B T H S C I: Efore HE Onorable Upreme Ourt OF Ndiana

I
5th AMITY NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022 PAGE NO.

TEAM CODE: 113
BEFORE THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
PETITION AND APPEAL INVOKED UNDER ARTICLE 32 AND 136 OF INDIANA

CONSTITUTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 351 OF 2020
SATAT VIKAS SANGH PETITIONER
STATE OF DEVBHOOMI RESPONDENT
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 5 OF 2022
STATE OF DEVBHOOMI
PROSECUTION
MR. TEJA SINGH & ORS. DEFENCE
COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

MEMORIAL FILED ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

II
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS...............................................................................................................
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES..................................................................................................................
TABLE OF CASES..........................................................................................................................VII
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION....................................................................................................XIII
STATEMENT OF FACTS................................................................................................................XIV
ISSUES PRESENTED......................................................................................................................XVI
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS.......................................................................................................XVII
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED.................................................................................................................
CONTENTION 1: THAT THE STATE LEGISLATURE OF DEVBHOOMI DOES NOT HAVE ANY
SPECIFIC POWER TO MAKE LAWS/POLICIES FOR DOMICILE-BASED RESERVATION..............1
1.1 That there is violation of Article 16(3)..............................................................................
1.2 The rationale of reservations in Educational Institutions cannot be extended to

private employment.................................................................................................................
1.3 That such powers if allowed to exist would be against the foundation of Indiana….......
CONTENTION 02: THAT THE STATE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT HAVE THE POWER TO
DIRECT EMPLOYERS OF PRIVATE SECTOR TO RESERVE JOBS FOR LOCAL CANDIDATES......3
2.2 That the State doesn’t have any such powers....................................................................
2.2 That such reservations if allowed would go against the Constitutional ethos...................
2.3 That such reservation if allowed to exist would directly and proximately interfere
with the freedom of trade.........................................................................................................
CONTENTION 03: THAT THE DEVBHOOMI STATE EMPLOYMENT OF LOCAL CANDIDATES

ACT, 2020 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL...........................................................................................5
3.1 The Act violates Article 14................................................................................................
3.2 The Act violates Article 16................................................................................................
3.3 The Act violates Article 19 (1) (g).....................................................................................

III
3.4 The Act violates Article 21..............................................................................................
CONTENTION 04: THAT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF THE OFFENCES U/S 147, 148, 149,
302, 307, 326, 120B AND 34 OF THE INDIANA PENAL CODE, 1860 AND THE HIGH COURT
OF DEVBHOOMI HAS ERRED IN ACQUITTING THEM..............................................................11
4.1 That the accused persons are guilty u/s 147 of IPC.........................................................
4.2 That the accused persons are guilty u/s 148 IPC.............................................................
4.4 That the accused persons are guilty u/s 120b IPC...........................................................
4.7 That the accused persons are liable to be punished u/s 302 IPC.....................................
4.8 That the accused persons cannot avail the Right to Private Defence..............................
4.9 That the accused persons are guilty u/s 34 IPC...............................................................
PRAYER FOR RELIEF................................................................................................................XVIII

IV
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATION EXTENSION
¶ Paragraph
Anr. Another
Cr. Criminal
ed. Edition
etc. Etcetera
Govt. Government
HC High Court
Hon’ble Honourable
i.e. that is
No. Number
Ors.. Others
S. Section
SC Supreme Court
S.C.C. Supreme Court Cases
U/S Under Section
v Versus

V
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES
S.NO STATUES PAGE CITED AT
01. The Constitution of India, 1949 Passim
02. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Passim
03. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 Passim
04. The Indian Penal Code, 1860 Passim
BOOKS AND DIGESTS
S.NO BOOKS AND DIGESTS EDITION PAGE CITED AT
Mahendra Pal Singh & VN. Shukla,

01. 13th Passim
Constitution of India
02. M.P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law 7th 9th
Will Circ, Principles of Circumstantial

03. 6th 17th
Evidence
J.V Ryan, The Law of Criminal Evidence in
04. - 18th
British India
05. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, Law of Crimes 26th Passim
06. K.I Vibhuti, PSA Pillai Criminal Law 13th Passim
Anirudh Krishnan & Harini Sudersan, Law of

07. 1st Passim
Reservation & Anti-Discrimination
ONLINE DATABASES AND DICTIONARY
S.NO ONLINE DATABASE PAGE CITED AT
01. www.jstor.org (JSTOR) Passim

VI
02. www.lexisadvance.in (LEXIS ADVANCE) Passim
03. www.livelaw.in (LIVE LAW) Passim
04. www.S.C.C.online.com (S.C.C. ONLINE) Passim
05. www.manupatrafast.com (MANUPATRA) Passim
S.
AUTHOR TITLE FORUM PAGE CITED AT
NO
Sons of Soil: A
Comparative
Constitutional or
Romit Constitutional Law
Convenient Federalism? An
01. Nandan & Administrative Passim
Analysis of the Haryana
Sahai Law Journal &
State Employment of Local
Blog
Candidates Bill, 2020
Reservation on the basis of
State Domicile: A Practice
Sankalp
02. Unfair to People and S.C.C. Online Blog Passim
Udgata
Unexpected of
Governments
India’s per-capita income
Press Trust
03. rises 6.8 per cent to Rs The Print 6th
of India
11,254 a month in FY20
Karnataka proposes to
provide 100% quota to
04. Scroll Staff Scroll.in 9th
Kannadigas in blue-collar
jobs in private sector
G. Implications of
Economic and
05. Thimmaia Reservations in Private 4th
Political Weekly
h Sector
ARTICLES

VII
TABLE OF CASES
S. Pg
CASE TITLE CITATION
No. No.
1. Abdul Karim v State of Maharashtra 1978 Cr LJ 1485 14
2. Ajay Hasia v Khalid Mujib 1(981) 1 S.C.C. 722 7
3. Amar Singh v State of Punjab (1953) S.C.R. 418 11
4. Amrik Singh v The State of Pepsu (1951) 3 Pepsu LR 635 17
5. Appu v State AIR 1971 Mad 194 18
6. Ashok Datta Naik v State 1979 CrLJ (NOC) 95 (Goa) 13
7. Ashok Kumar v State of Punjab AIR 1977 SC 109 19
8. Ashok Kumar v State of Haryana 2003 (2) S.C.C. 143 19
(1979) Cri LJ 1275, HC

9. Awadesh Mahto v State of Bihar 15
(Patna)
10. Badri v State of U.P. AIR 19953 All 189 16
11. Bakshish Singh v State of Punjab AIR 1971 SC 2016 18
12. Balbir Singh Balwant Singh v The State AIR 1959 P H 332 20
13. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India & Ors. 1984 AIR 802 9
14. Bhe Ram v State of Haryana IR 1980 SC 957 18
15. Bherusingh v State 1956 Madh BLJ 905 19
16. Bhupinder Sharma v State of H.P. 2003 (8) S.C.C. 551 19

VIII
17. Bidi Supply Co. v Union of India AIR 1956 SC 479 5
Board Of Trustees of The Port of Bombay v

18. 1983 AIR 109 10
Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nandkarni
19. Chahat Khan v State of Haryana AIR 1972 SC 2574 17
Commissioner of Income Tax v Patranu Dass

20. AIR 1982 16
Raja Ram Beri
21. Deo Narain v State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1973 SC 473 19
22. Dharmarajan v State 2014 CrLJ 3162 13
23. Dibia v State of U.P. AIR 1953 All 373 16
Dr. Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v The Chief

24. (2021) S.C.C. 362 7
Minister
25. Dr. Pradeep Jain v Union of India & Ors. 1984 AIR 1420 1
26. Gobind v State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. (1975) 2 S.C.C. 148 9
27. Gopal Naidu v Emperor AIR 1923 Mad 523 20
28. Hazarat Gul Khan v Emperor AIR 1928 Cal 430 17
29. In Choitano Ranto and Others AIR 1916 Mad 788 13
30. Indra Sawhney v Union of India AIR 1993 SC 477 6
31. Jagat Narain v State of Punjab 1979 Raj LW 192 13
32. Joseph Cheriyan v State AIR 1953 Tr & Coch 129 14
33. Khajah Noorul Hossein v C. Fabre-Tonnerre 24 WR 26, p 27 11
34. Koli Jesa Arjan v State (1988) 15 Rep 556 (Guj) 13

