Challenging workplace inequality: precarious workers'

institutional and associational power in Gauteng, South

Africa

Thomas Englert, Carin Runciman

Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa, Volume 101, 2019,

pp. 84-104 (Article)

Published by Transformation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/trn.2019.0038

For additional information about this article

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/745636

[ Access provided at 20 May 2020 15:41 GMT from University of Pretoria ]

Article

Challenging workplace inequality: precarious

workers’ institutional and associational power
in Gauteng, South Africa1
Thomas Englert and Carin Runciman
[email protected]; [email protected]

Abstract
The world of work has been reorganised, the numbers of workers employed through
the standard employment relationship has declined and there has been an increase in
non-standard employment: labour broking, outsourcing and other forms of precarious
and temporary work. This has created highly unequal workplaces where atypical
workers perform the same work as permanent workers for often half the wages of
what a permanent worker receives. This article considers how precarious workers
are organising, outside of trade unions, to fight against workplace inequality to gain
rights to permanent work. This article develops the power resource approach (PRA)
as a lens through which to explore how labour broker workers are organising in
Gauteng. Through the analysis of two workplace case studies, the article examines
how amendments to the Labour Relations Act (LRA) in 2015 provided new rights and
a new avenue through which precarious workers could organise. The case studies
illustrate the dynamic interactions between institutional and associational power, an
often overlooked relationship , and demonstrate the multiple avenues through which
precarious workers mobilise their power to fight against inequality.

Introduction
The use of outsourced, casualised and atypical labour in South Africa has
overlaid and perpetuated the apartheid system of cheap black labour.
Today, it is estimated that four out of ten workers in the formal sector are
precarious workers (Webster and Francis 2018). Such workers are
especially vulnerable to exploitation and earn, on average, half of what a
permanent worker earns (Casim and Cassale 2018).

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 Challenging workplace inequality

The use of workers employed through temporary employment services

(TES), more commonly known as labour broking in South Africa, has been
increasing since 1995 (Theron 2005). This has been aided by the fact, as
Theron highlights, that the 1995 Labour Relations Act (LRA) entrenched
a loophole regarding the employment relations of labour broker workers.
Until 2015, Section 198 of the LRA stated that workers were ‘deemed’ to
be employees of their employer (the TES) and not the client (the company
that hires the labour broker to provide workers) (Theron 2005). The
impact of this has meant that labour brokers workers have had little
protection against unfair dismissal, as challenging a dismissal by the
client company, when they are not legally considered to be the worker’s
employer, was all but impossible (Dickinson 2017a).
Similarly, labour broker workers were also, effectively, denied their
constitutional right to strike, one of the most powerful tools that workers
have at their disposal to improve their earnings and fight inequality. The
Constitution extends the right to strike to every worker but the LRA limits
this right to employees. So labour broker workers may only strike against
their ‘employer’, the TES. Even if labour broker workers did strike, there
is little reasonable prospect of exercising the rights to bargain as their
wages and conditions are determined by the contract between the client
and the TES. Therefore, any hope of success would depend upon the
remote possibility of the TES renegotiating its contract with the client
(Theron 2005). The increased use of labour broking has been a central part
of workplace restructuring and the restructuring of the working class
post-apartheid, entrenching both poverty and inequality.
The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) has since
2006 called for a ban on labour broking. The government, led by the
African National Congress (ANC), responded to this by amending Section
198 and new rights for labour broker workers came into force in 2015. The
amendment restricted labour broking to work of a genuinely temporary
nature and required that labour broker workers become permanent workers
of the client company after three months. While this was not a ban on
labour broking, it was a significant step forward in the right to decent
work. Since the amendment came into force, thousands of labour broker
workers, generally outside of trade unions, have attempted to take up these
new rights (Rees 2019).
Through a case study analysis of two workplaces, Luxor Paints and the
Midrand Dis-Chem distribution centre, this article examines how

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precarious workers2 in South Africa have built power to challenge the

deeply unequal post-apartheid workplace. We develop our analysis through
a critical engagement with the power resources approach (PRA), to
consider how the dynamic interaction of different forms of power contest
workplace inequality. This analysis is set against a consideration of how
the growth in ‘non-core’ work has restructured the labour market and how
trade unions have largely failed to adapt to the changing world of work.

