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IS A HOLDING OF THE
ARCHIVES 'SECTION
LIBRARY SERVICES
FORT,VENWORTH, KANSAS

DOCUMENT NO.fri(-2146,9_9 COPY NO.

A rmy-CIEG-ISC-PO-1408-1 Mar 50-5M

Prepared at
THE ARMORED SCHOOL
Fort Knox, Kentucky
1951 - 1952
 krirr'

ANTI TANK DEFENSE: WEAI-0NS AND CTRINE

DOWNGIIRM AT 3 YERR INTERVALS;

DE-CLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

A RESEARCH RER)RT PREPARED

BY

CaliITTEE 25

OFFICERS ADVANCED COURSE

THE ARxii0RED SCHOOL

r:: 1,:..1;::0731TV CFI/id/ILL

__,0 4-194- _____C4YrrkT11T_ JAIES L HARR.INGTON

CA?TAIN EDWARD S ENE130E

CAPrAIN JOHN "v4Ahi

CAPTAIN SAMUEL R. iiiARTIN

FIRST LIEUTENANT EDWARD P WYRUCHOWSKI JR

121111101.11.111101MOMMINNW

Fart, Kn9x„ Kentucky.

May 1952

ooty
 TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Chaptor Page

Preface

3. INTRODUCTION 4.. 6.606•414•••*4 1

2 THE UNITED STATES • • • • • • • • • • • • • 0.
Antitank Doctrine World War II. • • .. • •
Post War Developments of Antitank Doctrine. • . 23
Observatim and Conclusii-in. .•. ••• • 35
3 Cjii\ILD:, AND THE UNITED ICENGDOM• • • I, • • • • • • 42
Early Developments. • • • • • • • .r• • • • • * 42
Developncnt of Doctrine of Defens9. • • • • • 44
Postwar Developments. • • • • • .1,. • • • •. 48
4 GNriaLNY. • •... • • • • • 0 • • • • • • • • . 61
Doctrine of Defense • • • • • • 0 • • -
• • • • . '63

Employment of Weapons • • • •• c• • • • • 66
Cmduct of, Defense. • • . • 0 • • 0 • • • • • . 79
5 RUSSIA. • • • • • ..• • • • St • *• •0** 93
Wartime Developments .. _. • • • • • • • • • 96
Summary of Russin Antitank Doctrine to
include 1946 •.• • • 4.... • • • • • . • • • 109
6 . .
CONCLUSIONS....• • •. • • • • • • 5 • 5 • ID .115
Preliminary Ponc1ueiOn6 . • 6 AtL0 • • • • •. . 116
General Principle... • • • • • • • • • • • •,. 116
Principles of Organization. • • • • • • • • • j.17
An Antitank Doctrine.... • • . • . •. • • 11.8
7 RECOIZENDLTIONS• • • g• ••••• • 0 04 11•• 121
••••

APPENDIX: NE4 DEMOPliENTS .. • • •.•.• • ... 124

BIBLIOGRAPHY. • 4110. *••••••,*••• * * • • e. 332

11
 PREFACE

Research topics in the past have generPily dealt with

historical battles and situations. Feeling that much of the
valuable research in the field of.rocent 41i-t,Pry history had
been pretty well exhausted, The Armored School decided that
students of the 1951-1952 Advanced Class would derive more
benefit and produce more useful studies if subjects were as-.
signed in the realm of conteznporary military problems.

At the beginning of the school term, a questionnaire

was distributed to determine what problem or problems each -
student would like to study. Based on these questionnaires,
,The Armored School assigned topics for research study to students
conforming generally with their expresses desires. The school
selected those topics in which careful research would be of con-
siderable benefit to the Army.

Having expressed interest on our questionnaires in some

phase of anti tank tactics or weapons, we were organized as a
coinmittee in September 1951, All. officers had had sane experience
with tanks and anti tank weapons in training and/or combat.

• Captain James L. Harrington was commissioned in Armor in

1942. He participated in the invasions of Sicily, Italy, and
Southern France with the 753d Medium Tank Battalion. Recently
he served a year with the 70th Tank Battalion in the Korean con-
flict.

Captain Edward S. Eneboe since completing the Tank

Destroyer Basic Course in 1945 has served with the 37th Tank
Battalion and the U. S. Constabulary Forces in Europa.

Captain John Wrhl h,-)a recently served two years in

Support Company, inth AIR at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, end in
Korea. This company is presently equipped in part with the
towed 9Qnm anti tank gun.

Captain.Salnua R. Martin has recently served with Division

Reconnaissance units, including service in Korea with the 25th
Division Reconnaissance Company.

let Lieutenant Edward P.. Wyruchowski served with the 8th

Armored Division during World War II, Recently he has served with
the 70th Tank Battalion including a,year in Korea.

iii
S Choice of a proper scope was difficult because of the
site and nature of the field:'anti tank defense. After a num-
ber of preliminary discussions and a certain amount of general
reading by the committee members', we decided to narrow the scope
to a study of crewserved anti tank weapons. We divided the study
along national. lines.• Each committee member was assigned one of
the major . powers.,.

In general, this research has been conducted by study- -

ing material concerning tanks, anti tank weapons, defensive
doctrine, and the tactics of enployment of tanks and anti tank
, weapons. We decided informally to limit the study in thLs way.,
because of the time elenent. Little study was made of manpower,
industrial capacity,
- atonic weapons, or cost economy. Of course,
the influence of these factors is alluded to in the research paper
many times. Nevertheless, our conclusions are offered in realiz-
ation that factors outside the scope of the research may weaken or
nullify these conclusions.

iv
 SECURITY INFORMATION

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Can the United State's defeat Russia's huge army of tanks

on the battlefield? Is our army adequately .equipped and trained

to combat massive aniored thrusts? If not, what's wrong? Is

there something wrong with our anti tank weapons or how we anploy

then? Is our tactical doctrine'broad enough to cover every even-

tuality?

There is good reason for doubts to exist, We have never

encountered large enemy tnnk forces on the field of battle, nor

has our ally Great Britain. Only Germany and Russia have had ex-

perience in employing or defending against armor inasSed..brthe

• hundreds and even thousands.

We feel -619it our present concept of anti tank defense is

inadequate. It is our bblief, as a result of our study, that the

American concept, tied to the offensive, depends too heavily on

the tank to defeat armor. Eoreover, the concept itnplys that all

attacks will be stopped within the regimental sector. A complete

doctrine for anti tank defense under all conditions is nowhere

laid down. .

In an effort to ansl'iver. the above questions, we have made

a study of the entire field of anti tank defense. We have en-

deavored to answer two questions:

a. Tiilhat should be the United Stntes' doctrine for anti

tank defense?

4ert

'
 V e* 't

• b. Do we have the right weapons for anti tank defense?

A thorough study of the problem/must consider all of the

following factors:

a.. Military Organization

b.. Military Weapons

c. Tactics of Armor

d. Defensive Doctrine

e. Manpower

f. Industrial capacity

g. Economy

h. New devolopnents such as tactical atomic weapons

and guided missiles.

• The influence of these factors is involved. It will not

suffice to consider only the develonnent of a gun capable of

defePtin.g any tank. It will not suffice to consider only the

issue of greater quantities of anti tank weapons to line units.

Rather must the entire problem of anti tank defense be approached

by careful study and weighing of all factors — in turn and as they

affect one another.

Of necessity, however, we limited the scope of this study

in two ways. First, we have concentrated our efforts on the first

four factors listed above. These factors have the most direct
bearing on the problem, and the information is more readily avail

We have neither time nor staff nor qualifications to proper—

ly gather and evaluate information on the last four factors.

• Second,. within the first four factors_ we laave limited our research

by concentrating our stucy on. the requirements for mobile crew

served anti trInk weapons.. We studied individual anti tank weapons

and passive defense measures. only to the point that their place

in the general schane of defense could be determined.

There are few terms in this p-per which should confuse or

mislead the military r.eader. Foreign words are translated in the

text as they appear. It would perhaps be well to define three

common military words in order to ensure we are all thinid.ng along

the same lines:

a. Tank: a heavily armorc:d, highly mobile, vehicle,

mounting 'automatic weapons and any one of &number of different

• types of guns.

b. Tank Destroyer: a more lightly armored vehicle,

highly mobile, and mounting a gun specifically designed to defeat

tanks.

c. Assault Gun: An armored vehicle mounting a gun

specifically designed for the direct fire support of the infantry,

principally in the attack.

As can be seen from the above definitions, the Tank

Destroyer rnd the Assault Gun are "specialized" weapons. The

American Army has neither weapon today. We 11.,?.ve, instead, a tank

designed to perform all three jobs: anti tank defense, direct-fire

support of infantry, and the missions of offensive operation. We

will compare the relative merits of specializationrnd strnd--rd-

3
•ization throughout the text.

Within the committee, we divided The research work along

national lines. Because of their present day importance and their

past experience in World 'War II, the nations of the United States,

Great Br'itain, Germany, and Russia. have been studied. • In each

case a general work pattern was followed:

a. Early history of tanks and anti tank measures.

b. Defensive and anti tank doctrine as it developed

through the years.

c. Development and anployment of mobile crew-served

weapons.

d. 13attles which illustrated anployment of weapons and -

application of anti tank doctrine'at various stages.

e. Present day trends in weapons !Ind anti tank doctrine.'

In the succeeding chapters the reader will find that there

are differences in the method of presentation. These differences

are primarily the result of varying quantities and typos of in-

formation concerning each nation studied.

Chapter 2 traces the development of anti tank doctrine

in the United States from 1940 to the present, The existence of

sharp controversy throughout this period is apparent, and there

is no assurance th -t current doctrine is the ideal.

Chapter 3 indicates that although some areas of disagree-

ment do exist, the anti tank doctrine and weapons of Cnnadn and

the United Kingdom have been 'fairly well established since the
• latter stages of World War II. Generally, these nations tend ,

more tOward.specialization in weapons than does the United States.

Chapter 4 outlines the German development of tanks, tank

destroyers, and assault guns, and their subsequent caubinntion

for various reasons.

Chapter 5 describes the maturing/of Russia's present anti

tank doctrine, her greatanphasis on depth, the role of the in-

fantry soldier, and the role of the artillery.

Chapter 6 is devoted to the committee's conclusions, in-

cluding a list of principles and a general doctrine of anti tank

defense -which we feel are the principle fruits of our research

effort.

Chapter 7 consists of a list of recommendations in the

light of our conclusions.

This cmmittee sincerely hopes that this per will provide

a starting point for further study in the field of anti tank de-

fense, W0 hope the facts and ideas presented here will move the

reader to add his efforts to the developnent of a sound,doctrine

and weapons system.

 CM= 2

TI IMITZD STATES

Section I. Antitank Doctrine in World War n

With the sensational collapse of France at the hands of

German armor in 1940, military thinking in the United States

centered on the problem of antitank warfare. There were those

in this country who feared the long accepted infantry-artillery

team, so effective in the first World War, had been supplanted

by the tank-air team. All were agreed on the necessity for

stopping armor, but means, doctrine, and technique offered

subjects for an endless debate which continues to this day..

In general, there were in 1940 and there are now -

• two schools of thought, One held that the best defense against

tanks is another tank. The other, ably led by Lt Gen Leslie

J. McNair, held that our own tanks should be left free for

decisive action against enemy infantry and that enemy armor

should be opposed by a mobile mass of unarmored guns)

Some of the questions involved in this "great debate"

were:2

Could tanks best be stopped by tanks or guns?

Assuming that antitank guns were extensively

developed, what proportion of the armed might of the United

States should be devoted to this purpose?

Should gun calibre, armor, or mobility be the guiding

 •••

principle in fighting enemy tanks?.

Should antitank- guns .e towed or self—propelled?

Should antitank measures 1:.(:) used by the several

arms or should they be grouped under a separate arm?

In fighting many tanks should our antitank forces

await the appearance of the enemy or aggressively search him

out Pnd destroy him?

Should our rntitrnk forces maneuver freely during a

fight or fire only from previously selected concealed positions?

How much, if any, of our antitank forces should be

organic to divisions and smaller units, and how much should

be pooled in Corps, Armies Pnd under GHQ?

Despite intensive research, innumerable conferences,

• and the lessons of combat of World War 11, most of these ques—

tions remain unsolved. TWO schools of though remain in 1952,

using much the same arguments that were proferred in 1940.

The official policy of the United States Army has undergone

complete reversal in this time and seams to have been based

throughout on the subjective beliefs of whatever generals

enjoyed greatest prestige at the time with the General Staff.

Ledzjay....canuarnt. Prior to 1940, United States antitank

doctrine MS defensive and passive, envisioning a cordon defense.3

kost of the antitank weapons at this time were in the Pntitaank

companies of infantry regiments: decentralized, 'contrary to

long established GHQ principles of pooling.4

 The first break in this doctrine of'passive defense since

March 1938 came with the publication of War Department Training

Circular No 23 on 23 September 1.940. 7140 circular directed

•••••

that a minimum number of antitank guns be placed in fixed

initial positions and the maximum number be held in mobile

reserve.5 Although this was a major stride toward the offensive

concept, the doctrine remained defensive' in character and

scope.

On 15 April 1941, under strong pressure from Gen McNair

and guided by Lt Col Andrew D. Bruce, an antitank conference

was held at the War Plans Division, ZGS, in Washington. Gen

George C. Marshall established the principle of offensive

action against tanks, a departure from the hitherto defensive

concept. On this basis the conference recommended retention

of the antitank companies in the infantry regiments (GER non-

concurring), creation of divisional antitank battalions, and a

central reserve of GHQ, antitank battalion.s.6

Lt Col Bruce held another conference at the Planning

Branch, G--3, ?CGS, on May 26, 1941, in which the decisions

of the April conference were reaffirmed. It was decided that

provisional antitank battalions be organized at once, using

any artillery weapons usable against tanks, and that an anti-

tank officer be appointed in every division and higher unit.

It is interesting to note that.Gen lAciair and. Col Bruce both

opposed leaving the antitank companies in the infantry regiments,

(,

o but this had. to be done to win concurrence for the whole

program from the Chief of Infantry.7'

At the time of the Antitank Conference at the Army War

College 14-11 July 1942, the first signs of optimism were noted.

One month previous to the conference, the Germans destroyed

some 200 British tanks on the Egyptian—Libyan frontier using

guns primarily; and while a tragedy for the Allies, the incident
8
offered the first proof that tanks could. be halted. Second

reason for optimism was that the United States had -settled on

a course of action for antitank warfare. The Antitank Company

of the Infantry Regiment remained., but divisional antitank

battalions at corps, armies, and. GHQ, were in the process of

formation. The policy called for offensive mass action against

• tanks and centralized control of antitank weapons.9

In his closing remarks to the conference, Gen McNair

summed up the prevailing views of GHQ,:

...the counterattack long has been termed.

the soul of defense. Decisive action against a
tank attack calls for a counterattack in the same
general manner as against the older forms of attack.
A counterattack, of course, may be delivered. by
.other tanks, but the procedure is costly. There is
no reason why antitank guns, supported by infantry,
cannot attach tanks just as infantry, supported by
artillery, has attacked infantry in the past. -
Certainly it is poor economy to use 4 $35,000 medium
tank to destroy another tank- when the job can be done
by a gun costing a, fraction as much.1°

Gen McNair believed, that although all types of cannon

should be used against tanks, development of a series of special

,
1

9
S. a.ntitarlk guns were4imperative.11

'Large scale maneuvers In September 1911-1 offered an

opportunity to :test the new.doctrine. Speedy and. aggressive

action.by Antitank 13attalions organized in groups of three

was stressed, The battalions were ta,u.ght to search oat and.

attack enemy tanks before they bad..assumed *formation. 'Gen

McNair continually stressed awessiveness :in order to dispel

the defensive psychology' created by Axis successes.12

Antitank guns proved highly effective in the Carolina

maneuvers in November 19141.. Of 93 tanks ruled out of action,

91% were the result of guns, 5% by grenade, 3% by mines, and

1% by air, The 1st Armored Division was ruled destroyed..13

Tremendous emphasis was placed on an:titanic measures'in

• the latter half of 19/1-1.. A detailed memorandum published. by

Planning Branch, G-3, WDG-S, on lg August 19)41 envisioned. a

mobilized army of 55 divisions and proposed a ratio of four

antitank battalions per division or 220 battalions in all.

These would. be allocated on a basis of one antitank battalion

per division, 55 for armies and corps, and. 110 under GHQ,

contro1.14

Gen McNair opposed this plan, believing 220 battalions

too much for a 55 division army, and. as always, he objected

to organic inclusion of antitank battalions in divisions, armies,

and. corps. He preferred a separate Antitank Force under GHQ„

15
including all antitank guns except those in Infantry Regiments.

10
 ,./

S The tank dostper . With such an ambitious

program for such an tla.-gent need, all were agreed on the necessity

foT an Antitank. Center.16 On .27 November 1941., a 'JD letter

,
ordered the activation on. or about 1 December 1941 of a Tank

Destroyer Tactical and Firing Center, Including a ,tank -Destroyer

Board. Col Andrew D. Bruce, the guiding spirit of the program,

was designated Commanding Officer,17 ,

The same letter cr dered the immediate activation of

53 Antitarilc Battalions, all to be centralized under GHQ, contro1.18

Shortly thereafter, Antitank Battalions were redesignated

Tank: Destroyer Battalions, the old name savoring of defensive

tactics,19

Under .Gen Brucet s able leadership, the Tank Destroyer

• Program expanded rapidly throughout 1942 into a unique and

separate arm. By the end of 19142 it boasted a strength of

almost 100,000 with g0 battalions active and 614 more planned.20

The rise and: fall of tank aostroyers. Anticipating
a need for as many as twenty Tank Destroyer Battalions concen-

trated against a passed enemy tank attack, Gen McNair recommended.

activation of 222 battaliona.for the 114 divisions envisioned

in the WD-Troop Basis of 1943..

1 However, massed .armor was scarcely
used against United States forces in 1943. Eio demand appeared

for two..k destroyer brigades, and. groups were rarely used.- Tank

destroyer battalions were normally attached to divisions.21

Although the War Department only authorized 144 tank .

11
• destroyer battalions instead of the 222 recommended by Army
,..
Ground FT ces, Gen McNair further revised the program downward

to 106 on 1)-1- April 194-3. It had bedome apparent in overseas

theaters that additional. artillery,'tanks, and engineers

/
would be needed more than tank. destroyers. Marther, crowded

training facilities in the United. States necessitated a

slowing down of mobilization. As the bottom of the manpower

barrel was reached and the demand for infantry replacements /

increased, deactivation of Tank. Destroyer and Antiaircraft units

continued until in 1.91-111- only 78 tank destroyer battalions

remained.22

Equipment Development. 4.-t the outset of the tank dest-

royer craze in 19)-1-1; three types of TD battalions were planned:

o a light towed in battalion, a light SP gun battalion, and a

heavy SP gun battalion.23 However, with an eye on standardization

and recognizing the need for a heavier gun to match heavier

armor, the Tait: Destroyer Board. on 3 February 19)4-2 recommended

a dngle, standard. type, heavy SP tank destroyer battalion.

This was accepted by the War Department, and the Tables of

Organization and Equipment were published 17 June 1942.211'

A month later, the 3" SP gun was made the standard

weapon for tank destroyers, thus climaxing the race between

German tank development and .American tank destroyer development.

Initially, the Germans had the Mark III and Mark IV tanks 25

and. 32 tons respectively, which possessed great mobility but

I 12
 which could. be destroyed. by our 37mm 02n. The German Mark V, the
, ,

Panther, at 1-1-5 tons, could. be destroyed: with our 75mm. gun. Later

came the Mark la, the Tiger, at 66 tons; however, in anticipation

of our 3" gun, the Germans developed the 75 ton Royalty-Jager Panther

and the .75 ton Ferdinand. Thus in the words_ of one observer, "Ger-

man armor immobilized itself to meet the threat of more and. more

proficient tatili. destroyers".25

On 13 October 1.942, a Special Armored. Vehicle Board. composed.

of officers of the Armored. Force, Cavalry, Ordnance, and Tank

Destroyers, was appointed. by the War Department with Brig Gen

Williston B. Palmer as chairman. Its conclusions, published on

5 December 1942, ably present the best tank destroyer thinking

of the day: .

S ...A suitable tank destroyer gun motor carriage

is critically needed. The tan!: destroyer is
essentially a gun carriage, not a tank. The first
requirement is a gun adequate to knock out the stoutest
en.eirror taxii:c. ' The gun carriage must have: cross-country
mobility fully equal to that of a tank (which makes
a tracked vehicle essential); top speed. on roads
of )45-50 mph; top weight of 20 tons; traverse for
the gun of at least 35 d.egrees total; space for
the crew, equipment, and 40 rounds of ammunition; oc
armor protection against small arms and. fragments.'

Equipment policy changed. again in 19143 as North African

observers, notably Gen Omar Bradley and Gen Lloyd R. Fredendall,

expressed preference for the towed. gun over the self-propelled.

destroyer - because of the high silhouette of the latter. AGF

directed on 1 January 1943 that an experimental towed. gun battalion

,

be organized. By Novcmber 1943, following requests of theater

13
 ,

commanders, and. Influenced by the British, it was decided, to have

0 the battalions half towed and half SP.27

Evolution of tank destroyers tactics. The technique

of employment of tank destroyers underwent considerable change

between 1941. and 19143,, In 19141, Gen Bruce visualized a fast

moving vehicle, affording small arms protection, and. packing a

powerful punch in the form of a high velocity gun which could. be

easily and quickley fired. In his own words, "a cruiser rather

than a battleship."28 ',$o great was the terror created by German

tanks in 1940 in the minas of the Allied. soldiere, that Gen Bruce

and. Gen McNair overstressed aggressiveness in-tank fighting in

order to combat defensive attitudes. They strove to inculcate

a spirit of fearlessness in the presence of tanks. Tank destroyer

o personnel were taught to move boldly ahead and shoot it out with

cannon; and., in general, to use every means at their disposal

to destroy tanks. Offensive antitank tactics were the watchword

of early tank destroyer training.

The primary contention of tank destroyer proponents -

,
that tanks could be stopped by 0,ans - was fully confirmed. by
29
combat experience. However, reports from North 2.1,frica were

unfavorable. Gen Patton and Gen Deve.zs declared tank destroyers

30
not practical.