IX
35. Kuria v State of Rajasthan AIR 2013 SC 1085 19
36. Laxman v State of Maharashtra AIR 1974 SC 1803 17
37. Maiku v State AIR 1953 All 749 12
38. Maneka Gandhi v Union of India 1978 (2) SCR 621 6
2008 S.C.C. OnLine SC

39. Mangal Singh v Kishan Singh 16
1740
40. Masalti v State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1965 SC 202 11
41. Md. Idrish v State 2004 Cr LJ 1724 (Raj) 16
42. Md. Sharif & Anr. v Rex AIR 1950 All 380 16
43. Motor General Traders v State of A.P. (1984) 1 S.C.C. 222 6
44. Munney Khan v State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1971 SC 1491 20
45. Nagaraj v Union of India (2006) 8 S.C.C. 212 7
46. Nimba Ram & Ors. v State of Rajasthan 2018 S.C.C. OnLine Raj 123 11
Olga Tellis & Ors. v Bombay Municipal

47. 1986 AIR 180 10
Corporation
48. P.A. Inamdar v State of Maharashtra (2005) 6 S.C.C. 537 3
Pannalal Binjraj & Anr v The Union of India &

49. 1957 31 ITR 565 SC 7
Ors.
50. People v Aguilar (1997) 18 Cal.4th 1023 14
51. Prabhakar Rao H. Mawle v State of A.P. AIR 1965 SC 1827 6
52. Prabhu v State of Madhya Pradesh 2008(13) JT72 14 14
53. Pradeep Kumar v Union Administration 2006 (10) S.C.C. 608 19

X
Chandigarh
54. Priya Patel v State of M.P. 2006 (6) S.C.C. 263 19
55. Queen Empress v Niddha (1891) XIV 14 All 38 15
(1867) 4 Bom HCR (Cr Ca)

56. R v Francis Cassidy 15
17
57. Rajesh Kumar v Dharamvir AIR 1997 SC 3769 19
58. Ram Bilas Singh v State of Bihar (1964) 1 Cr LJ 573 11
59. Ramla v State of Rajasthan (1963) 1 CrLJ 387 14
60. Re Marimuthu Naidu & Ors. v. Unknown AIR 1923 Mad 606 12
61. Rohit Yadav v State of Bihar 2007 Cr LJ 202 (Pat 13
62. Sabir v Queen Empress (1894) ILR 22 Cal 276 13
63. Lalo Gulam Hussein Shaikh v State of Gujarat AIR 2016 SC 5101 12
64. Samaruddi v Emperor 40 ILR Cal 367 12
65. Santosh v State of Madhya Pradesh 1975 Cri LJ 602 (SC) 16
66 Satnarain Das &Ors. V Emperor AIR 1938 PATNA 518 20
67. Shajahan v State of Kerala (2007) 12 S.C.C. 96 20
68. Shaji v State of Kerala (2005) Cr LJ 3121 (Ker) 11
69. Shambu Nath Singh v State of Bihar AIR 1960 SC 725 13
70. Sheik Yusuf v Emperor AIR 1946 Pat 127 11
71. Sheo Prasad Bhor v State of Assam AIR 2007 SC 918 13

XI
72. State of Karnataka v Shiv Shankar (1978) 1 Kant LJ 197 (200) 20
73. State Of Karnataka v Union of India & Anr. 1978 AIR 68 2
74. State of Kerala v KJ Thomas, (1961) 1 Cr LJ 661 11
75. State of Kerela v N.M. Thomas AIR 1976 SC 490 8
State of Maharashtra v Balram Bama Patil &

76. AIR 1983 SC 305 15
Ors.
77. State of Maharashtra v Meyer Hans George AIR 1965 SC 722 16
78. State of Maharashtra v Bhairu Sattu Berad AIR 1956 Bom 609 16
79. State Of Rajasthan & Ors. v Union of India 1977 AIR 1361 2
80. State of West Bengal v Anwar Ali Sarkar 1952 AIR 75 6
81. State Of West Bengal v Union of India 1963 AIR 1241 2
82. State v Banamali Maharana 25 Cut LT 433 11
83. State v Dinakar Bandu (1969) 72 Bom LR 905 17
Sukhnandan Saran Dinesh Kumar & Ors. v

84. 1982 AIR 902 4
Union of India & Anr
85. Sundar Singh v State AIR 1955 All 232 13
Union of India & Ors.v FormulatOrs.

86. 2002 8 S.C.C. 410 17
Association of India
87. Union of India v Dudh Nath Prasad AIR 2000 SC 525 8
88. Upendra Nath v State (1968) Cut LT 226 11
89. V Narasimha Rao v State of A.P. (1969) 1 S.C.C. 839 1

XII
90. Venkatambbia v Crown AIR 1923 Mad 603 12
VN. Sunanda Reddy & Ors. v State Of Andhra

91. 1995 AIR 914 1
Pradesh & Ors.
92. Yogendra Moraji v State AIR 1980 SC 660 18

XIII
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The counsel on behalf of the petitioners humbly approach the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
Indiana under Article 32 and Article 136 of the Indiana Constitution.
ART. 32: REMEDIES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS CONFERRED BY THIS PART (PART
III OF THE CONSTITUTION)
1. The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement
of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
2. The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including
writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and
certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by this Part.
3. Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (1) and
(2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local
limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court
under clause (2).
4. The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise
provided for by this Constitution.
ART. 136: SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL BY THE SUPREME COURT
1. Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion,
grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or
order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of
India.
2. Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order
passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the
Armed Forces.

XIV
ISSUES PRESENTED
ISSUE 1
WHETHER THE STATE LEGISLATURE OF DEVBHOOMI HAS ANY SPECIFIC

POWER TO MAKE LAW/POLICIES FOR DOMICILE-BASED RESERVATIONS AND
IF YES, THEN TO WHAT EXTENT?
ISSUE 2
WHETHER THE STATE GOVERNMENT HAS THE POWER TO DIRECT THE

EMPLOYERS OF PRIVATE SECTOR TO RESERVE JOBS FOR LOCAL
CANDIDATES?
ISSUE 3
WHETHER THE DEVBHOOMI STATE EMPLOYMENT OF LOCAL CANDIDATES

ACT, 2020 IS CONSTITUTIONAL?
ISSUE 4
WHETHER THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF THE OFFENCE U/S 147, 148, 149, 302,
307, 326, 120B AND 34 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 AND THE HIGH COURT
OF DEVBHOOMI HAS ERRED IN ACQUITTING THEM?

5TH AMITY NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022 PAGE NO. 1
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
CONTENTION 1: THAT THE STATE LEGISLATURE OF DEVBHOOMI DOES NOT HAVE ANY
SPECIFIC POWER TO MAKE LAWS/POLICIES FOR DOMICILE-BASED RESERVATION.
It is humbly submitted that the state legislature of Devbhoomi doesn’t have any specific powers
to make laws/policies for domicile-based reservations since (1.1) there is a violation of Article
16(3), 1.2) that such powers if allowed to exist would be against the foundation of Indiana.
1.1 THAT THERE IS A VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 16(3).
1. It is submitted that under Article 16(3) of the Indian Constitution, the Parliament has the sole
power to make laws in a special case prescribing any requirement as to residence within a State
or Union territory prior to appointment, as a condition of employment in the State or Union
territory. Under article 35(a) this power is conferred upon Parliament but is denied to the
legislatures of the States,.35(a) is a notwithstanding provision
2. Confirming the same reasoning, Justice M Hidyatullah, in the case of AVS Narasimha Rao &
Ors. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. 1 said, “the legislative powers to create residential
qualification for employment is thus exclusively conferred on the Parliament and can make
laws regarding the same”. The implementation of this power of the parliament under Article
16(3) was witnessed when the Parliament enacted the Public Employment (Requirement as
to Residence) Act, 19572 aimed at abolishing all existing residence requirements in the states
and leaving exceptions for Andhra Pradesh, Manipur, Tripura and Himachal Pradesh.
3. Furthermore, in 1995, the Supreme Court, in the case of Sunanda Reddy v state of Andhra
Pradesh3, upheld the decision in Pradeep Jain v Union of India4 and struck down the policy
that allowed an extra 5% weightage in marks for candidates with Telugu as a medium of their
instruction. Thus, it is submitted that there is a violation of Article 16(3).
1.2 THE RATIONALE OF RESERVATIONS IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS CANNOT BE EXTENDED

TO PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT.
1
V Narasimha Rao v State of A.P. (1969) 1 S.C.C. 839.
2
The Public Employment (Requirement as to Residence) Act, 1957, No. 44, Acts of Parliament, 1957.
3
V.N. Sunanda Reddy & Ors. v State Of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. 1995 AIR 914.
4
Dr. Pradeep Jain v Union of India & Ors., 1984 AIR 1420 (hereafter referred to as Pradeep Jain).

