Rene Descartes' "Meditation of the First Philosophy" is written as a firsthand account of thoughts which

occurred to Descartes in the course of six days (meditation per day) in which he withdrew from the world
in order to find a firm and proven basis for his understanding of reality.

Descartes opens "Meditation" with an apologetic statement (perhaps in fear of the Inquisition), explaining
that he does not promote heresy but rather a deeper devotion and a way for skeptics (abounded in
Descartes' times) to come back to religion.

The first meditation of the book starts from this skeptic approach and Descartes describes how many
things he held to be true turned out the be wrong. He sets his task as finding something which cannot be
doubted to be true, arguing that this thing can be the secure a stable basis for constructing valid
knowledge of the world. This move draws on Descartes' need for an established method to inquire into
reality, discussed in his "Discourse on the Method".

Descartes establishes his skepticism by methodically exploring the origins of knowledge, doubting them
all in order to find out what remains beyond all doubt. He rules out the senses which can be deceiving, but
also our ability for non-empirical knowledge. To end the debate, Descartes offers the thought of a
malicious demon which constantly fools us. Since the demon hypothesis cannot be univocally defeated,
Descartes finds himself in the end of meditation 1 unable to know anything.

Descartes continues to wonder if he himself in fact exists. He gives his famous answer (the cogito)
holding that I for sure exist. Deceived and erroneous as I may, there is still an "I" who is wrong and
deceived (and in the famous formulation: "I thing therefore I am").

Existing is good, but Descartes wonders what else I can know about reality. The following thing after
proving the self is proving that God Exists. in the later chapters of "Meditation" Descartes gives three
philosophical proofs of God's existence. The important thing about God for Descartes is that his
benevolent and eternal perfection are a source of validation to all I know. This knowledge for Descartes is
not the dogmatic church but rather the inner individual capacity for rational thought, a type of methodical
proof-seeking type of thought he calls science.

In the first mediation of René Descartes' "Mediations on the First Philosophy" (titled: "On the things
that may be called Into doubt") He introduces his project of building a new edifice of scientific and
philosophical knowledge using his method of doubt (first proposed in his "Discourse on the Method").
According to Descartes neither the senses nor reason can be trusted so long as it possible that we are
mistaken about their deliverance. We are familiar with everyday errors in perception and this should
suggest, in this extreme philosophical enterprise, that we reject the evidence of the senses entirely, since
they are not infallible. Yet there is surely a difference between a local mistake, such as seeing a square
tower as round in the distance, and a global mistake, which would be when everything we experience is
mistaken. But since any veridical sensory experience could be reproduced as a dream, if there is no means
of distinguishing dreaming from wakefulness, we cannot be sure whether experience faithfully reflects a
world beyond the mind or not. The dreaming hypothesis would leave knowledge of such things as
mathematical truths alone, for they are no less true in dreams. Yet, Descartes holds, if there could be an
malicious demon with full control over my mind, then he could deceive me constantly, for the certainty
that naturally attends even the simplest of thoughts, such as that 2+2=4, could be nothing more than his
making me feel certain. It therefore appears I can be certain of nothing and this is the point in which
meditation 1 ends.

In Meditation 1 Descartes presents his radical doubt and its consequences on our ability to know
anything. In a sense Descartes breaks down reality and knowledge for the purpose of reconstructing it on
firmer, more scientific grounds. The next meditation will try to do just that but in order to do so Descartes
needs to find his base, of what he calls his " Archimedean point" of certainty which is to su bject of
meditation 2.

In the second mediation of René Descartes' "Mediations on the First Philosophy" (titled: "On the nature
of the human mind and that it is easier to understand than bodies") he establishes his Archimedean point
of certainty, the Cogito and shows that, contrary to common belief, we know the mind better than we
know the world around us (assuming that there is one, doubts still remain at this point of Descartes'
argument). In Meditation 1 Descartes offered the "Demon argument" which holds that we can never know
if a malicious demon is not tricking us into believing what we hold to be true. Now, in meditation 2,
Descartes argues that regardless of how cunning the demon is, he cannot make me think I do not exist,
since the apprehension of that thought will make one aware that one is thinking it. Hence one cannot fail
to be certain that one exists just when one is thinking (and here comes the famous formulation of the
Cogito: "I think therefore I am"). Descartes knows he is at least a mind – a thinking thing. To think in this
extended sense is not merely to cogitate but to have any kind of mental act. The distinctness of mind and
body is revealed, as mind is not extended and body is; yet Descartes admits he cannot yet tell whether this
is a real or merely conceptual distinction. By bringing a piece of wax near a fire, Descartes argues that
bodies are not perceived by the senses but by the intellect. The wax loses all the sensible properties it had
and gains new ones. If it were nothing more than the sum of these properties, we would have to conclude
that one object had been destroyed and another created. The intellect understands the essence of body to
be spatial extension, which is preserved (if modified) over the change of sensible properties.