Methodology
The case studies presented here are from different industries and are of
differing workplace sizes. Luxor Paints is a family-owned paint
manufacturer located in the Jet Park industrial estate on the East Rand of
Gauteng, employing an estimated 200 workers, the majority of which
were employed by a labour broker. Dis-Chem is a high street pharmacy
chain that was founded in 1978, which has now grown to include, as of
November 2019, 149 stores across South Africa and Namibia (Dis-Chem
2019). It is listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and was valued at
R20 billion at the time of the listing (Business Report 2016). The
Midrand distribution centre employs over 1,000 workers. It is also where
the Head Offices of Dis-Chem are located and in the analysis that follows,
there are overlaps between the management of the distribution centre and
the overall management of Dis-Chem.
The seeming differences between the cases presented here may lead
some to question the comparative validity of the case studies. The strength
of presenting case studies that may, at first, appear quite different from
one another is that contextualised comparisons can help to make patterns
emerge across diverse experiences and manifestations (Locke and Thelen
1995). Comparing diverse contexts thus highlights the commonalities in
experiences across industries and across workplaces of different sizes as
well as to draw out insights that are specific to their contexts. This guards
against drawing conclusions that are narrowly confined to particular
sectors and enables us to draw better analytical insights into how workers
are organising to contest workplace inequality.
The case studies arise out of the ongoing work that both authors have
engaged in with the Casual Workers Advice Office (CWAO) and the
Simunye Workers Forum (SWF). The CWAO is a non-profit organisation
established in 2011, in Germiston, Gauteng, specifically to assist
precarious workers to organise (see Runciman and Webster 2017, Webster

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and Englert 2019). Since the 2015 LRA amendments came into force, they
have assisted over 12,000 labour broker workers to become permanent
workers (CWAO 2019). The SWF was established in 2015 by labour
broker workers from across industrial sectors as a forum in which they
could organise together around their common issues.
The article primarily draws upon group interviews with worker leaders.
Drawing on the testimonies of worker leaders has both strengths and
weaknesses. Workers leaders are often the most knowledgeable about
ongoing struggles and provide particular insights into these struggles.
However, by focussing on worker leaders we are aware that the narratives
presented here may, and are probably not, shared by all workers. The
interviews are also supplemented by the ongoing research, knowledge and
experience of the authors who have been actively involved in supporting
the struggle of workers within SWF. The research that is presented here
is therefore a product of deep and ongoing engagement with ‘comrades’
and is supplemented by relationships that extend far beyond a conventional
research project.

The restructuring of the South African labour force

Von Holdt and Webster (2005) analyse the South African labour force as
made up of three concentric circles with a core of permanent employees
in the formal economy, surrounded by a group of non-core workers, those
in precarious working conditions within the formal sector, and finally the
periphery composed of the informal and the unemployed. (Webster and
Francis 2019:17, this issue), thus challenging the idea of a dual economy
constituted by a modern and an informal sector. The three concentric
circles constitute a continuum between those that ‘earn a living’ in the
formal economy and those that have to invent their own means of subsistence
– ‘making a living’ – in the informal economy (Webster 2005). The non-
core is made up of those workers who, despite working in the formal
sector, experience uncertain and perpetually changing working conditions.
Although the conceptualisation of the core, non-core and periphery
developed by von Holdt and Webster undoubtedly adds valuable insights to
the observed reality of the South African labour market, it, perhaps,
creates a false distinction between the role of the core and non-core in the
formal workplace. Indeed, just as Webster found in 1985, that black
African migrant foundry workers played a fundamental role in the
production process, precarious workers are at the core of the production

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process today (see Webster and Englert 2019). While we may want to be
cautious about the distinctions drawn between the categories of core and
non-core workers, measuring their presence provides invaluable insight
into the changing structure of South Africa’s labour force.
Table 1: Core, non-core and periphery, 2004-2017 (millions)
2004 2017 Change
Millions % of Millions % of EAP Millions %
EAP
Core 6.6 33 8.4 34 +1.8 +27
Non-core 3.1 15 5.3 22 +2.2 +71
Periphery:

Informal 2.2 11 2.8 11 +0.6 +27

Unemployed 8.4 41 8.1 33 -0.3 -4

Total
economically 20.3 100 24.6 100 +4.3 +21
active
population
(EAP)

Source: Von Holdt and Webster (2005), Webster and Francis (2018) and Englert
(2018)

