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The Y2K Problem:

Technological Risk and Professional Responsibility

Mark Manion William M. Evan


Drexel University The Wharton School
[email protected] University of Pennsylvania

he Y2K problem evokes two contrasting responses: Given the widespread diffusion and complex interdepen-

T technological optimism and technological pessimism.


The optimist sees the Y2K problem as only a poten-
tial technological failure, mostly because s/he has boundless
dencies existing between companies and countries through-
out the industrialized and developing worlds, the potential
confusion resulting from this built-in technological failure
confidence that is can be solved by technology, through rig- could be truly global in nature. The OECD reports that there
orous compliance procedures. The pessimist, on the other exist much dissimilarity between the various countries in
hand, argues that the problem is actual, not potential. Efforts terms of their Y2K compliance and readiness. Since the Y2K
to make computer networks Y2K compliant have already problem is a "systems" problem, viz., even if one country
entailed massive costs to the U.S and the world. Some re- gets its house in order, countries that have not done so may
searchers even claim that the Y2K problem already consti- still adversely affect it. In fact, severe economic consequences
tutes the single most expensive technological failure known such as a major global recession are predicted, says Dr. Ed
to mankind. Moreover, the Y2K problem might lead to the Yardeni, chief economist and managing director of Deutsche
most expensive wave of litigation in human history. Bank Securities. Yardeni predicts, "It could be as bad or
This problem has prompted President Clinton to approve worse than the 1973-1974 global recession. ''2 Yardeni is not
the I~ar 2000 InJ~rmation and Readiness Disclosure Act, signed alone in his prediction. 3
into effect October 19, 1997. In this Act, Congress made
public the following facts: Anticipation of the Problem
(A) At least thousands but possibly millions of informa-
tion technology computer systems, software programs, and Our dependence upon computer and communication sys-
semiconductors are not capable of recognizing certain dates tems is growing at a rapid rate, but as society becomes more
in 1999 and after December 31, 1999, and will read dates in dependent on computers, we also become more vulnerable
the year 2000 and thereafter as if those dates represent the to computer malfunctions. Computer systems by their very
year 1900 or thereafter or will fail to process those dates. nature are unreliable and unpredictable and society has yet
(B) The problem described in subparagraph (A) and re- to come to terms with the consequences. The Y2K problem,
sulting failures could incapacitate systems that are essential now looming menacingly, was, in fact, anticipated, and hence
to the functioning of markets, commerce, consumer prod- completely avoidable. This particular example of technologi-
ucts, utilities, government, and safety and defense systems, cal failure in not the result of so-called "unintended conse-
in the United States and throughout the world. quences" of technologyZ-- this problem was foreseeable and
(C) Reprogramming or replacing affected systems before fully anticipatible.
the problem incapacitates essential systems is a matter of As early as 1984, an article appeared in Computerworld
national and global interest. 1 diagnosing the problem and calling for programmers and
By removing the first two digits of the year, hundreds of managers to take heed of the date conversion difficulties
thousands of computer programs that keep our economy that would happen at the turn of the century. 5 Gillin, the
stable are on the verge of a meltdown. This is truly ironic, editor of Computerworld, reported the findings of William
because without computers and their associated communi- Schoen, the programmer who first identified the year 2000
cations systems, much of industry, commerce, transport and problem. He discovered the problem in 1983 while working
distribution, government, the military, health services, edu- at one of the Big Three automakers. As Schoen attests, data
cation and research, etc. would grind to a halt. Now, be- processing people had known about the risk as early as the
cause of a computer malfunction, they may all grind to a halt. 1970s, but, as Schoen puts it, "It's just that no one thought
What will happen if we lose our electricity, telephones, ac- their codes would last that long. ''6
cess to banks and money, food distribution, water supply, Schoen even designed a programming solution to the pre-
automobile fuel for days, weeks, even months? dicament, calling it the Charmar Correction, a cure for "the
serious problem ignored by the entire data processing c o r n -

