FICHTE’S AENESIDEMUS REVIEW AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF GERMAN IDEALISM NOTICE: THIS MATERIAL MAY BE PROTECTEG 3 COPYRIGHT LAW (TITLE 17, U.S. CODE). ‘Ty:7s2 there appeared anonymously a book entitled, Aenesidemus, or Concerning the Foundations of the Elementary Philosophy Pro- pounded in Jena by Professor Reinhold, including a Defense of | Skepticism against the Pretensions of the Critique of Reason.* ‘This curious work, which takes the form of series of letter exchanged be- tween an enthusiastic champion of the new transcendental philosophy (“Hermias”) and a skeptical critic of this same philosophy (“Aenesi- emus”) created something of a sensation, appearing as it did at the height of the first wave of general enthusiasm for the Critical Philoso- phy. ‘Though by no means the first published attack on Kantianism, ‘Aenesidemus was distinguished from most of the other early eriti- DANIEL BREAZEALE " Aenesidemus oder iber die Fundamente der von dem Herma Profes- vor Reha ih Tes paiferton Blomenar Plone, Nebel ser “enheidigung des Skepticiemus gegen die Anmassungen der Vernunftkri- treet Sed stonyraguly ins wth no nletin of publisher or place fof publication. Some indication of the importance of this neglected work is that when, atthe beginning of the present century, the Kanigesellschaft in fugurated a program of republishing “rare philosophical works” the first ‘work selected for inclusion inthis series was Schulze's Aenesidemus (‘New Urucke seltener philosophischer Werke,” vol. 1 (Berlin: Reuther & Ret- chard, 1911). ‘References to Fichte's writings are to volume and page number of Jo- hann Gottlieb Fichtes sammtliche Werke [=SW], ed. I. H. Fichte (Berlin: Vek & Comp, 184546). Fichte’s letters are referred to by date and recip- ient, as published in J.G. Fichtes Briefoechsel.. Kritische Gesamtausgabe, fed: Hans Schulze, 2d ed. (Leipzig: Haesse), 1990), ‘All translations in this essay are by the author. In the ease of both Fichte’s writings and letters, the translated texts have been checked Zgainst the versions of the same texts published in the still uncompleted 3G. Fichie-Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften ed. Reinhard Lauth and Hans Jacob (Stuttgar-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann, 1964 to date). ‘The text of Fichte's review of Aenesidemus may be found in SW, 1 3-25 and in AA, 1.2: 41-61. Phe name is derived from that of Aenesidemus of Knossus, a ne0- Pyerhonean skeptic who taught at Alexandria during the first century B.C. Review of Metaphyeics $4 (March 1981: 545-568 Comgnght © 1981 by he Review of Metophyricsoo DANIEL BREAZEALE cisms by the detailed character of its serutiny as well as by its willing- hess to examine the Critical Philosophy aren in its Dig te but also in the more “advanced” version represented by K. L. Rein. hold’s Elementary Philosophy. Aenesidemus claimed to be nothing less than a demonstration of the untenability of the new philosophy, specifically, of its failure to refute what the anonymous author called “Humean skepticism.” For a young and enthusiastic Kantian like Fichte the challenge presented by Aenesidemus was simply too great to ignore; indeed, it was the first book which he undertook to review after being invited to become a contributor to the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, where, after considerable delay, Fichte's lengthy review was finally pub- lished in February of 1794.2 The Aenesidemus review turned out to be much more than a defense of Kantianism against skepticism. It implies a fundamental reassessment of both Kant’s and Reinhold’s work and—in tentative but unmistakable terms—announces the discovery of a new standpoint and of a new foundation for transcen- dental philosophy. Fichte’s review of Aenesidemus thus not only signals a revolution in his own philosophical development but marks a Se gars in the history of German Idealism. jough Aenesidemus was published anor asl} wi low tobe the work of Goioh Ernst Schule (1761188), who at the time of its publication was professor of philosophy at Helmstidt. Schulze was not unknown to Fichte. ‘The two had been fellow stu- dents at Pforta and then again, briefly, at Wittenburg. Fichte’s atti- tude toward Aenesidemus was further complicated by his belief that 9 At the time the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, which ir-Leitung, which was publis at Jp, pera ie eating ray ara i he Geranoesing von ‘on the basis of his sudden fame as aullior of the Attempt a &.Grtigue of All Revelation, Fiehte was invited by C. G. Schatz \Counder axe cooditor of the Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung) in the fll of 178 to be 2 regular contributor.” cht’ letter to Schitz of 25 May 1790 ac knowledges, “I have undertaken the review of Aenesidemus and will be sending it to you from Zurich within a shor time."”" More than half a year Inter he again wrote to Schitz concerning the promised re In this letter he reports that, despite his efforts, the review remains unfinished {Bnet [have been thrown ito an unforeseen labor by Aenesidemus'sskep- fielam.”' In fact, it was not until midoFanuary of 179 that Schits received iehie's manuscript, "Thus, although Aenesidemus was the fist review qphish Fete undertook for the Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung, it was the ast of his three reviews to appear in thet journal. ike all contributions to this journal, Fichte's reviews were published unsigned. FICHTE’S AENESIDEMUS REVIEW 847 ‘Schulze was the anonymous author of a very harsh and sareastic re- view of Fichte's Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation.* Wounded by the unconcealed hostility of this review, Fichte nevertheless re- solved to keep his feelings to himself and to avoid any public quarrel with Schulze—a resolution which, as events developed, was honored primarily in the breach. Despite his determination “to treat the book gently and considerately precisely because I consider its author to be the same person who reviewed my Critique of All Revelation,” Fichte’s published review of Aenesidemus included some sharp per- sonal attacks which he later declared to have crept in “quite contrary to my intentions.”* Good intentions to the contrary, the Aenesi- demus review proved to be another chapter in one of those acrimoni- ‘ous literary feuds which were such an unfortunately characteristic feature of Fichte’s public career.* ‘The explanation for Fichte’s long delay in completing his review ‘of Aenesidemus is not to be found in any change in his private eircum- stances (in the spring of 1793 he moved from Danzig to Zurich, where he was married in October of the same year) nor in any personal quar- rel with Schulze. The true reason for the delay is apparent from a passage in a letter which Fichte wrote to an old acquaintance in mid- November of 1793. After mentioning his recent marriage and the ac- cumulated work which has occupied his time, he adds: “In addition to this I immediately thereafter began a book by a resolute skeptic, which led me to the clear convietion that philosophy is still very far “The review in question appeared in 1793 in the Neue aligemeine deutsche Bibliothek (el, 2.1. “Among other things, this review charges Hehte with having deliberately omitted his own name from the first edition Ot the Critique of All Revelation and of aping the Kantian manner simply in order to play 2 joke on the public. Fichte's reaction to this review is ap- Garent from his letter of 25 March 1708 to Gottlieb Hufeland: “Tt eauses me Pain great pain —that I should be the innocent eause ofa literary feud car- Ted on in such a tone.” Letter to Hufeland, 8 March 1794. In the same letter Fichte states “my plan isto win over by love those who especially hounded Reinhold with fear. By replying to none of the attacks on my Critigue of All Revelation ind by refusing to write a sharp preface (to the Second