INTELLECTUAL INTUITION AND THE BEGINNING OF FICHTE'S PHILOSOPHY : A NEW

INTERPRETATION
Author(s): Thomas P. HOHLER
Source: Tijdschrift voor Filosofie , MAART 1975, 37ste Jaarg., Nr. 1 (MAART 1975), pp.
52-73
Published by: Peeters Publishers/Tijdschrift voor Filosofie
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40883927

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 INTELLECTUAL INTUITION AND THE
BEGINNING OF FICHTFS PHILOSOPHY:
A NEW INTERPRETATION

by Thomas P. HOHLER

In1 his Differenzschrift of 1801 Hegel asserts that the

foundation of Fichte9 s system is the intellectual intuition, pure thin
of itself, pure self -consciousness, 1 = 1, I am; the absolute is sub
object, and the I is this identity of subject and object '

These words which identify the intellectual intuition with the

principle of Fichte' s Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaft
(1794) were most decisive for every interpretation of Fichte from
time to the present. This interpretation had the greatest impa
situating Fichte as the very first and necessary stage of German Id
whose culmination is Hegel himself.
The goal of this article is to call this interpretation into que
and to suggest a new understanding of Fichte - an understandin
will save Fichte from the clutches of Hegel.
Our modus operandi will be to direct our fullest attention on
himself without being distracted by a direct confrontation with
and without becoming engaged in a discussion of Schilling's no
of the intellectual intuition. Our first part will consist of a descrip
treatment of Fichte's intellectual intuition, especially as it is dis
in Die Zweite Einleitung of 1797. This will lead to a conside

1. G. W. F. Hegel, Differenz des Fichte'schen und S eh ellin ¿sehen System

Philosophie, Werke in zwangzig Banden (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag,
II, 52.

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INTELLECTUAL INTUITION and THE BEGINNING OF FICHTE'S PHILOSOPHY 53

of the intuition as a starting point of the Wissenschaftslehre. At t

point we will examine the Wissenschaftslehre 1798 nova method
where Fichte does explicitly begin with the intellectual intuition. W
will then make an attempt to relate this back to the Grundlage of 1794
Our third section will focus its attention on the actual beginning of th
Grundlage, on the first principle. Finally, the Grundlage will b
considered explicitly as a Grundlage.

DESCRIPTION OF THE INTELLECTUAL INTUITION

In this section we wish to present Fichte' s arguments for the in-

tellectual intuition and the function it serves. As is indicated in the
Erste Einleitung, Fichte' s concern is to account for those representa-
tions which are accompanied by the feeling of necessity. In other words,
how are there objects there for me ? In this question there is implied
that there are objects there for a consciousness ; and consequently, this
means that consciousness must also be aware of itself as being different
from objects. Thus, the question of the ground of the existence of
objects for me becomes the fundamental question.
One might wonder why or how such a question arises in the first
place, for these are not ordinary questions. These are not questions that
are asked in one's daily concerns and occupations. Fichte would main-
tain that this „why ?" which is so necessary for philosophy emerges
from the horizon of a practical independence or autonomy of the
questioner. These philosophical questions come to the fore from a
person who feels the need to ask questions and to secure answers. This
means that they arise out of an act of freedom. Freedom is the inde-
monstrable ground for philosophy, in that freedom is the place wherein
there issues forth a doubt, a question. In this act of freedom whereby
the individual puts into suspension his concernful absorption in the
objects of his concern, he comes to» an awareness of himself. Only on
the basis of an act of freedom can any individual follow the Fichtean
dictum :

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 54 Thomas P. HOHLER

Attend to yourself
and turn it towar
does to its disciples
but only with you y

Thus, the reflectin

1) he is aware of h
and being investiga
but also is simulta
is doing the watch
dimensions of the
Here the going in
outside of itself.
unity of the I.
This activity of th
Only in this act is
is the primordial
because a concept
a determination of
the I immediately
does the acting, i
enact3.

The self-returning
intuition. It is th
self-consciousnes
consciousness.

This first characteristic presents a textual ambiguity concerning the

intellectual intuition. In subsequent passages Fichte relates this intuition
to self-consciousness. Although that activity whereby the I immediately
grasps itself had been identified as the intellectual intuition, and
although that activity was not self-consciousness nor a consciousness of
an object, Fichte writes that
2. J. G. Fichte, S'dmmtlkhe Werke, herausgegeben von J. H. Fichte (Berlin,
de Gruyter, 1971), I, 422. Hencefort S.W. with volume and page.
3. S.W., I, 463.
4. S.W., I, 459.

