INDIGENOUS PEOPLE

Profile

According to some estimates, there are close to 100 indigenous peoples, exclusive of the Muslim groups,
though the exact size of the indigenous population remains unclear: while the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples estimates that there are approximately 11.3 million indigenous peoples in the
Philippines, for example – a figure amounting to around 11- 12 per cent of the population – some civil
society estimates suggest they may comprise between 10 and 20 per cent of the population.

There is a great variety of social organization and cultural expression among these communities. Some
specialize in wood-carving, basket-making and weaving. Others are known for their embroidery,
appliqué and bead-making. They range from the Bontoc and Ifugaos, who built the renowned rice
terraces in the mountainous interior of Luzon, to indigenous peoples practising shifting cultivation or
hunter-gathering.

A significant number of indigenous peoples in central Luzon are Protestant Christians, having been
converted by American missionaries in the early twentieth century and educated in missionary schools.
For others there is a considerable difference in terms of integration with lowland Christian Filipinos.
Some have intermarried. Others have remained isolated. There is little general agreement on the names
and numbers of these indigenous communities.

While some of these indigenous peoples emerged from early waves of Malay or Proto-Malay migrants,
about 27 of them, such as Aeta and Ati, are Negritos that were already long-established in the
Philippines: they are thought to be the descendants of the earliest settlers to the archipelago, who may
have migrated there through land bridges from the Asian mainland some 30,000 years ago.

A common geographical distinction is often made between Igorot (Tagalog for ‘mountaineer’) on Luzon,
and Lumad (‘indigenous’) for those in Mindanao, with others in Luzon and the Visayas using their
collective name, such as the Manobo, Mangyan, etc. Ten upland tribal groups on Luzon have been
identified: Ifugao, Bontoc, Kankanay, Ibaloi, Kalinga, Tinguian, Isneg, Gaddang, Ilongot and Negrito.
Ifugaos of Ifugao province, Bontocs of Mountain and Kaling-Apayao provinces and Kankanay and Ibaloi
of Benguet province were all wet-rice farmers who have for centuries worked their elaborate rice
terraces. Groups such as the Ibaloi were the most influenced by Spanish and American colonialism and
lowland Filipino culture because of the extensive gold mines in Benguet, the proximity of the city of
Baguio, good roads and schools, and a consumer industry in search of folk art. Other mountain peoples
of Luzon include Kalinga of Kalinga-Apayao province and Tinguian of Abra province, who employ both
wet-rice and dry-rice growing techniques. Isneg of northern Kalinga-Apayao, Gaddang of the border
between Kalinga-Apayao and Isabela provinces, and Ilongot of Nueva Vizcaya province all practise
shifting cultivation. Although Negritos formerly dominated the highlands, by the early 1980s they were
reduced to small groups living in widely scattered locations, primarily along the eastern ranges.

The other concentration of indigenous communities is in central and southern Philippines. The Lumad
tribal groupings of Mindanao include Ata, Bagobo, Guiangga, Mamanwa, Magguangan, Mandaya,
Banwa-on, Bukidnon, Dulangan, Kalagan, Kulaman, Manobo, Subanon, Tagabili, Takakaolo, Talandig, and
Tiruray or Teduray. The Lumad groups of Mindanao have faced, and continue to face, long-term
displacement and legalized land dispossession, which is also a threat to other indigenous communities in
the Philippines. The southern Philippine island peoples of Mindanao are resource-rich and were
formerly under-populated compared to the northern island peoples of Luzon. Thus, throughout the
twentieth century, there was a steady migration of Christian lowland Filipinos into areas previously
occupied and dominated by Lumad and Moros. These migrations were initially encouraged by the
American authorities, when the Philippines was under their rule, and were given further impetus by
central government authorities after independence by the development of plantation agriculture,
logging concessions and hydro-electric and geothermal energy schemes. Lumad are now outnumbered
in their ancestral lands.

Historical context

The Spanish crown, by virtue of colonization, claimed rights over the islands and the authority to dispose
of the land. Later, the US authorities institutionalized their legal powers to dispose of all land and voided
all the previous land grants by Moro or Lumad chiefs, as well as others throughout the Philippines, that
had been made without government consent. Only individuals or corporations could register private
claims to land ownership. This left no room for the concept of ancestral or communal land, which the
indigenous Lumad had held to be sacred and not subject to individual title or ownership.