24 Computersand Society, December 1999


munity." He then proceeded to create a consulting com- billion to 600 billion dollars. 9 Worldwide costs are estimated
pany, Charmar Enterprises, and went on a campaign to mar- to total about $1 - 2 trillion. *°
ket his "correction" to the problem. However, he elicited Litigation costs alone are estimated to be more than $1
only two sales for the Charmar Correction, and dissolved trillion. Experts project that costs to most large corporations
Charmar Enterprises in 1984. The sale price for the Charmar will average around $30-$50 million. With some 300 bil-
Correction was a mere $995.00. This is indeed ironic, given lion+ lines of code to inspect, and at a cost of $10, $15,
the millions, even tens of millions that many corporations sometimes $20 a line, once can see where the expense comes
and other organizations are now paying to "fix" theY2K prob- from. Some experts claim that the problem is going to set
lem. Schoen was not alone, however, in campaigning for the IT industry back 30 years. 11 The statistics in Table 1
attention to the date-field encoding problem. As early as 1960 illustrate the general costs to fix the problem.
Greg Hallmuch of the U.S. Bureau of Standards was raising
the issue. 7 In 1967 Susan Jones, assistant director of the Table 1. General Costs to Fix The Y2K Problem ~2
Department of Transportation was urging Congress to ad- Corporation Y2K Budget Lines of Code Peopleon Project
dress the date conversion situation. 8 AtlanticEnergy $3.5M 25 M 7
In addition, many claims have come from the program- CanadianImperial $150M 75-100M 250-300
Bankof Commerce
ming community that their urgings to top management of
C. R. Bard $11M 8M 10
their corporations to address the potential problem were all Merrill-Lynch $200 M 170 M 300
ignored up until very recently. The question of responsibility Nabisco $22 M 17 M 50-60
arises: how could management have been so shortsighted in Union Pacific $44 M 72 M 104
the first place? Even worse, one must be able to account for
how, once they became aware of the problem, most major As one can see, the disruptive consequences of Y2K are
companies could respond so lethargically, as if in deep de- enormous and hence the severity of the problem demands
nial. In short, how could we have let it happen? The answer some sort of accountability for wrongdoing and responsibil-
to this question is not as easy as it seems. ity for harm in such grievous circumstances. Congress, how-
This essay constructs a complex, ramified argument ever, has recently short-circuited the need for accountability
through which these questions can be answered. To this end, by succumbing to corporate pressures to enact legislation
this paper analyses 1) the hazards and costs of the Y2K prob- limiting liability for losses due to the Y2K problem. 13
lem, 2) the causes of the problem, and 3) the
professionalization of computer programmers and software Causes of the Y2K Problem
engineers.
The most common misconception about Y2K is that it is a
The Hazards and Costs of Y2K. single problem. Unfortunately, this perspective had created a
commonly held belief that the "problem" is trivial, although
There are at least three types of systems that are affected by widespread, and that a single solution is possible. In reality,
the date conversion problem. They are: personal computers, the causes and the solutions are multifarious and complex.
mainframe computers and the software running on them, As one computer guru put it:
and embedded microprocessors. The scope of the problem It [Y2K]...wasperpetratedby peoplewho decidedthat what we
is extensive, but the problems associated with embedded did yesterdaywas good enough for today and did not look out
microchips is especially crucial, given their pervasive utiliza- for tomorrow and evaluatethe inevitableconsequenceof cut-
tion in most, if not all, of our sociotechnical critical infra- ting corners. It was exacerbatedbypeople who scoffedat warn-
structure and safety-critical systems. The potential hazards ings and were in denial and irresponsible. It was turned into a
associated with Y2K non-compliance are serious and far- crisisby people who left it to the last minute.*4
reaching.
Commercial risks and potential losses associated with This section discusses the complex set of reasons and
mainframe dysfunction, as well as individual risks and losses causes at the root of the perpetuation, exacerbation and cri-
associated with PCs pose serious harm to businesses and sis construction of the Millennium bug. Although the causes
consumers. But the risks and dangers associated with em- are numerous, the interaction of three factors--technical,
bedded chips are especially critical, since they involve seri- programming, and managerial--can be identified as a flame-
ous threats to our entire critical infrastructure, including all work for analyzing the problem.
safety-critical, financial-critical, and health-critical systems.
They are threats to our social and political structures. Technical factors
The estimates for overall expenditures to correct the Y2K Lack of internationally accepted date standards. There exist no
problem are increasing steadily. The current figures (Octo- universal standard for date representation. Following the
ber 1998) estimate US costs to be anywhere from $150 National Institute of Standards of Technology, the U.S. pro-