Gen McNair commented on.Gen Dever& report in February i

1943 and. outlined. his conception of offensive antitank action.

A substantial change in his views can be detected. After noting.

114-
that the tank -must advance to accomplish its mission, Gen McNair

wrote:

...Since the tad.: must advance, the TD need

only to maneuver for a favorable position, conceal
itself thoroughly, and. ambush the tank.: It is correct
to think of the sZDeas acting offensively in that it
does not sit passively on the chance that a tank may
come its way, but on the contrary seeks out the tank
and places itself where it can attack the tank effect—
ively. However, the destroyer would be foolish indeed
to act offensively in the same manner as the tank,
for such tactics would place the destroyer at a
disadvantage, and. would sacrifice unnecessarily the
advantages which the destroyer has by the very nature
of things.31

The Historical,Section, Army Ground. Forces, comments

as follows:

...The trouble in North *Africa, was that the

tank destroyers, instead of firing from concealed
positions, maneuvered too freely during combat.
Instead of being aggressive in their reconnaissance
and preparatory dispositions, they were aggressive in
the face of tanks themselves, and. suffered. severe
casualties because of their virtual lack of armor.
Concealment was in any case difficult. The heavy
destroyer with its 75mm gun on the self—propelled
mount, proved to have too high a silhouette to be
- easily adaptable to tactics of concealment and ambush.-
- But the excessive use of maneuver during combat was
due in large part to the orders of higher commanders
to whom the tank destroyers were attached. Because
of the novelty of the. tank destroyer and. insufficiency
of combined training at home, and because some
compand.ers were unsympathetic to the tank destroyer
idea, battalions were assigned missions for which they
wore unsuited...x.

On 21 March 1943, 4.1ied. Force Headquarters at Algiers

published Training Memorandum 23 restating the doctrine of tank

destroyer employment and. stressing "rapid reconnaissance, thorough

concealment in prepared- positions, and. avoidance of premature firoll.33

15
 In the midst of all this controversy, AG-F urgently

directed the Tank Destroyer Center to -iewrite 18-5. So

great was the divergence of opinion, over a year was consumed in

this revision.34

The technique of employment as visualized in 1943 was

ably expounded. by Maj Gen A. D. Bruce in a letter dated 19 May

1911.3:

...It will be noted that our tactics continue

to be epitomized in our shoulder sleeve insignia and
in our motto. Panther-like, we seek information of
enemy tanks and of suitable firing positions;
panther-like, we strike and. destroy by gunfire from
'favorable positions. This does not meo„n that we
seek out tanks with guns, nor chase them, nor pursue
them, nor charge them.35

Effects of the tail: destroyer program. Th net effect

of the tank destroyer program is 4.1,d.mirab1y summarized. by Rd'oert

PalmerR. of the Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, as follows:

..,,Though the tank destroyer development did

not tuna out exactly as anticipated by the school
which promoted it, it played an important part in the
mobilization of the Army to meet the situation
presented in 1940. The Tank Destroyer Center exer-
cised an influence beyond the special-type battalions
which it trained. 4s the center of antitank activity
and. research It was the main agency, as far as the
United States was concerned, by which the tark menace
of 1940 was overcome, the idea of the invulnerability
of armored forces exploded, and. armored forces
consequently reintegrated into a tactics of combined
arms. Special tank destroyer battalions became
proportionately less necessary as armored forces
lost their ability (in so far as they ever had it)
to fight as a separate arm, As taaks came to be less
comonly en-ployed in armored masses there was less
need. for tank destroyer battalions capable of rapid
concentration, in general, the success of antitank
developments by 19143 1.1as as great as anyone would. have
dared to expect in tile, dark days.of 19110„
 i
7'.
,

r.

More particularly, the tanit.destroyer battalions,

• though not activated. hi the numbers originally
planned., were fast and. hard-hitting fighting units.
They were among the most .heavily mechanized units in .
the Army.• The completely motorized battalion of 1944,
with a 6trength of less than E500 men, occupied. ten
miles. of road space, was largely self-sufficient for
maintenance and. administration, included strong elements
of reconnaissance, radio, and. antiaircraft protection,
.. and. carried thirty-six 34nch or 76mm guns (towed or
self-propelled)—the same number of light field. pieces
as in the three artillery battalions of a division.
The battalions adopted., in addition to their primary
antitank.'functions, a general role of supporting
artillery. As higher commanders gained skill in -
tank destroyer employment, the battalions were put to
a variety of aggressive uses, such as destroying of
, antitank guns as well as of tanks, acting as .advance
guard and covering withdrawals, assisting in the -
clearing of mine fields, and. laying of interdiction
and harassing fires in conjunction with division
artillery.

, Here again the development was not exactly

what was expected. It was in fact better; for it was
always better, in General 14Q-1.'s view, for a combat
unit to escape from the limitations af too specialized
a role. In a sense also the two antitank schools were
reconciled. That the 'tank destroyer was a useful
weapon none could reasonably deny. But those who had
azguei that the tank destroyers should not be a separate
arm could draw comfort from the thought that they were,
successful in proportion as they to on the character-.•
istics of highly mobile artillery.3

Principles of Lt Gen Leslie J. McNair. No single

individual exercised. a greater influence on the antitank doctrine

of the United. States during World War II .than it Gen Leslie 3.

McNair who headed. GHQ, and. the Army Ground Forces. It is imperative,

therefore, to study these organizational and tactical principles

which guided Gen .i,diarair through these critical times, ato geheral

topics will be discussed: antitank doctrine and centralization.

17
 McNair on antitank doctrine. Ge:d lic5Slair believed whole-

111 heatedly in offensive action. The first departure from passive

defense measures by the United. States Army in September 19140

came as a result of his insistence. In Augu.st 19140 he wrote;

•
...A mechanized attack invariably will be
concentrated, calling for a doncentration of antitank.
weapons. The smaller the number of antitadk guns
the greater was the need.. of holding them as a mobile
reserve, ready in4a,ntly to rush to the point of
mechanized attack,3(

Gen 1402..Tair was one of the most aggressive advocates

a tank destroyers. He refused to believe that tanks could be

beaten only by tanks.3g His concept of armor envisioned the

.Armored Division for exploitation and pursuit, GHQ, tank destroyer

battalions for defense against enemy armor.39

• On 12 March 1941 McNair wrote to the Chief of Staff,

United States Army:

.„.„7:he ta:k was introduced to protect against automatic

- ar:..x- fire, which was devoloped so greatly during
smc,.1!
and since the World *War. Its answer is fire against
which th,;- tar.a: e.ocs not *protect the antitank gvn.
That 1;h.IJ:1 answor failed was due primarily to the pitifully
and. taafif,quate.1,-,v-, number and power of French and British
antitri.k E;cms, as well as their incorrect organization.
The, t.. is a conspicuous target and. cannot cope with a
sufficiently powerful gun in position. The antitank pine
is also a thoroughly effective antitank weapon...

need. ri a greatly expanded mobile'force

of suf.t?,ne guns has been pointed out repeatedly,
but is 7.1c,t :rocured-)40
•

The mt.1%;a1z: :- Dol.cies of GHQ at the time of its solution

in March 19142 called for a separate antitank force with tank

destroyers concentrated. under the commanding general of the field
 forces to allow rapid. "massing of.moblle antitank power 3 preferably

11) for offensive

,
..,, action."...4.1.'
McNair on centralization. It was the principle of
, .

concentration, or pooling, or centralization which perhaps

caused. greatest friction between Gen 1,1cNair,and field commanders.

Gen McNair considered. it quite natural for field commanders

to strive for self—sufficiency by demanding organic inclusionaf

practically every conceivable type of unit. However, it was

McNairl s job to reconcile this desire of field commanders with

economy of manpower at a time when ina.nDower was terribly critical,

lici.lairi s gu.iding principle was "to concentrate a maximum

of men and materials in offensive striking =its capable of dest-

42
roying the enemyl s capacity for resistance." In short, economy

I of force.

One of the corollaries to this is the principle that combat

units should have organic only such personnel and equipment as

they need at all time. What is needed only occassionplly would

be attached. from pools at higher headquarters. The concept of

"task force" was paramount in his thinking.

4 second. corollary is that primarily defensive weapons

and uhits should. absorb as little of the national resources as

possible. On 3 June 3.943, Gen McNair wrote to 0,3, War Department:

...I maintain that our organization must be

an offensive one, not cringingly defensive. We
cannot provide thousands of purely defensive weapons
with personnel to man then without detracting
from our defensi.ve power....43 .

19
• Third, special units and excessively specialized personnel,
0
useful only on certain occasions, should be discouraged. By app—
,
hication of the pooling principle, he hoped to counter the ill

effects of necessary specialization.

On the principle of pooling, Gen McNair had much to

say, He believed that "...diversity in time and space -- var—

iations of daily need and differences in range and mobility"

should determine in each case the decision as to where an item

should be organic,
44

The advantages of pooling were econorrg of force, mobility,

flexibility, and capacity for massed employment.

The disadvantages were in the dependency of subordinate

commanders of streamlined units and the fact that attached units

I were often not available or were misunderstood.

In June 15-1-1, while observing the Tennessee maneuvers,

Gen McNair said:

0.,It can be expected that the location of hostile

armored elements will be known practically constantly,
thus -permitting antitank opposition to be moved corres—
pondingly, and massed at the proper point.45

Age.,in in the ..A.C4F. letter on Revised Organization, 21 July

1943, McNair wrote:

...Organic antiaircraft and. antitank defense

of divisions is a moot question, It is entirely
natural that division commanders desire such .
defensive means in strength sufficient to defeat all
1 .- 1nd. are impractical
attacks. Provisions of this ,0:
and. unsound from the standpoint of economy...of force.
At the same time it is reasonable to furnish a

...
20
 limited,. defense organically and. provide a pool of
means sufficient to reinforce threatened points so
as to afford. full protection. The infantry has
antitank guns, but the pool of iak destroyer units
affords, , more powerful reserve',to meet a massed tank
attack, )

McNair was under constant fire from field. comminders on the

pooling principle. In February 3.943 Gen Jacob L, Devers recommended.

that ID and AA equipment be organic not only to divisions but also

as far down as battalions, Writing to Gen Marshall, Devers said:

...Economy of forces is not gained by having a

lot of units in a reserve pool where they train
individually, knowing little or nothing of the units
they are going to fight with. It is much better to
make them a part of a division or corps, even to the
wearing of the same shoulder patch. If they are
needed, elsewhere in an emergency, they can be
withdrawn easily from the division or corps and
attached where they are needed. Zconorry of force
and. unity of command go together. You get a little of
either if you get a lot of attached units at the last
moment. Team play comes only with practice.q

After noting that Gen Dever& proposals would require 24,000

.50 caliber antiaircraft machine guns and 7200 antitank guns in

addition to current requirements, Gen McNair wrote:

...0= limited manpower and. production

facilities can be utilized to better advantage.

Paving decided. on the total resources to be

devoted to'these defensive elements, there is the
added question whether these resources are to be
dispersed in driblets throughout our forces, or
whether they are to be organized in mobile masses
which can be concentrated at the decisive point
under the principle of economy of force. General
Devers and his group obviously arc dispersionists
of the first water; I take the opposite view,
believing that the artful concentration of forces at
the vital point is essential in tactics.,
 It goes without saying that nassed guns can be
dispersed, either partly or wholly if desirec11,‘ but
guns dispeTsed organically cannot be massed..4

The War Department sulnorted. Gen McNair.

Again in May 1943,

1 Army Service Forces proposed including
.50 cal machine guns and 3" antitank guns in the Table of Organization
of service units. A.GF replied that to carry out these recommendations

28g,1.34 additional .50 cal machine guns would be required by the

end of 1943 although only 81,683 would be available for all units.

4.1.so some 50,000 additional 3" guns would be required. McNair wrote:
i

...A hostile armored threat will be countered

by massing our antitank- guns at the threatened point,
not by dissipating our 3-inch self-propellekantitank
guns by organic assipment to service units..'49

The in= Department agai.n. supported McNair and. the principle

of pooling antitank weapons was confirmed.

• Demand,for organic inclusion of tanks in the infantry division

hardly arose until 1944. Use of tanks against enemy tanks was not

favored. An troops bad. organic antitank measures.for use against

small scale tank attacks, and in the event of a major attack, tank

destroyers would rush to the threatened spot. In this manner,

our tanks would be free to attack targets more vulnerable to armor,

This question did not become generally controversially voiced until

19144.50

Army Ground Forces Tables of 1.):,.)rch 1943.

1 The guiding
principles of Gen ivi6liair were generally firm and accepted by the

time of .A.G.F Tables of March 19'43 were submitted. In the preparation

22
;
• of these tables it was assumed that a massed. enemy tank attack &Alla

not affect all divisions at once, hence the, best protection for the

most threateted. division was a pool of counterweapons. Each division

would have certain antitank weapons for normal protection. These

included additional rocket launchers and rifle grenades. Antitank

guns at battalion and. regimental level wore retained but reduced.

Thus the trend was to de—emphasize special antitank units in battalions

and. regiments and place more emphasis on the individual soldier.51

••.Thus an echeloned. antitank !defense was. sot

Lip, beginning with the riflementis grenades and
improvised weapons, passing thr§ugh rocket launchers
and antitank guns, including artillery pieces of the
division, most of which could 1:4 used against tanks,
and culminating in mobile tank destroyers to be
attached in the event of heavy armored attack.5?

Such was the doctrine of antitank warfare in 1.943, and

• so it remained =tilt the end of the end of the war.

acTiair III
Postwar Development of .Antitank Doctrine

With the exit of Gen McNair and the return of field commanders

after the war, great changes were effected in American Tables of

Organization and Equipment. The principle of pooling suffered greatly

as revised tables incorporated. new organic units in regiments and

divisions, and the tank replaced the tank destroyer. In this section

reports of principal postwar boards and. conferences pertaining to

antitank warfare will be noted..

AGE Equipment Review Board 20 June 1945. :Under the direction

,

23
 of Maij Gen Gilbert R. Cook, ti4s :board. confirmed the 146gaie,cioctrine

and. proposed. retention of tank destroyerq. The board reported.i

...The tank destroyer is a direct fire support

artillery weapon. Using high velocity armor and concrete
piercing ammunition its principal mission is the dest—
ruction of hostile armored vehicles. Using relatively
low velocity ammunition, its principal mission is the
destruction of hostile personnel; weapons, and. equipment
by direct fire or by indirect fire. In its role of directt ,
fire support, it is the accompanying gun to ground. troops:33

Noting that towed guns lack the 1?attlefield mobility essential

to antitank weapons, the board. recommend development of three SP

tracked tank destroyers: a light weight'lgun stressing mobility and

capable of operating with an infantry regiment in all but the most

extreme terrain; a medium weight gun to'; operate with ftont line

elements; and. a heavy weight gun caliable of destroying the heaviest

armor and. fortification.54

• Theatre General Board US.ItET.'195.. Basing its recommendations

on tabulated questionnaires sent to experienced combat leaders, the

General Board recommended overwhelmingly that the tank assume the

mission of the talk destroyer. This was conditioned by the requirement

that the tank possess a high velocity weapon capable of destroying

other tanks and that three tank battalions be made organic to the

infantry division, The Board refleoted experience in the European

Theatre only, and, a note of organic empire building can be detected.55

The Armored Conference, Fort :Knox, 13-23 May 19146. This

conference voted unanimously for the tank to assume -the role of the

tank destroyer.. It further declared. by unanimous vote that there was

 no need for tank or tank destroyer groups.56

O The Stillwell Board 29 May 19146. This, the -viar Department

Equipment Board, sounded the 'death knell of tank destroyers and.has

had. a lasting effect on the official antitank'doctrine of the United.

States. Because of its iinportance, certain conclusions regarding

tanks and tank destroyers are citoted.,

1. Combat experience in the recent war

demonstrated. that the principal Inissions of armor
are to exploit a breakthrough aala to pursue the enemy.
The tank operating by direct fire and movement, is the
armored striking element. Although the tank is capable,
of executing indirect artillery fire, such use is definitely
a secondary mission,,

2. Its original concept, the purpose of the tank

destroyer was to place upon the battlefield a highly
mobile and. powerful antitank gun not then available
in a tank,. 7ihereas the typically- thin-skinned, highly
gunned vehicle' ,mown as the tank destroyer will always
be able to carry more powerful armament for the same
overallizight than the corresponding tank, this inherent
advantage does not .justify the continuation of the
development of this class of fighting vehicles in view of
the present and future potentialities of tank armament,
mobility, and. maneuverability. Therefore, development
of the tank destroyer should. be terminated.

3. The presence of armor on the battlefield. always

attracts enemy armor. It is imperative, therefore, that
the tank class of weapons includ.e one type of on that
is sufficiently powerful to knock out any weapon that the
enemy may place on the battlefield.

4. There should. be no further development of towed

antitank guns. The vulnerability of the gun crews to
machine gun and. artillery fire, together with the guniz
lack of both mobility and ability to go into action promptly,
militates against this type of weapon.57

In another section of the report the Stillwell Board concluded:

•11.• ••„.The best antitank weapon is a better tank.

The thin-skinned, self-propelled tank destroyer has too

25
 .•':!,
,...,
,

_
-
limited a role to warrant further 'development.. Similarly,
the towed tank destroyer is outmO , d.58

12. In addition.to recoiless weapons, which fulfull

only part of the requirement- for antitank -defense, there is
a need for saf-prope.11.ed.,, high velocity, armored. antitank
gun in the infantry,-59
,
This last paragraph seemingly contradicts previous conclu.sions..

However, since the Board was exceedingly positive in

. recommending dis-
continuation of tank destroyers, it must be presumed that the vehicle

described abbve is a tank,

The Conference on Antitank Defense 6-7 Oct 1948. Representatives

of the several arms and. services met at Fort Monroe in October 194S

to review American antitank doctrine in view of postwar developments

and. to make recommendations based on their findings. Under the

chairmanship of Col J. P. Eckert, the conference prepared a voluminous

S report which remains the most comprehensive document on the subject

during the postwar period. Col B. P. Purdue of the Training Section,

AC.h.-FF, presented current doctrine in a paper entitled "United States

Army Antitank Doctrine and Tactical Requirements". He pointed out

, that the infantry division has organic rifle grenades, bazookas, and.

the 57mm and 75mm recoiless rifles for close antitank defense, and

that the field artillery can be effective, With reference to heavier

antitank weapons, he said:

..-.As a basic principle, wherever and whenever infantry

battalions are subject to a possible enemy armored attack
or counterattack, at least one platoon of the regimental
antitanic company will be attached to each vulnerable
rifle battalion.

26
-
 • ..•
Infantry as currently organized does not have
antitank weapons other than tanks which organic
alone can deal
efficiently with enemy tanits...3ecause prop
erly executed
armored attacks are launched suddenly and.
wk.-fling, there never will be time to with little
move any supporting
tanks from a reserve position to reinforc
organic weapons of an infantry batt e inadequate
alion quickly enough
to protect the battalion under atta
ck,
4:4The mission of this platoon is to
cause the enemy to further disclose hisgain time, and to
intentions and;
capabilities in order that the regimental
commanders can
decide when to commit talk reserves in time
movement of these reserves,ou for effective

Col Purdue noted the excellent performance

of tank destroyers
in combat against enemy tanks, but he
pointed out the defensive
limitations of this type weapon. Clinchin
g his point, he -said:
...We believe we cannot expend the indu
strial manhours,
the training time, and the shipping for a
weapons which
is purely defensive. nd with the probable
shortage
of combat troops which faces us in the =cc
war, can we
afford to tie down too many soldiers for
defense? Most
who have studied the problem believe the
answer to be "NO",
and that is why we are depending on the tank:
,
defensive—offensive weapon, for the backbone a powerful
of our antitank
defense.

However, despite these strong arguments., we

are the
only niajor army of the world which bas,aban
doned towe0.
antitank guns and. weapons of the tark desttoye type..b1
r
Implementing these thoughts, the Conference
recommended
development of a light tank for reconnaissan
ce but capable of
defeating any comparable tank and able to
engage larger tanks
by skilled, employment; a medium, general purpose tank
, also capable
of defeating comparable tanks; and a heavy tank whic
h could defeat -
a.ny tank.,62

Finally, Col Purdue summarized the proposed anti

tank doctrine
of the United. States 4=my as follows;

27
 First, ..our doctrine calls for coordinating ap.l
weapons and. means for the defeat of enemy armor, making
maximum utilization of natural obstacles au.gmented by
artificial ones. The most effective and quickly prepared
of the artificial obstacles is the minefield..

Second., we believe in the tank as the major antitank

weapon because: first, it can be used for both offense
and defense, and thereby is a more efficient weapon than
one designed. primarily for defense; and second, our concept
of the defense calls for maximum use of mobile reserves
for reinforcing units in -Position, for deepening defense
areas, and for the counterattack. Only the tank meets
all these requirements. This concept of relying solely .
on the tank as the major antitank weapon is no a universal
concept among the major armies of the world...°3

While these thoueits presented. the prevailing opinion of

the conference, a significant and provoking minority opinion was

Oxpounded by Lt Col E. C. Orth representing The Armored School and.

speaking for Gen Bruce Clarke. He stated that current doctrine

was still largely influenced by the Stillwell Board Report and. that

this board. made its recommendations with no qp ecific enemy in minds

Its basis was the war with Germany whereas we now face a different

antagonist. Col Orth posed. the question of whether in the next war

we will elect'to fight it out with a numerically superior Russian

army or decide upon a considerable softening up period primarily

defensive in nature. It is conceivable that in the early phase

of the war we will seize and hold. air bases from which to punish

the enemy. If this would be the case, a defensive weapon would

definitely have a place, Col Orth summarized .Armored. School opinion

as follows:

....We believe there is a necessity for a family of

antitank guns. The squad, platoon, and company levels
are taken care of, but. at the battalion there is a definite
 ,
,

•••

iieed. for antitank protection. The recoiless weapons have

iiSt fulfilled this need. ',Ihether this weapon for the
battalion is towed or self—propelled is up to the designers.
It should have more range than the company and. squad
weapons. ede cannot expect at all echelons a weapon
that will knock out the heaviest armor at the longest
range. 'ye cannot standardize weapons or equipment to
such an all—purpose degree that we sacrifice efficiency of
.
employment for standard.14;ation.

