DSA PROJECT

CASE ANALYSIS REPORT ON

Tuka Ram And Anr V. State of Maharashtra (Air 1979 SCR 185)

Submitted by:

Name Registration no.

Shreha Shah 190401417036

BA LLB (HONS.)

2019-24

Course Teacher: Prof. Rohit Ranjan

LAW OF CRIMES (CLAW 206)

Alliance School of Law

Alliance University, Bangalore
10/ 11 /2020
 The Supreme Court of India

TUKA RAM AND ANR. V. STATE OF MAHARASTHRA

Citations- 1979 AIR 185, 1979 SCR (1) 810

Bench- A.D Koshal (J), Jaswant Singh (J), P.S. Kailasam (J)

PETITIONER- TUKA RAM AND ANR.

RESPONDENT- STATE OF MAHARASTHRA

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 INTRODUCTION

In the late 1970s, feminist activism in India gained traction. A Mathura's Gang-Rape Case was
one of the most national-level problems that brought the women's community together. March
1972 was recognized as the black day in the history of women's liberation. On 26th March 1972,
the Matura rape case became the incident which was produced out of custodial rape in the
Bharat, whereby a young Harijan girl named Mathura was took advantaged by two policemen at
the Desaiganj Police Station complex in Chandrapur district of Maharashtra as it led to changes
to the Rape Law through the 1983 Criminal Law Amendment. Justice Jaswant Singh, Kalisam,
and Khosal, who was strongly criticized by the people for their legal fallacies and the
interpretation of the law as vague and the sexiest tone, delivered the judgment. Then there was a
massive public uproar and demonstrations against the laws of the country after the Supreme
Court acquitted the accused.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The ground of action, in this case, arose on 26 March 1972, when Appellant No.1 Tukaram
(Police Constable) and Appellant No. 2 Ganpat (Head Constable) sexually assaulted a young
woman named Mathura (P.W.1) at Desai Gunj Police Station. Mathura served in the house of
Nunshi (P.W. 2), where she met Ashok, a relative of Nunshi, and fell in love with him. Since
they decided to get married, their relationship gradually became very intimate. Gama, Mathura's
brother (P.W. 3) submitted a complaint to the Desai Gunj Police Station on the above-mentioned
date, alleging Nunshi, her husband Laxman, and Ashok of the abduction of Mathura. They were
all consequently taken to the police station at around 9:00 pm, where Head Constable Baburao
(P.W.8) reported the statements of Mathura and Ashok. After documenting the claims, Baburao
left after directing Gama to bring a copy of Mathura's birth record at around 10:30 pm. When
Mathura, Nunshi, Gama, and Ashok were leaving, the appellants asked Mathura to stay behind
and to fly out with her companions. Then, at the rear end of the house, Ganpat pulled Mathura to
the latrine, where he loosened her garments and lit the torch, gazing at her private parts. Soon
after that, amid protests and stiff resistance on her part, she was pulled to the Chhapri balcony at

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the back of the building where he had sexual intercourse with her. With respect to Appellant No.
1 Tukaram, the allegation was that owing to his drunken condition, he fondled her private parts
but was unable to have sexual intercourse.
When they saw that the lights were off and that the door was locked from the inside, Nunshi,
Gama, and Ashok, who was waiting outside the police station, became suspicious. They marched
to the rear end of the building and screamed at Mathura, who was drawn to the crowd outside the
police station. Tukaram left the police station soon afterward and told them that Mathura had
already left. After that, she told Nunshi and Gama that Ganpat had forced her to undress and
raped her when Mathura returned from the police station. Baburao was taken from his house for
the purpose of registering a complaint against him. He took the statement from Mathura, which
was registered as the first data study. Mathura was evaluated at 8 p.m. by Dr. Shastrakar. The test
on 27 March showed that her body had no injury marks and her hymen revealed old ruptures.
Although there was no semen present on the pubic hair and inside the vagina, the presence of
semen was revealed by Mathura's clothes as well as Ganpat's pajamas.
In accordance with Section 376 (Punishment for Rape) read in Section 34 (Acts carried out by
many persons in favor of the common purpose of all) of the Indian Penal Code, charges were
brought against the Appellants.

