possible response. Unfortunately, the latest international
developments suggest that this anarchy could be even more
destructive with actors increasingly guided by instincts.
The Great Equaliser

The pandemic pushes us to revisit concepts that used to be regarded
nearly as axioms in past decades. The idea of dividing countries into those
that are “free” and those that are “not free” which was central to the ideological
model of the world in the 20th and early 21st centuries, has now suffered
a major blow. It has turned out that many of the social levers that autocrats
were previously blamed for using are now not just usable, but very popular
among democracies.
Overall, the revival of the state has diverse implications. Quarantine

measures augmented by the extensive opportunities offered by modern
technology provide states with ample opportunities to develop tools for
controlling society. The emergency can now justify what used to be viewed as
a violation in terms of law or ethics, while authorities face hardly any restraints
in terms of declaring a state of emergency, or determining its terms and duration.
Relying on geolocation to trace contacts with potential carriers of the virus,
using artificial intelligence to monitor quarantine violations and face detection
to track the movement of people and many other solutions that were previously
taboo are now considered a necessity.
State control methods will gradually permeate the capitalist economy

(monitoring employees, for example), giving a new meaning to Michel Foucault’s
idea of power as a means of controlling the human body in time and space.
We could see new forms of dictatorship and enslavement, and modern-world
versions of Jeremy Bentham’s social prison and panopticon. Biotechnology
has all chances of becoming another dividing factor. Express tests in airports,
new solutions for protecting employees, disinfection and health monitoring
could become just as common as the metal detectors that became widespread
in the early 2000s to fight terrorism. This time, however, the alienation both
within and between states will be much deeper.
On the flip side of the coin there will be new forms of protest, social
mobilisation and aggressive non-conformism that will become much more
likely and intensify against the backdrop of the coming economic downturn.
Growing unemployment and popular discontent with ineffective crisis
mitigation measures, as well as insufficiency of government support could
serve as a trigger.
The type of government is unlikely to play a decisive role in the dichotomy

between dictatorship and freedom. There will be a universal push towards
greater control, on the one hand, and resistance, on the other.
Finally, a new vision of mobility will become a defining characteristic for

the new society. The cross-border mobility of the globalisation era may well
become a thing of the past both as a behavioural practice and a moral tenet.
It will be considered safer to avoid extensive contacts and stay at home, both
in the immediate and broader sense. The world would undergo momentous
change if the fear of an open society were to take hold. The pandemic abruptly
stopped tourist flows that have come to symbolise global unity in the 20th
century and were among the most visible achievements of globalisation. It
will take a long time for the sector to recover, and it may never reach its pre-
coronavirus levels.
Over the past half a century, humanity benefitted from

unprecedented growth rates. Globalisation took shape not only as an
idea of building a single economy on a global scale but also as a means
for people to move around irrespective of state borders. The advent
of universal connectivity covered states and society at large, gradually
leading to the emergence of a truly global society with cross-border links,
shared interests and values. At the political level, the concept of global
governance took root on the back of this transformation, along with
the first signs that international cooperation could evolve into a single
global policy. At any rate, this is how processes that started in the late
20th century were interpreted. At the same time, globalisation became
part of national foreign policies, helping some countries become stronger
and weakening others.
While some mainstream politicians may have fears regarding

the erosion of sovereignty, no one questioned the economic rationale
of globalisation, usually leaving it to futurologists to ponder over these
topics. The debate on resource constraints to human development has been
raging since the late 1960s and early 1970s, influenced by reports released
by the Club of Rome. The world was said to lack fuel, arable land, fresh water,
etc. Some of the suggestions in this debate were intentionally catastrophist,
leading to the conclusion that humankind had to stop believing in progress
as the main development driver. It was argued that future generations would
be worse off than we are. This meant that the outlook was quite bleak.
The UN responded to these warnings with a campaign in which it persisted
in stressing that growth was inevitable. This is how the term “sustainable
development” was born within the UN. While stressing the need to take care
of the environment, it did not question the global commitment to sustained
economic growth.
That said, in recent years the theory of a global risk society has
been gaining traction among sociology scholars, as well as more broadly
in the information and cultural space, based on the works by a number
of European sociologists, most notably Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens.
The gist of this concept is that as social and technological links between
people become increasingly complex at a global scale, it results in an almost
inevitable increase in the accumulation of risks, and their cumulative effect
could threaten the entire global system.
There can be a variety of risks and resulting catastrophes.