4. It is humbly submitted that domicile-based reservations though are allowed in educational

institutions but they carry the rationale of giving back to the state. First, since the state finances
these colleges from taxpayers, they deserve a reciprocal benefit. Second, there is a high
possibility that the majority of the talent generated will be retained within the state leading to its
development. But such considerations do not translate into matters of private employment. No
taxpayer money is involved in the private firms, businesses, etc. Furthermore, there is no surety
of people employed in the private sector to remain in the same place forever and thus the same
rationale cannot be applied to private employment.
5. SOME UNIVERSITY HAVE APPLIED DOMICILE BASED RESERVATIONS BUT AT

THE END OF THE DAY SUCH UNIVERSITIES FALL UNDER UGC (*)WHICH IS A
CENTRAL AGENCY, WHO CONTROLS AND APPROVES THE ACT OF THE
UNIVERSITIES.
1.3 THAT SUCH POWERS IF ALLOWED TO EXIST WOULD BE AGAINST THE FOUNDATION OF
INDIANA.
6. It is humbly submitted that the Preamble of the Constitution of Indiana was framed with great
care and deliberation so that it reflects the high purpose and objective of the Constitution
makers.
7. YOUR HONOUR At a time when caste and religious-centered controversies are COMMON in
Indiana and communal riots due to religion, caste, creed, region, etc. are common in the nation,
giving such promotion to regional loyalty at the expense of national integrity serves as a blow
to the philosophy of our constitution.
8. It is humbly submitted that Article 1 of the Constitution proceeds to declare that Indiana shall
be a Union of States but emphasizes that though a Union of States, it is still one nation with one
citizenship. Part II recognizes only Indian citizenship; it does not recognise the citizenship of
any State forming a part of the Union.
9. In State of Karnataka v Union of India & Another,5the court stated that the Central
Government has the power to give direction to the State Government, doing so not because of
geographical or territorial unit reasons but because they are constitutionally empowered to do
so. Similarly, in the case of State of West Bengal v Union of India, 6 the Supreme Court held
that the Indian constitution does not promote a principle of absolute federalism and that “the
5
State Of Karnataka v Union of India & Anr, 1978 AIR 68.
6
State Of West Bengal v Union of India, 1963 AIR 1241.

central government is the final authority for any issue. The political power distributed between
both union and state government with greater weight given to the union government.” ( IF
THEY SAY KI SATATES KE PASS POWER HAI UNDER COOPERATIVE FEDARALISM
SO THEY CAN MAKE THIS CASE LAW SAYS KI THEY CANNOT )
10. In State of Rajasthan v Union of India,7 former Chief Justice Beg, stated that if our
constitution creates a central government that is amphibian in the sense that it can be either
federal or unitary according to the need of the situation and the circumstance of the case.
Furthermore, it is submitted that if such domicile-based discrimination is allowed, then a
contradicting paradigm would be created wherein the outsiders of a particular domicile who
have been vested the fundamental rights by virtue of their citizenship could be deprived of it
because of the state-created domicile-based discrimination. As mentioned earlier, doing so will
result in creating a parallel citizenship to the citizenship of Indiana which threatens the
foundational structure of cooperative federalism on which Indiana is based upon and thus such
powers if allowed would go against the foundation of Indiana. Hence, such reservations should
not be allowed.
CONTENTION 02: THE DEVBHOOMI STATE EMPLOYMENT OF LOCAL CANDIDATES ACT,

2020 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
11. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble bench that to be held unconstitutional, a statute must
either be in excess of legislative competence or because the matter offends some fundamental
rights. In the case at hand, The Devbhoomi State Employment of Local Candidates Act, 2020
(herein after referred to as “the Act”) is ultra vires as the state legislature is not the competent
authority to enact the said Act. Further, it also contravenes fundamental rights and mandatory
provisions in the Constitution. It is also contended that the provisions in the Act are vague,
unreasonable, and overboard in the following ways and hence is to be declared unconstitutional.
3.1 THE ACT VIOLATES ARTICLE 14.
12. It is submitted that the Act violates the right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution.
The Constitution of Indiana allows the classification of people/things for the purpose of
legislation for providing protection8 and ensuring equality.
7
State Of Rajasthan & Ors. v Union of India, 1977 AIR 1361.
8
Bidi Supply Co. v Union of India, AIR 1956 SC 479.

13. A legislative classification must be reasonable and must rest upon some substantial distinction
with a reasonable relation for which such classification is made.9 For a classification to be
reasonable two tests must be fulfilled: - (A) the classification must be founded on an intelligible
differentia and (B) the differentia must have a rational relation with the object sought to be
achieved by the statute in question.10 Further, (C) the classification must not be based on an
arbitrary foundation.11
14. THE CLASSIFICATION MADE IS NOT FOUNDED ON AN INTELLIGIBLE DIFFERENTIA : Intelligible

differentia is a test that uses rational/reasonable grounds to distinguish between people or
things. However, in the instant case, the distinction made between the native and the non–
natives for providing reservations in private jobs is unreasonable and thus does not have
intelligible differentia. It was held in Pradeep Jain that even valid discrimination based solely
on the residence cannot be sustained if it is unreasonable. The Act imposes a blanket and
unreasonable restriction on the employment of outsiders in all private jobs. Such blanket
restriction has been put in place without any deliberation on the purpose for prescribing such
classification between domiciles of the state and outsiders.
15. THAT THE CLASSIFICATION MADE HAS NO RATIONAL NEXUS WITH THE OBJECT SOUGHT TO
BE ACHIEVED BY THIS ACT: The basis of classification made by the state must be according to
the object of the law.12 The differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be
achieved by the statute in question.13 In the present case, the objective behind enacting the Act
was the upliftment of the unskilled natives by providing them jobs in the private sector,
however, no demarcation has been made between the skilled and unskilled workers of
Devbhoomi for the reservation making it unclear who will use these reservations for their
benefit.
16. The meaning of domicile was understood in the same sense in Union of India v Dudh Nath
Prasad14 where it was held that “residence” and “domicile” carry the same meaning, in as much
as both refer to the permanent home.
17. It is submitted that the only classification that is made the basis for the Act is 50,000 rupees.
However, this classification is also unreasonable as this pre-condition of remuneration operates
on the presumption that only factory and blue-collar jobs fall within it but in reality, the median
9
MAHENDRA PAL SINGH & VN. SHUKLA, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 52 (Eastern Book Company 2017).
10
Motor General Traders v State of A.P, (1984) 1 S.C.C. 222.
11
Maneka Gandhi v Union of India, 1978 (2) SCR 621 (hereafter referred as Maneka Gandhi).
12
Prabhakar Rao H. Mawle v State of A.P., AIR 1965 SC 1827.
13
State of West Bengal v Anwar Ali Sarkar, 1952 AIR 75.
14
Union of India v Dudh Nath Prasad AIR 2000 SC 525.