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INTELLECTUAL INTUITION and THE BEGINNING OF FICHTE'S PHILOSOPHY 55

self-consciousness is immediate ; in it the subjective and the ob

are inseparably joined and are absolutely one.
Such an immediate consciousness is called with the expression
Wissenschaftslehre an intuition 5.

This passage identifies the intellectual intuition with self-co

ness ; but, in terms of the Grundlage' s practical part, th
consciousness is a demand, a practical task, an ideal. In other
self-consciousness is a transcendental ideal that lies in infini
transcendental ideal where self-consciousness is achieved finds its
possibility in the consciousness of the moral law wherein the I alone
can ever get a grasp of itself. This consciousness of the moral ideal too
is the intellectual intuition. „Only through this medium of the moral
law do I catch sight of myself ; and in catching sight of myself, do I
necessarily see myself as self -active' ' 6.
We have seen the ambiguity of Fichte's intellectual intuition. On
the one hand, it is an immediate awareness of the I in its activity ; yet,
on the other hand, it is a consciousness of the moral/practical ideal
never to be attained. Fichte does not seem to distinguish a methodo-
logical unity of the I with itself from an absolute, ideal unity that is
always ahead of the finite I - even though he does make a distinction
between the I as intuition and the I as ideal. There is the confusion

of the I as intellectual intuition from which the Wissenschaftslehre sets

out, and of the I as the ideal with which it ends. In the I as intellectual
intuition lies merely the form of the I-hood, the self-returning activity
which also, of course, becomes the content of that 7.

Ini the first case, the self-returning act of the I is seen as the form of
the I-hood or as the intellectual intuition. In contradistinction to this,
there is the I which „as ideal is the rational being in so far as it has
partly exhibited universal reason perfectly within itself, is indeed
rational throughout, and nothing else but rational* ' 8.

5. S.W., I, 528.
6. S.W., I, 466.
7. S.W., I, 515.
8. S.W., I, 515.

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 56 Thomas P. HOHLER

This ambiguity be
the intellectual in
being passive and
Above, the intel
enacts itself. It i
the one that does
disclosed. This is the active side of the intellectual intuition : in the
very acting the I discovers that it is itself acting, and its ideal thereby
emerges. On the passive side, this intuition is an awareness - an
awareness of the ideal to be realized. This ideal, of course, is total
harmony or unity of the I with itself. It is this harmony that the
passivity expresses as the Ys relationship to its ideal, to its task to be
realized. This ideal serves as the fundamental unity without which no
other act of the I would be possible.
What we have called the methodological unity of the I would be
related to the active side of the intellectual intuition whereas the
absolute ideal unity would be related to the passive side of the same
intuition. In other words, the intellectual intuition can be seen in two
perspectives : as an active posing or as a passive awareness. This dual
perspective accounts for the ambiguity of the intellectual intuition.
This ambiguity whose resolution we have been moving towards is
not made any clearer when Fichte discusses his relationship to Kant in
this regard. In brief, Fichte argues that his intellectual intuition is com-
pletely compatible with the Kantian philosophy - even though that
philosophy explicity does not allow for such an intuition. Fichte relates
it to Kant's unity of apperception and also to the categorical impera-
tive9.

In summary, the intellectual intuition is the I's activity that returns

back on itself. This is the way philosophy must begin and proceed, but
it is not clear whether this is a total consciousness of the self or whether
it is merely a methodological procedure. The question might be posed
in another way : is reflection intuition or vice versa ? Is the I imme-
diately given as such or is it given as a task of concrete reflection ? Is
9. S.W., I, 472.

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INTELLECTUAL INTUITION and THE BEGINNING OF FICHTE'S PHILOSOPHY 57

the thetic posing of the I the beginning or the task of philoso

reflection ? Or finally, does setzen in the Grundlage mean intu
To these questions we might get an access if we try to discov
locus of the intellectual intuition both in terms of the Wissenschaf
lehre in general and the Grundlage in particular. This leads
discussion in the next section where the intellectual intuition as a
starting point will be investigated.

