G.R. No. 180986.  December 10, 2008.

NORBERTO ALTRES, EVITA BULINGAN, EVANGELINE

SASTINE, FELIPE SASA, LILIBETH SILLAR, RAMONITO
JAYSON, JELO TUCALO, JUAN BUCA, JR., JUE CHRISTINE
CALAMBA, ROMEO PACQUINGAN, JR., CLEO JEAN
ANGARA, LOVENA OYAO, RODOLFO TRINIDAD, LEONILA
SARA, SORINA BELDAD, MA. LINDA NINAL, LILIA PONCE,
JOSEFINA ONGCOY, ADELYN BUCTUAN, ALMA ORBE,
MYLENE SOLIVA, NAZARENE LLOREN, ELIZABETH
MANSERAS, DIAMOND MOHAMAD, MARYDELL CADAVOS,
ELENA DADIOS, ALVIN CASTRO, LILIBETH RAZO, NORMA
CEPRIA, PINIDO BELEY, JULIUS HAGANAS, ARTHUR
CABIGON, CERILA BALABA, LIEZEL SIMAN, JUSTINA
YUMOL, NERLITA CALI, JANETH BICOY, HENRY LACIDA,
CESARIO ADVINCULA, JR., MERLYN RAMOS, VIRGIE
TABADA, BERNARDITA CANGKE, LYNIE GUMALO, ISABEL
ADANZA, ERNESTO LOBATON, RENE ARIMAS, FE
SALVACION ORBE, JULIE QUIJANO, JUDITHO LANIT,
GILBERTO ELIMIA, MANUEL PADAYOGDOG, HENRY
BESIN, ROMULO PASILANG, BARTOLOME TAPOYAO, JR.,
RUWENA GORRES, MARIBETH RONDEZ, FERDINAND
CAORONG, TEODOMERO CORONEL, ELIZABETH
SAGPANG, and JUANITA ALVIOLA, petitioners, vs. CAMILO G.
EMPLEO, FRANKLIN MAATA, LIVEY VILLAREN, RAIDES
CAGA, FRANCO BADELLES, ERNESTO BALAT, GRACE
SAQUILABON, MARINA JUMALON and GEORGE DACUP,
respondents.

Remedial Law; Pleadings and Practice; Verification; Certification of Non-

Forum Shopping; Under justifiable circumstances, Courts have already
allowed the relaxation of the requirements of verification and certification
so that the ends of justice may be better served.—Under justifiable
circumstances, we have already allowed

_______________

* EN BANC.

584
the relaxation of the requirements of verification and certification so that the
ends of justice may be better served. Verification is simply intended to
secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct
and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that
the pleading is filed in good faith; while the purpose of the aforesaid
certification is to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum shopping.
Same; Same; Same; Same; On the requirement of a certification of
non-forum shopping, the well-settled rule is that all the petitioners must sign
the certification of non-forum shopping; The rule, however, admits of an
exception and that is when the petitioners show reasonable cause for failure
to personally sign the certification.—On the requirement of a certification of
non-forum shopping, the well-settled rule is that all the petitioners must sign
the certification of non-forum shopping. The reason for this is that the
persons who have signed the certification cannot be presumed to have the
personal knowledge of the other non-signing petitioners with respect to the
filing or non-filing of any action or claim the same as or similar to the
current petition. The rule, however, admits of an exception and that is when
the petitioners show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the
certification. The petitioners must be able to convince the court that the
outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of justice.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Distinction between non-com­pliance with the
requirement on or submission of defective verification, and non-compliance
with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against
forum shopping.—1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance
with the requirement on or submission of defective verification, and non-
compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification
against forum shopping. 2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a
defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The
court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the
attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may
be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby. 3)
Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or
petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have
been made in good faith or