salary for Indiana’s population is below forty thousand rupees. 15 Thus, this classification
encompasses the majority of jobs. This arbitrary restriction on the outsiders in all private jobs
deprives them of their constitutional right to employment.
18. Further, the definition of local candidate merely mentions the word ‘domiciled’, which in itself
is a highly ambiguous term, even the Hon'ble Supreme Court has not been able to concretize the
definition, and if the standard definition of 'place of birth' is taken it would be violative of Art.
15(2) prima facie, alternatively if the accepted definition encompassing 'residence' is taken,
most of those migrant workers, whose influx the state government has mentioned in the
objective, would be eligible to be considered as Local Candidates.
19. THAT THE QUANTUM OF RESERVATION PROVIDED IS ARBITRARY: The Supreme Court in the
case of Indra Sawhney v Union of India 16 held that reservation under Art’s. 15(4) and 16(4)
should not exceed 50%. It should be held as a Constitutional prohibition and any reservation
beyond 50% would be liable to be struck down. The Court further opined that no provision of
reservation or preference can be so vigorously pursued as to destroy the very concept of
equality.
20. Furthermore, in M Nagaraj Vs Union of India, 17 a five-judge bench ruled that the ceiling of
50%, the concept of creamy layer and the compelling reasons, namely, backwardness, the
inadequacy of representation and overall administrative efficiency are all constitutional
requirements without which the structure of equality of opportunity in Article 16 would
collapse.
21. A five-judge Constitution Bench of the SC in Dr. Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v Chief Minister &
Ors.,18 struck down the Maharashtra law granting reservation to the Maratha community in
admissions and government jobs in the state in the Maratha quota case on May 5, 2021. The
court held that there is no need to revisit the Indra Sawhney case and the 50% ceiling, although
an arbitrary determination by the court in 1992, is now constitutionally recognized. It is
submitted that the 75% reservation imposed by the Act in the present case at hand is off the
reasonable limits and exceeds the cap laid down in the Indra Sawhney case. The reservation
granted to the natives under the Act is violative of the Constitutional provisions and cannot be
15
Press Trust of India, India's Per-Capita Income Rises 6.8 per cent to Rs 11,254 a Month in FY20, THE
PRINT (Jan. 7, 2020), https://theprint.in/economy/indias-per-capita-income-rises-6-8-per-cent-to-rs-11254-a-
month-in-fy20/346119/.
16
Indra Sawhney v Union of India; AIR 1993 SC 477 (hereafter referred as Indra Sawhney).
17
Nagaraj v Union of India, (2006) 8 S.C.C. 212.
18
Dr. Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v The Chief Minister, (2021) S.C.C. 362.

classified as an extraordinary situation and hence is to be struck down by this Hon’ble bench
being ultra vires to the Constitution.
22. It is submitted further that the act also confers arbitrary power upon the executive. The SC in
Pannalal Binjraj v Union of India 19 held that a statute that confers discretion on the executive
must furnish criteria or guidelines for the exercise of that discretion. Without such criteria or
guidelines, if the discretion in effect confers arbitrary power, the statute will be hit by Article
14 of the Constitution. Additionally in Ajay Hasia v Khalid Mujib Sehravardi20 the Court held
that wherever there is arbitrariness in State action – Article 14 must immediately spring into
action to strike down such state action. Article 14 is meant to strike back at arbitrariness
because any arbitrary action involves the negation of equality.
23. In the present case, the discretion of whether an employer’s claim regarding the non –
availability of desired local candidate for the job is true or false confers arbitrary power to the
designated officer, as he will have the sole authority to decide whether a particular employer
can be exempted from the reservation or not. This amounts to arbitrariness and hence is
violative of Article 14.
24. It is humbly submitted that in Pradeep Jain vs. Union of India, 21 the bench agreed to the fact
that the word ‘domicile’ in the general parlance refers to domicile “not in its technical legal
sense but in a popular sense as meaning residence and is intended to convey the idea of
intention to reside permanently or indefinitely.” The meaning of domicile was understood in
the same sense in Union of India v Dudh Nath Prasad22 where it was held that “residence” and
“domicile” carry the same meaning, in as much as both refer to the permanent home.
25. In the Act, the foundation already established in the above-mentioned cases is being followed
where Section 2(g) of the Act defines a local candidate as someone who is domiciled in the
state of Devbhoomi. Furthermore, the factual matrix uses the words “native”, “local resident”
and “domiciled” in the state of Devbhoomi quite loosely and interchangeably implying the
same meaning to all of these terms. Thus, it is humbly submitted that the understanding of the
word “domicile” with respect to the Act, implies the place of residence. Article 16 explicitly
19
Pannalal Binjraj & Anr v The Union of India & Ors., 1957 31 ITR 565 SC.
20
Ajay Hasia v Khalid Mujib, (1981) 1 S.C.C. 722 (hereafter referred as Ajay Hasia.)
21
Pradeep Jain v Union of India, (1984) 3 S.C.C. 654 (hereafter referred as Pradeep Jain).
22
Union of India v Dudh Nath Prasad AIR 2000 SC 525.

affirms that domicile discrimination is impermissible through its words that no discrimination is
allowed based on “place of birth” and/or “residence”.
26. Articles 14, 15, and 16 form the same thread ensuring the right to equality and supplementing
each other.23 By not adhering to any of these principles, the Act introduced by the state of
Devbhoomi is in contradiction to the constitutional ethos of the nation and thus should be held
invalid.
3.3 THE ACT VIOLATES ARTICLE 19 (1) (G).
27. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble bench that reservation by the State Government in a
private establishment violates Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of Indiana. By mandating
private institutions to employ a certain set of candidates, the Act constricts their right to carry
on their occupation freely.
28. The 93rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 2005 allowed the state to make provisions for the
advancement of socially and educationally backward citizens or SC/ST in matters relating to
admission in private educational institutions. However, the amendment does not give power to
the state to make such provisions for employment in private institutions and therefore, any law
in this regard lacks constitutional support. In 2016, the government of Karnataka proposed
100% reservation in blue collared jobs in private sector industries.24 It was contended that the
government may recommend the private sector to give preference to Kannadigas but they
cannot enforce any binding law upon recruiting locals on them.
29. The reservation policy imposed by Act effectively interferes with the Constitutional rights of
private enterprises to carry on their trade freely, especially when they do not receive any
Standard Operating Procedures from the government and the law also fails on constitutional
touchstone. The counsel for the petitioners most respectfully put forth before this Court that the
Act makes it imperative for the organizations to employ local candidates. Prima facie, the Act is
in utter violation of the rights of the employers.
30. This act also violates Article 19 (1)(e) as a person has a right to reside and settle in any part of
India. But this act restricts a person to exercise this right and settle in Devbhoomi because to
reside and settle at a place, employment is a must. But 75% of them being reserved doesn’t give
23
State of Kerela v N.M. Thomas, AIR 1976 SC 490, 10.
24
Scroll Staff, Karnataka proposes to provide 100% quota to Kannadigas in blue-collar jobs in private sector,
SCROLL.IN, Dec 22, 2016, https://scroll.in/latest/824889/karnataka-proposes-to-provide-100-quota-to-
kannadigas-in-blue-collar-jobs-in-private-sector.

them a reasonable opportunity to secure a job and settle in Devbhoomi and thus violating
Article 19 (1)(e).
31. It is humbly submitted by the counsel for the Petitioner that the Act violates the right to live
with dignity of the people enshrined under Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. The liberty of an
individual is a matter of fundamental natural law, a private preserve, and must be safeguarded
from unnecessary interference.25 The scope of Art. 21 is very broad and it covers every aspect
which is required for an individual to live a healthy and secure life.26
32. In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India, 27 characterizing Art. 21 as the heart of
fundamental rights, Bhagwati J. observed: “It is the fundamental right of everyone in this
country to live with human dignity free from exploitation. It must include protection of the
health and strength of workers, men and women…, opportunities and facilities for children to
develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity, educational facilities,
just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief”.
33. In the present case, if 75% reserved employment of local candidates whose gross monthly
salary is not more than 50,0000 is to be made effective, it would mean that the employers (to
escape the punitive fines) would have to lay off the non-native people working at present in the
said category which violates their human dignity. To be noted is also the fact that no provisions
are made to restore the position of the laid-off employees.
34. Article 21 also includes the right to livelihood. The Court, in Board of Trustees of the Port of
Bombay v Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nandkarni,28 came to hold that ‘the right to life’
guaranteed by Article 21 includes ‘the right to livelihood’. In The Olga Tellis v Bombay
Municipal Corporation,29 a five-judge bench of the Court implied that the right to livelihood is
borne out of the right to life. The Court further observed: “The sweep of the right to life
conferred by Art.21 is wide and far-reaching. An equally important facet of the right to life is
the right to livelihood because no person can live without the means of livelihood.”
35. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that by implementing such domicile-based
reservations, a direct implication would be that people from other states would not be able to
25
Gobind v State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors., (1975) 2 S.C.C. 148.
26
M P JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1131, (7th ed, Lexis Nexis - 2017).
27
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India & Ors., 1984 AIR 802.
28
Board Of Trustees of The Port of Bombay v Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nandkarni, 1983 AIR 109.
29
Olga Tellis & Ors. v Bombay Municipal Corporation, 1986 AIR 180.

