Public Disclosure Authorized

WPS7482

Policy Research Working Paper 7482

Shock Waves: Managing the Impacts of Climate Change on Poverty

Public Disclosure Authorized

Background Paper

Social Protection and Disaster Risk

Management in the Philippines
The Case of Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan)
Public Disclosure Authorized

Thomas Bowen
Public Disclosure Authorized

Development Economics
Climate Change Cross-Cutting Solutions Area
November 2015
Policy Research Working Paper 7482

Abstract
This paper evaluates how the Philippines utilize social pro- into the national disaster risk management framework
tection systems and programs to help households better of the Philippines, taking the lead coordinating role in
manage disaster risk. Exposure and vulnerability to natural disaster response activities. Consequently, social protec-
disasters and the effects of climate change are particularly tion programs are on the frontlines of disaster response
high in the Philippines. At the same time, the Philippines in the Philippines. This paper focuses specifically on the
has developed one of the most advanced social protection devastating impact of Typhoon Yolanda, which struck the
systems in the East Asia Pacific region. The Department of country in November 2013, as a case study against which
Social Welfare and Development is prominently integrated the Philippines’ social protection response can be assessed.

This paper was commissioned by the World Bank Group’s Climate Change Cross-Cutting Solutions Area and is a background
paper for the World Bank Group’s flagship report: “Shock Waves: Managing the Impacts of Climate Change on Poverty.” It
is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development
policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.
org. The author may be contacted at [email protected].

The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.

Produced by the Research Support Team

 Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management in the Philippines:
The Case of Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan)

Thomas Bowen

Keywords: social protection, disaster risk management, risk financing, typhoon, Philippines
JEL: I32, H50, Q54

Acknowledgements
This country case study is one of a series of four case studies produced under the task: Making Social
Protection Systems More Responsive to Natural Disasters/Hazards in East Asia and the Pacific.
Financial support to prepare these studies was provided by the Rapid Social Response (RSR) fund.
The other three case studies in the four-part series include Fiji, Tonga and Vietnam. Additional
financial support for this specific case study on the Philippines was provided through the World
Bank’s Climate Change and Poverty global report, for which this case study is a background paper.

This case study was authored by Thomas Bowen ([email protected]), Junior Professional
Associate, Social Protection and Labor Global Practice (GSPDR), World Bank. Oleksiy Ivaschenko
([email protected]), Senior Economist, GSPDR served as Task Team Leader. Aleksandra
Posarac (Program Leader: Poverty, Human and Social Development - Philippines), Cynthia Burton
(an independent Disaster Risk Management and Social Protection Specialist), Pablo Acosta (Senior
Economist GSPDR) and Jehan Arulpragasam (Practice Manager, GSPDR) also provided valuable
guidance and expertise throughout the drafting of the report. However, the accuracy of the
information contained in the report is the sole responsibility of the author.

The author wishes to sincerely thank all of the stakeholders consulted during the preparation of this
report for their time and invaluable insights. This includes: government representatives (in particular
the many representatives consulted from the Department of Social Welfare and Development), World
Bank Manila Country Office staff, regional organizations, international development partners, and
representatives of non-governmental organizations.

1. Executive Summary

Exposure and vulnerability to natural disasters and the effects of climate change are particularly high
in the Philippines. The Philippines is currently ranked as the country with the second highest level of
disaster risk in the world and is the eighth most vulnerable country to the effects of climate change.12
Its location, climate and topography expose the country to many recurring natural hazards. These
include both climate-related hazards (e.g. typhoons, floods, droughts, storm surges, landslides) and
geophysical hazards (e.g. volcanoes, earthquakes and tsunamis). Recent research has suggested that of
the 10 most exposed cities in the world to natural disasters, eight are located in the Philippines
(including Manila – ranked 4th).3 In addition, an average of 20 tropical cyclones hit the country every
year, of which five to seven are destructive. Moreover, climate change projections predict increases in
annual mean temperatures for the country range from 0.9°C to 1.1°C by 2020, and by 1.8°C to 2.2°C
in 2050.4 These changes in temperature are projected to lead to more frequent and severe tropical
storms and typhoons.

Poor households are often disproportionately affected by disasters in the Philippines due to heightened
vulnerabilities and relatively fewer resources for coping. Many Filipinos live just above the poverty
line, cycling in and out of poverty due to high vulnerability to shocks – including natural disasters.
Indeed, between 2003 and 2009, 44 percent of the population was poor at least once – and of that 44
percent, two out of three households moved in and out of poverty.5 Rapid urbanization and the
proliferation of informal settlements and urban slums have compounded vulnerabilities, especially
among poor households migrating from rural areas. Livelihoods among those remaining in agriculture
(30 percent of the total labor force in 20146), and those in the informal urban labor market, are
particularly at risk from the effects of natural disasters and climate change. Poorer households also
have fewer resources to manage disaster risk and cope with the impacts of frequent, repeated
disasters. Oftentimes, this leads to the adoption of negative coping strategies such as selling assets,
reducing food consumption, removing children from school to work for additional household income,
etc.

At the same time, the Philippines has developed one of the most advanced social protection (SP)
systems in the East Asia Pacific region, designed to help poor households manage risk and shocks.
Undergoing rapid and comprehensive social welfare reform since 2007, the Government of the
Philippines (GoP) and the lead agency for social protection and social welfare, the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), have developed a number of national SP programs that
are accompanied by advanced information and delivery systems. For example, the Pantawid Pamiliya
Pilipino Program (4Ps) is a nationwide conditional cash transfer (CCT) program aimed at poverty
alleviation and human capital accumulation that reached over 4.4 million households in 2014. Social
protection systems, programs and policies buffer individuals from shocks and equip them to improve
their livelihoods and create opportunities to build a better life for themselves and their families.7 That
one of the most frequent and severe shocks facing Filipino households is natural disasters offers
interesting lessons as to the ways in which DSWD’s SP system is used to respond to disasters.

DSWD is prominently integrated into the national disaster risk management (DRM) framework,
taking the lead coordinating role in disaster response activities. DSWD is the lead agency for “disaster
response” within the GoP’s National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan (NDRRMP). The
department also has responsibilities across the national prevention and mitigation, preparedness,
recovery and rehabilitation pillars of the NDRRMP. Concurrently, it is also the lead agency of four
coordinating clusters of the UN cluster system1 – food security, shelter, camp coordination and camp

1
At the country level, the UN cluster system aims to ensure a more coherent and effective disaster response by
mobilizing groups of agencies, organizations and NGOs to respond in a strategic manner across all key sectors
or areas of activity, each sector having a clearly designated lead, in support of existing government coordination
and emergency response mechanisms.

1
management, and protection. As a result of this national SP-DRM linkage, SP programs are
prominently positioned to respond to disasters in the Philippines.

On 8 November 2013, one the strongest typhoons ever recorded, Typhoon Yolanda (internationally
referred to as Typhoon Haiyan) struck the Philippines, with severe human and economic
consequences. With wind speeds exceeding 300 km/h, Typhoon Yolanda is the most powerful storm
to have made landfall in the history of the Philippines.8 The storm elicited “storm surges” of over four
meters (13 feet) in some regions. Nearly 6,300 people died and a further 4.1 million people were
displaced.9 The storm affected some of the country’s poorest regions and was projected to increase
national poverty incidence by 1.9 percentage points, with estimates of up to an additional one million
people having fallen into poverty.10 This tragic event represents the focal point of this case study – a
severe natural disaster against which the delivery of post-disaster SP programs can be reviewed, their
system’s strengths and weaknesses observed, and valuable lessons extracted ahead of the next such
event.

In response to Yolanda, DSWD implemented a variety of social protection and social welfare
programs to meet the multiple and changing needs of affected. These programs can be broadly
grouped into the following categories: distribution of in-kind relief items, cash transfers, shelter, and
community driven development. These programs are mapped out in Figure 1 along a stylized post
disaster timeline, illustrating the post-disaster phases in which each program was implemented.

Figure 1: The primary response, recovery and reconstruction programs of DSWD in the case of
Typhoon Yolanda

Note: “Relief, early recovery, recovery and reconstruction” refer the typical international conception of the post-
disaster phases over time. “Response” and “recovery and rehabilitation” represent the GoP conception of
these phases. They align as illustrated on the figure’s x axis

Initial DSWD relief operations centered on the provision of food and nonfood items to meet the
immediate and urgent survival needs of the affected. By the end of November 2013, 375,000 food
packs were distributed by DSWD, rising to 5.1 million food packs by the end of December. Other
essential nonfood items, such as mats, blankets, tarpaulins, hygiene kits and clothing, were also
provided. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster (10 -23 November 2013), DSWD also began to
provide Food for Work (FFW) as an early relief program, later transitioning to the Cash for Work
program. With over a million houses damaged, over 500,000 of which were totally destroyed, DSWD
also provided temporary shelter assistance to the many displaced households during the relief phase.

2
After immediate survival needs were addressed, DSWD delivered a number of cash-based response
programs. Prominently, DSWD utilized its national CCT program, the 4Ps. Upon the declaration of a
“state of calamity”, the requirement for beneficiaries to comply with the conditions of the 4Ps
program is waived by DSWD in affected geographical areas for a set period of time. This makes the
4Ps’ cash grants unconditional at a time when conditions may be hard or impossible to meet if, for
instance, the supply side is down or access to facilities is limited. Utilizing the pre-existing 4Ps
system in this way, DSWD were able to quickly release of a total of P550.5 million (US$12.5 million)
to Yolanda affected 4Ps beneficiaries between November 2013 and February 2014 – just three months
after the disaster struck.11

In the case of Yolanda, both the World Food Program (WFP) and UNICEF utilized the national
household targeting system and the 4Ps delivery system to deliver additional emergency cash transfers
to affected households. The grant amounts received by the 4Ps beneficiaries from DSWD post-
Yolanda remained fixed at the same amount that is delivered by the 4Ps in normal, non-emergency
programming. However, in the case of Yolanda, WFP and UNICEF ‘topped up’ the amount delivered
by DSWD to 4Ps households in affected areas, effectively scaling up the 4Ps grant amount during a
time of increased need for affected beneficiaries. This was a pragmatic and replicable practice.
Indeed, it illustrates the potential efficiency gains for both humanitarian agencies and the targeted
beneficiaries of delivering post-disaster grants through a national cash transfer program to pre-
targeted poor and vulnerable households. Indeed, WFP again utilized the 4Ps to deliver cash top-ups
to 4Ps beneficiaries after Typhoon Ruby (Hagupit) in 2014.12

Ahead of future disasters, a scalable emergency cash transfer program could be developed in order
that post-disaster cash transfers are also able to reach additional, non-4Ps affected households.
Currently, the post-disaster cash transfers that DSWD delivers through the 4Ps are only provided to
4Ps beneficiaries and not to other affected households that may be equally or more poor and as or
more affected by the disaster. This is because they are delivered through a CCT that is not designed to
be explicitly responsive to disasters. The introduction of a scalable emergency cash transfer program
as a complementary but separate program would preserve the integrity of the 4Ps CCT as an
instrument for long-term human capital accumulation and poverty reduction. In that regard, the
scalable emergency cash transfer would have the explicit objective of providing income support to
affected households. This scalable instrument would better equip DSWD to deliver a more equitable,
broad-based post disaster cash transfer intervention that reaches both 4Ps and non-4Ps affected
households. This could, in turn, also help to supplement some of the substantial burden of in-kind /
food pack delivery with a cash based response, once immediate food based needs have been met and
beneficiary needs transition away from survival to asset re-accumulation and livelihood restoration.

Disaster risk financing mechanisms could help to manage the additional caseload of a scalable
emergency cash transfer, and/or institutionalize the scaling up of grant amounts to affected
households. The top up grants of UNICEF and WFP illustrated how the 4Ps grants could be ‘scaled
up’ to provide increased assistance to 4Ps beneficiaries in an acute time of need. This ‘scaling-up’
process could be institutionalized within DSWD. Similarly, the scaling out of the program to new
beneficiaries would entail an increased financial liability in the event of a disaster. There is a number
of risk financing mechanisms that could allow DSWD to fund the grant top-ups themselves and / or a
temporary increase in beneficiary caseload, including DSWD specific contingent financing, or
through linkages to the broader GoP risk financing strategy, including, for example, a Catastrophic
Draw-Down Option (CAT DDO).2

Following the Yolanda response, the coverage of the 4Ps’ regular, long-term CCT programming was
also expanded to permanently enrol households that were newly impoverished as a result of the
impacts of the disaster. The DSWD reported processing the inclusion of an additional 20,000

2
A Cat DDO is a contingent credit line that provides immediate liquidity to IBRD member countries in the
aftermath of a natural disaster. It is part of a broad spectrum of risk financing instruments available from the
World Bank Group to help borrowers plan efficient responses to natural disasters.

3
households for enrolment into the 4Ps in 2014 based on updated information on the poverty status of
those affected by Typhoon Yolanda. This is an important lesson – that a regular SP program should be
capable of adapting to the new, post-disaster reality on the ground where household income,
consumption and livelihoods have been drastically altered, and consequently many more households
may have been made eligible for regular SP programs who previously were not.

In addition to the 4Ps, Cash for Work (CfW) is used by DSWD during the relief and early recovery
phases of a response, providing cash to self-targeting beneficiaries who execute projects that assist the
overall response and rehabilitation effort. The CfW is a useful vehicle for getting cash to beneficiaries
through participant self-targeting which minimizes the administrative burden of program delivery
relative to targeted cash transfers. Tasks given to beneficiaries in the CfW program included, for
example: loading/unloading of goods, repacking of relief goods, food preparation, sorting and
inventory of damaged property, clearing of debris, coastal clean-up, canal dredging, among other
things. The case of Yolanda suggests that the capacity of the CfW program could be scaled up to
reach more beneficiaries, but that care must be taken in setting wage parameters so as not to distort
what remains of local labor markets.

As operations transitioned from response to recovery and rehabilitation activities, DSWD also
transitioned its public works program from CFW to the “Cash for Building Livelihoods Assets”
(CBLA) program. Led by DSWD’s Sustainable Livelihoods Program, CBLA was initiated to support
longer-term efforts for the rebuilding of lost livelihoods after Yolanda. While CFW in the response
phase fills an immediate need, the work undertaken is rudimentary and disconnected from longer-term
livelihood resumption. CBLA is more directly geared to the restoration of lost livelihoods, key to
recovery and rehabilitation. Nevertheless, SLP staff reported that the program would likely reach only
16.8 percent of total affected households due to the SLPs relatively limited capacity to deliver,
indicating significant potential for the CBLA to be expanded for future disasters.

DSWD’s Emergency Shelter Assistance (ESA) program begins in the recovery phase and provides
cash and/or shelter materials for beneficiaries with damaged houses. The ESA targets households
whose houses were partially or totally damaged by Yolanda that are located in designated “safe
areas”. These safe areas – as designated by the Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP) - are designed
to promote “building back better” by preventing rebuilding in high risk zones. However, livelihood
diversification support is still urgently needed for fisher folk unable or unwilling to leave unsafe areas
along the coastline and who consequently remain ineligible for shelter support like ESA.