Table 1 provides an analysis of the number and percentage of workers

employed in core, non-core and periphery in the South African workforce,
although it must be stated that due to the difficulties in measuring
precarious work, all such data must be treated with caution. As Table 1
shows, the total of the economically active population (EAP) grew from
20.3 million people to 24.6 million people, an increase of 21 per cent.
While the percentage increases across the core, non-core and the periphery
can be explained, in large part, by the increase in the EAP it is also
important to note that the largest growth occurred amongst the non-core,
which increased by 71 per cent in just over ten years, over two times faster
than the formal and informal sectors. As a consequence, four out of ten
workers in the formal sector (core and non-core) can be estimated to be
precarious. This underlines the growing importance of this group of
workers in the labour process and the economy as a whole. Overall, the
large scope and increase in precarious employment makes it increasingly
difficult to consider such employment relations as ‘atypical’ (Englert
2018). Given that such workers are most likely to be denied basic labour
rights and earn considerably less than workers employed within the core,

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as argued above, the growing use of precarious labour has entrenched

poverty and inequality post-apartheid.

Labour power in precarious times

While the amendment to Section 198 of the LRA was intended to address
some of the inequalities outlined above, ultimately, the primary way in
which workers have been able to fight poverty and inequality has been
through collective action. Under conditions of capitalism, trade unions
have historically been a key vehicle through which worker rights are
fought for and working conditions improved. But the ability of trade
unions to organise to defend workers and contest working conditions
under current conditions, where work has been substantially reorganised,
has been considerably weakened. The percentage of the workforce
(excluding the agricultural sector) that is unionised has declined from a
high of 57.5 per cent in 1996 (Macun 2014: 43) to 35.1 per cent in 2019
based on data from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (StatsSA 2019).
Furthermore, the demographic of who is organised has altered considerably.
The latest COSATU survey demonstrates that 90 per cent of its membership
are permanent workers, with two thirds of those members engaged in
skilled or supervisory work (Bischoff and Tame 2017:66). The traditional
blue collar worker that was historically the base of COSATU has declined
in their significance and very few atypical workers are organised in
COSATU or any trade union.
The challenges faced by the South African trade union are not unique
and trade unions across the world confront similar issues. This has led to
the development of a body of literature focussed on trade union renewal
through the analysis of the power resources approach (PRA). As Schmalz
and his colleagues note, ‘the PRA is founded on the basic premise that
organised labour can successfully defend its interests by collective
mobilisation of power resources’ (2018:113). The PRA analyses four
forms of power. Structural power, derived from workers position in the
economic system and their ability to control, disrupt or halt production.
Associational power, the power that emerges from collectives that are
able to mobilise power in various forms. Societal power, the power that
can be derived from alliances with other actors such as social movements,
students and NGOs, to support labour demands. Lastly, institutional
power pertains to the institutional framework for labour relations, which
is itself a product of labour struggles derived from both structural and

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associational power. A wide body of literature analysing PRA in relation

to precarious workers has developed in recent times (for an overview see
Schmalz et al 2018). However, we argue that this literature is built upon
a number of key assumptions that are problematic for our analysis of
power.
Analysts and activists of the labour movement often start with the
premise that precarious workers are ‘too vulnerable’ and therefore
‘difficult to organise’ (see Horn 2014, Vulnerable Workers Task Team
2014). However, this view is often premised entirely on the difficulty of
organising precarious workers into traditional trade unions due to the
unstable conditions of their employment based on the underlying
assumption that labour broker workers move in and out of the workplace
relatively quickly. But, as our ongoing research has demonstrated, labour
broker workers are for the most part employed for relatively long periods
of time. A 2018 survey of 128 workers within the SWF demonstrated that
most had worked between one and four years in the same company. While
this is a small and not necessarily representative survey, these findings are
also confirmed by the experiences of the authors in working with the
CWAO. In our experience, labour broker workers are not flexible extras
but increasingly occupy core functions in the production process, as
argued above.
A further limitation of the PRA literature, we argue, is that it has tended
to understand the strengthening of associational power only through the
lens of trade unions (see also Sullivan 2010), neglecting an analysis of
flexible, informal and/or independent forms of associational power.
When the struggles of precarious workers are analysed using PRA, it has
tended towards focussing the analysis upon societal power as a key
resource to build precarious workers’ power (Webster and Ludwig 2017,
Wilderman 2017). This is based on a further assumption that the
restructuring of work, through the use of atypical labour, has limited the
availability of other sources of power, particularly structural power.
Although it is undeniable that deskilled workers in a high unemployment
context have less structural power than skilled workers, what is often
missing from analysis is an appreciation of the fact that such workers
increasingly occupy a central place in the production process and, as such,
have the ability to significantly disrupt production — especially in a
context where labour broker workers have either entirely replaced
permanent workers or do the same or similar jobs to permanent workers,