edition} [ have shown. that Tam no literary squabbler. ‘Therefore, I would be very sorry if these two reviews (viz. the review of Aenesidemus and an earlier published View of a book by A. L. Creuzer] should east such an unwanted suspicion ‘upon me.” T Tye public controversy between Schulze and Fichte went on for ‘years, finally culminating in the hysterieal polemics of Fichte’s 1797 essay, Annalen des phitosophischen Tons.548 from being a science. ‘Thus I was forced system and think of a tenable one.” skeptic” is made explicit in a letter wise = tter white. Pickin s is same period to J. F. Flatt, professor of sasinwy a Tee i Aenesidemus, which I consider to be oxe «1: = | ucts of our decade, has eonvineed me ct {already suspected: that even after the philosophy is still not a science. Aenezize: toits very foundations, and, sine one 27 ‘open sky, I have been forced to constr To be sure, Fichte had alread: 7 ly begz. about orthodox Kantianism pri x prior to readirg Aenesidemus,® pote he tid to answer Schulze’s specise obiections that he — confront his own misgivings in any : s : iy fundamental a ae forced Fichte to reconsider his general allegiance to Hantian philosophy a5 well as hs more recent enthusiasm fo the fa verion of that philosophy embodied in Reinhold’s _ : Aaa For the fact of the matter is that Fichte found himself in | sania agreement wih some of See’ most finden ob | jection inhold’s and Kant’s presentations oft {al philosophy. Despite this agreemert, however opaNe by tmean wished to avardvitory othe sept in his quarrel with the ee losophy. In order to defend the latter while at the same a ae ‘some of the skeptic’s objections he was forced to make stinction between the true “spiit” of the Critieal Philosophy and * sandr. my own previous 3 of this “resolute “f Rant and Reinhold, 2 has shaken my system ca very welllive under the rex Stern” entertain some doubts "To Ludwig Wihelm Wloemar, letter survive Ihelm Wloemar, November 1793, Only a draft ofthis Tod. F. Flatt, November or D nia were, nber or December 1793. Again, only a draft {biter survive, "Very similar pasages may be found ih Fico shee Beer IA Co Sepa nt hua Tee RS * The degree to which Fichte was ever an orcheton o ae asson ofthis question, ee Petar Beaman Probleme ihres Anfangs (Bonn: Bouvier, 1974), _ $0.69 37 FICHTE’S AENESIDEMUS REVIEW 549 the particular form or “etter” of the same, as found for example in the writings of Kant and Reinhold.'* With respect to these two au- thors (beth of whom were of course still living) Fichte found himself ‘n a somewhat delicate position. On the one hand, he had to agree that Aenesidemus had exposed crucial wealmesses in both Reinhold’s and Kant's systems; on the other, he felt himself genuinely indebted to both Kant and Reinhold and considered himself their most staunch ally in any battle against the erities of transcendental idealism. This explains one of the most curious features of the Aenesidemus review: the way in which Fichte concedes so many of Schulze's objections without ceasing for a moment to present himself a defender of the Critical Philosophy against the attacks of the skeptic. By distinguishing the “spirit” of Kantianism from its “letter” Fichte was able to accept many of Schulze’s objections without admit- ting that Aenesidemus was a successful refutation of the Critical Phi- losophy. But to make this strategy plausible Fichte had to incorpo- rate the skeptie's valid observations into the Critical Philosophy itself. That is to say, the strategy of the Aenesidemus review de- manded a thorough revision of the very system which was ostensibly defended. ‘The new system would have to be immune to Schulze’s '® “Beyond the spirit of Kantianism there is no room left for inquiry. I 1am fully convinced that those first principles which I wish to establish Clearly and distinctly were already—though obscurely —placed by Kant himself at the basis ofall ofhis inquiries. Ido, however, hope to go beyond the letter of Kant.” This passage is from Fichte’s letter of 2 April 1794 to Karl Bottiger. Similar comments on the obscure nature of Kant’s genius, ‘whieh gave him the correct results without the correct reasons, may be {oud in the previously mentioned letters which Fiehte wrote during the winter of 1798/4 (see above, n. 8). The same theme recurs frequently in Fiehte's early published writings, for example, in the following passage from the preface to the first edition (1794) of Concerning the Concept of Theory of Scientific Knowledge: “The author remains convinced that no human understanding can ad- yance further than that boundary on which Kant especially the C tigue of Judgment, stood, and which he declared to be the final bound. ary of finite fnowing—bit without ever tling us specieally where it lies. I realize that I will never be able to say anything which has not already-—directly or indirectly and with more or less elarity—been indicated by Kant. I leave to future ages the task of fathoming the genius of this man who, often as if inspired from on high, drove philo- Sophical judgment so decisively from the standpoint at which he found it toward its final goal” (SW, 1: 30-31).550 DANIEL BREAZEALE objections while remaining at objections whe remaining least compatible with the systems of ‘This was the imposing task which faced Fichte in the winter of 1973/4 as he struggled with Aenesidemus. Before the skeptic could be rebutted and the review submitted, Fichte's own view of his rela- tion to his predecessors would be transformed and the foundations would be laid for a work which would absorb a lifetime of effort, the Teeter eer riod concerning the compatibility of his new system wit otal he one ht wat om Reo tthe dere he 1 [et impetan mal dn oN wm eintition of Kein h ivi losophy from a single principle); on the other, his Ege enny er inane tents ge ment With Kant ‘This is party because Schul's strongest objections are dined at Reino, an alo beeauo Fiche worked out hig ne yiter s the specie of a detailed re-examination of Reinhold’s Elementary ‘How complicated—and anxious—Fichte’s 0 oward renga hin ferences with Renold seul cs nay be frre fer the flowing two passages, theft rom his eta of 2 April 174 to Kai Jottiger, the second from his letter of 1 Mareh 1794 to Reinhold himself “Lam pleased thatthe review of Aenesidemus has aroused aod that you aporove ofthe manner nwhch {peak aout Reno confers that fr a long time {felt myself in predicament concern g {he manner in which {would hav fo tet te reat iepedent tNnkor and worthy man. Fort had to conta ham stration rardly, Thad to demonstrate the untenability of his system.” “The review of Aenesidemus . .. will have indicated have i two thin which T wish to be equally obvious to you: frst, how highly I value your inquiries and how much I ow to you and ‘second, where along the path which you have so laudaly follower I believe Ihave to go ther. I have already sketched at least the major portions of that system to which L referred inthe review, but iis stil far fom bein clear enough to communicate. Nevertheless, we are alread\ close agreement that I am almost ct a 5 we wil reac love sgrmen th t certain that one day we will reach Se 1c nrg compare te dreopet ope of he shove pa ELC eect cote wi Fichte writes, “am a declared opponent of your system.” Tbe lieve that I have justified my opinion of Aenesidemus. "From my Tovlew of it, it should at least be clear that I have acted in good faith, ETE at PR SA Sr Acnesiderous than Idi even then; yet des seem to me that it has ae al Zour ‘lementary Philosophy” (Fragment of a letter, March- biguity in Fichte's comments FICHTE'S AENESIDEMUS REVIEW 551 Wissenschaftslekre, or “Theory of Scientific Knowledge.”