Together with the social assistance (social safety net) programs of DSWD, social insurance was also
used innovatively by GoP to provide access to post-disaster finance to eligible beneficiaries. Within
weeks of the disaster, the Social Security Scheme (SSS) of the Philippines announced that members in
disaster affected areas would be given a moratorium on repayment of any outstanding loans and that
pension advances, salary loans and house repair loans would be available to members on concessional
terms. As of March 2014, more than 80,000 members and pensioners received relief assistance
through salary loans and pension advances (more than P1.2 billion in salary loans and released P225
million worth of advanced pensions). However, it should be emphasized that the coverage of formal
social insurance in the Philippines is still relatively limited, with these programs not accessible to the
majority of the poor and vulnerable – particularly in those areas affected by Typhoon Yolanda.
Nevertheless, these initiatives are complimentary to the social safety nets of DSWD and can be
hugely important in preventing eligible, previously near- or non-poor households from slipping into
poverty after a disaster.

Alongside these GoP and DSWD cash based programs, separate humanitarian CTPs were also
implemented in the Yolanda response - to an “unprecedented degree”13. At least 45 international
humanitarian agencies implemented CTPs – unconditional and conditional - within the inter-agency
response to Yolanda. UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs) reported that between December 2013 and August 2014, more than three-quarters (77
percent) of these CTPs were conditional cash transfers (60 percent of which were cash for work, 20

4
percent cash for food or shelter), while just under one quarter (23 percent) were unconditional.14 Four
agencies alone in the inter-agency response distributed around US$34 million, benefitting 1.4 million
disaster-affected people.15

Considerable effort was made to coordinate the large number of CTP providers with the government
cash-based response programs - with some positive results. Ultimately, however, post-Yolanda
response documentation and reviews reveal that 1) there has been no rigorous evaluation of the impact
of the overall CTP response, and 2) there nevertheless appear to have been issues in CTP coordination
leading to coverage gaps and duplication. The leveraging of existing SP information systems for
increased future CTP coordination should continue to be explored ex-ante the next disaster by
relevant CTP implementing agencies and DSWD. If leveraged correctly, the pre-existing information
and capacity of these SP systems could help to increase coordination of overall CTP response for
future, large-scale disasters.

The Yolanda experience has also demonstrated the important role that CDD programs can play in the
recovery of poor and vulnerable people from disasters. The National Community Driven
Development (NCDD) program of DSWD (formerly KALAHI-CIDSS) was set up in 2002 to
alleviate rural poverty. The NCDDP has wide geographical programmatic coverage, operating in the
poorest municipalities that also happen to be the most vulnerable to disasters. Moreover, building on
ongoing work, the program has a well-established network of community facilitators and community
volunteers on the ground. A contingent component of the NCDD was designed to adjust and simplify
procedures in the case of disasters, triggered by the GoP’s declaration of a state of calamity. For
example, the contingent component allow for certain types of projects and activities that are otherwise
not permitted under regular NCDD rules, in order to “better address the recovery needs of
communities”. Additionally, basic operational procedures are modified to hasten implementation.

Taken as a whole, these myriad interventions demonstrate how social protection programs can and
should be on the frontlines of disaster response. The number of programs and the sheer scale of each
intervention delivered by DSWD in response to Yolanda is undoubtedly impressive, and demonstrates
the potential for an empowered social protection department / ministry to provide a holistic package
of disaster assistance to poor and vulnerable households. As the case study makes clear, there are also
areas for further program and systems development to strengthen DSWD’s ability to manage large-
scale disasters like Yolanda. In particular, through introducing greater design flexibility, along with
the necessary risk financing mechanisms, to scale-up post-disaster social protection programming in
order to reach a larger share of affected households.

This case study proceeds as follows: section two presents the levels of exposure and vulnerability to
natural disasters and climate change in the Philippines, as well as their linkages with poverty and
vulnerability; section 3 then describes the particular impacts of Typhoon Yolanda within this context;
section 4 presents an in-depth account of the national disaster risk management framework and the
linkages that it is has to social protection, before examining the lessons that emerged from Yolanda
with regard this framework, its institutions and procedures; having presented the institutional and
legal framework for DRM in the Philippines and outlined the mandate of DSWD, section five then
presents the myriad social protection and social welfare programs delivered by DSWD in this context;
section six concludes the study by extracting the primary lessons learned and recommendations from
this case study.

5
2. Natural Disasters, Climate Change and Poverty in the Philippines

The Philippines is currently ranked as the country with the second highest level of disaster risk in the
world and is the eighth most vulnerable country to the effects of climate change.1617 Its location,
climate and topography expose the country to many recurring natural hazards. These include both
climate-related hazards (e.g. typhoons, floods, drought, storm surge, landslides) and geophysical
hazards (e.g. volcanoes, earthquakes and tsunamis). Recent research has suggested that of the 10 most
exposed cities in the world to natural disasters, eight are located in the Philippines (including Manila -
4th).18 An average of 20 tropical cyclones hit the country every year, of which five to seven are
destructive. Map 1 illustrates the relative global concentration and severity of tropical cyclones that
have historically struck the Philippines. Moreover, climate change projections predict increases in
annual mean temperatures for the country range from 0.9°C to 1.1°C by 2020, and by 1.8°C to 2.2°C
in 2050.19 These changes in temperature are projected to lead to more intense tropical storms and
typhoons. Different areas of the country will be impacted in different ways. For example, regional
projections for the Philippines include a 60 – 100 percent increase in annual rainfall in the Central
Visayas and Southern Tagalog (including Metro Manila) by 2050, while annual average rainfall in
Mindanao is expected to decline by 11 percent.20

Map 1: The historical instances and intensity of tropical storms and hurricanes21

Source: Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (GAR) 2015, p. 67

While typhoons occur with particular frequency in the Philippines, the country is also exposed to
many other types of natural hazards. Approximately 74 percent of the country’s population and 60
percent of its land area are susceptible to multiple natural hazards (hazard maps in the Annex illustrate
the diversity and severity of risk, at the provincial level, across the Philippines.).22 Notably, the
country is located on the ‘Pacific Ring of Fire’, a ‘ring’ of volcanic and seismic activity that runs
along the edge of the Pacific Ocean, where around 90 percent of all earthquakes occur and 75 percent
of all active volcanoes are located.23 Earthquakes are a relatively common occurrence in the
Philippines, with 14 having occurred since 1990.24 Most recently, a 7.2 magnitude earthquake struck
Bohol province in central Philippines, October 2013, just weeks before Typhoon Yolanda struck. The
earthquake was felt in 60 municipalities and six cities across six provinces. There were 222 deaths and

6
3.2 million individuals were affected, 95,884 of whom were displaced. At the same time, as Figure 2
highlights, there has been a pronounced trend toward more frequent natural disasters of all kinds in
the Philippines since 1990 and a concurrent increase in the number of people that are being affected
by them.

Figure 2: The number of natural disasters has been increasing in the Philippines, and they have been
affecting more people, 1990-2014

Source: data from D. Guha-Sapir, R. Below, Ph. Hoyois - EM-DAT: International Disaster Database –
www.emdat.be – Université Catholique de Louvain – Brussels – Belgium.

The impacts of repeated and increasingly frequent natural disasters are undermining poverty reduction
in the Philippines. Despite high economic
growth in the Philippines over the last Figure 3: Poverty Status 2003, 2006, and 2009
decade, the national poverty rate has not
significantly declined. According to the
GoP’s official poverty estimates, income
poverty has remained almost unchanged
since 2003 at around 25.2 percent. One
reason for this is the high degree of
transient poverty in the Philippines. Many
Filipinos live just above this poverty line,
cycling in and out of poverty due to high
vulnerability to shocks – including natural
disasters. Indeed, as Figure 3 illustrates,
between 2003 and 2009, 44 percent of the
population was poor at least once – and of
that 44 percent, two out of three households Source: World Bank (2014), Country Partnership Strategy for the
moved in and out of poverty. A study by Republic of the Philippines for the Period FY2015-2018, p 4
Anttila-Hughes and Hsiang (2013)
combined physical storm data with household surveys to conclude that, on average, typhoons that hit
the Philippines depress affected household incomes by 6.7 percent (net of public and private transfers)

7
and household expenditures by 7.1 percent.25 Consequently, they found that typhoons led to
significant reductions in human capital investments among affected households, especially in
education (-13.3 percent) and health (-14.3 percent).26 While food expenditures did not appear to
decline as strongly among affected households, reductions in their food expenditure did extend over a
longer period of time, in many cases beginning immediately in the year of storm exposure and
continuing for three years afterwards.27 These impacts are not disaggregated by income status, but
highlight the relative burden on households possessing lower steady-state income and expenditure
levels.

Limited savings and access to finance inhibit poor households’ ability to respond and recover from
disasters, creating a cycle of poverty and vulnerability. In the event that livelihoods and/or assets have
been destroyed by a natural disaster, poor households may be compelled to employ harmful strategies
to cope due to a lack of savings and access to finance. For example, the Post Disaster Needs
Assessment (PDNA) of Typhoons Ondoy and Pepeng that struck the Philippines in 2009 highlighted
that: “the main coping strategy adopted after the disasters was to take on temporary work but this was
found to be particularly challenging in rural areas with fewer opportunities to earn off-farm income…
sources of credit regularly used prior to the storms often became unavailable... where households are
able to borrow, they frequently use loans to cover basic expenditures and to pay back other loans …
households have had to reduce expenses further by cutting down on food, and there are reports of
children being taken out of school and of older children working… with few assets and no land to sell,
many of the most vulnerable households fear they may not be able to recover.”28 In this way, poverty
and vulnerability to natural hazards are closely linked and mutually reinforcing. Poor and socially
disadvantaged groups are usually the most vulnerable to hazards, reflecting their social, cultural,
economic and political environment. Disasters, in turn, are a source of transient hardship and distress
and a factor contributing to persistent poverty. Indeed, at the household level, poverty is the single
most important factor determining vulnerability to natural disasters.29

Urban poverty and the growth of informal settlements have contributed to heightened vulnerability to
natural hazards in the Philippines. The annual urban growth rate in the Philippines is 2.2 percent, and
close to half of the population (49.3 percent) resides in urban areas. 30 This includes more than 12
million (around 21 percent) living in the Metro Manila area, which is also the world’s most densely
populated city.31 Around 45 percent of urban dwellings are in informal settlements (about 30 percent
of which reside in Metro Manila), one of the highest proportions of informal settlers in the world.32 33
Ever growing numbers of rural migrants and urban poor live in these often precariously located and
poorly constructed settlements. Indeed, the impacts of Typhoons Ondoy and Pepeng on the Metro
Manila region in 2009 were found to have been exacerbated by the heavily polluted environment in
urban areas, together with urban congestion and proliferation of slums.34

This already high and increasing vulnerability to natural disasters has become ‘the new normal’ for
the Philippines, carrying a high economic cost, and diverting resources away from longer term
development efforts. Previous GoP estimates suggest the average direct cost of damages from
disasters is about 0.5 percent of GDP annually.35 In the future, the Philippines is expected to incur (on
a long‐term average basis) about $4.6 billion per year in damage to assets due to earthquakes, tropical
cyclones, and increased rainfall. In the next 25 years, the Philippines has a 40 percent chance of
experiencing a loss of more than $18.8 billion and casualties greater than 70,000 people; it has a 10
percent chance of experiencing a loss of more than $44.8 billion and casualties greater than 95,000
people.36 Consequently, the GoP has revised its original target to halve the official poverty rate from
34.4 percent in 1991 to 17.2 percent by 2015, to between 18-20 percent by 2016; this change takes
into consideration the slow response of poverty to economic growth and the setbacks in 2013 due to
the impact of disasters.37

These natural disaster costs extend to losses in productivity and livelihoods, especially for informal
workers. The PDNA for Typhoons Ondoy and Pepeng reported that informal workers were the worst
affected, with “workers and micro employers in the informal sector the most vulnerable to natural
disasters, especially small traders and vendors, food-related producers, service providers, self-

8
 employed agricultural workers” with their vulnerabilities further increasing following the disaster.38 In
particular, the increased intensity and frequency of natural disasters is expected to reduce the
productivity of agriculture and fishing in the Philippines, the main source of livelihoods for the
majority of poor Filipinos – including indigenous groups. The annual combined damage to agriculture
from typhoons, droughts, and floods reached PhP 12 billion (USD 246 million) in 2011, equivalent to
3 percent of total agricultural production.39 Taking a specific case, Typhoon Pablo (Bopha) struck the
Philippines in December 2012, particularly affecting Eastern Mindinao where agricultural and fishing
livelihoods predominate. A GoP study found that agriculture as the primary source of livelihood
declined by 23 percent and fishing by 26 percent as a result of the disaster and that nearly 12 percent
of respondents were rendered completely jobless as a result of the typhoon.

3. The Impacts of Super‐Typhoon Yolanda

Typhoon Yolanda struck the Philippines on November 8, 2013. With wind speeds exceeding 300
km/h, it is considered the most powerful storm to have made landfall in history.40 Yolanda cut a path
directly across the central Philippines, severely affecting areas in the eastern, central, western Visayas,
and northern Palawan (see Map 2), precipitating a storm surge of over four meters in Eastern and
Western Samar and Leyte that led to massive loss of life and extensive damage to public and private
assets (see Table 1 for a detailed breakdown of those affected/damages by region).

Table 1: Geographic Areas and Total Number of Persons and Families Affected41
Number affected Percent 
Region
Provinces Cities Municipalities Barangays Families Persons of Total
4‐A Calabarzon                5                6                        33              168                 5,935                 27,076 ‐
4‐B Mimaropa                5                2                        62              793            101,006               466,120 4
5 Bicol                6                7                        92           1,229            150,889               692,020 6
6 Western Visayas                6              16                      117           3,176            801,660           3,673,721 30
7 Central Visayas                4              14                        84           2,119            652,055           2,965,990 24
8 Eastern Visayas                6                7                      137           4,387            850,080           4,271,726 35
10 Northern Mindano                4                3                          7                 26                 4,253                 19,592 ‐
11 Southern Mindano                3                1                        11                 19                 1,000                   5,000 ‐
13 Caraga                5                3                        44              205               14,799                 69,956 1
TOTAL              44              59                      587        12,122         2,581,677         12,191,201 100
Source: NEDA, Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (RAY), 2013, p. 3

The human and economic costs of the disaster to the Philippines were extremely high.3 In terms of
economic devastation, Yolanda cost the country an estimated P571.2 billion (USD 12.9 billion) in
damages,42 with over a million homes damaged or destroyed. This equated to 0.9 percent of gross
domestic product (GDP). Nearly 6,300 people died, 80 percent of them from the country’s second

3
Along with the sheer strength of Typhoon Yolanda, well-documented issues with the communication of early
warning information contributed to these devastating human impacts. A GIZ / EU Commission assessment of
the early warning efforts for Yolanda found that the warning was received with enough time to enact
preparations but that, crucially, information on the storm surge was not clearly communicated. Consequently,
many residents (the report estimates as many as 50 percent in some areas) in the affected regions elected to
remain in their homes despite receiving the warnings. Specifically, many were warned about the coming
“storm surge”, but did not understand the term. GIZ calculated that approximately 94 percent of the
casualties in Tacloban, Palo and Tanauan were caused by the storm surge. The study concludes that “serious
warnings and more effective evacuations along the coastline could have saved many lives”, highlighting the
primary importance of information, and the sufficient understanding of that information and disaster
evacuation procedures by the public, in saving lives.