Computers and Society, December 1999 25


tocol is month-day-year, so January fourth, nineteen ninety- leading edge replacement systems. Designing new systems
eight would be 01-04-98. Canadians and Britons reverse day to be compatible with older systems is generally a resource-
and month so that same day it would be 04/01/98, or "April ful way to maximize efficiency. This feature may be con-
Fool's day. The Scandinavians use yet another system, put- sumer and producer friendly, but if this is done neglecting
ting the year first: 98.01.04. The International Organization the values of quality, reliability, and science, the move to
for Standardization has as its standard: 1998:01:04. Notice universal compatibility will inevitably lead to the design of
that this standard includes the four-digit year. The lesson to faulty systems. Even when a generally good thing, systems
learn is that standardization is crucial in computerization. compatibility allowed the "bug" to spread like a virus or
The industry needs to universalize its standards of opera- bacteria. Moreover, the conversion problem was not ad-
tion, as well as standardize and keep extensive records on dressed when designing systems for compatibility.
date-field labeling, programming documentation, and record
keeping. Managerial factors
High cost of computing. The second technical factor was Managerial accounting protocols. One major cause of the prob-
simply due to the primitive state of computing technology in lem stems from the fact that accounting procedures have
the beginning. In the days of Hollerith cards, computer space treated software expenditure to be an expense in the period
was at a premium and computer memory was very expen- incurred. This means that spending money on maintaining
sive. Given that programmers wanted to conserve computer software has been treated like a telephone bill. It gets paid
memory and storage space, which at the time was extremely regularly, but at the end of the day it is perceived as not
expensive, they ended up encoding calendar dates in a six- increasing a corporation's net worth. This means that capital
digit format mmddyy, rather than an eight-digit format. This expenditure for fixing the problem is seen as coming off the
equals a 40% saving for relatively no loss of information, bottom line. It was difficult to convince a CEO or CFO that
and hence capital. This may account for the original deci- a $5 million corporate expense to solve the Y2K problem, in
sion for a six-digit date format. the early 1990s, was a "good thing to do." This accounts for
the management inertia on this issue. '8 In other words, Y2K
Programming factors compliance has been a "tough sell."
Unexpected tenacity of original programs. Most programmers How do you convince management to take on a multi-
did not envision that the programs they wrote 30 years ago million-dollar project where the return investment is zero? It
would still be running at the end of the 20 ~h century. This shows stubbornness, tenacity, and ignorance of other factors
permitted the development of psychological processes such stemming from bureaucratic rationalism, efficiency, and capi-
as rationalization, dissociation, and other mechanisms of tal accumulation. 19 These kinds of factors are the result of
psychic numbing to avoid the cognitive dissonance between rigid organizational hierarchies - the typical obedience chain
what they knew to be wrong, but their insistence on continu- of positive and negative reinforcement. Left unchecked, this
ing their defective practice nevertheless. led to amoral functionalism and a sense of amoral rational-
Code Re-Use. A fourth complication is that virtually all ity.
new applications have algorithms from previous systems. The Decisional Inertia. Another cause of the problem is deci-
re-use of algorithms that have a hidden date-processing fault sional inertia on the part of CEOs and CIOs. One cause of
is one reason the Y2K problem is so extensive. 15 Inciden- the indecisiveness is that many top managers have been de-
tally, this fact is what likens Y2K to a virus: faulty algorithms ferring attention to the problem in the hope that a "silver
get used and re-used, spreading their deadly payload to more bullet" may come along to solve the problem. But most ex-
and more systems. perts acknowledge that a "silver bullet" is very unlikely to
Since successive applications are often built on earlier emerge. "There are hundreds of computer languages and a
programs, or incorporate subroutines from other programs wide variety of systems" reports Kazim Isfahani, industry
into their own structure, this means that successive applica- analyst at Giga Information Group, an IT consultancy
tions are constructed on the basis of what could be faulty group. 2° This is a perfect example of the false optimism of
data. technology and progress. The belief that for every problem
Programs are still written using old algorithms. Even the of technology, a solution is found with a technological "fix."
best and most modern code in the world could be hamstrung Another managerial cause of decisional inertia that led
by historical data that are faulty. 16 In fact, much software, to failure to act in a timely manner is top management's
which vendors and manufacturers knew were "infected" with general ignorance of management information systems. Cor-
the "millennium bug", have continued to be sold until very porate and governmental management certainly appreciated
recently.'7 the benefits and results of computerization, but took little or
Systems compatibi&y. Systems operating software, as well no interest in understanding the complexity of information
as customized programs, have been designed to be compat- systems management. Hence one important lesson to learn
ible with older versions. Out-of-date programs have supported from Y2K is that top management must understand infor-