Col H. .11, D. Heiberg, representative 4.111- Bd # 2, concurred.

with The Armored. School opinion and. said;

....Je feel that the antitank defense of a squad, .

platoon, and. company can be adequately handled with rocket
launchers and. re . coaless weapons. It is felt, however,
that at battalion level there is a need for an antitank
gun of 76= or 9Qmni calibre. Board -# 2 believes that the
employment of a tank in this role in sustained_ defense is
uneconomical employment of armor; rather than dig the tank
in; o....- otherwise Immobilize it in the battalion defensive
position, it is ou:,:' belief that the tank should be held
in mobile reserve fOr counterattacking an enemy thrust.
It would seem, therefore, that a self—propelled antitank
gun would be more suj.table for the battalion antitank defense
than would. the tank b5

Also of particular interest were the comments of Lt Col

A, J. Stuart, USVIC, representing the Division of Plant and Policies,

Hq Marine Corps. Acknowledging the serious threat posed by armor

to amphibious operations, he proposed a broad three pot program.

First, he called for increased. emphasis on intelligence to learn

the location and disposition of enemy t'..nk and antitank concentrations.

Second, he pressed for an improved antitank warning service "as

adequate warning seems to in fact constitute half the solution of

the antitank problem in permitting the counterconcentrm.tion of

,
sufficient =.1.nta.tank power."66 Third, Col Stuart called, for coordin—

._ ation of the antitank forces of the several arms.

29
 Cp]. Stuart also stated that the Marine Corps was experimenting

with tastical air and. guided. missiles in the antitank role.

Concluding his remarks, he intimated sympathy with The.

Armored School and AK' Board # 2 opinion as follows:

...Tank versus tank means mutual attrition — numbers

will. win. The concept.of the AT defense largely based on
superior tank strength therefore is not co letely satis—
factory from the amphibious point of view.

Advisory Panel on Armor (Harmon Board)18 February 119.

The Harmon Board. agreed. with the conference on M.titank Defense of

1948. Its excellent 9tatement of armor doctrine is quoted:

Par lg. Th.tn‘e is a requireeat fur tanks organic

to the to asFil.st the infantry oldier
in attack and defense and. to E..ssist in providing continuity
to the battlefield,

. Par lh, There is a requirement for an armored division

strong i.n for exploitatiodl, heavy assault, and. the
creatioit of t3hock effect in depth on the battlefield., and.
to assist the infantry div-3sions in defense against mass
employment cf armor, thereby providing complementary and.
coordinate clivis.onal ele:nen:i- s 'in the corps combined.
arms team

Par 1i0 'There is a requirement for an additional reserve

of armor within the corps, capable of defeating the heaviest
armor of the enemy that can be used and to strengthen the
infantry citir!%.r.ion formatip or add additional power
to the armored divIsion°

Elsewhere in the Harmon Board. Report the first characteristic

recommended for the infantry support tank is armament to defe6.-b

comparable enemy armor, ancl with reference to antitank gins, it said:

Par 10d., There is no requirement in the standard infantry

battalion for a mobile antitank weapon, oth.c.,,:: than its man
portable weapons, i addition to the tank protection provided.
by tanks available,b9

. 30
 Combined Conference. on.Armor 17-24 March 3.949.. In this

conference the United. States, United. Kingdom, and. Canada met under

the chairmanship of Major General E. Ni Harmon to exchange information

and provide standardization insofar as possible. Certain basic

differences in doctrine arose and remained =settled.

The British and Canadians maintained that the first two

years of war will be primarily defensive and. proposed a universal

tank and. a family of" SP antitank guns. These SP guns would be capable

of defeating, any tank and wd,1l be organic in the British armored. and

infantry divisions and probably in the independent armored. brigacles.70

The United. States adhered to its program of a family of three

tahks. American doctrine stressed limited offensive action for

armor in the defensive phase, and maintatned that national economy

• could not support two sets of weapons, one for offie, and one f5r.

defense.71
.

Significant, perhaps, is the agreement "b.i all countriies that

a definite requirement exists for a heavy tank capable of defeating

"7'1
any tank of the enemy. fc• '

Any ap.l.pment J;oard 8 March 1950- Under the chairmanship

of Lb Gen John B. Hodge, this board convened at Fort Monroe to bring

the •Irir Department E

- quipment Board Report of 1546 (Stillwell Board)

up to date. C,irtajri fucslamental changes with regard. to antitank

doctrine were rocom,:nrZ.Lae..,

Noting with alarm that existing American antit.c. Dnd tank

equipment is inferior to that of the potential enemy, and recognizing

31
the vital importance of adequate defense ag,i,inst armor, the Board

recommended:

...The highest priority and greatest support be

given to the development and procurement of the
following:

Infantry antitank weapons and =munition

Tanks and tank ammunition

The board, noted that: *

The mission of armor is the destruction of enemy forces

by means of armor—protected, firepower, mobility, and shock
actionr,..It is particularly suited for such roles as break—
through,. attack of deep objectives, pursuit and exploitation,
counterattack, parid movement and displacement over „it
considerable distances, and counteroffensve action.(9.

Although there is no mentj„on of the tank in an antitank

role in the above quote, the Board recommended the following family

of tanks:

.....There is a requirement for a light tank for security,

reconnaissance, and light combat missions...The tank must
possess armament commensurate to 5„ts missions and,have
medium capability of defeating frontal armor of any comparable
enemy armored. vehicle and the sides of any tank at a range
of 2000 yards,,

There is a requirement for a medium tank for assault, -

pursuit, exploitation, and antitank missions; for the
support of light tanks in reconnaissance; as the principle
weapon of ,the armored division; and as the follow—up
tank for the airborne division.
•„have the mj,n:i.nim capability of defeating the frontal
armor of any comparable tank and the sides of any tank at
a range of 2000 yards.

There is a requirement for a heavy tank for heavy assault

action and heavy antitank missions; for the support of medium
tanks in attack and defense; and. to provide a weapon of. such
powerful capabilities that it may be the master of the
battlefield. The weight of this tank should be less than
75 tons.. This tank ehould be distinguished. by 1,ts powerful

32
 gap; and its effective armor protection. The tank must
posess armament capable of defeating at 2000 yards any
armbred vehicle which an enemy could conceivably operate
in the field. Its armor should provide protection from
any probable attack originating within a frontal sector
of 60 degrees and. all-around protection of the crew from
small arms, artillery shell fragnents and. light antitank
guns. Protection of the crew from the disabling effects
of conventional antitank mines should be provided.

It obvious from the above that the Board envisaged the

tank as the major antitank weapon; however, in another section as

the highest priority in infantry equipment we find the development

of the battalion anti:tad.: weapon to bridge the gap between recoiless

rifles and. tanks, The Board reports:

...There is a requirement for an antitank weapon

in the infantry division, in addition to the tanks,
capable of defeating at least thirteen inches of armor
at a range of 2000 yards, with a 75yo probability of a
first round hit on a target 7.5 ft by 7.5 square allowing
a 5% range error.

All fields must be fully exploited to assure that

these weapons will have maximuzsi mobility„and. concealment.
These weapons need not be man portable.to

The above is obviously an endorsement of the minority

opinion put forth by The Armored School at the Conference on AntitazAc.

Defense in 1948.

Recent Conferences. Since the Army Equipment Board Report

of 1950 there have been other conferences and continuous board action

with respect to tank and antitank development. However, these boards

contributed nothing radically new to doctrine.

The United States Policy Conference' on Armor 16-20 October 1951

set targets for future design goals for the family.of tanks, but the
family remained. essentially as delineated by the Army Equipment 3oard

33
of 1950,17
Similarly, the Tripartite Conference on Armor and. Bridging,
.
x'eiterated.• requirements for the three classes of tanks.:78

Guided Missiles in ‘tintitank. Warfare • The development pf

guided missiles has progressed to the point where. we may be on the

threshold. of radical changes in antitank doctrine.. :No such missile

exists today, however missiles of the required accuracy are under

development.

The "LaCrose" missile, originally d.esigned by the Marine

Corps and now an army project, will be effective against tanks. It

has a range of 1-15 nautical miles, travels at subsonic speeds,

carries a warhead of 500# (including the shaped charge) and. has a

probable error of 15 feet. It is scheduled. for service use in 19533

The missile is to be directed. by forward control parties which will

have direct observation and uneconomical for use against tanks.;

hence the "laCross" is not likely to be used. for this purpose.79

Recommendations by the .a.rw Field Force Bw..rds in April 1951

stressed the Import:2=e of development of,a suitable guided. missile

for antita* work, and, since thon considerable experimenting has taken

place. A..cornmercial fj.rm has submitted plans for a suitable missile

which is considered. practical. Oranance is considering'purchasing

the French SS-1.0 guided missilq which is a relatively inext)ensive

.missile already in existence and which allegedly is effective. It

is reasonable to assume that some such missile will be available

in the next few years.

34,
 The errigatest emphasis on guided missile development is quite

• naturally in the strategic field, and such weapons will be in service

this year or next. They can be expected to contribute indirectly

to antitank defense by destruction of enemy potential, petroleum

dumps, and isolation of the battlefield just as air and medium artillery

are now doing.

Section III. Observations and Conclusions

In Sections I nnd. II of this chapter, the development

of antitank doctrine in the United States has been traced. An

effort was made to present the facts and. to reserve comment. In

this section, the committee extracts a list of principles which

bear on the subject and which reflect their awn opinions.

I. antitank doctrine mast be offensive.

• 2. Massed enemy armored attack can be countered only by

concentration of antitank forces.

3. it minimum number of antitank weapons should be in fixed

positions, a maximum held in mobile reserve.

Li-. Concentration can best be achieved by pooling major

antitank weapons under higher commanders.

5. Combat units should have organic only what is needed

in all situations.

6. Defensive weapons should absorb as little as possible

of the national resources.

7. Special units should be discouraged.

35
 8. The disadvantages of special units can be countered

in part by pooling and by assigling secondary missions.

9. Standardization is desirable, but efficiency is paramount.

. 10. Special units can be retrained easily for other related

missions in later bases of a war.

11. An improved intelligence system will assist the aziful

concentration of counterweapons.

12. Infantry mu.st have some organic antitank protection:

13. An effective antitank warning system is essential and

should be provided by organic infantry antitank weapons.

14. All antitank effort mast becoorainated.

15. Skillful organization of the ground and use of natural

and artificual obstacles, especially minefields, is the first

requisite for coordinated antitank defense.

16. Air, artillery, and, guided missiles are effective in

destroying enc,-my potential, immobilizing enemy armor by disrupting

logistical support, and isolating the battlefield.

17. zintitank: defenses must be in great depth and echeloned

with strength to the rar.

18, The squad, platoon, and. conpany have adequate antitank

weapons, e'mploying small *arms, incendiary and smoke grenades, rifle

grenades, rocket launcl=s, and recoiless

19.. Tactical air, field artillery, and antiaircraft artillery

are highly effective against tanks 3nd should be integrated into the

'antitank plan..

36
 20. Tanks are effective against tanks when held on mobile

• :

reserve, but are uneconomical when used. as stationary antitank guns.

,

21. .:intitank guns are most effective when firing from selected,

concealed. positions. Thorough reconnaissance by mobile reserve comm—

anders is essential.

22. Chemical agents are effective against armored concentrations

23. Guided missiles will someday be effective against attacking

tanks. This development coui4 conceivable revolu.onize antitank

doctrine.
,
' 24. The tank is most effectively used against infantry and

in .missions exploiting its mobility. .ii. high velocity gm on every

tank is not essential to these missions.

\
25. The tank destroyer is an effective antitank weapon.

26. Tank development has been preoccupied with gun development

• ,
in order to accomplish its new mission of antitank, Thus, tanks

have become tank destroyers.

27, The defensive phase of the next war is likely to be lengthy.

28, There is a need for an attitarik gun, not a tank, in

the battalion position to bridge the gap between the recoiless rifle

and the tank and to permit the concentration of the regimental tank

company.

29. Since such a gun is an approved requirement for the

,airborne division, the problem of stanxiardization of equipment is

not important in this case.

_

30.. Corps artillery battalions employing high velocity guns

- 37
 should be trained and employed as tank destroyers. These dual purpose

• guns would supplement tanks in the antitank role,

ifiCES FOR CHAPTM. 2

'Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley.,

United: States Any in World War II — The zIrmy Ground Forces — The
Organization of Ground Combat Troops (Jashington: Historical Division,
D i947), pp 231I2]4;
2 Ibid, p 73.
3 Lt Col Emory A. Dunham, AO Study No 29 The Tank Destroyer
History (Fort Monroe, A.GP, 1946), pp 1-2.
4 Greenfield et al:, op. cit. p 75.
Ibid, p 75.
6 Did, p 77.
Ibid., p 78.

Ibid,

9 Dunham, op cit. pp 1-2.

37° Ibid, p 3.
11 Greenfield et al, op cit, p 79.
12 1b14, P gl,

13 Ibid., p Go.
14 Dunham, op. cit. 10 14,
15 Greenfield. et al, op. cit. p 82.
3.6
Dunham, op. cit. p 4.
17 Greenfield et al, op. cit. p 82.
18 Ibid., p 82.
 19 Dunham, op. cit. p 4.
_ 20-Greenfie1d et al, OD. Cit. p 424.
21 Ibid, p 427.

22 Ibid, p 428.

23 Dunham, op. cit. pp 9-10.

24
Ibid., pp 20-217

25 Mid, pp 26-27.

26 Report of the Special Armored VehibleBoard. (Aberdeen

6-1-*), p 3.
ter75 Tge-
Proving Ground., 'yid; Aberdeen Proving .-exiC 7--

7 Greenfield, et al, .21D,cj, p 1427.

28 Dtbam,dp3.

29 Greenfield et al, op. cit. p 75.

30 IbId., p 4-25.

31 p 426.
/

• 32 Ibid., p 426.

33 Ibid., p 1426.

34 Ibid, p 427.

35 Dunham, qp cit. p 26.

36 Greenfield,.et al, op. cit. pp 4281430.

37 Ibid., p 75.
33 p 74,
39 Mid, pp 325-326.
140 \Mid, p 389.
P
84.
142 Ibid., p 273.
143 Ibid,. p 316.

39
 144. Ibid.., pp 292-293.

45 Ibid., p go.

146 Ibid, pp 37s-379.

1'17 p 296.

148 Ibid., p 296,

149 •Ibid, p 297.

50 Mid, pp 294-295.

Ibid, p 305,

52 Ibid, p 307.

53 Re-Dort of the AGF Equi ment Review Board (Washington:

AGF, 20 June /15), par

Ibid, par 33, 35.

55 Report of the Theater General Board USTM (ETO APO 408:
USITT, 19145), Stud,y 0-8, 50.

56 Report of the Armored Conference (Fort Znox, Ky: The

,1.}-23 May 146), Qu.estions'# 5, 8.
Armored Center,

57 Var Department ETA ment Board Report Uashington:

1M Office of the C/S, 29 May '6), p 32.

58 Ibid, p 12.

59 Ibid, p 16.
60 Report of the Conference on Antitank Defense (Fort Monroe:
AFF, 6-7 Oct 14g), Sec 13 p 7.

63- Ibid., Sec 13, pp 4-5.

62 ,,
la Sec 1, p 5.

63 Did, Sec 13, p 13,

614- Ibid, 'Sec 214, p 1.

65 Ibid, Sec 25, p 1._

140
 66 la Sec 32, p 1.

• 67 Ibid, Sec 32, p 1.

6g Report of the AYE Advisory' Panel on Armor (Ft Monroe:

An,. 18 Feb k9), Vol I'Part B Inel 1.

69 Ibid., Vol I Part B Inel 1.

70 Report of the Combined Conference on Armor (Fort Monroe:

AK', 17-24 Par )49), Annex *

Ibid, p 9. I.71

72 Ibid,'ID 59,
73 Report of the Army Equipment Board (Port Monroe: An,
8 Ear 50), p I.

74 'bid, p 27.
75 Ibid, pp 28-29.

76.Ib1d, p 21.
77 Repart of
the United. States Army Policy Conference on Armor
(Fort Monroe APP, i6-10 Oct 51) art I!

• 78 Report of the Tripartite Conference or. Armor and. Bridging

.(Fort Monroe: .tinnex-777,757-7-

79 Tactics of Guided Missiles (Fort Bliss, Tex: AA. ez GI Branch,

The Artillery School, 1952.)

•
 CHAPTEii, 3

CANADA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

This chapter., deals with the evolution of antitank

weapons within the Cana clian and United Kingdom Armies. The

period covered is from 1940 to present. More emphasis is

placed on recent years since the intent of this study is to

determine possible future,developments and use within the

antitank field. As will be noted in the chapter, a good share

of the =ferial is devoted to, thouitts of various experienced

individuals as to the doctrine and equipment for nntitank.

means, Actually there was no major change from the end of

World War IT to the present.

• EILLY DEVELOPiviENTS

The British Amy entered the war during 1939 and 1940

with generally two types of tanks. These tanks consisted of

a small number of cruiser tanks mounting a two pounder gun

••

and carrying very thin armor. These cruiser tanks were WM—

bined with a large number of snail tanks mounting nothing

heavier than a machine gun and carrying a crew of three. There

wore a very few heavily armored tanks designed to be used with

infantry to fora the backbone of the assault. There were two

types of armored tanks, both carrying a two pounder: the

.1
Matilda I and Matilda 11.

The British and French armored fighting vehicles were

' 42
• little different from the Germans, but the Germans had

superiority of numbers. The armored operations of 1940 were

characterized by the develbpment of the German "blitz krieg".,

which was developed on the close cooperation of armor and air.

The British at this time were sadly lacking in antitank Runs,

relying on the theory that natural obstacles would stdp an

armored threat. It was soon learned that water obstncles in

particular had little or no influence on armored warfare, as

had been previously believed. By the end of 1940 the British

Army was practically without armored fighting vehicles. The

total armored strength, excluding some very light tanks, con-

sisted of tvienty-eight cruiser type tanks. There were also

five "Armored Command Vehicles" which were being Utilized by

headquarters of the 1st Armored Division. These ."Armored

Command Vehicles" were made;of three ply wood and marked "For

Training Purposes Only".

At the end of 1940, all the Matilda type vehicles

had been lost to the enemy. A better armored vehicle and, a

better -gun had to be developed before any active operations

could be resumed. At this time, however, an invasion.,

appeared likely, and it was decided that grenter numbers of

armored vehicles outweighed the advantages of new design. There-

fore, no significant changes were made in production. In the

meantime, the Germans had modified their Mark III and Mark

IV Tanks by adding more frontal armor. ith this modification

43
 they were immune to the 2 _pounder gun.2

During the next phase of the war, we saw the start

of tank versus tank battles on the desert. The tank started

to reign supreme, and the idea tiv-,t close cooperation of all

alms .Was no longer essential began to develop. At tilts time

we see the introduction of another tank enemy, the German dual

purpose 88mm. This IriCr pen had been field tested in Si)ain

and found useful against aircraft or tnnics. This weapon could

stay out of tank weapon range and shoot Pway. The solution

to this problem was a bettor weapon, which could onEng,e the

crews of the 8enin and knock them out. The British did not

have the answer, but ST guns began to appear as ,7 field ox

pediont.3

• DEVEINEENT OF LocTRINE OF DEFENSE

As we have scan above, it was obvious seine remedial

action was necessary to stop enemy tPliks. The British intro-

duced an Antitank Regiment of 36 antitank guns. It is the

intent of this section to discuss the use of this Antitank

itogime_nt and how /the doctrine was evolved.

The first real use of the antitnnk regiment occurred

during operations of October - Dcccmber

. 1940 in the Irestern

Desert. The commander of the 7th :,rmoreci Division in operation

fiCompross lan"'considered ,the regiment sufficient but felt

the guns should be mobile and armored. Further, he w':3 of

the opinion they should be with the support group and be z

S 44
 accompanied by infantry. General Wave11, on the other hand,

believed the regiment should be under division artillery

C.

control. Here we see the initial thoughts of mobility and

armor for antitank w.enpons and also differences of opinion on

use of antitank weapons at the outset.4

The use of this antitank regiment and lessons learned

may be more easily pointed out by several examples.

During operations in Lugust and September of 1942, an

Armorec'. Brigade Group with an ,ltntitank Regiment of 24-6 pounders

and 12-2 pounders was found to be invaluable for holding battle

positions.. The 00 of the antitank regiment *as responsible

for the layout of the antitank guns and for coordinating with

flank units. This proved entirely satisfactory. The anti-

tank regiment was found useful in overcoming tactical deii-

• ficiencids existing when a squadron had to be detached from

the armored regiment. Further use of the antitank regiment

was as a screen to cover the move of armor. The individual

weapons were so widely dispersed at t imes that the problem of

protection for the crew became a major one. It was found that

with good fields of fire the antitank guns could be protected

by small arms firc, m the tPnks by day, but th,, t the infantry

must provide the protection at night. This also applied to

the protection oft anks at night.5

In the Battle of Medenine (6 alarch 1943), we see a

very successful defense by the British with particular emphasis

45
S -
on antitank guns.

follows.
Driefly, the battle may be summarized

The positions extended 43,300 yards with the Highland

as

Division on the right and the 7th Armored Division and the New •

Zealand Division on the center and left. In rear of the Corps ,

were three brigades of armor. The first attack started at

0600 hours against the 7th Armored Division front,. This attack

was stopped, and four other attacks launched throughout the

day were stopped. Several other attacks were broken up by

artillery fire before they could be launched. Only two tcrTt.

porb.ry penetrations were „made.' • The story of one antitank

troops is interesting to nob c. The guns wore sighted on either

side of a Wri di with a dummy mine field placed to tcmpt, the

tanks into the wadi. ' Fire was held until five enemy tanks

S were within 300-500 yards range, though they had been seen at

800 yards. It was necessary to open fire then as the tanks

were within 200 yards of the infantry positions. These five

tanks were knocked out in five minutes and the action was

over. During this

_ ong- gcment, one of the antitank guns was

blown clear of its pit, but the crow continued firing, knocking

out another tnnk.6

.The key to success in this battle was well placed in:-

fantry defenses backed up by antitank' and artillery,fires. (The

antitank units had coordinated with units on the flanks. No

line of approach had been left uncovered. There was no

,
N7
artillery in the antitank role other than antitank weapons.)

