Expert Commentary

The Next Pandemic: Prepare for “Disease X”

Kenneth V. Iserson, MD, MBA The University of Arizona, Department of Emergency Medicine, Tucson, Arizona

Section Editor: Mark I. Langdorf, MD, MHPE

Submission history: Submitted May 14, 2020; Accepted May 14, 2020
Electronically published June 8, 2020
Full text available through open access at http://escholarship.org/uc/uciem_westjem
DOI: 10.5811/westjem.2020.5.48215
[West J Emerg Med. 2020;21(4)756–758.]

Disclaimer: Due to the rapidly evolving nature of this outbreak, worldwide. About one new disease is emerging each year.1
and in the interests of rapid dissemination of reliable, actionable Not all have human-to-human transmission, but enough
information, this paper went through expedited peer review. do (e.g., severe acute respiratory syndrome, Middle East
Additionally, information should be considered current only at respiratory syndrome coronavirus, Ebola virus disease) to
the time of publication and may evolve as the science develops. scare those tasked with monitoring the world’s health. To
highlight the danger and to prioritize research, each year
The COVID-19 pandemic will, slowly, and with the World Health Organization (WHO) commissions an
some hiccups and many tragedies, pass into memory. expert committee to update its list of the most threatening
This coronavirus may disappear and later recur, continue infectious diseases that lack effective treatments or vaccines.
endemically under vaccine control, or simply attenuate The current list (Table 1) contains COVID-19.3 That is no
and vanish.1 The economy and healthcare systems will surprise, given that the entire world is now focused on that
return to a new normal, some parts more quickly than pathogen. What should act as a wake-up call to seriously
others. Like the multiple plagues humanity has endured fund the surveillance of, research into, and treatment of the
since our ancestors gathered into cities, it will generate wide variety of potential pandemic agents is the entity at
recriminations for slow and misguided responses, the end of the short list: Disease X. Since 2015, the WHO
profiteering, and over- or underreacting to economic, has used this designation for a disease that could cause a
social, and healthcare events that will, retrospectively, be pandemic due to a pathogen currently unknown to cause
obvious.2 The individuals and organizations most culpable human illness. Last year’s Disease X now has a name,
for exacerbating the disaster (e.g., many national and COVID-19. The next unknown and unnamed entity may
some state political leaders) will escape responsibility already be lurking.
while they scapegoat others and try to re-write history. One might ask: Why don’t we devise a plan to identify
Heroes, whether individuals who helped provide clear such pathogens early and mobilize scientists, the healthcare
risk communication and leadership (e.g., Anthony Fauci, community, politicians, and the populace to fight these
MD, of the National Institutes of Health; Sanjay Gupta, scourges? The answer is, we already have. We know what
MD, of CNN; and Li Wenliang, MD, who died while steps to take to limit a pandemic. WHO, the Centers for
trying to notify the world about the pandemic) or groups Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the Departments
that persevered in the face of fear and life-threatening
danger (e.g., emergency department, intensive care unit,
emergency medical services, and other critical healthcare
staff and first responders) will emerge. Without fanfare, Table 1. World Health Organization list of emerging diseases for
most will return to their normal jobs, scarred but proud of research prioritization.3
their efforts. As they have before, pundits and scholars will • COVID-19
write endlessly about the pandemic’s cause, effects, and • Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever
ways to ameliorate the next pandemic’s brutal destruction • Ebola virus disease and Marburg virus disease
• Lassa fever
of lives and ways of life. The problem is, we have done all • Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV)
this before and seem not to have learned the lessons our and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)
predecessors taught. • Nipah and henipaviral diseases
To most people, COVID-19 appears to be an anomaly; • Rift Valley fever
it isn’t. The 20th century began with devastating waves of • Zika
Spanish flu that killed from 50 million to 100 million people • Disease X

Western Journal of Emergency Medicine 756 Volume 21, no. 4: July 2020
Iserson The Next Pandemic: Prepare for “Disease X”