* Again, Fichte’s letters from this period are especially interesting and show just how clearly he understood the signifieance of what was happen ing: [Aenesidemus] has overthrown Reinhold in my eyes, has made me [ispicious of Kant, and has overturned my whole system from the Ground up. One cannot live under the open sky. It cannot be helped: Fhe system must be rebuilt, And this is what T have been faithfully doing for the past six weeks or so. Come celebrate the harvest with wrote { have discovered a new foundation, out of which it will be easy to develop the whole of philosophy. Kants philosophy, as such, is cor reet--but only in its results and not in its reasons." ‘Though there is some doubt concerning the alleged suddenness of Fichte’s discovery during the winter of 1793/4" there can be no doubt, that the discovery was of the highest importance for Fichte's self-im- posed task. As he wrote to Flatt in the previously quoted letter, ‘Aenesidemus had not only convineed him that philosophy was not yet a secure science, but it also reinforced his conviction that it could be- come such “only if it is generated from one single first principle.” To this he added the boast: “I believe that I have found this first prinei- ple and I have found it to hold good, to the extent that I have ad- vanced in my inquiries so far.” This was written in November or De- cember of 179. By mid-January of the next year he could write: “I have already erected the framework upon my: first principle, and have Fichte’s first use of the term “Wissenschaftlehre” to deseribe his new standpoint occurs in his letter of 1 March 1794 to Bottiger. ™ To Heinrich Stephani, December 1798. 1 In his Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Lichtstrahlen aus seinen Werken und Briefen nebst einen Lebenabriss (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1868), p. 48, Fichte's nephew, Edward Fichte, recounts the following: “Let us here rmen- tig something which he later tol his friends——how, before a warm winter Stove an after he ha been mediating long and ontzumnsl Upon high- est philosophical principle, he was suddenly seized, as if by something self dent, by the thought that only the T, the concept of the pure subject-ob- Jeet, could serve asthe highest principle of philosophy." (Henrich Steffans rote elaborate version of the same story is quoted below, n. 42.) Gn the other hand, Fichte himself affirmed—most notably in 1797 in the "Second Introduction” to the Theory of Scientific Knowledge (SW, 1: $hS) bat algo in certain passages in his correspondence —that the idea of ‘SGnetructing his philosophy upon the foundation of the pure I had already occurred to him in 1782. Will Kabitz ong ago substantiated this ela, (iiich has been more recently defended by Reinhard Lauth and eriticized by Peter Baumanns, See Kabitz, pp. 32-65; Baumanns, pp, 69-70 ni; and auth, “Genése du ‘Fondement de toute la doctrine de la seience’ de Fichte & partir’ de ses ‘Méditations personelles sur élementarphilosophie,"” A7- Chives de Philosophie 85 (1971): 51-79.562 DANIEL BREAZEALE [alteady discovered how to make the transition [from the theoretical] to the practical part.”"* Especially gratifying to Fichte was the way in which this new system appeared to complement those of Kant and Reinhold. ‘Whereas these earlier systems were in many respects correct, they were at the same time incomplete. Specifically, they lacked solid foundation in a self-evident first principle as well as the sort of sys- 4¥ tematic structure which would ground the certainty of the whole in the certainty of this first principle. Fichte’s discovery was meant to remedy precisely these defects, to supply what was missing in—and yet clearly presupposed by—the writings of Kant and Reinhold. Once this was accomplished, it would (or so Fichte hoped) become ob- vious that his new system was only another and more tenable version of the system. It is in this sense that Fichte understood his own ad- vance beyond Kant and Reinhold as at the same time a defense of the Critical Philosophy. What precisely was the “discovery” which Fichte made during the winter of 1793/4? What was the “new principle” upon which he proposed to base his reconstruction of transcendental idealism? To answer these questions, let us look more closely at the content of ‘Schulze’s criticisms and at Fichte’s reply to these in his review. Aenesidemus describes himself as a “Humean skeptic,” and ex- plains that by “skepticism” he means the view “that in philosophy nothing can be decided on the basis of incontestably certain and uni- vorsally valid first principles concerning the existence or nonexis- tence of things in themselves and their properties nor concerning the limits of man’s capacity for knowledge.”"* Thus Aenesidemus's skep- ticism is not one which involves the denial of the certainty of immedi- ate consciousness (mental representations) nor of logical laws; what it denies is the possibility of going beyond these to obtain “objective © To Stephani, December 1798. ‘That this claim was no idie boast is rade clear in a document from this period entitled Bigne Meditationen iber ElementarPhilosophie(Practisce Philosophie. Though utilized by some previous scholars (most notably Kabitz) this important text was only pub- lished in 1971 in AA, 2. 3: 19-266. What this manuscript shows is how Fichte developed the outlines of his own philosophy in the context of a de~ re-examination of Reinhold's Elementary Philosophy. Though the term Wistenschafislehre does not occur, this text really deserves to be called the first of Fiehte’s many published and unpublished presentations of his system. For further discussion of the content and importance of Eigne ‘Meditationen, see the texts by Baumanns and Lauth mentioned in the pre- vious note ‘Aenesidemus (1911 ed.), p. 18. FICHTE’S AENESIDEMUS REVIEW 553 Knowledge.” His basic objection to the Critical Philosophy is that it violates these skeptical strietures on the limits of knowledge and of philosophy and is thus a new form of philosophical dogmatism. ‘The aim of Aenesidemus is to substantiate this charge by examining the Critical Philosophy, both in its original form and in the more ad- vanced version represented by Reinhold’s Elementary Philosophy— to a detailed analysis of which most of Schulze’s book is devoted. As Aenesidemus presents it, the basic deductive strategy of the Critical Philosophy is to move from the fact of representation to the reality of the thing in itself and the subject in itself as conditions nec- essary for explaining this primal “fact.” But such a move from thought to being is, according to Aenesidemus, iliit, for it does not follow from the fact that we must think of things in a certain way that they must exist in conformity with the way in which we must think them. Aenesidemus argues that the Critieal Philosophy violates this prineiple insofar as it requires the doctrine of (unknowable) things in themselves and an (equally unknowable) subject in itself or transeen- dental I. Furthermore, he finds completely uneonvineing Kant's at- tempt to get around this diffieulty by introducing a distinction be- tween “knowability” and “thinkability.” At the transcendental level no such distinction is permissible. With respect to Reinhold’s Elementary Philosophy Aenesidernus has many additional specific objections to raise. He launches a with- ering attack on the ambiguity of Reinhold’s technical vocabulary, on the arbitrariness of some of his fundamental propositions (such as the correlation of multiplicity with “content” and of unity with “form”), and on his illicit use of causal inferences. Singied out for special crit- cism is Reinhold’s proposed highest principle of philosophy, the so- called “principle of conseiousness,”"* which, according to Schulze, nei- 1 The easy manner in which Schulze uses Reinhold’s system as the main text case in his examination of Kant’s Critieal Philosophy is striking confirmation of the truth of Nicolai Hartmann's observation that “contem- oraries viewed Kant’s philosophy in the light of Reinhold’s, and thus at first the differences between the two theories could seem to vanish.” Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, 3d ed. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1974), M-35. Tr Reinhold’s “principle of conseiousness” was meant to be no more than a statement of the alleged fact that all consciousness involves the dis- tinction between a subject and an object, as well as representations, and that in every act of eonsciousness the representation is distinguished from and related to both the subject and object. From this innocent-appearing principle Reinhold proposed to derive (as the condition for its possibility) the entire Critical Philosophy. he. fon fe het ve Sage: ‘neg alt foibas884 DANIEL BREAZEALE ther is the highest philosophical ince it ° principle (since it stand principle of contradiction) nor can provide the Critieal Phiten? with an adequate foundation, ow Most of Aenesidemus is concerned s , with the theoret the Critical Philacopky it concludes, however, witha brefeeeon tion of Kant pracieal philosophy. ‘The entire theory of the pos lates of prateal reason is rejeted a going far beyo the demands al reasoning. Furthermore, the postl 0 : moral theology founded fae bau be eesaraae a pon them, are held to be : the most basie (theoretical) principle 1Priccophy, Ae sie (theoretical) principles ofthe Critical Philosoph suing that before we can know what ict Have to ht to do we fi know what we ean do, Schul aio "mos cata , Schulze eurtly dismisses Kant’ consering the priory of patil reason, ns anos lan ough Acnesidemus directs his. variou: : is various objections to speci sen ri Mi dental idea inal ofits possible forms. He does profess a certain naman for the Crt Phiosophy “as a work of plilosophial ,” but his final verdict is that this philosophy ject fal * cts th phy isan abject fa ovina bsaueof is iegimate onion of subjetve who lective nsesity. Stripped othe “thing inte” ard th "transeen 4 dental I,” the Kantian system turns out, accor " inditingushable from Berkeleyean hewomenain fb That there is no legitimate it legitimate place within the Critial Phik for any doctrine of things in themselves is a point really granted by Fiche, Tadd the pint seams to hin s obvious that he cannot uit bring hse acim that such dete indeed tobe fond he writings of both Kant and Reinhold; instead, self with the remark “that neit ‘wot Reabeld hes ty ay her Kant nor Reinhold has by ‘means delaredhimsel ouly and strongly enough agsinat. this mis Chie, which has been the eommon souree fl the objections tical as wellas dogmatis—which have been raised against the Cri ilosophiy."* a Just as Fichte finds it obvious th : vious that the very thought of a thin Spar om any relation to representation wat apse of whims, Pipe dream, nonthought" he als sees clearly that "the skepti aya be vietorious so long as one holds on to the thought of a ‘ein Kunstwerk des philosophischen Geistes" (Aenesidemus, p. ® “Aenesidemus Review,” S| ™ Tbid., p. 18. Eee 305). FICHTE'S AENESIDEMUS REVIEW 555 connection between our knowledge and some thing in itself which is supposed to have reality entirely apart from our knowledge.” From this, with characteristic directness, he concludes: “Therefore, one of philosophy’s first aims is to demonstrate clearly the futility of such a thought.” If this point has not been made clear in previous ‘yersions of the Critical Philosophy, then surely it must be a feature of central emphasis in some fiture version of the same. In clear antici pation of his own Wissenschaftslehre Fichte, in the Aenesidemus re- view, describes some of the consequences of clearly dismissing the ancient pipe dream concerning knowledge of “things in themselves.” ‘Suppose that further advances in the future along the way which Rein- hole to his eredit, has opened up for us should reveal the following: that the most immediately eertain thing of all, “Tam,” is also valid onl {or the I, that all that is not-1 is for the T only; that it (i.e, the not-I} ‘receives all ofits determinations a priori and only through its relation to an I that, however, al ofthese determinations, insofar as they ean ‘be Known a prior, become absolutely necessary upon the mere condi tion of a relation between a not-L and any Tat all. From this it would follow that the notion of a thing in itself, to the extent that this is sup posed to be a not-L which is not opposed to any I, is self-eontradietory, End that the thing is actually constituted in itself in just that way in ‘hich it must be thought to be constituted by any conceivable inteli- gent 1(.e., by any being which thinks in accordance with the principle St identity’ and contradiction). It would also follow that what is logi- tally true for any intellect which is conceivable by a finite intellect is at fhe Game time true in reality and that there is no other truth but this." Yet the construction of a truly consistent idealism would not be without its cost. Even at this early date Fichte showed a remarkably clear grasp of the elusive relationship between systematic philosophy and the circularity of thought. On this point he is refreshingly can- did: one ean possess a truly scientific philosophy (.e., a genuinely sys- tematic transcendental idealism) only if one is willing to admit the ul- timacy of “the circle of understanding within which every finite understanding, ie., every understanding that we ean conceive, is r necessarily confined.” But once one is willing to admit this, one will = Letter to R. V. Reinhard, 15 January 1794 2 *Arnesiderug Review SI 20 cone - % Thid.,p. 11. Typically, Fichte goes on to credit the diseovery of this circle to Kant Fimself-ran atrbution whic tells us more about Fehte than it does about Kant (SW, 1: 19-20): “"But no matter how often one pretends to the contrary, no person has ever had or can have Aenesidems's thought of a thing which Mas re Siity and distinctive properties independently, not merely of the| 556 DANIEL BREAZEALE then discover how little has really been lost. It is true that without things in themselves it is no longer possible to look for some “higher” or “external” ground for subjective necessity (“the unconditional ne- cessity which is diseovered in our minds”). But philosophy requires no such external ground, for: This passage from the external to the internal or vice versa is pre- cisely what is in question. Tt is precisely the task of the Critical Phi- losophy to show that no such passage is required, that everything which oceurs in our mind can be completely explained and compre: hhended on the basis of the mind iteelf.. The Critieal Philosophy does not even dream of trying to answer a question which it considers con- tradictory to reason. This philosophy points out to us that eile from ‘which we cannot escape. Within this eirele, on the other hand, it fur- nishes us with the greatest coherence in all of our knowledge.” 1f Kant and Reinhold could not have been guilty of clinging to the self-contradictory demand for knowledge of things in themselves, who then is guilty of such hopes? In fact, it is the skeptic himself. What Aenesidemus really objects to is not the doetrine of things in themselves but the weakness of what he takes to be Kant's and Rein- hold’s attempt to infer the existence of such things from our mental representations. ‘The skeptic simply takes it for granted that gen- uuine knowledge must be knowledge of external things in themselves, and he treats this assumption as if it were rooted in human nature itself, without pausing to ask whether such an assumption ean have any meaning whatsoever. “Thus, here at the foundation of this new skepticism, we clearly and distinctly have that old mischief which, until Kant, was perpetrated with the thing in itself.”