2015.09.02 Arroyo V Philippines
2015.09.02 Arroyo V Philippines
2015.09.02 Arroyo V Philippines
United Nations
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A/HRC/WGAD/2015/24
General Assembly Distr.: General
• 16 November 2015
Original: English
GE.15-20042(E)
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Submissions
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22 July 2013, Ms. Arroyo filed a further motion that the Court rule on her application for
bail, arguing that the finding of insufficiency of evidence made for her co-defendants
should also apply to her. The Court refused to consider the application for bail, and Ms.
Arroyo filed another motion for bail on 24 October 2013.
11. On 5 November 2013, over one year after Ms. Arroyo’s arrest and arraignment, the
Court ruled on bail for the first time. The Court dismissed Ms. Arroyo’s motion on the basis
that, under applicable Filipino law,1 an accused person cannot be released on bail for a
“non-bailable” offence, such as plunder, if the Court finds that there is “strong evidence of
guilt”. Ms. Arroyo filed motions for reconsideration of that decision on 21 November 2013,
18 February, 21 April, 5 May and 30 June 2014, but they were all denied.
12. On 1 October 2014, the Court again considered the matter and based its decision
exclusively on its view of the strength of the evidence against Ms. Arroyo, refusing to take
into account the absence of any risk of flight, evidence-tampering or further offending by
the accused, or her precarious health condition. According to the source, two of Ms.
Arroyo’s alleged co-conspirators were released on bail in 2014, even though they had
previously absconded to avoid arrest for over two years. Ms. Arroyo’s lawyers filed another
motion to reconsider the denial of bail, but that motion was dismissed on 18 February 2015.
13. In total, Ms. Arroyo has already brought 10 motions seeking bail in the context of
the Sweepstakes case and challenging court rulings that ordered her detention on remand.
14. In August 2014, Ms. Arroyo filed a demurrer in which she requested that her case to
be dismissed immediately after the close of the prosecution case, for insufficiency of the
evidence. There has been no ruling on that motion by the Court and Ms. Arroyo has been
given no indication as to when such a ruling will occur. Ms. Arroyo has not been given any
information by the authorities as to the date on which her trial will resume or the expected
time frame for a final judgment to be handed down.
1
Section 13 of the Constitution of the Philippines 1987 establishes a presumption of bail in criminal
proceedings but specifies that this does not apply to offences punishable by life imprisonment,
provided there is strong evidence of guilt. In such cases, under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, an
accused person shall not be granted bail.
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that, in denying bail to Ms. Arroyo on an automatic basis, the Sandiganbayan Court failed
to give any consideration to the possibility of applying less restrictive alternatives to pretrial
detention, such as house arrest, reporting requirements, sureties or other limits on Ms.
Arroyo’s activities, and therefore did not assess whether Ms. Arroyo’s remand in custody
was reasonable and necessary in all the circumstances.
18. The source points to the fact that there was no periodic re-evaluation of the
justification for continuing the detention of Ms. Arroyo, and that the rulings denying Ms.
Arroyo’s numerous requests for bail over a 10-month period from January to November
2013 effectively remanded her in indefinite detention. The source notes that the
Sandiganbayan Court only considered and ruled on the possibility of release on remand in
November 2013, over one year after Ms. Arroyo was arrested. The source also argues that
Ms. Arroyo’s right to be tried without undue delay has been violated.
19. For these reasons, the source argues that the detention of Ms. Arroyo violates
articles 9 and 14 of the Covenant.
20. Finally, the source contends that the criminal prosecutions against Ms. Arroyo are
politically motivated and persecutory in nature, thus constituting discrimination on the
grounds of Ms. Arroyo’s political or other opinions, and violating her right to equal
protection of the law and her right to a fair trial under articles 2 (1), 3, 14 (1) and 26 of the
Covenant. The source referred to the Government’s defiance of court rulings to remove
travel bans against Ms. Arroyo and its removal of judges involved in Ms. Arroyo’s cases,
the timing of the charges brought against Ms. Arroyo, certain comments made by public
officials suggesting her guilt while she was still on trial, the different treatment applied to
five of her co-accused who were released on bail despite the charges against all accused
being based on the same set of facts and the evidence of one prosecution witness, and the
delay and uncertainty as to when her trial will take place.
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communication. However, the source subsequently confirmed that Ms. Arroyo wishes the
matter to be dealt with as a regular communication.
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31. In relation to the delays in concluding the proceedings against Ms. Arroyo, the
Government presented a timeline that included a long list of motions filed on behalf of Ms.
Arroyo between July 2012 and April 2015 and the responses from the prosecution. The
Government argues that due process required the Sandiganbayan Court to carefully
consider all of the motions, which were carried out within a reasonable period and in
accordance with applicable Filipino laws on the right to a speedy trial. The Government
submits that any delay was attributable to the numerous motions filed by Ms. Arroyo.