ISSUES RAISED BEFORE THE COURT

1. Whether the consent of Mathura was present?

2. Whether Appellant 1 and Appellant 2 will be convicted under Section 376 of The Indian
Penal Code?
3. Whether the police officer’s act will be seen as rape?
4. Whether the grounds of acquittal of the police officer by the Court are valid?

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 ARGUMENTS

ARGUMENT NO. 1:

According to the decision of the Trial Court, in the matter of consent, as the girl was adjusted to
intimacy and wishes to satisfy her sexual desires, the intercourse formed consensually. However,
the High Court overturned the Trial Court's ruling, finding that sexual intercourse was rape and
not voluntary sexual intercourse. It is proved that even if the implied consent by her, Mathura
was a minor and 14 years of age; how could it be considered to be valid consent; therefore, it was
not valid consent. 

ARGUMENT NO. 2

On the facts submitted to the Trial Court, it was held that Mathura was accustomed to sex, and,
based on that evidence, both appellants were not convicted and acquitted under Section 376 of
the Indian Penal Code. But, on the contrary, the High Court held that since Mathura was
accustomed to sex and both of the accused were strangers to Mathura, so the question was how
she could have entrusted them to satisfy her needs.

ARGUMENT NO. 3

Under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, the Trial Court convicted the appellant and the
High Court held the police officers responsible for the crime of rape.

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ARGUMENT NO. 4

The Trial Court held that her charges of rape were untrue because Mathura had not cried out for
help. Her ways of humbly following Ganpat and allowing him to have sexual intercourse with
her and suggesting that the 'consent' in question was not consent that could be kept as 'passive
submission' aside.
As per the Trial Court, the officers are acquitted because the intercourse formed consensually,
and that Mathura did not raise any alarm or make any sound for assistance while having
intercourse. Yet both police officers were held accountable by the High Court for the crime of
rape.

JUDGEMENT BY THE SESSION JUDGE

The learned Sessions Judge found that on the date of the incident, there was no satisfactory proof
to show that Mathura was below 16 years of age. He also argued that she was "a stunning liar"
whose testimony was "ridden with falsehood and impossible." The learned judge claimed that
Mathura possibly had intercourse with the second appellant, namely Ganpat. But he added that
"sexual intercourse" and "rape" occur in a world of distinction. He said Mathura had sexual
intercourse with Ganpat because of her free will. And she was groped by Tukaram because she
was "regular to sexual intercourse." Then he concluded that the prosecution had not proven its
argument against the appellants.

JUDGEMENT BY THE HIGH COURT

In relation to its finding with regard to the age of Mathura, the High Court agreed with the
learned Sessions Judge but held that the allegations made by her against Ganpat were credible
due to circumstantial evidence, in particular, that of the existence of semen stains on the clothes
of the girl and the appellant of Ganpat.
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While the learned Sessions Judge was correct to say that there was a world of difference between
sexual intercourse and rape, the High Court observed that there is a difference between consent
and passive submission. The High Court held that the sexual activity at issue was forcible and
that it amounted to rape.

The High Court did not accept that he had made any attempt to rape the girl in relation to
appellant Tukaram but took her word for granted insofar as he was claimed to have fondled her
private parts following the Ganpat appellant's act of sexual intercourse. It was on these grounds
that Appellant Tukaram was convicted and sentenced by the High Court to one year in prison
and Appellant Ganpat to five years in prison.

JUDGEMENT BY THE SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court eventually reversed the High Court 's conviction in 1979 and convicted the
accused. The Supreme Court decided that this was a case of consensual sexual relations with the
Sessions Judge. "The Supreme Court further added on this point that there was" no resistance "on
her part because" no signs of injury "were found on Mathura 's body and because she did not"
raise an alarm "for help she" consented to sex.