Through the efforts of the Lumad of Mindanao, and their supporters among the lowland Christian
Filipino community, two important provisions were written into the 1987 Constitution. Article XII (5)
obliges the state to ‘protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to
ensure their economic, social and cultural wellbeing’, while Article XIV (17) commits the state to
‘recognize, respect and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to preserve and develop
their cultures, traditions and institutions’.
However, the state also continued to maintain rights to land, and national development policies
continued to be shaped by powerful economic interests and political forces. Lumad continued to seek
the return of lands taken from them through harassment and illegal manipulation and seek the
revocation of all plantation permits and logging concessions. They sought self-government within their
ancestral lands with their customary laws, and the preservation of their indigenous cultures. In all these
matters, Lumad faced an up-hill battle.

Greater democracy after the end of the regime of President Ferdinand Marcos led to a number of
favourable changes. In the same year, the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (1997) was adopted, with a
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) established under this legislation. The former
recognized indigenous peoples’ native title to land and their (limited) rights of self-determination and
free exercise of culture. It also offered an option of applying for a ‘Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title’.

However, these positive steps in relation to indigenous peoples’ rights have not proved as effective in
their activities as might have been hoped. This was partly due to legal challenges as to the
constitutionality of both, which was not resolved favourably by the Supreme Court of the Philippines
until 2002. In addition, the full recognition and implementation of the rights of indigenous peoples that
are contained in the 1997 Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act still faced many hurdles: there have been
criticisms that the 2004 removal of the NCIP from the President’s Office to the Department of
Agriculture, for example, weakened its position and influence, while the disbandment of Task Force 63
(a body and mechanism which promotes inter-agency cooperation on indigenous peoples’ issues)
indicated the low priority that state authorities were actually giving to the rights of indigenous peoples.

Following recommendations by the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples that the
NCIP call for a ‘National Consultative Assembly’ (with the objective of including indigenous peoples and
organizations in the planning and implementation of the Commission’s activities), the NCIP convened a
National Forum in November 2006. This led to the establishment of the Indigenous Peoples’
Consultative Body (IPCB), operating at a national, regional and provincial level. The composition of IPCB
is tripartite, including representatives of NCIP, indigenous peoples’ organizations and NGOs. Despite
criticism concerning their membership, the establishment of these bodies was seen as a positive
development towards enhanced participation by indigenous peoples in the making and implementation
of NCIP policies.

While indigenous peoples have in theory a right to mother tongue education under the Indigenous
Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997, this right is still unimplemented. An Institute for Indigenous Peoples’
Education set up a handful of ‘pilot schools’ to respond in a more receptive way to the culture and
traditions of indigenous peoples, but teaching in indigenous languages is not part of the official state
curriculum. Privately established indigenous schools, which occasionally teach in local community
languages, continue to meet obstacles from Department of Education authorities in the registration
process and in recent years have been attacked by armed groups, many of whom are suspected to be
linked with security forces, due to suspicions that the schools are promoting support for the communist
insurgency.

Current Issues

Although most indigenous communities live in isolated rural areas, a growing number are migrating to
cities in search of better livelihoods and social services. Many are driven from their traditional lands by
militarization, tribal conflicts and the expansion of large-scale development projects, which frequently
bring little or no benefits to local communities, particularly women: many indigenous women, unable to
secure employment with the mining companies and leave to find work in urban areas, suffering extreme
poverty in cities like the northern city of Baguio or the capital city, Manila. They often face poverty and
exclusion as a result of their limited formal education and the fact that their skills may not be suited to
an urban context. In Baguio – where indigenous people make up over 60 per cent of the population – it
is estimated that some 65 per cent of indigenous migrants suffer from extreme poverty. Many of them
are migrant women working as vendors in the city streets, where they are regularly pestered by police
as part of the government’s anti-peddling drive.

