Unkwe 13

 attack had already been drawn up and been agreed to by the GoU, GoSS, and DRC.
The US
government and army were also on board, apparently actively so.
November 29-30, 2008

- A large contingent of Ugandan and international delegates gathered and waited at the
designated LRA assembly point in Ri-Kwangba.
- Kony once more failed to show up.
- For almost all concerned, the Juba peace process was dead.
- There were a few feints suggesting otherwise over the next ten (10) days including Museveni
saying that he would agree to talk directly by phone with Kony.
- But immediately after the November 30th deadline passed, Uganda began actively
implementing plans to send the UPDF into Congo on a military mission to destroy the LRA.
- Reports from the rebel camp indicate that they too were preparing for war.
 Operation Lightning Thunder was bout to begin.
- t most.
- The operation was specifically designed to capture or kill senior LRA leaders.
December 14, 2008

- UPDF began bombing LRA camps in Garamba.
 forces, just go and sit there, let the Ugandans see if they really are the best."
 Intelligence amassed over the several preceding months, including the use of sophisticated
electronic monitoring devices and other high-tech equipment provided by the U.S.
 The offensive was to begin with surprise air attacks by jets and helicopter gunships on the
camps, with Kony's personal hut supposedly identified and specifically targeted.
 Helicopter gunships delivered commandos to the bombed camps to secure the said camps and
carry out search and destroy operations against LRA members who survived the bombings.
 Finally, a much larger ground offensive of more than 4,000 troops was to follow the air and
commando attacks to continue any remaining operations against a rebel force that was already
to have been hit hard.
 However, reports from Garamba (from both LRA fighters and former abductees) indicate that
Kony ordered the evacuation of the camps the day before the airstrikes began. President
Museveni argued that he, "may have escaped because he acquired a gadget that he used to
monitor the radio conversations of the pilots manning the helicopter gunships". Thus, the camps
were empty or nearly so.
 No commandos or UPDF troops were dropped off by helicopter gunships immediately after the
bombings for at least 3 days. This gave the rebels days to divide into small groups and scatter
- )
Mid-March 2008
- 12 UPDF members killed, 1 jet down, 100 rebels claimed dead were bodies found in the forest,
not killed in direct ground engagements, 50 rebels killed, 5 LRA commanders captured, and 300
abductees rescued.
March 15, 2018

- Announced ending of the operation.
HR VIOLATIONS
1. Forced Recruitment
o Often killed those who were reluctant to join the LRA or hacked off their ears, lips, and
limbs.
2. Violence Against Women & Children such as:
o Raided a girl's school;
o Female abductees were often forced to become wives of the rebels and some incurred
aids;
o A mother was instructed to eat her son and was beaten to death with a padlock when
October 04, 2002: A headline that took up more than a quarter of the front page of The
Daily Monitor screamed, "Army Gives Acholi 48 Hours to Quit Homes";
o UPDF has ordered people living in the 3 districts of Pader, Gulu and Kitgum to vacate
their homes.
o According to a letter by the commander of "Operation Iron Fist", Brig. Aronda
Nyakairima, the villages must move to or near designated camps for Internally Displaced
People within 48 hours.
o Nyakairima said the people should vacate with immediate effect from 7:00am of Oct.
o This announcement goes to all law-abiding citizens in the abandoned villages of Gulu,
Pader and Kitgum districts to vacate with immediate effect."
o After LRA attacks extended in 2003-2004 into the Lango and Teso subregions, nearly a
million more were displaced (although without government fiat), creating the conditions
that in 2005 Egeland described as "the biggest neglected humanitarian emergency in
the world."
o Nearly 2 million northern Ugandans now lived in camps, more than a million of whom in
Acholi (over 90 percent of the subregion) were forced to do so by the government
policy. It also left most of the encamped people with little or no protection from the
rebels. The camps were no longer even euphemistically called "protected villages" but
IDP camps.
o Government provision of basic services - water, sanitation, health care, education to the
camps was inadequate. It was impossible for most households to grow food or make a
living in another way. Huts could be so close together their thatched roofs touched.
Poverty and congestion led to high levels of alcoholism, domestic and sexual violence,
and crime.
o Forced encampment means forced dependency, forced vulnerability, forced humiliation,
forced congestion within camps, and forced isolation from outside. The physical,
psychological, economic, social, and cultural damage caused by forced encapment is
almost unimaginable. Human resilience and strength of will helped many people to cope
creatively and positively with the extreme circumstances forced upon them.
o Of adults surveyed in camps in Gulu and Kitgum districts, over 50% had been abducted
during the war, nearly 40% had their own child abducted, over 2/3 had witnessed a child
being abducted; nearly half had witnessed a family member being killed, over half had
been threatened with death, and nearly 20% had been physically mutilated, maimed, or
injured. (2005 survey)
o The statistics do not incorporate much of the domestic violence endemic in the camps,
nor do they include evidence of most UPDF violence.
o Conditions in the camps were resulting in 1,000 excess deaths a week. Thus the
structural violence of camp life produced a far greater number of deaths than those
caused by the LRA, just more quietly and unobtrusively. (2005 study by WHO & Ugandan
Ministry of Health)
o Report rates of trauma in northern Uganda is higher than in either Darfur or Iraq, with 2
most common causes being: (1) lack of food and water; (2) lack of shelter and housing.
(2008 study by the London School of Tropical Medicine)
o The inadequacy of government protection and services so glaring that an eventual flood
of nongovernmental organizations and other humanitarian aid agencies tried to fill the
void.
o However, according to Sverker Finnström, structural violence is relatively easy to ignore,
mask, or deny. This is not yet the "official discourse" of the Northern Uganda war.
RESOLUTION
WHAT CAN BE DONE TO STOP LRA ABUSES?

1. Deploy well-trained, capable troops in the numbers needed to protect civilians and arrest LRA
leaders.
o Ensure that these forces have sufficient transport capacity, including helicopters, to
reach threatened civilians quickly;
o Ensure that these UN and other forces respect international human rights and
humanitarian law is crucial.
2. Enhance early warning and intelligence gathering.
o Focus on LRA movements and to identify communities vulnerable to attack.
3. Improve communications, including by building cellphone towers.
o Will provide mobile phone coverage in LRA affected areas and effects to ensure that
high-frequency radios are available in all key population centers should also be
supported.
4. Ensure fair trials for serious crimes.
o This is in accordance with international standards. Uganda's amnesty act should be
amended so that those responsible for war crimes and other crimes in violation of
international law are not immune from prosecution.

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 attack had already been drawn up and been agreed to by the GoU, GoSS, and DRC.

November 29-30, 2008

 Operation Lightning Thunder was bout to begin.

December 14, 2008

March 15, 2018

WHAT CAN BE DONE TO STOP LRA ABUSES?

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