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as our case studies will illustrate. The distinctions that von Holdt and
Webster (2005) made between core and non-core workers no longer
strictly hold and this requires analysts to rethink structural power in
relation to precarious workers (see also Englert 2018).
While previous analysis of PRA in relation to precarious workers
struggles may have its limitations, we believe that the analytical framework
is still a useful tool for unpacking the dynamics of worker struggle for
analysts and activists alike. However, we stress, that the conceptual
framework has the most utility when the focus of analysis is between the
dynamic interactions between different sources of power. As Schmalz and
his colleagues highlight, ‘it is not so much the extent of power resources,
but rather their development and specific combinations which are crucial’
(2018:115). In the following case studies, we trace the dynamic interactions
of power as workers confronted their employers in the struggle for
permanent work. We begin by introducing the workplace case studies by
providing some contextual history, before going on to analyse how the
intersections of differing forms of power shaped the struggle within each
case.

Working as a labour broker in Luxor Paints and Dis-Chem

Labour broking has instituted a new workplace apartheid, which has
manifested itself in both the formal and informal segregation of workplaces
(see Englert 2018). Labour broker workers often use separate entrances
to permanent workers, use change rooms of inferior quality and are denied
access to workplace facilities such as break rooms and clinics (see also
Theron 2016). Formal segregation is often reinforced by informal
segregation amongst workers, as Pule, a worker at Dis-Chem explains,
the old permanent guys in the canteen they had their own tables. Even
if they are not there you can’t sit there. They had this tendency to treat
us like we are in a foreign land. (group interview, August 10, 2018).
In a context of often strong antagonisms between permanent and labour
broker workers, workers often struggle to find common ground. However,
at Luxor Paints, permanent workers and labour broker workers did find,
briefly, a cause to unite around.
At Luxor Paints, permanent workers were unionised by the Chemical,
Energy, Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers’ Union (CEPPWAWU),
while the labour broker workers were not unionised. The labour broker
workers say that the union never approached them to organise them and

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that management banned meetings with the permanents. As Khongelani

says, ‘our constitutional rights to form or to join a trade union were
violated… To survive was individual choice to accept victimisation,
oppression and violation of your rights as a worker’ (group interview, July
26, 2018).
Despite this, in 2012, the permanent workers under CEPPWAWU
embarked on a strike for better wages and managed to convince the non-
unionised labour broker workers to join them in exchange for including
the demand that they be made permanent workers. Although labour broker
workers were not convinced that the permanent workers would keep to
their word, the labour broker workers joined the permanents on strike.
Unfortunately, these fears were well founded when management made an
offer to the permanent workers to end the strike. Management gave the
permanent workers a choice between a pay increase of R200 and 20 labour
broker workers a year being made permanent, or a higher increase with no
labour broker workers being made permanent. They chose the latter in a
closed meeting from which the labour broker workers were excluded.
After the meeting, the permanents told the labour broker workers ‘at least
you still have a job’ (Khongelani, group interview, July 26, 2018). What
the experience at Luxor Paints highlights is the contingent way in which
the concerns of labour broker workers are used to ultimately advance the
demands of permanent workers.
In comparison, at Dis-Chem most workers were no longer unionised
following a three month strike in 2010, led by the South African
Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union (SACCAWU), that had
a crushing impact on workers. The strike became disruptive, at times,
leading to the arrest of workers (News24 2010). The strike ended without
any of the union’s demands being met, leaving the workers demoralised
and fearful of organising. It also resulted in workers leaving the union
without joining any other. Although most of the labour broker workers
were employed after the strike, this legacy impacted upon them too,
creating an atmosphere in which workers were scared to organise.