seek employment in Devbhoomi since there’s active discrimination working against them by
the state violating their right to livelihood.
CONTENTION 03: THAT THE STATE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT HAVE THE POWER TO
DIRECT EMPLOYERS OF PRIVATE SECTOR TO RESERVE JOBS FOR LOCAL CANDIDATES.
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble bench that the constitution does not have any
provision for domicile-based reservations in employment for the private sector since (2.1) that
the State does not have any such powers, (2.2) that such reservations if allowed would go
against the Constitutional ethos and (2.3) that such reservation if allowed to exist would directly
and proximately interfere with the freedom of trade.
2.1 THAT THE STATE DOES NOT HAVE ANY SUCH POWERS.
36. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble bench that through the 93rd Constitutional
Amendment of 2005,30 the State was allowed to implement reservations in private unaided
educational institutions for greater access of quality higher education to SC/STs. However, it
did not provide for reservations of employment in private companies. Thus, private companies
which are not aided by the government or fall under the public domain cannot be forced to
select candidates on any other ground.
37. Domicile-based reservations in educational institutions whether aided by the government or not
are commonplace but they carry the rationale of giving back to the state that cannot be extended
to private sector employment as has already explained earlier. Furthermore, the SC in the case,
P.A. Inamdar v State of Maharashtra31 held that paucity of resources in government
institutions cannot be a reason for forcing private institutions to implement reservation policies.
Thus, the state doesn’t have any power to enact such reservations.
2.2 THAT SUCH RESERVATION, IF ALLOWED, WOULD GO AGAINST THE CONSTITUTIONAL

ETHOS.
38. It is humbly submitted that the power to create domicile-based reservations in private sector if
provided to the state would go against the constitutional ethos of article 19(1)(g). In
Sukhnandan Saran Dinesh Kumar v Union of India, 32 the SC observed that if a restriction on
30
The Constitution (Ninety Third Amendment) Act, 2005, NO. 93, Acts of Parliament, 2005.
31
P.A. Inamdar v State of Maharashtra, (2005) 6 S.C.C. 537.
32
Sukhnandan Saran Dinesh Kumar & Ors. v Unionof India & Anr, 1982 AIR 902.

trade directly and proximately interferes with the freedom of trade, it becomes challengeable
under Article 19(1)(g).
39. Under Article 19(1)(g), all citizens have a fundamental right to practice any profession, or to
carry on any occupation, trade or business as a fundamental right. Mandating private
institutions to employ a certain set of candidates constricts the right to carry on their occupation
freely. A reservation policy in the private sector imposes regulation on the selection process and
the standard yardsticks for selection takes away the freedom which the private enterprises enjoy
and thus violating constitutional ethos.
2.3. THAT SUCH RESERVATION, IF ALLOWED TO EXIST, WOULD DIRECTLY AND PROXIMATELY
INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF TRADE.
40. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble bench that along with violating the constitutional
ethos, such reservations come with extreme economic implications which are contrary to the
interests of the natives of the state, the outsiders as well as the nation. Rahul Bajaj, chairman of
Bajaj Auto, wrote an article 33 opposing any imposition of reservation policy on the private
sector. He argued that such reservations will harm merit and the private sector has already
given one-third of jobs to the SC/STs and OBCs on merit, without any discrimination. It is
submitted that reservations would directly and proximately interfere with the employers' right
to freedom of trade in the following ways:
41. REDUCED MOBILITY OF LABOUR: Restricting the sources of employment would mean that
more time would be required to find candidates. This would make businesses inelastic if they
would want to upscale their operations which would in turn, disrupt and dismantle the entire
wheel of the economy by gravely reducing the mobility and free flow of labour.
42. COMPANIES FORCED TO EITHER SKILL OR THEIR EFFICIENCY: In this era where scouting for
global talent is the key to gaining competitive advantage, the short-sighted and ill-informed
strategy severely robs the private companies of their freedom to recruit employees as per their
needs. Under such circumstances, the companies are either forced to sacrifice skill or their
efficiency.
43. COMPANIES FORCED TO EITHER OPT FOR CAPITAL INTENSIVE METHODS OR TO LEAVE
DEVBHOOMI: It is further submitted that companies hire when they are assured of the suitability
of the candidate and then further invest in the upgradation of their skills. However, because of
33
G. Thimmaiah, Implications of Reservations in Private Sector, 40, Economic and Political Weekly 8 (2005).

reservations they will be forced to invest substantially in advance which would increase the cost
of labour. This has the potential to backfire as companies would now be forced to either opt for
capital-intensive methods or leave the state of Devbhoomi destroying the already existing jobs
too. Furthermore, several small businesses would entirely run out of business since they
wouldn’t have the resources to do either of these.
44. ANTITHETICAL TO A BOOMING BUSINESS REGIME: It is humbly submitted that reserving jobs in
the private sector is also a delegation of the state government's duty to invest in and improve the
skill-based or vocational education and training of its people; the result of which is a trade-off
where an employer can either incur costs and bear risks of skill upgradation of an unfamiliar
candidate or compromise in talent. Such a law is antithetical to a booming business regime and
can over time, kill the pace of economic growth and private investments leading to a pit hole of
unemployment and poverty. Thus, such reservations would interfere directly and proximately
with the freedom of trade.
45.
CONTENTION 04: THAT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF THE OFFENCE U/S 147, 148, 149,
302, 307, 326, 120B AND 34 OF THE INDIANA PENAL CODE, 1860 AND THE HIGH COURT
OF DEVBHOOMI HAS ERRED IN ACQUITTING THEM.
46. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that the acquittal of the accused persons by the
Hon’ble High court is not justified as the acts of the accused persons were unlawful and
punishable u/s 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 326, 120B and 34 of the Indiana Penal Code.
4.1 THE ACCUSED PERSONS ARE GUILTY U/S 147 IPC.
47. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble bench that the four accused persons can be held
guilty for rioting u/s 147 if the essentials u/s 146 are fulfilled. It is humbly submitted that there
was an unlawful assembly that used force and violence in prosecution of a common object.
48. There was an unlawful assembly: To constitute an ‘unlawful assembly’, it should be established
that there was an unlawful assembly of five or more persons, 34 who have a common object
among35 the five specified u/s 141.36 In the present case, Mr. Teja Singh was accompanied by
34
Khajah Noorul Hossein v C. Fabre-Tonnerre, 24 WR 26, p 27; Masalti v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC
202; State v Banamali Maharana, 25 Cut LT 433; State of Kerala v KJ Thomas, (1961) 1 Cr LJ 661; Upendra
Nath v State, (1968) Cut LT 226.
35
Amar Singh v State of Punjab, (1953) S.C.R. 418.
36
Sheik Yusuf v Emperor, AIR 1946 Pat 127.

25 armed personnel to Uchihar. Out of these 25-armed personnel, Mr. Teja Singh, Mr. Kalia,
Mr. Vibhuti Mr. Ranga and 7 others are guilty of the offences committed. Thus, the first pre-
requisite that there must be 5 or more people is fulfilled. In Ram Bilas Singh v State of Bihar,37
the Supreme Court concluded that there would be an unlawful assembly of five or more
persons, even if less than that number have been convicted by it owing to the fact that all of
them couldn’t be identified.
49. It is further submitted that there should exist a common objective that must fall under the five
clauses mentioned u/s 141 IPC. The first clause is resistance to the execution of law or legal
process and the fifth clause is by means of criminal force or show of criminal force to compel
any person to do what he is not legally bound to do or omit to do what he is legally entitled to
do. It is submitted that both of these clauses apply in the present case.
50. In Nimba Ram & Ors. vs State of Rajasthan,38 the common object has to be essentially inferred
from the facts and circumstances of each case, the nature and number of injuries inflicted, the
manner of executing the common object and so on. It can also be ascertained from the acts and
language of the members of the assembly, their behavior at or near the scene of the incident,
and their course of conduct. It is submitted that when we apply these aforementioned tests in
the present case it can be laid out that the common object of the unlawful assembly was to
instigate violence in an otherwise peaceful protest which the protestors are legally entitled to,
create chaos, disharmony and stifle the dissent.
51. It is humbly submitted that the accused knew of massive protests being held to prevent the
Chief Minister to enter Uchihar. If the primary motive was to reach the destination safely, the
accused could’ve taken any other route but they remained insistent to go into the angry crowd
despite DSP S.P Pandey warning them against doing so due to security reasons. Furthermore,
the language used by Mr. Kalia, “how to deal with this disorderly conduct of protestors”
conveys how their primary concern was to “deal” with the protestors and not to reach their
destination safely.
52. Additionally, the statement of PW 1 confirms the preparation that the accused had done to
achieve the common object as the accused seemed well prepared to create such a situation of
violence. It is further submitted that the third essential: the common object of the unlawful
assembly in the present case is falling u/s 141(1), (2), and clause (3).
37
Ram Bilas Singh v State of Bihar, (1964) 1 Cr LJ 573; Shaji v State of Kerala, (2005) Cr LJ 3121 (Ker).
38
Nimba Ram & Ors. v State of Rajasthan, 2018 S.C.C. OnLine Raj 1237.