After establishing his point of certainty in meditation 2 and escaping some of the radical doubt of
meditation 1, Descartes' meditation 3 will continue to reconstruct the world with a little help from God.

In the third mediation of René Descartes' "Mediations on the First Philosophy" (titled: " On the
existence of God ") Descartes establishes the principle that anything which can be clearly and distinctly
perceived by the natural light is true and uses this to establish that God exists. In meditation 2 Descartes
establishes that he in fact exists (after raising some concerns in meditation 1). In meditation 3 Descartes
notes that he finds himself with an idea of God in his mind and asks what is the cause of this idea? For
Descartes a cause must have as least as much reality as its effect. Since Descartes or any other finite being
has less finite reality than God, only God could be the cause of his idea about God (see separate summary
of Descartes' proofs of God). This means for Descartes that God must exists. Descartes then wonders, by
way of continuation, whether he could exist with his idea of God if God didn’t exist? He argues that he
could not have brought himself into existence, for only a perfect being could do this and he recognizes
that he is not perfect (that's very modest of Descartes, but let's remember that he claims to have written
"Mediation on the First Philosophy" in 6 days very much like someone else who crated his world in such
a time span). Descartes could have been brought into existence by his parents, but this merely forces us to
ask how they came into existence. Eventually, we will need to recognize a being with a higher degree of
reality. So God must exist to be the cause of our existence. As for the idea of God, we know it can’t be an
invention of my mind, since my mind is limited and God is not. It could be something I have picked up
from others but this too forces the question of whether they got it from. Descartes concludes meditation 3
with the assertion that we are born with the idea of God. God himself places the idea of himself in us as a
craftsman puts his mark on his work.

After doubting the world in mediation 1 and then finding a basis for it (the self) in meditation 2,
Descartes' mediation 3 brings god into to picture so that we may believe in a little bit more than just our
own existence. In meditation 4 we will see how Descartes uses God to reassure us of a reality.

In the fourth mediation of René Descartes' "Mediations on the First Philosophy" (titled: "on truth and
falsity") Descartes investigates how it is that we can make mistakes. This should be understood in
relation to mediation 1 in which he doubted everything he knows and gave strong evidence to not being
able to trust our knowledge since we are always in possible error. Mediation 2+3 reconstructed our
assurance of reality but in now remains to be understood how is it that we make mistakes. Since God is
perfect (as suggested in mediation 3), he cannot be deceiving me (as suggested in meditation 1). For the
same reason, he could not have given me some faculty of making mistakes (such as misjudging or
misapprehension). Similarly, nor could have he given me imperfect faculties for detecting the truth.
Finally, for Descartes it must be in God’s power to have made me such that I never erred. Yet it is
obvious that I do make mistakes. How is this? For Descartes in meditation 4 it is because of a difference
between the understanding and the will. When I consider, I exercise my will, for I must choose what I am
to judge and want to do it and then my understanding, in making the judgement. So long as I use my
understanding correctly, I will never make mistakes, for God has given me a faculty of clear and distinct
perception (this is partly why Descartes is credited with fathering science). Mistakes arise when my will
extends beyond my understanding: when I make a judgement without subjecting what I am judging to my
understanding. This is what occurs when we jump to conclusions, trust appearances, and choose without
thinking of the consequences, for example. Should we say that God’s error lies in giving me such a will?
No, for God has given us free will, which is a sign of his benevolence, and free will does not come in
degrees, so it is not as if he could have given us two faculties, the understanding and the will, whose
limits exactly coincide.

After devoting meditation 4 to explaining why we make mistakes and how we can avoid them, Descartes'
meditation 5 takes us to our relationship with the material world (also questioned in meditation 1), where
we meet God again.

