Harold A Linstone Multiple Perspective Theory
Harold A Linstone Multiple Perspective Theory
Harold A Linstone Multiple Perspective Theory
ABSTRACT
In the area of sociotechnological systems the science/technology based paradigms of analysis haver serious
limitations. Building on the work of Graham Allison, we explore the use of multiple perspectives to develop
greater insights; specifically, an organizational/societal perspective and a personal/individual perspective aug-
ment the conventional “technical” perspective. Application of the three perspectives to several technology
assessments and other complex decision areas indicates that the concept can effectively narrow the gap between
model and reality for decision making.
Section I describes the background leading to the study and Section II focuses on the limitations of the
traditional perspective. Section III develops the multiple perspectives and Section IV summarizes illustrations
and applications to date. The concluding section (V) offers guidelines to assist assessors, forecasters, policy
analysts, and other users.
Section I. Introduction
The origin of this research can be traced to the principal investigator’s “Confessions
of a Forecaster” [31:3-121. We recall that the fifties had seen impressive successes in
operations research and systems analysis: linear programming and inventory optimization
as management aids, nuclear war strategy (deterrence, second strike) in military planning.
Researchers developed game theory and decision analysis; by the sixties cost-benefit
calculations and the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) became de rigueur
among Washington cognoscenti. The computer was the ideal tool and its rapid spread had a
‘DR. LINSTONE was the Principal Investigator. He is Director of the Futures Research Institute and
University Professor, Portland State University. The Core Team of the project included:
DR. ARNOLD J. MELTSNER, Deputy Principal Investigator, Professor at the Graduate School of Public
Policy, University of California, Berkeley;
DR. MARVIN ADELSON, Professor at the Graduate School of Architecture and Urban Planning, Univer-
sity of California, Los Angeles;
DR. ARNOLD MYSIOR of Mysior-Runion and Associates, Washington, D.C.;
DR. LINDA UMBDENSTOCK, Planner, Los Angeles County Hospital;
DR. BRUCE CLARY, Assistant Professor of Public Administration, Portland State University;
DR. DONNA WAGNER, Assistant Professor, University of Bridgeport;
DR. JACK SHUMAN, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Rockville, MD.
The full report is indicated in this paper as Ref. 34 and is based in part upon research supported by the National
Science Foundation under Grant No. PRA 7910020. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recom-
mendations expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
National Science Foundation.
seductive effect: computer modeling became a major occupation. The great expectations
placed on systems analysis reached their pinnacle in 1967 when Max Ways wrote in
Fortune’s survey “The Road to 1977”:
The further advance of this new style [systems analysis] is the most significant prediction that can be made
about the next ten years. By 1977 this new way of dealing with the future will be recognized at home and
abroad as a salient American characteristic. 1571
It was about the same time that the idea of technology assessment (TA) took root.
Congressman Emilio Q. Daddario introduced H.R. 6698 in the Congress on March 7,
1967. The bill was designed to stimulate discussions to formalize the concept of a priori
assessment of the impact of technology, thus strengthening the legislative process in the
area of technology policy.
Ten years later bleak reality had displaced the euphoria about systems analysis in
general and technology assessment in particular. Ida Hoos writes:
In our technological era, the dominant paradigm is so technically oriented that most of our problems are
defined as technical in nature and assigned the same treatment4octoring by systems analysts. The
“experts” are methodological Merlins. Technology assessments are conducted by latter-day intellec-
tual condortieri, the brains-for-hire.
Most of the technology assessments I have reviewed must be taken with a large measure of
skepticism lest they lead us to regrettable, if not disastrous, conclusions. [23]
There is still only lip service paid to any but “rational” or traditional “systems analysis” approaches and
models in addressing the TA process. [32: I321
It should be emphasized that the concept of multiple perspectives need not be con-
fined to applications in the area of technology assessment. As the literature review [34:
Table 21 shows, the value of similar multiple perspectives has been demonstrated in other
contexts (e.g., understanding the Cuban missile crisis, management of policy modeling in
public sector bureaucracies). The illustrations in this study also range beyond TA.2 The
factors which applications to date have in common are:
Thus social impact assessment (SIA), environmental impact statements (EIS), corpo-
rate planning, venture analysis, and the design or management of complex systems which
are not purely technological, offer significant opportunities for the introduction of
multiple perspectives.
a. The definition of problems abstracted from the world around us and the implicit
assumption that problems can be solved;
b. Optimization or the search for a best solution;
C. Reductionism, i.e., study of a system in terms of a very limited number of
elements (or variables) and the interactions among them;
d. Reliance on data and models, and combinations thereof, as modes of inquiry;
e. Quantification of information;
f. Objectivity, the assumption that the scientist is an unbiased observer outside of
the system he or she is studying, i.e., truth is observer-invariant;
g. A tendency to ignore the individual in the search for generality, supported by a
trend of reductionism and quantification (e.g., use of averages) as well as objec-
tivity;
h. Time movement seen as linear, i.e., at a universally accepted pace reckoned by
precise physical measurement.
‘See Section IV
278 HAROLD A. LINSTONE ET AL
determine decisions, e.g., the alternative with the highest calculated effectiveness is
selected. Figure la selectively summarizes the general approach.
The success of this mode of thought and its paradigms has led very naturally to
increasing pressure to extend its use beyond science and technology, i.e., society and all
its systems. The attitude is typified by the planning, programming, and budgeting drive in
the 1960s and the popularity of econometric models in the 1970s. As a Dean of the School
of Electrical Engineering at MIT put it: “I doubt if there is any such thing as an urban
crisis, but if there were MIT could lick it in the same way we handled the Second World
War.” [.53a:48] Organizations become cybernetic systems, utility theory determines pref-
erences, social benefits are synthesized, decision analysis provides the key to decision
making, policy analysis selects strategies. There is a mathematical theory of war and, of
course, “management science.” Hugh Miser, in his recent state-of-the-art review of
systems analysis and operations research for the centennial issue of Science, recalls
Herbert Simon’s description of systems analysis as a “celebration of human rationality”
and concludes:
The challenge is to enlarge this celebration to include the rational management of all of society’s systems
and their problems. [40: 1461
Figure lb portrays the situation. Without question the technical perspective is ideal for
well-structured problems in physical science and technology. Why, then, is there deep
trouble in relying on it in ill-structured areas such as technology assessment?
To answer this question we examine the eight paradigms listed above in more detail.
“A complex problem P usually has several solution concepts S; each of these leads to several new problems
P, etc. In other words we have a tree/branch structure with levels of P and S succeeding each other indefinitely
into the future. Some Ps are of the diminishing ripple type, some have an amplifying effect (“the cure is worse
than the illness”).
THE MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVE CONCEPT 279
a.
on well-structured technological
sys terns
b.
on complex, ill-structured systems
(technological-social-individual)
ORGANIZATIONS
one. They do not manage themselves by manacling themselves.” Evolution shows that
their safe-fail strategy is eminently suited to a world which is inherently unpredictable at
certain times.