On the one hand, they can be technology-related. It is not a coincidence that
the global risk society theory became especially popular in the aftermath
of the Fukushima disaster. On the other hand, there are natural hazards
stemming from imbalances in human environmental impacts. It is clear
that this perspective blurs the lines separating a rational view, on the one
hand, and irrational and mystical thinking (nature avenging humans),
on the other. This gave rise to a form of environmental eschatology and
the aesthetic of catastrophism. Greta Thunberg has come to symbolise
the approach whereby irrationalism of this kind manifests itself from
carefully calculated emotional impacts.
Up until a few months ago the debate on global risks largely

revolved around climate change and the international response, from
the Kyoto Protocol to the Paris Agreement, mostly regarding mid-to-long-
term projections. However, the coronavirus pandemic signalled the urgency
of environmental and social risks resulting from globalisation. In fact,
against the backdrop of climate change, epidemics and pandemics and
other natural and man-made disasters the global risk society could well
be regarded as a real alternative to the existing concept of globalisation.
Therefore, understanding how new risks affect the global political system
and the evolution of the world order is essential. This transforms strategic
planning into global risk planning. However, during the pandemic the “social
distancing” phenomenon took on a universal dimension and proliferated
among international actors, calling into question humanity’s ability to join
efforts to fight global challenges.
If the advent of the global risk society is inevitable, this means that
we are on the brink of a radical transformation of social relations, behaviour
patterns and morality. Looking at the world through the prism of constant risk
exposure changes the perspective, bringing a different set of ethical categories
to the foreground. Will the very notion of progress remain relevant in a global
risk society? This is now a key question. If the continuum of disasters is a norm,
rather than an exception, it has to be understood that other calamities will
follow after the coronavirus. This means that the goal of achieving “sustainable
development” along with the commitment to constantly improving the quality
of life and expanding the comfort zone become unaffordable luxuries.
In this framework, human efforts will focus on damage mitigation rather than
development.
This changing reality pushes us to rethink the ethical aspects of relations

between the “golden billion” and the rest of the world. The virus has become
the “Great Equaliser” that has spared neither rich nor poor. In this context, while
the developed world seemed far ahead of the developing countries in terms
of improving the quality of life and its expectancy, this advantage proved much
more elusive than previously thought.
For example, with the progress in healthcare over the past decades
it seemed that only third world countries would suffer from epidemics
of infectious diseases, such as dengue fever or Ebola, due to chronic failures
and lack of proper sanitation and hygiene. Developed countries received only
routine news reports on the horrible epidemics sweeping faraway lands without
any direct link to the “civilized” world. Those who did not want to stand aside
would try to compensate for this generalised apathy through philanthropic
undertakings or volunteer NGOs. For the West, even outbreaks of infectious
diseases, including SARS or the swine flu in China, the main emerging power, fell
into this convenient paradigm that divided humankind into first- and second-
class people.
The coronavirus outbreak in Europe and the United States has changed
the way people understand success and failure. First, it has become clear
that the most advanced healthcare system with the latest technology cannot
overcome a massive outbreak of a not very complex but severe and highly
infectious disease. Second, locals in third world countries started treating white
tourists and business travellers as plague-stricken when they were stuck far
away from home after their flights were cancelled. Xenophobia quickly reversed
course and was no longer directed from the rich to the poor, but vice versa.
Brought into the spotlight by extreme conditions, these mental patterns will
fade over time, but will leave their mark.
The paradox is that, on the one hand, constant risk calls for much
more global solidarity than before. On the other hand, this runs counter
to human instincts. The “every man for himself” principle and the demands
for societies to be sealed off from outside influences could become
imperative for public opinion and politicians. This will definitely affect
economic development.
Safety Net
For now, it is hard to describe the economic implications of this
extraordinary situation, even though there is widespread consensus that they
will be momentous. What sets this global pandemic apart is that it has literally
caused the entire world to bring economic activity to a halt. Instead of the chain
of consequences that usually follows a crisis, we have witnessed the entire
system being placed on pause.
The world economy is about to be reformatted. This implies more than

the inevitable exacerbation of economic contradictions between the major
actors, principally China and the United States. The new risks will cause
the global and regional value-added chains to change.
The crisis has aggravated the setback to the world economy brought
about over the past few years by protectionism. Vital medicine and medical
equipment were subject to trade restrictions during the pandemic. As the disaster
unfolded, none of the prior sanctions were lifted; moreover, the United States
announced possible additional sanctions and protectionist measures.
This course of events does not seem to justify the hopes of some leading
economists (including Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen) that the post-pandemic
global economy will finally find the “moral compass” and begin to emphasize
the development of “human capital.”
Of course, no one could have predicted this turn of events. Still,