In the fifth mediation of René Descartes' "Mediations on the First Philosophy" (titled: " On the essence
of material things and the existence of God once more") Descartes finds the essence of material things to
be extension, this train of thought leading him to another proof of God’s existence, and explains finally
the role of God in his philosophy. Being a rationalist, Descartes reflects on how he can discover truths by
examining the essence of things, regardless of whether they exist. Yet God is such (and the only such
thing) that necessary existence belongs to his essence. The concept of God contains within it the notion of
perfection and eternity and therefore it cannot not exist for non-existence is opposed to perfection and
eternity (see separate summary of Descartes' proofs of God). So reflection on God’s essence shows that
he exists, necessarily. (Descartes warns us not to not to think that God’s existence depends on our
reflecting on this, God precedes our perception of it and in fact enables it). Observing finally how it is not
evident that the square of the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of
the other two sides, Descartes remarks that once discovered, it should be that we do not need to go over
the proof each time to know this. So long as we have just clear and distinct perception as a touchstone for
truth, we could not avoid doing so. If we have proved the existence of a benevolent God, then we have
greater security in our material reality. A conviction that a certain truth is evident because we have once
proved them is grounded by His existence. In other words, we don’t need to worry about an evil demon
constantly fooling us. We can therefore engage in the practice Descartes calls science.

Descartes' meditation 5 is another step in reconstructing our image of the world doubted in meditation 1.
Meditation 2 and meditation 3 build a firm assurance of the self (the cogito) and of God. Meditation 4
discusses our ability to know things, which when combined with God's benevolence can assure us
regarding the truth of our knowledge and ability to explore reality (as long as we do it rationally and
scientifically). The final step in Descartes' Meditation 6 is to discuss the body-mind distinction and our
ability to know we exist as part of the conceived material world.

In the fifth mediation of René Descartes' "Mediations on the First Philosophy" (titled: " On the existence
of material things and the real distinction between the mind and the body") Descartes establishes the
distinction between mind and body, investigates their nature and concludes that he can know he exists in
a material world of other things. Descartes observes that he has a faculty of imagination, which presents
ideas spatially, as opposed to the faculty of the intellect, which does not. We can illustrate their
distinctness by noting that I can conceive of a chiliagon but I cannot imagine one. Imagination requires a
body, intellection does not; hence, Descartes concludes, imagination is not part of the essence of mind.
The distinctness of mind and body is shown by the fact that if I can clearly and distinctly perceive X
existing independently of Y, then X must be independent of Y, for it would be contrary to God’s power
not to be able to make it so. I can conceive of mind without body and vice versa. For mind is indivisible
and body is divisible, neither substance depends on the other and we can treat them as separate. For
Descartes we are a composed union of mind and body. I am not simply informed of damage to my body
when I step on a pin. I experience it as a pain. Do now my senses faithfully depict an external world? My
senses may often let me down (as demonstrated in meditation 1) but we have explained the source of
error and that God is not a deceiver. So my senses are right in reporting an external world but I must be
careful in judging whether they report the nature of things correctly. With knowledge of mind, body and
God, I can reject the extreme doubts that started me off and pursue the enterprise of genuine scientific
discovery which is the final goal of Descartes' "Mediations on the First Philosophy".

One of the most basic challenges in metaphysics is to explain how it is that things are the same despite
differences. The Greek philosopher Heraclitus (540 - 480 B.C.E.) points out that you can never step into
the same river twice, referring not just to rivers, but to places, people, and life itself. Every day everything
changes a little bit and everywhere you go you find new things. Heraclitus concludes from such
observations that nothing ever remains the same. All reality is in flux.

The problem with seeing the world this way is that it leads to radical skepticism: if nothing stays the same
from moment to moment and from place to place, then we can never really be certain about anything. We
can’t know our friends, we can’t know the world we live in, we can’t even know ourselves! Moreover, if
Heraclitus is right, it seems science is impossible. We could learn the properties of a chemical here today
and still have no basis for knowing its properties someplace else tomorrow.