** Conse- quently, insofar as Schulze’s objections to Kant’s talk about things in themselves have any merit, they do not drive one into skepticism but rather toward a more consistent idealism. human fculty of presentation, bat of any and ever alos Te addition, one always thinks of oneself qua intellect striving to know the thong. ts ony the ia eng ae thor hth most of his flowers, necpeearty ta et cet ne tan, or mona, withthe power of representation and ‘Moroes had fot tance ae oe aa A on hs mind is enclosed (which was the only thing that Leibniz, who saw tversthing ela, fled to co), then ey Weald wave hoe neo shiy comes te thing wld be sna aed a ee fale atic wa vce Wy Kan * Tbid., p. 19 (also p. 17). See too Fichte’s discussion, in his 4 Intros to the'Theory of Sense Knog ofthe dation nk Tate skeptics demands upon pean eh oa FICHTE’S AENESIDEMUS REVIEW 557 Regarding Schulze’s elaborate criticism of Reinhold’s “principle of consciousness” and its claim to be the sought-for “highest principle of philosophy,” Fichte again found himself in the delicate position of having to agree with many of the skeptic’s specific objections while at the same time defending the fundamental correctness of Reinhold’'s project. ‘The most original and historically influential feature of Rein- hold’s Elementary Philosophy was its emphasis upon the indispens- ability of systematic form in philosophy. In book after book Reinhold argued that the on!y way in which philosophy could become truly “sci- entific” was by becoming rigorously systematic, and that the only way that it could become rigorously systematie was by being derived in its entirety from a single, self-evident first principle.” The Ble- mentary Philosophy is the result of Reinhold’s application of this method to the Kantian philosophy. ‘The Elementary Philosophy begins with a principle which is meant to be no more than the statement of a self-evident fact: “in con- sciousness the subject distinguishes the representation from both the subject and the object and relates it [the representation] to them both.” This activity of distinguishing and relating is assigned to what Reinhold calls the “faculty of representation” (Vorstellungs- vermégen), and the first—and by far the most original—portion of the Elementary Pailosophy is entitled “Theory of the Faculty of Rep- resentation,” the explicit task of which is to show how Kant’s “two roots of knowledge” (viz., thought and intuition) ean both be derived from the single “principle of consciousness.” ‘The Elementary Philos- ophy thus claims to uncover that “common root” of all knowledge, concerning which Kant could merely speculate," and in the absence of which Kant’s presentation of his philosophy had to fall short of rig- orous systematic form. In the second portion of the Elementary Phi- losophy (which Reinhold calls “Theory of the Faculty of Knowledge” # Reinhold’s most suecinet discussion ofthe nature of systematic form and the need for a single first principle in philosophy is to be found in his Beytrige zur Bericktigung bisheriger Missverstandnisse der Philosophen, vol. 1 (1760), See especially chaps. 2 and 5. % Beytrige, I 267. In the space of three years Reinhold published three separate expositions of his Elementary Philosophy, The first was en- titled Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermd- mis (1769); the second is contained in chap. 8 of the previously mentioned jeytrage, 1 (1790); the thind is in Ueber daa Fundament des philosophi- schen Wissens (7E1). > See Critique of Pure Reason, A1S/B29 and ABUBTB.858 DANIEL BREAZEALE and which is in turn divided into a “Theory of Sensibility,” “Theory of Understanding,” and “Theory of Reason”) the main doctrines of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason are derived from the results of the preceding analysis of the faculty of representation (for which there is no analogue in Kant's writings). Finally, in a very sketchy and unsatisfactory third portion, entitled “Theory of the Faculty of De- sire,” Reinhold attempts to derive the will as a necessary condition {for the possibility of the principle of consciousness, thereby proving rather than merely asserting the priority of practical reason, Though frequently lapsing into superficiality, Reinhold’s version of the Critical Philosophy (at least in its theoretical portion) possesses several undeniable virtues. First, itis far clearer and easier to grasp than Kant's own presentation of his philosophy. Second, it shows an admirable awareness of the unresolved tensions in Kant’s work and a courageous willingness to do whatever is necessary to resolve them. Third, it begins with and clings fast to what many consider to be the central insight of Kant’s analysis of knowledge: that all consciousness (ie, all representing) involves both a priori and a posteriori ele- ments. Even before his discovery of Reinhold’s writings® Fichte showed a strong interest in the problem of the unity of Kant’s eritieal writings, and especially of the relation of the various Critiques to each other. ‘The great, indeed decisive, contribution whieh the study of Reinhold’s works made to the development of Fichte’s own think- ing was to convince him of the need for finding a single first principle to serve as the starting point for a philosophical system, a system + Reinhold’s essential contributions to the development of transcen- dental idealism have been badly neglected (especially among English speak- {ng students of this subject). For an excellent recent reassessement of his importance, see the collection edited by Reinhard Lauth, Philosophie aus einem Prinzip. Karl Leonhard Reinhold (Bonn: Bouvier, 1974), especially the two articles eontributed by the editor, both of which are concerned with Reinhold’s relation to Fiehte. By far the most complete study of Reinhold's Elementary Philosophy remains Alfred Klemmt’s mammoth, Karl Leon- hard Reinholds Elementarphilosophie. Eine Studie tber den Ursprung des spekutativen deutschen Idealismus (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1958) Sit is certain that Fichte was already acquainted with Reinhold's ‘work (probably Beyériige, 1) in the fall of 1792, for the second edition of At- tempt ata Critique of All Revelation included a new section (theory of the ‘wilP) written under the obvious influence of his study of Reinhold. "By the fall of 1793 he was familiar with the other published versions of Reinhold’s Elementary Philosophy as well. FICHTE'S AENESIDEMUS REVIEW 559 which then had somehow to be derived in its entirety from the first principle in question. Fichte never made any attempt to conceal his debt to Reinhold on this score; indeed, his early published writings ‘contain frequent and prominent, acknowledgement of the importance of Reinhole’s “immortal serviee” in “calling the attention of philoso~ phizing reason to the fact that philosophy in its entirety has to be traced back to one single first principle, and that one will not discover the system of the human mind's permanent modes of acting until one has discovered the keystone of this system.”