REDUCTIONISM
Von Foerster’s First Law expresses the reductionist process rather well:
The more complex the problem which is being ignored, the greater are the chances for fame and success.
1171
4The dictionary tells us that to managemeans “to control or to direct the use of.” As Von Foerster notes,
this implies that management reduces the degrees of freedom of the technological system being managed. In
probing more deeply, it is ominous to find that “manage” is related to the word “manacle, a device for
confining the hands, usually consisting of two metal rings that are fastened about the wrist and joined by a metal
chain.” Much of American industry looks at technology assessment and environmental impact statements in
precisely these terms, i.e., efforts to shackle technology. [I81
THE MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVE CONCEPT 281
to be fun for the modelers, but it also can be a nightmare for the real-world problem
solver. 5
In this world view, it is difficult to realize that, as we move beyond the pure
science-technology domain, other systems of inquiry may prove more fruitful. Following
are several candidates:
7. Noumena. Reality beyond the perception of our senses, a world which we can
only intuit, to which we are linked through our unconscious mind; in such a
world, there is no temporal distinction of past, present, and future.
Thus, we see that there is much out there beyond data-based, model-based, and
complementary multimode1 systems of inquiry.
QUANTIFICATION
In ancient Greece, the Pythagoreans attempted to preserve the purity of their mathe-
matical expressions by putting to death the man who discovered incommensurables.
Today, the computer has become the ideal instrument to fuel the drive for quantification.
%ree years ago a Pentagon computerized war game resulted in such a command and control breakdown
that the entire computer-dominated Worldwide Military Command and Control System was reexamined. “The
question is whether the traditional reductionist approach to understanding can make workable such a ‘holistic’
challenge as a worldwide U.S. military command and control system.” [51]
282 HAROLD A. LINSTONE ET AL
A new version of Gresham’s Law states that “quantitative analyses tend to drive out
qualitative analyses.” Zadeh’s “fuzzy set theory” has even been developed to quantify
qualitative terms, and, in the manner of a shoehorn, squeeze them into the computer input
format.
The developed nations are, culturally speaking, measuring societies. We measure
national military strength by comparing numbers of strategic weapon systems with the
Soviet Union (ignoring the fact that accuracy is far more significant than quantity and that
the ability to destroy the enemy’s industrial capacity four times may not be better than
destroying it twice). We measure individuals by their worth in dollars and societies by
their gross national product in dollars. In the words of Yankelovich,
The first step is to measure whatever can be easily measured. This is okay as far as it goes.
The second step is to disregard that which can’t be measured, or give it an arbitrary quantitative
value. This is artificial and misleading.
The third step is to presume that what can’t be measured easily really isn’t very important. This is
blindness.
The fourth step is to say that what can’t be easily measured really doesn’t exist. This is suicide. [58]
OBJECTIVITY
The traditional assumption of objectivity on the part of scientists and technologists is
revealed more and more frequently as a myth. Churchman writes of the social sciences:
One of the most absurd myths of the social sciences is the “objectivity” that is alleged to occur in the
relation between the scientist-as-observer and the people he observes. He really thinks he can stand apart
and objectively observe how people behave, what their attitudes are. how they think, how they decide
[it is a] silly and empty claim that an observation is objective if it resides in the brain of an unbiased
observer. [7:86]
Mitroff lays to rest objectivity in its traditional meaning in the physical sciences with his
study of Apollo moon scientists [42:248]
Von Foerster, himself a cyberneticist, insists that objectivity cannot occur in the
relation between scientist-as-observer and the people he observes. The claim that the
properties of an observer must not enter into the description of his observations is non-
sense, because, without the observer, there are no descriptions. The observer’s faculty of
describing enters, by necessity, into his descriptions. [ 181
If objectivity cannot be assumed for the scientist in his proverbial ivory tower, it
would seem foolhardy indeed to carry this assumption over to technology management in
a real world setting. The real world is a complex system in which virtually everything
interacts with everything-and this includes the manager. That being the case, the choice
of model and data, of problem definition and boundaries, is always partly subjective.
The man of system seems to imagine that he can arrange the different members of a great society with
as much ease as the hand arranges the different pieces upon a chessboard. He does not consider that the
pieces upon the chessboard have no other principle of motion beside that which the hand impresses upon
them; but that, in the great chessboard of human society, every single piece has a principle of motion of its
own altogether different from that which the legislature might choose to impress upon it.
THE MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVE CONCEPI 283
Economic models have to aggregate a number of things, and one of the things they aggregate is you! In
great globs you are aggregated into statistical classes
Jung says that, until you have gone through the process of individuation you will not be able to
face the social problems. You will not be able to build your models and tell the world what to do
From the perspective of the unique individual, it is not counting up how many people on this side and
how many on that side. All the global systems things go out: there are no tradeoffs in this world, in this
immense world of the inner self. All our concepts that work so well in the global world do not work in
the inner world. We have great trouble describing it very well in scientific language, but it is there,
and is important.
To be able to see the world globally, which you are going to have to be able to do, and to see it as a
world of unique individuals that is really complexity. [9:88-901
In retrospect, we encounter instance after instance where individuals were crucial in the
interaction of a technology with the society: Wernher von Braun’s leadership in rocket and
space vehicle development, Rachel Carson’s book, The Silent Spring. In these cases, we
have an impact of individuals on technology. Conversely, technology may have a tremen-
dous impact on the individual. Television ended the career of Senator Joseph McCarthy,
radio (e.g., the fireside chats) worked powerfully for President Franklin Roosevelt, and
the space program TV coverage created the astronaut as a folk hero.
TABLE 1
Jung’s Typology and Time Orientations
Source: [3 1: 101
than individuals; they do not expect to die like human beings. This does not mean they use
a zero discount rate, merely a lower one than individuals. The effect of different discount
rates on the perception of the increase of world population can be seen in Figure 2. Note
that at a 5% rate the crisis seems to disappear.
Social time is multigenerational. Organizations are, in fact, a curious blend of long
and short time horizons. There is the motivation of perpetuation and the pressure of
meeting next month’s payroll and protecting next year’s budget. As do individuals,
organizations have a spectrum of time horizons. Small companies contrast with large
ones, medieval Christian with modern American societies, rich European states with poor
African nations.
Thus the discount rate depends both on the conception of time and, to a lesser degree,
on organizational and individual differences (Figure 3).
These, then, are eight important paradigms which govern our usual perspective of
complex systems. They also suggest why so much systems analysis and technology
assessment is an “inside job,” performed for other analysts who share the same
paradigms and not necessarily for the audience that needs it.
b
3
Nomalfzed
World
Population 2 1
(1970 = 1)
YEARS IN FUTURE
Fig. 2. The discounting phenomenon: world population crisis. (Note: Zero discount rate case based on
Meadows’ “Limits to Growth” standard run [39:124].)
THE MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVE CONCEPT 285
Technological time
Social time
F
affluent person
Personal time
I I poor person
Fig. 3. Relative time horizons-a schematic. (Note: For qualifications see text.)
We continue in this vein here and focus on the question: Does recent literature suggest
how we can look at the problem differently?