• 46
• One principle used was that antitank guns are not for

the protection of infantry but for the destruction of tanks..

Guns, therefore, must be sighted with this in mind and it is

the'duty of the infantry to protect the crews from enemy

attack.

The lessons learned were that (1) a properly coordinated

defense with antitank guns in depth will defeat a purely armored

attack, (2) antitank guns should be placed in concealed and

defiladed positions, (3) guns must be mutually supporting, (4)

a high state of training and discipline of the crews is a very

important factor.9

Through the period June 1943, the following conclusions

were reached by the British: In all phases of battle the prin.

,

• ciple Qf employment of artillery in supPort. of tanks, of tanks

and infantry, or of infantry alone, are the same. Certain

additional factors, affecting the application of these prin-

ciples-to the support of armor, have to be considered'. They

depend upon the characteristics of tanks and of antitank

10
weapons. The characteristics of the tanks referred to were

mobility, offensive action, and armored protection with the

usual negative characteristics of blindness when buttoned up -

the-vision being cut down at the most critical time, The

characteristics of the antitank guns were-that they wore

normally sited in depth and therefore concealed from attacking

tanks until range is more advantageous to the antitank gun. As

47
• for the destruction of antitank guns, the following con—

clusions were reached: artillery can destroy only if an

observer can see the antitank gun,. Normally, an antitank gun

will be in defilade or not seen until it fires. Even though

once seen, accurate and deliberate fires. are necessary to

destroy the enplacanent. This cannot be accomplished rapidly,

\
and if observation is bad, will cause an exce3sivesexpenditure

of anmunition. Further, int he operations of armored units

destruction is seldom possible because of time and ammunition

factors, If armor can bypass, smoke can be used effectively.

The ability of guns to destroy an antitank gun will be ,the

11
exception rather than the rule.

POSTWAR DEVELOPMENTS

Th e next section deals with the period from the end

of the war to present. It deals with what the armies of the

United Kingdom and Canada were thinking about and is not

necessarily doctrine,

The backbone of the antitank defense up to the end

of the war had been a high velocity gun firing armor piercing

ammunition. It depoilded largely on velocity and mass to

penetrate an armored vehicle, The thicker the armor, the bigger

the gun. The Germans hadreadhed P 128mm (approximately

12
inches) gun firing P shell weighing 62.5 pounds.

There are at least four possible means to mount such

a gun:

48
 a, Turret of a tank with 360 deErec traverse.

b. 'A self-propelled vehicle with limited traverse.

c. A towed version.

d. A fixed gun in a pill box.13

-
In the case of mounting the gun ir a, tank, it was believed
i
that to penetrate over six inches of armo%- the recoil would be
too large. It would require a turret o-c.b. eight or nine feet:.

This would necessitate a large wide tans t nd would prove difficult

to move., It also means that if the tank were to have the

necessary armor protection) it would end iap being se heavy that

its mobility would be greatly restricted mnd mobility is the

tanks' most essential asset)4

In the case of the soli-propelled' *chicle with limited

• traverse, it was felt that such a gun coul: be mounted in a

lighter vehicle and have more armor protection by accepting

the limited traverse factor. This, of cottreie, Was based on

its use as a purely defensive weapon. This type yr:14cl° would

naturally be at a disadvantage when opposed by tanks of 360°

traverse, but, in a concealed and strtion?ry position and

sighted along the \avonue of pproach, _it could \fire at a dvancing

tanks with ease and still he immune to all but armor piercing

=munition capable of penetrating its frontal plate armor,15

A towed gun is no longer felt practical. It has de-

veloped that the gun is so large it can no longer be manhandled.

Further; the gun pit has to be so large that there is no pro-

49
• tection for the crew. HE, mortar and artillery fire cPn

easily knock out the crew. Although the self—propelled ve—

hicle is naturally more costly, the towed version is so vulner—

16
able that it is practically useless.

The antitank gun in a fixed defense — a pillbox gun — is

also useless. By the time the defensive works have been con.-

structed; the guns they were built for haVe been out dated
17
and all mountings have to be revised.

There have been numerous attempts to overcome the dis

advantages of a limited traverse gun. These attempts include

a hollow charge HE projectile which has a very slow velocity

and depends on its explosive power for penetration. Because

of law initial velocity, this type projectile normally cannot

• get a first round hit.

type wtapon.
Another attempt was the tapered bore

This type combined high velocity and low pro—

jectile resistance. The greatest disadvantage to this is the

high tube wear which in turn necessitPted constant alteration

to the sights. This type depends on penetration to set fire to

18
the target or wound the crew.

At this time it was further felt that the short range

weapon such as the Bazooka, Molotov Cocktail, and similar

adaptations would never replace the antitank gun becPusa of the

extensive chnr-ge that the t-nks could still do at longer ranges.

On the other hand, it was felt that if the hollow ch-rge type

projectile could be improved in accuracy, and propelled by

50
• rocket means.it would replace the ,antit'nk gun and also the.

primary armament of the trnk•

19

The conclusims at this time were that the design nd

development of the tank and antitank weapons wore no longer a

race between armor thickness and the high velocity gun, but a
20
race between armor and hollow charge projectiles.

It is significant to note thnt by October 19473 the

organization of the Armored Division provided for two self—

propelled ntitP.nk regiments.21 The United Kingdom was con—

tinuing to concentrate on a more 'efficient antitank gun while

the United States was going ahead with rocoiless weapons. The

United States believed in bigger and bigger tanks while the

United Kingdeiii believed in a redistribution 0f annor to enable

• the tank to mount a heavier orthodox gun.

22

At the Antitank Conference conducted by ocAFF 6-8

October 1948, man3i interesting views and principles on antitank

tactics and equipment were brought out by the United 4ngdom

and Canadian representatives.23

Tactical principles discussed were as follows:

a,. A gun can always defeat the thickest armor which

can be made mobile. Eighty tens believed to be the practical

limit which would mean about 13 1/2 to 14 inches of Prmor.

Therefore, the first requirement in defeating' an enemy t'nk is

to have a more'powerful gun than he has.

b. With equality of gun power,. the a dvantPge always

51
 rests with the one firing from the stationary position. This

advantage will naturally diminish when the gun is discovered

unless the gun is mobile. Therefore, the second requirement

is one of ePse of concealment, and thirdly, one of mobility*

c. The concealment factor favors a weapon of the

bazooka typo or towed version of an antitank gun. However, the

inaccuracy of the bazooka and the fact that a six pounder gun

is the most powerful that is practical t,,) be manhandled, requires

that a more powerful gun be mounted on a track like vehicle.

. d. Tanks, including s' elf—propelled ,guns, moving in

battle have to stop to locate tPrgets and shoot at them. There—

fore, the speed built into the vehicles provides very little

protection and the fourth requirement is the, maximum armor

• protection after all other requirements have been met,.

e* In order to mount on tracks a more powerful weapon

than on an enuny te3nk, a certain loss of traverse -nd all

around armor must be accepted. The answevis what the British

,pelled antitank gun*

call a self—prc.

Based on the above principles there must be three

24
categories of weapons as follows:

a. An infantry platoon werpn for local defense and

a tank hunter. This wcap-n t.) be portable by one man, capable

of penetrating 6.3" of armor at 300 yards and ,striking at 30

degrees obiquity and with an ad,curacy of 80% chance for a first

round hit at maximum range.

• 52
 b. The infantry battalion for immedi,te defen3e of

the battalion needs a weapon capable of 6.3" penetration at,

1000 yards and 30 degrees obliquity. This weapon to possess

the same accuracy requirements as for the platoon weapon and

in addition it should bo c,pable Of being broken down into

various parts, the heaviest part being a two man carry for a
distance of 500 yards..

0. The self-propelled artillery weapon should be able

to be utilized in the following roles:

(1) Capable of defeating enemy armor by firing

from preselected firing positions (and if

possible defiladed positions) upon likely

tank approaches.

(2) Capable of rapid movanent from one position

to another when discovered or to meet new

armor threats.

(3) The self-propelled gun willnot be required

to maneuver in formation against the enany

nor as a general rule to be used in close

support of infantry during the asslult.

The advantages of such a self--propelled gun over a

tank of similar weidat (even though there is a less in traverse

and P rin r)are as follows:

a.Economy of productin

b. Econ:my of manpower in that less training yp.m.ad be

53
 rinci a sir Iler crew is necessary.
required ;

c. Economy of force in that the self—propelled gun

could be used in defensive and holding roles thereby liberating

more tanks for c-.)ncentrntiDn on the assault.,

d... The weight advantage would allow Superior gun

to a tank o comparable weight.

e. The armor thickness could be concentrated on the

front of the hull where if used as visualized it is more im.—

Rortant

f, There is also an P.C1VP ntri go of be ing slightly

easier to conceal..
The conclusion reached was: Best answer to an enemy

tank is NOT another tank, but an SP antitank gun. Only thus

can superior gun power be achieved,26

The 0r..11.P dian Army policy and equipirien' t for nntitank

wea pens was the Same a s the United Kingdom policy at. this time.

For the infantry weapons, they were employing the one man

pL.rtablo PIAT, which was capable of knocking out a heavy tank

at 300 yards, -nd, also the 6 pounder, capable of neutralizing

a - henvy tank up to 1000 yards. Canarl'

, also ,believed that the

slef—propolled antitank regiment under divisional artillery

provided the largest measure of flexibility in antitank defense.

However, CPnacla believes there Pre mbny occasions where the

towed version is necessary to the infantry plrticulnrly when

water obstacles must be overecne. The Canadian policy at this

54
 time was to maintain within the division antitank artillery

• regiment, the towed 17 pounder for all normal roles.

27

The Canadians expressed the belief that accuracy was

of primary importance and that at maximum range specified

there should be a 90% probability of obtaining a first round

28

The divergence between the United States and the United

, Kingdom may be summed up at this time as follow:29

a. The United States used infantry antitank weapons

plus actual tanks for the defeat of enany P rm.)r This docti-ine

is based upon the b.-alai' that tanks may be used for both the

offensive and the defensive and therefore more efficiency is

gained. Also, the doctrine of defense called for the maximum

• use of mobile roservos4

b. The United Kingdom requires infantry antitank

weapons within the infantry battalion an arititank units organic

to both the division and corps with the primary r -le of anti—
,
tank defense.

It is'interesting to note that at this time Canada

stated she would study the United States and United Kiniylom

ideas, attempting to maintain an open mind and later determine

31
her position.

Some thought have been advance concerning the use of

a light tank. One Canadian writer states that the antitank

gun and the shaped charge have made thick armor 3f doubtful

55
• valuei The armor is supposod to protect the crew but tho

tanks only protection is its inability. Why restrict this

mobility by the use of heavy and useless armor. Make this armor

proof against smell ,

Arms and splitering and avoid the worst

affeats of the antitank gun by utilizing speed and maneuver.

It is safer to be in a light fast tank against tocia:yrs weapons..

Sometimes it is forgotten that the tank is a moans to bring

to the battlefield a direct fire weapon that the foot soldier

cannot carry. The long ranges of tanks anti the antitank role

of the present tanks are a, digressi..n. A recoilless we-pon

on a small turret is needed to save tonnage. The main weapon

should be accurate up to 1000 yards. If such a vehicle could

thus be made small enough with an abundance of power) it could

• accelerate quickly in ncl would be in little dan7er at r^ngcs

greater than 1000 yards. With a sighting device for the vehicle

commander, the gunner could be done away with. At the same

time, with improved transmissions and driver controls, tho

assistant driver cculd be done away with. Such a. light, low

vehicle, boldly handled, would present a very Clisturbing and

fleeting target, Such a vehicle muld also be cheaper to

31
produce and could appear on the battlefieY in scarms.

Such a light tank would not be designed to deal with

enemy tanks at ranEes greater than 1000 yards nor sli:Juld, any

tank have this as the primary role. Armored units should have
organic antit"nk units which could shepherd and Dvorwatch,

56
 knocking out enemy tPnks at long ranges.32

The bow; views were based on economical rePsDns. The

author felt that the heavy tanks were becoming a growing strain

on the economy. Ail the "gadgets" of present day. tanks could

be produced but at the mcpense of other needed ituns..

less vulnerable ,and cheaper means of getting more fire power

on the battlefield is what was needed by CPnadals tankers.33

During the British Infantry Commander's Conference of

October 1950, Lieutenant General Gale, Director of Military

Training, expressed some interesting thoughts concerning anti-

tank weapons and defense. He stated thPt between World War I

and II the British le-iriny was taught that the defense is based

on an artillery and medium machine gun fire plan. General Gale

believes the basis n.,:w should be an antitank plan with supporting

artillery, machine guns and rifles. What has been neglected

in the past is the importance of antitank (7efense. Once

an antitank defense plan has been thought out, the machine

guns and other weapons will fall int)

- Place in the overall

defense plan. Further, General Gale stated the best defense

of the immediate infantry area is a good sort range weapon such

as the rocket launcher or the ene-rga grenn0.e.34

In the British Infantry Division, the Diviskm Artillery

commander is responsible for the antitank defense. This command-

er has one antitank.regiment (equal to a United StPtOS

battalion) of 25 pounder self-propelled WCP pons. The employment

z 57
of these weapons is closely coordinated with the tanks -that

are available to the division. The British fool that the

framework of any defense is the antitank defense, and is ,

essential that this defense be mordinntocl on n'division levol.

The concept is to got the many tanks in "tank runs" and with

the antitank weapons disposed in depth,trap the enemy tanks

and destr9y.35

From the above study of CnnaCian and United Kingdom

policies on antitank dcfaise we see a "pattern of controversy"

throughout and at the Sallie time there appears no doubt that

there is a general agroanent that an antitnk weapon is

necessary. Main points of argument have been:

a. Control

b. EimplLynent

c. Typo weapon

d. Thwed or self-prpelled

e. Economic factors

f. Use of hollow charge typo projectiles and/or guided

missiles.36 The view of the cmmitteo on these subjects are

included in the last chapters nf this report.

FOOTNOTES-MR CHAPTER 3 -
1C.A.L. Dunphio, CBE,DSO, at the LAIL=1,
(Cenadian Army Journal, August 1947)

58
 31.1
4.0za72EILL
.. in 2..Q. Wr?stern October—Deccraber
1940,(Documpnt Section, The Armored Divisinn, Fort Knox, Ky)
File ND. 36.55-44

5Less-) s ktrumesi Lazut—Septembqr 1,2h2 (Armored

Brigade Group) tDocuniont Section,•The Armored School,Fort
Knox, Ky) File No. 36.11-23

6 ajz2. (6 liprch 1943) (Document Section,

The Armored School, Fort Km-..)x, Ky) File No, 36.35-44

8
Ibid
9
imq

10EmPL)mm_Qnt( hrtillery in Support Id Armor,

Gfigidirlaq East Forces, Juno, 21,1949„ (Document Section
The Armored School, Fort Knox, Ky.)

3-11bia

16Ibio

21Cnpt R.. J. Sutherinndz "Artillery in the larmclre

Brttl o" (Carr dinn Amy Journpl)

24.1 j G. P Liarriott, "The Anti Re 1 ent"

- (Cprrdinn Army Journal, Fobrunry 1948

59
 23Report of Conference on Antitank Defense, 6-7
October 1948, OCLIF (Fort Knox, Kentlicky, Army Field Forces
Boprd #2, File #021.42-18)
24Ibid
W.M.ROwl•WRI.

251bie

26Ibid

271tid
28

3O1j211
1
33tini H. W. F. 4pploton, "The Case for the Lighter
Tank" (Canedim tomy 0 rn.71, Lay 1950) pp 56-59
324.Thici
33
1bici
34British
Infa.ntry Cgrarnander t s conference,o0
arir
ctotl
6et er
rr50
(Docunient Section Fort, Knox, Kentucky, trken from
dated 19 April, 1951 (File #150.29

35Ibid

36Capt Pierre "j Artillery R...,12cjiats."

(Canadien Army Journal, June 1949)

60
• CHAPTER. 4

GERMANY

To trace the German developnent and tactical usage

of the antitank weapon, it is necessary to begin developnents

during World War I. It was here that the tank made its first

appearance, followed soon afterwards by its counter weapon,

the antitank gun.

Briefly, the evolution of the t,

.nk and Pntitank weapon

in the World War I may be divided into three stages:1

The first phase of the evolution of the tank occured

during the period 1914-1916. The principle Ilse for the tank

was one of destroying the MG-is and thus permitting the infantry

• passage thru the trench systuns.

The second stage, 1916, was the realization that the

tank by itself was vulnerable. To confront this threat two

ideas were introduced. A heavier gun was added to the tank

and secondly tanks were for the first time employed in mass

for self protection,

During the third phase, 1917, Generals Estrenne and

Foch conceived the idea of a heavy tank with high speed, close

in protection, more armor, and capable of breaking thru a de-

fensive system up to and including the artillery positions. Thus

a new tactical concept was introduced:p team, where the heavy

tank would be scnt ahead to destroy the artillery positions while

61
,,

S the light tanks would follow to mop up. In this proposed

role, the heavy tank was also given a secondary weapon to be

used for antitank defense. With the team concept there also

appeared a weapon whose primary role would be antitank defense.

.

These weapons were mounted on light tanks, or were drawn by

tractor or truck.

After the armistice, the tank team (nbryo was laid aside

ibr the more popular concept of using the tank solely as an

infantry i support weapon. However, there remained enough critics

to keep the new doctrine alive. The most noted in Germany was

Colonel Guderian.2 During the same period, acme gains were

made in the developnent of the antitank gun. It was pointed

e
out that a stationary antitank gun could serve its needs in

S static war, but that against the tank or a mobile war, it

lacked maneuverability and all around defense. The German

also believed that regardless whether tank or antitank, the

vehicle with the heavier gun would win. This influence was

apparent in World lipr II where the Germans managed to hold the

upper hand in heavier guns.3

The Spanish Civil War strengthened the German belief

that tanks should be used in mass and required a team organ-

ization to successfully exploit its characteristics.

. Another

outcome, was the realization that the tanks required more armor
_
and close-in protection.
Thus, with the beginning of World War II the Germans

62
 had married their now weapon with offensive doctrines and had

, produced a mutuPily supporting team.4 This term consisted of

a.family of self-propelled or towed vehicles whose primary or

secondary missions were support of the tank or of each other.

DOCTRINE OF DEFENSE

The offensive influence combined With the maneuver-

ability of the weapons also influenced the German Defense

Doctrines. The stablized front of solid lines and trench work

disappeared to be replaced by mobile defense which was to make

full use of the mobile weapons.

The general principles of defense are summarized as

follows:5
N

a. The purpose of the defense is to nullify the hostile

• attack.

b. The position selected is held to the last; the

commander may under certain circumstances, however, restrict

the time..

c. The defensive position selected must compel the

enemy either to attack, relinquish the advance, or attQmpt to

void cembat. -

d. H5t±l envelopments are countered by extencIng or

refusing the flank (or finnks), or by edheloning of reserves.

e If the many attempts to march around in order .-Eo

avoid the position entirely, then he should be attacked.

The Germans consider the following means available

63
o and important in their accomplishment of the general defense

position.

A. Destroy the enemy by an increasing weight of fire

..
before he can reach the main" battle position.

b. To organize positions so that they are mutually

sapportingi
_
c. ,To hold out a reserve from every unit for counter

attack.

di. Prepare each position for all around defense.

e. Prepare an over all defense position in depth.

The normal defensive positions were laid out to

destroy the enemy with an j,ncreasing weight of sire power

before he could reach the main battle position. They had a

S strong reserve behind the main battle positions to destroy

by counterattack whatever enany had penetrated their positions.

They chose ground for defense based primarily on good

observation for their artillery and infantry weapons in order

to achieve maximum fire effect. Other factors consisted of

concealment for infantry, suitability for counterattack, and

flank protection.. Although stress was laid on use of camou-

flage and cover, they did not hesitate to sacrifice cover for

good fields of fire.7

The actual organization of the ground had great

depth and consisted of mutually supporting localities which

were manned by groups of all arms. The mission for these

a 64
 ‘

S groups was to fight and counterattack from their positionsy

even after a penetration had been made. Observation posts

were used both in depth and in width. Extensive fire plans

were made for all supporting weapons to cover vital features

such as approaches to the defensive positions and to deririve

the enemy the use of terrain features that could be used for

observation.

The German position normally consisted of three main

zones:8 The first was the advanced positions which had the

mission of delaying the enemy's advance and to cause him to

deploy prematurely. Vital road centers, critical terrain

features, and Likely OP Ts were held to deprive the encray of

their use. The advance positions were located about 5000 to ,

• 8000 yards in front of the main battle zone and were normally

held by mobile forces such as the reconnaissance battalion

of a division.

The second zone consisted of battle outposts whose

mission in addition to those listed under the advance positions,

was to deceive the enemy as to the exact location of the main

battle belt and to prevent surprise. Units occupying battle

outposts were organic to those holding the main belt. Anti—

tank weapons were incorporated in these outposts, and the line

was normally located from 2000 to 3000 yards in front of the

main belt.

The third zone consisted of a series of strong points

• 65

V
• which were mined, mutually supporting,: and organized in depth.

Each strong point was equipped with ammunition and food for

several days operation and was capable of holding out eveln when

by-passed. Normally the strong points were manned by company

sized units mutually supporting to form a battalion size

center of resistance.

BMPLOULNT OF WEAPONS

To study the employment of the German antitank weapons

in the defense as well as their antitank role in the offense,

it is necessary to knovr the employment of all the weapons.

This becomes even more apparent when many weapons are given

secondary roles of antitank defense. Also, at a later date,

some of the characteristics and roles of the various weapons.

• were merged for reasons of necessity or as a result of technical

advances.

The German concept of tank employment must also be

considered since it w as the primary weapon around which the

Germans had built their team. To summarize briefly the role

of the tank, a translation of a German GO by panzer high

'command is included. The order consisted of 10 principles

of the employment of the tank, its capabilities Pnd limit-

'9
ations.

-a. The tank is a deciding weapon in battle.