* "Where Fichte disagrees with Reinhold is not over the need for a single first principle in philosophy, but rather over Reinhold’s insis- tence that his own “principle of consciousness” constitutes, the sought-for first principle which could serve as the “keystono of this system.” It is interesting to compare Fichte’s reservations con- cerning Reinhold’s principle of consciousness with Schulze's pub- lished objections to the same principle. Schulze finds Reinhold’s statement of the prineiple—along with the attendant distinetions be- tween the representation, the representing subject, and the repre- sented object —to be filled with ambiguities, ambiguities which are reflected in the arbitrariness of the entire “Theory of the Faculty of Representation” which Reinhold proceeds to erect upon this princi ple. What Schulze does not object to is the underlying claim: that if philosophy isto be systematic it must begin with some fact. Accord: ingly, Schulze interprets the principle of consciousness as an empiric ‘al generalization, though not as a genuinely universal one (since, ac- cording to him, there are some kinds of consciousness to which this principle does not apply). Thus, Reinhold’s insistence to the con- trary notwithstanding, Schulze concludes that the principle of con- sciousness must be a synthetic principle based upon abstraction from experience. The fundamental disagreement between Reinhold and Schulze, however, concems the success of the Elementary Philoso- B“Aenesidemus Review,” SW, 1: 20. In the preface to the book in which Fichte offered his frst public Presentation of his new system (eber Sep apniy dor Wiocenechaftstehre {V704)) the same high praise is reter- dena af ain just as sincerely convinced that nothing, following Kant’ spirit aiegeniua, ebuld contribute mare to philosophy than Reinhold’s systematic Fislosophy must necessarily make under the guidance of whomever t may SW, BD).56 : DANIEL BREAZEALE phy in “deriving” its various the payin us theorems and conclusions from this first With some of Schulze’s criticism: i 's—especially those concernin the fatal ambiguity of certain of Reinhoe’s key terms andthe enuive cal character of some of his most basie “derivations” —Fichte makes no attempt to conceal his agreement, He agrees as well that the Principle of consciousness “is based upon empirical self observation and certainly expresses an abstraction.” At the same time, Fichte grants that this principle possesses a certainty which is more than empirical, but from this he consludes—not that the principle i an lye (which is what Reinhold had held)—but rather, “that it must be ; d upon something other than a mere fact.”** On this all-impor- tant point (alimportant, tat i, for the subsequent development of = Idealism), Fichte diverges from both Reinhold and Schulze: hough the skeptic and the Elementary Philosopher are ; Rear serra array ee ea hi ces the concept of representation], it remains question: ih reviewer whether pibvphy tel ois rom the nani. , for instance, that those objections which can justifiably be Biilosopy shoul ad ws nthe future fo suspect tha hore mt bea ‘a whole (and not merely for theoretical It is not that Fichte wishes to reject the principle of conscious- ness an the contrary, the Aenesidemus review suggests that most of = lze’s objections to this prineiple can be met, but only if we are wling to sacri the claim tat tis prnepl is indeed the frst prin ciple of philosophy. Ts certainty can ony be defended by deriving it bm something more certain.” Regarding such a possibility Fichte says, “this reviewer anyway is convinced that the principe of con- iousness is a theorem which is based upon another first principle, ® Ibid, p. 8. * tb. ® “If T may risk asserting something which ean ox proven here nso s Aanenidemis st a ac Prevusiy ete onsider this theorem: [vz., the principle of consciousness] to ropost ifn derived om eerie, then oe naturally fas oad wit hat there are experiences which might contradiet this proposition. If, hor: Sng fs same proposition fs desved srom incontrovertible fs. principles ana tite lenial of the proposition in question involve tcatition, then any alleged experience which would be ineompatbe, with the principle of consciousness ‘ Wie papel of 1e8s would have to be dismissed as ineonceiv- FICHTE'S AENESIDEMUS REVIEW 561 from which, however, the principle of consciousness ean be strictly derived, a priori and independently of all experience.”** But what is the “higher” prineiple from which the principle of consciousness is now to be derived? With this we come to the most original aspect of | -Fichte’'s Aenesidemus review: “The initial incorrect, presupposition, and the one which eaused the principle of conscious ‘ness to be proposed as the first principle of all philosophy was pre- cisely the presupposition that one must begin with a fact. We cer-) tainly do require a first principle which is material and not merely formal. But such a principle does not have to express afact [Thatsa- che} it can also express an_Act (Thathandlueg}.”” With this sur- prising suggestion, the pieces begin to fall into place. ‘The highest act of the mind, the supreme Act with which all phi- losophy must begin, cannot be the act of representing or perceiving. Since, on Reinhold’s own admission, ‘vepresentation involves the ac- tivities of “distinguishing and relating,” then the act of representing already involves a synthesis. “Thus arises the very natural question: 2 Thid, See also p. 10:", . . insofar as Acnesidemus's objections are aimed at the prineiple of consciousness in itself they are groundless. They seretiowever, appropriate objections to the principle of consciousness con Siféred as the frst prineiple ofall philosophy and as a mere Zact, and they snake it necessary to establish a new foundation for this principle.” ‘inthe Theory of Seientite Knowledge the 1 is represented. But it does not follow that the I is represented merely as a representing I. Other {atures may well be found in this [. Qua. philosophizing cubject, the I is ifaisputably only @ representing I, but it might well be more than this qua ‘dhect of philsophizing. Representing is the highest and absolutely first srert the philosopher as such, But the absolutely first act of the human seind might well be something else. In advance of all experience itis al Tuuty probable that this is s0, since representation is something which ean te completely exhausted and which operates in a thoroughly necessary man- te corincequently, there must be an ultimate foundation for the necessity TFrepresentation, a foundation which, qua ultimate foundation, ean be fused upon nothing further” (Ceber den Begriff der Wissenschaftalehre, SW, 1:8. Sr tAenesidemus Review,” SW, 1:8, The term “Thathandlung? is 2 technical term of Fichte's own coinage (which is here translated simply as SMe put witha capital A). This is the term which, in his published ver- ‘lone ofthe Wissenschaftslehre, he employs to designate the sel-positing of TEL As conceived of by Fiehte, the I has no existence at all apart from EM. "acté: the self ists sele-activity. ‘The Thathandlung is identical to the T recognized in its full freedom, which is not the same as the theoretical T {entellct”) For this later facts are indeed ultimate, which explains why Fishte held that Reinhold’s prineipe of eonseiousness was the first principle of theoretical philosophy only l562 DANIEL BREAZEALE _/ how is it possible to trace all the actions of the mind back to an act of connecting? How is synthesis conceivable without presupposing the- sis and antithesis?”™* Indeed, Fichte implies that this is not conceiv- able, which leads him to the conclusion that “prior to all other pereep- tion, the intuition can be related to an object originally opposed to the subject, ie., it can be related to the not-I, which is not perceived at all, but which is originally posited (gesetzt].”*” ‘Thus the activities of distinguishing and relating are not themselves representations; they are acts of positing which make representation possible. Such an originary Act is not simply an act of positing: itis at the same time one of self-positing. This is the only explanation for the origin of that “subject” and “object” which are already presupposed in the principle of consciousness: “The absolute subject, the I, is not given by empirical intuition; it is, instead, posited by intellectual in- tuition. And the absolute object, the not-I, is that which is posited in opposition to the 1.”