The long running conflict between the military and the New People’s Army (NPA) in the mountains of
Mindanao – lasting some 50 years and with a total death toll of more than 40,000 lives since it began –
has had particularly devastating impacts on the Lumad people, a cluster of 18 indigenous communities
in Mindanao. Many Lumad civilians have been caught in the conflict, subjected to militarization within
their communities or targeted with extrajudicial killings and torture. Thousands have been displaced
while fleeing violence by security forces. According to a joint stakeholders’ report to the UN Universal
Periodic Review on the Philippines in September 2016 submitted by KATRIBU National Alliance of
Indigenous Peoples, 102 extrajudicial killings of indigenous peoples were committed by the previous
Aquino administration. Since President Rodrigo Duterte took power, these murders – despite making
calls for an end to the killings of Lumad – have continued, with military, vigilantes and private security
forces suspected of carrying out the attacks. Many of the victims have been notable opponents of
mining, oil palm plantations, corruption and government abuses.

A peace roadmap that was approved in 2016 included plans for negotiations with the National
Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP). After over 40 rounds of talks under five different Philippine
governments, the two parties met again in August 2016 in Oslo, Norway, for the first formal peace talks
in five years. The NDFP is an umbrella group of communist organizations, representing the Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the NPA, in the negotiations. The 2016 formal talks in
Oslo included a timeline for negotiations, initiating a ceasefire, negotiating immunity for NDFP members,
and an amnesty for detained political prisoners, the latter of which brought negotiations to a standstill
with the previous government. The two parties agreed to an open-ended ceasefire, which managed to
maintain a fragile peace throughout the year, despite not yet being able to agree to the terms of an
official bilateral ceasefire agreement. The negotations subsequently collaped, with Duterte claiming in
July 2017 that he planned to resume fighting against the NPA due to their failure to respect the terms of
the ceasefire. While he offered to resume talks in early 2018, uncertainty has persisted. There have,
however, been localized peace talks leading to some 8,000 people surrendering by the end of 2018.

Alongside the communist rebellion, an Islamist insurgency has also contributed to widespread insecurity
in Mindanao: while agreement was reached in 2018 with the largest group, the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF), to hold a plebiscite in January 2019 on the creation of a larger autonomous Muslim region
known as Bangsamoro, a large number of ISIS-affiliated extremist groups continue to operate outside
the framework of any peace agreement.

Lumad communities have often been caught in the crossfire of the protracted civil conflict in the
southern Philippines, and regularly accused of harbouring communist sympathies. Alternative education
has become the target of particular scrutiny and distrust, with the military accusing indigenous schools
of promoting communist propaganda. State officials have drawn outrage for recommending the
introduction of new schools run by the military. The Save Our Schools Network has accused the army
and pro-government militias of staging premeditated attacks on alternative education institutes in order
to marginalize indigenous land and cultural rights: local estimates suggest that there were 95 attacks on
Lumad schools in the southern Philippines between September 2014 and 2015, an average of eight
cases per month.

One of the most notorious incidents took place in September 2015, when a troop of armed men
stormed an alternative Lumad school in the southern Philippines. Teachers and students were dragged
from their dormitories and rounded up, together with hundreds of other civilians, in the small village of
Diatagon in Lianga, Surigao del Sur. Two indigenous leaders – known for their work protecting the
community’s ancestral lands against encroachments from mining companies – were hauled in front of
the crowd and executed at point-blank range. One of the victims in particular, Dionel Campos, was the
chairperson for Mapasu, an indigenous organisation striving for ancestral land rights. The head of the
alternative school, Emerito Samarca, was later found in one of his classrooms, with his throat cut and
two gunshot wounds in his abdomen. Samarca, who was slain at Lianga, was also a vocal campaigner
against large-scale development projects that fuel violence and displacement in the southern
Philippines. The government denied any involvement in Samarca’s murder, claiming the attackers
merely dressed up in army fatigues that matched the insignia of the nearest battalion. Approximately
3,000 Lumad indigenous people were forced to flee in the wake of this incident, resulting in an extended
period of displacement.

This treatment, driven by the belief that Lumads are supporting the NPA insurgency, has resulted in
indiscriminate killings and widespread displacement of indigenous communities. There has been limited
change since Duterte took power: in 2017, for instance, he accused indigenous schools of supporting the
rebellion and threatened to bomb them. This situation creates further barriers for Lumads, who have
some of the lowest educational levels in the Philippines, in accessing schooling. Part of the problem is
the entrenched discrimination towards indigenous youths within the centrally managed school system,
which often treats them as outsiders and second-class citizens. The time and cost of travelling long
distances to reach public schools also place insurmountable burdens on many Lumad families.
Indigenous activists in the southern Philippines insist that the right to a free and culturally tailored
education is fundamental to defending indigenous heritage and rights, which are often intimately tied to
the protection of ancestral lands and resources. The government’s failure to investigate crimes against
Lumad schools has left the communities more vulnerable to further attacks and encroachments.