9
poorest region, the Central Visayas. A further 4.1 million people were reportedly displaced.43 As of
2014, the GoP reported that more than 1,000 people were still “missing”.44

Yolanda affected some of the country’s poorest regions and was projected to increase national poverty
incidence by 1.9 percentage points, with projections of up to an additional one million people falling
into poverty.45 Pre-typhoon poverty incidence in the six hardest hit regions46 ranged from 29.1 percent
in Western Visayas to 45.2 percent in Eastern Visayas.47 Estimates in the GoP’s Reconstruction
Assistance on Yolanda Plan (RAY), 2014, indicated that the poverty gap in these regions had already
increased as a result of the disaster. The Eastern Visayas region is likely to experience the largest
increase, with the poverty rate estimated to grow from 41.2 to 55.7 percent.48 The results of the 2014
Annual Poverty Indicators Survey (APIS) released by the Philippine Statistics Authority showed
poverty incidence among Filipinos rising to 25.8% in the first half of 2014, from 24.6% in 2013.

The impact on production and livelihoods was significant, and remains potentially debilitating,
particularly for the hardest hit regions. The large-scale destruction of crops and other physical assets
has disrupted industry and has increased unemployment and underemployment. Vast quantities of
crops were destroyed, including 161,400 hectares of coconut farms. Farmers also reported losses of
livestock, agricultural equipment, post-production facilities, fishing vessels, and irrigation systems.
These losses have had a substantial long-term negative impact on the domestic economy and
household welfare. There also are strong multiplier effects to the informal sector, which constitutes a
large share of the local economy in the affected regions. The government estimates that around six
million workers were affected by the typhoon, of which around 2.6 million are vulnerable workers
without adequate social insurance or unpaid family workers.49

The occurrence of other intense weather events before and after Yolanda has further increased the
fiscal burden and hardship experienced by significant segments of the population. Weeks before
Yolanda struck, Bohol Province and other parts of central Philippines experienced a 7.2 magnitude
earthquake, with damages estimated at P2.2 billion (US$50 million). Following Typhoon Yolanda,
Typhoon Glenda struck the north and central regions in the Philippines in July, 2014 resulting in an
estimated total cost of P10.8 billion (US$ 247 million). Indeed, Yolanda or any other typhoon /
disaster in the Philippines should not be thought of in isolation, but as one in a succession of frequent
events, the impacts of which are accumulative for the most exposed and vulnerable.

10
Map 2: Typhoon Yolanda’s Path and the Municipal Level Poverty Rate50

Source: Reliefweb, REACH initiative

4. The Philippines’ Disaster Risk Management Framework and Its
Linkages to Social Protection

The Philippines has one of the most advanced social protection systems in the East Asia Pacific region.
Undergoing rapid and comprehensive social welfare reform since 2007, DSWD has developed a number
of national SP programs to help poor households manage risk and shocks; advanced information and
delivery systems have been developed to accompany these programs. For example, the Pantawid Pamiliya
Pilipino Program (4Ps) is a nationwide conditional cash transfer program aimed at poverty alleviation and
human capital accumulation that reached 4.4 million households in 2014.

Social protection is at the forefront of the overall government response to disasters like Yolanda. As
natural disasters constitute one of the most frequent and severe types of shock facing Filipino households,
the GoP’s lead agency for social protection and social welfare - the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) - plays a prominent role in meeting the needs of poor and vulnerable people who
are adversely affected by their impacts. This role became intensified during the Yolanda response and led
to a number of important lessons regarding the most effective ways to utilize and scale up existing SP
systems for large-scale disaster response.

DSWD is also the government’s lead agency for four clusters of the UN cluster system during the
response phase. The cluster system, instituted in 2006 as part of the UN Humanitarian Reform process, is
designed to facilitate effective humanitarian coordination by strengthening leadership and accountability
in key sectors at the national and global levels.4 The cluster system may be triggered to coordinate the
government’s response and/or the broader international humanitarian response to a disaster, as was the
case during Typhoon Yolanda. In 2007, the GoP formerly adopted the Cluster Approach, assigning
government cluster leads to each of the 11 Clusters (see Annex 1). DSWD is government lead agency for
the food security, camp coordination and camp management, shelter and protection clusters.

The National DRM Framework and Social Protection

The GoP has demonstrated its overarching commitment to build increased resilience to natural disasters
through its adoption of the Hyogo Framework for Action, 2005 – 2015 (HFA) and the Sendai Framework
for Action, 2015-2025. The HFA5 outlined priorities for action, guiding principles and practical means for
substantially reducing disaster losses by 2015. Under its obligations as a signatory to the HFA, the
Philippines developed a Strategic National Action Plan (SNAP) on Disaster Risk Reduction, 2009-2019.
The GoP is also a signatory to the HFA’s successor, the Sendai Framework for Action, 2015 -2025 (SFA).

4
The Cluster Approach operates at two levels – at the global level, the aim is to strengthen system-wide,
humanitarian preparedness and technical capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies by designating global
cluster leads and ensuring there is predictable leadership and accountability in all the main sectors or areas of
activity. At the country level, the aim is to ensure a more coherent and effective response by mobilizing groups of
agencies, organizations and NGOs to respond in a strategic manner across all key sectors or areas of activity,
each sector having a clearly designated lead, in support of existing government coordination and emergency
response mechanisms.
5
The World Conference for Disaster Reduction, 18-22 January 2005 in Kobe, Hyogo, Japan began the process of
pushing international agencies and national governments beyond rhetoric on DRR toward setting clear targets
and commitments. The HFA was the first internationally accepted framework for DRR. It set out an ordered
sequence of objectives (outcome – strategic goals – priorities), with five priorities for action. The UN and the
signatories of the HFA met biannually from 2005-2015 to review progress against the Hyogo Framework

12
As a country committed to the SFA, the GoP continues to be committed to four priority actions for
achieving DRR: 1) understanding disaster risk; 2) strengthening disaster risk governance to manage
disaster risk; 3) investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience; and 4) enhancing disaster preparedness
for effective response, and to build back better, in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction.

At the national level, the Government of the Philippines has developed comprehensive legislation and
institutional arrangements governing disaster risk management. The Philippines’ Disaster Risk Reduction
and Management Act (PDRRM, or Republic Act 10121(RA10121)) was adopted in May 2010. The
RA10121 supersedes prior legislation from 1978, which was primarily focused on post-disaster response
and provides greater emphasis in the government´s approach to disaster risk reduction. RA10121
established the framework for the creation of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management
Council (NDRRMC), which is headed by the Department of National Defense (DND). The Office of
Civil Defense (within the DND) is the Chair of the NDRRMC and is assisted by four Vice Chairpersons,
each with a thematic area of responsibility: the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) Secretary
for disaster prevention and mitigation, the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)
Secretary for disaster preparedness, the DSWD Secretary for disaster response, and the Director-General
of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for disaster rehabilitation and recovery
(see Figure 4).6 Building on RA10121, the subsequent National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management
Plan, 2011-2028 (NDRRMP) articulates the expected outcomes, outputs, key activities, and indicators for
each of the Vice-Chairperson’s agencies under their delineated but mutually reinforcing thematic areas of
responsibility.

Figure 4: The National Disaster Risk Reduction Council: Division of Responsibilities51

Source: Figure adapted from GoP, National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC),“National Disaster
Risk Reduction and Management Plan (NDRRMP), 2011-2028”, 2011.

6
Aside from government agencies, the NDRRMC also includes representation from financial institutions, local
government leagues, the private sector and civil society organizations (CSOs) reflecting the “Whole of Society”
approach to disaster management.

13

The NDRRMC structure is replicated at the regional and local levels for increased vertical integration of
disaster risk management. Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils (LDRRMC) are
located in every Barangay and tasked with approving, monitoring and implementing LDRRMPs; ensuring
that DRR and CCA concerns are integrated into local development plans, programs and budgets;
undertaking evacuation procedures for local residents before disasters.52 The LDRRMCs are also tasked
with preparedness activities through information dissemination and raising public awareness at the local
level by, for example, displaying hazard maps in community spaces and disseminating printed
information materials. Within the LDRRMCs, local databases are linked to national databases maintained
by the OCD that detail their human resources, equipment, directories and location of critical
infrastructures and their capacities. The Regional Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils
(RDRRMC) mirror the NDRRMC structure framework (Figure 4).7

The Linkage between the National DRM Framework and SP

Under the national DRM framework, DSWD takes overall responsibility for coordinating NDRRMP’s
Thematic Area 3: Disaster Response. The overarching goal of Disaster Response, as defined by the
NDRRMP, is to “provide life preservation and meet the basic subsistence needs of the affected population
based on acceptable standards during or immediately after a disaster”.53 More specifically, the NDRRMP
states that the disaster response thematic area includes both immediate response activities and early
recovery activities. Immediate response activities include needs assessments, search and rescue and relief
operations, provision of food and non-food item relief packages, etc. Early recovery activities
acknowledge that “the multidimensional process of recovery begins in a humanitarian setting” and
includes activities that help to restore basic services, livelihoods, governance, security and rule of law,
environment and social dimensions, including reintegration and social and emotional rehabilitation of
displaced populations”.54 As Vice Chairperson, DSWD coordinates the activities of the lead agencies for
disaster response which are DSWD itself, OCD, DND, DILG and Department of Health (DOH).
Numerous implementing partners are assigned to each lead agency to assist in implementation of disaster
response activities.8

It is important to note that Local Government Units take the lead role in disaster response in the
Philippines – their roles are only assumed by national capacity in the event of the declaration of a ‘state of
calamity’ at the local or national level. By law (Local Government Code of 1991), LGUs are supposed to
be at the frontlines of government response to disasters. This reflects their closeness to the specific issues
and knowledge of the needs of their communities. National government plays an enabling role, providing
LGUs with the resources and funds they need to respond effectively. This relationship is enshrined in
Republic Act No. 10121: “LDRRMCs shall take the lead in preparing for, responding to, and recovering
from the effects of any disaster… the NDRRMC and LDRRMC shall always act as support to LGUs
which have primary responsibility as first disaster responders”.55 The LGU’s leading role is only
augmented by national capacity when a state of calamity is declared, and assumed by national capacity
when the LGU’s capacity to respond has been decimated by the disaster, as in the case of a disaster of the
proportions of typhoon Yolanda.

7 Regional OCD directors are Chairpersons, and Vice-chairpersons include the Regional Directors of DSWD, Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG), Department of Science and Technology (DOST) and National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA). RDRRMCs monitor the work of the LDRRMCs, execute regional disaster risk management
plans, and coordinate with the relevant line agencies in times of disaster.
8
For detailed overview of the assignment of responsibilities by agency see National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management
Council (NDRRMC),“National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan (NDRRMP), 2011-2028”, 2011, pp.27 - 31

14
Within DSWD, the Department for Risk Reduction and Operations Office (DRROO) manages the
operationalization of DSWD’s response activities. In 2012, DRROO was created within DSWD, housing
two divisions: 1) Warehouse Management and Donation Facilitation Division and 2) the Disaster Risk
Reduction and Management Office. Whereas the Warehouse Management Division is primarily
concerned with the management and maintenance of infrastructure for delivering relief services post
disaster, the DRRMD lead in the planning , coordinating and monitoring of all disaster response efforts
and is composed of four sections: 1) Disaster Response Operations Monitoring and Operations Center
(DROMIC) section; 2) Food and Non-Food section; 3) Camp Coordination and Camp Management
section; 4) Protection, Shelter and Livelihood section.56

Response activities are financed through the National and Local Disaster Risk Reduction and
Management Funds (NDRRMF – formerly ‘Calamity Fund’ & LDRRMF) and the Quick Response Fund.
In 2010, RA10121 reformulated the former “Calamity Fund” as the NDRRMF, broadening the scope of
its use from solely post disaster relief, recovery and reconstruction activities to also include disaster risk
reduction, mitigation and preparedness activities.57 The NDRRMF is a lump sum fund appropriated under
the General Appropriations Act (GAA). In a post disaster context, however, the process for securing the
release of funds is lengthy: implementing agencies send a request to the OCD, who review the application
before sending to the NDRRMC for review, who, if approving, send to the Office of the President, who
advise the Department of Budget Management to release the funds. This is especially problematic in the
response phase when activities must be undertaken immediately.58 As such, RA10121 also decreed that,
of the annual amount appropriated to the NDRRMF, 30 percent “shall be allocated to Quick Response
Funds or stand-by funds for relief and recovery programs in order that the living conditions of people may
be normalized as quickly as possible.” Unlike the NDRRMF, the QRF does not require the
recommendation of the NDRRMC or the approval of the Office of the President to trigger the use and
release of funds. If QRF funds remain in a given year they may be carried over, and when the QRF gets
depleted, the agency may request for replenishment with a request to the DBM to be approved by the
Office of the President The NDRRMF is replicated at the local level through Local Disaster Risk
Reduction and Management Funds (LDRRMF); no less than 5 percent of regular source revenue must be
set aside for DRM activities. Of the total amount appropriated to LDRRMFs, 30 percent is allocated to
local QRFs for response and recovery activities.

Aside from coordinating disaster response, DSWD is also a lead agency and implementing partner in each
of the other three NDRRMC thematic areas. The DSWD is assigned responsibilities under each Thematic
Area. This is logical due to the overlap which normally occurs between the emergency relief, early
recovery and longer-term recovery phases of a disaster response, and the complementary role of social
protection programs in livelihood support across each phase. Similarly, efficient response is predicated by
adequate preparedness undertaken in Thematic Area 2 of the NDRRMP.

Lastly, DSWD is the government lead for the following clusters of the UN cluster system: Food Security;
Camp Coordination and Management/Non-Food Items; Protection; and Shelter. In the Philippines, the
UN cluster system was established by the National Disaster Coordinating Council in 2007.59 Where
DSWD’s clusters are concerned, partner humanitarian lead agencies are as follows: United Nations High
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), Protection; World Food Program (WFP), Food Security;
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), Shelter; International
Organization for Migration (IOM), Camp Coordination and Management/Non-food Items.60

15
The Institutional Role of DWSD in Practice during the Yolanda Response

Relief Phase

DSWD’s lead / focal role in four clusters, combined with coordinating the overall GoP relief operations,
created substantial institutional strain on the Department. Both the international community and the
Government used the cluster system as their main vehicle for coordinating the Yolanda response. A post
Yolanda UNOCHA evaluation of the humanitarian response operations found that, “the cluster system
rolled out in the Yolanda response placed considerable strain on government departments, notably on
DSWD, which was expected to assume leadership of five clusters while also serving as the primary
delivery channel for [GoP] relief. While this large and dual role was one taken on by DWSD in earlier
disasters, the scale of the Yolanda disaster and response created a huge strain for one department”.61 
While international observers have noted that “no humanitarian response to a disaster of [the scale of
Yolanda] will be perfect”, Oxfam highlighted that “when Typhoon Yolanda struck, several ministers were
dispatched to oversee relief operations or aspects of the response… despite commendable energy, there
was no clear leader for the whole response.62 This experience should prompt reflection on the ability for
one government department to effectively manage each of these clusters in a large-scale disaster,
especially in combination with the primary responsibility to implement relief operations.