THE INTELLECTUAL INTUITION AS STARTING POINT

Fichte writes that the „Wissenschafslehre proceeds ... from

intellectual intuition, that of the absolute self-activity of the I" 10. W
such a statement, the question is whether the Grundlage of 1794 begin
with the intellectual intuition or whether the intuition should be plac
elsewhere in respect to the Grundlage. This question becomes mo
serious and most critical in the light of the fact that in the Grund
one cannot find any reference to an intellectual intuition. Let us repea
in the Grundlage of 1794 no reference is ever made to any intellec
intuition. What exactly does this all mean if a Wissenschaftslehre mus
proceed from an intellectual intuition, which is the only firm phil
phical perspective ?
If both of these are true - if the Wissenschaftslehre must begin wit
the intellectual intuition and if the Grundlage makes no mention of it
then it would seem, if consistency is to be maintained, that the Grund
lage is not a Wissenschaftslehre. This is not as shocking if we rec
the title of the work of 1794 : Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaf
lehre. For something to be a Grundlage means that it shows the fo
dation, that it is a propaedeutic to the Wissenschaftslehre. What
want to suggest is that the Grundlage is not yet a Wissenschaftsleh
but only an introduction to it.
What takes place in the Grundlage is a description of the structu
of the transœndental imagination, which is the essence of the I and
activity. The unity of this I, the „I am", is the unity of theory a

io. S.W., I, 471.

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58 Thomas P. HOHLER

practice, of nece
This unity of th
ideal unity in wh
itself in order to
This is the Fs pr
It would consequ
when all the syn
point where the
this point has th
been described. O
to philosophize,
own freedom as
philosophy, for t
of freedom is no
can do nothing w
Since the conscio
of the Grundlage
while that it do
rootedness in th
what had remain
plicit the free, f
ditions of the I as
justification of it
of the intellectua
into the „what"
The implications
not begin with th
at the end of the
intuition can st
though the Grun
This clarification
1798 nova metho
11. S.W., 1, 506.

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INTELLECTUAL INTUITION and THE BEGINNING OF FICHTE'S PHILOSOPHY 59

intuition. In this text Fichte begins with the feeling whereas the Grun
lage ended there.
On the introductory page before the introduction of the Wisse
schaft sl ehr e 1798 nova methodo f Fichte makes three remarks t
contrast this new text of 1798 with that of 1794 12. First, the Grundl
of 1794 begins with the theoretical and subsequently moves to th
practical sphere. What is important is the relationship between t
theoretical and the practical. Concerning the 1794 text, the introducto
comment says that the theoretical should be and is explained by
practical. This is correct as can be seen from the 1794 text13. At t
time what was most fundamental was reason's practical dimension e
though reason needed the theoretical to be aware of this priority of th
practical. Secondly, this quite obviously contrasts with the Wissen
schaftslehre of 1798 where the theoretical will explain the practi
sphere. The ground of explanation in the Wissenschaftslehre 1
nova methodo will be the theoretical. Thirdly, Fichte maintains in
Grundlage the distinction between the theoretical and the practic
whereas at its end the distinction seems to break down ; any n
beginning will begin with the „theoretical and the practical joine
Consequently, in this new text of 1798 Fichte presents a structure
the Wissenschaftslehre that does not follow the necessary path laid ou
in the Grundlage. Why can it proceed in this different fashion ?
preliminary answer can be the intellectual intuition.
We wish to show that the Wissenschaftslehre 1798 nova method
does begin and how it begins with the intellectual intuition. We w
tlhen relate this new beginning to the earlier Grundlage, especial
with reference to the third fundamental principle.
As it has been indicated, the intellectual intuition is an activ
whereby the I grasps its own activity, where the subject and the objec
are the same. In essence it is an activity that turns back on itself.
the very first pages of this new text of 1798, we find the same pheno
12. J. G. Fichte, Wissenschaftslehre 1798 nova methodo, Nachgelassene Schrif
herausgegeben von Hans Jacob (Berlin, Junker und Dünnhaupt Verlag, 1937),
343. Henceforth N.S. with volume and page.
13. Confer S.W., I, 126.