the Valdai Club’s reports and papers repeatedly highlighted risks related
to exacerbating trade disputes between countries and the weakening
of international cooperation frameworks. The economic crisis induced by

the COVID-19 became a shock for multilateral institutions and cooperation,
disrupting transport, trade and economic ties between countries and regions.
In our reports we emphasised the need not only to strengthen

the existing multilateral mechanisms, but also to develop new ones.
In particular, over the past year the Valdai Club proposed creating a kind
of safety net3 in the form of a preventive mechanism for enabling countries
to coordinate efforts to counter a crisis before it occurs. This effort primarily
consisted in having the world’s largest economies set up an ex-ante system
for coordinating their economic stimulus measures. The 2020 crisis revealed
the importance of adopting this approach. If a model developed and prepared
in advance had been put into action, it would have improved the stability
of market expectations and boosted confidence among companies, investors
and consumers.
What we are witnessing today is a series of hasty and disparate measures

that fail to prop up the markets. During the March extraordinary virtual G20
Summit the leaders simply tried to persuade each other to avoid, if possible,
inflicting any damage on others when implementing their own mitigation
efforts. They failed to move beyond this point.
There are serious reasons to believe that things will get only
worse as the economic downturn inevitably deepens. The world economy
needs a transparent, effective rules-based mechanism for implementing
a coordinated economic growth stimulus policy instead of having
a small group of major economies devise ad hoc mechanisms in the midst
of the economic downturn.
Over the past year we noted that “limiting the coordinated fiscal response
solely to the country level significantly restricts the scale of resources that may
be devoted to fiscal stimulus at the global level. There needs to be an ex-ante
mechanism that allows for a coordinated response across all layers of the Global
Financial Safety Net and the use of an entire array of reserves and resources
to deliver the stimulus.”4
3
See Yaroslav Lissovolik, Regionalism in Global Governance: Exploring New Pathways, 2019. Valdai International
Discussion Club website. URL: https://valdaiclub.com/a/reports/regionalism-in-global-governance/.
4
See Anton Bespalov, Andrei Bystritskiy, Yaroslav Lissovolik. Regional Trade Blocs as Supporting Structures in
Global Governance, 2019. G20 Insights. URL: https://www.g20-insights.org/policy _briefs/regional-trade-blocks-
as-supporting-structures-in-global-governance/
We also said5 that the involvement of regional institutions such

as regional development banks as well as the regional integration
arrangements could be an effective way to improve the stimulus. As part
of the measures for fighting the economic crisis, the IMF noted the need
for coordinating actions with regional financial institutions. We stressed6
the need to coordinate crisis mitigation efforts with regional integration
associations such as the European Union, ASEAN and the Eurasian Economic
Union. This is due to the significant capability that regional institutions
possess in tracking intra-regional processes as well as their experience
in coordinating national economic policies within their respective regions.
Engaging regional cooperation mechanisms, developed within regional
integration arrangements and development institutions, including with
funding from regional development banks, is equally important. With so
many countries closing their borders and going into lockdown the operating
margin for interstate institutions has been greatly reduced, but when
the process of reopening begins, as it inevitably will, regional associations
could play a leading stabilising role, since neighbouring countries not only
share the same markets but are also affected by the same problems, which
means that working together to solve them makes total sense.
Just as we suggested in 2019, creating a crisis response mechanism

could be part of an even larger-scale initiative to build a new global economic
architecture with the involvement of regional actors. We proposed creating
a new cooperation framework for regional integration arrangements and
institutions coordinated by the G20. The resulting grouping could be designated
as the Regional 20 (R20), bringing together regional integration associations
and institutions in which the respective G20 members would play a leading
economic role.7 This would promote greater horizontal coordination among
regional institutions, while at the same time stepping up vertical cooperation with
global multilateral organisations. For example, regional financial mechanisms
could work with the IMF, regional development banks could get involved with
the World Bank, and regional integration associations, with the WTO.
One might assume that factors such as geography and distance

in trade flows would lose their importance in the post-pandemic world
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
7
See Yaroslav Lissovolik, Regionalism in Global Governance: Exploring New Pathways, 2019. Valdai International
Discussion Club website. URL: https://valdaiclub.com/a/reports/regionalism-in-global-governance/.
economy. Meanwhile, the presence of digital technologies and remote

