Company Share Valuation in Australia
Company Share Valuation in Australia
Company Share Valuation in Australia
The value of shares in a private company will, to a large extent, depend on the
value of the underlying business or assets and thus the principles concerning the
valuation of unlisted shares can equally be applied to sole traders and
partnerships.
See for example authorities referred to by the Full Court of the Family Court in
Ramsay (1997) FLC ¶ 92-742
In that case, (one involving the valuation of a minority share holding in a Family
Company) the Court held that:
The valuation of unlisted shares is clearly one of the most difficult areas of
valuation for Courts hearing property settlement cases. A company can operate a
range of ventures from retailing to investment. The importance of obtaining a
clear understanding of the methods and thence an accurate valuation in cases
where shares in a company represent a major or only asset of the parties cannot
be too strongly stressed. As was noted by Cohen J in Duffy v Perry (unreported
New South Wales Supreme Court, 23 July 1986):
"Despite the obvious importance that the question of values was going to take in the matter
valuations were only obtained by both parties on the day before the hearing and indeed they
were only completed on the first day of the hearing. Both of them show signs of the extreme
hurry in which they were prepared. '' (p 8)
"Considering that the plaintiff is seeking the payment of a large sum of money as representing
her interest in the company it seems extraordinary that so little concern has been paid to the
essential aspects of the valuation. '' (p 12)
Many of the most important cases concerning valuation have been decided
concerning the valuation of estates for the purposes of death duties. More
recently, cases decided under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) provide useful
examples of the available methods. However, although these cases give some
guidance, valuations under the De Facto Relationships Act, 1984 (NSW) clearly
still remain at the discretion of the trial Judge. Valuation, especially of unlisted
shares, sole traders and partnerships, is like real estate, very much a matter of
opinion as much as calculation.
The various ways real property and shares were valued was examined by the
New South Wales Supreme Court on the termination of a de facto relationship of
11 years: see Molina v Fajwul (1994) DFC ¶ 95-151 .
The Court went into considerable detail in the case of the valuation of shares in
the private company involved. It looked at the items which covered the valuation
of the shares and some loan funds. These included:
a) director's remuneration;
b) rent provision;
c) capitalisation rate;
d) loan due to the defendant; and
e) years to be taken into account in assessing future profits.
The New South Wales Court of Appeal unanimously rejected the appeal by the
de facto husband in Fajwul v Molina unreported 8 August 1996. They held that
the trial Judge had made no error going to the exercise of discretion shown or to
be inferred.
As the term implies, an unlisted company is one the shares of which are not
listed on an official stock exchange. A family company, the number of
shareholders of which is restricted, is generally an unlisted company. On the
other hand, a public company, the number of shareholders of which is only
limited by the extent of authorised capital, is often a listed company.
There are many examples of companies which are either owned or controlled by
one person or a family and, as a result, there are few transfers of its shares. An
established market does not exist for its stock and even when there are sales at
irregular intervals they are unlikely to be representative transactions which fairly
indicate the market value of its shares.
It is unwise to attach too much weight to the prices of shares of listed companies
in the same or a similar line of business to that of an unlisted company. The
potential purchaser of shares of an unlisted company may be expected to invest
cautiously. For these reasons alone it is dangerous to draw too definite
conclusions from the price-earnings ratios of listed public companies with a view
to applying them to unlisted companies.
(1) Actual sale price of parcels of the same shares in a bona fide sale at
proximate date.
(2) Capitalisation of estimated future profits (ie profit basis).
(3) Capitalisation of expected dividends (ie dividend basis).
(4) Asset value.
(5) Liquidation basis.
Normally, even where it has been decided to use one of the methods above, it is
desirable, where possible, to check the results with a value obtained by another
method.
In Parker v Parker (1993) DFC ¶ 95-139 , the New South Wales Supreme Court
stated that the proper time to value assets was at the date of the hearing.
Shares were therefore valued at that time and on an arm's length basis rather
than at any special value to the defendant. When shares are valued on a
capitalisation of future maintainable profits, it was necessary to take commercial
matters into account.
The plaintiff, a de facto wife aged 31, changed her name to that of her de facto
husband aged 50. The couple lived together for seven years from 1984 to 1991
and had two children born in 1985 and 1988. At the time the couple met, the
woman had very little training or work experience. The male defendant for many
years gave every indication of being very wealthy and the couple lived an
appropriate lifestyle. The de facto husband's assets were in shares in various
companies he owned. The Court considered five matters of principle in relation
to the valuation of the defendant's property:
The Court considered the value of the de facto husband's property, the value of
the de facto wife's contributions and the extent of the benefits she had received.