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60 Thomas P. HOHLER

menon. In distin
goes to the object

with the represen

same - in the con
but here the activi

This is an immed
in that I pose my
comes forth, I t
both mutually ex
one, or there is a
Though this intu
also become awar
also be a non-activ
that this activity
come to stand, h
senschaftslehre
Darstellung der
ation. This is the
of the I. In the la
Think yourself an
the act of underst
thought of the I
were not especiall
in your conscious
you ; and now you
only with attentio
The inner activit
the concept 16.

Consequently in
with the activity
posed are there t

14. N.S., II, 355.

15. Ibid.
16. S.W., I, 533.

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INTELLECTUAL INTUITION and THE BEGINNING OF FICHTE'S PHILOSOPHY 61

the I are intimately and necessarily connected. They both fall

into one. This means that the I is both subject and object. Suc
beginning of the new Wissenschaftslehre of 1798 17.
With such a beginning Fichte notes that it is the opposite
Grundlage^ of 1794 where the movement was from an accom
fact (Tathandlung) to ,an accomplished fact (Tatsache). Here
the method is reversed because we begin with the determinac
I which is the middle term of the I and the Not-I. In brief, t
Wissenschaftslehre begins with the third foundations! princ
understood at the end of the Grundlage, and not with the first.
what will be shown in the following.
In the Grundlage the third principle is third because it is f
conditioned, but materially unconditioned. It needs the first t
ciples for its own form. This means that it is assigned its tas
,two preceding principles, but that the way in which this task
achieved is completely unconditioned18.
What is this task ? It is to find some point of unity betwee
and the Not-I where both could be maintained as they are
canceling each other and without destroying the unity of consci
This is achieved by means of the concept of divisibility. Mutu
tion is what maintains both the unity of consciousness and the t
ness of what is opposite. Limitation is only a partiu denial or
There is a third act which partially unites the opposed. To lim
set limits between things. Thus, every synthesis is also an an
that „as a Not-I is opposed to an I, accordingly the I which is
and the Not-I which opposes are partially posed" 19.
Consequently, all opposed are alike in one way and all al
opposed in one way. This is true only of part of our knowle
of the whole. It is a principle that grounds all synheses and an
This is the third foundational principle of the Grundlage : t
the Not-I are partially opposed to each other. This means that wh

17. Confer N.S., II, 355-60.

18. Confer S.W., I, 105-06.
19. S.W., I, 109.

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62 Thomas P. HOHLER

there is a situati
can be separated
grounds the poss
which allows th
contains all othe
This means that
of all propositio
word, the form i
This is the thir
gestion is meanin
Wissenschaftsle
1798 work must
wherein opposite
the Grundlage w
question is then
and proceed.
Already we men
the reverse of th
plished fact and
Tatsache with wh
of the beginning
One must infer
from the concept
same time ; there
I acquire the con
concept - the two
the self -returning

This accomplishe
how the I emerg
This „how" is br
activity as restin
- as we saw earli

20. Confer NS., II,

21. N.S., II, 360.

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INTELLECTUAL INTUITION and THE BEGINNING OF FICHTE'S PHILOSOPHY 63

can see how the I emerges. „Thus, we became conscious of our o

activity by the undetermined's flowing over, or, in other words, by
transference from the determinarle to the determined, from the
limited to the limited ; we maintained intuition of our activity'
This means that we intuit both activity and rest at the same time ; a
only because of this can the Wissenschaftslehre begin. This, of co
is the intellectual intuition 23.
The I emerges only when there is a limited activity, i.e. an acti
contrasted with rest. Since this self-returning activity is determ
it is limited. The beginning is a situation where there is a posing
an opposing or where there is an I and a Not-I posed together 24.
the Wissenschaftslehre of 1798 begins with the I and the Not-I b
partially opposed to each other ; it begins with the third princip
the Grundlage. This Fichte affirms when he writes the follow
„Critical idealism - the Wissenschaftslehre and with it fully
Kantian system - proceeds from the absolutely joined acciden
both - or from the mutual working of the I and the Not-I" 25.
It seems that the Wissenschaftslehre does begin with the intelle
intuition, but this is only possible because this intuition is related to
third principle as that principle is understood at the end of the Gru
lage. The intellectual intuition is not related to the first principle ; t
means that this first principle must be reinterpreted as the starting
of the Grundlage.