*® To be sure, this implies the ultimacy of the previously-diseussed idealistic circle: ‘The mind is 2 noumenon insofar as it isthe ultimate foundation for any particular forms of thought at all. Tt s a transeendental idea, insofar as these forms of thought are considered to be unconditionally neces- sary laws. But itis a transcendental idea whieh is distinguished from all other transcendental ideas by the fact that itis realized through intellectual intuition, through the “! am,” and indeed, through the “T simply am, because Iam.” ... The Tis what it is, is because itis, and is for the 1 What is announced in the Aenesidemus review is nothing less than Fichte's discovery of the winter of 1799/4: philosophy can be- Ibid., p. 7. ® Tbid., p. 9 # Thi. p. 10, “Intellectial intuition,” therefore, is not a form of consciousness at all, Fichte is explicit on this point: “Neither [the absolute I nor the absolute rnot-I] occur in empirical consciousness except when a representation is re- lated to them. In empirical consciousness they are present only indirectly, as the representor and what is represented. One is never conscious of the absolute subject (the representor which could not be represented) nor of the ‘absolute object (a thing in itself, independent of all representation) as some- ‘hing empire giver.” Ti.) Neglect of hs mportant point responsi ble for the wide-spread (romantic) misinterpretation of “intellectual intui- tion” as a privileged faculty of philosophical knowledge. Fichte's actual view is that the structure of [-hood (the I's presence to itself as an absolute self-positing) has the form of an intellectual intuition. This is something that the philosopher learns by means of abstraction and reflection; itis not discovered by intellectual intuition * Tid, p. 16. FICHTE'S AENESIDEMUS REVIEW 563 ‘come a science only if it can be presented as a system founded upon nothing but the indubitably certain self-positing Act of the I, which provides the first principle from which everything must be derived. Philosophy must begin, not with consciousness, but with self-consciousness; not with any fact, but with an Act. Here—in the self-positing activity of the I—we encounter that which Kant’s re- sults seemed everywhere to presuppose but nowhere to state unam- biguously: the point of unity between thought and being. Once this has been clearly grasped and made into the necessary starting-point of philosophy, then skeptical objections like Aenesidemus's—the heart of which, it must be remembered, was the charge that the Criti- cal Philosophy depends upon an illicit move from subjective to objec- tive necessity, from thought to being—can be laid to rest once and for all. Understood as an Act of self-positing, the Tis no mere idea; it is an idea which is at the same time its own realization. Thus (though without calling any attention to the fact) Fichte has to deny, not only Kant’ distinetion between appearances and things in themselves, but also his insistence that all of our intuition is sensible. ‘This absolute © Readers unfamiliar with Fichte's published Wissenschafislehre of 17945, might find helpful the following description, by one of Fichte's for- mer students, of the discovery in question: recall how, in a close, intimate circle, Fichte used to tell us about the ‘origin of his philosophy and how he was suddenly surprised and seized by the fundamental idea of this philosophy. For some time he had dimly realized that truth consists in the unity of thought and object. He had realized as well that such unity could never be found within the realm of the senses and that where, as in mathematics, it was to be found it produced only a rigid and lifeless formalism completely alien to life and to action. At this point he was suddenly surprised by the thought that the act by whieh self-consciousness seizes and holds onto iteelf is clearly a type of knowing. ‘The I recognizes itself as some- thing produced through its own activity; thinker and thought, knowing and its object, are here one and the same. All knowing pro- ceeds from this point of union, not from the sort of unfocused eonvem- plation which is supposed to'yield time, space, and the categories. “Now,” he asked himself, “if one were to isolate this first act of selt. ‘knowing, an act which is presupposed by every human thought and deed and is contained in the most divergent opinions and actions, and fone were to trace the pure consequences of this act, would this act not reveal and display the same certainty which mathematies pos- esses, though in a form which is living, active, and productive?” ‘This thought seized him with so much elarity, power, and assur- ance, that he could not give up trying to establish the I as the prineiple of philosophy. Tt was as if he were foreed to do so by the spirit which had grown mighty within him. (Henrich Steffens, Was ich erlebte (Breslau: J. Max; 1841), pp. 161-62.)oe DANIEL BREAZEALE self-positing of the I is intellectual intuition. One of the most promi- nent features of subsequent post-Kantian speculation is the attempt to rehabilitate the doctrine of intellectual intuition—a project an- nounced for the first time in Fichte's Aenesidemus review. Unsurprisingly, none of these themes are worked out in any great detail in the Aenesidemus review, and without the benefit of hindsight it would be easy to overlook entirely the importance of this essay. Yet it remains remarkable how much of Fichte's system is already discernable in his review of Aenesidemus. ‘This is especially true of his concluding comments on Schulze's criticism of Kant’s moral philosophy. Whereas Fichte was forced to acknowledge a certain amount of agreement with Aenesidemus's criticisms of the theoretical portion of the Critical Philosophy, with the latter’s remarks on the practical portion of the same he betrays no sympathy at all. Especially galling to Fichte is Schulae’s rejection of Kant’s principle of the priority of Practical reason on the grounds that before we can know what we ought to do we must first, know what we can do. In replying to this (rather ignorant) objection, Fichte points out that the ethical law is not directed first at the physieal world, but is instead a law for deter- mining the will, and as such, is by no means dependent upon prior theoretical knowledge concerning what is possible in the world of ap- pearances.* Not for nothing did Fichte characterize his own emerg- ing system as a “philosophy of freedom.” The guiding thread of his own attempt to systematize the Critical Philosophy was precisely Kant's dictum concerning the priority of practical reason. Indeed, as a letter written during this period clearly shows, the basis of Fichte's objection to Reinhold’s attempt to make the principle of conscious- ness the first principle of philosophy was not theoretical at_all ‘© “The ethical law is not at frst supposed to produce an action at all, but only the constant endeavor toward an action, even if this action, hin. dered by the force of nature, should turn out never to have any efficacy in the material world.” (“Aenesidemus Review,” SW, 1: 22.) “My system is the first system of freedom. Just as France has freed ‘man from external shackles, so my system frees him from the fetters of things in themselves, which is to say, from those external influences with which all previous systems—including the Kantian—have more or less fet tered man. Indeed, the first principle of my system presents man as an in dependent being.” "(Dra of a letter from Fiehte to Bagggesen, April or May 1795.) See, too, the remark in Fichte's letter to Reinhold, $ January 1800: “From beginning to end my system is nothing but an analysis of the concept of freedom... .” FICHTE'S AENESIDEMUS REVIEW 565 (though, as we have seen, he ha ample theoretical objections to offer), but practical, “It is,” he writes, “amusing when Reinhold tries tomake everything that happens inthe human soul into @ repre; sentation, Anyone who does this ean know nothing of freedom ani the practical imperative. If he is consistent, he must become an em- irical fatalist."