585

are true and correct. 4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-

compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally
not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there
is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of “substantial compliance” or
presence of “special circumstances or compelling reasons.” 5) The
certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or
petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as
parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however,
as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke
a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in
the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the
Rule. 6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed
by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or
justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a
Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his
behalf.
Same; Civil Procedure; Distinction between a question of law and a
question of fact.—The Court had repeatedly clarified the distinction between
a question of law and a question of fact. A question of law exists when the
doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or
falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact, on the other hand,
exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of
facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence
considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and
relevance of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to
each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. When there
is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether the conclusion drawn
therefrom is correct is a question of law.
Municipal Corporations; Local Government Units; Section 344 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 speaks of actual disbursement of money
from the local treasury in payment of due and demandable obligations of the
local government unit.—Section 344 speaks of actual disbursements of
money from the local treasury in payment of due and demandable
obligations of the local government unit. The disbursements are to be made
through the issuance, certification, and approval of vouchers.

586

Same; Same; Section 344 of the Local Government Code of 1991 thus
applies only when there is already an obligation to pay on the part of the
local government unit.—Section 344 of the Local Government Code of
1991 thus applies only when there is already an obligation to pay on the
part of the local government unit, precisely because vouchers are issued
only when services have been performed or expenses incurred.
Same; Same; Section 474, subparagraph (b)(4) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 requires the city accountant to “certify to the
availability of budgetary allotment to which expenditures and obligations
may be properly charged”; By necessary implication, it includes the duty to
certify to the availability of funds for the payment of salaries and wages of
appointees to positions in the plantilla of the local government unit.—
Section 474, subparagraph (b)(4) of the Local Government Code of 1991,
on the other hand, requires the city accountant to “certify to the availability
of budgetary allotment to which expenditures and obligations may be
properly charged.” By necessary implication, it includes the duty to certify
to the availability of funds for the payment of salaries and wages of
appointees to positions in the plantilla of the local government unit, as
required under Section 1(e)(ii), Rule V of CSC Memorandum Circular
Number 40, Series of 1998, a requirement before the CSC considers the
approval of the appointments. In fine, whenever a certification as to
availability of funds is required for purposes other than actual payment of
an obligation which requires disbursement of money, Section 474(b)(4) of
the Local Government Code of 1991 applies, and it is the ministerial duty of
the city accountant to issue the certification.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and order of the

Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Br. 3.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Hortelano Law Office for petitioners.
  The City Legal Officer for respondent.

587

CARPIO-MORALES,  J.:
Assailed via petition for review on certiorari are the Decision
dated February 2, 20071 and Order dated October 22, 20072 of
Branch 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iligan City, which
denied petitioners’ petition for mandamus praying for a writ
commanding the city accountant of Iligan, Camilo G. Empleo
(Empleo), or his successor in office, to issue a certification of
availability of funds in connection with their appointments, issued
by then Iligan City Mayor Franklin M. Quijano (Mayor Quijano),
which were pending approval by the Civil Service Commission
(CSC).
Sometime in July 2003, Mayor Quijano sent notices of numerous
vacant career positions in the city government to the CSC. The city
government and the CSC thereupon proceeded to publicly announce
the existence of the vacant positions. Petitioners and other applicants
submitted their applications for the different positions where they
felt qualified.
Toward the end of his term or on May 27, June 1, and June 24,
2004, Mayor Quijano issued appointments to petitioners.
In the meantime, the Sangguniang Panglungsod issued
Resolution No. 04-2423 addressed to the CSC Iligan City Field
Office requesting a suspension of action on the processing of
appointments to all vacant positions in the plantilla of the city
government as of March 19, 2004 until the enactment of a new
budget.
The Sangguniang Panglungsod subsequently issued Resolution No.
04-2664 which, in view of its stated policy against “midnight
appointments,” directed the officers of the City Human Resource
Management Office to hold in abeyance the transmission of all
appointments signed or to be signed by the
_______________