THE FIRST PRINCIPLE AS A STARTING POINT

In this section we must show that the Grundlage begins in a different

way : different from the writing of 1798 and from the intellectual
intuition. This means we must give a detailed analysis and interpreta-
tion of the first principle as first. In the very first paragraph Fichte
begins by stating that he wants „to look for the absolutely first, abso-

22. ibid.
23. Confer S.W., I, 463 and also N.S., II, 357.
24. Confer N.S., II, 361-67.
25. N.S., II, 384.

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64 Thomas P. HOHLER

luely unconditio
ledge' ' 26. He wa
that serves as t
expresses is an ac
Immediately Fic
tinguished from
result of the for
which is dependen
Tathandlung and
and the founded
this grounding t
grounded. This
expressed in the
this primordial ac
Since this activity
ness and must be
this activity as th
ness we can proc
means the groun
think anything w
question of wheth
ble. Indubitabili
fundamental pro
With this logica
makes it quite c
copula in contrad
exist". Being can
relational or con
e.g. „A is A" or „
existential meani
subject, e.g. „Th
situation we are

26. S.W., I, 91.

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INTELLECTUAL INTUITION and THE BEGINNING OF FICHTE'S PHILOSOPHY 65

only with the copula meaning where the two terms are relate
maintains this distinction, but does not presently develop it.
Another important feature that is present in the propositio
it is certain, but there is no further ground for this certainty ot
that it is such in and by itself. This certainty is self-evident and
doubt. For „this proposition is absolutely certain, i.e. wit
further reason : and in saying this, undoubtedly with general ap
one ascribes to himself the possibility to pose something absolut
What Fichte is indicating is the possibility of posing someth
solutely. Man's freedom means that man can pose something abso
To be free means to be able to pose something without any g
justification other than itself. It is this which emerges here
merely logical statement. Fichte, however, is not speakin
anything existing, but only about a logical relation.
Since we are not concerned with whether A exists or not, b
with the formal relation between the two members, we are s
for that which can account for the transition, for the passing o
A on the left (Ai) to A on the right (Ar). In other words, w
that holds the two together in the „is" ? This Fichte calls „X
What can now be said about the beginning of the Grundlag
it begins conspicuously with a merely logical assertion, but t
contains more and implies more. It immediately confronts us
possibility of freedom, an act of posing something absolutel
leads us to investigate this „X" further.
Thus, far, we began with „A is A" (A = A) and saw that
not concerned with the existence of the A. This „is" was m
relation. In focusing on the formal aspect alone, we came to this
then A is". This was based on „X" ; but here, in the expressio
the „is" is without a predicate and consequently expresses an e
meaning. With the givenness of A as existing (Ar), under w
ditions does or can this givenness take place ? Beginning
existing we want to trace it back to the conditions of its pos
When and how can there be an A ? We no longer are at a mer
27. S.W., I, 93.

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66 Thomas P. HOHLER

connection, but ar
proposition asser
of judging. The u
A - the unity c
other be in the I
and from which,
The logical move
is the condition
expressed in the
judgement groun
„X" accounts for
of unification. T
under which A c
and, therefore, it
it is posed by a
the rule of conn
itself and theref
himself as bound
it ultimately goe
Consequently, the
the judging I abs
in general ; this
specifically posing
that is continuall
absolutely posed

This means, that

between Ai and A
sameness or self
because of the rul
posing of it by t
- self -identity -
words, the rule o
or in the „I am
28. S.W., I, 94.

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INTELLECTUAL INTUITION and THE BEGINNING OF FICHTE'S PHILOSOPHY 67

We have arrived at the source of identity in the posing of th

The validity of the proposition „A^A" is grounded in the „1
There is, however, a difference between the proposition „A = A
that of „I = I". This difference is that in the case of the forme
entire content is conditioned by something other than itself. It dep
at least on the „X" or on the identity derived from „I = I". Conve
„I am I" is posed absolutely and is unconditioned. It is pose
identical to itself absolutely and not on condition of anything els
„I am" is disclosed through and by means of the logical propos
„A = A". This means that the latter is only a Tatsache, but not y
ultimate Tathandung. Any posing of anything in the I requires
the I must also be posed before hand. We have not yet seen this
absolute act that grounds all.
It is now required to go from a judging activity to an absolute
posing activity, from a particular activity to a pure activity. This p
activity is one that expresses its own being. To pose is its very b
and to be is its posing. The am of the „I am" means a posing
affirming of itself, that the I poses or affirms its being. The I
its own being, and its own being is to pose itself. The being of
is self-affirmation, self-assertion ; it is a necessary and essential ch
ter of the being of the I or of the I-hood of the I. This is to say
the I is to be understood as absolute subject. „That whose bei
essence merely consists of posing itself as being is the I as abs
subject" 29.
Thus we have come to the I-hood of the I. We have discovered that
this „I am" which is a pure activity, a Tathandlung, consists of a self-
posing. It is this that determines it as an absolute subject : its being is
to affirm or pose itself ; and in so doing, it is. What does Fichte mean
by absolute subject ? One important dimension of this absolute charac-
ter is that it is a subject without any predicate, an „is" that expresses
an existential meaning rather that a relational one. The „I am" has this
existential meaning for its „is", but in a unique way : it is the com-
pletely unconditioned. In other words, since the „I am" originally does
29. S.W., I, 97.