communications will be growing. No transformation of global governance
is possible without the creation of functional new ways of regulating
the world economy in order to counter global threats related to cybersecurity,
pandemics and manmade disasters. Ideally, measures should be taken
to reinforce such global institutions as the World Health Organization or
the International Organization for Migration.
The main lessons of the ongoing economic downturn should be the need
to create a more balanced and inclusive global economic system that would
include coordinated crisis response mechanisms agreed in advance, while
relying on the extensive potential for working with regional groups and
development institutions.
That said, we have to acknowledge that in the post-pandemic world

the economy could follow a path that would make all the proposals that have
been made until now irrelevant. By their sheer scale, these developments will
outweigh any measures discussed so far.
Special Responsibility
and a Moral Imperative
The Second World War arose from a multitude of processes to become
the bloodiest of all the wars in human history. Among its main catalysts was
the profound economic crisis of the late 1920s and the first half of the 1930s
that came to be known as the Great Depression. Today this term is often
mentioned in connection with the economic aftermath of the pandemic.
Gloomy forecasts are by no means in short supply these days. All historical
parallels are relative, since history never repeats itself in exactly the same
way. Still, the sharp fall in resources available to national governments
and international organisations is the most alarming of all the changes
we are witnessing.
Excessive possibilities used to be the norm. This is what the era

of liberal globalisation taught the world in the late 20th and early 21st
centuries. Of course, various resources are not distributed in a uniform
manner, but overall they are plentiful and available whenever an urgent
need arises, although the terms for accessing them may vary. Debt
accumulation became common practice, promoted by the increasing
availability of refinancing tools relying on funds from around the world
that were not tied to a specific industrial potential. Of course, not every
country had the political weight to plug a financial hole of any size. But
even going bankrupt at the state level, which a number of countries
experienced, would not change the way these countries managed their
economies. First tier countries had the resources to back their economic
needs with political power, and had no qualms about creating financial
pyramids, confident in their ability to operate them for an indefinite
period of time.
This excess in resources is irreversibly becoming a thing of the past,

no matter which of the possible scenarios materialises in the development
of the world economy after the pandemic. Instead of this excessive capacity, we
will live in a world with a deficit of development resources. Competition for them
will inevitable intensify. Major social and economic challenges threatening all
states without exception and the lack of mechanisms for ensuring even basic
justice or a universally recognised international system of norms and institutions
will only exacerbate risks. In the worst-case scenario, the most archaic version
of international relations in the form of “international and political Darwinism”
may become a common reality.
The last of the world wars ended 75 years ago. Since then preventing
a disaster of this scale from repeating itself has been the main imperative
in international politics. This was made possible primarily through the system
of institutions created by the victorious powers in 1945 and based
on the balance of power between the main parties. The international order that
emerged back then and remained mostly intact even after the end of the Cold
War resulted from the experience of the first half of the 20th century. Today,
we are witnessing the crumbling of these institutions. However, the challenges
in a world that is still interconnected, much more complex and deficit-driven
highlight the need to be especially diligent in following its “safety rules.” “Force”
and “morality” must become the basic tenets for any emerging system of relations.
These are natural factors embedded in our consciousness. Morality does not
necessarily result from force, as confirmed by the failed attempts by the United
States and its allies to build a unipolar world after the end of the Cold War.
The pandemic creates a lot of anxiety about the future, while also
offering an opportunity to discuss new forms of global moral responsibility
irrespective of national priorities or the inevitable power politics. The goal

is to mitigate threats arising from the objective imbalances in the race
for resources when “there is not enough of them to go around,” as well
as to prevent a totally unacceptable situation in international politics
for both strong and weak nations. This may seem rather naïve against
the backdrop of the United States and China trading insults regarding
the source of the infection. But the very idea that relations between nations
could depend on an abstract notion of justice rather than merely on their
individual strength was just as naïve only a century ago, in the aftermath
of a cruel war.
It would not take much to start moving in this direction. Unlike

at the time of the Black Death in the mid 14th century, states have
the technical capabilities at their disposal to create a single platform
for fighting pandemics and natural disasters. In the context of COVID-19,
the World Health Organisation has been working proactively on a wide
range of medical problems, and the outbreak highlighted how meagre
its resources are. The WHO’s 2020–2021 budget is just $4.84 billion,
and could be substantially lower considering the refusal by the United
States to finance its operations. Designed as an irreplaceable focus
point for medical information from around the world and the backbone
for the international medical community, the WHO lacks the tools for
a proactive and decisive engagement on the ground. There is a need for
a new approach whereby states agree to either vest this organisation or
any other entity based on it with real authority in order to counter global
pandemics that could be much worse than the current outbreak. Global
power institutions (the UN) could be backed by global moral institutions,
for example, a universal agency on pandemic prevention, in order to ensure
justice for all, at least on this narrow issue considering its urgency for
the international community.
The post-COVID-19 world will be different and marked by bitter