53. THERE WAS THE USE OF FORCE AND VIOLENCE AND SUCH VIOLENCE WAS IN PROSECUTION OF A
COMMON OBJECT: The word “force”39 in section 146 of the IPC, has to be understood as defined
in the Bluebook Dictionary, “Strength exerted on an object, power, impetus”. “Violence”40 is a
word of wider import than “force” and includes force used against inanimate objects also. 41 In
the present case, Mr. Teja and his armed personnel forcefully removed the barricades, ensued
violence and force by threatening the protestors with armed weapons. Furthermore, accelerating
a car at maximum speed among hundreds of protestors and open firing at them all encapsulates
under force and violence which was ensued to obtain the above proved unlawful object.
54. Thus, all the essentials are being met fairly and all the accused are guilty of rioting and should
be punished as per punishment laid u/s 147 of IPC.
4.2 THAT THE ACCUSED PERSONS ARE GUILTY U/S 148 IPC.
55. It is submitted that to constitute an offence under Section 148, a person must be a member of
such an unlawful assembly which along with being guilty of the offence of rioting under
Section 146 is also armed with a deadly weapon.
56. Where members of unlawful assembly carry arms with a common object, it is immaterial
whether all the arms carried by all accused persons were used or not. 42 In the present case, all
the accused were carrying pistols and arms, and those arms were used for inflicting violence
which can be corroborated with factual matrix, witness statements (Annexure: 05), First
Information Report (FIR) (Annexure 02) and Forensic Report (Annexure 04). Thus, the accused
persons are guilty u/s 148 IPC.
4.3 THAT THE SECTION 149 IPC IS APPLICABLE.
57. It is submitted that s.149 propounds a vicarious liability in two contingencies by declaring that
if a member of an unlawful assembly commits an offence in prosecution of the common object
of that assembly, then every member of such unlawful assembly is guilty of the offence
committed by the other members of the unlawful assembly. 43 Further, mere knowledge of the
39
Force, BLUEBOOK DICTIONARY, (21st ed. 2020).
40
Violence, BLUEBOOK DICTIONARY, (21st ed. 2020).
41
Maiku v State, AIR 1953 All 749; Samaruddi v Emperor, 40 ILR Cal 367; Re Marimuthu Naidu, AIR 1923
Mad 606; Venkatambbia v Crown, AIR 1923 Mad 603.
42
Saddik @ Lalo Gulam Hussein Shaikh v State of Gujarat, AIR 2016 SC 5101.
43
Sundar Singh v State, AIR 1955 All 232; Sabir v Queen Empress, (1894) ILR 22 Cal 276; In re Choitano
Ranto and Others, AIR 1916 Mad 788 15; Shambu Nath Singh v State of Bihar, AIR 1960 SC 725.

likely commission of an act or the commission of the offence by any member of unlawful
assembly also attracts the provision of section 149, IPC.44
58. In Sheo Prasad Bhor v State of Assam,45 it was held that when a charge under section 149, IPC
is made, each accused don't need to be assigned an independent part played in the beating. If it
is found that one of them was a member of the unlawful assembly which ultimately caused the
death of the deceased, then all who were members of the unlawful assembly can be held liable
and convicted.
59. Similarly, in the present case, the offence of murder and grievous hurt committed was in the
prosecution of a common object and even if an individual act cannot be assigned to every
member, the fact that they all had knowledge of the likely consequences of open firing at the
crowd and accelerating the car in the crowd makes all the 11 accused persons liable under
Section 149 IPC.
4.4 THAT THE ACCUSED PERSONS ARE GUILTY U/S 120B.
60. It is submitted that the essential ingredients of Criminal Conspiracy u/s 120B are an agreement
between two or more persons which relates to doing or causing to be done either an illegal act
or an act that is not illegal in itself but is done by illegal means.
61. An offence u/s 120B IPC does not require that the act of agreement take any particular form
and the fact of agreement may be communicated by words or conduct. 46 It is also not necessary
that each member of the conspiracy must know all the details of the conspiracy. It is humbly
submitted that despite one’s not making any overt act, if he is found to be a party, that is to say,
he had agreed to the common design and had not resiled he is guilty of conspiracy.47
62. It is submitted that in this instant case, Mr. Teja was stopped by the DSP Uchihar Mr. S.P
Pandey so that the peace can be maintained but the accused forcefully removed the barricades,
accelerated the car and mowed down protestors, killing three and grievously hurting many
others. He gave the order to his associates not to stop whatever and whoever comes in between
them and all of his associates followed those instructions thus, participating in the overt act
with the shared agreement to cause harm and create chaos. Thus, the accused should be held
guilty u/s 120B of IPC.
44
Rohit Yadav v State of Bihar, 2007 Cr LJ 202 (Pat); Koli Jesa Arjan v State, (1988) 15 Rep 556 (Guj).
45
Sheo Prasad Bhor v State of Assam, AIR 2007 SC 918.
46
Dharmarajan v State, 2014 CrLJ 3162.
47
Ashok Datta Naik v State, 1979 CrLJ (NOC) 95 (Goa); Jagat Narain v State of Punjab, 1979 Raj LW 192.

63. It is humbly submitted that all the accused are guilty of voluntarily causing grievous hurt by
dangerous weapons or means to the protestors, thereby being an offender u/s 326 of IPC.
64. VOLUNTARILY CAUSING GRIEVOUS HURT: The act of voluntarily causing grievous hurt has
been defined under Section 322. Intention to cause hurt, or knowledge that an act is likely to
cause hurt is the most decisive factor to decide whether a person can be held guilty of
voluntarily causing hurt.48
65. It is submitted that in the present case, the accused had the knowledge that if they would
accelerate the car in a heavily crowded place, it is bound to hit and maw down people. The
accused’s intention can clearly be interpreted from the words “do not stop the car no matter
what or who comes in front of the car”. Thus, it is ascertained that all the accused had the
knowledge and intention to cause grievous hurt.
66. THE HURT CAUSED IS GRIEVOUS: Grievous hurt is hurt of an aggravated form. Section 320
states specify the nature of injuries that can be categorized as ‘grievous hurt’. The eighth clause
u/s 320 is a general clause that covers all injuries which endanger life 49 or which caused bodily
pain or disrupted a person’s routine activity for twenty days or more. It can be clearly seen from
factual matrix50 that the protestors were severely injured in the clash.
67. GRIEVOUS HURT BY DANGEROUS WEAPON OR MEANS: It is humbly submitted that dangerous
weapons under section 326 IPC cover even instruments which are not designed for use as
weapons, but are capable of being used as weapons. No generalisation can be made about what
constitutes a ‘dangerous weapon’. It needs to be ascertained in the light of the facts of each
case.51
68. Further, it also includes causing hurt by dangerous means. In People v Aguilar52 it was observed
that a car can be considered a deadly weapon insofar as it is an instrument that can be used in a
way to cause substantial, significant or great bodily injury or death, so it can be classified as a
deadly weapon. Perusal of the facts, it can be seen that the car was used as a weapon to inflict
grievous hurt and thus all the essentials of grievous hurt are fulfilled making the accused
persons liable u/s 326 of IPC.
48
Abdul Karim v State of Maharashtra, 1978 Cr LJ 1485; Joseph Cheriyan v State, AIR 1953 Tr & Coch 129.
49
Ramla v State of Rajasthan, (1963) 1 CrLJ 387.
50
Factual Matrix, para. 20th, 1st line.
51
Prabhu v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2008(13) JT72 14.
52
People v Aguilar (1997) 18 Cal.4th 1023.