Land rights remain an ongoing issue for indigenous communities, many of whom still lack official
recognition of their ancestral land. Under the 1997 Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act, 221 ‘Certificates of
Ancestral Domain Title’ (CADT’s) had been issued by March 2018, covering over 5.4 million hectares.
While this may sound impressive, the process has involved the land rights of indigenous communities
totalling only 1.2 million people. Besides this, the process to obtain a title remains difficult and lengthy:
in 2012, an additional procedure was added in the attempt to address jurisdictional issues between
agencies, but it has slowed the process even further. After the titles are issued, they must be registered
with the Land Registration Authority, to make the titles more robust against land incursion. Less than 50
of the 182 CADT’s issued by September 2016 had been registered.

Even land recognized as indigenous under these certificates can still be lost to development projects,
since mining and other projects can be pursued if a certificate of ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent’
(FPIC) is obtained from affected indigenous communities. A number of indigenous peoples have
repeatedly reported that they have been deceived, threatened and even seen some of their people
assassinated, in order for companies to receive these FPICs. Many claim that a string of murders of
indigenous leaders have been linked mainly to their defence of their ancestral lands. Development
projects being undertaken, such as mining, the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway and various eco-tourism
projects have caused the indigenous Aetas to leave the area around Mount Pinatubo. Indigenous land
also continues to be redistributed directly to non-indigenous settlers by the Department of Agrarian
Reform, through the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
Bangsamoro History

Moro Muslims

Profile

Moro is the name by which Filipino Muslim ethno-linguistic groups are usually known. While the 2010
Census estimated that approximately 5.6 percent of the population were Muslim, the National
Commission on Muslim Filipinos estimated in 2012 the actual figure to be around 11 per cent of the
population. The majority of Muslims live in the southern island of Mindanao as well as Palawan and the
Sulu archipelago. Many self-identify as Bangsamoro or Moro Muslims, whose traditional territory is in
Mindanao.

The main Moro ethno-linguistic groups are Maguindanao, Marano, Tausug, Samal, Bajau, Yakan, Ilanon,
Sangir, Melabugnan and Jama Mapun. However, three of these groups – the Maguindanaos of North
Cotabato, Kudarat and Maguindanos provinces, the Maranos of the two Lanao provinces, and the
Tausug from Jolo – make up the great majority of Moros. These languages, just like Tagalog and most of
the other languages spoken by Christian Filipinos, belong to the Malayo-Polynesian language branch of
the Austronesian language family. Most are Sunni Muslims, though with some animist practices in the
case of certain Moro minorities living in higher zones.

Despite these linguistic and religious differentiations from the Christian majority, Moros have not
traditionally been united, and the various groups, which are divided by degrees of Islamic orthodoxy as
well as by linguistic difference, are often hostile to each other. Yet Moros have shared a common
hostility to the central authorities – Spaniards, Americans and then, after independence, Christianized
Filipinos from Luzon.

In the Mindanao region, decades of fighting between the government and Moro-Muslim separatist
groups have resulted in mass displacements affecting mostly Muslim communities.

Historical context

The Islamic religion came to the southern Philippine islands some 200 years before the European
colonial period. Moros developed a centralized religious, social and political system based on the
Qur’an. Several sultanates emerged, similar to historical sultanates that developed in what are now
Indonesia and Malaysia, with the sultans being both religious and secular leaders. These sultanates were
de facto states, exercising jurisdiction over Muslim and non-Muslim alike. At the time of the Spanish
conquest, the Muslim principalities had the most administratively complex communities in the
Philippines. The sultanates established on Sulu and Mindanao were the furthermost extension into Asia
of the Islamic religion, and it is possible to see the Moro conflict as a 400-year struggle between Islam
and Christianity, with neither side being able entirely to subdue the other. The sultanates resisted and
fought Spanish authority for 300 years. After the Americans replaced the Spaniards, Moros fought the
United States from 1903 to 1935, losing an estimated 20,000 lives. Since independence, Moros have
sporadically waged political and armed struggle against the Philippine government based in Manila.