In a narrow sense the concept of multiple models is widely recognized. We em-
phasize that we refer to the use of multiple models simultaneously, not sequentially. Past
struggles suggest that acceptance of multiple models requires a considerable degree of
intellectual sophistication or maturity. In mathematics, the nineteenth century challenged
us with the Euclidean, Riemannian, and Lobachevskian geometries, while physics offered
the wave and particle theories as simultaneously valid.
HISTORY
AI&on’s Models [ 11
The main descriptors of the Allison models6 are shown in Table 2. Models I and II
could be built on a solid base of 1950s and 1960s scholarship. The RAND school and its
disciples produced a plethora of rational actor guidelines and case studies. The organiza-
tional process model was drawn largely from the Simon-March school of organizational
decision making [37] and from Cyert-March’s “process-oriented” theory wherein the
internal structure of the firm plays a role as significant as the market dynamics [ 121.
Similar to Allison’s questioning of the assumption of rational choice in foreign policy
making, Cyert and March challenge the axiom that profit is the only motive behind
business decisions. Instead, they argue that goals are reached through bargaining and
compromise between the major subunits within the organization. Maximization of profit is
only one consideration. In the prevailing economic theories of the firm (and Allison
Model I), decision makers are assumed to have complete information about alternatives.
Cyert and March, in contrast, posit a process of problem solving characterized by incom-
plete information and biased toward dominant perspectives within the organization.
6We prefer the word “perspective” over “model” (which Allison uses) to emphasize that we are consider-
ing different sets of paradigms or world views, not merely different mathematical formulations.
TABLE 2
Allison’s Three Models
I. II. III.
Rational actor Organizational process Bureaucratic politics
Basic unit of analysis Action as choice of total system Actions as organizational output in Action as political resultant (bargaining,
framework of present capabilities and compromise)
constraints
Organizing concepts Unitary decision maker (e.g., Constellation of loosely allied units Players (“where you stand depends on where
government) topped by leader5 you sit”)
One set of goals (e.g., national) Problems factored; power fractionated Parochial priorities and perceptions
Problem-directed search
Miscommunications
Source: [ 11
288 HAROLD A. LINSTONE ET AL
The foundations of Allison’s first two conceptual models (I and II) are stronger than
those of the third. Organizations are easier to analyze than individuals and permit more
ready generalization, hence propositions. (We recall the quotations from Adam Smith and
Churchman in Section II). Allison in his afterword notes that “Model III tells a fascinating
story, but is enormously complex. The information requirements are often over-
whelming” [ 1:274]. The use of a rational actor model and an organizational process
model for a case study of a 1962 presidential crisis is self-evident, considering the strong
countercurrents of the time. Rationality was the hallmark of “the best and the brightest,”
the whiz kids brought in by Secretary of Defense McNamara to the dismay of the up-
parcrtchik dominated by career civil servants, true “organization men. ” In the five years
prior to the formation of the Harvard May Group [ 1:ixl Models I and II were, so to speak,
in public confrontation all over Washington. Model III subsequently signified the recogni-
tion that two models could not encompass all the crucial aspects of the decision-making
process.
1. There are regularities in the decision process which have to do with the structure
as opposed to the content of cognitive operations;
2. The full human mental apparatus is engaged in the simplest of operations such as
direct, immediate perception;
3. Most of what happens in the human mind is not accessible to direct, conscious
experience. In other words, a great deal of information processing is conducted
independently of conscious direction.
Inferential memory, consistency, reality, simplicity, and stability provide the basis of
this paradigm.
Andersen’s perspectives are similar: rational, organizational, and cognitive [3]. A
comparison of Allison’s and Andersen’s models shows a difference in stress in the third
perspective: Allison is concerned with bargaining, Andersen with learning and mental
decision processes. Allison focuses on governmental action as a result of compromise,
perceptions, styles of play, personal goals, and rules of the game. Andersen deals with the
individual’s limited information processing capability, inferential memory, focusing
rather than scanning as a basis for choice, and small group interactions leading to a shared
reality. It is thus apparent that Andersen’s cognitive model deals not only with the
individual but with small groups.
The commonality of Allison, Steinbruner, and Anderson is that each places three
perspectives on one object of interest. It is a device also known to writers and historians.
Rashomon is a classic literary example. And historian Fernand Braudel divided his distin-
guished work on The Mediterranean into three levels: the story of man’s contact with the
physical, inanimate environment, the social history of groups, and history on the scale of
individual men. He sees historical time as geographical time, social time, and individual
time, bringing to mind our view of future time in Figure 3 [6a:20-211.
THE MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVE CONCEPT 289
By radically distinct disciplines they do not mean, say, operations research and
engineering, but operations research and law. Different conceptualizers are convergers
and divergers, problem formulators and problem solvers.
ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS
------I ITECHNOPERS~NALI / I
PERSONAL ASPECTS
ogy; computers alter group decision-making processes and office operations; telecom-
munications galvanize the formation of common interest groups. Cost-benefit analysis is
a technical means to evaluate some of these interactions.
e) Organizational Actors. Since organizations are as old as human society and much
older than science, organizational entities have existed long before cybernetic or other
theories of organization. The family, clan, village, state, church, club, union, party, and
company are all examples of organizations which interact with technology. There are
victims, beneficiaries, and regulators that become involved with the impact and control of
THE MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVE CONCEPT 291
technology. There are primary and secondary actors. For example, in the struggle for the
Apollo program, NASA and the U.S. Air Force were primary actors, the Army and Navy
were secondary actors. The Air Force was in competition for budgets with the other
services and this competition affected its interest in the Apollo program.
The most basic societal unit, the family, has been strongly affected by technology.
Mobility has stimulated the spread of the nuclear family, isolation of the elderly, and the
rootlessness of the young.
h) Decisions. The last element represents the direct outcome of the political activity,
e.g., a decision to adopt and implement a policy. It also signifies the indirect consequence
of the first six elements and is shaded in Figure 4 as the culmination of the cycle
originating with a. This does not mean that the process ends here. A decision may itself
affect the technology a and alter its evolution, leading to changed effects on elements b to
g, and consequently again to the decision h. A decision may alternatively affect b to g
‘Such a leader must, of course, surround himself with appropriate lieutenants. Placed in a senescent
marragement setting, the risk-taking leader may well fail and quit.
292 HAROLD A. LINSTONE ET AL
directly. In either case there is continuing change. Almost never in a TA can we consider a
sequence, e.g., u to h, as static or not subject to iteration or alteration over time. This
means that the TA should not be a one-time exercise but a continuing activity. Finally, the
values may change and alter organizations e, or new actorsf may appear following an
administration change.
Table 3 shows examples of these eight elements drawn from Lawless’ 45 case studies
of technology and social shock [30]. Not surprisingly, we have many examples in these
case descriptions of elements u, b, c, e, g, and h with few of elements d andf’. The focus
on the individual tends to be hidden or submerged by the far more easily tracked organiza-
tionally related items.