conflict. In autumn, many heads of state will converge in New York City
(hopefully they will be able to do so considering the epidemiological
situation) to mark the anniversary of the United Nations Organisation and
celebrate its contribution to preserving peace on Earth. Leaders of the most
powerful nations representing the permanent members of the UN Security
Council will meet on the side-lines of these celebrations. The initiative
to hold this summit came from the Russian President, and was supported
by the leaders of Britain, China, the United States and France. These
countries pioneered the UN system 75 years ago, officially proclaiming

the commitment to sparing succeeding generations from the scourges
of world wars. Today, this goal is no less urgent, given the sharp escalation
in the conflict potential and the need to counter a growing number
of diverse threats.
The world has radically changed over the past decades. However,
the United Nations Organisation must still be regarded as a valuable asset
to the international community because of its ability to deliver on its key
mission and despite the inevitable shortcomings. The UN survived through
the most challenging times after the end of the Cold War, and this was not
a coincidence. In a crumbling world no other viable alternative exists or
can be invented. The choice is simple: either preserve the institution that
represents the highest form of international cooperation, or fall back into
harsh competition guided by instinct rather than reason. Countries that have
been vested with special privileges since the establishment of the United
Nations have special responsibility to the entire world to prevent the second
scenario from becoming a reality.
ValdaiClub
ValdaiClub
ValdaiClub
[email protected]
MGIMO
UNIVERSITY

Staying Sane

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Staying Sane

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Staying Sane

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Valdai Discussion Club Report

Oleg Barabanov, Timofei Bordachev,

© The Foundation for Development and Support of the

42 Bolshaya Tatarskaya st., Moscow, 115184, Russia

5 The Genesis of the Crumbling World

9 The Growing Anarchy and Risk of a New Bipolarity

14 The Great Equaliser

21 Special Responsibility and a Moral Imperative

About the Report

A sovereign state remains the only institution capable of acting in an organised

The familiar ideological schematics, especially with respect to the “democracy

The “showdown” of international institutions reduces the future to two basic

The erosion of political structures is compounded by social shifts. An awareness

The 2018 report, Living in a Crumbling World1, drew the biggest

At the time, we were accused of excessive alarmism: despite the obvious

The scale of the crisis induced by the pandemic can be attributed

The future of the state

Neither transnational corporations, nor international organisations or

The erosion of institutions

The crisis of conventional ideologies

Judging by the experience of various countries in combating the disease,

The advent of ethical pluralism

Lack of prospects for speculative economy

The Growing Anarchy

It is quite natural that the response to these developments

However, there is a major obstacle in the form of the continuing shifts

The prospects of the emergence of a new bipolar world order

Even if the international community comes up with coordinated

China’s ambition and confidence have been on the rise due

Confrontation in various spheres, as well as attempts to gradually

ethical categories, rather than military, political or even economic matters.

Today, there is a stark cultural difference between the main opponents,

Nuclear capability remains the main factor preventing the world

We described anarchy as a new (revived) model of

The Great Equaliser

Overall, the revival of the state has diverse implications. Quarantine

State control methods will gradually permeate the capitalist economy

The type of government is unlikely to play a decisive role in the dichotomy

Finally, a new vision of mobility will become a defining characteristic for

Over the past half a century, humanity benefitted from

While some mainstream politicians may have fears regarding

There can be a variety of risks and resulting catastrophes.

Up until a few months ago the debate on global risks largely

This changing reality pushes us to rethink the ethical aspects of relations

The world economy is about to be reformatted. This implies more than

Of course, no one could have predicted this turn of events. Still,

of international cooperation frameworks. The economic crisis induced by

In our reports we emphasised the need not only to strengthen

What we are witnessing today is a series of hasty and disparate measures

We also said5 that the involvement of regional institutions such

Just as we suggested in 2019, creating a crisis response mechanism

One might assume that factors such as geography and distance

economy. Meanwhile, the presence of digital technologies and remote

That said, we have to acknowledge that in the post-pandemic world

Excessive possibilities used to be the norm. This is what the era

This excess in resources is irreversibly becoming a thing of the past,

irrespective of national priorities or the inevitable power politics. The goal

It would not take much to start moving in this direction. Unlike

The post-COVID-19 world will be different and marked by bitter