A long-term historical trend has been the displacement and dispossession of Moros from traditionally
Moro territory. In the nineteenth century, the Spanish gained a foothold on Mindanao through
missionary efforts among the non-Muslim elements of the population and private military expeditions.
Displacement and dispossession accelerated in the early 1900s as the American colonial authorities
initiated policies to import homesteaders from the northern islands. The development of large-scale
plantation agriculture for commercial export provided a further incentive for immigration. Policies of
resettlement accelerated after the Second World War and independence, when, in response to the Huk
rebellion in Luzon, tens of thousands were encouraged to migrate to farms and homesteads in
Mindanao. Lowland, formerly northern Catholic Filipinos came to outnumber Moros, which led to land
disputes, Christian vigilantism, and a cultural and religious reaction.

It is through these official government policies that the Moros not only came to lose most of their
traditional land but were also to become minorities. From about 76 per cent in 1903, the Moros only
constituted 19 per cent of the population of Mindanao by 1990. Not only did the government take away
the land from the Moros to give to Catholic Filipinos, it also banned the use of their languages in
education and gave most employment and political positions to non-Muslims.

In 1968, the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) was launched by radical Islamic leaders calling for
independence from the Philippines and the creation of a Bangsa Moro, or Moro nation. This, and local
‘Christian’ countermeasures, led to full-scale revolt. The years 1969 to 1972, prior to martial law, were a
period of indiscriminate violence between Muslims and Christians. In September 1972, then President
Ferdinand Marcos cited the bloodshed and chaos in Mindanao, along with the communist New People’s
Army insurgency in Luzon, as reasons for the imposition of martial law.

The result was a full-scale guerrilla war as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) supplanted the
MIM, and proclaimed Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan as Bangsa Moro. Radical Arab states such as Libya
began to provide financial aid and Sabah (in eastern Malaysia) became a sanctuary for MNLF fighters.
Fighting continued throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, causing large-scale disruption and
displacement. Through the intervention of the Organization of Islamic Conference, the MNLF and Manila
held negotiations in the late 1970s and 1980s, although there was still fighting on the ground. A
plebiscite following the passage of the 1987 Constitution paved the way for the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in 1989 comprising four Muslim provinces in Mindanao (Maguindanao,
Lanao del Sur, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi).

In the early 1990s, the MNLF split. The old faction accepted that independence was politically unviable
and that the autonomous region was the best available option. The group’s second-in-command,
Salamat Hashim, went on to found the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The Abu Sayyaf Group
(ASG) – which translates as ‘Bearer of the Sword’ – was formed in 1990-91 by MNLF members angered
by its leaders’ perceived moves towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Along with its desire to
create an independent Islamic nation in the Philippines, the group also had broader visions of a pan-
Islamic super-state in south-east Asia and was accused by the US and Philippines governments of having
links with the radical regional militant network Jemaah Islamiah.

Under a peace deal signed in 1996 with the MNLF, the central government in Manila gave the Moros
autonomy in the south, where the majority of them live. However, the ceasefire collapsed in 2001, when
MNLF guerrillas loyal to the governor of the Autonomous Region attacked an army base in Jolo, Sulu,
killing 100 people and wounding scores.

Peace negotiations between the MILF and the government got under way in 1997, and a ceasefire was
agreed. However, the truce broke down in 2000 and subsequent attempts at reconciliation between the
two sides repeatedly stalled. A significant breakthrough occurred in 2016, however, when the two sides
agreed on a peace roadmap.

Current issues

Conflict between the government and security forces and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) and other armed Muslim non-state groups have resulted in massive
displacements for Mindanao Muslims. Many have also fled due to clan feuds (‘rido’) between Moro
clans, political rivalries and land disputes. As of November 2018, there was an estimated 80,439
displaced persons due to conflict in areas of Mindanao. After being displaced into IDP camps, there are
very few livelihood options. Besides being vulnerable to trafficking, Muslim women migrate to Cotabato
City or General Santos City, often becoming underpaid domestic workers.
More than 100,000 people, many from the country’s Muslim minority, were uprooted following the
siege of Zamboanga in 2013. Thousands were subjected to arbitrary relocation, with others reportedly
receiving inadequate aid and food supplies. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
(IDMC), most of the people who remain displaced are urban poor who lack formal landownership or
tenancy rights in their area of origin. The repatriation process has been further hindered by concerns
about certain areas deemed unsuitable for returns due to risks of flooding or renewed violence. The
IDMC has called on the government to prioritize housing rights for displaced communities as part of the
resettlement process. Congress is currently reviewing new legislation on the rights of IDPs, seen as a
crucial step towards protecting vulnerable minorities and indigenous people in the Philippines. The law
is a revised version of a historic 2013 bill that was controversially vetoed by former President Benigno
Aquino. A Bill of the Rights of Internally Displaced Persons Act was presented to Congress in 2017 and is
pending approval.