69. It is further submitted before the Hon’ble bench that the accused persons are guilty of an
unlawful offence u/s 307 of IPC. In State of Maharashtra v Balram Bama Pate 53 the Supreme
Court held that the injury caused to the victim doesn't need to be sufficient to cause the death.
What the Court has to see is whether the act was done with the intention or knowledge and
under circumstances mentioned in this section.
70. THE INTENTION: It is submitted that whether the accused person intended to commit murder of
another may be traced in his acts, and attended to facts and circumstances. The type of weapons
he carried and the nature and situs of injury inflicted by him may be of great assistance to the
court for ascertaining his “intention”. Intention may also be gathered from the words uttered, if
any, at the time of the incident, motive of the accused, and severity of the blows given, etc.
71. In the present case following two instances clearly point out the intention of the accused to
instigate violence amongst the protestors and to go to any extent to cause grievous hurt or death
so that their common objective can be fulfilled.
72. Firstly, Mr. Kalia and Mr. Ranga ask the protestors to step back or their one negligent act could
cause the life of hundreds. Secondly, Mr. Teja directs his associates to accelerate the car
amongst the heavy crowd at maximum speed and not stop whatever or whoever comes in
between and finally, the Act of the accused persons firing at the crowd of protestors from close
quarters points further toward the intention for an attempt to murder. If the intention would
have been to safeguard their selves and escape the danger, warning shots in the air would have
been fired and not directly at the protestors.
73. THE ACT: In the case of Awadesh Mahto v State of Bihar,54 for a charge of attempted murder
u/s 307 IPC, the accused must discharge or fire the firearm and if the shot misses or the weapon
malfunctions he nevertheless has committed an act capable of causing death under s 307. It is
submitted that in the present case, after hitting three men when Mr. Teja’s vehicle crashes into
the divider. Mr. Teja, Mr. Vibhuti and three other associates stepped out of the car with
licensed arms and started to open fire at the protestors.
74. It was held by the SC in the case of Mangal Singh v Kishan Singh55 that a firearm shot missing
the victim would fall u/s 307 of IPC. Similarly in the present case, the founding 9 bullet shells
53
State of Maharashtra v Balram Bama Patil & Ors., AIR 1983 SC 305.
54
Awadesh Mahto v State of Bihar (1979) Cri LJ 1275, HC (Patna); R v Francis Cassidy (1867) 4 Bom HCR
(Cr Ca) 17, HC (Bom); Queen Empress v Niddha (1891) XIV 14 All 38, HC (All).
55
Mangal Singh v Kishan Singh, 2008 S.C.C. OnLine SC 1740.

clearly imply that these shots were fired at the crowd with the intention to cause death or such
grave harm which is likely to cause death. Thus, the accused persons should be held guilty u/s
307 IPC.
4.7 THAT THE ACCUSED ARE LIABLE TO BE PUNSIHED U/S 302 IPC.
75. It is humbly contended that the accused is guilty of committing the offence of murder under Sec
302 IPC keeping in consideration the essentials u/s 300 IPC. The Petitioner humbly contends
that both, the actus reus and the mens rea of the crime are established in the instant matter,
negating any claims of private defense.
76. MENS REA IS PROVEN: Mens rea is considered as guilty intention, 56 which is proved or inferred
from the acts of the accused.57 It is submitted that the intention to kill is established in light of
the clear-cut motive of the accused & preparation of the accused.
77. THE ACCUSED HAD KNOWLEDGE : In Santosh v State of Madhya Pradesh,58 it was held that
mere knowledge that natural and probable consequences of an act would be death will suffice
for a conviction u/s 302 of IPC. It is submitted that causing a serious injury on a vital part of the
body of the deceased with a dangerous weapon leads to the inference that the accused intended
to cause death or bodily injury sufficient to cause the death of the victim. 59 Given that the
accused shot the victim in the left part of the chest 60 and ran the car over the protestors, injuring
vital parts of the body, it is logical to conclude that they knew that the natural and probable
consequence of their act was death.
78. THE ACCUSED HAD MOTIVE TO KILL: S.8 of The Indiana Evidence Act61 stipulates that any fact
is relevant which shows or constitutes motive or preparation. Motive can be abridged as
“something so operating upon the mind as to induce or tend towards inducing a particular act or
course of conduct.62 In Hazarat Gul Khan v Emperor,63 it was held that motive, though not a
sine qua non for bringing the offence of murder home to the accused, is relevant and important
on the question of intention. Furthermore, if a person kills another under the pretext of self-
56
Commissioner of Income Tax v Patranu Dass Raja Ram Beri, AIR 1982.
57
State of Maharashtra v Meyer Hans George, AIR 1965 SC 722.
58
Santosh v State of Madhya Pradesh, 1975 Cri LJ 602 (SC).
59
Md. Idrish v State, 2004 Cr LJ 1724 (Raj); Md. Sharif & Anr. v Rex, AIR 1950 All 380; Badri v State of
U.P., AIR 19953 All 189; Dibia v State of U.P., AIR 1953 All 373, State of Maharashtra v Bhairu Sattu Berad,
AIR 1956 Bom 609.
60
Fact Matrix (Annexure 06, Part A).
61
Indian Evidence Act, 1872, No. 01, Acts of Parliament, 1872.
62
WILL CIRC, PRINCIPLES OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, 57, (6th ed.).
63
Hazarat Gul Khan v Emperor, AIR 1928 Cal 430.

defense, it is essential to consider whether his real motive was to save his own life or to take
cruel revenge upon a man whom he found in his power. It is further pertinent to note that if
there is a motive in doing an act, then the adequacy of that motive is not in all cases necessary.
Heinous offences have been committed for very slight motive.64 In the present case, it can be
established that the motive of the accused was to stifle the descent and teach a lesson to the
protestors through force and might.
79. THE ACCUSED HAD INTENTION TO KILL: It is presumed that every sane person intends the result
that his action will produce and if a person hits another on a vulnerable part of the body, and
death occurs as a result, the intention of the accused can be no other than to take the life of the
victim and the offence committed is murder.65 The intention to kill can be inferred from the
murder and the nature of the injuries caused to the victim. 66 In Chahat Khan v State of
Haryana67 it was held that When injuries are inflicted on vital parts of the body like the
abdomen by a lethal or sharp-edged weapon, the irresistible inference is that the accused
intended to kill the deceased. Similarly in the present case, the accused gruesomely mowed
down three people under their car and even open fired at the crowd leading to one death due to
a gunshot clearly points out that the accused had intention to kill.
80. PREPARATION OF THE ACCUSED: The SC of India interpreted the word “Preparation” not only
as of the action or process of preparing the components to produce the compound but also as
that which it is prepared68 Though preparation by itself is not punishable and is irrelevant if the
offence is not committed or is not even attempted, preparation is proof of premeditation69 where
the offence or its attempt is committed.
81. In Appu v State,70 it was held that the fact that the 4 accused brought a bar made of iron and a
pair of pincers it amounted to preparation on the part of the accused. Which clearly showed an
intention to commit the offence of burglary. Similarly in the present case, the fact that Teja
Singh was accompanied by 25 armed personals along with the heavy ammunition clearly points
towards the intention to instigate violence and suppress the dissent. The same can be
corroborated from the confessional statement of PW (1).
64
State v Dinakar Bandu, (1969) 72 Bom LR 905.
65
Amrik Singh v The State of Pepsu, (1951) 3 Pepsu LR 635.
66
Laxman v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 1803.
67
Chahat Khan v State of Haryana, AIR 1972 SC 2574.
68
Union of India & Ors. v Formulators Association of India, 2002 8 S.C.C. 410.
69
J V RYAN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE IN BRITISH INDIA, 15 (1912).
70
Appu v State, AIR 1971 Mad 194.