- There-

- nt should be limited to the "main effect" in

fore, employme

suitable terrain.

S 66
 b„, The tank is not an individual fighting weapon. The

smallest unit is the tank platoon; for larger missions, the

tank company.

e. The tank is not an infantry support weapon. It

breaks into and thru the enemy line, for the closely following

infantry.

d. The tank can take a piece of terrain and clear it,

but it cannot hold its This is an infantry mission, supported

by infantry heavy weapons, antitank guns, and artillery.

es The tank is not to be etnployed as artillery which

fights the enemy for an extended period from one position.

The tank fights while moving with short halts for firing.

fs The mission of the infantry is to pin down enemy

defensive weapons and to follow the tank attack closely in

order to exploit completely the force and moral effect of that

attack.

.gs The rassion of the artiller7 is to support the

tank attack by fire, to destroy enemy artillery, and to follow

closely the rapidly advancing tank attack. The main task of

the artillery support is continuous flank protection;

hi The mission of the tank destroyers is to follow

the tank attack closely and to get into the battle immediately

when tank fights tank.

The mission of the combat engineers is to clear

minefields and to open gaps under tanic) infantry and artillery

!,

67
• protection, in order to enable the continuation of the tank

attack.

j. The tank is blind and deaf at night. It is then

the mission of the infantry to protect the tanks.

The remaining principle support weapons were broken

down into four categories: The antitank (TD), assault gun,

SP infantry howitzer, and self-propelled field artillery. At

a later date, the AA guns, both self-propelled and towed were

included as a fifth group.

In the anployment" of antitank weapons; the Germans

maintained that it was wrong to split up antitank units corp.,

pletely so as to have a proportion of antitank fire everywhere.

The smallest unit perraissable was a half platoon (2 tanks)

• except in street defense where less could be employed.

suggested that whole companies or at least a full platoon be

They

used to cover likely tank approaches, maintaining that to use

a single gun was to ask for destruction.3.0 Other terrain,

over which tanks might approach, was to be covered by mines,

obstacles, or tank destruction det.,

..cfrn.ents. The use of anti-

tank weapons against infantry was the exception rnther than

the rule. The reasons forbidding nntitank against targets

other than tanks were that the antitank gun was limited by

mobility, bulkiness a nd that once it had fired presented it-

self as a target to the enemy, The technical limitations were

the great strain to which the barrel was subjected to, the small

• 68
S iissue of HE ammunition, and finally that accuracy mild diminish

•with wear.

On the march, the regimental antitank companies were

distributed throughout the march column by platoons. One

half platoon was always kept as far forward as possible. The

remainder of the platoon marched with the advance guarcl while

the remainder of the company marched together. Thcy did not

use heavy antitank .,auns with the advance guard since too much

time was required to bring them into action. Tank scouts on *

motorcycles were kept well forward of the march unit in seni!ch

of enethy armor and surveying for possible antitank positions.

Assembly areas were usually protected by tractor

drawn antitank guns. They were located not only to protect

• the area ,from surprise, but also to protect the final movement

of the units out of the assembly area. Emery opportunity to

push forward the antitank defense was exploited, whenever un—

expected gains of g.ound were made.

During the attack, the antitank guns followed the ad—

vancing infantry in areas likely to frvor tank counter. attack.11.

They moved from cover to cover in such a manner as to always

be in. an advantageous position. Positions behind hedges were

considered most favorable and when possible positions were on

reverse slope or in defilade. As many guns PS possible were

to fire simultaneously. The ideal concept was to assigi one

target per:platoon. Flanking fire was considered best.

• ,
69
 when the objective he.d been reached or if the attack

had been held up it was the responsibility of the antitank

unit canmander to immediately set up a solid belt of antitank

defenses. Their use on uncovered flanks was permissible only

when accompanied by.infantry.

The formulation of the defense plan was the responsibility

of the unit antitank commander. The prerequisites- of an

effective antitank support of a unit is the location of the

main defense with suitable fields of fire. Antitank defenses

were located somewhat to the rear of the MLR and camouflaged,

however, forward enough to effectively cover the ground in

12
front of the0,11. Antitank positions were also built in

the rear areas and used as part of the mobile reserve.- Norma

regimental antitank companies were assigned the forward areas,

while division antitank units were to the rear.

Alternate and dummy positions were considered

essential, Mines and obstacles would be employed in suitable

areas. Tank hunting detachments should be held ready in

villages, wooded arca..7, and close country. Nests of antitank ,

guns were to be under a 'single commander, and drifts arriving

subsequently would be incorporated into the existing antitank

defense plan. Fire was to hold until the last possible moment;

the tank warning 1rd priority over all other messages.

In 1943-1944, the GennPns considered 'to-. mergin,:the-.41'D

and the assault gun under a' single heading of Panzerjagerwaff&

70
• (antitank weapons) to include all their models- whether new or

old. With this event all German antitank weapons were classed

under the headings of towed antitank, early tank destroyers

and later tank destroyers.

All these types can be found in the antitank battalion

of the infantry division and armored division, as well as in

13
Army and ccmpany headquarters units. Towed antitank guns

were considered to be a defensive weapon for pesitional or semi—

positional warfare. The might, of the heavy antitank guns and

the vulnerability of the unarmed prime movers limited their

mobility on the battlefield. They relied on prepared positions

and camouflage, especially from air observation. In the

attack, if used at all, they were at the point of main effort.

They were therefore used primarily in prepared defensive

14
positions.

Towed antitank artillery wa s divided into two categories

of medium and heavy antitank guns.

Medium (Mittlere) antitank 5cm Pak. 38 (1160) —

obsolete gun in the later part of the war but still used.

Heavy (Schwere) antitank 7.5cm Pak. 40(1/46) -was

used as a standard gun for most of the units as listed: .,

1st Co, antitank battnlion, in the infantry division.

1st Co, antitank battPlion, volksgrena dier

3rd Co, antitank battalion, in the motorizeci

3rd Co, antitank battalion, in the armored division.

71
• 43/41 (V71) found in the 3rd Co of

the antitank battalion of an armored division, and in C2-1C),

artillery antitank battalions and GHQ fortress antitank

cor.apanies. ,

Early tank destroyers were armored motor gun carriages*

They were lightly armored with open top fighting compartments

and limited traverse. The nature of their annment precluded

their use as assault guns and required protection of t4P In-

fantry weapons. Because of those liinitations they were not

included in the merger of the assault guns with the tank destroyer,

but rather were given the name of self-propelled antitank. The

more commonly encountered types were:

a. 7.5cm Pak. 40/2 Carder II" a standard 75mm gun

S on a P2. Kpbu. II chassis*

.b. 7.5an Pak. 40/3 Varder 38 (7t)" also a standard

75mm antitank gun on a modified P2 Kpbu. 38 (/) chassis*

c. 8.8cm Pak*. 434 irMashorn" 88mzu antitank gun mounted

on an old type carriage which was one referred to as a Ponzer-:

jajer IV chassis.

d. The French 75mm antitank guns mounted on Lorraine

chassis was discontinued in 1943-1944. The. 75mm guns are found

/

in the 2nd companies, of the antitank battalion of the infantry

and volksgrenadier divisions.

The new type tank destroyers ccmbined the high velocity

function of the assault guns with the tank destroyers. The '

S
••

72
newer models were formed from converted earlier tank destroyers,

converted assault guns, and newly designed tank destroyers.

The newer types had more slope to the armor, closed

fighting compartments, stronger frontal armor, and a gun with

high penetration characteristics. They could be used for

missions against tanks as well as in support of infantry..

The models wore divided into two ctegories;'....1.ight.i, and

medium to heavy tank destroyers. The light tPnk destroyer's

consisted of the following:

a. Jagetpanzer 3E1 — 7.5cm Pak. 39 Fahrgestelly and

was sometimes referred to as a "light assault gun".

/1

b. Jagdpanzer IV— 7.5cm. Pak. 39 1/48 Fahrgestoll

Very s imila r to the assault guns of Stu. G. 40 Class,‘

c. Panzer IV (Lang) — 7.5cm Pak. 42(1/70)

Fahrgestell IV. Had it not been for the merge of the tank

destroyer s and assault guns, this model would. have been

:.classified as an assault gm.

The medium and heavy tank destroyer's utilized the

most modern tank-chassis. They were tglgtfm.feri-ed type liWrould

have been used exclusively were sufficient facilities nvpil—

able to produce adequate numbers, kiloriels in this class were

the:

a. Jagr'.panthor (Schwere Panzerjager 8.8cm Pak.

43 1/71. This mcY'.el was earlier referred to as a medium tank

destroyer but later reclassified as a heavy tank destroyer.

73
 ,

• l',ctics of anployment are the same as for the light tank

destroyer...

b. Jagdtiger (Schwere Panzerjager VI) 1/28an Pak.

(1/55). Usually found in GHQ units.

During the latter days of World War II, the Germans ,

set down a list of requirements for the antitank gun. Prin

,

ciple requirethents for the antitank:: gun were considered to

be:

a. Ability to penetrate the enemy's tank armor at

15
the maximum range at which accurate engagement can be made.

b. A projectile which will not only penetrate the

armor but will cause sufficient mechanical damage inside the

tank, or personnel casualties, to disable the tank as a fight—

• . ing vehicle.

c. Ease of maneuver and concealment, requiring a

carriage and low silhouette.

d. A high rate of fire, flat trajectory and an accurate

sight.
.1
,

e. Protection for the gun crew against MG fire as a

.gminimum and against AP and HE projectiles, and bomb near

misses as an optimum.

f. An HE projectile which will enable the gun to

effectively engage soft skinned targets when the oppoitianity

offers and does not conflict with the guns primary task.

It is interesting to note that the requirement for the

74
 antitank gun are very similar to those that might be considered

as requirements for a tank. Though not in name, the Germans

had merged the tank destroyer with the assault gun, and with

the tank.

The mission of assault artillery was to move rapidly

with the advancing infantry,' for whom it furnished quick

direct SupPort by fire over open sights. Indirect fire methods

16
were not used. The Germans considered the assault gun most

useful in breaking up roadblocks, barricades, and fortified

17
masonary buildings. The gun was to be fired only at the

closest possible range, and then at the halt. To .the Germans

the assault gun was the decisive infantry support weapon.

However, the assault gun was not considered a reconnaissance

St vehicle and the Germans prohibited their use as armored cars

18
or as accompanying support weapons for patro is.

In the attack the assault guns were sited in the

forcmost positions at the point of main effort.19 They were

20
primarily to engage enemy infantry weapons and field artillery.

In the pursuit, the assault gun advanced with and formed

the baakbone of units assigned to seize and defend commanding

terrain..21 Most of the assault guns moved with the advance

guard of the advance detachment to deal with points of weak

22
resistance and to engage enemy tanks when necessPry:

During the withdrawal, assault guns were assigned to

.23
the rear guard commander* Their task was to engage "the

75
 enemy till other troops could disengage from the fight.
0
..
The lighter assault guns were merged with the tank

destroyers to forin the Panzerjager Kompanie, found in the

various types of divisions. The heavier assault guns -

assault gun artillery proper - were found in GHQ pool units,

assigned to the artillery arm. These =its were sometimes

armed with a high velocity direct fire weapon as vrell as

assault howitzers.

The latest models were mounted low on turretless tank

24
chasis. Frontal armor was thick and they had limited traverse.
-
•

According to directives from the Chief of the Panzer

Troops, the self-propelled infantry howitzer were to accompany

S the infantry into battle and to support them. Targets designated

for their fire were normally enemy centers of resistance and

infantry support weapons. They were also issued smoke to

25
blind, and hollow charge4 ammunition to engage enemy tnnics.

However, the howitzers were not used as antitank in the prjmary

role. Nor were they employed as an independent patrol, or

a point in battle or on the march. Here the Germans emphasized

that the howitzer was not an assault gun.

The SP infantry howitzer had weak vertical armor, no

overhead protection for the fighting compartment, and lack of

V

close in defense weapons.. They were mounted either on tank

,
-

chasis or half-tracks. The newer weapons had guns to include

380mm and were found in GHQ companies. (Panzersturm-morser

S 76
Kompanie).

SP artillery was used in the same manner as tractor

drawn artillery in both defense and offense: It was sited at

maximum 4000'yards behind the infantry and covered the main

26
approaches of the enemy. It displaced forward with the

infantry and its primary mission was.counter battery fire (

- in

practice, the allied guns out ranged the German guns). ,Self;-

propelled artillery was not intended for close support of the

infantry, nor was it intended to .cooperate with a tank attack:

It was always handled as a. battery and could be used for general

support of a unit but was never placed under command of that

The principles of tactical use of SP field artillery

were:

a. The weapon forms the artillery of the panzer

division. It is employed according to artillery principles:

Its characteristics do not permit its use as an assault gun

or tank destroyer except in emergency.

b. It should be employed as whole units.

c. Has cross country mobility, rapid opening of fire,

protection noinst small arms fire and artillery fra gients.

d. The unit has armored observation posts (1 ton

armored half-tracks) which cnn be used in conjunction with the

attacking infantry.

The self-propelled artillery consisted of a field

77
 artillerpiece mounted on a tank chasis.- The carriage and

giin.were lightly armored and offered prdtection

. only *against

small arms and shell fragments. No overhead* cover was. provided.

The greatest' change from prewar manuals had been the

German Use of its anti-aircraft guns in forward areas..28 Prior

to the war the primary role was anti-aircraft ,while

it could be Used as antitank or artillery.

The secondary role soon assumed priority and became

an indispensable complanent to the antitank artillery of the

Aitiy. A proportion of the heavy batteries were still used in

,the anti-;aircraft role, primarily for the protection of advance

airfields and in periods of inactivity or preparation in

29

• assembly areas prior to attack.

Once action began, whether offense or defense, the

anti-aircraft weapons were usually awkward when employed against

armored targets. The German tactical usage of anti-aircraft

artillery was ivroPrad A portion of the anti-aircraft

weapons were held in mobile reserve in the vicinity of the •

Their chief role was antitank defense which they carried

out by letting the tanks to close to very close ranges. The

ranaining anti-aircraft artillery which was not - Used on the

MLR took up artillery positions from about 2000 - 4000 yards

behind the *Oa and performed normal artillery tasks. - Their

use as artillery naturally added depth to the antitank defense

in that they were capable of performing antitank roles when-

• 78
 31
ever the enemy managed to penetrate the German MLR.

CONDUCT OF THE DEFENSE

In Africa during th6 first defense of Libya, a linear

fire plan and defense was used.. Units bivouaced within a

thin ring of weapons, and if grouped at all, usually bunched

without variety. The only specific roles in the defense

of an area were assigned to artillery and anti—aircraft guns.

The antitank guns were strung out in a straight line on the

front and the cou.nteratt'ck role was usually assigned to a

weak unit.

The reorganization of defense policies in Africa was

based on principles from the doctrine of defense described

earlier in this chapter. Liodifications were introduced to

compensate for the terrain, troops, equipment available, and

32
the enemy.

The basic principles emphasized were:33

a. Effective fire was more important than cover.

b. The object of defense, was to wear down the

enemy before launching a counterattack, usually with armored

troops.

c. The mission of reconnaissance was to discover the

enemy intentions and to screen one's own positions which were

organized in depth.

cl. Fire plans must include interlocking fire to

11.

cover .the entire front.

79
• e. Most of the fire should be concentrated to cover

the strong points which were considered to be the keys to the

position.

f. A series of mutually supporting centers each

capable of all around defense must be organized in depth.

g. For defense, troops were disposed in:

(1) Advance positions (forgeschobone stellungen)

(2) Battle outposts (Gefechtsvorposten)

(3) 0,11 (Hauptkampflinie) to be hold until the

counterattack.

In the defense, the Germans :those suitable ground for

combined action by infantry, machine guns, antitank guns, ar—

tillery, and tanks. A series of defense .areas were constructed

capable of all around defense and all around field of fire

against any form of attack. These areas were built as far

in depth as possible, General Ravenstein enphasized the all

around defense by the following summary.34

Dummy positions should be built and camouflage

technique improved. There should be no long commuli-
ications tren(thos as those reakin a position by thin
ning out the defenders troops. 'Mine fields, carefully .
marked, should be laid inside and outside of positions.
All around and aubseaor defenses and each position to
have at least one holvy antitank gun and several 37mm
antitank garx, antitank rifles,, and heavy and:light
machine guns.
Antitank guns word to be fixed in their firing
positions and well dug in. Artillery to be emplaced
so as to fire over open sights, but protected against
tank attack by being located well within the system..
Every antitank gun to fire in all directions.
Artillery to have concentration of direct fire
against tanks and that guns would be able to swing _

80
 ,
---

S rapidly to other targets. One section of each battcry

to be prepared for mobile work.

Artillery was placed where it could support either

his defensive areas or his tanks if they were launched in a

counterattack. in the defense, the artillery was assigned

35
three missions in the following priority:

a. To attack ccneentrations of tanks Pnd mortar trans—

Port.
b: To disperse columns pushing past the strong points.

c. To lay a barrage on infantry attacks.

The tanks were echeloned in depth on the most

dangerous flank or located so as to protect weak points in

the defensive system. On several occasions, tanks were placed

• in two separate locntions so as to facilitate e. pincer

movement on an attacking enemy.

The mission of the strong point was to destroy the

enemy if at all possible, and if failing in this, -wa'3 to

hold the enemy until a counterattack could be made by the

tank corps. Th,)

- aaphaiTis the struggle was placed on de—
3f:
_
_ feating against the tank; therefore, the defense was built

around the antitank defense. The best positions were allotted

to antitank weapons and to any other weapon that could fire

- in an antitank role. ,,-_n went so far as to

General Surnmerm,
36
establish a time table for all weapons used in the defense:

- 1st,Phase: Anti7aircraft and antitank guns open fire

on attacking tanks, the heaviest fire being directed on

81
 masses of tanks and tanks attacking gaps in the mine
fields. Artillery fires on enemy artillery accompanying
the tanks and on all active batteries; if there is no
artillery accompanying the-tanks, the artillery fires on
tank masses.
2nd Phase: Anti-aircraft and antitank guns, then
guns and antitank r-ifies fire on the tanks, aiming now
at the nearest. Artillery fires on the Lotorized In-
fantry end fires also on any masses concentrating behind
the tanks. The infantry divides its attention between
aircraft and tanks.
3rd Phase: Antitank guns continue fire on tanks, ,.
concentrating on those that have penetrated. Artillery
continues to fire counter battery and on targets of
opportunity.. Infantry turns,to fighting tanks with gns-
aline, grenades, explosives, at the same time engaging
enemy infantry. Enemy penetrations in subsectors Prp
driven out by counterattacks of strong points in pincer
formations. Penetrations between subsectors are blocked
by antitank guns supported b3i. infantry and artillery, in
an antitank role, the enemy tank was the most important •
target and those weapons that were not employed in anti
tank roles, would trke over the defense of the weapons
engaged in the antitank task.

In the defense of Omar and Halfaya, the 15th

Armored Division included the following principle features

in her defense plan:

a. Strong points were held by mixed troops in either

company or battalion strength with all around defense down to

include platoons. The distances between strong points were

14, 2, 3 1/81 2, 34- and 3 1/8 miles; thus, each could support

its neighbors or cover the interval between by artillery..

Distances between the company positions within the main' strong

points varied between 1/4 and 5/8 miles in general.. A deep

mine field with only nine- openings covered the whole front

between Halfar and Omar. Tn front of the mine field were

82
S eight advance posts.
,
Each depended on the main position in

front of which it was located. Their distance in front of

the main position varied 11- to 3 miles. in front of the main

position a barrage zone of 31- miles depth was established.

:

This zone was divided into three bands of li;.- miles each so as

to allow room for friendly patrols to maneuver. About 4 miles •

from the main outposts, three patrol outposts were established.

b. Because of the width'of the African front,

theoretical subdivision into advance position, battle outposts,

and chief battle line was disregarded. Inste'ad„ the area was

divided into areas of battle ,outposts, main defense line,

and reserve. Thc., battle outposts were placed only where the

enemy could approach unawares. Their role was reduced to

S observation by day and listening posts at night. The MLR

was covered entirely by fire and was in depth to satisfy

the two principles: (1) a thin line could be easily

,
penetrated and would develop into a breakthrough, (2) casual-

ties are heavy when artillery has registered on a line.- At

least one quarter of each company, battalion, and regiment

was kept in reserve for counterattack.. Heavy ma chine guns

were placed on the flanks, and antitank guns were positioned

in depth. Small groups of from 20 to 80 men, reinforced with

anti-aircraft and antitank guns were located at various

points forward of the main battle position.

Meanwhile, in the Russian theatre, the slowdown of the

• 83
• German drive forced the Germans to revert to a mobile defense

and to revise their former offensive use of Pnt,itpnic weapons,.

Besides establishing the normal strong points in depth, they

included antitank and antiaircraft guns, special tank

destroyer groups, and infantry ur0..ts..

Antitank defense played an important, frequently

even a decisive role in practically all operations in
the East. Every type of equipment which could be em—
ployed effectively in one way or another was pressed
into service for this purpose.37

The terrain was strengthened by use of r: ntitmic

ditches, traps, minefields and barriers. The strong points

took on a dual role -r- delay the attacking tanks and/o14. lure

them into antitank barrages laid down by a large number of I

antitank gun's.

• More emphasis was placed on artillery fire against

tanks. kobility of antitank weapons in the forward areas

was reduced due to the need of the infantry for those weapons

and the fact that displacement was often difficult under

enemy fire, However, the antitank reserve was not altogether

I

eliminated. The heavier antitank g

- uns and assault guns were

kept in the rear to be used in the direction of the main

tank attack.

Infantry training in antitank defense was improv.ed.38

Special infantry tank destroyer groups were formed. These

groups consisted of 3 to 5 men end were joined together to

form squads and platoons. They were used whenever there

• 84
• existed a shortage of antitank guns or in terrain that favored

their use, such as woods. Normally, there were 3 such

squads in an infantry battalion, two in a company, and one

in en artillery battery..

The shortage of manpower, mounting pressure of allied

operations, improved Soviet mobility, massed artillery, fires

and German lack of mobility on Russian terrain forced

modifications to the normal hedgehog defense systcm.39 The

mobile reserves were seriously hampered in their mission of

supporting threatened centers of resistance and strong points.