Table 2. Lessons learned after SARS: preparation, management, and risk communication.1,6,7,11
1. More pandemics will appear. Be prepared. COVID-19 will not be the last new disease to take advantage of modern global
conditions. Continued vigilance is vital. Preparation includes enhancing the integration and effectiveness of the public health,
healthcare, and emergency management systems through education, supplying adequate provisions, and drills as well as
developing incentives (eg, tax credits, identified cost savings) that increase the number of nongovernmental entities engaged in
actions that enhance their communities’ health security.
2. Report cases early. Global health security requires promptly identifying and reporting cases of any disease with the potential for
international spread. Concealing these cases or denying that they exist carries the potential for enormous human suffering and
death, loss of international credibility, negative domestic and regional economic impact, and a very real risk the outbreak will spiral
out of control.
3. Alert the world. As soon as an emerging and transmissible infection is confirmed, international bodies, such as WHO, must issue a
global alert through all available communication modalities.
4. Promote international scientific collaboration. The world’s scientists, clinicians, and public health experts must act
collaboratively to investigate, control, and, if possible, eliminate the disease.
5. Provide leadership and consistency. Coordinating messages and policy among federal, state, and local health officials and
affected institutions is critical to avoiding contradictions and confusion that can undermine public trust and impede containment
measures. To build public trust and cooperation, provide continuous, accurate, and science-based information on what is known
and not known about the disease. Information should be technically correct and sufficiently complete to support policies and actions
without being patronizing. Minimize duplication of, and ensure coordination between federal, state, local, and tribal authorities.
6. Avoid speculation. During an outbreak, limit officially disseminated information to specific data and results; messages should
omit speculation, over-interpretation of data, overly confident assessments of investigations and control measures, and comments
related to other jurisdictions. Rumors, misinformation, misperceptions, and stigmatization of affected groups must be addressed
promptly and definitively.
7. Provide safety guidelines. It is essential to provide guidance to the public on actions to take to protect themselves and their family
members and colleagues. Assess healthcare system cybersecurity and develop alternative plans for any cyberincident.
8. Institute travel limitations and screening. Implement appropriate travel restrictions and airport screening to contain the
international spread of an emerging infection. Airport screening may include passive passenger screening using questionnaires or
sophisticated infrared equipment to screen all passengers for fever and indications of possible exposure, as well as health worker-
conducted interviews.
9. Implement early and consistently support containment, testing, and aggressive contact tracing. In the absence of a curative
drug or preventive vaccine, well-known public health interventions can effectively contain an outbreak. The methods include active
surveillance of suspected contacts, self-surveillance by contacts who voluntarily isolated themselves, and widespread testing, social
distancing, and quarantine.
10. Stockpile necessary medications and equipment. Enhance the national capability to produce and effectively use both medical
countermeasures and nonpharmaceutical interventions, including those needed for both the acute and the chronic conditions.
11. Bolster national healthcare infrastructures. A high priority is improving existing healthcare systems’ weaknesses that permit
emerging infections to amplify and spread and that can compromise patient care. This includes having adequate materials and
capacity for expected surges of infected patients, including hospitals and other healthcare facilities.
12. Protect healthcare workers. The people at greatest risk for contracting the disease are health workers, including first responders.
This requires working with professional societies to improve strategies (including PPE use) to protect healthcare workers. Special
vigilance must be paid to women, who staff the lower ranks of health personnel in many countries.
13. Do just-in-time professional education. Educate healthcare workers and public health staff on appropriate strategies to recognize
the disease and to implement control measures.
14. Prepare the public. Recognize that preparation for and control of pandemics are extremely disruptive and consume enormous
resources at levels that might not be sustainable over time.
WHO, World Health Organization; SARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome; PPE, protective personal equipment.

of Homeland Security and Health and Human Services have to act.8-11 The CDC is chronically underfunded and has no
produced and disseminated detailed plans.4-7 After the SARS political power. Academics are voices in the wilderness
pandemic, for example, WHO itemized the steps needed to whose advice is usually sought too late in the process for it
control a pandemic (Table 2). These vital steps were ignored to have much effect.
during the initial period of the COVID-19 pandemic.1 WHO, As the COVID-19 threat lessens, politicians will make
chronically underfunded, is saddled with a bloated, slow, grand promises to implement plans to stop, or at least to
and uncoordinated bureaucracy that has to answer to 194 prepare for, the next pandemic. The recovering economy
countries. It has been condemned for both overreacting will be too weak at first to support the effort, although more
(2009 H1N1 pandemic) and severely underreacting (2014 funding will be promised in the future. Politicians will
Ebola epidemic and the COVID-19 pandemic) and for failing ultimately make changes that are politically expedient and

Volume 21, no. 4: July 2020 757 Western Journal of Emergency Medicine
The Next Pandemic: Prepare for “Disease X” Iserson

will fail to authorize the changes necessary to produce faster, diseases-for-research-and-development-in-emergency-contexts.

more flexible responses. The memories of angst and societal Accessed April 8, 2020.
disruption during COVID-19 will recede. Our bulwarks 4. US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. National Pandemic
against pandemic diseases will remain underfunded and Influenza Plans. CDC website. Available at: www.cdc.gov/flu/
inadequate to the task. Even so, multiple Disease Xs are pandemic-resources/planning-preparedness/national-strategy-
clearly in our future; we need to be prepared. planning.html. Accessed May 9, 2020.
5. US Department of Health and Human Services. Pandemic Influenza
Plan: 2017 Update. Available at: www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-
resources/pdf/pan-flu-report-2017v2.pdf. Accessed May 9, 2020.
Address for Correspondence: Kenneth V. Iserson, MD, MBA,
6. US Department of Homeland Security. National Response
University of Arizona, Department of Emergency Medicine, N.
Campbell Avenue, Tucson, AZ 85724. Framework, 4d ed. Available at: www.fema.gov/media-library-
data/1582825590194-2f000855d442fc3c9f18547d1468990d/NRF_
Conflicts of Interest: By the WestJEM article submission agreement, FINALApproved_508_2011028v1040.pdf. Accessed May 9, 2020.
all authors are required to disclose all affiliations, funding sources
7. Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response. National Health
and financial or management relationships that could be perceived
as potential sources of bias. No author has professional or financial Security Strategy and Implementation Plan: 2015-2018. Available
relationships with any companies that are relevant to this study. at: www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/authority/nhss/Documents/
There are no conflicts of interest or sources of funding to declare. nhss-ip.pdf. Accessed May 9, 2018.
8. Desmond-Hellmann S. Preparing for the next pandemic.
Copyright: © 2020 Iserson. This is an open access article
Wall Street Journal. Available at: www.wsj.com/articles/
distributed in accordance with the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution (CC BY 4.0) License. See: http://creativecommons.org/ preparing-for-the-next-pandemic-11585936915?mod=itp_
licenses/by/4.0/ wsj&mod=&mod=djemITP_h. Accessed April 4, 2020.
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investigates/special-report/health-who-future/. Accessed May 7, 2020.
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Western Journal of Emergency Medicine 758 Volume 21, no. 4: July 2020