Firstly, it is astonishing that the absence of opposition to consent has been equated by this Court.
Even if Mathura wanted to resist, in front of two well-built, powerful constables, she would be
helpless and therefore unable to carve "marks of injury" on her body. Although the Court read
Section 375(3) of the IPC to hold that her consent was not gained by frightening her because she
did not protest when she was removed from her family, it omitted Section 375(2), which states
that without her consent, rape is sexual intercourse with a woman. Secondly, how certain the
courts are that Mathura did not scream for support is doubtful. When Ganpat took Mathura up to
the washroom to rape her, the doors were locked everywhere.

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It is very likely that even though she called out for help, she would not have been noticed. At this
point, it is reasonable to challenge this Court as to what would be its decision if the victim were
verbally handicapped in this case?
Furthermore, the Supreme Court agreed with the Sessions Judge that Mathura was "sexual" and
that the whole story was fabricated to sound "virtuous in front of Ashok." Two widely used
mistakes in the English language,' Argumentum ad Hominem' and 'Hasty Generalization' have
been committed in this regard.

In essence, this means that, rather than ruling on the merits of the case, the Court has
continuously undermined the character of the claimant and drawn conclusions without any
relation with its premise. It felt that Mathura was so promiscuous that even though her sibling
Gama, employer Nushi, and beloved Ashok were waiting for her right outside the police station,
she could not let go of any possibility of having sexual intercourse. Mathura 's error in finding
out the exact appellant who raped her further worked against her because the Court claimed that
if she should go against her initial testimony by transferring the defendant from Tukaram to
Ganpat, she would have lied about everything else as well. No attention was paid to the fact that
these men were strangers to her and that before this incident she had never seen them or that it
may be difficult for her to clearly see their faces when the lights were turned off.
The truth is that while Ganpat raped her, Tukaram remained a spectator as if it was a
pornographic film or that he was intoxicated on duty, determining the fate of this young girl was
also considered alien. Both the defendants were cleared by the Supreme Court, arguing that this
supposed relationship was a "peaceful affair."

REASONING

Section 374 and section 34 are the main sections applied in this situation. The cases in which an
act may be considered rape or sexual harassment are outlined in section 375 of the IPC. The
Court has taken the view that when acts of a sexual nature are committed against a woman
without her permission, or even if that consent has been obtained through illegal means, the
Court has found sexual harassment.

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They concluded in this case that the act committed against Mathura would not amount to rape.
They claimed that, "the circumstances given in the case were such that it was not possible to
draw the conclusion of sexual harassment. It could not be concluded that the girl was or was
exposed to any fear or compulsion that would warrant the assumption of any "passive
submission." They also claimed that there was no evidence to support the sexual harassment
claim because no marks of harm were identified
Now, of course, the cries and the alarm are a concoction on her part, but then there is no reason
to disbelieve her claim that she and Gama had after Baburao reported her argument. When
Ganpat appellant caught hold of her and took her away to the latrine, they began leaving the
police station and were passing through the entrance door. And if that were so, it would be
absurd to say that while she was in the company of her brother (and maybe even of Ashok and
her aunt Nunshi) she would be so over-awed by the fact that the appellants were individuals in
control or by the condition that she was just emerging from a police station, and had essentially
left the police station, that she would make no attempt at all to resist. On the other side, even
before she noticed who her molester was, her natural instinct would be to shake the hand which
caught her and call out for help.

Her inability to appeal to her companions who were no other than her brother, her aunt and her
lover, and her actions in meekly following the Ganpat appellant and allowing him to have his
way with her to the full gratification of his desire, makes us feel that the consent in question was
not a consent that could be swept as "passive submission" aside. Secondly, it must be borne in
mind that the burden is still on the prosecution to prove affirmatively any aspect of the crime it
tries to create and that such responsibility never changes. It was therefore incumbent on the
appellant to claim that, in the case of sexual intercourse attributed to Ganpat, all the ingredients
of section 375 of the Indian Penal Code were present. It is clear from the judgment that the
judges' rationale lies in the assumption that, given the fact that the girl did not bear any physical
wounds, it could not have been rape. They often quickly offer reasons why, in this situation,
passive submission should not be considered by turning the facts to the inference they have
already interpreted. The assumption they stressed was that the girl's character was 'loose' and was
thus out to argue unfairly against two people who had not committed any crime.