The National Disaster Response Plan of 2014 illustrates that the Philippines and DSWD were quick to act
on lessons learned from Yolanda, streamlining DSWD’s organizational response structure to more
explicitly link with the UN cluster system. Recognizing the need for continuous strengthening of
response and relief procedures, and the possibility of another unusually large-scale disaster in the future –
particularly given current climate change projections for the Philippines - DSWD adopted the National
Disaster Response Plan in June 2014. The NDRP is designed to address the ‘worst case disaster
scenario’, that is, a typhoon of equivalent strength and impact to that of Yolanda. The following
modifications have been made to the cluster system, as utilized in the Philippines:

1. The NDRP excludes the establishment of Early Recovery, Livelihoods or Shelter Clusters during
initial emergency relief operations. These clusters are now designated as belonging to NDRRMC’s
fourth thematic Area – Disaster Recovery and Rehabilitation – and were not considered under the
area of Response.63
2. The Logistics and Emergency Telecommunications Cluster will be divided into two separate clusters,
one for Logistics and one for Emergencies.
3. An Agriculture Cluster will not be formed in the future during initial relief operations
4. Two additional clusters will be created for: a) search rescue and retrieval and b) management of the
dead and missing.

This new response plan organizational structure is illustrated in Figure 5.

16
Figure 5: New Cluster Structure under the NDRRMC thematic area for disaster response64

Source: DSWD, “National Disaster Response Plan (NDRP), 2014

Typhoon Yolanda also highlighted issues with funding relief and response activities through the QRF.
One year after Typhoon Yolanda occurred the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) reported
that it had released a total of P52 billion to support government relief and rehabilitation operations –
however there were issues in accessing QRF financing in a timely fashion. The largest share of that total
(P6.06 billion) went to DSWD to augment its Quick Response Fund (QRF) and to support its relief
feeding program.65 In 2013 the QRF allocation for DSWD had been P652.5 million. However, Typhoon
Pablo and the Bohol earthquake, occurring in 2013 prior to Typhoon Yolanda, had already depleted the
Quick Response Fund, which needed further augmentation from the Department of Budget Management.
Furthermore, a Commission on Audit (COA) report one year on from Yolanda investigating relief
operations found that funds could not be sourced from the NDRRMF or even the QRF in a timely
fashion.66 DSWD reported to the Commission on Audit that in order to fulfil its mandate it had to act
immediately to respond to the unprecedented impacts of Yolanda. However, the COA states that,
“DSWD’s experience from past disasters indicated long delays in the actual release of Calamity Funds or
QRFs even if DSWD immediately requested for budget releases. Thus it had to source from available
allotments (in its budget) to enable it to respond and carry out its mandated tasks with dispatch.”
Following Yolanda, the annual NDRRMF and QRF allotments have increased, but it remains to be seen
whether delays in the release of QRF for response activities are being sufficiently addressed.

Recovery and Rehabilitation Phase

Due to the scale of the impacts of Yolanda and the challenges to coordination and implementation during
the immediate response phase, the GoP instituted a new organizational structure for the recovery and
rehabilitation phase – strengthening the role of DSWD in this area. The GoP formally announced the end

17
of the “response” phase and programs in July 2014, accompanied by a transition to the recovery and
rehabilitation phase. A new (temporary) coordinating body was created to lead the Yolanda recovery
process, the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (OPARR). The GoP had
previously created a similar body after Typhoon Pablo (also a category 5 Typhoon), highlighting the
government’s recognition that large scale disasters require special authority to mobilize the full resources
of the country and to expedite the decision-making process under the direct authority of the President.67
OPARR is structured around sectors (livelihood, infrastructure, social services) rather than the thematic
areas of NDRRMP (disaster preparedness, response etc.) as depicted in Figure 6.

Figure 6: The Cluster framework of OPARR: Typhoon Yolanda organizational structure in the recovery
and reconstruction phases68

Source: Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), “Philippines: Typhoon Yolanda Ongoing
Recovery: Recovery framework Case Study”

This institutional readjustment for the “recovery and rehabilitation” phase resulted in DSWD assuming a
prominent role as Chair for the Social Services Cluster. The goal of the Social Services Cluster was
articulated by OPARR as being “to facilitate restoration of basic needs such as shelter, education and
health to the most vulnerable members of society, and to improve or put in place social protection
services to Yolanda affected communities, as well as provide healthy environment and strengthen
capacity to cope with future hazards and disasters”.69 The Cluster’s programs, projects and activities
included the recovery and rehabilitation of education and health services and the continued provision of
emergency food supplies and emergency shelter assistance.70 Moreover, OPARR stipulated that DSWD
would be an active participant in other recovery clusters, particularly the resettlement and livelihoods
clusters, primarily through its Emergency Shelter Assistance and Cash for Work activities (these
programs are discussed in detail in the following section).

More clarity is needed on the role of DSWD and SP in the post-Yolanda recovery frameworks for future
disasters. While the NDRP has integrated Yolanda response experience into a new framework for
increased coordination of response activities, it remains unclear whether the Recovery and Rehabilitation
thematic area of the NDRRMP will be permanently restructured around coordinating clusters of the kind
utilized by OPARR. In either case, while the duties and roles of DSWD in the response phase seem to be

18
quite clear, they are less so for the recovery and rehabilitation phase. In particular, SP programs can play
a more prominent role in restoring lost livelihoods and enabling livelihood diversification.

Rules/procedures that govern the transition from the response phase to the recovery and rehabilitation
phases – and the programs enacted therein - need greater clarity. Whether or not the OPARR recovery and
rehabilitation framework is adapted post-Yolanda, this and the new response framework are not dynamic.
Instead they each reflect a post disaster “phase” in isolation. Greater information on exactly what governs
the transition from each phase, and consequently the roles and programs enacted by DSWD in each phase,
is needed. In the case of Yolanda, the response phase ended in July 2014 and the humanitarian clusters
were disengaged. However, as Figure 7 illustrates, the typical GoP timeline for transitioning from
response to recovery is one month. Yolanda response phase cessation in July 2014 is more reflective of
the typically lengthier international humanitarian transition timeline, as well as the unusual severity of the
disaster. Nevertheless, it is understood that a lack of clarity on phase transition created confusion as to the
timing of the myriad activities undertaken by DSWD post-disaster. Greater alignment with the
international humanitarian timeline in the event of severe disasters like Yolanda could create increased
harmony with national and international post disaster activities.

Figure 7: Emergency response and recovery timeline – GoP vs. international humanitarian71

Source: Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation Steering Group, “IASC Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation of
the Typhoon Haiyan Response”

19
5. Post‐Yolanda Social Protection Programming

Given its prominent position in the national DRM framework, DSWD implemented a variety of programs
to assist Yolanda affected households. These programs can be broadly grouped into the following
categories: distribution of in-kind relief items, cash transfers, shelter, and community driven development.
These programs are mapped out in Figure 8 along a stylized post disaster timeline, illustrating the post-
disaster phases in which each program was implemented.

Figure 8: The primary response and recovery programs of DSWD in the case of Typhoon Yolanda

Note: “Relief, early recovery, recovery and reconstruction” refer the typical international conception of the post-
disaster phases over time. “Response” and “recovery and rehabilitation” represent the GoP conception of
these phases. They align as illustrated on Figure 8’s X axis

The case of Yolanda offers interesting lessons regarding the ways in which pre-existing national social
protection systems may be most effectively utilized to coordinate the overall GoP and international
humanitarian response Yolanda’s devastation was so extensive that the government’s response was
supplemented with a full scale international humanitarian response, coordinated through the UN cluster
system. A number of international organizations utilized similar modes of assistance to those of DSWD.
In some cases, this assistance was well harmonized with DWSD’s response, while in others there was a
lack of cohesion.

1. Relief Programs

Government first-responders were overwhelmed by the scale of the disaster, prompting DSWD to
strengthen its surge capacity for future large-scale disasters. The extreme scale of the damage wrought by
Typhoon Yolanda seriously hampered the GoP and humanitarian relief efforts during the first few days.
DSWD and other GoP response agencies had been able to preposition goods, equipment, and personnel to
respond immediately once Yolanda had passed. However, Yolanda was extremely destructive: roads and

20
bridges were damaged and / or blocked, there was no clean water supply, no food, no electricity, and lines
of communication were down. Prepositioned goods and equipment in Region VIII (Eastern Visayas) were
washed away by the storm surge, and a number of the personnel that had been placed on alert in Field
Offices and LGUs were themselves severely affected by Yolanda, decimating the local response capacity.
Surge teams comprised of DSWD staff – from surrounding regions and Central Office, Manila – the
military and police were mobilized as local capacity was overwhelmed by the disaster. In the case of the
DSWD surge team staff, many were not formerly trained in disaster response, nor were they trained to
deliver the psychosocial care to the affected that many of them necessarily had to perform during the first
few days of the disaster. This experience has led DSWD to begin training all staff in disaster response and
post-disaster psychosocial care provision for when the need for surge teams on such a scale arises again in
the future.

Initial DSWD relief operations centered on the provision of food and nonfood items –this was a
monumental task that overstretched DSWD’s capacity to deliver FFP to such a scale. In light of the above
logistical issues, DSWD family food pack (FFP) distribution commenced on the third day of the disaster.
In November 2013, 375,000 food packs were distributed by DSWD and by the end of December that
number rose to 5.1 million food packs. Other essential nonfood items such as mats, blankets, tarpaulins,
hygiene kits, clothing, were also provided. However, assessing the effectiveness of the overall response
operations, a Commission on Audit report highlighted particular problems in FFP management, storage
and delivery mechanisms, among them: inefficient warehousing/inadequate facilities leading to instances
of spoiling and lapses in the documenting and recording of FFP production and delivery to beneficiaries.72
All of which highlight the need for further investment in DRROO’s key infrastructure and administrative
processes for future large scale FFP operations. However, the extent and nature of increases in the
capacity for in-kind relief goods needs to be considered carefully against investments in other, potentially
more efficient modalities of relief – specifically, cash based interventions (see below section Cash
Transfer Programs) that require less of an administrative burden and standing capacity to deliver.

In the immediate aftermath of the disaster (10 -23 November 2013), DSWD began to provide Food for
Work (FFW) as an early relief program. Beneficiaries were given food packs in exchange for the
provision of their labor to assist in the repacking and distribution of relief goods. On 24 November, with
needs moving beyond immediate survival necessities such as food and temporary shelter, DSWD replaced
the FFW program with the Cash for Work (CFW) program discussed below.

The overall government (FFP) and humanitarian food relief programs were coordinated by DSWD and
the Department of Agriculture through the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster. The Cluster stated that
it would “support and be aligned with actions specifically with the response plans of government
counterparts, particularly those developed by the Department of Social Welfare and Development and the
Department of Agriculture. As such, cluster members will be coordinated to prioritize support activities
which complement or help to fill gaps, where the government has identified further assistance is needed
to meet the identified needs of target populations. They will also ensure at all times they take closely into
account existing government policies and delivery systems”73 The Inter-Agency Humanitarian
Evaluation of the food security operations found that there was no evidence of “major and sustained
geographic gaps” in food coverage, but did highlight that isolated/remote/severely damaged communities
had to wait much longer for assistance. Moreover, “there was a concentration of activity around
coordination hubs and, in Region VI, in coastal areas.”74

DSWD also provided temporary shelter assistance to the many displaced households whose houses were
partially or totally destroyed. Damage assessments would ultimately conclude that 1,012,790 houses were
damaged by Yolanda, with 518,878 houses totally damaged and 493,912 houses partially damaged.
Among this devastation, DSWD facilitated the provision of emergency shelter kits to 7,615 households

21
from the municipalities of Tanauan and Palo, Leyte and Guiuan, Eastern Samar. A DSWD Memorandum
stated that shelter kits were delivered to houses in ‘can build’ areas or safe areas, but that the number of
families receiving this assistance was limited due to the low volume of shelter materials delivered by the
Department of Public Works and Highways to DSWD.75 As lead for the Shelter Cluster, DSWD helped to
coordinate and inform the humanitarian response that delivered roofing solutions to 136,267 households
and emergency shelter kits to a further 51,454 households.76 As a secondary step, DSWD oversaw the
transfer of displaced families to transitional shelters or bunkhouses constructed by the Department of
Public Works and Highways. By the fifth month of the response phase, a total of 3,187 families in Region
VIII who were temporarily living in tents and makeshift houses were transferred to 245 completed
bunkhouses in Leyte, Eastern Samar, and Western Samar.

2. DSWD Cash Transfer Programs (CTPs)

DSWD used several of its programs in response to Yolanda. The most important was a national
conditional cash transfer program, the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps). The 4Ps is the third
largest CCT in the world, reaching 4.4 million poor households with children 0-18 (2015). DSWD also
deliver conditional cash transfer programs post disaster in the form of Cash for Work (C4W), Cash for
Building Livelihood Assets (CBLA) and cash for shelter (“Emergency Shelter Assistance”, ESA).

Alongside these GoP cash based programs, humanitarian CTPs were also implemented in the Yolanda
response - to an “unprecedented degree”77. At least 45 international humanitarian agencies implemented
CTPs – unconditional and conditional - within the inter-agency response to Yolanda. The UNOCHA
reported that between December 2013 and August 2014, more than three-quarters (77 percent) of these
CTPs were conditional cash transfers (60 percent of which were CFW, 20 percent cash for food or
shelter), while just under one quarter (23 percent) were unconditional.78 Four agencies alone in the inter-
agency response distributed around US$34 million, benefitting 1.4 million disaster-affected people.79

a.) The 4Ps Conditional Cash Transfer Program

The GoP has adopted an international best practice of building flexibility into DSWD’s flagship 4Ps
social protection program to convert conditional cash transfers into unconditional cash transfers during
times of emergency. This is a key element of effective post-disaster response and adjustment in the social
safety nets: the ability to deliver cash transfers to affected people as quickly as possible in order to
minimize the adoption of negative coping strategies.

In regular times, the 4Ps delivers cash grants to households with children (aged 0-18) that live beneath the
poverty line and meet conditions pertaining to investments in their children’s education and health. The
grants in turn are intended to provide an immediate alleviation of hardship in poor households, while
incentivizing long term human capital accumulation among children to break the intergenerational cycle
of poverty. 4Ps beneficiary households, in general, must satisfy the following criteria: be identified as
poor by the National Household Targeting System – Listahanan; have children 0-18 years old and/or have
a pregnant woman at the time of assessment; agree to meet the conditions specified in the program,
including attending monthly Family Development Sessions (FDS) which cover numerous topics from
domestic violence and nutrition to disaster preparedness (see Box 1).