1 Rollo, pp. 17-24.

2 Ibid., at pp. 31-36.
3 Id., at pp. 37-38.
4 Id., at pp. 39-40.

588

incumbent mayor in order to ascertain whether these had been

hurriedly prepared or carefully considered and whether the matters
of promotion and/or qualifications had been properly addressed. The
same Resolution enjoined all officers of the said Office to put off the
transmission of all appointments to the CSC, therein making it clear
that non-compliance therewith would be met with administrative
action.
Respondent city accountant Empleo did not thus issue a
certification as to availability of funds for the payment of salaries
and wages of petitioners, as required by Section 1(e)(ii), Rule V of
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, Series of 1998 reading:

“x x x x
e.  LGU Appointment.  Appointment in local government units for
submission to the Commission shall be accompanied, in addition to the
common requirements, by the following:
xxxx
ii.  Certification by the Municipal/City Provincial Accountant/Budget
Officer that funds are available.” (Emphasis and italics supplied)

And the other respondents did not sign petitioners’ position

description forms.
The CSC Field Office for Lanao del Norte and Iligan City
disapproved the appointments issued to petitioners invariably due to
lack of certification of availability of funds.
On appeal by Mayor Quijano, CSC Regional Office No. XII in
Cotabato City, by Decision of July 30, 2004,5 dismissed the appeal,
it explaining that its function in approving appointments is only
ministerial, hence, if an appointment lacks a requirement prescribed
by the civil service law, rules and regulations, it would disapprove it
without delving into the reasons why the requirement was not
complied with.

_______________

5 Id., at pp. 41-45.

589
 Petitioners thus filed with the RTC of Iligan City the above-stated
petition for mandamus against respondent Empleo or his successor
in office for him to issue a certification of availability of funds for
the payment of the salaries and wages of petitioners, and for his co-
respondents or their successors in office to sign the position
description forms.
As stated early on, Branch 3 of the Iligan RTC denied petitioners’
petition for mandamus. It held that, among other things, while it is
the ministerial duty of the city accountant to certify as to the
availability of budgetary allotment to which expenses and
obligations may properly be charged under Section 474(b)(4) of
Republic Act No. 7160,6 otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991, the city accountant cannot be compelled to issue a
certification as to availability of funds for the payment of salaries
and wages of petitioners as this ministerial function pertains to the
city treasurer. In so holding, the trial court relied on Section 344 of
the Local Government Code of 1991 the pertinent portion of which
provides:

“Sec.  344.  Certification and Approval of Vouchers.—No money shall

be disbursed unless the local budget officer certifies to the existence of
appropriation that has been legally made for the purpose, the local
accountant has obligated said appropriation, and the local treasurer certifies
to the availability of funds for the purpose. x x x x” (Italics supplied)

_______________

6 Section 474(b)(4), Republic Act No. 7160 provides:

“Section  474.  Qualifications, Powers and Duties.—
xxxx
(b)  The accountant shall take charge of both the accounting and
internal audit services of the local government unit concerned and
shall:
xxxx
(4)  certify to the availability of budgetary allotment to which
expenditures and obligations may be properly charged.”

590

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration7 in which they

maintained only their prayer for a writ of mandamus for respondent
Empleo or his successor in office to issue a certification of
availability of funds for the payment of their salaries and wages. The
trial court denied the motion by Order of October 22, 2007,8 hence,
the present petition.
By Resolution of January 22, 2008,9 this Court, without giving
due course to the petition, required respondents to comment thereon
within ten (10) days from notice, and at the same time required
petitioners to comply, within the same period, with the relevant
provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioners filed a Compliance Report dated February 18, 200810
to which they attached 18 copies of (a) a verification and
certification, (b) an affidavit of service, and (c) photocopies of
counsel’s Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) official receipt for
the year 2008 and his privilege tax receipt for the same year.
Respondents duly filed their Comment,11 alleging technical flaws
in petitioners’ petition, to which Comment petitioners filed their
Reply12 in compliance with the Court’s Resolution dated April 1,
2008.13
The lone issue in the present petition is whether it is Section 474(b)
(4) or Section 344 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which
applies to the requirement of certification of availability of funds
under Section 1(e)(ii), Rule V of CSC Memorandum Circular
Number 40, Series of 1998. As earlier stated, the trial court ruled that
it is Section 344. Petitioners

_______________

7  Rollo, pp. 25-30.

8  Supra note 2.
9  Rollo, pp. 52-53.
10 Ibid., at pp. 54-55.
11 Id., at pp. 113-127.
12 Id., at pp. 146-157.
13 Id., at p. 145.