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 ANALYSIS

Authority, in its simplest form, implies superiority, combined with 'fear.' Fear is something that
turns a person into a 'subject' or rather a 'victim.' The sense of authority exerted by the two
policemen was quite gruesome in the present case. In Mathura's view, it was more than enough
to create terror, such that her will or ability was reduced to mere obedience. "In the midst of the
night,” to instill a sense of fear emanating from an authority in the mind of the victim of such a
grotesque 'rape' crime, the act of calling Mathura to the police station is enough. In comparison
with Nandini Satpathy's case, it can therefore be drawn, that according to Section 160 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, a woman is not authorized to engage in a police investigation in
any location other than her home. The Court then held that the very act of directing a woman, in
violation of Section 160(1) CrPC, to come to the police station might build friction and negate
voluntariness. It can therefore be concluded here that the Indian Supreme Court puerilely expects
a young girl aged 14-16 to be brave, to have absolutely no fear of authority, and therefore when
forced into intercourse, to scream and battle two well-built, robust policemen.
The whole judgment consists of combinations of some offensive terms, such as defining the rape
as a "plot," "tissue of lies," "habitual to sexual intercourse." But, the most shocking one,
“Mathura was an individual of easy virtue”. The tone adopted by Justice Koshal and his line of
argument seem not only to Mathura but to all young girls, in general, to be quite insensitive. The
point of significance here is that the judge's attention is entirely deviated, from judging the
commission of rape to challenging the victim's sanctity and morality. It appears from the facts
mentioned by the Supreme Court and its assertion that since there was no stiff resistance,
Mathura had submitted to the rape. The policemen were also not found guilty of rape.
Surprisingly, Justice Koshal concentrated exclusively on IPC Section 375(3), claiming that the
woman passively submits only when her "consent has been obtained by placing her in fear of or
damage. The reasoning and the inference reached by the Court in acquitting the two appellants

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are based solely on that provision, and the second clause of the IPCC Section 375 dealing with
the passage is not taken into account. The difference between "consent" and "submission" is not
understood by the Court. The central distinction here is that consent implies submission, but the
same is not necessarily valid. The absence of resistance is, however, not equal to or suggestive of
agreement. Even if the third portion of Section 375 were to be charged to Ganpat, the issue of
whether there was "consent" remains important and crucial. Thus, the Supreme Court's claim that
only "fear of death or harm" is capable of vitiating consent for sexual intercourse is 'flawed.'
Therefore, it becomes crystal clear to infer that there was no consent from Mathura but merely a
'submission' according to the facts of this case.
Furthermore, it is somewhat troublesome for the Court to expect that a 16-year-old girl, who
fends for herself by doing manual labor, can grasp the principle of 'consent instead of having the
privilege of education.' The language of the judgment is troubling when the struggle of Mathura
(evidenced on both the accused in the form of the nail and bite marks) is considered a valid
mark.
The Indian law has been representing the role of a rape victim within society as someone
powerless and insecure since the creation. Highly flawed, vile, and repugnant is this strong
dictum. It not only degrades the role of women in society but also reflects the traditional
patriarchal view embraced by our lawmakers today.
Justice Kaushal, by condemning a woman's civil rights, totally sidelined the 'moral part' of the
event. The whole 'structure and agency' concept hops in here. In such a case, which agency does
a woman exercise? The social system and structure of suppressing and shielding a survivor of
rape from others, doubting whether or not the victim would be able to marry, keeping her locked
at home, showing concern and sympathy for her, both lead to the declining or rather extinct
social agency of women. The Supreme Court does not pay any attention whatsoever to the
factors connected with the victim of the tender. Mathura comes from a weak socio-economic
position. In such a situation, she lacks knowledge of legal rights and access to legal services, and
her autonomy in the exercise of her agency is rather grim.