Needless to say, most people would prefer to avoid skepticism. It’s hard to carry on in a state of complete
ignorance. Besides, it seems obvious that science is not impossible. Studying the world really does enable
us to know how things are over time and across distances. The fact that things change through time and
vary from place to place does not seem to prevent us from having knowledge. From this, some
philosophers, such as Plato and Augustine (354-430), draw the conclusion that Heraclitus was wrong to
suppose that everything is in flux. Something stays the same, something that lays underneath the changing
and varying surfaces we perceive, namely, the universal essence of things.

For example, although individual human beings change from day to day and vary from place to place,
they all share the universal essence of humanity, which is eternally the same. Likewise for dogs, trees,
rocks, and even qualities—there must be a universal essence of blueness, heat, love, and anything else
one can think of. Universal essences are not physical realities; if you dissect a human being, you will not
find humanity inside like a kidney or a lung! Nevertheless, universal essences are metaphysical realities:
they provide the invisible structure of things.
Belief in universal essences is called “metaphysical realism,” because it asserts that universal essences are
real even though we cannot physically see them. Although there are various different versions of
metaphysical realism, they are all designed to secure a foundation for knowledge. It seems you have a
choice: either you accept metaphysical realism or you are stuck with skepticism.

Ockham, however, argues that this is a false dilemma. He rejects metaphysical realism and skepticism in
favor of nominalism: the view that universal essences are concepts in the mind. The word “nominalism”
comes from the Latin word nomina, meaning name. Earlier nominalists such as the French philosopher
Roscelin (1050-1125), had advanced the more radical view that universal essences are just names that
have no basis in reality. Ockham developed a more sophisticated version of nominalism often called
“conceptualism” because it holds that universal essences are concepts caused in our minds when we
perceive real similarities among things in the world.

For example, when a child comes in contact with different human beings over time, he begins to form the
concept of humanity. The realist would say that he has detected the invisible common structure of these
individuals. Ockham, in contrast, insists that the child has merely perceived similarities that fit naturally
under one concept.

It is tempting to assume that Ockham rejects metaphysical realism because of the principle of simplicity.
After all, realism requires believing in invisible entities that might not actually exist. As a matter of fact,
however, Ockham never uses the razor to attack realism. And on closer examination, this makes sense:
the realist position is that the existence of universal essences is a hypothesis necessary to explain how
science is possible. Since Ockham was just as concerned as everyone else to avoid skepticism, he might
have been persuaded by such an argument.

Ockham has a much deeper worry about realism: he is convinced it is incoherent. Incoherence is the most
serious charge a philosopher can level against a theory because it means that the theory contains a
contradiction—and contradictions cannot be true. Ockham asserts that metaphysical realism cannot be
true because it holds that a universal essence is one thing and many things at the same time. The form of
humanity is one thing, because it is what all humans have in common, but it is also many things because
it provides an invisible structure of each individual one of us. This is to say that it is both one thing and
not one thing at the same time, which is a contradiction.

Realists claim that this apparent contradiction can be explained in various ways. Ockham insists,
however, that no matter how you explain it, there is no way to avoid the fact that the notion of a universal
essence is an impossible hypothesis. He writes,

There is no universal outside the mind really existing in individual substances or in the essences
of things.... The reason is that everything that is not many things is necessarily one thing in
number and consequently a singular thing. [Opera Philosophica II, pp. 11-12]

Ockham presents a thought experiment to prove universal essences do not exist. He writes that, according
to realism,

...it would follow that God would not be able to annihilate one individual substance without
destroying the other individuals of the same kind. For, if he were to annihilate one individual, he
 would destroy the whole that is essentially that individual and, consequently, he would destroy
the universal that is in it and in others of the same essence. Other things of the same essence
would not remain, for they could not continue to exist without the universal that constitutes a part
of them. [Opera Philosophica I, p. 51]

Since God is omnipotent, he should be able to annihilate a human being. But the universal form of
humanity lies within that human being. So, by destroying the individual, he will destroy the universal.
And if he destroys the universal, which is humanity, then he destroys all the other humans as well.

The realist may wish to reply that destroying an individual human destroys only part of the universal
humanity. But this contradicts the original assertion that the universal humanity is a single shared essence
that is eternally the same for everyone! For Ockham, this problem decisively defeats realism and leaves
us with the nominalist alternative that universals are concepts caused in our minds when we perceive
similar individuals. To support this alternative, Ockham develops an empiricist epistemology.