591

posit, however, that it is Section 474(b)(4) under which it is the

ministerial duty of the city accountant to issue the certification, and
not Section 344 which pertains to the ministerial function of the city
treasurer to issue the therein stated certification.
A discussion first of the technical matters questioned by
respondents is in order.
Respondents assail as defective the verification and cer­tification
against forum shopping attached to the petition
as it bears the signature of only 11 out of the 59 petitioners, and no
competent evidence of identity was presented by the signing
petitioners. They thus move for the dismissal of the petition, citing
Section 5, Rule 714 vis a vis Section 5, Rule

14 Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC.  5.  Certification against forum shopping.—The plaintiff or
principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory
pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed
thereto and simultaneously field therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore
 commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any
court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no
such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending
action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if
he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been
filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to
the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by
mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be
cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall
constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding
administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel
clearly constitute willful and delib-

592

4515 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Docena v. Lapesura16

which held that the certification against forum shopping should be
signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case and that the
signing by only one of them is insufficient as the attestation requires
personal knowledge by the party executing the same.17
Petitioners, on the other hand, argue that they have a justifiable
cause for their inability to obtain the signatures of the other
petitioners as they could no longer be contacted or are no longer
interested in pursuing the case.18 Petitioners plead substantial
compliance, citing Huntington Steel Products, Inc., et al. v. NLRC19
which held, among other things, that while the rule is mandatory in
nature, substantial compliance under justifiable circumstances is
enough.
Petitioners’ position is more in accord with recent decisions of
this Court.
In Iglesia ni Cristo v. Ponferrada,20 the Court held: 

_______________

erate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with
prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for
administrative sanctions.

15 Section 5, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC.  5.  Dismissal or denial of petition.—The failure of the petitioner to
comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the
docket and other lawful fees, deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition,
and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition
shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
The Supreme Court may on its own initiative deny the petition on the
ground that the appeal is without merit, or is prosecuted manifestly for delay,
 or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require
consideration.
16 407 Phil. 1007; 355 SCRA 658 (2001).
17 Ibid., at p. 1017; pp. 666-667.
18 Rollo, p. 151.
19 G.R. No. 158311, November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 551.
20 G.R. No. 168943, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 828. 

593

“The substantial compliance rule has been applied by this Court in a

number of cases: Cavile v. Heirs of Cavile, where the Court sustained the
validity of the certification signed by only one of petitioners because he is a
relative of the other petitioners and co-owner of the properties in dispute;
Heirs of Agapito T. Olarte v. Office of the President of the Philippines,
where the Court allowed a certification signed by only two petitioners
because the case involved a family home in which all the petitioners shared
a common interest; Gudoy v. Guadalquiver, where the Court considered as
valid the certification signed by only four of the nine petitioners because all
petitioners filed as co-owners pro indiviso a complaint against respondents
for quieting of title and damages, as such, they all have joint interest in the
undivided whole; and DAR v. Alonzo-Legasto, where the Court sustained the
certification signed by only one of the spouses as they were sued jointly
involving a property in which they had a common interest.”21 (Italics in the
original, italics supplied)

Very recently, in Tan, et al. v. Ballena, et al.,22 the verification

and certification against forum shopping attached to the original
petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals was signed by
only two out of over 100 petitioners and the same was filed one day
beyond the period allowed by the Rules. The appellate court initially
resolved to dismiss the original petition precisely for these reasons,
but on the therein petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, the
appellate court ordered the filing of an amended petition in order to
include all the original complainants numbering about 240. An
amended petition was then filed in compliance with the said order,
but only 180 of the 240 original complainants signed the verification
and certification against forum shopping. The Court of Appeals
granted the motion for reconsideration and resolved to reinstate the
petition.
In sustaining the Court of Appeals in Tan, the Court held that it is a
far better and more prudent course of action to excuse a technical
lapse and afford the parties a review of the