26 Computersand Society, December 1999


mation technology. In order to limit the effect of such causes Contribute to societyand human wellbeing.., minimize nega-
in the future, one must force CEOs and CIOs to be skilled tive consequencesof computing systems,including threats to
and knowledgeable about technology that is the lifeblood of health and safety.
their corporation. Moreover, business schools must train
their students how to manage organizations that depend on Now, given the extent and extremity of the risks and
complex information technology systems. causes of the Y2k problem discussed above, it is safe to
As recently as a few years ago, programs were being writ- assume that this code was violated.
ten that did not take into account date changes and date Take also ACM General Moral Imperative 1.2, which
fields in data processing. In fact, one survey reports that states
only 20 percent of America's biggest companies have de- Avoid harm to others...the computing professional has
vised a full-fledged strategy to deal with the problem. 21 Timely the...responsibility to report any signs of systemsdangersthat
planning depends on whether managers were alert to the might result in seriouspersonal or socialdamage.If one'ssupe-
issue. Most were not because the information technology riors do not act to curtail or mitigate such dangers, it may be
(IT) industry was either in denial, or negligent. Even when necessaryto "blow the whistle" to help correct the problem or
managers became aware of the problem, they also exhibited reduce the risk."
denial and neglect. A typical response from industry experts
is, "I won't be in this position or this company in the year Obviously, few, if any, computer professionals followed
2000. It's not my problem. ,,= For example, as recently as this code in the case of Y2K. Or, take ACM Specific Profes-
December 4 1998, the Wall &reetJournal quoted a corporate sional Responsibility 2.1:
executive as stating, "This year 2000 stuff is waayyyy over ...Strive to achieve the highest quality...in professional
done. It's complete, complete lunacy. "23 work...The computingprofessionalmust striveto achievequal-
Given the grave business, legal, and social risks and haz- ity and to be cognizant of the serious negative consequences
ards caused by Y2K, and, given the elucidation of such a that may result from poor quality in a system."
large set of causes as the seven identified and discussed above,
it is not difficult to conclude that accountability for safe, And ACM Specific Professional Responsibility 2.5:
reliable, and beneficial information technologies has been ...Give comprehensiveand thorough evaluationsof computer
greatly eroded in the Y2K case. In the next section, we turn systemsand their risks...Computer professionalsare in a posi-
to a discussion of the role of professionalization in the con- tion of special trust, and therefore have a specialresponsibility
trol and management of potentially risky technologies such to provide objective,credibleevaluationsto employers,clients,
as computerization. users, and the public...any signsof dangerfrom systemsmust be
reported to those who have opportunity and/or responsibility
Professionalization of Software Engineering to resolvethem. ,,25

In his 1914 book Business: A Proffbssion, Brandeis identified Computer professionals are responsible for the effective
two distinctive attributes of a profession: the mastery of a development and operation of information systems. When
systematic body of theoretical and technical knowledge and major events are known to occur that pose significant risks
the development and internalization of an ethic of service.24 or that will compromise the effective operation of these sys-
Although he did not persuade business to heed his advice tems, such as the year 2000 date problem, computer tech-
about an ethic of service, his blandishments are as timely as nologists have a professional responsibility to alert manage-
ever with respect to the professionalization of software engi- ment and take corrective action in a timely manner. As com-
neers and computer programmers. Well-established profes- puter ethicist Helen Nissenbaum writes, "If any reasonable
sions communicate their ethic of service through a code of person fails to take precautions of which he is capable, and
ethics and a procedure for monitoring their members' com- that any reasonable person with normal capacities would have
pliance with the ethical principles enunciated in the code. taken in those circumstances, then he is not excused from
Hence, one way to determine a profession's self-acknowl- blame merely because he did not intend the outcome. ''26 Since
edged ethic of service is to look at their code of ethics. When computer professionals failed to take reasonable precautions
one looks at the code of ethics of computer programmers to avoid the Y2K problem, they are collectively responsible
and software engineers, it would seem that many of the prin- for the predicament, even if they did not intend to cause
ciples of the code are violated in the case of Y2K. such a problem. Nor could they have fulfilled their responsi-
Take for example the code of ethics of the Association of bilities simply by reporting the problem to top management
Computing Machinery (ACM), one of the most established without any further action. This belief is shared by members
of computing professions. As a "General Moral Imperative," of the computing community itself and is expressed by Leon
the code of ethics of the ACM implores its members to Kapplelman, who states that