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 68 Thomas P. HOHLER

not have a predic

predicates.
Expressed differently, the I-hood of the I is the posing or the affirm-
ing of itself. The self-posing of its being designates the I as absolute
subject. This self-posing implies that the I is necessarily and originally
an I that has only possible predicates. In and by this self-posing of its
being a world can open up for it. This thetic self-posing opens up for
the I a whole realm of possibility, but this posing must take place in
the desert. It must be absolute ; but in this self-posing of itself in a
desert without predicates, the Ts absolute character emerges as a
necessity to move from itself, outside itself, and beyond itself. This
means that the first principle - because it is the first principle - moves
on to a second principle.
With this positive meaning of the absolute character of the subject
so articulated, the negative sense can now be seen. At this point, this
absolute dimension does not mean that all that is, can be found in the
subject and by the subject. This may be the case, but it has not been
shown at this point in the Grundlage. In other words, Fichte has not
indicated that to be an absolute subject means to have a vision of the
absolute or to have absolute knowledge. There is not a vision nor an
intellectual intuition of the I's identity with itself. The absolute subject
does not know itself absolutely as might be the case for Schelling or
Hegers understanding of Fichte. At this point we do have the Ts being
for itself ; but by this, Fichte merely wants to express the identity of
the self-affirmation of the I and its being. This had been indicated a
little while ago. The for-itself does not mean an intuition or a vision
of itself - this is not the meaning of the absolute subject. That the
„/ originally poses its own being absolutely ™ means that the I is a
self and not a thing ; but this distinction between the self and a thing
already leads us beyond the first principle. There is no way for
determining the difference between that whose being is to affirm that
being, and that which is opened up for that being. What is affirmed,
30. S.W., I, 98.

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INTELLECTUAL INTUITION and THE BEGINNING OF FICHTE'S PHILOSOPHY 69

however, is that the I is an identity from which all identity

spring.
This last sentence is most thought provoking because of the light it
sheds on the notion of absolute subject. As Fichte so emphatically has
indicated, the certainty of a logical proposition as a beginning has
shown that this too is derived from and grounded in the self, in its
self-identity. Fichte pursues this through two abstractions until he
arrives at the category of reality. In this and by this category, what is
real emerges as that to which the identity expressed in „A = A" can
be applied. „Every thing to which the proposition A = A is applicable
has reality in so far as this [proposition] is applicable to it" 31. This
category defines what is real ; and this is defined in terms of the
applicability of identity. What does this mean ?
We get an insight into the meaning of the real in the very next
sentence in which Fichte conjoins it with essence (das Wesen). What
Fichte suggests is an identity of reality and the essence. „That which is
posed by the mere posing of something (that which is posed in the I),
is the reality in it [proposition], is its essence' ' 32. This recais the
Kantian notion of real 33. By reality Fiche does not mean actuality, for
reality is more closely related to essence.
Reality is related to the whatness of something, to that which
constitutes something to be this unity as opposed to that unity. We are
not at all concerned with the actual existence of something, but with
what something essentially is. It is a determination of something as to
its thing character and is that pre-condition which is demanded prior
to any discussion of its actuality or non-existence. It is that unity which
must confront me as an object over against me as subject. In other
words, reality is the determination of the object, is that aspect which
guarantees the self-sameness necessary to even speak of existence or
non-existence. Since we have seen that this category of reality is
31. S.W., I, 99.
32. Ibid.
33. In this connection confer Martin Heidegger, What is a Thing ? (Chicago,
Gateway, 1967), pp. 206-22.

