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Issue 1:

Whether insanity can be a ground of defense against rape and murder of a minor?

A 2011 forensic psychiatry study in which 5024 prisoners were evaluated in a semi-
structured interview program showed the analysis that 4002 (79.6%) people could be
diagnosed with disease diagnosis—mental or substance use. The philosophical basis for the
exemption of crazy transgressors from criminal responsibility is perhaps the functional
limitation of retributive and dissuasive theories of punishment that highlights the provision
of section 84 of the Indian Criminal Code that is based on Mc Naughten's 1843 Rule in
England.

In this scenario, without any doubt or requirement to be proved again, it has already been
established that the defendant has a psychological disorder which was proved with proper
evaluation. This was the reasoning over which the dependent head prior received an
acquittal and remained the basic ground of acquittal in this scenario.

There is a well-established principle, "Actus Non-Facit Reum Nisi Mens Sit Rea," which
literally means an act does not make an offender liable without a guilty mind. The offender's
Intention or guilty mind (Mens Rea) is an integral part of committing a crime. The defense of
insanity is a law that protects a person incapable of understanding the nature of the act
done by him.

The first case which dealt with the law of insanity was R v. Arnold (1724), in which Edward
Arnold attempted to kill and even wound Lord Onslow and was tried for the same. The
evidence clearly showed that the accused had a mental disorder. J. observed:
"If he was under the visitation of God and could not distinguish between good and evil, and
did not know what he did, though he committed the greatest offense, yet he could not be
guilty of any offense against any law whatsoever."
The very basic point that the defendant has a mental disease was that the root cause of this
unfortunate incident and the disease could solely be held responsible itself and not the
dependent, who is also a victim of this unfortunate disorder. This disorder and any actions
he commits due to this disorder remain beyond his control, and he should not be held liable
for them.

The hearing of M'Naughten and his release was a topic of discussion in the House of Lords,
and as a consequence, they called upon fifteen judges to decide on the question of criminal
liability in the cases where the accused is incapable of understanding the nature of the act
and also answered the questions advanced. Fourteen judges had the same answers. Tindal
C.J. gave the view of the majority; these answers to the questions are known as
M'Naughten's Rule. The following principles were cited:
If the person knew what he was doing or was only under partial delusion, he is punishable.
There is an assumption that every man is prudent or sane, knows what he is doing, and is
responsible for the same.

To establish a defense based on insanity, it must be ascertained at the time of perpetrating


the act the accused was in such a state of mind as was unable to know the nature of the act
committed by him.
A person with sufficient medical knowledge or is a medical man and is familiar with the
disease of insanity cannot be asked to give his opinion because it is for the jury to determine
and decide upon the questions.

In this unfortunate scenario, the defendant was unaware of what he was doing and was not
under partial delusion but a complete state of delusion which has already been proven in
the previous Court. Therefore, it cannot in any way make the defendant punishable because
it is very objective that Mens Rea was missing.

However, it was just a spectrum of uncontrollable rage, as the learned doctors and their
reports proved. Every man is prudent or sane and is aware of what he is doing, and
responsible for the same does not apply here because the very nature of him being prudent
or sane is absent in a defendant's case. We have been able to prove that during the time of
the perpetrating act by the defendant on the victim, the defendant was in no proper state of
mind and was unable to decide the nature of the act he committed there and was in a state
of unawareness. All these important matters of facts having proved by doctors with
sufficient mental and medical knowledge who specialize in this very criminal logical mental
disorder with the disease of insanity whose opinions have prior established the very fact of
insanity in the case of a defendant.

In Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, a person of an unsound mind shall act- Nothing is an
offense committed by someone currently unable to know the nature of the act or does what
is wrong or contrary to legislation due to a lack of a sound mind.
For this defense, the following elements are to be established-
The accused was in a state of unsoundness of mind at the time of the act.
He could not know the nature of the act or do what was either wrong or contrary to the law.
The term 'wrong' differs from 'contrary to the law.'

In Rattan Lal v. State of M.P., it was well established by the Court that the crucial point of
time at which the unsound mind should be established is the time when the crime is actually
committed and whether the accused was in such a state of mind as to be entitled to benefit
from Section 84 can only be determined from the circumstances that preceded, attended
and followed the crime. In other words, the behavior precedent, attendant, and subsequent
to the event may be relevant in determining the mental condition of the accused at the time
of the commission of the offense.

Irresistible impulse is a sort of insanity where the person cannot control his actions even if
he understands that the act is wrong. In some cases, the Irresistible Impulse Test was
considered a variation of Mc'Naughten's rule; in others, it was recognized as a separate test.
Though the Irresistible Impulse Test was deemed an essential corrective to Mc'Naughten's
selective perception, it still had some criticisms.