It then looked to whether the amount arrived at would be just and equitable
taking into account the de facto wife's reliance on the relationship and the
reasonable expectations that a person in her position would have held. The Court
held that:
1. the appropriate time to value the assets was at the date of the hearing
unless there were other factors involved;
2. the shares were to be valued on an arm's length basis rather than
attributing to them any special value to the defendant;
3. there was no place in the present case for the principle that the property
should be valued according to its highest use;
4. when shares are valued on a capitalisation of future maintainable profits it
was necessary to take commercial matters into account; and
5. the principle that the Court was entitled to award a higher percentage of
disclosed assets on the basis that the probabilities were that the defendant
had undisclosed assets was not attracted in this case.
The Court also took into account the community expectation that the domestic
partner of a wealthy and successful businessman who had borne him two
children would have a home provided by him. The amount finally awarded to the
de facto wife was $275,000 to be paid after she had returned specified items of
the defendant's property. See Parker v Parker (1993) DFC ¶ 95-139 .
"What is the most appropriate method of estimating the value of shares in a proprietary
company depends upon a variety of factors. They include the purpose for which the valuation
is made, the nature of the shareholding, the character of the company's business, its capacity
to earn profits and the net value of its assets. It has been said that a valuation based on
earning capacity is generally most appropriate because the hypothetical purchaser of shares in
a company which is a going concern is looking, not to a winding up, but to the profits which
will ensue from the company continuing to trade (McCathie v Federal Commissioner of
Taxation (1944) 69 CLR 1 ; Abrahams v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1944) 70 CLR 23 ;
Commissioner of Succession Duties (SA) v Executor Trustee and Agency Co of South Australia
Ltd (1947) 74 CLR 358, at pp 361-362 ). But it has been recognised that valuation by reference
to assets backing or a liquidation basis will be appropriate where earning capacity provides no
real measure of the true share value (The Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) v Pearse
(1951) 84 CLR 490 ) or present overwhelming difficulties (Elder's Trustee and Executor Co Ltd
v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1951) 96 CLR 563 ; Jekyll v Commissioner of Stamp
Duties (Q) (1962) 106 CLR 353 ) or where the shareholding is such as to enable the holder to
bring about liquidation of the company (New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd v Commissioner of
Inland Revenue (1956) NZLR 501 ). See generally the judgment of Gibbs J in Gregory v FC of
T 71 ATC 4034; (1971) 123 CLR 547 .
There is always the risk that in examining methods of valuation attention is diverted from the
object of the exercise, namely the ascertainment of the real value of the shares, to the means
by which the object is to be achieved. As a general proposition the valuation by means of
capitalization of profits is appropriate to those cases in which the likely purchasers will be
looking to the profits which the company will earn as a going concern. Where, however, the
valuation of the shares as calculated by reference to their assets backing substantially exceeds
their valuation as calculated on a capitalization of profits, the former is to be preferred, subject
to a discount for the expenses of winding up and distribution, unless there is some good
reason for preferring the latter, as, for example, where the shareholding to be valued is a
minority of shareholding and those in control of the company intend to carry on its business
because that course has advantages for them. Even in such a case it will be proper to take
some account of the assets backing of the shares in order to reflect the possibility that those in
control of the company might be minded in the future to sell their shares or to realize the value
of the assets of the company. ''
"In the circumstances I consider it proper to take a composite figure of $70,000 representing
the equity of the Horsfield Bay property and the capitalised figure of $43,450 representing the
value to a potential purchaser of the business of the company. That such an approach, taking
account of both factors, is legitimate, is indicated by the remarks of Mason J in Mallet v
Mallet.”
Richard Maurice holds degrees in Law and Economics from Sydney University.
He was admitted in 1984 and worked in private practice as an employed solicitor in a general practice and later for the
Federal Attorney General's Office representing disadvantaged clients and as a duty solicitor in the Family Court, in
NSW State Children’s Courts and in many NSW Local Courts.
In 1988, he was called to the private bar. Since then he has practiced mainly in the areas of Family Law, De facto
relationships and Child Support, together with Wills and Probate. He also works as a Mediator in Family Law financial
and parenting matters.
He has appeared in a number of significant Family Law cases including seminal cases on Family Law and De Facto
property division like Pierce and Pierce (1999) FLC 92-844 and Black v. Black (1991) DFC ¶ 95-113 and Jonah &
White [2011] FamCA 221 and more recently Sand & Sand [2012] FamCAFC 179 and Adamson & Adamson [2014]
FamCAFC 232.
www.richardmaurice.com
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