Computers and Society, December 1999 27


Potential falloutfrom Y2K problemswillput our [the comput- Ensure adequatedocumentation on any project on which they
ing profession] credibilityto the test of fire. Let'sfaceit. Good work, including a log of the problemsdiscoveredand solutions
intentionsaside,computingprofessionalscreatedthe Y2Kprob- adopted.
lem. Notwithstanding varying degrees of complicity by engi-
neers, auditors, accountants, users, management, and others, If this would have been followed in the case of Y2K, the
the simple fact is that the code is broken and the code is the actual place of date-fields in complex programs, as well as
responsibilityof the computing professionY code that is re-used, would have been identified and docu-
Ed Yourdon, computer and Y2K consultant, makes ex- mented, thus alleviating the literally thousands of man-hours
plicit the connection between a profession's adherence to a already spent on identifying, line-by-line, the two-digit date
code of ethics and its role in the mitigation of technical fields in order to make the program Y2K compliant.
failures, specifically the Y2K problem, when he states that Take for example principle 1.12 that states
"if we computing professionals had insisted on following that Whenever appropriate, delete outdated or flaweddata.
code of ethics [i.e., the ACM code], we might have avoided
the year 2000 problem altogether...,,28 If this had been heeded, programmers would have re-
The professionalization of computer programmers and fused to use two digit date-fields long ago, and not continued
software engineers has been, in many ways a slow process. to use them until very recently.
The first major step was a workshop on Software Engineer- Another principle that was violated is 2.0 which states:
ing Ethics held at Carnegie Mellon University's Software Disclose to appropriate persons or authorities any actual or
Engineering Institute. 29 Many of the topics at the workshop potential danger to the user, a third party, or the environment,
were of a pedagogical nature - how best to institute ethical they reasonably believe to be associatedwith the software or
concerns into the computer science and software engineer- related documents for which they are responsible, or merely
ing curriculum. It was as early as 1975, however, that spe- know about.
cialists were calling for the professionalization of computer
programming. 3° Palmer's article stressed the benefits that According to this principle, programmers have a respon-
could result from the licensing of computer programmers, sibility to insist that top management take action in the event
both for working professionals and their clients, as well as that software, which they write, poses a "potential danger"
the larger society that depends on computers and the soft- to the user or a third party. It is safe to say that Y2K poses
ware that runs them. more than potential danger to individuals, corporations, and
There are two opposing views as to whether computer society at large, given everything demonstrated above.
programmers should be required to submit to a licensing Principle 2.04 states that professional software engineers
procedure. One side states that the licensing of computer must
professionals is one way to achieve a heightened sense of Cooperate in effortsto addressmatters of gravepublic concern
accountability, responsibility, and knowledge in software caused by softwareor relateddocuments.
development. The other side states that governmental regu-
lation should not get involved because it will stifle the cre- This principle obligates professionals to go beyond merely
ativity and innovation that computer programmers are known reporting on problems, but also to help "coordinate efforts"
for. 31 that cause "grave public concern." This, we can assume, would
Before computer programmers and software engineers include the possibility of blowing the whistle on companies
can or cannot be held liable for their actions, however, they that refused to address the problem that Y2K has caused,
need to clearly establish themselves as a profession, and, as even after the problem was brought to top management. In
we have stated, the process has been slow. For instance, in this sense, this principle is analogous to ACM's General Moral
the mid-70s the Special Interest Group on Software Engi- Imperative 1.2. This calls for professionals to recognize that
neering (SIGSOFT) was formed by the ACM, and the ACM their responsibilities go beyond the client, even self-interest,
Software Engineering Notes and IEEE Transactions on Soft- in the spirit of an ethic of public service.
ware Engineering were first published. In 1993 the ACM and To recognize the wider social responsibilities of the pro-
IEEE Computer Society established a Joint Steering Com- fession, principle 2.07 states
mittee for the Establishment of Software Engineering as a [Do] not put self-interest,the interestof an employer,the inter-
Profession. 32 est of a client, or the interest of the user ahead of the public's
Finally, in January of 1994, the IEEE Computer Society, interest.
in consultation with the ACM, drafted a Software Engineer-
ing Code of EthicsY Again, as with the ACM Code, many Given that computers have a central and growing role in
of the principles of this proposed code were violated in the commerce, industry, government, medicine, education, so-
case of Y2K. For instance, Principle 1.08 states that the pro- cial affairs, and private use, the need for computer profes-
fessional software engineer shall sionals to heed their social responsibilities can be expected