22
 Box 1: The 4Ps and disaster preparedness

Attendance at Family Development Sessions (FDS), held once a month, is one of the conditions for
receipt of 4Ps grants. One of the topics covered teaches beneficiaries to be disaster-ready, including
what warning messages to be aware of, and what items should be packed for evacuation, including
identification documents, clothes, and other essentials. It represents one way in which a CCT can be
used for ex-ante disaster preparedness at the household level. Post-Yolanda, FDS was also used to
deliver information to the 4Ps households on how to recognize and address post-traumatic stress.

A 4Ps beneficiary’s Yolanda story shows the potential value of disaster preparedness education
through FDS:

Christina, 33, knew that the heavy rains and powerful winds forecasted for typhoon ‘Yolanda’ could put her
family in danger. Hence, before the storm made landfall in her province, she, her husband, and their three
children, left their home for an evacuation center, bringing with them packed essentials such as a flashlight,
food, and clothes. When Yolanda struck, Cristina’s family was among the millions whose homes and belongings
were wiped out by the typhoon. The winds and surging waters tore off their roof and washed away everything,
including furniture, school supplies, and even their treasured pictures and medals. Thanks to the lessons on
community disaster risk reduction and preparedness that she learned in the Family Development Sessions
(FDS), she was able to prepare for the typhoon’s onslaught by saving important documents, preparing
emergency supplies, and getting her family to safety.

Source: DSWD (2014) 2013 Annual Report, Manila.

Given the issues concerning the lack of understanding of the term “storm surge”, and the resultant loss
of life, it is clear that understanding disaster communications is crucial to disaster preparedness and
survival. FDS sessions provide a medium for increasing household awareness of pertinent disaster
information that could save lives. It is understood that DSWD is currently developing new guidelines
and content for family disaster preparedness FDS sessions, to be delivered in disaster prone
municipalities.

To respond to the situation where the health and educations services are disrupted because of disaster and
beneficiaries are not able to meet the CCT conditions, the 4Ps design includes a provision that suspends
conditions for a limited period of time when a “state of calamity” is declared. After a disaster, it is
unrealistic to assume that beneficiaries can meet the conditions of the CCT, especially in instances where
the supply side may be down, with schools and health centers destroyed or being used for relief
operations. As such, a resolution (NAC Resolution No. 13, Series 2013) was enacted by DSWD in July
2013 to codify the removal of Compliance Verification in cases of a “state of calamity, disaster,
complexity and other exceptional cases”. The DSWD Regional Director of an affected area submits a
request to deem all beneficiaries in the affected area as compliant to the 4Ps’ National Project
Management Office. If approved at the level of the Secretary, beneficiaries will be deemed compliant for
a maximum of three consecutive compliance verification periods (three months). This is not an
unprecedented procedure, with the Bolsa Familia CCT program in Brazil having undertaken similar steps
to deliver unconditional payments to beneficiaries affected by flooding in 2011.

The DSWD was able to use these protocols to deliver much needed cash, without conditions, to a large
number of 4P beneficiaries over a relatively short time period. On 8 December, one month after the
disaster, DSWD 4Ps staff conducted a massive validation exercise of the affected 4Ps beneficiaries as a
first step in delivery. The purpose of the validation exercise was to 1) locate the 4Ps beneficiaries; 2)
identify them from among other displaced households (in cases where they were residing in evacuation
centers and resettlement areas); 3) validate and update the data profiles of the identified household

23
beneficiaries against existing records; 4) facilitate the issuance of temporary ID cards to be used for
obtaining their cash transfers; 5) prepare necessary documentation for replacing lost cards and provide
new, permanent credentials.80 The validation exercise and other essential administrative steps, were
carried out quickly enough to enable the release of a total of P550.5 million (US$12.5 million) 4Ps cash
grants to Yolanda affected 4Ps beneficiaries between November 2013 and February 2014.81 It should be
emphasized that these were regular CCT grants due to the beneficiaries, disaster or no disaster. The
difference was that the compliance with conditions was voided.

DSWD also demonstrated resourcefulness and flexibility in locating and facilitating the validation of
displaced 4Ps households that had left the affected regions. Reportedly, by January 2014, 23,000
individuals from Yolanda affected areas had arrived in the Metro Manila region. Public announcements
were broadcast to inform displaced 4Ps beneficiaries that they could contact the respective 4Ps city or
municipal links in the area where they were residing to claim their benefits. If the beneficiaries had lost
their identification documents, they were identified and validated against the 4Ps beneficiary database.

Both the World Food Program (WFP) and UNICEF decided to utilize the 4Ps system to deliver further
‘top up’ grants to affected 4Ps beneficiaries. This process of topping up DSWD’s 4Ps grants represents
the primary example of DSWD-humanitarian coordination in response to Yolanda. The WFP agreed to
work with DSWD in the validation of 4Ps beneficiaries, subsequently disbursing two separate top up
grants to validated beneficiaries through the 4Ps payment system. The Memorandum of Understanding
entered into between WFP and DSWD stated that, “[DSWD and WFP] agree to collaborate in assisting
Typhoon Yolanda through the joint implementation of the Emergency Cash Transfer Top-Up Project for
Typhoon Yolanda Affected Populations in 4Ps Areas (EUCT) by which WFP shall grant additional
emergency cash grants to qualified beneficiaries of the 4Ps program on top of DSWD’s regular cash
grant”.82 It was agreed that payment would be delivered through the 4Ps existing payment modalities
(including the Land Bank of the Philippines, Philippines Post, Prepaid Card and Globe Cash (mobile
payments)). The first transfers were delivered quickly between December 2013 and January 2014, and the
second between January 2014 and February 2014. Each transfer amounted to a fixed amount of PHP1300
(US$30) per beneficiary household.

Replicating the top-up initiative of WFP, UNICEF subsequently delivered a series of top up cash grants
through the 4Ps, targeted to 4Ps beneficiaries in the worst affected region, Eastern Samar. As UNICEF
wrote in the Memorandum of Agreement with DSWD, “DSWD and UNICEF appreciate the growing
recognition of cash transfers as an effective tool to meet emergency and early recovery needs, recognize
the 4Ps program as a robust targeting platform identifying the poorest of the poor in routine social welfare
programming and identify shared priorities within the UCT and CCT programs for program efficiency
and effectiveness to include: efficiency in expenditures and adequate service provision”.83 DSWD had
assessed that the province of Eastern Samar was the worst affected by Yolanda, and as such UNICEF
specifically selected it for the delivery of its top up grants. It was agreed that DSWD would identify,
consolidate and validate a database of 5,801 4Ps beneficiary households in the five worst affected
provinces of Eastern Samar.84 The UNICEF top-ups consisted of a cash grant amount of PHP 4,370
(US$100) per month, for six months, delivered between July and December 2014. DSWD and UNICEF
monitoring of the program during the period July through September 2014 reveal that within the first 3
months of implementation PHP75,609,600 (US$1,700,000) of UNICEF grants had been disbursed to 4Ps
beneficiaries in the five municipalities of Eastern Samar, reaching 5,728 households in August and 5,739
households in September.85

However, non-4Ps poor and vulnerable households are excluded from the cash transfer, and any donor
funded top-ups, because the 4Ps’ system does not have the flexibility to reach non-4Ps households. Being
a CCT with conditionality temporarily removed, the beneficiaries received the grants that they were due
ahead of time, upon being validated. Poor households without children, near poor households tipped into

24
poverty by the disaster, etc., that may be equally or more affected by the disaster than a 4Ps household
could not be reached through this program. As DSWD noted to UNOCHA, “the Philippine Government is
supportive of humanitarian agencies using their social protection programs as a vehicle to target
appropriately, and to transfer assistance in a coordinated way. However, they have also advised that
agencies should not feel the need to discriminate between existing beneficiaries and those who are
evidently in need of emergency assistance and not on the scheme.” In these cases, DSWD emphasized
that the humanitarian community should target the excluded affected population. However, again, without
a robust assessment of the cash coordination, it cannot be said whether the non-government programs
were well targeted and complimentary alongside the 4Ps, and together whether overall coverage was
adequate and broadly equitable. Moreover, it appears no assessment has been undertaken to examine the
impacts of the delivery of the CCT grants to the program beneficiaries compared to those poor households
not receiving any cash assistance. While it is likely too late to capture this data, survey work on these
impacts for beneficiary households following subsequent disasters should be strongly considered.

Given the limited capacity of the 4Ps CCT to expand its caseload in times of disaster, there is a need to
consider an additional cash transfer program that is scalable, and whose primary objective is to respond to
disasters. The 4Ps CCT is ultimately a program with specific objectives that pertain to long term human
capital accumulation. It is not, and should not be a primary vehicle for post-disaster cash transfer delivery
to affected households. As such, while maintaining the integrity of the 4Ps CCT as a separate program, a
new scalable emergency cash transfer program should be strongly considered. Such an emergency cash
transfer would be capable of scaling out cash transfer coverage to larger shares of affected households,
including but not limited to 4Ps beneficiary households.

Following the Yolanda response, the coverage of the 4Ps’ regular CCT programming was expanded to
permanently enroll households newly impoverished as a result of the impacts of the disaster. NEDA noted
in Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda II9 that “expanded social protection programs, both short-term
(e.g., cash for work) and medium-term (e.g., 4Ps conditional cash transfers), are important for social
sector recovery, implemented in close cooperation with planned livelihood initiatives [in the Livelihoods
Cluster of OPAAR] to provide opportunities for the poor to meet basic needs, restore social services to
pre-disaster levels, and access income earning opportunities”. To this end, DSWD reported processing the
inclusion of an additional 20,000 households for enrolment into the 4Ps in 2014 based on updated
information on the poverty status of those affected by Typhoon Yolanda.

b.) Cash for Work (CFW) and Cash for Building Livelihood Assets (CBLA) programs

Cash for Work is used by DSWD during the relief and early recovery phases of a response, providing the
dual benefit of delivering cash to beneficiaries, and executing projects geared toward assisting the overall
response effort / rehabilitating community infrastructure. DSWD have been implementing CFW programs
in response to disasters since 2008. These programs are designed as a short term intervention to provide
temporary employment to distressed/displaced individuals for relief and rehabilitation in their
communities or evacuation centers. In exchange for their labor, beneficiaries are provided with cash to
meet their food and basic needs.86 Generally, beneficiaries will be paid 75 percent of the prevailing
regional minimum wage, with projects, on average, being not more than 10 days in duration.

9
Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda’s Implementation for Results (RAYII) is a companion document to RAY
Build Back Better (RAY) released in December 2013. RAY presented a Post-Disaster Needs Assessment
(PDNA) as well as the Government’s strategic plan to guide the overall recovery and reconstruction of the
economy, lives, and livelihoods in the affected areas. RAY II, a companion piece, presents an overall results
monitoring framework of RAY in line with the Philippine Development Plan (PDP) 2011-2016 and the
clusters of OPARR.

25
Responding to Yolanda, DSWD replaced what was initially the Food for Work program with the Cash for
Work (CFW) program on 28 November, 20 days after the disaster hit. Given the severity of the disaster,
the 10 day ceiling on individual work activities was extended to 15 days, and workers in CFW programs
were paid 100 percent of the prevailing minimum wage. Tasks given to beneficiaries in the CFW program
included: loading/unloading of goods, repacking of relief goods, food preparation, sorting and inventory
of damaged property, clearing of debris, coastal clean-up, canal dredging, among other things. In this
way, the CFW helped to provide much needed additional assistance to DSWD relief programs on the
ground, while providing beneficiaries with cash based assistance. By January 2014, 15,188 affected
persons from the Eastern Visayas had availed the CFW program. However, the CFW program was noted
as having beneficiary selection issues in some instances with some government and private sector
employees electing to participate in the program instead of their regular jobs.87 While the screening of
takers should be more stringent, this also points to a trade-off between setting the CFW wage at the
minimum wage level for a higher rate of assistance, but potentially distorting the labor market, versus the
typical 75 percent CFW wage that is less distortionary but offers less assistance to beneficiaries.
Moreover, there may be scope for DSWD to enhance the capacity of the CFW program to be delivered to
a greater number of beneficiaries. Despite the presence of the DSWD CFW program and a large number
of humanitarian CFW programs, survey work conducted by the Protection cluster reported “lack of
income generating activities” as the most reported protection problem among respondents during the
response phase (May 2014).88

It appears that significant effort was undertaken to coordinate the provision of humanitarian CFW with
GoP requirements, especially with regard to a unified wage rate. Nevertheless, it is unclear the extent to
which wage rate guidance was followed by each implementing agency. Humanitarian agencies operating
outside of the official inter-agency response were also not party to these agreements, with one such
agency reportedly delivering CFW with a wage rate twice the value of the minimum wage, creating a
large distortion. Similarly, targeting of CFW was highly varied among programs, with some targeting 4Ps
beneficiaries, others certain vulnerable groups, others IDPs etc. As in the case of the impact of 4Ps in
disaster (see previous section), without rigorous analysis, an assessment of the adequacy of coverage is
impossible. The overall CFW picture is, therefore, a blurry one that indicates a patchwork of
programming coverage, benefit levels and project types. A more detailed discussion of government-
humanitarian CTP coordination follows this section.

As operations transitioned from response to recovery and rehabilitation activities, DSWD also
transitioned its public works program from CFW to the “Cash for Building Livelihoods Assets” (CBLA)
program. Led by DSWD’s Sustainable Livelihoods Program, CBLA was initiated to support longer term
efforts for the rebuilding of lost livelihoods after Yolanda. While CFW in the response phase fills an
immediate need, the work undertaken is rudimentary and disconnected from longer term livelihood
resumption. CBLA is more directly geared to the restoration of lost livelihoods, key to recovery and
rehabilitation. Activities of the CBLA projects focus on river dredging and embankment; digging and
dredging of canals and irrigation systems; restoration of farmlands, farm-to-market roads, public markets,
and school facilities; communal farm preparation; clearing of destroyed crop and crop diversification.
Priority beneficiaries are identified through the Listahanan database as being poor, with 4Ps beneficiaries
prioritized. Displaced families whose heads of household did not have employment prior to Yolanda, and
families whose heads are engaged in informal labor are also prioritized. As of Aril 2014, DSWD
anticipated that CBLA would reach 150,000 families, dispersing a total of PHP1.5 billion in financial
capital in that same year.89 Nevertheless, SLP staff reported that the program would likely reach only
16.8 percent of total affected households due to the SLPs relatively limited capacity to deliver, indicating
significant potential for the CBLA to be expanded for future disasters.