82. ACTUS REA IS PROVEN: It is humbly submitted that in the instant case, the actus reus is
established by way of factual matrix and witness statements. The circumstantial evidence in the
instant matter shows that within all human probability, the act must have been done by the
accused.71
83. On the morning of 24th May, 2020, as per PW (5) and the factual matrix, Mr. Teja asked Kalia
to forcefully removed the barricades after a brief argument with the officer. According to the
confessional statement of PW 4, the accused, Vibhuti Singh, ran the car over the protestors
leading to the deaths of three protestors. Further, post this as per PW 3, Teja Singh opened fire
at the crowd, leading to the death of the reporter, Prashant Tamde, reaffirmed by the post
mortem report which clearly lays down that the death was caused by a gunshot wound.
84. In a case where murder was caused in the prosecution of rioting, it is not required for the
accused to be assigned a specific over act, all the accused will be liable who are sharing the
membership of the unlawful assembly and have the same unlawful objective. 72 Thus, all the
accused persons should be held guilty u/s 302 IPC.
4.8 THAT THE SECTION 34 IPC IS APPLICABLE.
85. It is humbly submitted that ordinarily, every man is responsible criminally for a criminal act
done by him. However, s.34 of IPC makes an exception to this principle and lays down the
principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act. The soul of section 34 IPC is the joint
liability in doing a criminal act.73
86. As observed in Ashok Kumar v State of Punjab74 the existence of a common intention amongst
the participants in a crime is the essential element for the application of this section. To
constitute common intention, it is necessary that the intention of each one of them was known
to the rest of them and was shared by them. 75 It was held in Bherusingh v State76 that when the
accused persons tried to escape after attacking the victim which caused his death, they act in
close concert and harbour the common intention of beating the deceased which falls u/s 34 IPC.
87. Similarly in the present case, the accused drove together in a convoy to the place of the event.
That the accused had the common intention in committing the crime has already been
71
Bakshish Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1971 SC 2016.
72
Bhe Ram v State of Haryana, IR 1980 SC 957.
73
Kuria v State of Rajasthan, AIR 2013 SC 1085.
74
Ashok Kumar v State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 109.
75
Pradeep Kumar v Union Administration Chandigarh, 2006 (10) S.C.C. 608; Ashok Kumar v State of Haryana,
2003 (2) S.C.C. 143; Bhupinder Sharma v State of H.P. 2003 (8) S.C.C. 551; Priya Patel v State of M.P, 2006
(6) S.C.C. 263.
76
Bherusingh v State, 1956 Madh BLJ 905.

established through the accompanying circumstances, behaviour and statement of witnesses.

After committing the act, the accused also fled from the crime scene together. All of this points
towards their joint liability towards committing the act and thus the accused should be held
guilty u/s 34 of the IPC.
4.9 THAT THE ACCUSED PERSONS CANNOT AVAIL THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE DEFENCE.
88. It is humbly submitted that the private defence is exercised only to repel unlawful aggression77
and not to punish the aggressor for the offence committed by him. 78 It is preventive in nature
and not punitive. Its exercise cannot be vindictive or malicious 79 and it does not include the
right to launch an offensive attack.80
89. It is further submitted to attract the application of s. 100, the foremost essential that needs to be
fulfilled is that there must be no safe or reasonable mode of escape by retreat. 81 However, in the
present case, the imminent danger in the present case could have been avoided. The accused
should have tried the other possible routes or they should have opted for another safe way to
escape.
90. Another requisite is that the person exercising the right of private defense must be free from
fault in bringing about the encounter.82 However, in the present case the accused argued with
DSP and forcefully removed the barricades bringing about the encounter. It has already been
established they reached the incident place to instigate violence and stifle dissent with help of
force and violence. Thus, they are not free from fault and thus cannot avail private defence.
91. Third requisite is that there must have been a necessity for taking the life. 83 However, instead of
open firing, the accused could have fired a warning shot, or at the very least, fired at some other
part of the body. It is thus apparent that there was no necessity for taking a life and further an
act in lieu of private defence must be done with a bona fide intent and without any unnecessary
force or violence.84 Furthermore, there can be no right of private defence where the riot is
premeditated on both sides.85 In the present case, the entire thing was pre-planned and the
accused share no bona fide intent, and thus shouldn’t be given a defense of private defense.
77
Rajesh Kumar v Dharamvir, AIR 1997 SC 3769.
78
Deo Narain v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1973 SC 473.
79
Munney Khan v State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1971 SC 1491.
80
Shajahan v State of Kerala, (2007) 12 S.C.C. 96.
81
Yogendra Moraji v State, AIR 1980 SC 660.
82
Balbir Singh Balwant Singh v The State, AIR 1959 P H 332.
83
State of Karnataka v Shiv Shankar, (1978) 1 Kant LJ 197 (200).
84
Gopal Naidu v Emperor AIR 1923 Mad 523.
85
Satnarain Das &Ors. v Emperor, AIR 1938 PATNA 518.

Therefore, it is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the accused cannot avail the
plea of private defence.
92. It is humbly submitted that in this case all the accused in a well-planned and orchestra
conspiracy armed with deadly weapons reached the protest site where they committed the crime
of crushing the innocent protesters under their car and the most gruesome and depraved manner
opened fire at the crowd leading to a journalist’s death and hence all accused persons should be
awarded death penalty as the circumstances prove to be the rarest of rare case.

5TH AMITY NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022 PAGE NO. XVIII
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
In light of the facts of the case, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the
Counsels on behalf of the Petitioner humbly pray before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
Indiana to kindly adjudge and declare that:-
a. That the state legislature of Devbhoomi does not have any specific power to make
laws/policies for domicile-based reservations.
b. That the state government do not have the power to direct the employers of private
sector to reserve jobs for local candidates.
c. That the Devbhoomi State Employment of Local Candidates Act, 2020 is
unconstitutional.
d. That the accused are guilty of the offence u/s 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 326, 120B r/w
34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the thus shall be awarded death penalty.
AND/OR
Pass any other order which the bench deems fit in the best interest of Justice, Equity and
Good Conscience, and for this act of kindness the Counsels on behalf of the Petitioner as in
duty bound shall forever pray.
All of which is respectfully submitted
__________________________
SD/-
Counsels for Petitioner

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I

5th AMITY NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022 PAGE NO.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

PETITION AND APPEAL INVOKED UNDER ARTICLE 32 AND 136 OF INDIANA

WRIT PETITION NO. 351 OF 2020

SATAT VIKAS SANGH PETITIONER

STATE OF DEVBHOOMI RESPONDENT

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 5 OF 2022

MR. TEJA SINGH & ORS. DEFENCE

COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

SPECIFIC POWER TO MAKE LAWS/POLICIES FOR DOMICILE-BASED RESERVATION..............1

1.1 That there is violation of Article 16(3)..............................................................................

1.2 The rationale of reservations in Educational Institutions cannot be extended to

DIRECT EMPLOYERS OF PRIVATE SECTOR TO RESERVE JOBS FOR LOCAL CANDIDATES......3

2.2 That the State doesn’t have any such powers....................................................................

CONTENTION 03: THAT THE DEVBHOOMI STATE EMPLOYMENT OF LOCAL CANDIDATES

3.1 The Act violates Article 14................................................................................................

3.2 The Act violates Article 16................................................................................................

3.3 The Act violates Article 19 (1) (g).....................................................................................

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

3.4 The Act violates Article 21..............................................................................................

4.9 That the accused persons are guilty u/s 34 IPC...............................................................

PRAYER FOR RELIEF................................................................................................................XVIII

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

S.C.C. Supreme Court Cases

U/S Under Section

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

S.NO STATUES PAGE CITED AT

01. The Constitution of India, 1949 Passim

02. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Passim

03. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 Passim

04. The Indian Penal Code, 1860 Passim

BOOKS AND DIGESTS

S.NO BOOKS AND DIGESTS EDITION PAGE CITED AT

Mahendra Pal Singh & VN. Shukla,

02. M.P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law 7th 9th

Will Circ, Principles of Circumstantial

05. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, Law of Crimes 26th Passim

06. K.I Vibhuti, PSA Pillai Criminal Law 13th Passim

Anirudh Krishnan & Harini Sudersan, Law of

ONLINE DATABASES AND DICTIONARY

S.NO ONLINE DATABASE PAGE CITED AT

01. www.jstor.org (JSTOR) Passim

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

02. www.lexisadvance.in (LEXIS ADVANCE) Passim

03. www.livelaw.in (LIVE LAW) Passim

04. www.S.C.C.online.com (S.C.C. ONLINE) Passim

05. www.manupatrafast.com (MANUPATRA) Passim

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

1. Abdul Karim v State of Maharashtra 1978 Cr LJ 1485 14

2. Ajay Hasia v Khalid Mujib 1(981) 1 S.C.C. 722 7

3. Amar Singh v State of Punjab (1953) S.C.R. 418 11

4. Amrik Singh v The State of Pepsu (1951) 3 Pepsu LR 635 17

5. Appu v State AIR 1971 Mad 194 18

6. Ashok Datta Naik v State 1979 CrLJ (NOC) 95 (Goa) 13

7. Ashok Kumar v State of Punjab AIR 1977 SC 109 19

8. Ashok Kumar v State of Haryana 2003 (2) S.C.C. 143 19

(1979) Cri LJ 1275, HC