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70 Thomas P. HOHLER

founded on the i
anything as an o
supposed and dem
in the subject. On
and identity of a
i.e. one which is
ground for the r
itself : an identi
subject can there
again, this immed
In this present d
of the identity o
lage with the in
activity as its ow
handlung as grou
moved from its
course of the te
task. In no place
of this activity. T
a desert, and yet
practical sphere. T
and intuitively l
then can philoso
and proceed. At t
self-posing is no
conscious of its o
and is the essent
The I demands th
the infinite. On
I necessarily lies
been speaking. (H
absolutely, first b

34. S.W., I, 277.

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INTELLECTUAL INTUITION and THE BEGINNING OF FICHTE'S PHILOSOPHY 71

THE GRUNDLAGE AS A GRUNDLAGE

With the development of the two previous sections, our final task
is to articulate the meaning of the Grundlage as a Grundlage. This
means that we show how the Grundlage of 1794 can be understood,
not as the whole system, but as an introduction to the system. We wil
look at Fichte's own division of his system or Wissenschaftslehre with
particular emphasis on the Grundlage 35. Any conclusions or implica-
tions will then be drawn out.
In the last pages of the Wissenschaftslehre 1798 nova methodo the
necessary divisions of the Wissenschaftslehre are described. Without
giving a detailed analysis of the divisions, let us note that there are
two main divisions : the Wissenschaftslehre of theory and the one of
praxis. The former is an empirics (Empirie) that tries to show how the
world is and must be, i.e. how the world is given. The latter is concer-
ned with the individual in his moral concerns and dimensions. Here the
question is how the world should be for rational beings. There are
made further distinctions and divisions : logic, philosophy of religion,
aesthetics.

The essential concern is how Fichte himself relates the Grundlage

to the entire system.

This Wissenschaftslehre must be contained in our Grundlage ; and it is

so contained, but only according to its main features. The particular
science is distinguished from the whole in that the particular science
proceeds to the determination of the individual which is contained in the
main concept ; and the universal science, on the contrary, remains
situated within the main concept and its determinacy.
... Only the fundamental concepts belong in the Grundlage - not
everything that emerges in consciousness ; and so it has been. But all that
is in consciousness must be found there by analysis of the fundamental
concepts contained in the Grundlage 36.

35. Confer the excellent article of Reinhard Lauth, „Le problème de l'interper-
sonalité chez J. G. Fichte," Archives de Philosophie, XXV (juillet-décembre, 1962),
336-44.
36. N.S., II, 606.

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72 Thomas P. HOHLER

Here Fichte expli

the Wissenschaft
features and pri
appropriate. In th
and exposed in o
analysed in the pa
It can be said tha
for the Wissensc
furnish the mate
Grundlage with t
formal dimension
which any furth
foundation that i
Wissenschaftslehre

As has been indic

logical propositio
we can trace back
discovered the gr
it can be said tha
begins with the po
way through the
and justification.
This dual aspect o
can be seen in th
Grundlage. Gradua
stand that this I
standing. This I,
comes to appropri
exhibited at the o
of the Grundlage,
conditions and li
certainty from w
maintain and atta

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INTELLECTUAL INTUITION and THE BEGINNING OF FICHTE'S PHILOSOPHY 73

fallibility is as present as any certainty 37. „So infallibel das Wissen

so fallibel ist dessen Nachkonstruktion" 38. The Grundlage pres
the reasons, or better yet, the necessary situation of every philosop
reflection.
Thus, in the development of the various parts of the system, there
is always this precarious background. Each of the deductions, e.g. those
of the Naturrecht, always stems from and returns to what has been
laid down in the Grundlage. Consequently, the Grundlage is both an
introduction and a foundation. This means one cannot enter the
Wissenschaftslehre without going through the Grundlage, nor can one
leave it behind. Thus, the Wissenschaftslehre is a continual beginning
and re-beginning pragma of the charting of that movement toward
self-understanding and self-consciousness ; for, as philosophers, we
are „pragmatic writers of the history1 ' of the human spirit 39.

37. Hans Radermacher, Fichtes Begriff des Absoluten (Frankfurt am Main, Klos-
termann, 1970), pp. 39-66.
38. Ibtd., p. 44.
39. Confer S.W., I, 77.

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