26
The Department for Labor and Employment also implemented a CFW program designed to provide
temporary employment for workers made unemployed by disaster. Established in the recovery and
rehabilitation phases, the Emergency Employment program targets workers in establishments / industries
affected by disasters. Work is aimed at formal sector workers (differentiating it from CBLA
beneficiaries), and is of short duration. Like DSWD’s CFW, the Emergency Employment program also
centers on cleaning and clearing, roadside maintenance and community infrastructure. A work project has
a minimum of 10 days duration, paying the minimum wage and providing social insurance and any
required protective equipment. In line with the Yolanda Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program, as
part of the OPARR livelihood cluster, DOLE provided emergency employment and livelihood assistance
to 99,325 individual beneficiaries, costing P520,029,000 (US$12 million). DOLE, through its regional
offices, also conducted skills training and workshops on business planning for its beneficiaries.

c.) Cash for Shelter Assistance- “Emergency Shelter Assistance” (ESA) – program

DSWD’s Emergency Shelter Assistance program begins in the recovery phase and provides cash (or,
where more appropriate, shelter materials) for beneficiaries with damaged houses. The ESA targets
households whose houses were partially or totally damaged by Yolanda that are located in designated
“safe areas”. These safe areas – as designated by the Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP) - are
designed to promote “building back better” by preventing rebuilding in high risk zones. Beneficiaries are
those households that have no permanent source of income or whose income is below the poverty
threshold and whose homes are partially or totally damaged. The targeting of the ESA is based on
reporting of household damage, as verified by DSWD staff, and whether or not the household has
received comparable assistance from a different source. The rate of assistance is PHP30,000 (US$670)
for fully damaged houses, and PHP10,000 (US$ 223) for partially damaged houses and can be released in
the form of a cash grant, or as shelter materials depending on the situation most favorable to the
household. ESA block grants are released to requesting LGUs who report monthly on physical and
financial accomplishments to DRROO. However, shelter and livelihood diversification support is still
urgently needed for fisher folk unable or unwilling to leave unsafe areas along the coastline and
consequently remain ineligible for shelter support like ESA.

d.) Government and Humanitarian Cash Transfer Program Coordination

Considerable effort was made to coordinate the large number of CTP providers with the government
cash-based response programs - with some positive results. To facilitate inter-agency cooperation and
coordination with GoP on cash transfer response programming, UNOCHA deployed a Cash Coordinator
to the field on 24 November. An Inter-Cluster Coordination Operational Group (ICCOG) was established
in Manila to coordinate field level implementation and monitoring of all CTPs. The presence of a CTP
advisor was found to have been extremely useful in promoting coordinated CTPs.90 Alongside the
primary examples of WFP and UNICEF utilization of the 4Ps system, some other examples of good CTP
program cohesiveness are documented below.

DSWD and UNOCHA encouraged the humanitarian CTPs to leverage existing social protection and other
systems to increase coordination in their delivery, including:

 Disaster Affected Family Assistance Card (DAFAC)

DSWD utilize the Disaster Affected Family Assistance Card as the primary tool for monitoring the
receipt of all benefits by disaster affected households, including cash. The DAFAC is used by DSWD
in coordination with LGUs to register households affected by disasters and track the post disaster
relief services that they receive (a copy of a DAFAC is attached in Annex 3). It records basic
information pertaining to whether the beneficiary’s house was damaged (partially or totally), whether

27
 they are a 4Ps CCT beneficiary, whether they are vulnerable (older person, lactating mother, PWD),
estimated monthly income, etc. At the same time, the DAFAC records the assistance received by each
individual, ranging from food packs and shelter to SP programs including involvement in cash for
works programs in an effort to distribute relief evenly among beneficiaries.

Humanitarian agencies were encouraged by the GoP to adopt the DAFAC as their primary tool for
monitoring their programs in order to increase coordination among GoP and humanitarian programs.
However, some agencies expressed reservations about utilizing the DAFAC. Concerns primarily
centered on whether the number of households that may not have been issued a DAFAC – by staying
with relatives instead of evacuation centers, where DAFAC’s were distributed, for example -
rendering them ineligible for support. The extent to which there were issues with DAFAC coverage
remains unclear. However, a needs assessment survey undertaken by the Protection cluster did find
that “lack of documentation” (non-DAFAC specific) and “access to humanitarian services” were
listed as “severe protection problems” by 50 percent and 45 percent of those surveyed, respectively.

Regardless of potential DAFAC coverage issues, the DAFAC is a paper based recording system that
would benefit from digitization for improved information management on relief program
disbursement and stronger linkages between local and national level information systems.
Investments in technology for encoding the DAFAC data at the local level, with linkages to national
level unified databases, could significantly enhance the data management of response needs and
program disbursement. Going a step further, on site electronic registration of beneficiaries could
eliminate an enormous administrative burden in distributing and administering the paper based
DAFAC. Such a process was used in Pakistan to register households affected by large-scale flooding
in 2010 for the receipt of both relief and recovery cash transfer payments.91

 The Listahanan

The Listahanan is a national household registry used in the targeting of beneficiaries of the national
CCT program and other government anti-poverty and social programs. In 2011, the Listahanan
contained information on 11 million households (or 60% of all households in the Philippines). In this
way, the Listahanan is a valuable resource for locating households affected by a disaster. DRROO
utilize the Listahanan to create estimates of the number of households, including poor and vulnerable,
that will be affected by a disaster given its location/path. It is also a valuable resource that informs
Post Disaster Needs Assessments (PDNAs). However, while rich in household information, the
Listahanan is only updated every four years, rendering its information on location and poverty status
of households less accurate yearly. However, in 2015, a nationwide updating and expansion of
Listahanan is underway (it will include 75% of all households) and will provide more accurate
information on household poverty status by region. While issues regarding its infrequent updating
will remain, the Listahanan nevertheless provides a unique resource for information on affected
households and estimated needs.

The CWG also created a process for humanitarian agencies to coordinate with the Listahanan,
digitizing the information on their beneficiaries by submitting it to the National Household Targeting
Office (NHTO – manages the Listahanan) for verification and or inclusion into the database. This
process was intended to help digitize the DAFAC process of tracking which households were
receiving which benefits from humanitarian agencies, while simultaneously helping NHTO to widen
the Listahanan database further by enabling inclusion into the database of affected households that
were not at that time currently included (this process is pictured in Annex 4). This, in turn, helped
DSWD to meet its mandate to increase the 4Ps coverage by 20,000 more chronically poor households
affected by Typhoon Yolanda.

28
 The 4Ps Beneficiary Update List (BUL):

The BUL is a list of the 4Ps beneficiaries. Updated every two months by DSWD 4Ps staff, the BUL
contains information on poor households with children (as identified using the Listahanan and a
Proxy Means Test targeting method) that are also beneficiaries of the national 4Ps CCT program. The
information that is updated regularly pertains to eligibility conditions required by the 4Ps program. It
appears that a number of CTPs directed assistance directly to 4Ps households utilizing this up-to-date
beneficiary information.

 The 4Ps Spot Checks:

During the development of unified inter agency CTP monitoring tools, the GoP and DSWD
encouraged the use of the 4Ps’ spot check monitoring system for greater coordination and
comparability of outcomes. The National Advisory Committee (NAC) suggested that humanitarian
agencies implementing CTPs utilize the 4Ps spot check monitoring system, under the overall
guidance of the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC).92 Successive periodic updates by
UNOCHA of the overall cash coordination effort reported that CWG discussions had been undertaken
on using some of the 4Ps spot checks questions in their monitoring tools for greater comparability.

 The 4Ps Grievance Redress System (GRS)

The Grievance Redress System (GRS) is a component of the 4Ps CCT that allows anyone to direct
queries, clarifications, complaints, grievances, and appeals to the appropriate 4Ps GRS offices at the
community, provincial, regional and national levels. It has an investigation and verification
component, works in coordination with legal and law enforcement authorities, and is linked with an
MIS system that compiles the data to monitor the status of the grievances.93 UNOCHA noted that “the
GRS can serve as a vehicle for humanitarian agencies using the 4Ps targeting infrastructure to channel
feedback on the additional assistance being provided in the emergency response”. 94

The extent to which these recommendations were adopted by the inter-agency humanitarian response
remains unclear, and where / if they were utilized, specific details on lessons learned are yet to emerge.
Nevertheless, the potential value of a more unified overall CTP response facilitated by pre-existing SP
information systems is clear, and further research into the streamlining of these information systems into
future inter-agency response would add much value.

The use of these SP information systems for overall response coordination should continue to be explored
ex-ante the next disaster. Relevant CTP implementing agencies, UNOCHA, the CWG and DSWD should
continue to explore developing and systematizing the use of these and other pre-existing SP systems ex-
ante the next disaster. The Listahanan, BUL, spot checks and GRS are each robust information systems,
as evaluated during their delivery of the national CCT program.95 If leveraged correctly, their pre-existing
information and capacity could help to increase coordination of overall CTP response for future, large-
scale disasters.

Ultimately, post-Yolanda response documentation and reviews reveal that 1) there has been no rigorous
evaluation of the impact of the overall CTP response, and 2) there nevertheless appear to have been issues
in CTP coordination leading to coverage gaps and duplication. Cash Working Group memos reported a
number of emerging issues in the overall cash transfer programming during the response phase: “poor
coverage of inland barangays; critical levels of under coverage in Aklan and Antique; over focus in
Northern Iloilo compared to other areas in proximity such as Capiz; dispersal of activities suggest an
unbalanced response among the CTPs”.96 After humanitarian operations were concluded, the final inter-

29
cluster coordination group progress monitoring report concluded with regard to CTPs that, “given the
multitude of actors that provided cash assistance, and the limited oversight and cash coordination
structures that currently exist within international humanitarian architecture, it is not possible to
accurately report the total number of households and individuals assisted, or the total amount of cash
transferred to disaster- affected communities”. A UNOCHA evaluation of the response also concluded
that “it is clear that there is much more to be done to ensure that simultaneous use of cash in various
clusters provides maximum impact at household, community and local economy levels”.97

e.) Other cash‐based initiatives: Social Insurance

The Social Security Scheme (SSS) of the Philippines also made a significant contribution to the social
protection response to Typhoon Yolanda, providing assistance to eligible Yolanda affected households.
Within weeks of Yolanda, the SSS announced that members in disaster affected areas would be given a
moratorium on repayment of loans and that pension advances, salary loans and house repair loans would
be available to members on concessional terms (Box 2). The SSS made several disaster relief instruments
available to their members, including advanced release of pensions, preferential terms for salary loans,
easier house repair loan terms. As of March 2014 (one month before the claim period ended on April 30),
the SSS had granted more than PhP1.2 billion in salary loans and released PhP225 million worth of
advanced pensions. More than 80,000 members and pensioners received relief assistance through salary
loans and pension advances. A total of 13,746 pensioners received pension advances, 90 percent of
whom were Yolanda affected pensioners.

Box 2: The Disaster Responsive Social Insurance Instruments of SSS

Pension Advance
 This allows members to withdraw 3 months of pension payment in advance in regular times. For
Yolanda, victims were allowed to withdraw for up to 6 months in advance. Once removed, no
additional withdrawals during that period were allowed.
Salary Calamity Loan
 For first time borrowers, this is a salary credit up to 2 months of one’s regular salary. The regular
interest rate of 10 percent was reduced to 1 percent for victims of Yolanda
Salary Loan Entry Renewal Program (SLERP)
 If borrower has paid back at least 1 year of their regular salary loan can apply for a SLERP, but what
remains of their prior salary loan that they have yet to repay deducted from the amount provided via
the SLERP.
 Normally 10 percent interest rate. For Yolanda (seen as exceptional and will not happen again for
near future) interest rate reduced from 10 percent to 1 percent and regular 1 percent service fee
waived.
 Repayment period of 2 years, but with a 6 month moratorium for Yolanda victims.
House Repair Loan
 Members can borrow for up to about PHP 3 million (US$67,000). In calamity areas, the SSS
reduces the service fees and reduce the interest from 9 percent to 3 percent. The duration of
repayment ranges from 10 to 15 years)

The SSS post Yolanda response represents an innovative approach to what is effectively a cash based
disaster response from a social security agency. It has the potential to prevent households from falling
into poverty as a result of a natural disaster. However, it should be noted that given the high rates of

30
informality in the Philippines, especially in those regions impacted by Yolanda, the coverage of these
initiatives was limited.

3. Community Driven Development

The Yolanda experience has demonstrated the important role that CDD programs can play in the recovery
of poor and vulnerable people from disasters. Under the NCDD program and its contingent component,
developmental infrastructures selected by communities are being constructed in order to help in the
rebuilding and rehabilitation of communities in Yolanda affected areas. To date, there are 331 on-going
sub-projects in Regions IV, V, VI, VII and VIII amounting to PHP 553,745,511 (US$12.4 million). These
projects include, for example: 85 road projects (construction/improvement/concreting); 61 foot
path/access trails; 53 school buildings; 37 seawall/flood control/drainage/riprap/spillway; 35 water
systems; 20 health stations.

The National Community Driven Development (NCDD) program of DSWD (formerly KALAHI-CIDSS)
was set up in 2002 to alleviate rural poverty. The program aims to do this by providing resources to poor
rural municipalities for investment in public goods and by reviving local institutions for people’s
participation in governance. Participating communities follow very detailed participatory processes,
repeated three times in each participating municipality, to secure resources for investments in public
goods.98 The NCDD program is targeted at the poorest 25 percent of municipalities in 42 of the poorest
provinces in the Philippines. As of December 2010, the project had covered 4,583 barangays in 200
municipalities and supported 5,645 subprojects, worth PHP 5.7 billion; and benefiting about 1.26 million
households.99

The NCDD program is an effective channel or delivery mode for disaster recovery for a number of
reasons including its geographic coverage, community based participatory approach, pre-existing
networks of facilitators and volunteers, existing capacity and existing systems.100 The NCDDP has wide
geographical programmatic coverage, operating in the poorest municipalities, many of which are also
among the most vulnerable to disasters. Moreover, building on ongoing work, the program has a well-
established network of community facilitators and community volunteers on the ground. Area
Coordinating Teams can support municipal authorities in conducting rapid needs assessments and
initiating post disaster activities with communities. Financial management, procurement, facilitation,
monitoring and evaluation and structures for the disbursement of community grants are in place that can
be used in the disbursement of disaster response grants.101 However, the ordinary process of community
mobilization, planning, selection of subproject (the Community Empowerment Activity Cycle (CEAC)),
typically takes one year rendering it too cumbersome for response and recovery engagement.

A contingent component of the NCDD was designed to adjust and simplify procedures in the case of
disasters, triggered by the GoP’s declaration of a state of calamity. The NCDD program’s Disaster
Response Operations Sub-Manual details the ways in which program parameters are changed upon the
declaration of a state of calamity. Amongst these are, for example, modifications to the activities allowed
that otherwise are not permitted under regular NCDD rules, in order to “better address the recovery needs
of communities” (see Table 2). Additionally, basic operational procedures are modified to reduce hasten
the CEAC. These include the waiving of mandatory Local Government Counterpart Contributions;
modification of criteria for selecting sub-projects to favor the most affected barangays; funding
allocations be downloaded to projected in two tranches as opposed to one; etc.