_______________

21 Ibid., at pp. 841-842 (citations omitted).

22 G.R. No. 168111, July 4, 2008, 557 SCRA 229.
 594

case to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on
technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties, giving a false
impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in
more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.
The Court further discoursed in Tan:

“Under justifiable circumstances, we have already allowed the relaxation

of the requirements of verification and certification so that the ends of
justice may be better served. Verification is simply intended to secure an
assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not
the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the
pleading is filed in good faith; while the purpose of the aforesaid
certification is to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum shopping.
In Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation, we ruled
that the verification requirement had been substantially complied with
despite the fact that only two (2) out of the twenty-five (25) petitioners have
signed the petition for review and the verification. In that case, we held that
the two signatories were unquestionably real parties-in-interest, who
undoubtedly had sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the Petition.
In Ateneo de Naga University v. Manalo, we also ruled that there was
substantial compliance with the requirement of verification when only one
of the petitioners, the President of the University, signed for and on behalf
of the institution and its officers.
Similarly, in Bases Conversion and Development Authority v. Uy, we
allowed the signature of only one of the principal parties in the case despite
the absence of a Board Resolution which conferred upon him the authority
to represent the petitioner BCDA.
In the present case, the circumstances squarely involve a verification that
was not signed by all the petitioners therein. Thus, we see no reason why we
should not uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals in reinstating the
petition despite the said formal defect.
On the requirement of a certification of non-forum shopping, the well-
settled rule is that all the petitioners must sign the certification of non-forum
shopping. The reason for this is that the persons who have signed the
certification cannot be presumed to have the

595

personal knowledge of the other non-signing petitioners with respect to the

filing or non-filing of any action or claim the same as or similar to the
current petition. The rule, however, admits of an exception and that is when
the petitioners show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the
certification. The petitioners must be able to convince the court that the
outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of justice.
 In the case at bar, counsel for the respondents disclosed that most of the
respondents who were the original complainants have since sought
employment in the neighboring towns of Bulacan, Pampanga and Angeles
City. Only the one hundred eighty (180) signatories were then available to
sign the amended Petition for Certiorari and the accompanying verification
and certification of non-forum shopping.”23

In the present case, the signing of the verification by only 11 out

of the 59 petitioners already sufficiently assures the Court that the
allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of
the imagination or a matter of speculation; that the pleading is filed
in good faith; and that the signatories are unquestionably real
parties-in-interest who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and
belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition.
With respect to petitioners’ certification against forum shopping,
the failure of the other petitioners to sign as they could no longer be
contacted or are no longer interested in pursuing the case need not
merit the outright dismissal of the petition without defeating the
administration of justice. The non-signing petitioners are,
however, dropped as parties to the case.
In fact, even Docena24 cited by respondents sustains petitioners’
position. In that case, the certification against forum shopping was
signed by only one of the petitioning spouses. The Court held that
the certification against forum shopping should be deemed to
constitute substantial compliance with

_______________

23 Ibid., citations omitted.

24 Supra note 16.

596

the Rules considering, among other things, that the petitioners were
husband and wife, and that the subject property was their residence
which was alleged in their verified petition to be conjugal.25
With respect to petitioners’ non-presentation of any identification
before the notary public at the time they swore to their verification
and certification attached to the petition, suffice it to state that this
was cured by petitioners’ compliance26 with the Court’s Resolution
of January 22, 200827 wherein they submitted a notarized
verification and certification bearing the details of their community
tax certificates. This, too, is substantial compliance. The Court need
not belabor its discretion to authorize subsequent compliance with
the Rules.
For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in
capsule form the jurisprudential pronouncements already reflected
above respecting non-compliance with the requirements on, or
submission of defective, verification and certification against forum
shopping:
1)  A distinction must be made between non-compliance with
the requirement on or submission of defective verification, and non-
compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective
certification against forum shopping.
2)  As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect
therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.
The court may order its submission or correction or act on the
pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict
compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the
ends of justice may be served thereby.28

_______________

25 Ibid., at pp. 1017-1021.

26 Supra note 10.
27 Supra note 9.
28 Sari-Sari Group of Companies, Inc. v. Piglas-Kamao, G.R. No. 164624, August
11, 2008, 561 SCRA 569.