Realising power: the interaction of associational and institutional

power
When the amendment to Section 198 came into effect in 2015, the
differing histories of workplace struggles and the dynamic interactions of
power encountered by workers shaped their responses. At Luxor Paints,

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the labour broker workers joined the National Union of Metalworkers of

South Africa (NUMSA), the union now organising the permanents, in
2015, after the organiser approached them about their new rights. However,
they were never fully integrated into the union as all the shop stewards
were permanent workers and the labour broker workers did not have a
representative. Despite this, the NUMSA organiser negotiated with
management and came back with an offer, which would make them
permanent workers but not equalise their wages with that of existing
permanent workers. The organiser encouraged the workers to accept the
offer, arguing that once they were permanent, he would be able to negotiate
for better wages.
At the same time, some workers had seen the CWAO ‘Big New Rights’
pamphlet and a delegation of workers attended a general meeting at the
CWAO, prior to the formation of the SWF. The delegation came back with
a positive report that there were many workers from different companies
at the meeting, and they were advised by a CWAO organiser that they
should be made permanent and equalised. Armed with this knowledge, the
workers were reluctant to accept the deal negotiated by the NUMSA
organiser and pursued the matter with the regional office bearers. However,
the office bearers agreed with the organiser that they should accept the
offer from management. When workers raised the possibility of opening
a case at the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration
(CCMA), the organiser said that it was not possible as ‘the case doesn’t
have a name’. The organiser and the regional office bearers seemed
unaware that the workers could, indeed, open a case at the CCMA to access
their rights. Disappointed, the labour broker workers left NUMSA and
began to organise themselves. With support from CWAO, they opened a
case at the CCMA.
The amendments to Section 198 provided workers with new rights that
provided the impetus for workers to begin to organise. As one worker
reflected, in a context of highly unequal and divided workplaces, the
institutional power provided by the amendments was not enough on its
own:
When this thing of Section 198 came into be it give a little bit power to
the workers, but for those who wanted to force it to work, because the
laws can be there but if you don’t force it to work you can be exploited.
(Joshua, group interview, July 26, 2018)

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Recognising the need to build associational power that they had not found
in unions, the labour broker workers formed a workplace forum. The
forum had an elected chairperson, a secretary and treasurer, and they
adopted a simple constitution that had been suggested by CWAO. Workers
met twice a week, Tuesdays and Thursdays, during their lunch break, in
front of the company.
In contrast to Luxor Paints, both permanent and labour broker workers
were largely unorganised at Dis-Chem. In their case, the fight around
Section 198 rights began ‘in secret’ (group interview, August 10, 2018),
when a group of 17 night shift workers approached CWAO to open a case
at the CCMA. Employer responses to workers’ demands that their rights
be enforced was, inevitably, crucial in shaping the associational power of
workers.

Employer responses
Employer responses to the implementation of Section 198 differ and play
a crucial role in shaping the emergence of associational power.
Management at Luxor Paints deployed multiple tactics to delay and
frustrate workers. After the case was referred to the CCMA, the company
registered at the National Bargaining Council for the Chemical Industry
(hereafter referred to as the bargaining council) and successfully argued
that the CCMA, therefore, had no jurisdiction over the case, forcing the
workers to file a new dispute at the bargaining council. These delaying
tactics were used by Luxor management to taunt and demoralise workers.
Management also began to target individual workers, mainly those it knew
were financially vulnerable, to get them to sign the deal NUMSA had
negotiated. This tactic was used throughout the process and 21 workers
eventually succumbed and became known as the ‘600s’, a reference to the
pay increase they had accepted.
Despite the intimidation and delaying tactics used by management, at
the first conciliation at the bargaining council, the employer indicated that
they were willing to take the workers permanently and negotiations began.
Workers say that the employer now seemed keen to negotiate as it had
realised that the ‘legal way’ would be costlier for them, having to pay for
lawyers, compared to the workers that received free legal assistance from
CWAO.
The workers elected an ad hoc negotiating team who would also liaise
with CWAO during the negotiation. The initial offer from the company

