G.R. No.

L-24803 May 26, 1977

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as

Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural
Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.

Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.

Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.

BARREDO, J.:

Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated
January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald
Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the
complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant
Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his
father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting
subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named
Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused
was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack
of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."

Actually, the motion to dismiss was based on the following grounds:

1. The present action is not only against but a violation of

section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of the Revised
Rules of Court;
[What is Rule 111 Rules of court Philippines?
"1. Under Rule 111 of the 1964 Rules of Court, the civil liability arising
from the offense charged was impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, unless such civil action was expressly waived or reserved.]
 2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final
and or in res-adjudicata;

3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant

Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as guardian of the other
defendant through emancipation by marriage.

(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])

was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for
reconsideration of the defendants of such denial, reiterating the above
grounds that the following order was issued:

Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the

defendants on January 14, 1965 and after thoroughly
examining the arguments therein contained, the Court finds the
same to be meritorious and well-founded.

WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is

hereby reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of the above
entitled case.

SO ORDERED.

Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p.
21, Record on Appeal.)

Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are

presenting for Our resolution the following assignment of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY

UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT -

THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A

VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE
REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE
111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;
 II

THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS

NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;

III

THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194

OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT
CASE; and

IV

THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION

AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS
RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT
THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)

It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants,

defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal
Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial,
he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of
"lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the
parties has favored Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably
because appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in
the court's decision. And so, when appellants filed their complaint against
appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the
death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss above-referred
to.

As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues
presented for Our resolution are:

1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of

Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not
reversed?

2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied
against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of
the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and
getting subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?

The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration
and further clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or
negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly established in this
jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court
postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on
the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito  and
mere culpa  or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence
of our own, that the same given act can result in civil liability not only
under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion
holds:

The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same

act machinist. come under both the Penal Code and the Civil
Code. In that case, the action of the agent killeth unjustified
and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a
criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject
of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to
be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who
was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1

It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could

have been prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence
causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal
Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of
negligence being a proper subject matter either of a criminal
action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or
of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or
negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this
jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito  or culpa
aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly
recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the
wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a
criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could
have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime. (p.
617, 73 Phil.) 2

It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court

specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that
although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for
reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also
made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence,
nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent
civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil
Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3

The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should

ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as
we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood,
in the past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate their
foundations.

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only
reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal
import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution
of culpa aquiliana  would have very little scope and application
in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to
property- through any degree of negligence - even the
slightest - would have to be Idemnified only through
the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such
a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-
delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the
lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd
and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws,
disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit
that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to
smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient
origin and such full-grown development as culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made
enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case,
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required,
while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There
are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be
shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a
preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can
and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles
1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there would be
many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus
Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both

the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has
given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and
efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up
a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of
the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting
that there is another remedy, which is by invoking
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual
method is allowed by, our laws, it has nevertheless rendered
practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and
effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-
contractual.

In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual

course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the
harms done by such practice and to restore the principle of
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq.
of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the
stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own
natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted
into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is
believed, make for the better safeguarding or private rights
because it realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for
the further reason that an independent civil action, not
depending on the issues, limitations and results of a
 criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party
wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure
adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)

Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the

foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the
Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of
negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would
reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but
that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the
reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of
February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not
a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force
here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations "which are
derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable
by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book
(which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline
qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized
could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter
of the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift-
hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to
smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and
such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil
Code." And so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code
Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it
is to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the
Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not punishable by
law," thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa
aquiliana  includes acts which are criminal in character or in
violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the
corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is
Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto  shall be
governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-
delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177
of the new code provides:
 ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under
the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice
for the same act or omission of the defendant.

According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177)

through at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we
consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The
former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa
aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own
foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such
distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or
"cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an
outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article
2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil
action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but
for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said
article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p.
162.)

Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of
negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that
upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that
killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same.
And considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the
new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and
independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in
character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility
arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111,
contemplate also the same separability, it is "more congruent
with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony
with modern progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant language
in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co. , 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do
hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia
covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal
in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming
the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of
civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We
here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana  includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.4

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal

case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that
acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's

emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty.
Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the
conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from
responsibility cannot be upheld.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of

the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation
takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also
clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of
the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by
marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over
the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as
though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or
encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or
guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance
of his father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176
is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." In the
instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was
living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the
occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still
subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is
not unusual.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind

the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their offending child
under Article 2180 is that the obligation of the parent to supervise their
minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third
persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in
providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless,
sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such
emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or
do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II,
pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action.
Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the
parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor,
does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and
alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done
by their minor married child without their consent. (Art. 399;
Manresa, supra.)

Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill

notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald.
However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as
a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling,
subsidiary to that of his son.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is
ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs
against appellees.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.

Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.

Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second Division.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J,  concurring:

Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is
blameworthy, when judged by accepted legal standards. "The Idea thus
expressed is undoubtedly board enough to include any rational conception
of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any society."
(Street, J. in Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil.
587, 600). See article 38, Civil Code and the ruling that "the infant
tortfeasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person in the same
manner and to the same extent as an adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 cited by
Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs. Tiangco, 74 Phil. 576, 579).
 

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J, concurring:

Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is blameworthy, when judged by
accepted legal standards. "The Idea thus expressed is undoubtedly board enough to include any
rational conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any society." (Street, J. in
Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600). See article 38, Civil Code
and the ruling that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person in the same
manner and to the same extent as an adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs.
Tiangco, 74 Phil. 576, 579).

Footnotes
1 Referring to Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919.

2 Referring to Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil. 821.

3 Referring to Bernal et al, vs. House et al., 54 Phil. 327.

4 Parenthetically, Manresa seemingly holds. the contrary view thus:

"Sin embargo, para no ineurrir en error hay que tener en cuenta que los lineage. del
precepts contenido en el presente articulo son bastante mas reducidos, pues no se
hallan comprendidos en el todos los datios que pues tener por causa la culpa o la
negligencia.

"En efecto, examinando detenidamente la terminos general de la culpa y de la

negligencia. se observe que, tanto en una como en otra de dichas causas, hay tres
generoso o tres especies distintas, a saber:

1. La que represents una accion u omision voluntaria por la que results incumplida
una obligacion anteriormente constituida.

2. La que sin existencia de una obligacion anterior produce un dano o perjuicio que,
teniendo su origen en un hecho ilicito, no reviste los caracteres de delito o falta; y

3. La que teniendo por origen un hecho que constituya delito o falta produce una
responsabilidad civil como accesoria de la responsabilidad criminal.

"La primera de estas tres especies de culpa o negligencia es siempre accesoria de

una obligacion principal, cuyo incumplimiento da origen a la terminos especial de la
culpa en materia de contratos, y el eatudio de esta debe harms al examinar cada
contrato, en especial, como lo hicimos asi, analizando entoces los peculiares efectos
de dicha culpa en cada uno de ellos.

"La tercera de las especies citadas es accesoria tambien, pues no puede concebirse
su existencia sin la de un delicto o falts que la produzca. Es decir, que solo al lado
de la responsabilidad criminal puede supuesto esa responsabilidad civil y la
obligacion proveniente de la culpa, ineurrir como una consecuencia de la
responsabilidad criminal, y, por consiguente, su examen y regulacion perusal. al
Derecho penal.

"Como consecuencia de ello, results que la unica especie de culpa y omisiones o

negligencia que puede ser y es meanwhile.' del presente capitulo, es la separability,
o sea la que sin la existencia de una obligacion anterior, y sin ningun antecedents
contractual, produce un dano o perjuico que tiene su origen en una accion u omision
culpable solo civilmente; as decir, que siendo ilicita, no reviste sin embargo, los
caracteres de un delito o falta por no estar penada por la ley. Y aun dentro de estos
lineage hay que restringir aun mas los terminos o la materia propria de este articulo,
el cual se refiere unicamente a la culpa o negligencia personates del obligado, pero
no a las que prudencia de actos o de omisiones de persons., distintas de este." (pp.
642-643, Vol. XII, Manresa, Codigo Civil Espanol.)
5 "Nuestro Codigo no ha seguido la escuela italiana, sino que mas bien se ha
instantaneous, en el criterio de la doctrina full-grown puesto que impone la
obligacion de reparar, el dano causado en virtud de una presuncion juris tecum de
culpa por parte del que tiene bajo su autoridad o dependecia al causante del daho,
derivada del hicimos de no haber puesto el cuidado y la vinculos debida en los actos
de sus subordinados para evitar dicho resultado. Asi es que, segun el parrafo ultimo
del art. 1,903, cesa dicha responsabilidad cuando se prueba que los obligados por
los actos ajenos emplearon toda la diligencia de un buen padre de familia. Luego no
es la causa de la obligacion impuesta la representacion, ni el interes, ni la necesidad
de que haya quienes responda del dano causado por el que no tiene personalidad in
garantias de specialist. para responsabilidad por siendo sino el incumplimiento
implicito o supuesto de los deberes de precaucion y de prudencia que impuesta los
vinculos civiles que unicamente al obligado con las persons., por quienes debe
representacion, el mal causado, Por ese motivo coloca dicha obligacion entre las
que prudencia de la culpa of negligentj (pp. 670671, Manresa, Codigo Civil Espanol,
Vol. XII.)