The Technicul Perspective. This perspective has been the dominant one in the technology
assessment literature. The first book on the subject of TA announced that:
Technology assessment is a systems analysis approach to provide a whole conceptual framework, com-
plete both in scope and time, for decisions about the appropriate utilization of technology for social
purposes. [2 1561
The technology and its environment are viewed as a system in the now-familiar way
sketched in Section II. Terms like alternatives, tradeoffs, optimization, data, and models
suggest the rational, analytic nature of the technical perspective. The tools include proba-
bility theory, decision and cost-benefit analysis, system dynamics, and econometrics.
THE MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVE CONCEPT 293
TABLE 3
The Eight Elements-Illustrated by
Lawless’ Case Studies
Our
element Lawless case Illustration
a) Technology DMSO (dimethyl sulfoxide) Interest revived 75 years after initial synthesis as a
suppressed wonder drug? possible means to recover useful chemicals from
wood pulp wastes. Uses were found as industrial
solvent and drug carrier.
b) Physical Setting The Donora, Pennsylvania air In October 1948 twenty deaths and nearly 6,000
pollution episode illnesses occurred due to a combination of a
prolonged temperature inversion and industrial
emmissions.
c) So&technical The nuclear power controversy The Atomic Energy Commission takes initiative in
setting facilitating nuclear power generation by cooperating
with industry in R & D.
d) Technopersonal The fluoridation controversy Dentist Frederick McKay spends his off-hours for
setting three decades on finding the cause of mottled teeth,
notes lack of decay twenty years before serious
studies were done.
e) Organizational Abuse of medical and dental X rays National Council on Radiation Protection and
actors Measurement formed in 1929 collaborated with
radiological societies and X ray industries to set first
standards for exposure.
fl Individual actors The thalidomide tragedy Dr. Frances Kelsey was new to the FDA
bureaucracy and thalidomide was her first case. She
resisted continued pressure from drug manufacturers
due to her own considerable knowledge of medicine
and pharmacology.
g) Political action The Dugway sheep kill incident Congressional hearing obtained admission by Army
that nerve gas tests killed 6,000 sheep. Admission
came after repeated denials by key army officials
and involvement of a dozen different agencies.
h) Decision NTA (nitrilotriacetic Acid) in Surgeon General acts to stop manufacturers from
detergents using NTA in detergents, based on environmental
studies which were disputed by extensive
manufacturer tests.
Source: [30]
The bias toward the T perspective is seen in the Central Intelligence Agency:
Technological cleverness is the pride of the U.S. intelligence But American supremacy in technical
intelligence is profoundly misleading. It is not representative of U.S. intelligence capabilities as a whole
but stands in stark contrast. For in every other intelligence field-human spies, analysis of data collected,
and ability to conduct secret operations-the U.S. intelligence community appears to be dangerously
deficient. [54]
It is probably not a coincidence that the means of obtaining input (personal contact)
and the type of input obtained with the 0 and P perspectives are not those accessible to
surveillance satellites and other high technology sensors.
Since the T perspective is such a well-mined lode, we will focus our attention on the
other perspectives.
Each organizational actor is cognizant of parochial priorities and interests; they are
distinctive to his or her organization. The same applies to standard operating procedures,
and these go far toward limiting potential decision alternatives. Seen from the organiza-
tional perspective, a technology appears to create problems or solve problems for the
organization. There is concern that the technology may disturb the functioning of an
organization, i.e., become a disruptive force. Interest in a technology also is a strong
function of the amount of “noise” made about it (e.g., inquiries from “above”, mention
in the media).8 There is a strong tendency to break down problems in accordance with
organizational responsibilities.
Machiavelli, often misrepresented, was in fact vitally concerned with the soundness
of one organization, the state. As a modern executive has observed, the principles evolv-
ing from an organizational perspective in Florence, AD 1530, are readily transferable to
the corporation in New York or London AD 1980:
It means looking at the corporation in a new way: looking not through the eyes of the accountant and
systems analyst and economist and mathematician, but through those of the historian and political scien-
tist. [25:x]
The Personal Perspective. This is the most subtle and elusive perspective, the most
difficult to define. Here the world is seen through the eyes of the individual. The P
perspective should sweep in any aspects which relate individuals to the technology and its
impact and which cannot be brought out by the other perspectives. Thus we exclude from
this perspective the purely physical impacts of a technology on the individual as well as
the impact of, say, farmers on an agricultural technology. But intuition, charisma, leader-
ship, and self-interest, which may play vital roles in matters of policy and impact, may
only be evoked by the P perspective.
Freud, in his epochal Interpretation of Dreams, perceived three layers: the profes-
sional, the political, and the persona. He found the first to be the most current and
accessible; the third to be the deepest and least current and accessible [50:184]. The
similarity to our three perspectives is self-evident. As would be anticipated with
sFactors such as these suggest how the 0 perspective affects technological forecasting
296 HAROLD A. LINSTONE ET AL
Freud’s psychoarcheological conception, we shall find most difficulty with the personal
perspective.
IDENTIFYING INDIVIDUALS. There are clearly many persons who interact, directly
or indirectly, with a sociotechnological system. There are beneficiaries and victims,
builders and users, regulators and lobbyists. Then there are the “hidden movers.” These
are individuals who, from a second or third level position, pull the strings that determine
how things progress, Attention is usually so keenly focused on the behavior of the
puppets, which is overt, that the effect of the puppeteer, who is hidden from view, is
ignored. In the case of a very prominent power position, we tend to look for the power
behind the throne, especially if we suspect that the ostensible power person is not operat-
ing under his own steam. This is difficult enough, but at least in such a case-because of
the interest of historians, political analysts, etc.-the individuals surrounding the power
position are in the public eye and therefore subject to scrutiny. Still, the “gatekeeper,”
the person who controls the information flow in an organization, is often difficult to
identify.
For less publicly prominent positions, the powers behind the throne usually remain
obscure. They may not even appear on the organization chart. One way of possibly
identifying them is to look for the individuals who do the writing in an organization
(policy statements, position papers, standard operating procedures or regulations, etc.).
Their writing frequently sets the tone for the organization, or else it becomes a point of
departure for discussion within the organization. If such individuals hold their position for
any length of time, they may wield considerable influence.
Personal probing is essential in identifying key individuals. In cases of an emerging
technology, key individuals may not yet be identifiable. In such cases, types and their
characteristics must be sketched. And here, too, the P perspective is of inestimable value.
What makes a future Sammy run can often be predicted by analogy with past movers. In
fact, an interview might elicit interesting insights on how to “beat the system” or end-run
recalcitrant bureaucracies.
INTUITION, LEADERSHIP, AND SELF-INTEREST. Intuition is a well-appreciated
trait in the world of business, as the following quotes suggest. R. P. Jensen, Chairman of
General Cable Corporation:
On each decision, the mathematical analysis only got me to the point where my intuition had to take over.