At the start of 2016, the finalisation of the peace negotiations with rebels was at a crucial junction: the
Basic Bangsamoro Law (BBL) needed to be passed before Congress was adjourned 3 February 2016,
ahead of the elections. The BBL was the final implementing legislation, resulting from years of peace
negotiations, that would create an autonomous region of Bangsamoro in Mindanao to replace the
existing Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. Although Aquino failed to see the BBL passed, in July
2016 the new government announced its approval of a comprehensive peace roadmap as proposed by
the presidential peace advisor Jesus Dureza. It specifically mandated that a new BBL would be drafted.
Further negotiations were held in mid-August 2016 in Kuala Lumpur, leading to the expansion of the
Bangsamoro Transition Council (BTC), a body that would be tasked with redrafting the BBL, consisting of
21 members – 11 from MILF and 10 from the government. The government expressed its hope that the
expanded BTC could make the process of drafting the implementing legislation more inclusive by
including representatives from the MNLF, another armed faction, as well as affected indigenous
communities.

Some positive steps towards peace have been signalled by Duterte’s signing in July 2018 of the
Bangsamoro Organic Law, paving the way for a plebiscite in January 2019 on whether what is currently
the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) would be dissolved and in its place a larger
Muslim autonomous region, Bangsamoro, would be established in its place.

The Bangsamoro plebiscite went ahead in two phases in January and February 2019. In the first phase,
the results were overwhelmingly in favour of five of six southern Mindanao provinces and cities to join
the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). The results of the second phase
were less clear, with barangays (administrative wards) in North Cotabato province voting in favour
whilst inhabitants of six towns in Lanao del Norte province voted against joining the new region.
Meanwhile, an 80-member Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) was named, with MILF appointing 41
members and the government naming 39 members. The BTA will act as an interim 3-year parliament,
headed by MILF chairperson Ebrahim el Haj Murad, pending elections in BARMM.

It is hoped that these measures will help bring an end to the longstanding conflict in the south. The way
forward is unclear, however, as MILF has three training camps in Lanao del Norte which in principle will
fall outside the BARMM. Decommissioning and reintegration of MILF fighters is another important issue.
Also, the region must now contend with the threat of ISIS-associated militant groups such as Maute and
Abu Sayyaf, both of whom were involved in the bloody occupation of Marawi between May and October
2017 that saw more than 1,000 people killed and much of the city destroyed. Many of these extremist
groups continue to operate outside the peace process.

None of the Filipino government’s policies or the powers attributed to the ARMM have had an effect on
the loss of land of the Muslim Moros: a process which has been going on for decades. Members of this
minority have already lost land, because of government legislation and policies such as the
extinguishment of their traditional land rights and the government-sponsored resettlement of mainly
Christian Filipinos on the land they previously owned. Land redistribution programmes, such as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, which in theory might have returned Moro land to members
of the Muslim minority, appear to have mainly benefited Christian settlers.

The rights of the Moro minority are still not being completely respected in a number of areas despite the
benefits which they are beginning to receive from the autonomy arrangements of 1997. State schools do
not use their main languages as medium of instruction to any significant extent (despite positive efforts
such as the 2004 Basic Education Assistance for Mindanao to improve basic education in Southern and
Central Mindanao and the introduction of teaching of Arabic), nor do most of the civil service and
governmental positions require fluency in one of these languages, though they do demand fluency in
Filipino. Given the very large numbers of non-native Filipino-speakers and their concentration in parts of
Mindanao, this language policy continues to create a very real obstacle to the full participation of the
Moro Muslims in the country’s public and political life, and they remain vastly under-represented in
categories of educational attainment and in employment levels in almost all categories of civil service
employment and political representation. This in turn perpetuates the perception of the Moros as a
disadvantaged group unable to compete against Christian Filipinos.