Discussion
36. In regard to Ms. Arroyo’s numerous applications for bail, the Working Group recalls
that, pursuant to article 9 (3) of the Covenant, it shall not be the general rule that persons
awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to
appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings. As emphasized by the Human
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Rights Committee, pretrial detention should be an exception rather than the rule and as
short as possible.2
37. In Ms. Arroyo’s case, the reason for denial of bail was the Court’s finding of strong
evidence of her guilt, for which there was no presumption in favour of liberty and no room
for consideration – or reconsideration on a periodic basis – of Ms. Arroyo’s individual
circumstances.3 The fact that the Sandiganbayan Court made this determination in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the Philippines and other laws does
not prevent the detention from being arbitrary.4 The mere conformity of a court decision
with domestic law in itself cannot be used to justify the detention of an individual for over
three years without conviction and in violation of international standards. 5 Ms. Arroyo has
been deprived of her liberty in violation of the principle that release must be the rule and
provisional detention the exception, as provided for in article 9 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and article 9 (3) of the Covenant.
38. In addition, because the Sandiganbayan Court had determined that the charges
against Ms. Arroyo involved a non-bailable offence for which there was strong evidence of
her guilt, it did not consider any alternatives to her detention. In a previous case, 6 the
Human Rights Committee found that the State party must demonstrate that there were no
less invasive means available of achieving the same ends of detention – that is, mitigating
the risk of flight, interference with evidence or reoffending – that may arise from release on
bail, for example, by the imposition of reporting obligations, sureties or other conditions.7
In the present case, there were other options open to the Court, including house arrest,
which would have imposed less hardship in terms of Ms. Arroyo’s health. The Working
Group considers that the fact that Ms. Arroyo was detained in a hospital at her request and
was allowed to leave at various points does not make her detention the least invasive option
open to the Government. The detention was therefore arbitrary under article 9 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 9 (1) and (3) of the Covenant.
39. The Working Group notes that Ms. Arroyo’s eligibility for bail was not considered
by the Sandiganbayan Court until November 2013, over one year after she had been
arraigned in October 2012 and 10 months after she had made her first bail application in
2
See Human Rights Committee general comment No. 8 on the right to liberty and security of persons,
30 June 1982, para. 3.
3
In its general comment No. 35, para. 38, the Human Rights Committee observed in relation to article
9 (3) of the Covenant that “detention pending trial must be based on an individualized determination
that it is reasonable and necessary taking into account all the circumstances, for such purposes as to
prevent flight, interference with evidence or the recurrence of crime”.
4
The Working Group respectfully agrees with the approach taken by the European Court of Human
Rights in a similar case, in which the Court said: “In the present case, the applicant’s requests to be
released on bail were similarly dismissed on the grounds that he was accused of an offence which,
under article 19 of the Criminal Code, qualified as a serious offence and that article 143, paragraph 1,
of the Code of Criminal Procedure precluded release on bail in such cases. The Court considers that
such automatic rejection of the applicant’s applications for bail, devoid of any judicial control of the
particular circumstances of his detention, was incompatible with the guarantees of article 5, paragraph
3”. See European Court of Human Rights, Piruzyan v. Armenia, app. No. 33376/07, 26 June 2012,
para. 105.
5
The Working Group acknowledges that the period for which a person can be detained depends on the
circumstances, including the complexity of the matter and the role of the accused. However, on the
present facts, the detention was too long.
6
Communication No. 1014/2001, Baban v. Australia, Views adopted on 6 August 2003, para. 7.2.
7
See also general comment No. 35, para. 38, in which the Human Rights Committee stated that “courts
must examine whether alternatives to pretrial detention, such as bail, electronic bracelets or other
conditions, would render detention unnecessary in the particular case”.
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January 2013. The Government does not dispute that the first time that bail was considered
and denied by the Sandiganbayan Court was on 5 November 2013. While there were
numerous motions for the Court to rule upon, the Working Group considers that the Court
should have given priority to Ms. Arroyo’s bail motions, given the presumptive right to bail
under article 9 of the Covenant. A delay of over one year in ruling on bail is incompatible
with the provisions of article 9 (3) of the Covenant, which requires that “anyone arrested or
detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer”.
40. The delay in considering Ms. Arroyo’s bail status was also contrary to article 9 (4)
of the Covenant. As the Human Rights Committee has noted, persons deprived of their
liberty are entitled not merely to take proceedings, but to receive a decision on the
lawfulness of their detention, and without delay. 8 The Working Group considers that the
violation of article 9 (3) and (4) amounts to a violation of the right to liberty and security of
person and the right to a fair trial.
41. In addition, the Working Group considers that the delay in bringing proceedings
against Ms. Arroyo in the Sweepstakes case violated her right to be tried without undue
delay under article 14 (3) (c) of the Covenant and the right to a fair trial under articles 10
and 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In a previous case, the Working
Group found that a delay by the complainant in availing him or herself of the guarantees to
a fair trial may result in the detention not being attributable to the State, 9 as was argued by
the Government in the present case. However, in the case of Ms. Arroyo, some of the
delays were not caused by her, including the failure of the Sandiganbayan and Supreme
Courts to rule on the motion challenging probable cause on 24 October 2012 and on the
demurrer requesting the dismissal of Ms. Arroyo’s case, which was filed on 27 August
2014.