597

3)  Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one

who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in
the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters
alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and
correct.29
4)  As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance
therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not
curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless
there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of “substantial
compliance” or presence of “special circumstances or compelling
reasons.”30
5)  The certification against forum shopping must be signed by
all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case;31 otherwise, those who did
not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or
justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or
petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of
action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the
certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the
Rule.32
6)  Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be
executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel.33 If, however, for
reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is

_______________
 29  Rombe Eximtrade (Phils.), Inc. v. Asiatrust Development Bank, G.R. No.
164479, February 13, 2008, 545 SCRA 253.
30  Chinese Young Men’s Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v.
Remington Steel Corporation, G.R. No. 159422, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 180.
31 Juaban v. Espina, G.R. No. 170049, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 588.
32 Pacquing v. Coca-Cola Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 157966, January 31, 2008,
543 SCRA 344.
33  Marcopper Mining Corporation v. Solidbank Corporation, G.R. No. 134049,
June 17, 2004, 432 SCRA 360.

598

unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney34

designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
And now, on respondents’ argument that petitioners raise
questions of fact which are not proper in a petition for review on
certiorari as the same must raise only questions of law. They
entertain doubt on whether petitioners seek the payment of their
salaries, and assert that the question of whether the city accountant
can be compelled to issue a certification of availability of funds
under the circumstances herein obtaining is a factual issue.35
The Court holds that indeed petitioners are raising a question of
law.
The Court had repeatedly clarified the distinction between a question
of law and a question of fact. A question of law exists when the
doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call
for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented,
the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted.36 A question of fact,
on the other hand, exists when the doubt or difference arises as to
the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration
of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the
witnesses, the existence and relevance of specific surrounding
circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the
whole, and the probability of the situation.37 When there

_______________

34 Vide Fuentebella v. Castro, G.R. No. 150865, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 183;
Eslaban, Jr. v. Vda. de Onorio, G.R. No. 146062, June 28, 2001, 360 SCRA 230.
35 Rollo, p. 121.
36 Mendoza v. Salinas, G.R. No. 152827, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 414, 419;
Vide also Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 159417, January 25, 2007, 512 SCRA 684.
37 Ibid.

599
is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether the conclusion
drawn therefrom is correct is a question of law.38
In the case at bar, the issue posed for resolution does not call for
the reevaluation of the probative value of the evidence presented,
but rather the determination of which of the provisions of the Local
Government Code of 1991 applies to the Civil Service
Memorandum Circular requiring a certificate of availability of funds
relative to the approval of petitioners’ appointments.
AT ALL EVENTS, respondents contend that the case has become
moot and academic as the appointments of petitioners had already
been disapproved by the CSC. Petitioners maintain otherwise,
arguing that the act of respondent Empleo in not issuing the required
certification of availability of funds unduly interfered with the power
of appointment of then Mayor Quijano; that the Sangguniang
Panglungsod Resolutions relied upon by respondent Empleo
constituted legislative intervention in the mayor’s power to appoint;
and that the prohibition against midnight appointments applies only
to presidential appointments as affirmed in De Rama v. Court of
Appeals.39
The Court finds that, indeed, the case had been rendered
moot and academic by the final disapproval of petitioners’
appointments by the CSC.
The mootness of the case notwithstanding, the Court resolved
to rule on its merits in order to settle the issue once and for all,
given that the contested action is one capable of repetition40 or
susceptible of recurrence.