31
Table 2: Activities that can be financed under NCDDP’s Contingent Component102
 Repair of rural and local roads  Collection and removal of technogenic debris
(building parts, mixed waste, timber) as well as uprooted
trees, debris from public infrastructure, public spaces and
agricultural areas, and its deposition in pre-existing waste
management facilities that are operating under national
licensing and regulations and comply with normal practice
in the country
 Backfill, reshaping and landscaping of areas  Repair of public buildings (including government
affected by erosion offices, meeting hall and places of religious worship –
latter TBC) and infrastructure (e.g. transmission lines,
street lighting, traffic signs, bus stops)
 Repair of riverbank protection systems and  Collection and removal of earth, mud and plant
earth-fill dykes up to 5m height if supervised by a debris from public infrastructure and spaces as well as
qualified engineer agricultural areas and its deposition, landscaping and
greening at appropriate locations.
 Repair/reconstruction of small bridges (san up  “Bunk houses” - allows for the construction/re-
to 15m) construction of damaged homes of the most affected
households.
 Construction of temporary bypass roads up to  Other similar undertaking such as temporary
500 m length, if not located in sensitive habitats and land
setting up of school, health and water facilities for access
acquisition follows the provisions of the main ESMF to basic needs and services of affected population
and bypasses are completely removed and the alignment including temporary housing for vulnerable population
restored to its original conditions once the need for their
such as children, lactating and pregnant women, elderly
service has expired. and persons with disabilities (PWD).
 Repair / reconstruction of communal irrigation
and water supply systems and of facilities that they have
been completed with project funding.
Source: DSWD, “National Community Driven Development Program: Disaster Response Operations Sub-
Manual”, p. 6

The NCDD is also one modality through which DSWD invests in disaster risk reduction. While this case
study has necessarily focused on disaster response, social protection and social development programs
can and should engage in ex-ante, disaster risk reduction (DRR) and climate change adaptation (CCA)
activities. The NCDD streamlines disaster risk reduction into its operations through the inclusion of DRR
focused sub-projects that can be selected by communities for community investment. Box 3 tells the story
of one such investment in Iloilo province and how this helped to save lives and reduce damages inflicted
by Yolanda. This is an innovative and seemingly effective use of CDD for DRR.

32
Box 3: NCDD and disaster risk reduction

Through the NCDD, before a disaster, it is possible for communities to decide to undertake project activities
that are aimed at reducing the risk of disasters for their community. The story of Barangay Mangorocoro, (Ajuy
municipality, Iloilo province) illustrates this, and how the community’s decision to invest in a sea wall through
the NCDDP spared it from the worst effects of Yolanda:

“Ajuy was one of the municipalities in Iloilo that was hit hard by the super typhoon [Yolanda], affecting 11,510
households, 7,064 of which totally lost their homes because of the disaster. Prior to the construction of the sea wall, current
Barangay Captain Conrado Fernandez said that it was normal for the elementary school campus, where an NCDDP school
building now stands, to be flooded during high tide, even in normal weather.

It was the constant fear of being flooded that pushed the residents of Brgy. Mangorocoro to lobby for the construction of a
sea wall during an NCDDP assembly. They were able to complete the construction of the sea wall in 2010. When presented
with another opportunity by the NCDDP, they upgraded their sea wall, having it cemented to make it even more durable to
better protect them from harm.

It was this foresight that protected them from experiencing the full impact of Yolanda. While some flooding occurred in
Barangy Mangorocoro at the height of the typhoon, their village did not suffer from any casualties because the sea wall
protected them from the rising waters. Simon Hagurin, one of the senior citizens in Brgy. Mangorocoro who served as a
volunteer in NCDDP, said that he did not want to think about what would have happened to their village had the sea wall
not been constructed. This was echoed by Ajuy Mayor Juancho Alvarez, who said, “if the sea wall had not been there,
Brgy. Mangoroco would have been washed out.”

(See: “DSWD’s Kalahi-CIDSS saved Iloilo town from ‘Yolanda’”, February 2014 http://www.dswd.gov.ph/2014/02/dswds-kalahi-cidss-
saved-iloilo-town-from-yolanda/#sthash.4l8Fwrcy.dpuf)

4. Core Shelter Assistance Program (CSAP)

The broader approach of DSWD to the provision of permanent safe housing for the poor has been
demonstrated to be well aligned with ‘build back better’ principles, saving people’s property and offering
a model for post-Yolanda housing reconstruction. Through DSWD’s ongoing Core Shelter Assistance
Program (CSAP), poor households may receive a standardized two-room structure that is built to
withstand 220 kmph wind-speeds and earthquakes of up to intensity 4 on the Richter scale. As a testament
to the potential resilience of the CSAP units, many previously built units located along Yolanda’s path
were found to still be standing in the aftermath of the storm. A Municipal Social Welfare and
Development Officer stated that “The core shelter units built through the CSAP of DSWD are still
standing even after the mighty force of Typhoon Yolanda. … all 80 units built in 1991, 2000 and 2010 in
Barangays Cansuso, San Marcelino, San Sebastian, and San Guillermo remain standing.”103 DSWD
reported that around 10,733 CSAP units are currently under construction in Regions IV V VII and VIII,
with a budget of PHP715.3 million.104

33
6. Lessons Learned and Recommendations

Given its exposure and vulnerability to natural disasters, the Philippines has developed an advanced
disaster risk management framework with strong linkages to social protection. The Philippine’s historical
experience of preparing for and responding to frequent disasters has led to the institutionalization of a
highly sophisticated disaster risk management framework. This has meant that the GoP is strongly
positioned to manage the frequent natural disasters that the country faces on a regular basis. Positioned
prominently within this framework is the Department of Social Welfare and Development a leading
government agency for social welfare and assistance programs. Consequently, a number of such programs
are implemented by DSWD in post-disaster response. Moreover, DSWD has made efforts to imbed the
disaster management and response elements into its regular programs, such as its flagship conditional
cash transfer program, a community driven development program and a suite of interventions under a
sustainable livelihood program. DSWD has adopted an approach that considers poverty alleviation and
reduction programs as disaster reliance building programs, as well; and, in turn, disaster resilience
programs as poverty reduction programs (getting people out of poverty makes them more resilient to
disasters – people more resilient to disaster are also more resilient to poverty).

Indeed, the Philippines case demonstrates that social protection should feature prominently in a country’s
overall DRM framework in order to play an effective role in disaster response. That DSWD is a leading
agency for disaster response has created natural synergies between the Department’s functioning and
mission to “to develop, implement and coordinate social protection and poverty reduction solutions for
and with the poor, vulnerable and disadvantaged” with the specific needs of those affected by disasters
who are also often the poorest and most vulnerable. Such a prominent positioning in the government’s
DRM framework is rare in many countries where social welfare ministries or departments can be poorly
integrated and consequently play a bit-part role in disaster response. Given the plethora of activities
delivered in response to Yolanda, it is clear that the GoP and DSWD are a global leader in post-disaster
social protection.

Special financial arrangements for quick liquidity to response programs, such as the Quick Response
Fund, are necessary to deliver response services in a timely and efficient fashion. Accessing finance to
fund relief programs through pre-established budget lines in a timely fashion is a necessity post-disaster,
when the affected may be slipping into destitution by the hour. The Philippines recognized that response
activities of the sort carried out by DSWD require immediate liquidity to be delivered rapidly, and that
this could not be achieved through the regular calamity fund / National Disaster Risk Reduction and
Management Fund (NDRRMF) due to the lengthy administrative processes required to release funding.
The Quick Response Fund was created to address this issue through dedicated reserves for response
activities. Nevertheless, the specific case of Yolanda highlighted problems in sourcing financing from
even the QRF in a timely fashion. Yolanda also raised questions as to the adequacy of the QRF amount
for a fiscal year’s worth of disasters, because while the QRF may be replenished once emptied, this is also
a lengthy process.

During the response phase of a large-scale natural disaster like Yolanda, coordination between the
government, the humanitarian community and their respective response programs is crucial. Alongside
the myriad of programs delivered by DSWD during the response phase, a full-scale humanitarian
response was activated. Many of the programs delivered by the government and the humanitarian
community were the same in nature – from in-kind food and non-food relief items to conditional and
unconditional cash transfer programs. In the case of Yolanda, the Philippines’ adoption of the cluster

34
system seemingly significantly aided the coordination of activities along sectoral lines. Where DSWD
were concerned, the cluster system allowed the Department to coordinate activities under the shelter,
food, camp coordination and camp management/NFI and protection sectors with some notable successes.
However, post response evaluations by the likes of Oxfam and ISAC stressed that in the case of large-
scale disasters, DSWD’s leadership of four separate clusters, alongside the delivery of GoP relief, during
the response phase left DSWD overstretched by such a large institutional burden. The DSWD’s adoption
of the National Disaster Response Plan (NDRP) post Yolanda has integrated lessons learned from
Yolanda pertaining to more efficient response, especially with regard to a closer alignment of disaster
response functions with the UN cluster system.

The GoP demonstrated flexibility in adapting its National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan
in response to Yolanda, affording social protection a prominent place in recovery and rehabilitation.
Reacting to the unprecedented severity of the typhoon and the devastation it has caused in affected areas,
and the problems in providing immediate and coordinated response during the relief phase, the GoP
created a special temporary executive body to manage recovery and rehabilitation. The Office of the
Presidential Assistant for Recovery and Rehabilitation (OPARR) afforded a prominent place to social
protection in the overall recovery and rehabilitation effort. The OPARR was recently (mid-2015)
disbanded and the Government has initiated a review of its disaster response and management framework
and policies and programs with a view of learning from the Yolanda lessons.

Crucially, as far as this case study goes, DSWD employed a number of social protection and social
welfare programs in responding to Yolanda. The overall programming described in the preceding section
of this report highlight the potential for an empowered social welfare department to be on the front lines
of disaster response and disaster risk management. The case study has shed light on the impressive
number of programs and services that DSWD deliver across the post disaster timeline of response,
recovery and reconstruction. Primarily, these programs were in the form of in-kind, cash-based,
community driven, and shelter based interventions.

More and better monitoring and evaluation of SP disaster response programs and their impacts needs to
be undertaken for program development and informed recommendations. In evaluating the programs
delivered by DSWD in response to Yolanda it is clear that many of the best practices from this and other
experiences have not been captured, and that little monitoring and evaluation of disaster-responsive
programs was undertaken, especially during the response phase. During the relief phase of any disaster,
moral obligations to deliver to those in dire need undermine methodical monitoring and evaluation of
programs. This has caused problems for the humanitarian community at large with regard to evidence
based policy adjustments for efficiency gains in their programming. As a result, in the case of Yolanda, it
is difficult to assess the true impact of the programs and make informed recommendation for program
improvement. With an already strong track record in M&E among its regular programs such as the 4Ps,
there would be much value to be had in extending these processes to post-disaster SP programming,
particularly with regard to quantifying the impacts of the programs on affected household’s consumption.

The experience of using the 4Ps conditional cash transfer program in the aftermath of Yolanda highlights
the value of having a robust, national cash transfer program in place before a disaster. The presence of the
4Ps - a well-established, credible and well-targeted social protection program - provided a vehicle for the
delivery of cash transfers directly to affected beneficiaries who were already pre-targeted and enrolled.
The adoption of measures in advance of a disaster that remove the need for compliance to the program’s
regular conditions for beneficiaries affected by disasters also represents a best practice, adapting the
functioning of the program to the realities on the ground where conditions pertaining to school and health
facility attendance cannot be met.

35
The WFP and UNICEF’s utilization of the 4Ps program to deliver their cash grants as additional ‘top-ups’
to 4Ps beneficiaries was pragmatic and is replicable. Noting the value of using a delivery system such as
the 4Ps for delivery of assistance to beneficiaries that were pre-targeted as poor and vulnerable, with pre-
built grievance, monitoring and evaluation systems, the WFP and UNICEF decided to deliver their cash
grants through the 4Ps. This effectively ‘scaled-up’ the 4Ps by delivering increased grant amounts to 4Ps
beneficiaries in a time of increased need. Moreover, delivering an increased share of humanitarian cash
transfer programming through the 4Ps effectively increased cash transfer coordination, as well as
ownership of the overall response by the government, and the timeliness of delivery. Seemingly in tacit
acknowledgement of these efficiency gains, WFP again utilized the 4Ps to deliver cash top-ups to 4Ps
beneficiaries after Typhoon Ruby (Hagupit) in 2014.105

Reflecting on the lessons learned from Yolanda, and in particular after the poverty incidence increased in
2014, part of which is attributed to the adverse effects of the disaster, the government realized that an
emergency cash transfer program delivered to all affected households would have been an effective tool
in mitigating this poverty impact. Therefore, a more comprehensive, scalable emergency cash transfer
program is needed. This program can replace some of DSWD’s substantial burden of in-kind / food pack
delivery right after the relief and early recovery phases are over. The provision of food during the relief
phase will always be an urgent necessity. However, once this life-saving need has been met, typically
within the first month, the continued provision of food packs represents a sizeable administrative burden,
and one that may not align fully with the changing needs of the affected, needs that have moved beyond
survival. Increased capacity to deliver cash based assistance to households at this juncture would reduce
the standing capacity of DSWD to deliver food while offering poor households increased agency to begin
to re-accumulate assets, fix their households, etc. DSWD with other relevant policy making and program
development government agencies, such as the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), the
Department of Budget (DBM), etc. is currently exploring the potential of introducing such a program in
the Philippines.

The GoP / DSWD could integrate this scalable emergency cash transfer with risk financing mechanisms
to institutionalize the scaling up of grant amounts to affected households. The top up grants of UNICEF
and WFP illustrated how the 4Ps grants could be ‘scaled up’ to provide increased assistance to 4Ps
beneficiaries in an acute time of need. This ‘scaling-up’ process could be institutionalized within DSWD.
There are a number of risk financing mechanisms that could allow DSWD to fund the grant top-ups
themselves in times of disaster, including DSWD specific contingent financing or through linkages to the
broader GoP risk financing strategy, including, for example, a Catastrophic Draw-Down Option (CAT
DDO). In this way, DoF would be able to utilize a proven delivery mechanism to better cover household
level risk, a level of risk that it is not yet managing, delivering additional assistance directly to those most
in need. The development of such a budget line would require close cooperation, coordination and
agreement between DSWD, the Department of Finance (DoF) and the Department of Budget
Management (DBM).

Regardless of whether DSWD introduces an emergency cash transfer program, DSWD and other
government agencies should work in collaboration with the relevant humanitarian agencies to develop
pre-existing SP information systems for better coordination, ahead of the next disaster. During the
Yolanda response, DSWD encouraged humanitarian agencies to utilize a number of its pre-existing SP
systems and capacity to help coordinate the overall response. These included the national household
targeting system - Listahanan / CCT Beneficiary Lists for program targeting and the Grievance Redress
System and the Spot Checks monitoring of the CCT delivery system. The extent to which these SP
systems were utilized in response to Yolanda by the humanitarian agencies remains unclear, but the value
of leveraging existing capacity for coordinated response is clear, and was articulated repeatedly by both
DSWD and humanitarian agencies during the Yolanda response. In that regard, these parties should

36
continue to explore how they can utilize these SP systems for a more coordinated response, in advance of
the next disaster.

The CFW program is a useful vehicle for getting cash to beneficiaries through participant self-
selection/targeting with the dual benefit of aiding response activities and community rehabilitation. That
being said, it seems that the CFW was relatively small-scale post-Yolanda and that the program could be
significantly expanded in the case of future, large-scale disasters where concerns over lost livelihoods and
a lack of income generating activities reportedly dominate among the affected. However, it should be
noted that the CFW program was identified in some quarters as having a distortionary effect on what
remained of local labor markets after Yolanda, with some government and private sector employees
electing to participate in the program instead of their regular jobs either because their employer paid
beneath the minimum wage, or because the CFW work was seen as easier than the work of their regular
jobs with a similar return. As such, CFW is not a silver bullet, and where beneficiary pay is concerned
there is a clear policy trade-off requiring careful consideration.