The Germans were forced to move more of their strength to

the forward areas, main line, to have it rePdily available

for use against the Russians, This meant depleting their ,

• reserves by doling out more of their mobile arms evenly along

the line.40

A higher staff for the control of panzer type forces

should be created immediately to prevent complete at—
trition caused by the tactics of the enemy commands; The
Army commanders, thinl4ng only in terms of infantry, are
committing panzers in the front lines.Pnd splitting them
among the infantry units, where they arc used as anti—
tank weapons. Thus,one by one, our tanks are, being shot
to pieces by the *numerous enemy antitank guns.41

Eventually they adopted trench war and methods which

soon took on the role of delaying action and attraction rather

than their former bold offensive action.42

The tremendious stretch out of front made all sector

commanders wish to organize a continuous lino with all
means. As for one division, a sector of 20 — 30 a in
width was not an unusual occuranco. It is not difficult

85
• to compute how thin these positions were manned and one
could not talk of reserves or disposition in depth on
the main battle fronts.
If our infantry divisions wuld always have had an
antitrnk battalion (divisional assault gun battalion)
as a backbone, it would,4a.ve resulted in an invaluable
stability to the front,')

The latest defenses relied on trenches and continuous

antitank obstPcles in combination with strong points and

centers of resistance. This systan was used in two variations

depending on terrain being defended. Where conditions per7

mitted the constrwtim of continuous trenches, they were found

in the forward edge and behind the MLR to a depth of 1. to 2

miles. These trenches were connected with a series of strong

points located in the forward edge with additional resistance

centers placed in depth. The central defensive zone usually

• had 7 or more lines of continuous trenches. The rear areas

also had continuous defenses with a large number of intercon—

nected trenches.

Where conditions did not permit the constructions of

continuous trench system, as in the Crjmea (1944), the

Gennans modified the defense system by placing strong points

in the forward edge.44 Trenches and entitank ditches were

disposed in depth.

Weapon anplecanents usually wore located in t he

following manner:

a. MG and antitank rifles in squad strong points.

b. HAG 150-200 yards behind.

86
 04 .Lortars 200-500 yards behind, usually on reverse

slopes.

d. Antitank guns 200-400 yards behind.

.e. When used in an antitank role, infnntry- howitzers

and artillery were.located behind antitank ditches, about

800-1000 yards to the rear.

Firing positions for antitank guns, Infantry heavy

weapons, and artill were constructed so as to provide all around

protection. Reverse slope positions were thought preferable

becnuse they denied organized enemy reconnaissance, protection

against the Russian direct fire artillery, and the encm:y

,found

it difficult to control his troops on reverse slopes once .they

had entered into the fight..

• This system of defense permitted the Germans to

economize in manpower, reduce cn sualties due to artillery and

mortar fire, and helped conceal movements of the infantry.

However, the system was vulnerable to flank attacks once

wedge had been driven into the positions.

The breakthrough of the forward line was the most

critical stage of the defensive action in trench warfnre.. The

only salvation was a cgunterattack to regain the former position

as soon as possible. The Gellman theory was -U)

. use tv,ro or more

counterattacks simutaneously. During the breakthru, the in-

fantry was instructed to offer little opposition to the tanks,

leaving the missipn of their destruction to the antitank guns

87
• sited in .depth.

With increasing concentration of Russian artillery

fire, the Germans modified the placement of troops by intro-

ducing a false front.45 At first the infantry was moved rear-

ward during the initial enany artillery fire to return to

their initial positions only after the assault had begun.

This system changed later by the use of a completely false

front. The first line of trenches was never occupied in mass,

thus deceiving the enemy as to the exact location of the front

line. Only enough OP's and light machine guns wore loft in

the forward area to give the impression it was ocoui)Eado

This system proved highly satisfactory. German anti-

tank weapons, when employed properly within this revised

defense scheme, made the Russians, pay heavily for their guns.

One German general who served on the Eastern front

said:

The race between armor and Pak (antitank gun) has,

without a doubt, been decided in the favor of the latter.
...More Important than heavy armor are high speed and
the covering of great distances.... The present guns are
quite ample- with the exception of the optic...An automatic
gear connecting the telescope sight and range finder would
be required....
The Panzer Jaeger III (Tank destroyer) was our most
dependable assault gun. The panzer jaeger IV (7.5= gun)
introduced in the last year, was good and lived up to all -
demands - (I consider the American tank destroyers as
superior) -. I do reject the Jagd-Panther (antitank panzer) L6
and Jagd-Tiger, They did not prove themselves in my opinion.'

The Germans took their losses too, however. The war

was ending for them and the breakdown in the war effort was

88
• making itself felt in logistical difficulties.

In general, it should be noted thp,t we had too many

different, partially developed weapons. A. panzer division
with 150 kinds of =munition is unbearable to the supPly
system in a long run.... The multitude of types, and the
resulting difficulties of obtaining spare, parts, caused
worries which could not be solved even by the best im—
provisions.
...Our Panzers were superior to all enemy tanks, but
here, too, the fancy of the Germans for complicating be—
came apparent, and over—development resulted. This in
turn, had its effect on the output.47

Despite the heavy losses German arms were able to

. -
inflict on the Russians, their efforts were ineffectivci,for

the odds, by this time, were too great. The war ended with—

out further significant changes being made.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 4

1Generr.1 Wilhelm Von Leeb, Defense (Harrisburg, Pa.

Military Publishing Service, 19435 p 142.

21Injor General Heinz Guderian, Arran GO cos rm.(

Luir Cooperation with othe Ar (Document Section, The
_ Armored School, Fort Knox, Ky) File No 850.127.

31fDpv 101/nen ar "(a translation from

the VoLkischer Bc.,obachter for 14 May 1943, appearing in the
Reyiqw, September 1943) p 88.
• 4ibid

.
5C11
,=
,2 TrIptical, 204,trjacl (Washington, D.C. Military
Intelligence Service, War Department, Special Series #8, 20
December 1942) p 63.

ajor Warren R. Davidson, "German Tactical Doctrines"

(Intelligence MR, May 1945) p 65.
7Trl a an Tod:mien Tre December 1943,P 45.

89
 $01) cit Grrap T ticn Doct, i., passim.

9Tn. T AI • T ,a Septeinber 1943.

T.,-c,neis $1, October 1944

"OP cit, "Gcrprn Lletisn,1 D9ctrines", passim.

12Gelinrn Metho4 of WrrfPre in the 1,13azaL_I Dosed.
(Wpshington D.C. idilitary Intelligence Service, ilar
DepPrtinent, Inforrantion Bulletin #20, 9 July 1942)
• 131,-t, R. D. Boyd, "The Lit Antitrkik Giant' (translation
from An Cosantoir, July 1943, in the k,e;jaitezz ROViCNI3 November
1943) p 91.
14Dp cit, T1ennd Tpghninnl Tronees 9, passim.

15 jL nisal_aeak (June 1943) p 4.

16Tnoticn Tech pi Trends #54 (January 1945) p 35.
1714 Col V.
Kotelkin, "GermAlilizamalad Artillorv",
(translation from article in Krnswn ZVA P, 8 April 1943,
printed in bliiiitPrv Review', December 1943 p 68.

Tnaticp1 chnicP Tro (Decanber 1943) passim.

'448 (July 1944) passim.

200p cit., "German Self Propelled Artillery" passim.
21Tncti nric Teo i en1 Tr,
: #39 (December 1943) p 45.
Lt Col C. Bykov, "Self Propelled Artillery in Offensive
Combat" (Trnnsilatio'n from Krnsnr, Zvesda., 21 August 1943, print-
ed in Militnry Revirm. , April 1944) P 79.

23Ta.cti,cn1 alad TechinicP1 Trends, #48 (July 1944) passim...

24Ibid; passim.

250P at, "German Tactical Doctrines" passim..

264121j; passim.
•••
270? cit, "Developnents in Tank WrIrfare" passim.

90
• 2 erraa.n Anti—aircraft Artillery" (tillitm
Sorv,ice, War Department, 8 Februnry 1943)
29
"Tpqtic.P1
orence

TQ_eltnical Treprls #41 (Decanber 1943) p 41.

30
Cp.pt V.. C. Tokarsky, "Combat Formations of an Antiair—
craft Regiment while Protecting Troops" (Trrnslation from
Artilleriiskii Zhurnal, April 1943, printed in j_litlitz
April
4, 1944) p 81.
3114 Col V. Kotelkin, "German Antiaircraft Artillery"
(Translation from Krashaya Zvesda, 3 June 1943, printed in
Eilitary Rovirm, October 1943) p 83.
321bah'
chn Neckar, "Tank Tactics" (Translation from
German Book, Gocrmnp Artily LI ,ri'n 1,7...sr, printed in .11.1it,P.tyl
,40:view,
i January 1944) jo 73.
1
HAfrica" (Washington- D.C, IKtforrnatiqi Bulletin i-/20,
Military Intelligence Service, War Department, 1942) passim:

. than iLicith..,c.s of Warfare in the Libyan Desert"

34"Ger
(Information Bulletin #20, Military intelligence Service,
War Department, 9 July 1942) p

• 35-"Artiller,
,,,7 in the Desert" (Washington, D.C. Special
Series #6, Military Intelligence Division, War Department,'25
Novanber 1942) P
3611Tho Development of German Defensive Tactics in
Cyrenaica 1941" (Washington, D.C. Military Intelligence Service,
War Department, 16 October 1942) p

37"German. Doctrine of the Stabilized Front" (IIPshin on„

D,C. Special Series #16,2 Military Intelligence Division, War
Department, August 1943) p

3814,'Cel N.- Kupenko, "German Antitank Defense" (Translation

in litlktarv R June 1944) p 86.

390P eit, "Develorments in Tank Warfare" passim.

40"Trends in Tonic- Warfare" (Reprint from July

1943, in 144tax,,x, Rov1CIAT3 October 1943) p 66.
41 IN
"uomments of General Von Geyer" (Documents Section,
Fort Knox, Kentucky File #850.7.3, a report in the German
Generals series of documents)

91
 _

S 42major B. Korol, '"Breakthrough of German Defense" ,

(Translation from autaya Zypsd 16 July 1943, in
R9virly, February 1944) P 93.

4311Comments of General Joachim Peiper" (Documents

Section, Fort Knox, Kentucky, File #850.86. A report in
the German Generals' series of documents).
44TAct,j,cal and licichrlic Imaia, #51 (October 1944) p 26..

45Colonel I. .Khitrov, "Defense of the Forward E - dge"

(Translation from Kala.s4laya Zzacja, 6 July 1943, in Mil_itarz
Revigw, January 1944) p 84.

460p Cit, norma-Il ts of General Peiper", passim•

470p Cit, "comments of General Peiper", passim.

92

..-
 CHAPTEq. 5

RUSSIA

Soviet doctrine for combating enemy armored units has

undergone frequent and far reaching changes in the last two

decades.
\

After the Russiafl Revolution, the first steps taken

to modernize the Russian Army dealt with the basic organization

and command functions. It was not until the early 1930's that

steps were taken to mechanize the Army to any extent. In con-

junction with the building of armored vehicles

., the Russians ,
began a development of weapons capable of destroying tanks
'
and armored cars. These weapons were of 37mm size and smaller,

S of medium muzzle yelocity and were individual or small crew

served weapons. None of these weapons were self-propelled.

The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939, provided a testing

ground for these various weapons. Against the light vehicles

that appeared in Spain, the weapons proved capable of destruc-

tion. The Soviets, using these facts, based their doctrine

of antitank defense on the infantry's using these light weapons

2
singly and in groups.

The 45mm antitank gun proved highly successful in

Spain. This weapon was an adaptation of the German Reintnetall

37mm antitank gun. The Soviet 45nm. Antitank gun was first pro-

duced in 1932. As a result of the Spanish War, this antitank

S
,.

93
S gun becaose the standard antitank weapon for the infentry.3

During the late 19301 s Soviet antitank doctrine began

to solidify. The infantry was charged with the primnry mission

. Artillery was to complete the

of repelling enemy tank. attacks,

antitank defense by concentrating its fire upon enemy armor

concentrations even to the firing of conventional artillery

pieces as direct fire weapons. The artillery was to provide

the depth to the defense.4'

The infantry to accomplish its antitank mission was

to employ its conventional defense (3f P ntitank tank ditches .

and interlocking fire with the antitank guns covering roads, _

defiles, and key terrain features. These guns wore protected

from enemy infantry action by the unit of which they were a part45

S Other means of destroying enemy armor wore developed

for infantry use which played upon the vulnerability of tanks:

,
The ease with which a tank caught fire, general lack of mobility,

blindness of the crew when the tank was closed, and the weakly

armored portions, The Infantry, by aggressive action, was to

close with the tank, force entry into it, and set it afire, If
this wore impossible, they:were to fire at the weak points

with their hand weapons,

6

Combining the missions of the Infantry and the Artillery

the Soviet Army had r good basic plan at the outbreak of the
7
war in the -West, This plan was based on the assumptpn that

tanks would be employed solely in conjunction with infantry unit; _

S ,.

94

..

•
S It did not foresee the tank being asaigned independent missions

or that the infantry would be geared to the speed of the tank.•

The doctrine did not consider the massed tank attack designed'
.

to seize objectives fifty to one hundred miles in the enany

rear.

The Russian high command observed the Polish Campaign

with great interest in 1939. The defeat of the Western

powers in 1940 caus

. ed the Russians to review their concept of

antitank defense in detail.

The conclusion drawn from the failures to stop German

tanks in Poland and the West was that insufficient antitank _

guns were employed. Secondly, infantry units were not prepa,red

to withstand the shock of having tanks overrun their positions.8

S After the results of the Western Campaigns were weighed,

the Russians felt that their doctrine was sound but they began

and completed designs and tests on a new 57itim antitank gun

during 1940 to be organized into units under divisional command.

In addiiion to providing a most powerful antitnnk:weapon thiS •

new gun and its organizational control gave the Soviet antitank

defense considerably more depth.

By the end of 1940 production was begun on ti-ls new

gun and units were being organized and equipped.

At the outset of the German invasion of Russia, the

previously mentioned systan of defense against tanks was being

practiced by the Russian Army.

S 95
 ,

WARTIME DEVELOPMENTS
,
The initial German tank assaults proved to the
-

Russians thPt infantry remaining in position firing conventional

weapons was not sufficient. As a result many improvisations

were made by the infantry in their attempts to find hand weapons

that would prove capable of causing destruction.9

Fire barriers were laid in an attempt to cause German

armor to move through the fields of fire of the emplaced

antitank guns. These barriers were constructed of any burnable

material at hand such as straw, hay and grass piled in wind

rows and soaked with gasoline at key points. As the German

armor approached in the attack, these gasoline soaked points

,
were ignited by tracer fire. A wall of flame was formed that

S the German dared not pass for fear of setting his vehicle

afire. These fire barriers did not burn very long, however.

In 1941 an additional infantry weapon was developed

by the Russians. It took the form of the fifty one caliber

antitank rifle. This vr,eapon was issued to infantry units and

proved effective. against light armored vehicles. The weapon

was clip fed and had a high degree of accuracy. During the

course of the war, the number of these weapons increased 416%

in the infantry unit.11

Playing upon the vulnerability of a. tank to fire, the

fire biSttle, known as the Molotov Cocktail, came into being.

,

After initial successes with this weapon, great stress was placed

5 upon its use. The practice of the Germans which stressed the
\

96

,
• concept that the tank should overrun the infantry position

permitted the fire bottle additional success. In the pre

pared infantry position, the Russian soldier merely crouched

in the bottom of .his fd.khole until the tank passed over him

and then he tossed the fused bottle onto the back of the tank
where it exploded and ran downinto the engine compartment and

set the engine afire, causing the tank to be abandoned. This

same weapon was used under other circumstances PS noted in

the following excerpt taken from a Military Attache trans1ation:12

The Russian Army is using with great effect "tank

destroyer" teams of three men. Two are bottle throwers
and the senior is armed with a tammy gun. Having carried
out "Dry Run" on throwing from small carefully camou-
flaged trenches located in or near bridges, antitank-
ditches, escarpments, roads, forests, marshy terrain,
defilade positions they await the approach of enemy tanks
to within 20 yards range before tossing bottles. Oc-
cupants emerging from tank are picked off by tomaly gunner.
Coordinated groups of three are often scattered
checkerboard fashion about twenty-five to thirty yards
apart, according to the situation. They are also used
Pn flanks of columns for offensive and defensive work.

The progress of the war in Russia clearly indicated,

to the Russians that while infantry units could cause Some

casualties against armor, their efforts were not sufficient

to .stop a concentrated tank attack. Using thLs as a guide,

the basic plan began to change for the infantry as the year

1942 passed, The infantry units were to retain their positions

in the face of armored attack inflicting n11 the tank casualties

possible as the anamy passed over the positions. However, once

the tat* assault passed those positions, the Russian infantry

• 97
wPs to concentrate his .fire and attention tolArPrcl stopping the

infantr3r following the tank assaults,. Following this change

of infpntry antitank defense, the Russians bern to c.3ncentrate

upon development of crew-served weapons and mobile self pro

polled guns as the primary means of halting the advance of

13
enemy armored attacks.

The Russian Army at the beginning of the Gernrn invasion

of Russia based their antitank doctrine on the crew-served

antitank weapon; All other moans of destroying tanks, developed

or improvised„ were supplementary to the capabl.j.itiles of these

guns. The improved 1.937 Model 45mxn gun was the basic weapon

in use. However, a few units were equipped with the new 57mm
14
while others were still using the 37mnr.

- The 37mm antitank gun was successful only when it was

allowed a flank shot against the Go/man medium tanks. The

45muri succeeded in getting penetration on all surfaces if the

range was at minimum. The 57mm was an outstanding gun and

was capable of standing off armored attacks anytime it was

employed in numbers. However, neither the 45mm nor, the 57mm

was in universal ,use nor were they available in sufficient

quantities to present a defense on all fr:mts.15

The basic construction of n 11 three of these wcappns

placed stress first on the destruction ability of the gun and

following closely was the Emphasis on weight. All of those

guns were built of the lightest durable mnstruction in order

98
S that their crews would be able to man han.dle them with relative

ease, The adaptability of these guns PS well as their ,worth

is 'borne out by the following excerpt:

.

The antitank gun, which at the beginning of the campaign

considerably surpassed the antitank gun of our infantry.
divisions in efficiency, was readily put to use by us when—
ever we captured it. The antitank gun WS an auxiliary ,
weapon from which the ,lussi.an soldier never separated. Where—
ever the Russian infantryman was., antitank defense could .
be expected. At times it appeared that each Russian infantry.'
..
.• man had an antitank gun or antitank rifle, just as infantry—
men of other countries had ordinary rifles. The Russian
moved his antitank defense everywhere with great skill.
It was to be found even where no enemy tank attacks might
be expected. Erapincefaents were set up within minutes. If
the small gun, always excellently camouflaged was not needed -
for antitank defense, its flat trajectory and great accuracy
were put to good use in infantry combat,

The 37mm was a weapon that belonged to the infantry

regiment. The 45iiim was a weapon that belonged to the division

S commander to be employed by him in threatened areasZ . This

is borne out by the following Soviet Army Articles and explains

the tie—in of infantry weapons, mine warfare, and the artillery

I

antitank to form the first zone of antitank defense;

.The basic means of disabling tanks and of repelling

tank attacks is artillery fire at point blank range4- .
Antitank guns are the chief weapon for ilntitank defense.
Their fire is supplemented by the fire of the divisicn
and corps artillery, primarily cannon batteries; Large
calibre machine guns supplement antitank artillery at
short range. Hand grenades and inflamatory materials are.
effective means of combating tanks at short range.. Natural
and artificial antitank barriers Pre effective only in
combination with the fire of antitank weapons. Defense
is primarily antitank defense and cznanders must at. all
times maintain a mobile reserve.17

A mobile reserve was established as part of the anti

S 99
• tank defense during 1942. This reserve was made up of organized

units with towed antitank guns as their weapon. These mobile

reserves were centrally located and controlled by the division,

oorps Pnd army commanders. Their mission was to seal off,

destroy or force the withdrawal of enany armored penetrations.

Above the divisional level, self.

,propelled antitank guns were

foimed into the mobile reserve when they were available. The
following article translated from the Imaiza A 1.7.2uxual
. 18
explains:

The Red Army provides for three basic lines of anti—

tank defense. The first line is in front of the forward
positions, the second is in front of the area occupied
by shock troops of the leading defense echelon, and the
third is in front of the area where the main artillery
grouping and the divisional shock troops are displayed.
Its purpose is to prevent enemy tanks from penetrating
deep into our defense zone by stopping them in 'front of
the forward positions and annihilating than there. In
case the tanks do penetrate the forward positions, the'
task of the antitank defense is to break than up into
small groups, cut off the infantry frqn the tanks, and
prevent the -tril-cs from reaching the area of the main
artillery positions and the division command post. The,
idea bdhind this setup of antitank defense is to subject
the attacking enemy ta.nlIn to constant fire from successive
antitank defense fire positions.
The positions arc manned by the regimental antitank
artillery, which bears the brunt of the first massed tank
assault, antitank rifleman, and tank destroyer regiments.
Taking into account the tactics and armament of -enemy
tanks, we shall outline the proper organization of the
antitank artillery reserve of an infantry division. In;.•
asmuch as the antit7nk reserve is forced to combat all
types of tanks, it must have 76mm guns in additi:n to
those of 45mm and,in addition, detachments of antit-nk
rifleman, automatic rifleman and engineers. The antitank.
reserve must be extremely mobile, vehicles such as "Willy's".
and "Bantam" effect this mobility being used as prime movers*
The divisimal antitank reserve should be displayed
in thearea limited by the second line of defense and the

100
 section occupied by the shock troops and the division
command post.. atensivo preparations should be made in
this zone, positions chosen for guns and observation
posts, missions assigned to separate batteries. The
whole reserve must be prepared to maneuver either by
batteries or as one unit. The batteries should occupy
the positions in a diamond pattern with the guns at the
corners. Each side of the diamond should be at least
as long as the effective nnge of the guns in this position.