28 Computersand Society, December 1999


by the public at large. Computer professionals have in fact Notes
realized the growing necessity of their important role in the ~ar2OOOIn3~rmationandReadinessDisclosumAct.Oct. 19, 1998, EL. 105-271, 112
Stat. 2386.
society at large. In 1981, as part of the growing concern over 2 Harvard Business"Review, 76 (4), July/Aug, 1998, p. 162
the increasing use of computing technology in military ap- 3Jimms, J (1998). Could Y2K cause a global recession? Fortune 138 (7) pp. 172-176.
plications, specifically, the perceived increased threat of 4 %nner, E. (1996). Why things"bite back: technologyand the revenge of unintended
consequences. New York: Vintage Books.
nuclear war, a group of computer professionals organized 5 Gillin, B. (1984). "The problem you may not know you have", Computerworld,
what came to be known as the "Computer Professionals for February 13.
Social Responsibility" (CPSR). Its concerns cover everything 6 Ibid, p. 7.
7 Munro, Nell (1998) "The big glitch," National Journal30 (25) pp. 142-149.
from military use of computing technology to issues of civil 8 Ibid.
liberties in cyberspace. This model organization stands as a 9 Foremski, T. (1998, Wednesday, December 2). Millennium 'bomb' is already ticking.
testament to the need for computer professionals to recog- Financial 77rues. hfformation Technology, pp. 1.
to Garmer Group, 7 Oct. 1998. http://www.year2OO.com/costs.btm.
nize the leadership role they can, and must take, if society is it Reinke, B. (1998, October). IT industry consultant. Quoted in Phillips, William.
to be protected from the negative effects of computer tech- Here comes the millennium bug. PopularScience, 253 (4), p.92.
nology. 34 In fact the Y2K problem has put into the question ~2.The statistics in this table were gathered from Computerworld 31 (51), December
the professionalism of the computing community, 35 and it is 22, 1997, pp. 2,5,6,8 and Computerworld 32 (25), June 22, 1998, pp. 7, 8, 10.
,3 Barr, Stephen (1999). "Deal reached on Bill to limit Y2K liability." The ~shington
incumbent on computer professionals to "save their sacred Post, June 30, section A, p. A012.
honor" by responding to Y2K in a quick and thorough fash- ,4 DeJager, Peter. (1998). "It's a people problem." Availableat: bttp://www.year2000.com/
archive/people.html
ion.
,5 Keough, J. (1997). Your safety net has big holes in it. Solving the Year 2000
Problem.Boston:AP Professional, Chapter 3.
Conclusion ,6 Fairweather, B. (1998). Not facing the future: computing chaos in the new century?
http//www.ccsr.dmu.ac.uk/resources/professionalism/millennimn/Y2Kprob.html
17.Miller, C.S. (1995). "Microsoft Wakes Up to the Problem.." InJbworld,20 (15): 1-
The need for a professional code of ethics arises mainly due 3: Condon, Don. (1995) "Microsoft Tries to Rewrite Programming." InJbword
to the unequal balance of power between two parties - the 24 (6): 7-12.
professional and the client. The professional has all of the ,8 Garner, M. (1996) Why the year 2000 problem happened, http://www.is.ufl.edu/
bawb080h.htm.
expertise upon which the client is totally dependent. In the 19Meall, L. (1995). The century's time bomb. Accounumcy, 116 (128), 52-57.
medical context, for example, the patient is vulnerable to the 20 Foremski, T. (1998, Wednesday, December 2). Millennium 'bomb' is already
knowledge and directives of the doctor and must have ut- ticking, lhTnancialTimes,pp.1; Cf., Newling, R. (1998, Wednesday, December
2). No magic bullet to save the laggards. Financial Times, pp. 8