The Cash for Building Livelihoods Assets (CBLA) program is an innovative extension of the CFW that
addresses longer-term livelihood recovery needs. While CFW in the response phase fills an immediate
need, the work undertaken is rudimentary and disconnected from longer-term livelihood resumption.
CBLA is more directly geared to the restoration of lost livelihoods, key to recovery and rehabilitation.
Nevertheless, SLP staff reported that the program would likely reach only 16.8 percent of total affected
households due to the SLPs relatively limited capacity to deliver, indicating significant potential for the
CBLA to be expanded for future disasters.

The use of the National Community Driven Development (NCDD) program for recovery and
rehabilitation represents another best practice. CDD programs like the NCDD allow affected communities
to be intimately involved in the planning processes that shape the rebuilding of their communities. This
process is empowering at a time when communities are at their most disempowered and may not always
be given adequate voice in the rebuilding of their lost infrastructure and livelihoods. DSWD built into the
NCDD a disaster-contingent component, before Yolanda struck, which allowed it to adjust and simplify
procedures for disaster response, shortening, for example, the length of time to initiate a project through
the Community Empowerment Activity Cycle that usually takes a year to process. Such forward thinking
and preparedness is commendable and allowed the NCCD to react quickly to Yolanda with pre-arranged
procedures being triggered as opposed to hastily designed and applied after a disaster like Yolanda hits.

Lastly, alongside the disaster response activities detailed in this case study, DSWD has also applied SP
programs to innovatively address preparedness, disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation
concerns – though more could be done in this regard in the future. As described previously, DSWD
engages in these areas primarily through the family development sessions (FDS) of the 4Ps, NCDD
disaster risk reduction oriented sub-projects and the core shelter assistance program (CSAP) that both
helps in the reconstruction effort after a disaster and also creates resilient housing for the next disaster.
These are each excellent initiatives. In closing, however, it should be noted that SP programs have been
found to be useful for adaptation and mitigation activities, particularly with regard to livelihood
diversification and adaptation. For example, this has been the case in Ethiopia where the PSNP has helped
to combat soil erosion, increase water security and diversify livelihoods.106 While DSWD is prominently
mandated to lead disaster response, over time, greater SP investments in adaptation and mitigation could
directly reduce the caseload of response by addressing structural vulnerabilities among poor households
and communities directly at their source.

37
Annex
ANNEX 1: The Government of the Philippines’ Cluster Leads and non-Government Co-Leads

38
ANNEX 2: Maps of Vulnerability to Climate Change and Natural Hazards in the Philippines

39
40
41
42
43
ANNEX 3: Copy of the Disaster Affected Family Assistance Card (DAFAC)

44
ANNEX 4: Process diagram of proposed humanitarian coordination with Listahanan

45
END NOTES

1 United Nations University and the Institute for Environmental and Human Security/Alliance Development Works, “World Risk
Index”, 2014.
2 Verisk Maplecroft, “Climate Change Vulnerability Index, 2015” <http://maplecroft.com/portfolio/new-

analysis/2014/10/29/climate-change-and-lack-food-security-multiply-risks-conflict-and-civil-unrest-32-countries-maplecroft/>
[accessed: April 2015]
3 Verisk Maplecroft, “Natural Hazards Risk Atlas, 2015” < https://maplecroft.com/portfolio/new-analysis/2015/03/04/56-100-

cities-most-exposed-natural-hazards-found-key-economies-philippines-japan-china-bangladesh-verisk-maplecroft/> [accessed:
April 2015]
4 The World Bank, “Climate Change Adaptation in Coastal Communities: A Documentation of Project Experience”, 2012, p. 1
5 World Bank (2014), Country Partnership Strategy for the Republic of the Philippines for the Period FY2015-2018, p 4

6 Philippines Statistical Authority, “Percentage distribution of employed persons by industry, occupation, class of worker and
hours worked in a week, Philippines”, annual estimates based on the labor force survey (LFS), 2014”
<https://psa.gov.ph/sites/default/files/attachments/hsd/pressrelease/table%201.pdf> [Accessed: august 2015]
7 The World Bank, “Social Protection and Labor Strategy, 2012-2022: Resilience, Equity and Opportunity”, 2012, p. xi
8 United Nations Institute for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), “Global Assessment Report (GAR) on Disaster Risk

Reduction, 2015: Making Development Sustainable – the Future of Disaster Risk Management”, 2015, p. 165
9 UNISDR, “GAR 2015”, 2015, p. 49
10 Government of the Philippines, “Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda: Build Back Better”, 2013, p. 3
11 DSWD, “Response and Early Recovery Updates”, April 2014 http://www.fo8.dswd.gov.ph/2014/04/response-and-early-

recovery-updates-typhoon-yolanda/ [accessed: April 2015]

12 See: DSWD, “DSWD, WFP provide cash assistance to 6,700 families affected by Hagupit” ,

http://www.dswd.gov.ph/2015/02/dswd-wfp-provide-cash-assistance-to-6717-families-affected-by-hagupit/>, February 2015

[accessed: April 2015]
13 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), “Final Periodic Monitoring Report: Typhoon

Haiyan”, 2014, p. 34
14 Ibid, p. 34
15 Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation Steering Group, “IASC Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan

Response”, 2014, p. ix
16 UNU et al, “World Risk Index, 2014.”
17 Verisk Maplecroft, “Climate Change Vulnerability Index, 2015”
18 Verisk Maplecroft, “Natural Hazards Risk Atlas, 2015”
19 The World Bank, “Climate Change Adaptation in Coastal Communities: A Documentation of Project Experience”, 2012, p. 1
20 Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), “Vulnerability, Risk Reduction and Adaptation to Climate

Change: Philippines country profile”, 2011, p. 5

21 UNISDR, “GAR, 2015”, p. 67
22 GFDRR, “Philippines Country Program Update”, May 2014
23 United States Geological Survey (USGS), “Earth Quake Glossary – Ring of Fire” <

http://earthquake.usgs.gov/learn/glossary/?termID=150> [Accessed: 03/22/2015]

24 D. Guha-Sapir, R. Below, Ph. Hoyois - EM-DAT: International Disaster Database – www.emdat.be – Université Catholique de

Louvain – Brussels – Belgium.

25 Antilla-Hughes and S Shiang, “Destruction, Investment, and Death: Economic and Human Losses Following Environmental

Disaster”, 2013, p. 5
26 Ibid, p. 30
27 Ibid, p. 30
28Government of the Philippines et al, “Typhoon Ondoy and Pepeng: Post Disaster Needs Assessment”, 2009, p. 49
29 World Bank and the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC), “Natural Disaster Risk Management in the Philippines:

Enhancing Poverty Alleviation Through Disaster Reduction”, 2005, p. 13

30 World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI)
31 World Population Report (2014), <http://worldpopulationreview.com/world-cities/manila-population/> [Accessed: April

2015]
32 World Bank, Philippines Country Partnership Strategy FY 2015-2018, pp 2-3.
33 World Bank, “Getting a Grip on Climate Change in the Philippines”, 2013, p.10.
34 GoP et al, “Philippines Typhoons Ondoy and Pepeng: Post Disaster Needs Assessment” 2009, p. 52
35 World Bank and the NDCC, “Natural Disaster Risk Management in the Philippines: Enhancing Poverty Alleviation Through

Disaster Reduction”, 2005, p. v

36 World Bank, “Country Partnership Strategy for the Republic of the Philippines for the Period FY2015-2018”, p 5
37 Ibid, p 6
38 Government of the Philippines et al, “Typhoon Ondoy and Pepeng: Post Disaster Needs Assessment”, 2009, p. 48

46
39 World Bank, “Getting a Grip on Climate Change in the Philippines”, 2013, p 11
40 UNISDR, “GAR, 2015”, p.165
41 GoP, “Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (RAY): Build Back Better”, 2013, p. 3
42 Ibid, p 5
43 UNISDR, “GAR 2015”, 2015, p. 49
44 Ibid, p. 166
45 GoP, “Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda: Build Back Better”, 2013, p. 3
46
Mimaropa, Bicol, Western Visayas, Central Visayas, Eastern Visayas and Caraga
47 World Bank, “Philippine Economic Update: Pursuing Inclusive Growth Through Sustainable Reconstruction and Job
Creation”, March 2014, p 6
48 GoP, “RAY: Build Back Better”, 2013, p. 16
49 World Bank, “Philippine Economic Update”, March 2014, p 14
50 Reliefweb, REACH initiative, “Philippines: Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan) Distance from Typhoon Path and Poverty Rate (09

November)” < http://reliefweb.int/map/philippines/philippines-typhoon-yolanda-haiyan-distance-typhoon-path-and-poverty-

rate-09>
51 Figure adapted from GoP, National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC),“National Disaster Risk

Reduction and Management Plan (NDRRMP), 2011-2028”, 2011

52 NDRRMC, “Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act 10121”, 2010, p.14
53 NDRRMC, “NDRRMP”, p. 27
54 Ibid.
55 GoP, “Republic Act, 10121” or “Philippines’ Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act (PDRRM)”, 2010, p. 23
56 DSWD Memorandum Circular, No. 25 (Series of 2012), “Amendment to M.C. No. 1, Series of 2012, Entitled, “re-clustering of

Offices, Bureaus, Services and Units at the DSWD Central Office”

57 GoP, “RA1021”, 2010, p. 27
58 See for example GoP, Commission on Audit (COA), “Report on the Audit of Typhoon Yolanda Relief Operations”, 2014, pp.

30 - 49
59 National Disaster Coordinating Council, Memorandum Circular, No. 5 (series of 2007), “Institutionalizing the Cluster

Approach in the Philippine Disaster Management System…”, 2007

60 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), “Philippines: Humanitarian coordination

architecture (diagram)”
<http://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/PHL_humanitarian_coord_architecture.pdf>
61 Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation Steering Group, “IASC Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan

Response”, 2014, p. 44
62 Ibid, p. 7
63 GoP, Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), “National Disaster Response Plan (NDRP), 2014, p. 12
64
Ibid, p.11
65 GoP, Department of Finance (DoF), “P52-B Released to Yolanda Victims Since 2013:DBM”

<http://www.dof.gov.ph/?p=10810> Accessed: April 2015]

66 GoP, Commission on Audit (COA), “Report on the Audit of Typhoon Yolanda Relief Operations”, 2014, p. 35
67 Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), “Philippines: Typhoon Yolanda Ongoing Recovery: Recovery

framework Case Study”, 2014, p. 9

68 Ibid.
69 GoP, Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (OPARR), “Yolanda Comprehensive Rehabilitation

and Recovery Plan (CRRP), 2014, p. 42

70 Ibid, p. 48
71 Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation Steering Group, “IASC Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan

Response”, 2014, p. 49
72 GoP, Commission on Audit (COA), “Report on the Audit of Typhoon Yolanda Relief Operations”, 2014, pp. 30 - 49
73 UNOCHA “Typhoon Yolanda Strategic Response Plan”, 2013, p. 43
74 Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation Steering Group, “IASC Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan

Response”, 2014, p. 52
75 DSWD, Memorandum Circular No 24, (series of 2014) “Guidelines for the Implementation of Emergency Shelter Assistance

(ESA) Project for Families with Partially and totally Damaged Houses due to Typhoon Yolanda”, Memorandum Circular No
24, 2014, p. 1
76DSWD, “From Tents to Safer Shelters for Yolanda Survivors is Government’s Priority”

<http://www.dswd.gov.ph/2014/06/from-tents-to-safer-shelters-for-yolanda-survivors-is-governments-priority-2/> [Accessed:
April 2015]
77 UNOCHA, “Final Periodic Monitoring Report: Typhoon Haiyan”, 2014, p. 34
78 Ibid.
79 Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation Steering Group, “IASC Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan

Response”, 2014, p. ix

47
80 UNOCHA, “Cash Coordination Update: Response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda)”, January 2014, p. 3
81 GoP, DSWD, “Response and Early Recovery Updates”, April 2014 <http://www.fo8.dswd.gov.ph/2014/04/response-and-
early-recovery-updates-typhoon-yolanda/> [Accessed: April 2015]
82 DSWD and the World Food Program (WFP), Memorandum of Agreement, “Emergency Cash Transfer Top-Up Project for

Typhoon Affected Populations in 4Ps Areas”

83 DSWD and UNICEF, Memorandum of Agreement, “Emergency Unconditional Cash Transfer for Typhoon Affected

Population of Eastern Samar”, 2014

84 Ibid.
85 DSWD and UNICEF, “Emergency Cash Transfer: Narrative report for the July – September 2014 implementation”, 2014
86 DSWD, “Guidelines for the implementation of the cash for work project”, Administrative Order 15, 2008

88 Protection Cluster, “Protection Needs Assessment: Final results and Analysis”, May 2014
89 DSWD, “Rebuilding from ground zero: DSWD provides livelihood assistance for Yolanda survivors”
<http://www.dswd.gov.ph/2014/04/rebuilding-from-ground-zero-dswd-provides-livelihood-assistance-for-yolanda-survivors/>
[Accessed: April 2015]
90 Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation Steering Group, “IASC Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan

Response”, 2014, p. 55
91 See, for example, World Bank, “Pakistan’s Citizens Damage Compensation Program (CDCP): Case Study”, 2013
92 GoP, National Advisory Committee (NAC), Minutes: “Special Meeting of the NAC: Humanitarian Agencies’ Cash Transfer

Programming for Typhoon Haiyan Survivors”, 11 December 2013

93 UNOCHA, “Cash Coordination Update: Response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda)”, January 2014
94 UNOCHA, “Cash Coordination Update: Response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda)”, January 2014
95 See, for example: World Bank, “Philippines Conditional Cash Transfer Program, Impact Evaluation 2012”, 2013
96 Cash Working Group (CWG), Minutes: “Cash Transfer Working group Meeting, 17 March 2014”

<http://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/Rregion6%20CTWGMinutes%20of%20March%2017%2
0CTWG.pdf> [Accessed: April 2015]
97 Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation Steering Group, “IASC Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan

Response”, 2014, p. 55
98 Ibid.
99 World Bank, “Impact Evaluation KALAHI-CIDSS: Final Survey”, May 2011, p. 7
100 DSWD, “National Community Driven Development Program: Disaster Response Operations Sub-Manual”, p. 6
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid, p. 15
103 GoP, DSWD “DSWD Core Houses Survive Yolanda”, May 2014, < http://www.fo8.dswd.gov.ph/2014/05/dswd-core-houses-

survive-yolanda-2/> [accessed: April 2015]

104 GoP, Official Gazette, “Response and early recovery updates: 6 months after Yolanda”

<http://www.gov.ph/2014/05/08/response-and-early-recovery-updates-6-months-after-yolanda/> [Accessed: April 2015]

105 GoP, DSWD, “DSWD, WFP provide cash assistance to 6,700 families affected by Hagupit” ,

http://www.dswd.gov.ph/2015/02/dswd-wfp-provide-cash-assistance-to-6717-families-affected-by-hagupit/>, February 2015

106 See, World Bank, “Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP): Integrating Disaster and Climate Risk Management”,

2013

48