_______________

38  National Power Corporation v. Purefoods Corporation, et al., G.R. No.

160725, September 12, 2008, 565 SCRA 17, citing Gomez v. Sta. Ines, G.R. No.
132537, October 14, 2005, 473 SCRA 25, 37.
39 405 Phil. 531, 551; 353 SCRA 94, 102-103 (2001).
40  In David v. Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400,
171489 & 171424, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160, seven petitions for certiorari and
prohibition were filed assailing the

600

The pertinent portions of Sections 474(b)(4) and 344 of the Local

Government Code of 1991 provide:

“Section  474.  Qualifications, Powers and Duties.—

x x x x 

_______________

constitutionality of the declaration of a state of national emergency by President Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo. While the declaration of a state of national emergency was already lifted
during the pendency of the suits, this Court still resolved the merits of the petitions, considering
that the issues involved a grave violation of the Constitution and affected the public interest.
The Court also affirmed its duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts,
doctrines or rules, and recognized that the contested actions were capable of repetition.

In Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, G.R. No. 138965, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 53, the
petition sought to declare as null and void the concurrent appointments of Magdangal B. Elma
as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and as Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC) for being contrary to Section 13, Article VII and Section 7,
par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. While Elma ceased to hold the two offices during
the pendency of the case, the Court still ruled on the merits thereof, considering that the
question of whether the PCGG Chairman could concurrently hold the position of CPLC was
one capable of repetition.
In Manalo v. Calderon, G.R. No. 178920, October 15, 2007, 536 SCRA 290, a petition for
habeas corpus was filed by the police officers implicated in the burning of an elementary
school in Batangas at the height of the May 2007 elections. The Court decided the case on the
merits notwithstanding the recall by the Philippine National Police of the restrictive custody
orders against petitioners therein. Citing David v. Arroyo, the Court held: “Every bad, unusual
incident where police officers figure in generates public interest and people watch what will be
done or not done to them. Lack of disciplinary steps taken against them erodes public
confidence in the police institution. As petitioners themselves assert, the restrictive custody of
policemen under investigation is an existing practice, hence, the issue is bound to crop up every
now and then. The matter is capable of repetition or susceptible of recurrence. It better be
resolved now for the education and guidance of all concerned.” 

601

(b)  The accountant shall take charge of both the accounting and internal
audit services of the local government unit concerned and shall:
xxxx
(4)  certify to the availability of budgetary allotment to which
expenditures and obligations may be properly charged. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
xxxx
Sec.  344.  Certification and Approval of Vouchers.—No money shall be
disbursed unless the local budget officer certifies to the existence of
appropriation that has been legally made for the purpose, the local
accountant has obligated said appropriation, and the local treasurer
certifies to the availability of funds for the purpose. x x x” (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Petitioners propound the following distinctions between Sections

474(b)(4) and 344 of the Local Government Code of 1991: 

(1)  Section 474(b)(4) speaks of certification of availability of

budgetary allotment, while Section 344 speaks of certification of availability
of funds for disbursement;
(2)  Under Section 474(b)(4), before a certification is issued, there must
be an appropriation, while under Section 344, before a certification is
issued, two requisites must concur: (a) there must be an appropriation
legally made for the purpose, and (b) the local accountant has obligated said
appropriation;
(3)  Under Section 474(b)(4), there is no actual payment involved
because the certification is for the purpose of obligating a portion of the
appropriation; while under Section 344, the certification is for the purpose
of payment after the local accountant had obligated a portion of the
appropriation;
(4)  Under Section 474(b)(4), the certification is issued if there is an
appropriation, let us say, for the salaries of appointees; while under Section
344, the certification is issued if there is an appropria-

602

tion and the same is obligated, let us say, for the payment of salaries of
employees.41

Respondents do not squarely address the issue in their Comment.