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 AFTERMATH

This case stirred up great passions among citizens in society and resentment. It was important to
draft a law that was more sensitive to the feelings of the victims and that secured their human
rights and dignity.
This resulted in the passage in 1983 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act. Section 114(A) of the
Indian Proof Act was amended by that act, which specified that if the woman did not agree to
sexual activity, the Court must conclude that she had not consented.
Also amended was Section 376 of the IPC, making custodial rape an offense punishable by
imprisonment of not less than 7 years. This section transferred the presumption of evidence, once
sexual intercourse is identified, from the victim to the perpetrator. The amendment also restricted
the revealing of the identity of victims and maintained that rape trials should be undertaken as in-
camera proceedings.
While rape laws have been changed by Parliament to serve justice, the judicial implementation
of these laws has done the exact opposite.
While many decisions have succeeded in serving justice for the victims since the 1983
Amendment Act, there is still an equal number that is perversely drafted as the Mathura Rape
Case.

CONCLUSION

The decision made by the Bombay High Court seems adequately appropriate as it believes that
the claims made by Justice Koshal are inadequate and insubstantial to acquit the two appellants,
given the many factors that are not considered in the Supreme Court judgment. Mathura, a

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teenager between the ages of 14 and 16, yielded her body helplessly to Ganpat, who raped her.
This is analogous to passive submissions pursuant to section 375(2) of the IPC, which are not
equivalent to consensual sex. This judgment totally degrades a woman's moral rights. It shows
how, miserably, the Indian law fails to sympathize with the deep pain of all such women who
have been sexually abused and raped, including Mathura. While one of the many unfortunate and
troubling precedents was this decision, it is important to note that logic such as the one followed
in this case stems from fundamental deficiencies in the perception of the root cause behind the
commission of crimes such as rape or sexual assault. From the 'sexual objectification' of women,
sexual abuse of women occurs. As if there is nothing to a woman other than her sex (or her
body), objectification reduces women to their biology. Sexual objectification, that is, patriarchy,
may be traced to the most complicated and ancient social system. It would be an understatement
to presume that patriarchy is the duty of just men. Girls, too, engage in it by pursuing the
stereotypes of gender and regressive concepts such as 'purity' and 'virginity.' While rape laws
have been reformed over time in India, rape incidents continue to increase every year. This crime
has devastating psychological consequences, such as PTSD, depression, flashbacks, sleep
disturbances, and more, in addition to causing tremendous physical harm to the victim.
Improving protection and security for women in the state will be one step toward reducing this
crime. It is the mindset and mentality of men, like the Supreme Court judges in the Mathura
Rape Case, that needs reformation, rather than strict laws to penalize the wrongdoers.

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 REFERENCES

1. Nandini Satpathy v. Dani (P.L.) & Anr [1978] 3. SCR. 608

2. Mohd. Habib v. State [1988] CriLJ 137.
3. Vishaka & Ors v. State of Rajasthan & Ors [1997] SCR. 3011
4. Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra [1979] 2 SCC 143 [2]
5. The Indian Penal Code, 1860
6. The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 2013
7. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
8. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
9. “Rape Laws in India,” LexisNexis Butterworths India (pp.88-89)
10. Simran, “Case Analysis-Vishaka and others v. State of Rajasthan,”
(http://www.legalserviceindia.com) < http://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-374-
case-analysis-vishaka-and-others-v-s-state-of-rajasthan.html>
11. “Tuka Ram And Anr vs State Of Maharasthra,” (indiankanoon.org) <
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1092711/>
12. (lawlex.org) <https://lawlex.org/>
13. A.R Blackshield, “Capital Punishment in India,” (www.jstor.org) <
https://www.jstor.org/stable/43950631?seq=1>

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