L481
The typical T-trained mind usually balks at the mention of intuition. However, a few
T-oriented, highly respected scientists have not been afraid to pay homage to intuition and
accept it as an important concept. Consider Jacques Hadamard’s classic, The Psychology
of Invention in the Mathematical Field. He writes:
That those sudden enlightenments which can be called inspirations cannot be produced by chance alone is
already evident there can be no doubt of the necessary intervention of some previous mental process
unknown to the inventor. in other terms, of an unconscious one. 1201
THE MULTIPLEPERSPECTIVECONCEPT 291
He quotes Helmholtz, who observed that “happy ideas” never came to him when his
mind was fatigued or when he was seated at his work table. “After the fatigue . . . has
passed away, there must come an hour of complete physical freshness before the good
ideas arrive.”
Poincare distinguishes fully conscious work, illumination (happy ideas) preceded by
incubation, and the quite peculiar process of the first sleepless night. The unconscious
appears to consist of several levels. Hadamard writes:
It is quite natural to speak of a more intuitive mind if the zone where ideas are combined is deeper, and of a
logical one if that zone is rather superficial. This manner of facing the distinction is the one I should
believe to be the most important, [20]
In the case of exceptionally intuitive minds, even important links of deduction may
remain unknown to the thinker himself who has found them. The mathematician Cardan’s
invention of imaginary numbers is a beautiful example of the use of the nonrational to leap
from one rational to another rational domain.
More recently (1980), Nobel laureate Herbert Simon and associates have explored
the differences between experts and novices in solving physics problems. They find that
the expert is mentally guided by large numbers of patterns serving as an index to relevant
parts of the knowledge store. The patterns are
rich schemata that can guide a problem’s interpretation and solution and add crucial pieces of information.
This capacity to use pattern-indexed schemata is probably a large part of what we call physical intuition.
[291
Each person has a unique set of patterns which inform his intuition. In calling on the
P perspective, we are thus augmenting the conscious, logical T process by opening
ourselves to the deeper mental levels which store patterns of great potential value.
Leadership is a quality of recognized importance in science and technology as well as
in politics. Courant in applied mathematics, Rabi in atomic structure, von Braun in
rocketry, and Ford in automobile production were leaders; disciples, students, and im-
itators built on their innovative ideas and magnified their impact.
Self-interest motivates most of us, although it is usually hidden. It may take the form
of prestige, profit, power or pleasure. For a P perspective on the engineering profession,
Florman’s delightful book, The Existential Pleasures of Engineering [16], is recom-
mended. The felt need to mask this energizing factor generates deceptions and illusions
which may be difficult to penetrate. Successful technological innovation and policy
change implementation require leadership; leadership is driven by self-interest.
Effective organizations are those that have found successful ways of making the
self-interest of the members work constructively and in unison to support the goals of the
organization.
THE ROLES OF THE P PERSPECTIVE. Specifically, we see the P perspective in four
roles:
basing too much coverage of the 1980 campaign on polls, then writing learned analyses
claiming to know what was on people’s minds:
As it turned out, reporters would have been much better served by relying on their own legwork, which, in
turn, produces their own political instincts. [5.5]
The affected individuals may be considered as a group, but the impact may be
comprehensible only by dealing directly with individuals and their perspectives on a
one-to-one basis. Examples: Union reactions can be gauged better by knowing the at-
titudes of individual union members; the surprising reaction of blacks to electronic funds
transfer could be fathomed by direct dialog; the understanding of the impact of television
on children or of mobility on the aged benefits from personal contacts.
l Individuals may matter, and this perspective identifies their characteristics and
behavior.
Robert Goddard, Andrew Carnegie, and Admiral Hyman Rickover had recognizable
impact on the course of technology. Yet, we have found that there is a strong temptation
on the part of T perspective-oriented individuals to downplay the P perspective. Among
the arguments:
Novelists and playwrights express social issues very effectively through individuals.
Shaw uses the unique Lisa Doolittle and her father to portray class problems in England;
Arthur Miller uses Willie Loman to describe the American urge to be well-liked.
Hauptmann’s Rose Bernd, Ibsen’s The Wild Duck, Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago,
Burgess’ 1985, and television’s Upstairs, Downstairs are other striking illustrations of the
use of the P perspective to communicate social concepts.
The rare individual who can incorporate in his own thinking the appropriate balance
among the T, 0, and P perspectives can develop a TA as a one-person effort. Burby’s The
Great American Motion Sickness, is, in effect, a TA. It is merely necessary for a member
of Congress to read this book, which the government did not need to fund, to be quite well
informed about transportation technology. It might be more effective to support a good
communicator for one or two years to write a book on technology, approaching the subject
from different perspectives, than to fund a conventional TA team.
l It is a metainquiring system, i.e., it includes all the other inquiring systems (data,
model, dialectic, etc.):
TABLE 4
Multiple Perspectives
Optimization Satisticing (first acceptable, rather than best, option) Creativity and vision by few-‘&the yogi”
Incremental change, slow adaptation Each construes attributes of others
\
MULTIPLE MDELS (K
ORGANIZATIONS
"Crowds and Power"
PERSPECTIVES
Fig. 5
It is pragmatic, i.e., the truth content is relative to the overall goals and objectives
of the inquiry;
No single aspect has anybndamental priority over any of the other aspects;
It takes holistic thinking so seriously that it constantly attempts to sweep in new
components; it is in fact nonterminating and explicitly concerned with the future;
It postulates that the system designer is a fundamental part of the system: his
psychology and sociology are inseparable from the system’s physical representa-
lion.
A subtle, but important, advantage in the use of such a pragmatic Singerian approach
is the automatic reduction in the reliance on shaky theoretical analysis in decision making.
The strength of the quasitheological faith in models developed via the T perspective is
awe-inspiring and frightening. Multiple perspectives should minimize this self-delusion
since the T perspective no longer dominates the analysis.
The schematic in Figure 5 shows a single vertex for the T perspective and multiple
vertices for 0 and P. We do not consider the differences between disciplines (e.g.,
aeronautical engineering, electronics engineering, economics) as reflecting different in-
quiring systems. They all use the same data/model based paradigms (see Section II)-the
same mode of perceiving-but they do look at different parts of the problem (e.g., use
302 HAROLD A. LINSTONE ET AL
different variables and mathematical models). The aeronautical engineer, electronics en-
gineer, and economist may look at the same aircraft design and focus on different prob-
lems (e.g., lift, avionics, cost per mile). But they all use the T perspective: They develop
models (wind tunnel or computer), and seek to quantify and optimize. This is denoted in
Figure 6a by use of a single vertex for all three. Putting it simply, their “how” is the same
but their “what” differs from one person or organization to another.
The crucial differences between perspectives T on the one hand and O/P on the other
may be explored further. In Figure 6b we show by a slight modification of the figure the
quasicontinuous range of perspectives between individuals and organizations. There are
aircraft design
1111 discipline perspec tive
personal-organizational continuum
various individuals, informal groupings, more formal small and large organizations and
social entities. Each has a unique Weltanschauung, a different perspective.
FURTHER COMMENTS
Another Catch 22
In Section I we noted a Catch 22 situation. We can now add another. Impact and
policy analysis are essential to TA and the typical TA is expected to deal with impacts and
policy decisions which lie in the future, often five to twenty years away.