Section 344 speaks of actual disbursements of money from the
local treasury in payment of due and demandable obligations of the
local government unit. The disbursements are to be made through
the issuance, certification, and approval of vouchers. The full text of
Section 344 provides:

“Sec.  344.  Certification and Approval of Vouchers.—No money shall

be disbursed unless the local budget officer certifies to the existence of
appropriation that has been legally made for the purpose, the local
accountant has obligated said appropriation, and the local treasurer
certifies to the availability of funds for the purpose. Vouchers and payrolls
shall be certified to and approved by the head of the department or office
who has administrative control of the fund concerned, as to validity,
propriety, and legality of the claim involved. Except in cases of
disbursements involving regularly recurring administrative expenses such as
payrolls for regular or permanent employees, expenses for light, water,
telephone and telegraph services, remittances to government creditor
agencies such as GSIS, SSS, LDP, DBP, National Printing Office,
Procurement Service of the DBM and others, approval of the disbursement
voucher by the local chief executive himself shall be required whenever
local funds are disbursed.
In cases of special or trust funds, disbursements shall be approved by the
administrator of the fund.
In case of temporary absence or incapacity of the department head or
chief of office, the officer next-in-rank shall automatically perform his
function and he shall be fully responsible therefor.” (Italics and italics
supplied)

“Voucher,” in its ordinary meaning, is a document which shows that

services have been performed or expenses in-

_______________
41 Rollo, p. 148.

603

curred.42 When used in connection with disbursement of money, it

implies the existence of an instrument that shows on what account or
by what authority a particular payment has been made, or that
services have been performed which entitle the party to whom it is
issued to payment.43
Section 344 of the Local Government Code of 1991 thus applies
only when there is already an obligation to pay on the part of the
local government unit, precisely because vouchers are issued only
when services have been performed or expenses incurred.
The requirement of certification of availability of funds from the
city treasurer under Section 344 of the Local Government Code of
1991 is for the purpose of facilitating the approval of vouchers
issued for the payment of services already rendered to, and expenses
incurred by, the local government unit.
The trial court thus erred in relying on Section 344 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 in ruling that the ministerial function to
issue a certification as to availability of funds for the payment of the
wages and salaries of petitioners pertains to the city treasurer. For at
the time material to the required issuance of the certification, the
appointments issued to petitioners were not yet approved by the
CSC, hence, there were yet no services performed to speak of. In
other words, there was yet no due and demandable obligation of the
local government to petitioners.
Section 474, subparagraph (b)(4) of the Local Government Code of
1991, on the other hand, requires the city accountant to “certify to
the availability of budgetary allotment to which expenditures and
obligations may be properly charged.”44 By

_______________

42 Atienza v. Villarosa, G.R. No. 161081, May 10, 2005, 458 SCRA 385, 403.
43 Ibid., at p. 404, citing First National Bank of Chicago v. City of Elgin, 136 III.
App. 453.
44 Supra note 6.

604

necessary implication, it includes the duty to certify to the

availability of funds for the payment of salaries and wages of
appointees to positions in the plantilla of the local government unit,
as required under Section 1(e)(ii), Rule V of CSC Memorandum
Circular Number 40, Series of 1998, a requirement before the CSC
considers the approval of the appointments.
 In fine, whenever a certification as to availability of funds is
required for purposes other than actual payment of an obligation
which requires disbursement of money, Section 474(b)(4) of the
Local Government Code of 1991 applies, and it is the ministerial
duty of the city accountant to issue the certification.
WHEREFORE, the Court declares that it is Section 474(b)(4),
not Section 344, of the Local Government Code of 1991, which
applies to the requirement of certification of availability of funds
under Section 1(e)(ii), Rule V of Civil Service Commission
Memorandum Circular Number 40, Series of 1998.
SO ORDERED.

Puno (C.J.), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-

Martinez, Corona, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Leonardo-De Castro, J., On Official Leave.
Brion, J., On Leave. 

Section 474(b) (4) applies to requirement of certification of

availability of funds under Section 1(e) (ii), Rule V of Civil Service
Commission Memorandum Circular No. 40, Series of 1998. 

Note.—Courts will decide a question otherwise moot and

academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. (Altarejos
vs. Commission on Elections, 441 SCRA 655 [2004])
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