42. For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Arroyo’s case falls into category III of the categories
applied by the Working Group, as the non-observance of the international norms relating to
the right to a fair trial is of such gravity as to give the deprivation of liberty an arbitrary
character.
43. The source claimed that Ms. Arroyo was subject to prolonged detention because of
her political or other opinions and that this makes the detention arbitrary under categories II
and V of the categories applied by the Working Group. Category II applies when the
deprivation of liberty results from the exercise of the rights or freedoms guaranteed by
articles 7, 13, 14 and 18-21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 12,
18, 19, 21, 22 and 25-27 of the Covenant. Category V applies when the deprivation of
liberty constitutes a violation of international law on the grounds of discrimination based on
birth, national, ethnic or social origin, language, religion, economic condition, political or
other opinion, gender, sexual orientation, disability, or any other status, that aims towards
or can result in ignoring the equality of human beings.
44. The Working Group considers that the source has demonstrated that Ms. Arroyo’s
detention was arbitrary in accordance with categories II and V of the categories applied by
the Working Group. The Working Group is of the opinion that Ms. Arroyo has been
subjected to detention as a result of the exercise of her right to take part in government and
the conduct of public affairs under article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and article 25 of the Covenant. In particular, the Working Group takes note of the fact that,
as a result of her ongoing detention, Ms. Arroyo has been effectively barred from serving in
her current role as an elected member of the Philippines House of Representatives.
8
See communication No. 248/1997, Campbell v. Jamaica, Views adopted on 24 March 1993, para. 6.4.
9
In opinion No. 15/2001 (Australia), para. 23, the Working Group found that, although the length of
detention of two men for the purposes of extradition had been abnormally long, this was the result of
the fact that the men had availed themselves of all the guarantees to a fair trial provided for by law, so
that the length of their detention could not be attributed to the Government.
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Moreover, the Working Group is of the opinion that Ms. Arroyo has been subjected to
detention because of her political or other opinion, contrary to article 7 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and article 26 of the Covenant. In reaching this conclusion,
the Working Group has taken into account a pattern of conduct which indicates that Ms.
Arroyo was specifically targeted and the case against her was politically motivated,
including: (a) the Government’s defiance of court rulings to lift the travel bans against Ms.
Arroyo and its removal of judges involved in Ms. Arroyo’s cases; (b) the timing of charges
brought against Ms. Arroyo; and (c) comments by public officials suggesting her guilt
while she was on trial. These were factors cited by the source in arguing that Ms. Arroyo
had been subjected to detention as a result of the exercise of her rights and that she had
suffered discrimination on the grounds of her political or other opinion. The Government
did not refute any of those allegations in its reply. 10
45. Finally, a letter was submitted to the Working Group in March 2015 by a Filipino
non-governmental organization in which it encouraged the Working Group to take into
account numerous violations of human rights that had been allegedly committed by the
Government led by Ms. Arroyo. The Working Group takes this opportunity to reiterate the
universality of human rights and their applicability to all persons. The Working Group
considers that there is no stronger affirmation of human rights than in ensuring that the
rights of all persons, including those accused of serious human rights violations, are
respected. The Working Group notes that its opinion in the present case concerns whether
the rights of Ms. Arroyo under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
Covenant have been violated, but that it will be for the domestic courts in the Philippines to
determine whether Ms. Arroyo has in fact committed any criminal offence under applicable
law.
Disposition
46. In the light of the foregoing, the Working Group renders the following opinion:
The deprivation of liberty of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, being in contravention of
articles 7, 9-11 and 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 9,
14, 25 and 26 of the Covenant, is arbitrary, falling within categories II, III and V of
the categories applicable to the consideration of cases submitted to the Working
Group.
47. Consequent upon the opinion rendered, the Working Group requests the
Government to take the necessary steps to remedy the situation of Ms. Arroyo without
delay and bring it into conformity with the standards and principles in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant.
48. Taking into account all the circumstances of the case, the Working Group considers
that the adequate remedy would be to reconsider Ms. Arroyo’s application for bail in
accordance with the relevant international human rights standards, and to afford Ms.
Arroyo an enforceable right to compensation in accordance with article 9 (5) of the
Covenant for the deprivation of liberty that has already occurred.
49. The Working Group reminds the Government that its national laws, including laws
in relation to the granting of bail, should comply with all obligations under international
human rights law.
10
The Government did respond to the source’s allegation that the repeated rejection of Ms. Arroyo’s
bail applications and the different treatment applied to her co-accused, who were released on bail
owing to insufficient evidence, was discriminatory. The Government provided relevant portions of the
ruling relating to the co-accused, which demonstrates that the Sandiganbayan Court carefully weighed
the evidence against the co-accused and gave persuasive reasons as to the lack of evidence against
them. The Working Group considers that Ms. Arroyo did not suffer discrimination on that ground.
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50. If the remaining criminal cases proceed against Ms. Arroyo, the Working Group
requests the Government to ensure fair trials that respect all the guarantees enshrined in
international human rights law. In particular, the trials must take place without undue delay,
in accordance with article 14 (3) (c), of the Covenant.
10