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was still only an offer to ‘top up’ the salary, a top up that would not even
meet the bargaining council minimum wage, technically a labour law
violation, and was far from equalising pay with the permanent workers. The
company kept up the pressure on the workers to accept the deal. Aside
from targeting individual workers, they offered one of the negotiators a
supervisory position, an offer that was eventually accepted with the
agreement of the other workers, but this was, of course, not without its
tensions. Furthermore, during the negotiations, the company called in a
‘CCMA commissioner’ to explain their rights to them.
They said he was from CCMA [that he] was coming to clarify the issue
of Section 198, [but] he was just a bogus guy, they just found him in the
street just to come to lie to us… Immediately…this guy, we can see ‘hai,
this one.’ We say ‘comrade! let us go back to work. These people are
wasting our time’. (Desmond, group interview, July 27, 2017)
When the workers understood that it was a ‘fake commissioner’, they
walked out of the room. This episode was an important moment for the
workers, gaining knowledge on their rights had translated into a new-found
confidence and power at work:
That’s where we started to call our self the permanents of Luxor Paint
[sic], without even getting the contract because that’s when we started
to say ‘comrades, we no longer need Transman [the TES] in this
company because the law says we are permanent now.’ So every time
those people of Transman come we used to chase them away. (Desmond,
group interview, July 27, 2017)
The workers now refused to engage with the labour broker, who was
offering improved pay and conditions, they only wanted to talk to their
employer, Luxor Paints.
The workers went for arbitration in May 2016 but before the arbitration
award was made, the company agreed to make the workers permanent and
to equalise their pay and conditions with the permanents. In addition, the
workers would also receive back pay for what the company should have
paid them since 2015; the equalisation and back pay was staggered over
three months. Despite entering into an agreement, the employer tried one
last time to frustrate the workers by trying to apply different salaries to the
workers. Empowered by their experiences, the workers did not hesitate to
go immediately back to the bargaining council to ensure the employer
honoured the settlement agreement it had entered into with the workers.
By February 2017, all 65 remaining workers were permanent workers of

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Luxor under equal conditions and with back pay.

At Dis-Chem, the case of the 17 workers went for conciliation at the
CCMA and at the conciliation Dis-Chem agreed to take the workers
permanently in a phased approach, with workers with the longest years of
service being made permanent first. However, the company also only
agreed to make workers permanent who had opened a case at the CCMA.
Despite the fact that workers had won the right to permanent work, many
were still fearful to bring a case, as Matla explains:
some were scared to open the dispute. They thought they would be fired
if they opened a dispute against the company... They were scared to
challenge the company until they saw some getting permanent jobs.
That’s when they said ‘eish let’s try’… Most of employees at Dis-Chem,
it’s their first job so they don’t want to lose it. (group interview, August
10, 2018)
Inexperience of organising and fear resulted in over 20 different cases
being referred to the CCMA. This fear was exacerbated when management
started taking workers for polygraph tests and dismissed two workers,
who were subsequently reinstated with the assistance of CWAO. However,
rather than cowing the workers, the experience of fighting against the
polygraph test gave them new courage, ‘by conquering polygraphy it meant
that one day we would be permanent’ (Tebogo, group interview, August 10,
2018).

Building and maintaining power after Section 198

After becoming permanent, the workers faced different challenges in
building and maintaining associational power and in uniting with the ‘old’
permanent workers. In Luxor Paints, the new permanents tried to build
unity with the other workers, the old permanents and ‘600s’, but the
entrenched divisions were not necessarily easy to overcome. The forum
organised several discussions between its representatives and the old
permanent workers. The old permanent workers proposed to change
union, leaving NUMSA, and have all workers join a new union, the General
Industrial Workers Union of South Africa (GIWUSA). The forum members,
however, felt stronger than ever and did not want to join any union. The 65
workers that won the Section 198 case thus stayed in the forum and kept
meeting. They were joined by some of the ‘600s’ and a few of the old
permanents. However, most of the old permanents and the ‘600s’ joined
GIWUSA.

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Despite the fact that most of the workers joined GIWUSA, the forum
continued and was used to resolve immediate workplace issues. Problems
were discussed during the two weekly meetings and representatives sent
to management. Their most notable achievement was to get the company
to correct – after going to the bargaining council – the vacation days
workers were entitled to during the December holiday period, when the
workplace was closed. The forum was an effective way to address workplace
issues, one that even management came to respect, according to the
worker leaders.
While Dis-Chem management had agreed to make workers permanent,
it reneged on the conditions. The settlement agreement had stated that
workers would continue to work the same hours as they had previously
done and that their pay and conditions would be equalised with that of
existing permanent staff. However, this did not happen. Shifts were
changed, hours increased but with no increase in pay, and pay was not
equalised. In addition to this, management continually brought workers
into disciplinary proceedings after its failed intimidation attempts with
the polygraph tests. The reaction of management after workers had been
made permanent provided the impetus to organise, in this case.
Initially, workers attempted to organise in a workplace forum, similar
to Luxor Paints workers. However, the history and conditions of the
workplace made this more challenging. As most of the workers had
become permanent simply through adding their name to a list, worker
leaders found it difficult to convince workers about the need for a
workplace forum. Furthermore, workers have restricted access to the
workplace and cannot freely move around, as access passes restrict
workers to certain areas, a challenge not encountered in the smaller Luxor
Paints.
Workers decided that a union would be able to overcome these
difficulties as well as being able to bargain, as Tebogo explains, ‘the
purpose of the union was… to organise us and then to give us shape
because we were scattered... they would never believe in us, that we can
organise them. But through the union, when they see that powerful union,
they get hope’ (group interview, August 10, 2018). Within a period of less
than a year, workers joined and left two unions, eventually joining a third
union, the National Union of Public Service and Allied Workers
(NUPSAW). However, workers have not relied on the union alone and
employ a dynamic mix of organising strategies. Workers describe their