most trust that the doctor will act exclusively in the best 21Peters, James. (1997) "If wishes were noises," Computerworld31 (51), December 22,
interest of the patient. Similar situations of vulnerability and p. 2; Hicks, John (1997). "Many companies just starting to address the Y2K
trust exist between lawyers and their clients. Analogously, a problem." Byte 21 (9), p. 24-28.; Feine, Jacob. (1997). "Slow responses to year
vulnerable public can be harmed by technology created by 2000 problem." IEEESoftware 14 (3), pp. 126-133.
22Furma, Jeffand Martola, Alberta (1994) "Year2000 denial," ComputerworM28 (43),
engineers employed by corporations and governments that pp. 70-
develop large-scale technological systems. One way to insure 23 Binkley, Christina (1998). "Millennium bugged: the big Y2K problem is the silly
that doctors, lawyers, and engineers can be trusted to act in questions," ~ l l StreetJournal, December 4, p. 1.
24Brandeis, L. (1914) Business:APro3~ssion,Boston: Small, Maynard, and Company.
the interest of those they serve is to create in these profes- 25We are grateful to the paper by Cappell and Kappelman, Cappel, J. and Kappelman,
sions a high level of commitment to an ethics of service. L. (1998) "The Year 2000 Problem and Ethical Responsibility: A Call to Action,
From the perspective of the dependent and vulnerable cli- In~brmation Society 14 (3), pp. 187-197 for drawing attention to the particular
codes cited.
ents, it is essential that these professions scrupulously en- 26. Nissenbaum, Helen, (1994) "Computing and Responsibility," Communicationsof
force their codes of ethics. theACM37 (1), pp. 77.
As society becomes more and more dependant on com- 27 Kappelman, Leon (1999) "Saving Our Sacred Honor," CommunicationsoftheACM
42 (5), p. 23.
puting technology and information systems, it becomes more 2~ Yourdon, Ed. (1998) "The Moral Dimension of Y2K," Computerworldhttp://
and more vulnerable to harm if these systems fail. Nothing www.computerworld.com/home/print.nsf/atl/98121482A6 (accessed3/24/99).
illustrates this more than the Y2K problem. Hence, the con- 29 .Gotterbarn, Donald (1990) "A Workshop Report: Software Engineering Ethics,"
clusion of this essay is: the computing community should Journal of Systems Software 11 215 -216.
30 Palmer, George (1975). "Programming, The Profession That Isn't," Datamation 21
professionalize itself, by requiring their members to be li- (4), pp. 23-29.
censed, and enforcing a code of ethics that mandates ac- 3m.Gotterbarn, Don and Webber, James (1994) "Can Computer Programmers Commit
Malpractice?" Computerworld,28 (35), pp. 37-41.
countability on the part of their members.
~2. Bagert, D. (1999). "Taking the Lead ill Licensing Software Engineers,"
Y2K has already turned out to be the single most expen- Communications of the ACM 42 (4), pp. 27-29.
sive professional failure made in human history, and, no " . Gotterbarn, D., Miller, K. and Rogerson, S. (1997) "Software Engineering Code
matter what else Y2K may bring, it constitutes a perfect case of Ethics," CommunicationsoftheACM40 (t), pp. 110-118.
34 To find out more information about CPSR, please visit their web-site at: http://
study in software engineering ethics, managerial ethics, and www.cosr.orff
engineering ethics. • 35.Pollack,Andrew (1999). "Year2000 Problem Tests Professionalismof Programmers."
The New York Times, May 3, section C, page 1.

Computers and Society, December 1999 29

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