The Multiple Perspective Concept leads us to recognition of a predicament. Each
perspective tends to have a different planning horizon (Figure 3 and Table 4). Combining
this characteristic with our basic schematic, Figure 5, we can represent the dilemma as
shown in Figure 7. Thinking of the perspectives as beams of light directed at the problem,
we find that each beam has a different illuminating distance (like high and low headlights
in an automobile). So we arrive at the catch:
Even the longest beam, representing the T perspective in Figure 7, is often overesti-
mated. Consider technological and economic forecasting, for example. Ascher, in his
careful analysis of many academic, government, and industry forecasts, finds a consistent
pattern: the more distant the forecast target date, the less accurate the forecast [6: 1991. He
correlates this tendency with the core assumptions underlying the forecast. They are the
major determinants of forecast accuracy and much more crucial than sophistication of the
forecasting model. Since the core assumptions usually degrade with increasing time
horizon, they constrain the T perspective horizon more than the methodology-oriented
rational actor generally assumes.
We draw two implications:
1. TAs are inherently difficult to do well when they must deal with long-term
impacts and policies;
2. The most effective applications of multiple perspectives are likely to be in
sociotechnological systems for which the focus is on near- and mid-range prob-
lems, i.e., a time horizon encompassed by the 0 and P perspectives.
gNot surprisingly, individuals like Churchill, who use a lower-than-average discount rate in looking forward
to the future, also apply a lower-than-average discount rate to the past. Hence they have a more profound sense
of history.
THE MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVE CONCEPT 305
company image before others in the organization. And they recognize the long-
term impacts of their decisions. Ideally the TA team should seek out such indi-
viduals; unfortunately they are only rarely available. But the team leader should
certainly make a conscious effort to include, as team members of consultants,
individuals with strong 0 and P perspective orientations and a longer-than-
average time horizon.
2. There are many situations where a near or midrange time horizon provides a
sound basis for policy decisions. The multiple perspective concept should ulti-
mately leave its deepest imprint there as it bridges the gap between the model
world and the real world.
I I
Such an individual may indeed be interdisciplinary but he is still anchored in the same T
perspective.
An effective 0 or P perspective team member brings to bear a very different back-
ground than that of a T perspective member, e.g., law, journalism, acting, or administra-
tion. We know that a lawyer is at home with dialectic inquiring systems, an investigative
reporter works on hunches. Such an individual may be aided by having a high “social
intelligence quotient.” [4].
Archer [5] reports that women are generally more adept than men in this regard and
suggests that female intuition is not a myth. This observation is supported by Kaje [26] on
futures research and by our experience with male and female interviewers. We suspect
that many male academics, particularly those with science or technology training, tend to
be quite weak in social intelligence. This, in turn, is reflected in the bias toward the T
perspective.
Communicutions
Communication techniques for 0 and P perspectives (either for input or output) are
by no means identical to those associated with the T perspective.
Input. Jay observes that standard documentation is not the place to determine the foci of
power in an organization:
Real power does not lie in documents and memos outlining your terms of reference and area of jurisdic-
tion: it lies in what you can achieve in practice. The boss’s secretary can wield great power, like the king’s
mistress, without any authority at all-r at least not the sort you can show anybody. [25: 1421
Interviews play a dominant role in 0 and P, in contrast to the reports and surveys
used for T. Other methods such as participant observation, guided group dialog, and
open-ended simulation may also prove valuable in gaining an understanding of organiza-
tions and individuals. Future applications of 0 and P perspectives should explore these
possibilities more fully.
The key to comprehending individuals in P perspectives is the empathic capacity of
the interviewer or observer. No one individual is capable of empathy with everyone.
There are inevitably psychosocial barriers between certain people, no matter how skilled or
naturally intuitive a given interviewer or observer may be.
Empathic capacity in the interview situation is, in part, a function of the respondent’s
perception of the interviewer as nonthreatening and in part a matter of the ego strength and
self sufficiency (in emotional terms) of the interviewer. In certain circumstances, neurotic
behavior can produce close empathic feelings+specially if the neuroses complement
each other-but, in such cases, the degree of comprehension will be distorted by the
interviewer’s own feelings and emotional reactions. Unless the interviewer can both gain
insight and preserve the ability to dissociate himself from the client, the product will be a set
of idiosyncratic projections on the part of the interviewer, not a useful understanding of
the repondent.
Thus, we have a prescription nearly impossible to execute well in interviews. But
some talent can go a long way, and our experience over the past four years shows that it
exists most often in individuals who are not focused strongly on the T perspective.
Outpur. We take for granted the technical report format for technology assessments.
It is standard for the T perspective but not necessarily appropriate for the 0 and P
perspectives. The latter in particular suggests a unique contextual point of view which
lends itself to experiential formulation and personalized presentation. A scenario, a
vignette, or a story may crystallize the image or convey the tone far better than a conven-
THE MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVE CONCER 307
tional format. It can also serve as a vehicle to communicate the main ideas of the entire TA
(all perspectives) to an audience which cannot deal with, or is not satisfied with, the
tee hnical report format.
Table 5 suggests some of the possible matches of perspective and means of presenta-
tion.
In the applications, we have experimented with several of these vehicles for the 0
and P perspectives [34]. The oral briefing needs further explication here, however. Al-
most any report can be transformed into an oral briefing. It is included in Table 5 for 0
and P to highlight the problem of the sensitivity of these perspectives. It may be advisable
to present important insights orally but not in writing.
Unquestionably, these perspectives pose problems not of concern with the T perspec-
tive. They reflect the political nature of the TA and must be faced, just as they are by the
journalist.
There are several alternatives:
Changing Perspectives
Not only are there many 0 and P perspectives, but any one such perspective may
shift over time. In other words, the picture should be viewed as dynamic rather than static.
Aging tends to make the individual more conservative, less of a risk taker. Furthermore,
the individual assumes different roles at different times. The balance among the perspec-
tives should not be viewed as a fixed or rigid one. A technology which does not involve
human beings should not require 0 or P perspectives, but such a technology does not
exist. And if it did, technology assessment would be superfluous.
The apportionment of effort among the three perspectives cannot be disposed of by a
simple formula. It is a function not only of the technology, but also of the political
framework of the TA. As a first approximation, an equal three-part split in effort among
the three perspectives seems eminently reasonable.
TABLE 5
Some Means to Communicate Perspectives
T 0 P
Technical report fl v
Scenario/vignette v w ti
Transcript of interviews rc v
Summaries of interviews J v
Oral briefing rc v r/
Story/play r/
Integration of Perspectives
a TA should be “comprehensive,” or
the described perspectives are “definitive.”
Only a T perspective mind is likely to use these words. Anyone who has tried to
determine the number of interactions possible with a small number of elements in a system
will understand the unreality of comprehensiveness. lo So will anyone who has studied the
impacts of technologies in history.
‘OSee Section II
THE MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVE CONCEFI 309
MILITARY TECHNOLOGY
l Introduction of a new ship concept into the U.S. Navy (1868-1869) [43]
The USS Wampanoag was a 4200 ton “advanced technology” destroyer built for the
U.S. Navy and commissioned in 1868. She had sails and a steam engine, was fast (over 17
knots), maneuverable, and stable.