This organization of the antitank defense added depth

to the Russian position that it had not had before. The

reserve was held in assembly and when Pn area was 7,.tta eked,

the antitank batteries moved into their previously prepared

•
positions. This change in antitank defense began to pay off

in increased tank kills. German armor wPs required to mass

in greater strength than previously to penetrate this new

defense.

•
The Germans were forced' to concentrate battalions

of tanks where previously companies had a ccomplished the

mission, The continued goal of the entire defense was to

defeat the enemy in front of main battle position. However,

rtillizing that the impetus of a determined -Itteck can seldom

be dispelled before it has overrun the forwnrd positions,

the Russians through this grePter depth and mobility sought

to limit the degree of penetration. in all except massed

armored attack the defense was sound. Prior to the wPr in

Russia, the Soviet Army had not seen the need for self pro—

pelled antitank weapons ndas a result had not developed any

such vehicles. Consequently PS the German Army advanced into

Russia. andP war of mobility was forced upon the Russian

• 101
• Army, the Soviets rea.lized the dire need for a highly-mobile
19
antitank weapon.

The first German attacks caused the Russirns to nbandm

the T71 light tP nk as totrfly inadequate„ However, rathor

than abandon the equirmant completely, the chas T.is wv,s re—

modeled P nd mounted with the standard 37mm antitank gun, later

the 76mm. These were the first Russian self—propelled anti—

tank guns and proved fairly effective a ginst the lighter

German tanks. This was not the desirable piece of equipment

to fill the void created by the brePkclown of the linear

defense. The Russian's attempted to fill in by using their

tanks. But in tying clown the tanks to antitank defense, they

had no weapon with which to launch the c..)unter—atta.ck.2°

Upon the Completion of the T34 and after it had proven

itself on the battlefield, construction was begun on a. self—

propelled 76mm gun which became the standard self—propelled

weapon until later developments -otitmoded than. This 76mm •

was the same weapon that formed the main armament on the first

T34, The construction of the vehicle gave the Russian a

weapon that could be concentrated at .porps level and higher

to be use to blunt and destroy the deep armored penetration.

This self—propelled gun was just as successful as the T34 in

destroying German armor.21

The 76rnm scafr-propelled gun was held as reserve

weapon with the primary missi..n of antitank defense. If,

102
O however, the occasion presented itself, it could be used

against personnel nneL a s an artillery weapon.

Gem,n massed tank assaults against the prepared Rusian

defenses wore so higiy successful in gaining objectives and

destrpying large segtrints of the RussiPn Army by encirclement

that the whole defensip of the Russian Amy had to be cm-

caratrated toward the one goal of depriving the Germans of

the freedom to use his instrument of penetration and ex-

ploitatien. To accomplish this goal, the Russians perfected

a weapon, the Pntitnnk gun, for his position defense and

adopted tactics to suit this gun that wuld enable the defenders

to hold the position against all but the massed ccmbined arms

attack. Then to auglient the position defense, the salf-pro-

polled antitank gun provided the reserve with mobility and

fire power sufficient to blunt and destroy those enemy armored

elements that succeeded in pushing past the defensive positions.

This gun had only to he built to take its place in the reserve

and when it arrived, gave the RussiPn Army a greater capability

of shifting his forces to meat and counter the attack as it

was launched. The battlefield was further deepened and the

self-propelled in provided a weapon to prevent the widening

of the breech in the lines PS Well as a means of countering

the encircling armored clamonts.22

The defeat of the GormF.;n. Sixth Army at Stalingrad did

not bring about any great changes in the antitank defense

103
• doctrine of the Soviet Army but it did form the basis for

provements Pnd refinc.monts in the system.

It was at this point that the Russian Army bcgan.the

offensive movement that forced the Germans out of Russia..

This change necessitated the incorporating of the antitank

defense into the general pattern of offense.

The only new weapon that was Prided to the infantry

organization was the rocket launcher. This weapon was merely

integrated into the existing infantry tactics augmenting the

antitank rifle, grenades, and fire bottles.

The general pattern of Patitnnk defense remained un—

changed but means of making the pattern more effective were

carried out.

S Beginning in 1943, the devel -Tment of ground mount .

antitank guns went into full swing and resulted in the 10Can

and the lighter 85mm to counter the new and heavier German

tanks. These two weapons maintained the superiority over the

armor of the German tanks 23

The 76011 a rid the 57.m.m guns were clown graded and became

infantry weapons replacing the 45mm and added greater strength

to the infantry (3ivisims antitank defense. The missions of

the 57mm and 76mm wore: (1) Destruction of tanks an other

enemy motorized material. (2) Combating and annihilating

enemy infantry weapons. (3) Destruction of enemy personnel.

These refinements are borne out by the f.)1.1owing excerpts:

S ...
...

104
\

,
 ..

The emphasis of the defense was on the infantry

weapons, including antitank and self-propelled assault
guns2_ and on extensive mine 1a3ring.
Fricn 1943 on, the defense was strengthened by mass
employment of anti-aircraft guns and flame throwers in
the so cal3.ed antitank guns fronts which were superbly
camouflaged and dangerous for tank attacks.
In 1943, new methods of tank and antitank warfare were
introduced while methods of the infantry rannined the
sme. In seotors in which the terrain was passable for
tanks, antitank gun fronts would be set up in nearly all
instances. They were developed to extrerdinary strength
and foiled many a Germ'n armored attack. They were also
used against infantry, in which case they fired high
explosive shells. 24

The antitank front came into being by broadening the

infantry division antitank defense. In the sectors where the

terrain woad permit large massed ,, rmorod attack, the terrain

would be organized in depth to as much as forty miles. The

antitank front consisted of an area in which all dominating

S terrain would be occupied with antitank guns. Each terrain

feature would be occupied by a four gun battery, if the terrain

features were large enc,ugh. . At all times, wheie possible, the

batteries were mutually supporting. Each battery was emplaced

in the familiar diamond pattern in order t,) afford the position

of 3600 fields of fire. The positions were then reinforced

with antitank ditches, mine fields, automatic riflemen and

barbed wire. The antitank ditches and mine fields prevented

the enemy armor from overrunning the position. The automatic

riflemen and wire prevented enemy infantry from closing with

the antitank guns. The battery positions were located with

the idea in mind that any armored penetration entering the front

105
 _

S would be subjected to ce)r)tinuous fire, frontal, flank and rear

until it was forced by its losses to halt and retreat or be

totally destroyeci.25

The antitank front was given two missions: ,(1) Defeat

and if possible completely destroy enany armored attacks. (2)

,
Failing to halt the armored penetrations, the front, by its

fire, was to separate the infantry from the tanks.

The antitank front develorment increased in strength

constantly as the war progressed by the addition of more power—

ful antitank guns. The antitank battery positions were to

attempt by fire to destroy the maximum number of the enemy

,.
tanks PS possible. Thus, causing the massed front of tanks

to split to avoid the antitank fire. As the tank attack moved

S forward continuing to meet new battery positions which in turn

further broke up the massed front of tanks, the by—passed -

positions took the follow up infantry units under fire. When

the °homy armored advance slowed to a 'halt the mobile reserve

struck the penetration from the flanks.26

As rapidly as Soviet industry produced the 76nun self

propealed antitank guns, they wore integrated into the mobile

reserves, During the counter—attack the self—propelled guns

maneuvered to attack the many armor from favorable positions

while the towed antitank guns occupied positions to protect

27
•

the flanks and rear of the self—prDpelled guns from envelop mente

This method of cinploying the antitank defenses was so

106 '
S highly successful that German armor avoided the P ntit,r,nk

whenever possible. If an attack thrDugh an antitnnk fr:mt

front

could not be avoided, it became necessary to concentrate large

numbers of artillery weapons to saturate the area ahead of

28
the tank attack to assure the attack of any success whrtsoever.

Beginning in 1943 with the development of the SU 76

self-propelled gun, the 'Russian Army, realizing the need for.

such a weapon and its potentiality, nbarked on a long range

developnent plan. Utilizing the chassis of the T34 and the

later JSU models, the SU 85, SU 100, JSU 122, and JSU 152
_

were developed and integrated into existing units. As the

newer self-propelled guns became available, the SU 76 was

integrated as a weapon of the infantry division and the other

• models became corps and army reserve weapons. 29

Along with the vehicular development, a doctrine of

criployment came into being and is explained by the following

,
translated article:

Se1f7propelled artillery can exedute the following

missions. In the offense it can destroy firing positions,
tanks, and enemy infPntry units viiich block the advance
of our tanks and infPntry into the depth of the defenses.
As a part of an enveloping force self-propelloci artillery
can appear ai ddenly an the enemy is flank and rear and
direct deadly fire at enemy formations, artillery and
tanks. It will try to break up the enemy force into
isolated groups.
A reserve of self-propelled Prtillery can be mployed
to fight enemy tanks and to parry thrusts by enemy units \

which have penetrated into our flanks and roar. During

the battle for the main defense z-)ne, self-propellec: artillery
becomes a part of the counter attacking force and con-
stitutes a mobile antitank reserve. In covering the

,
107
 withdrawal, self—propelled artillery can be empicTed in
tank ambushes. In the fluid situation this weapon can
be used to cover tanks and infantry or provide than flank
/3rotection.3°

The period following the battle of Stalingrad until

the end of the war affected the antitank defense in two ways.

Ini,tially a state of conflict existed in which neither of the

opposing forces had control of the battle. To offset this in—

ability to decisively assume the initiative, he Russian Army

developed the antitank front to absorb the shpck of the final

German tank attacks. To perform this mission, the towed anti—

tank gun acted as the holding force while the self—propelled

antitank gun maneuvered'to deliver the defeat.31

Secondly, after the Russian Army had completely

• gained the initiative, the antitank weapons, both towed and

self—propelled, were used offensively against enany positions

and formations while at the same time -providing antitank

defense against the counterattack.32

As the Russian Army force( the withdrawal of the

German forces from Eastern Europe, the antitank weapons ac—

companied the leading cianents of the attack. Immediately

upon an objective's being seized, or the advance being halted.

,

the antitank defense was emplaced to defeat counterattacks

and aid the resumptim of the offensive. During the advance

of armored units antitank guns were often pulled by tanks

in order that they be available at all tixnes.33

108
 In 1944 the Russian antitank aircraft appeared on the

battlefield to lead the advance of the armored columns and

assist Russian armor in defeating the remaining..German aimored

units while the Genr,Pn units retreated into Germany. The

following quote illustrates this weapons use:

By the winter of 1944-1945 Russian antitank weapons

in aircraft had become so highly developed that they re—
presented a seriously growing menace to tanks and self—
propelled guns. In January 1945 during the second battle
of East Prussia, as many as 8 self—propelled assault guns
were set afire on one particular day by the antitank planes?'
1

These planes fired the conventional rocket and were

mounted on the Soviet fighter plane. Those planes attack

from a very low altitude which enabled them to be very effective

once they had located a target. Although these planes were

• not a deciding weapon on the Eastern front, they did succeed

in destroying tanks and prevented to some extent the massing

of German aimor in rear areas.

SIIIIARY OF RUSSIAN ANTI—TANK DOCTRINE TO INCLUDE

Evrly in the 1930 decade, the Russian Army began the

develerment of antitank weapons and antitank doctrine. Since

this early beginning the Russians have kept up with the changes

and improvements in armored warfare and the means of defeating

armoi‘.

This pace was maintained abo4 equally by foresight

and hard necessity.

- World War 11 and the German invasion forced

109
• the Russians to improvise interim weapons and tactics until

training and -production could fill the gaps that existed in

the antitank defenses irom time to time during the war in

the East.

From the first' inception of an antitank defense in

which:Russian infantry was charged solely with the arthitank

defense, the Russian Army progressed to the opposite pole of

thought that resulted in special antitank defense units. The

first infantry antitank defense using organic weapons was

supported by the artillery performing a secondary mission of

tank destruction. 0

The German mass use of armor which resulted in complete

destruction of Russian armies forced the Russians into adoption

• of measures that would deepen the battlefield to a depth .

sufficient to contain these annered led assaults. This depth

was attained by the creation o f strong points of antitank

_
weapons in all areas favorable to armored maneuver. These

strong point areas, called antitank fronts, were given the

mission of disrupting the mass of the attack into a Series

Of Smaller armored thrusts. Subsequent to the time the attack-

ing armor enterod these areas, it was continuously under fire

from the strong points. At the crucial moment when the attack-

ing armor lost its momentum, a mobile antitank reserve

consisting of towed and self-propelled antitank gU.ns counter-

attacked to destroy all of the enany armor that remPined alive

•
no
 S in the area. It was these antitank fronts that absorbed the

shock and defeated the bulk of the German armor on the Eastern

fr Dnt.

. The employment of large concentrations of armor by

the Germans brought about the renlization by the Russians that

the decisive offensive weapon en the battlefield was the tank.

,In this weapon lay the cause for the complete destructim of

the Russian - Army in:the western approaches. In order to _prevent

, the total defeat of Russia, a means must be found that would

rob the massed armored attack of its maneuverability.

The prevention of exploitation or envelopment by

enemy armored units necessitated deepening of the battlefield.

,
Weapons and tactics were necessary to prevent penetration.

S This restriction of employment was

tank front.
accomplished by the anti-

As the Russian hi-my moved into the offensive in 1944

and 1945, the tower', and self-propelled antitank guns accompanied l

the lead elements of the offensive. _ During the move these

weapons provided flank protection. If the offensive erne to

n halt, immediately the antitank front sprang- into existence

to- ward .off the counter-attack and to held the gains.

At all times the Russian Army builds its defense around

weapons and tactics that are ca re ble of defeating the encmy

armored attack. The Russian defense is built upon two basic

ideas: (1) The defense must be concerned primarily with de-

S 111
S feating the weapon most capable of inflicting defeat, Defense

against other weapons or forces must be provided for but they

are secondary; (2) The defensive position must present a

stable front around which other forces may be maneuvered to

inflict the final blow of defeat.

Tho weapon or weapons necessary to form the holding

force are a point of contention, however, the following quotation

clarifies to sonic degree Russian thought:

The Gemans thought that by opening fire at 2000 to

2500 meters, their "tiger" tank would be safe from medium
caliber guns. Such hes not been the case in practice. Of
course, it would be a mistake t..-.) underestimate the power
of the tigers, but cmbat experience has shown modern
antitank artillery is still more powerful. The contest
between armor and shell continues, 'In this as in other
spheres, tremendous progress has been made during the
war, but the limit has not yet been reached. Simul-
taneously with the increase in armor there will apparently
be a growth in the penetrative power of the shell.35.
,
It seems that the struggle between tank and gun will
be ever present. After all. every tank, for example, the
German Tiger, carries a gun that fires a. shell capable of
piercing its own armor.

Today the Russian Army contemplates a need for weapons

and units to perform the mission of the holding force in

addition to forces that are highly mobile.

It is possible, judging from the general trend, that

today the Russian Army contemplates a need for weapons r'nd units

to perform the mission of the holding force in addition to

forces that are highly mobile, to be used for encj.rclanent and

destruction.

112
 ymp.pipugummmop.esowmoimraeadisuMmilimm.umottw.....Ngl....W.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHLPTER,

1Q • 4.
Vr, .s zad.;intit.a_nji Ilen Dons (:lashing.
ton, D.C. intelligence Divisicin, GSUSh., Dep, .rtment of the
.1-trmy) passim.

2lat Col I Alexeyev, "Antitank Artillery of the Red *

Army" (Translation reprinted in the Field, ;;rtillerv
August 1942)

3I1314

4Laj Gon N. Guri1onkc, "Innobilizing Tank Lanouvorsti

(Translation reprinted in the Fielri ;,.rti31er,,r tinurnn13 Novem—
ber, 1942)

50p cit, '1"u-titanic Artillery of the Red Army".

6
Colonel V. Qua.dysnvich„ "Repulsing Tank Attacks by
Fire from Open Positions" (Translation reprinted in ,Field,
atilluzy JournP.1, November 1942)

• 814 Col I. Alexeyev, "The Development of 3-)vict Atj

tank Defense!' (Translation reprinteJ in sF1,0.1,(1,
z,a, Novanbor 1942)
Jnur—

.94ajor N. Chlrkanov, "Incendiary Fire Bottle Fields

and Fire Belts" (Translation reprinted in Lialjc at...U.151a
Jour a 3 November 1942)
1.0/bicl

Op cit, "The Development of Soviet Antitank Defense".

1211DA Dostrnvers" (Document Section, The Armored
School, Fort Knox, Kentucky, Document ifL'i2222, 12 October 1942)
13

1417 • A

15Ibicl

16 (Washington D..C.
1:Dculda of Russipn
Department of the Array Historical Division, LS T22, par 69)

113.
 17Op cit, "The Develorment of Soviet Antitank Defense"
18
C0l G.-, I Balashon,"titP.nk Artill,ery
2:11 Inf';rltry. Divislon D fo.Lzaa-.3 ".(Document Section,
The hrmored School, Fort Knox, &entuc idh—EE-LID Report
22, 14 January 1943)

190p cit,

21;

2211;
1_0

2301 cit, "Snvint vehiaaa pne Lmatitpnk

Wonoons" passim.

.240p cit, ns Wrrfare par 298,

220,212,
25
0p cite, "Tr.,.nlc Destroyers".
26Th

Gon Li Nozdeanov,'Jec lq-tillerv. in

ItLe ELL Armv" (Document Section, The Armored School, Fort
Kentucky, MA-EE-MID Report 22, 7 July Knox
1943)
280p
cit, Ilgssii,....zzi_ties of Ruppiln 1.41=t, passim.
290p cit, "Soviet Armored Vehicles and Antitank
Weapons" passim.

300p cit,"Solf—propelled Artillery in the Red "

310
p cit, "Tank Destroyers"

32Comments- of Gen Joachim Peiper (Document Sect

ion,
The Armored School, Fort Knox, Kentuciw, Germa Gener
n als
Series Historical Division M

33,Tbid

340p eit,Peen31rritios of.Russian IiiprfPre p 172.

3514 Co3, P. K3lomeitov, "Tank vs Artillery Gun"

(:1=ti
. a Tc1nicjawaca 44230 Decanber 1943)

-114
 CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIO.NS

In the preceeding chapters we have attempted to

present the reader the clod-trines taught and the weapons

used by the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom,

Germany and Russia. Although each nation differs from

any other nation in various matters, many valid conclusions

may be dravvn when all the facts are viewed against a common

background.

Each of the several nations studied'developed

weapons and doctrine conditioned by a particular background

of circumstances.- To mention only a few of the factors

making up a. background, we might mention the influence ec—

oncrtiic circumstances had on British antitank developments,

or the influence space had on German develorments or the

influence manpower superiority had in the evolution of

current Russian doctrine.

All the factors composing the background from which

we develop our weapons and doctrine can never be fully

known. Nevertheless, many can be deduced based on current

conditions and on what we have learned from the past.. We

offer, therefore, certain preliminary conclusions before

attempting to present any /specific ,conclusions concerning

doctrine or weapons.

115
 PR,FLIL:INARY CONCLUSIONS
_
a. The. defensive Alas° of the next war is likely

to be lengthy.

b.- Aritorecl forces lose most of their effectiveness

when the enemy possesses superiority in the air.

c.' The tnnk is most effectively used in.missi.ms

exploiting its mobility.

d. Tank developnent has been preoccupied with gm

development in order t.:,

- accomplish the antitank role. Thus,
tanks have become tank destroyers.

e. Tanks arc uneconomical when used as stationary

antitank guns, but arc effective in the ,

- ntitank role when

held in mobile reserve.

• f. Self-propelled antitank guns are highly effective

antitank weappns. Towed guns are also effective, but arc

limited by restricted mobility and lack of crew protection.

.g. Antitank weapons are most effective when

firing from previ:usly selected, concealed positions.

Thorough reconnaissance by mobile reserve ccnimenders is

essential.

h. Guided missiles will someday be effective antitank

weaPons, and may supplant the tank and antitank gun as the I

primary antitank weapon.

GENERAL
,. PR.DICIPLES

The following principles will apply under any circum-

-

...
n6
stances,, Together with the preliminary conclusions already

discussed,, they form the basis for the doctrine we propose,

in the last portion of the chapter.

a.. Antitp.nlc doctrine must be offensive.

b.. Antitank doctrine mist provide for the utilization

and amv-Itripiort of all available means.

c. Antitank defenses must be in great •(' 1.4Q.L......th and

echeloned with strength to the rear..

Kassed Grimy .armored attack can be countered only

c,oricertrnti)ri of antitank forces. The smaller the number of

antitank weapons, the greater is the need for holding than as

a mobile reserve.

e. Effective is essential to permit cf—

ficj.ent co unter—concentrnticn

f. An effective antitank fllw....zniato is essential

to antitank defense.

PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION

a. Concentration can best be achieved by z....7)bas; major

antitank weapons under higher commanders. Combat units should

have organic only what is needed all or most of the time.

b. Def„...nd.5zicjz
s 2lucleauLta should ab—

sorb as little as possible of the national resources.

c. The disadvantages of defensive weapons and,

specialized units can be countered in part by assigning

secondary misoi,ons and by Do 3)_ing.

•
117
 d.aPilOrrdiwItaa is desirable but efficiency is

paramount,

Circumstances may dictvte compromises in the

applicPtion of these principles. Departures from principle

should be made only after careful considerrtion.

AN IVNTITANK DOCTRINE

In this section the committee presents its concept

of a coordinated antitnk doctrine, applying the principles _

and conclusions listcd in the preceding sections.

A. -
411phasi,s is placed an effective intellence

to locate enemy r,rmored concentrations and to determine

his capabilities.

b. Air, artillery, and guided missiles deliver con,

-

11111 ventional, atomic, and chemical agents to sivgati.,

tentia11 to 4xawat or
41 en

destroy his conneatrati,24, to Immobilize

his arrlor by interdiction of logistical agencies, and to

isolate the battlefielpit

c. The first consideration in selecting a defensive

position is defense against mechanized forces. Skillful

or,_pni%ption_afround and maximum utilization of natural

and artificial obstacles, especially minefields, are emphasized,

Every effort is made to channolize the enemy attack and to

restrict his maneuver.

d. An effective system of security is provided by

covering forces and front—lino infantry, It provides early

\ 118
 warning and time for the P rtful concentration of counter-

weapons.