** : PinsFor Fiche, it amounts to one andthe same thing to say that phi- Tosophy must begin with the I and to say that it must begin with free dom. Furthermore, it is the necessary priority of practical reason whic fumishesFihte with the essential elue fr constructing a P- ww first principle. In fact, the osophical system upon his proposed ne' Aenesidemus review includes a remarkable, albeit very general, sketch of just such a system, ‘The passage in question is s0 interest ing and so significant for our understanding of what. Fichte was trying to accomplish in his subsequently published versions of just such a system, that it deserves to be quoted in full: it at itis, then in intelleetual intuition, the lis because its, and is what its, Ie naire ori nie ce mous. The I in empirical consciousness, however, the [ as intellect, is only in ylation to something intelgbe, and is, 6 that extent, depen dent. "But the I which is thereby opposed to itself is supposed to be, nat iyo, but one-—which is impossible, since “dependence” contra: diets "independence.” Since, however, the I eannot relinguish ts ab solute independence, a striving is engendered: the T strives to riake nats intelligible dependent upon ise in order thereby to bring that I which entertains representations of what is intelligible in unity with he self-poiting I. ‘Thisis what mean to say that raaon {x practical, in the pure | reason i ot practi, ot is practi i {hb ras intellect. Reason gratia ony nofar a strivosto unity these tn, This ot the lg a show that these ae the Ge rn ‘which must underlie Kant's own exposition (granted that he never GaBinnes thom spectely)Norife the place oshow hove a as teal philosophy arises when the striving of the inteligent I (whch in itself is hyper-physia) is represented, ie., when one descends the same steps Which one ascended in theoretical philosophy. A more succinct summary of the organizational strategy behind Fichte’s first Wissenschaftslehre can hardly be imagined. This radieal revision of transcendental idealism has one further consequence which Fichte mentions in his review: a clarification of the relation between practical belief and theoretical knowledge. Just because the postulates of practical reason are “beliefs,” does not © Letter to Stephani, December 1788, ‘"eneeidems Review? Si 1 22-28,566 DANIEL BREAZEALE imply that they are “mere beliefs.” For “such belief is far from being merely a probable opinion. On the contrary, it is the innermost be- lief of this reviewer anyway that this belief has the same degree of certainty as the immediately certain ‘I am’—a certainty which infi- nitely transcends that objective certainty which only becomes possi- ble through the mediation of the intelligent [Le., knowing] I.” Such certainty may indeed be called “subjective,” but this by no means im- plies any inferiority to so-called “objective” certainty, since “the ‘I am’ itself has only subjective certainty, and, so far as we can conceive of the self-consciousness of God, He himself is for Himself subjec- tive, Far from practical reason having to recognize the superiority of theoretical reason, the entire existence of practical reason is founded on the conflict between the self-determining element within us and the theoretical-knowing element."’” ‘The implications of this radical application of the principle of the priority of practical reason are pro- found and far-reaching; indeed, in order to see its ultimate conse- quences we have to look well beyond the history of German Idealism itself, to the philosophies of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. The foregoing discussion of Fichte’s review of Aenesidemus has been intended to call attention to the importance of this interesting and neglected essay. Of course, any serious analysis of Fichte’s phi- losophy, even one which is limited to his early system, will have to be based upon Fichte's publie presentations of and commentaries on his Wissenschaftslekre. The value of the Aenesidemus review is above all propaedeutie: it provides us with a unique—and very instructive —glimpse into the specific context within which he developed his life- Jong interpretation of the Critical Philosophy and out of which grew his own, highly original and influential philosophical system. If Fichte later came to regret the degree to which his first published presentation of his sytem was itself a product of the philosophical style and problems of its immediate age,'* that is all the more reason for contemporary readers of his Foundations of the Entire Theory of Scientific Knowledge to become more familiar with the context in question; and for this purpose there is no text better suited than his Aenesidemus review. © Ibid, p. 23. “Letter to Friedrich Johannsen, 81 Jamuary 1801. Only a fragment of this letter survives. : FICHTE’S AENESIDEMUS REVIEW 567 ‘The effect of Schulze’s book on Fichte’s own intellectual develop- ment is perhaps comparable to Hume's influence upon Kant, though in Fichte’s case the slumbers from which the skeptic awoke him might best be called “critical-dogmatic.” At the very least, Aenesidemus provided Fichte with the occasion to focus his own doubts about the Critical Philosophy and provoked him into detailed re-examination of Reinhold’s Elementary Philosophy. The effect of this, as we have now seen, was to encourage Fichte to set about the construction of own system. This is what happened in the winter of 1798/4, in the course of which Fichte made a series of “discoveries” which he spent the rest of his life trying to digest and articulate and which he an- nounced for the first time in his review of Aenesidemus. It is no wonder, therefore, that despite any personal antago- nisms between Fichte and Schulze, Fichte was always willing to ac- aowledge the special debt he owed to this “sharp-witted skeptic." He prominently displayed this debt by beginning his first public pres- entation of the Wissenschaftslehre with the following sentence: “Reading the modern skeptics, in particular Aenesidems and the ex- cellent writings of Maimon, has convinced the author of this tre of something which already appeared to be most probable, namely: that despite the recent efforts of the most perspicacious men, philoso- phy has not yet been raised to the level of a clearly evident sci- ence."s* More poignant—and—candid—is the following passage from an unpublished and unfinished essay: “Anyone who has not yet understood Hume, Aenesidemus (where he is right), and Maimon and has failed to come to terms with the issues they pose is by no means ‘© "Fichte’s relation to Schulze isan Bistorieal replication of Kant’ r= lation to Hume.” ules Vuilemin, Lheritage kantian ot la relation co- Porcnne Pars Presses Universitaires de France, 1068), pT. Vuile Tis nverpretation of Fite deerves mention here a one ofthe fw oa explicit attention to the role played by ‘Aenesidemus’s skepticiem . - Stlopment of Fietie's “genet method.” See Vullemin, pp. 7-28, A eriical skepticism, such a8 that of Hume, Matmon, or Aenesi demus . reveals the inadequacy ofthe reasons that have been secepted so'tar, din doing this it nteaten where more tenable ones are to be found’ Science always bent fom such skepis iit doesnot benefit in Fespect efits content, i gurely Goes in respect ofits form, Anyone wl Grates the sharp-wited skeptic the reget which he deserves has 4 poor repo what ieinthe mire ofence” Grendiag der groronten Ws sehafilehre, SW, 1" 120 1 " see tbe den Beg dar Wiewnachaalhre, SW, 1:29,568 FICHTE'S AENESIDEMUS REVIEW ready for the Theory of Scientific Knowledge: it answers questions which he has not yet raised and bandages him where he has suffered tno injury. University of Kentucky, * AA, 2. 8: 889; emphasis added. According to the editors of AA, 2 3, this untitled fragment was probably written in April of 1795, Preliminary work on this essay was completed in the Federal Republic of Germany under the auspices of the Alexander von Humboldt Founda. tion. Additional support was provided by a grant from the Program for ‘Translations of the National Endowment. for the Humanities, an indepen. Gent, Federal agency. The author gratefully aeknowledges the support thigh both of these foundations have provided for his continuing Mente studies,