0 In 1869, a Naval Board examines the ship and comes to the conclusion
that it is a “sad and signal failure.” A typical argument in their report:
“Lounging through the watches of a steamer or acting as firemen and
coal heavers will not produce in a seaman that combination of boldness,
strength, and skill which characterized the American sailor of an elder
day.” As Elting Morison observes: “What these officers were saying
was that Wampanoag was a destructive energy in their society .
They perceived that a machine tends to create its own environment and
draw men into it . I don’t admire their solution, but I respect their
awareness that they had a problem. [It] is not primarily engineering or
scientific in character. It’s simply human.”
A decision which appeared “stupid” from the T perspective becomes reasonable when
seen from the 0 perspective.
l The M-16 rifle: the long struggle to provide the U.S. Army with a superior rife
(originally called AR-15)
Army Ordnance has been furnishing rifles to the Army for over a century. In the
195Os, its Springfield Arsenal developed the M- 14 rifle.
Army Ordnance, responsible for providing small arms, strenuously opposed the
AR-15.
0 The Civil War inaugurated the era of the bullet. The myth of the western
sharpshooter and the formation of the National Rifle Association re-
flected development of a marksmanship tradition which infused the
Army Ordnance Corps. A marksman firing in long-range rifle competi-
tion needs a large, heavy round to maximize steadiness in flight and
minimize sensitivity to wind. The marksmanship tradition led Army
Ordnance to the M- 1 in World War II and then to the M- 14.
Ordnance ordered modifications to the AR-15 (now M-16), which “had very little to do
with . . warfare but quite a lot to do with settling organizational scores.” [ 15:77] Thus,
the M-16 became unreliable in combat in Vietnam. We note that the rational actor’s
selection of the best system hardly reflects the real-life decision process in which the 0
perspective is central. Parochial objectives of organizational actors may play a crucial
role. The Army does not operate as a unitary decision maker; individuals play a vital role
in the process. Overt and hidden motivations for actions must be clearly distinguished.
Truman has been President for only seven weeks, following the death of Franklin
Roosevelt. Germany has tendered its unconditional surrender and Japan is almost a de-
feated nation. The atomic bomb has been developed in great secrecy and is considered the
greatest military technological innovation of modern times.
Charles Peters’ and Henry Kissinger’s observations on the operation of the federal
government suggest that the 0 perspective is essential to an understanding of the decision
setting.
0 On shadow organizations:
Clubs are just part of a larger social bond that exists everywhere but is
especially prevalent in Washington, where private life is so much an
extension of professional life. This bond is the “survival network” .
From the day [government] people arrive in Washington they are busy
building networks of people who will assure their survival in power.
[4.5:5]
On protection of turf:
The Firemen First Principle . . when faced with budget cuts, the
bureaucrat . chops where it will hurt constituents the most, not the
least. The howls of protest wil then force the cuts to be restored. [45:40]
On power:
In a recent survey [lobbyists] rated the congressional staffs as their
number one lobbying target (by contrast, the White House ranked
sixth). [45: 1151
Kissinger on Secretary of Defense Laird:
I eventually learned that it was safest to begin a battle with Laird by
closing off all his bureaucratic or congressional escape routes, provided
I could figure them out. Only then would I broach substance. [28]
l Inflation
Konrad Kellen is not satisfied with the conventional Washington economists’ theoret-
ical T perspective or the bureaucrats’ regulatory 0 perspective on inflation. He asks: “Is
inflation fun?”
HYDROPOWER
The environmentally benign nature of hydropower and the projected energy shortage
make hydropower a particularly attractive source. A utility’s recent proposal to build a
hydroelectric facility is illuminated by the use of all three perspectives.
T From 1958 to 1980 five major engineering and cost-benefit studies are
undertaken and four alternatives developed. The construction of a 60
megawatt facility is the preferred choice.
HEALTH CARE
P This perspective provides the most immediate grasp of the essential and
unique world of the participants, but is the most elusive to deal with.
The role of the staff as conveyors and developers of an image and their
development of others in this context is quite different than their role in
T and 0 perspectives.
Typical P issues: Who are the movers? How can the image of
regionalization be developed by various interests and help to congeal
them? For example, it should reflect sensitivity to Black professionals
and their unique and controversial role in the community.
1 f J
Organlration (0) Role Market Conditions Kickoff Potential in
T Guayule rubber has been tested and found quite satisfactory as a re-
placement for hevea rubber. A worldwide shortfall of natural rubber of
2.4-4.9 million metric tons is anticipated by 2000. Assuming a
surprise-free scenario, 100% of the shortfall can be made up with
guayule by 1991. The impacts on the Southwest economy are likely to
be modestly beneficial. [ 191
316 HAROLD A. LINSTONE ET AL
A.D. Little
Technology
Assessment
aspects studied
(e.g., home computer)
National
Commission
Report
//,Ierspectives used
\
::::::
LOCUS of problems
-'**-' (elements)
w
P
Fig. 10 Schematic of perspectives: Electronic Funds Transfer Reports.
P Each actor sees his own prospective behavior differently than the others
perceive it. Each sees the others’ perceptions as distorted; each therefore
interprets a given act differently. This situation discourages formation
of intersectoral coalitions and encourages intrasectoral ones. None of
the present actors yet sees enough in it for him to have a feasible action
strategy. There is a crucial difference between those who are emotion-
ally tied to guayule and those who must make commercialization deci-
sions (advocates versus judges).
P The engineering schools tend to bias the student very strongly toward
centralized systems, viewing on-site systems as temporary expedients.
Most people have a “flush and that’s the end of it” attitude. There is a
strong dislike of the maintenance which is required with on-site sys-
tems: “You’ve got to babysit the toilets.”
318 HAROLD A. LINSTONE ET AL
Even technological forecasting itself may benefit from the use of multiple perspec-
tives. Normative forecasts supposedly express future needs. But the indicated needs may
reflect the 0 perspective of the client organization. A case in point is the defense estab-
lishment. From 1959 to 1970, Linstone directed four corporate planning needs analyses in
the area of national defense and space programs. By the time of the fourth of these
privately funded projects, the T perspective analysts had made an important discovery:
“The gap between what is needed and what is marketable means that a ‘needs analysis’ is,
in fact, a mirage.” [47: 1161 We buy what we like and are comfortable with, not necessar-
TABLE 6
Physical Risk as Seen from the
T, 0, and P Perspectives
T 0 P
Probabilistic Threat to product line, company image Type of danger (cancer as the “plague”
of this century)
Actuarial Abilitv to avoid publicity
. .