9
. In a.r.'clition, the front line infantry bi,ttalicin,

cmploying e11-around defense, holds its position, inflicts

maximum damage, separatas the encmy infantry from his armor,

and serves as a base of fire for counterattacking

reserves. Organic antitank weapons available to the sqtr.e,,

platoon, and company include smell arms, incendiary Pric'l smoke

grenades, rifle grenades, mr.n-portable rocket launchers, and

recoilless rifles. Antitank guns under battalion control

occupy positions within the front-line infantry battalion area.

f. Sufficient depth is provided to subject the attacker

to continuous fire at medium rrngcs, and to rob him of raomeritum.

• infantry reserve units, tactionl air, divisimr1 field

artillery, and antiaincmft artillery are integrated into

the antitank plan to provide this depth.

g. Tanks at all levels are held in pobile reserve

ready instantly to occupy previously selectee,:, concealed,

firing positions from which to counterattack.

h. Certain corps artillery battalions employing

high velodity guns in direct fire are employed to supple-

ment tanks in the antitank role. These ,dual, zazae

artiklerv bt- aiara- trained and equipped to function

either as indirect fire medium artillery or direct fire

antitank gun battalions.

• 119
• i. Antitank defense is a conimPnd responsibility.

At every echelon, the senior coromnrider of ln lrmorcd unit

or the Annor Officer is designated bati.L.taLic OVIi,ce,r to

,
assist the commander in planning, coordinating, supervising,

and executinc the rntitPnk mission.

120
 CHAPTER 7

RECCEREMATIONS

In this chapter the committee extracts th-)se

elaned's of its conclusi.ris which differ from current

official United States Ann' y antitank doctrine and

lists than as its recommendations.

.a. There is a. requirement for an antitank gun,

other th.),n a tank, to occupy p:psiti-ns

. within the in

fantry hthtalin defensive area. This gun shDulcl be cx-

tranely accurate, capable of defeating any tank at a range

of 2000 yards, highly mDbilo, and easily concealed. For

technical reasons, m,)'oility may be sacrificed for ePsu of

concealment. It need not be man-p::rtablc.

A Gun G.-)rai-p.n3r of three platoons, each containing

six of these guns, will be organic to infantry regiments

and will normally be broken down with 'no plat,-)on supporting

each battalion. In defense this gun i the major antitank

weapon of the battalion. It 'Provides front line infantry

with a weap_m of sufficient power and range to enable than

to maintain their position. In the attack, the gun is the

direct fire support weapon providing overwatchdng fire and

fire to the flanks.•

The infa.ntry-tank tan continues to functi)n according

to current doctrind, except that t)nks no longer provide

overwatching fire. • In this manner the characteristic

121
 mobility, shock action, and heavy armor of the tank is used

to best advnntage. With the aJ-Iditi.)n of the Gun Company,

the Regimental Tank Company is nolonger necessary,- The

organic division tank battalion is retained in the Infantry

Di--vision, and additional tank battali...:n.s may be attached

as needed,.

b. Tanks at all levels should be held in mobile

reserve. ready i.nst-ntly to occupy previously selected c7n-

coaled firing positions frm which to c.punterattnek.

With the ne,ditd.T.n of the antitank gun recommended

above, it is no longer necessary for tanks to occupy station-

Pry positions '11 the front line. The shock, mobility, and

armor of the tank arc exploit\ed to the fullest by concen-

trating them for massed action in the cunterattack which

is the key to defense.

c. Certain corps artillery battalions employing

high velocity guns sh -.uld be trained and equipped Ps dual

purpose artillery-antitank battalions. This provides a

pool of major antitank weapons available to corps and army

commanders to supplement t7nks. In normal offensive or

defensive operations these bettPli-ns function under the

Corps Artillery Officer as indirect fire medium artillery.

In the event of massed enemy mechanized attack, c)ntr.-,1 of

these battalions is shifted to the Corps Antitank Officer

vitr)'coordinates their empj_oyment with that of the c)untor7

122
 attacking t.Pnks• These dun1 purpose artillery hattnli.ns,

using direct fire, will r:ccupy blocking positions or rein—

force engaged divisions, thus !, ding depth t) the defense,

blunting the enemy thrust, and permitting mass maneuver by

friendly trnks.

At every cchelOn the senior cczmander of an

.•
armored unit or the Armor Officer is clesimated Antitank

Officer to assist the cmmander in planning, coordinating,

siporvisin, and executing the antitank mission. The need

for complete coorr'inati,n of all means and unity of effort

is thus provided for,

et High priority should be given t) the r'evelormont

of a guided missile for antitank uso. There is little doubt

that such a weapon can be devised, When nvailnblo it could

conceivably replace all antitank guns and relieve the tank

of its antitank mission. It should have r ranr7o of from

to 15 nautical miles, radius of probably - error of 15 feet,

carry a conventional wnrhend capable of clestro rrny tank,

and be controlled by forward observer teams with direct

observation of the target.

f. The committee recommends that an agency be

established within the framework of the Department of the

Army General Staff to effect continuous planning, research,

coordination, and supervision of all factors affecting the

antitank policies of the United Statesq

123
 APPEOIX

DETIMOPMES

Introduction

Gprmany's dash across Poland. in 1939 and her six weeks'

Blitzkriegl of France in 1540 awoke the world to a weapon of

tremendoudypotential: the tank. The success of German armored.

forces, pr6v;ed that the tank, properly employed, and used. against

an:enemy arii:irepared. to cope with its power, can decide the battle Emi.

can even be 'a major factor in winning a war.

The remainder of the war saw a refinement of tanks and

tank.'tactic paralleled by the development of antitank weapons

and. antitank defense measures. The race still goes on. At present,

it appears that the tank still has the edge. Its employment in battle

can still exert a decisive influence, but numerou.s antitank measures

are in the development stage. These measures may steal away the

tank's decisive potential and re-establish the balance between

offensive and defensive warfare..

' Antitank Guns

Many of the antitank guns presently under development grew

out of the realization that the airborne_units are still practically

defenseless against armor in the initial phases of an airborne

assault. However,, quite recently the army has recopized at least

an "interim" need. for an antitank weapon at the battalion level

of defense. The infantry soldier cannot effectively deepen the

1214
defense position. If tanks are emp3.oyed to deepen the defense, their

freedom Qf maneuver is lost. At a quarter of a million dollars a

copy, we'can't very well afford to produce sufficient tanks to

do both jobs.
a. "BAT." or "Bat Vehicle": This can hardly be called a

new development, since necessary modifications can be made by any

soldier an the field. The name means Battalion antitank. or Battalion

Antitank Vehicle. It consists of a 105ron recoiless rifle mounted

on a eT truck. The .-present weapon in use is the M27. Three new

rifles are being developed — the best to replace the P127. If

many of the obvious disadvantages of a recoiless weapon can be

eliminated, the BAT could Drove to be a highly effective antitank

weapon.

b. Gun, 76mm, T124, on Carriage T66: This gun, a conventional

towed antitank gun, has been tested and is tentatively placed.

on the equipment tables of airborne units. It weighs only 3943#

and can be easily dropped by parachute, employing heavy (imp techniques.

Ath the latest ammunition, Shot, NTAPDS, 761m, M331 this weapon

attains a muzzle velocity of 14150 fps. The prime mover for this

gun is the 3P4T truck.. The iT truck 411 pull it, but this vehicle

provides only marginal cross country mobility,

Neither the BAT or the 76mm AT gun have been issued to

units yet. Comparative tests will be made first, and. a decision

will be made based on the outcome of the comparison.

c. Carriage, motor, 90mm Gun, T101: Techniques for dropping

125
equipmept by parachute have progressed. to the point that a vehicle

has been designed which if technically satisfactory will give airborne

forces a self—propelled antitank gun which can be employed in phase

operations. Presumably, this would go a long way toward solving

the two biggest problems in an airborne assault: poor mobility

and the lack of adequate defense against armored attack. The T101

is a full tracked vehicle mounting a gun posessing the same ballistic

characteristics as the gun mounted in the new medium tanks, It -

1,4eighs l2500# and carries a crew of three. Power is furnished

by the six cylinder air—cooled, Continental engine. The gun will

traverse through Go degrees. The track is of the continuous track

variety. Armor protectionconsists of a frontal shield. No overhead.

protection is provided. Test firing has been conducted at D:1.0

Proving Ground. If acceptable, this gun will replace the 76rrim,

T1.24 on the airborne tables of equipment.

d. Ontos: Ontos, (from Greek word meaning the thing")

is the, name for a family of small, full continuous tracked vehicles

in the developmental stage. As a class, they have better armor

protection than does the T101. Several models have a turret.

Basically, there are two models: the T55, designed to carry five

men, and the T56, designed to carry ten men. The T56 is merely

a longer model of the T55. All models have some form of overhead

. and T16g are 'Tiller" versions of

protection. The T165, T167,

the basic models. Each has a turret and means for fire control.

Each has a rack on top of the vehicle for mounting two, four., or

126

•
six 105,41m recoiless rifles. A. .50 caliber spotter rifle is mounted.

coaxilly for ranging. Each turret contains a T35 periscope. Power

is developed by the 150I C truck engine and transmitted through

the "austerity type" M.290 cross drive transmission. Turret and.

guns will traverse manually through Go degrees. All vehicles weigh

less than 12000*.

Guided Missiles

Gray recently has the Army turned to serious investigation

of guided missiles in the antitank - or surface to surface - role:

Most of the United States research in the field of rockets has been

basic research, principally a study of such German developments as

the V-1 and. V-2. In the past year or so we have overcome Germany's

lead and have commenced development of specific missiles for specific

purposes.

Although no models have reached the final production stage,

antitank guided missiles now seem entirely feasible. As a result

of various studies at the various AP:,boards and similar agencies

in the Air Force and the Navy, it is felt ,that certain missile types

can be developed into potent antitank weapons.

Based principally on the recommendations of the 1950 Army

Equipment Board, presided over by Lt Gen John R. Hodge, Army Field.

Forces has issued a directive listing the necessary requirements

for a suitable surface to surface antitank: guided missile. The

requirements include the following:

127
ts a., The missile must have a range of a minimum of 500

yards and a maximum of at least 6000 yards.

b. Fire control using standard artillery fire direction

- procedures is desirable."

c. Its single shot kill probability should be .9.

d.. Its single shot hit probability should be .9.
e. The missile should have the ability to select and home

on a single target in an area of many targets.

f. It should weigh less than 100 pounds. ,

g. The missile should be fired from launching•

equipment commensurate in weight :to that of light field artillery._

h. lii'he ;Launching equiiment should be capable of 360°

traverse.

S i. It should have a high rate of fire.

.4 major obstacle to the use of guided missiles has been its

relative inaccuracy in comparison with a direct fire tank or antitank

gun. This obstacle is being overcome. Various systems for improving ...

accuracy are under development. These systems include forward. observez „r

-
'techniques utilizing radar-IIice devices, various -horning devices such '

as infra red. homing equipment in the body of the missile, and improved.

area fire techniques.

The below listed missiles are in various stages of development:

a. ..X.SS/1-.A.-16 and RV-A-8 (Hermes A3A and A33) - These

missiles are being developed as highly accurate, surface to surface

,
rockets for close support of ground. troops. They will possess a

S 128
 range of 25 to 135 miles and carry a 1450 pound warhead. They will

S ,

be usea. against troop and equipment concentrations. Accuracy

within circular probable error of 200 feet indicates how far we have

come in guided missile development. These weapons will be guided

electronically from the vicinity of the launching site all the way

to the target.

b. IliaCrosse" - This missile will be used against similar

targets, especially armored vehicles. It has a range of 5 to 15 miles

•1.

and carries a 500 pound warhead. The probable error will be 15 feet

for 50% of all missiles fired at the target. ".orward observers

operating within 1000 yards of the target will guide the missile in.

Greatly improved fire control is expected by using small type

helicopters with the laCrosse homing equipment installed.

• of 26 to 75
c. XSS24-a-3.7 (Corporal) - The Corporal may also be used

effectively against concentrations of armor. It will have a range

miles and carry a warhead of 1500 pounds. The Corporal

will be accurate to within 100 feet in azimuth and 500 fect in defl-

ection for 50% of the missiles fired. Ground guidance equipment has

re4ched an advanced stage of development. A launching site can fire

ten missiles per hour. TOT fire by several battalions employing these

missiles is possible. . These and other features lend great flexibility

to the tactical employment of SI Battalions using the Corporal.

d. DLIO,The D40 is a unique and. remarkably effective

guided missile which possesses even greater possibilities for use

against tanks on the battlefield than the weapons mentioned above.

129
 It is ,I, jet propelled 6phere, 23 inches in diameter, filled with '

S r-,

propellent and explosive material. a main and three smaller stabil—

- are located, on the surface of the _sphere: Observers

izing jet oi.±1ccs

employing a "joy stick" control typo of Mil radio transmitter, position

themselveo. within 3000 yards of the target. Using the radio and

binoculars the D/40 can be guided directly into the target. The

sphere can be held within one inch of the OT line. The sphere

can be flown through grass and only a foot off the ground4 It

travels at approximately 300 mph. Tanks will be a principal

target. An eight pound shaped. charge within the sphere will penetrate

16 inches of armor plate. At present this weapon is in limited

production principally for testing models. On the 11th of March,

1952, the President of Army Field Forces Board #2 wrote an official

S letter to the Chief, Array Field Forces, in which he stated that the .

impact of the D40

1 weapon on antitank defense structure, including

the possible effect on the antitank role of armor, deserves careful

study.

Tanks

Current United States' doctrine holds that the best antitank

weapon is a better tank. Based on this premise, all American tanks

_

carry main armament capable of destroying tanks of their weight class

and even of the next higher class, under favorable circumstances.

The primary mission of the heavy gun -bark is to destroy any tank

on the battlefieldi

130
,
,
 Tio heavy gun tanks have been producedi, However, a couple

S of designs are under development. At the Tripartite Conference

on Armor, held in October 1951, both the United States and Great
e%

Britain agreed on the necessity for a heavy gun tank. rt was

decided to charge the United. States with the development of a tank

mounting a 155ran gun, while G.T..eat Britain would work on a tank

mounting a ISOirim gun. The possible use of low velocity squash head.

or guided missile type explosives is being considered.

Conclusions

The outcome of all or any one of these new developments

is unimoirm. Their nature, however, is such that if even one proves

...

successful it will have a tremendous effect on tactical and possibly

strategic operations.

S Application of the principle of flexibility is not restricted

to the battlefield.. The professional soldier mast exercise flex- ...

ibility in weapons and doctrine by keeping abreast of the latest

developments and by exploring their possible uses and determining

how they will alter existing doctrine. fie must not rely on past

methods: we mast entertain and. explore every c ilk.mge. To discourage

change is to invite disaster.

131

\
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

.1. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, Bell

Wily, The Orgpnizstion of •d Cc "opt Tree (Washing—
ton: Historical Division, D/A, 1947)

2.. It Co]. Finery A. Dunham, AGF Study No 29, The

.Tpnk Destroyer History (Fort Monroe, ,%GF, 1946)

3, Eau= J1E .tb.2 SneciP1 47141Pre4 Vehicle Bc)nrd

(Aberdeen Proving Ground, Fid; Aberdeen Proving- Center, 5
Dec 42)

4. Report of the AGF Equiment Review Board

(Washington: .AGF, 20 Juno 45)
5. AL.Q.49..d, tha Gouz,rpi Boprel, USFET (KO
AID 408: USFET, 1945)

6. Report of the el.i.morgd Conferc)nce (Ft Knox, KY;

The Armored Center, .1243 May 46)

7. IlLTT
a 202zthi-Lautient Bo ReportReport (Washington:
WD Office of the CP, 29 May 46)

• 8. .Re_sart., of 1124 Conforeprio aa /Antitank alonzap, (Ft

Monroe: AFF, 67 Oct 48)

9. 1..L.,1.0.art.t,ho AFF Advisorv1:2;:2j2sal

Monroe: AFF, 18 Fob 49)
.11rair.= (Ft

10.. Ethm„ri aat,j omb-LI-1nd fc..ards=31112) lirmor, (Ft

1,13nroc: An'', 3.7-24 Mar 49)

U. .12,11=t of -IL- Army uiiion Board (Ft Monroe:

AFF, 8 Mar 50)

12. Reporl. of ato.z. Army Policy ConiQranc,e

au.112z- ar. (Ft Monroe: AFF, .16-;29 Oct 51)

13. -Report of the aimaxl= kitizcjaaa ,on Amor an

Brldging -(Ft Monroe: 14FF, 24-30 Oct 51)

. 14. Tactics.ips,r, 211..U.L3. Lissi es (Ft Bliss, Tcx: AAecar

Br, The hrtillory school, 1952

hauQc....ts of,L T is (Royal

Canadian .rraored:Corps Journra, 1,1r.'y 1947)

, 132
 .164 Major Ci.:d P. Marriott, T ,aNytAta.n.1- Rr,gilont
(CP:nadian Army Journal, February 1948

17.-...Captain J. 'Sutherland, Artillery. la,th,(1.4.1w.at-

s.1.d.Bptit,m, (G:,nadian Army Journal, June 1948)-
:
18. Major H W. F. Appleton, 22a,Ca pc), S.Qz ,Figbter -
Tpnic (Canadian' tinny Journal, May 1950)

19 Major General C. A, L, DunPhie, Tnic

(Canadian Army Journal, .Au.gust 1947)

20. Captain Pierre Martel, Fieid Rockda

(Canadian Army Journal, Juno 1949)

2J. jjjj Infantry Cafeuer._- s Cc)nforrnen, October

9qo (from Subject Letter OW4FF, .dated 19 April 1951)

22 Willleara Von Loeb., Pefensc (Military Publishing

Service, 1943)

. Co-
23. Heinz .Guderian, Arrioreci For(-r,s Eacie st,hdr
operation -vvi h nt or ArmS (German Generals Series, DA
Historical Division, 850.27)

• 24. Major Warren R. Davidson,

trinps,.(Int _MR, May 1945)

25. Ge)._2D-,..2.0±,ical Doetri

Tpctisaj.,

(Eilitary Intelligence
Service', WD, Special Series #8, 20 Dec 1942)

26. Africa (Information Bulletin #20, Military in-

telligence Service, 1942)

27. iUllcvthe au (Special Series #6, 25

Nov 1942, WD Military Intelligence Division)

28. ,Peculiaritirs of Russian Warfare (German Report

Series, DA Historical Division)

29. tijij j1l3 R9erire; j_12 Psivau Systrn

Ejajantrv Division 0a-EE.4.1ID Report #22 14 Jan 1944)

30. Self Pyopollocl Artillery la Jac Rod Airniv

LID Report, 31 Doc 1943)

.31. Soviet Lizilicamd Vehicles d.AntitAnk: Wen6ons

(Intelligence Division, GS, USA DA)

. 133
 32. The Field Artillery Journal:
October 3.941,-'kit, .B.NattjQ
November 1941, Aryttin k Attack
November 1942, Ibs..) DevQ.pont of Soviet, Antitank
.
ripssingsl
March 1943, ammr,42, DO* nse
Jt= 1943, Dow:Toping,Luatani4

330 The Coast. Artillery Journal:

January and. February 1943, Zap...only AntitPnk zn.6.1 Tani
Tactics

34. Tactica). and Technical Trends:

September 1943
December 1943
October 1944
June 1943
January 1945
May 1945

35. idilitary Review:

September 1939, The„ Zni.....21,2mant nn -CnrnbPt licainst
Modern Tanks
September 1943,
October 1943, Trends in Tpnk
a Soviet aanaLliza, Ret,.....2u of P.. ,r.ca nkb Thrust, Zatara_nld
,November 1943, GerriPn System of Active Defense, Light
isat,LbLak Gun obile Obstp.cic, ,Building Reserves, Tank in Attack.
December 1943, 2fignaly_9, aja.t. in the. Defense -
Gron. p n SP .1.-rti11erv,, Frsyi-t llostwnrcl the 1ic 11,TPnk
Fighting, KhPrkov-Dnieper .
January 1944, Tnnk TPeticta, Ppfenail of -L12.ci, 2.0.r.yzrr_d Edge.
April 1944, „&o,ployrejyt,
- of.,,ssnultnte24:2,214CX.7a - ..
Fmnt.

36. The Infantry Jcurn.al: May and June 1943,

GrIrripmrt s Zt...2.a.,j__cP1. Doetrim.

37. Po cuments at Fart Knox: 36.6 -

.11,„ of SP fir_i11r with, it, 36.17 - Chnrngtoria-
tica c.d.d.Lntitacic 118,,4 rYW.,2
850.86 - Battle, jj j- sj ioter nf 2p
.=;_tic2aa, :LA 2222—
auk rs4usz....s..

38. .R,Dort oxt- Chnrr c,tor4tcs of slz.11=0:anialLIL1 Anti-

Airborne (AFF, 13 Lpril 1949)

39. ost 2hum AT Gun Tla -)11 CP rrin ge T66 (LIT

Bd #2, 27 Decauber 1950)

• - 134
 S 40: Antitank and other Surface to Surface Guided
AFF Board #4:
30 June 1949, Luirt,b,, 9.12,irtnriv Report of Guj..c3s qd,
dSSflDevbloci-lent, July 1949 -1,...lfcizzalc_tn to Gaidad.Llissiles)
October 1950 Chara ctoristi jssU,
20 Novariber 1951 iiilit,Prv Cractjj 1,Dx..:,ntitank Liftad.
iam,s.. Department of the -Army:, 31 Decamber 1950, Scoi-
P ra1Logress.Ronort,...guidialaa Pro gar.

41. Additional LilitPry Review References: Lay 1945,

Tcnk post-qrs in Eurcon, tjao hrtzaL2cfrnAo Burra:,
GfyrmPn Su-pr_opoiled- Juno 19453 Hc,,,,vv sraf-Dr,Daied
Guns in..2.
111 July 1945, Lodern Tank Battla„ Docan-,'
ber 1945 Antitrnk Do-Ponr3c Enthrvis, January 19463 Tanks Versus
v4ePprms, =.10ri3., 1946, llnlyit,Prik Defrnsp -in Of_____;._,,fonrin
Ppers, April 1947.3 1,nt,itnnk

•••

4, •

135,
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