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associational power as involving ‘three pillars’ (Runciman fieldnotes,

May 19, 2018): NUPSAW, CWAO and the Economic Freedom Fighters
(EFF), of which many of the young workers are members. The three pillars
reflect the dynamic mix of strategies which workers are using to build
associational power, a mix that does not rely on the traditional model of
associational power, the trade union, alone.
The union, NUPSAW, is viewed with a mixture of scepticism and hope.
Workers wanted to join the union not only to build unity in their own
workplace, but also with the high-street stores. But workers were also
sceptical about the union and saw it as their role to push it rather than to
rely on union officials:
That union, without us it won’t even function. They are comfortable…
this union is failing, it needs pushing – we are just pushing it… it’s not
necessarily the union doing the work, it’s us as workers… We are the
ones frustrating the employer under the name of the union. (Pule, group
interview, August 10, 2018)

After less than a year of union membership, the notion that the union
was failing, largely because it had yet to win workplace recognition, was
a common sentiment expressed in worker meetings. Workers recognise
that their associational power is derived from them as workers and not the
union. CWAO and SWF continue to play an important role in providing
workers with information on their rights and to support their organisation,
even though they are union members.
While the union continues to fight for recognition, CWAO continues
to take up many of the shopfloor issues that workers encounter including
the fight for equalisation, which the union has largely ignored. Employing
both the union and CWAO is a deliberate strategy by workers to overwhelm
management, as Tebogo explains,
As NUPSAW, we tabled our demands, whereby one of the demands is
a living wage of R12,500. And we want better working conditions... The
other thing is that with CWAO, we are challenging this settlement
agreement. So now the boss is focussing on NUPSAW… So as soon as
the 20th, we sit with the union, he (management) will think ‘my problem
are solved I promised the union members that I’ll give them R1, 000’. And
then during the course of that week, he will receive an email saying ‘hey,
we want you again’. So his problems will grow day by day. (group
interview, August 10, 2018)

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However, through the experience of a strike with NUPSAW in January

2018, workers also recognise the limits of what can be achieved through
conventional means. When workers were dismissed for misconduct during
a strike in 2018, the workers turned to their ‘secret weapon’, the EFF.
When things fall apart and Simunye can’t do anything and the union can’t
do anything, our last option is EFF… There are other things that the EFF
can do to speed up the process. They will revoke the union’s license if
they go illegally to the store to march. So EFF can do that… The only
weapon we have is EFF. We use it when we run out of questions or
options. (Pule, group interview, August 10, 2018)
Following the dismissal, the EFF held two demonstrations occupying the
outside of two stores near to the distribution centre, in Carlswald and the
Mall of Africa (Midrand Reporter 2018). While EFF members were
singing and toyi-toying outside the Mall of Africa store, Dis-Chem
management phoned the EFF requesting that they come and meet with
them. The EFF and the workers then negotiated for the reinstatement of
the dismissed workers.
The reinstatement has had a powerful effect on the balance of workplace
power and relations. In the absence of workplace recognition for the
union, worker leaders have had to assist fellow workers in disciplinary
hearings, with worker leaders boasting that they have never lost one. This
has had a significant impact on the day-to-day power relations. Before
workers were made permanent, Dis-Chem was described by Tebogo as a
‘yes boss’ situations, where they say you jump, you don’t ask how high, you
just jump’ (group interview, August 10, 2018). Now, as Pule reflects, ‘he
[the supervisor] avoids giving warnings because he knows we will retaliate…
We understand that we have power’ (group interview, August 10, 2018).