Time for consequences to materialize
Expected value Politial sensitivity (voter anger)
(discounting)
calculations
Ease of litigation
Popular image of horror (nuclear
Fail-safe concept
Ease of shifting or spreading blame accident)
Margin of safety
Anonymity of decision makers Personal experience (survival of a hotel
design
tire)
Ease of changing decisions
Applicability of
Age of individual
precedent designs Socioeconomic status as determinant of
risk acceptance (life “guaranteed Popularization of risk (e.g., nuclear
safe” in U.S.) plants and The China SyndromeJ
ily what we need. Pilots want aircraft to fly so that an all-missile force would be organiza-
tionally unpalatable. Advancement in the Navy traditionally requires experience in com-
manding ships. Thus, the availability of an adequate number of ships is an important
consideration in developing normative forecasts. We are dealing here with an 0 perspec-
tive very similar to that which Morison recognized in the case of the U.S.S. Wampanoag.
A priority needs list based solely on a T perspective looks very different from one
based on both T and 0 perspectives. The T perspective takes account of Richard III’s
lament “For the want of a nail the shoe was lost . . .” so that the list would include
nonglamor items such as changes in training and communications equipment. A list based
on T and 0, however, features glamor items in the firepower and vehicle areas-new
aircraft and ships, and more exotic weapons.
Thus, the organizational perspective explains constraints and core assumptions which
strongly affect the technological forecasts. Standard operating procedures, morale needs,
as well as incrementalism and tradition determine the forecasts in subtle ways. l2 Even the
personal perspective comes into play. A technology-trained analyst nearly always moves
toward greater technological sophistication in addressing future needs. It is rare to find the
option of less sophistication, of fewer technical approaches, given equal consideration by
a technologist. We see the result in the imbalance in the intelligence field [54], in the
unending efforts to advance technological solutions in the Vietnam conflict, and in the
reliance on technical analyses in strategic military planning [ 151. The application of
multiple perspectives sweeps in considerations which can more clearly reveal the core
assumptions and avoid self-delusion in technological forecasting.
Finally, there is no mason to assume that only our own social setting lends itself to
the application of the Multiple Perspectives Concept. Workshops held in Mexico and
Chile (1981) show that non-U.S. practitioners grasp the concept readily and can use it in
very different cultural contexts.
Section V. Guidelines
In this final section we translate lessons learned into guidelines for the multiple
perspective user. While primary attention is devoted to technology assessment, most of
the discussion is applicable to sociotechnological systems generally, whether in the con-
text of government policy making, corporate strategic planning, regional development, or
systems implementation.
FORM THE TEAM TO ASSURE AN INTERPARADIGMATIC MIX RATHER THAN
MERELY AN INTERDISCIPLINARY MIX (EXAMPLE: ENGINEER PLUS LAWYER
PLUS WRITER PLUS BUSINESSMAN).
In Section III the question of personnel selection was addressed. In particular, the
common misconception that an interdisciplinary mix of professionals (such as an en-
gineer, an economist, a sociologist, and a systems analyst) is most suitable as a TA
team was exposed. l3 For multiple perspectives, we need an interparadigmatic mix,
“In cakes where a forecast is done by one organization A for another B and B imposes few constraints, the
biases of A may be crucial to the forecast. Examples: A’s ingrained modeling tools, its previous studies, and the
nature of its other current clients.
13By extension, a team composed only of academics is likely to be a disaster.
320 HAROLD A. LINSTONE ET AL
i.e., individuals who have been nurtured on different inquiring systems. Thus, one of
the most important members of the National Hydropower technology assessment team
was a lawyer; he has a very different sense of regulatory issues than does an engineer.
We are not assuming either is a priori familiar with the regulations; rather, they tend to
emphasize different perspectives (0 and T, respectively).
Formation of an interparadigmatic team for TA is not the end, but only the
beginning of the team design task. The most obvious characteristic of the different
perspectives, indeed the reason they are collectively more valuable than they are indi-
vidually, is that they typically conflict with each other; through their interaction and
conflict resolution, they lead to the generation of insights that would not have emerged
otherwise. Consequently, team process design, which anticipates the conflicts and
facilitates their interaction. must be addressed also.
The assessor does not start trying to create a scientific random sample but more of
a snowball sample, going from one key informant to another on the basis of leads. For
future technology, the assessor is likely to go to the scientists or the designers of the
technology and then proceed from producers to likely policy makers, consumers, and
other groups who may act on, or be affected by, the technology. With an existing or
near-term technology, it is possible to start with any concerned informant, and the more
knowledgeable the better. Within the resource constraints of the project, it is preferable
to be expansive in choosing people to interview or otherwise observe. Some people
from analogous fields may have useful perspectives, and others may represent views
which will become relevant in the future.
ADAPT THE MEDIUM TO THE MESSAGE, I.E., FIT THE MODE OF COMMUNI-
CATION TO THE PERSPECTIVE.
Different perspectives invite different modes of communication. For communicating
the 0 perspective, consider the use of excerpts or summaries of interviews, oral brief-
ings, scenarios, and vignettes together with the conventional type of report. For the P
perspective, all of the above, with the exception of the conventional report, merit
consideration.
A talented communicator can also use the P perspective to get all of the perspec-
tives (T, 0, and P) across to a wide audience. However, only rarely is this a practical
option; outstanding writers are unavailable and use of media is constrained by the
project budget.
RECOGNIZE THE POLITICAL SENSITIVITY OF THE 0 AND P PERSPECTIVES.
CAREFULLY EVALUATE HOW TO COMMUNICATE INSIGHTS IN AN INEVI-
TABLY POLITICAL SETTING.
Only the T perspective has the luxury of being neutral and politically harmless, but the
price is high: it may also prove rather useless. The 0 and P perspectives reflect the
realities of human beings, encompassing both the “original sins” of greed, crime, and
war, and the “divine touch” of creativity, leadership, and concerted action pro bono
publico. Political sensitivity may not arise as a problem in purely technological activi-
ties such as systems design. But it is inescapable in technology assessment, strategic
planning, and decision analysis. There are no simple answers; each case has unique
aspects. Some alternatives which a multiple perspective team should consider are listed
in Section III.
IN MOST CASES, LEAVE THE INTEGRATION OF THE PERSPECTIVES TO THE
USER OR DECISION MAKER, BUT DO POINT OUT CROSS-CUING LINKS
AMONG THEM.
Since a client or decision maker may integrate the perspectives in a very personal,
unique way, it is usually preferable to provide the analysis output to him or her without
trying to prejudge the integration process.
The assessor should usually maintain the integrity of each of the multiple perspec-
tives in the initial analysis and writing stages, producing T, 0, and P documents. In this
way, it is possible for insights to emerge which originate from each of the perspectives.
However, cross-cuing among the perspectives is of potential significance, and the
assessor should examine and exhibit such linkages. Finally, the use of multiple perspec-
tives makes communication with policy makers easier because the assessor soon ap-
preciates the orientation and language of various policy makers. In a sense, multiple
324 HAROLD A. LINSTONE ET AL
perspectives enhance our knowledge of the audience and the kinds of communication
which are appropriate to the specific situation.
REMEMBER THAT MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES CAN ADD INSIGHTS TO DECI-
SION ANALYSES FOR A WIDE SPECTRUM OF SOCIOTECHNOLOGICAL SYS-
TEMS (NOT ONLY TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENTS).
The illustrations in Section IV cover not only technology assessments, but military and
corporate planning as well as health care delivery.
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