Conclusion
The focus of this article has been to consider how, in the context of a
weakened trade union movement, workers organise to fight against the
inequalities they experience at work. The two case studies provide a
situated and relational analysis of how different sources of power have
unfolded in the struggle for labour broker workers to become permanent
workers. Both cases provide insight into the state of contemporary
workplaces in South Africa, where the workplace is divided and fragmented
socially and, often, structurally. Labour broker workers are frequently
not, as is often assumed, itinerant workers who transition through different

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workplaces frequently. In both cases, labour broker workers had worked

for years at the same workplace. This highlights that these are not the
flexible extras employers portray them to be, but that they occupy core
functions of the production process. Labour broker workers are
marginalised through lower wages, and their marginalisation is reinforced
both by management and other permanent workers through excluding them
either formally or informally from canteens and other facilities. These
dynamics of exclusion over status and working conditions divide the
workers and make mobilising and organising difficult. Our cases show
how these phenomena unfold in relatively different workplaces, and thus
point to deeper trends in the reshaping of workplace dynamics.
This situation is either not challenged, ineffectively challenged, or, at
times, actively enforced by unions as the Luxor Paints case study illustrates,
as well as similar case studies at Heineken and the South African Post
Office (see Dickinson 2017a, 2017b, Englert 2018). While unions may
often begin to recruit labour broker workers, they ultimately privilege the
demands of permanent workers, fail to properly incorporate them into the
union and even compromise the interests of labour broker workers.
It is against this context that the institutional power granted by the
amendment to Section 198 provided a powerful resource through which to
challenge the workplace inequality caused by labour broking. In both cases
the institutional power provided by the amendment to Section 198 provided
the impetus for workers to start to organise. The institutional power
provided by the amendment to Section 198 opened the door to building or
consolidating workplace organisation. In this perspective, the two case
studies show that associational power should not be understood solely as
formalised organisations. Indeed, the flexible form of the Luxor workers’
forum and the networks of workers that launched successive collective
cases at Dis-Chem show that associational power takes on various forms.
The trajectories of the struggles at both workplaces highlight the
dynamic mix of power resources at play. The strength of organising from
below is recognised both by the Dis-Chem and the Luxor workers. At
Luxor, the workers retained their independent forum and co-existed with
the union. At Dis-Chem, joining a union was seen as the best way to build
unity in a divided and fragmented workplace. But at Dis-Chem, workers
also use their newly forged associational power to keep pressure on the
union and recognise that the strength of any worker organisation lies in the
hands of workers themselves. Gaining knowledge of worker rights was

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crucial for building workers confidence and associational power. In

addition, Dis-Chem workers were able to utilise a mix of associational and
societal power against their employer, who had a consumer brand to worry
about – a strategy that would prove less effective against a small paint
manufacturer in a subsequent strike at Luxor Paints (see Hlungwani and
Runciman 2019).
Finally, the two cases highlight how labour struggles are being initiated
by precarious workers themselves. It shows how workers’ organisation
from below allows them to oppose changing mixes of power resources to
the inequalities and injustices of the workplace. In addition, both cases
highlight the relational nature of power resources. This should alert
against a tendency in the literature to use the PRA as a checklist rather than
as an analytical tool to understand how workers’ power is built in specific
contexts. In addition, we show that associational power should be
understood as a continuum between a loose informal network and formally
structured organisational forms, rather than the excessive focus on the
latter of most of the existing PRA literature. Our two case studies show
that the mainstream assumption that precarious workers should be organised
by permanents and their unions might not always be true. In fact, in both
cases, it is the precarious workers’ dynamism and struggle that initiate
action in the workplace rather than the opposite. This questions some of
the assumptions that are made about the direction from which potentials
for union renewal may come.

Notes
1. The authors would like to thank the workers of Luxor Paints, Dis-Chem and the
Simunye Workers Forum for sharing their struggles with us. We also wish to thank
the staff of the Casual Workers Advice Office for their comradeship in supporting
this research. Funding for the research was provided by the Southern Centre for
Inequality Studies, University of the Witwatersrand. Editorial support was kindly
provided by Terri Maggott. All errors are our own.
2. In recent times, there has been an increase in the use of the term ‘precarious’ to
describe a range of employment relationships such as labour broking, fixed-term
contract work, on-demand work or forms of so-called self-employment. However,
as Alberti and her colleagues (2018) highlight, there is also a need to understand
that precarious labour is not defined solely by contract status but also by the
‘subjective feeling of precarity’ (2018:49) engendered by forms of insecure work.
Therefore in our usage of precarious here we mean both the form of work and
the subjectivities it creates (see also Barchiesi 2011).

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