In the case Shrikant Anandrao Bhosale v. State of Maharashtra, it was held that the accused
had paranoid schizophrenia, and he was incapable of comprehending the nature of the act
committed by him. Therefore he was not guilty of murder and will be given the benefit of
section 84, IPC.
In the scenario, the psychiatrist has done a fine job of analyzing the defendant on all the
important factors that need to be considered. Assessment focusing on mental state at the
time of the offense.

The psychiatrist tried to assess the accused's mental state at the time of the infraction. The
psychiatrist tried to assess the accused's mental state during the offense.
The mental state test was done without important questions. The psychiatrist asked open-
ended questions and must refrain from asking important questions. The patient was
admitted, and performed a serial examination of the ward's mental state and serial
observations was performed.
ISSUE 2:
Whether confession made in police custody a substantive piece of evidence?

A conviction can be based solely on confession if the Court is satisfied with the voluntariness
and trustworthiness of confession. The level of satisfaction of the Court must be of a high
degree.

The Court must satisfy itself as to the willingness of the accused to confess because
confession may not always be voluntary and true. Sometimes it may be because of mental
aberration, vanity, to escape physical and moral torture, etc. which reduces its probative
value. Therefore, a legal duty has been cast upon the Court to ascertain whether the
accused's confession is voluntary.

In a defendant's case, the initial confession of what the defendant had done without being
in his senses was only present in his mind as the fragrance was done to the police
themselves. Therefore any fragment of information the defendant has passed on to the
police can also be considered fragments of his imagination due to his disorder playing an
important role in his mind.

Having no accurate memory of the defendant of the particular interrogation done on him by
the police due to his disorder also, the confession made to the police is unreliable and in the
scope of manipulation done by them. This confession does not meet the level of satisfaction
a court needs or must acquire before making it admissible in the proceedings. The
confession was not just involuntary but also untrustworthy simply due to the inadmissibility
of a statement made by someone with an unsound mind, which in this case is the defendant
himself.

In Sahoo v State of Uttar Pradesh, 1965, it was held that in case of confessions, courts must
apply a double test; Whether the confession was perfectly voluntary. If so, whether it is true
and trustworthy. If a confessional statement satisfies both conditions, it may be relied upon.
Admissibility is not based on logic but on law and strict rules. All admissible evidence is
relevant, but all relevant evidence is not admissible. The confession as a piece of evidence
appears very relevant because it is inexplicable why any person would deliver a statement
against their own interests. However, it's not admissible in all cases.

In this case, the statement made by the defendant is inadmissible in the first place itself due
to the nature of it being acquired from the defendant while he was not in sound mind full
stop the defendant, who has an acute mental disorder, was not in his correct state of sound
mind or diligent mindset as required to be present on anyone whose confession is being
acquired makes the entire statement or concession by him in advisable in Court.

Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 provides for the inadmissibility of confession
made to a police officer. It says that 'no confession made to a police officer can be proved as
against the accused.' Section 25 imposes a bar on the admissibility of confession made to a
police officer and excludes it from evidence against the accused under any circumstances.
Whether such a person is in police custody or not or whether the statement is made during
an investigation is irrelevant.

In Queen Empress v Babu Lal, 1898, it was observed that the objective underlying this rule
was to prevent the practices of torture and oppression by police officers to extort
confessions and secure convictions. If confession to a police officer is made admissible, the
police officers would go to the heights of torturing the accused and compel him to make an
involuntary statement merely to gain credit, which would result in grave injustice.

In State Of U.P. vs. Deoman Upadhyaya on 6 May 1960, it was said by the majority's opinion
that the appeal is allowed. Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act and s. 162, sub-s. (2), of the
Code of Criminal Procedure in so far as "that section relates to s. 27 of the Indian Evidence
Act", are intra vires and do not offend Art. 14 of the Constitution. The order of the High
Court acquitting the respondent is also set aside, and the order of the Court of Sessions
convicting the accused (respondent) under s. Three hundred two of the Indian Penal Code
and sentencing him to death is restored.

In State of Punjab v. Bhagwan Singh, the Supreme Court, in this case, held that an
extrajudicial confession's value only increases when it is consistent and convincing to the
conclusion of the case; otherwise, the accused cannot be held liable for the conviction solely
based on the confession made by him.

In, Sahadevan v. State of Tamil Nadu, the Supreme Court, while deciding the case, has made
few principles in the form of guidelines where the Court has to check such principles before
admitting the confession of the accused; the following principles mentioned by the Supreme
Court are:
Extrajudicial confessions are generally a very weak kind of evidence itself, and the Court
must examine such statements efficiently.
The people will make an extrajudicial confession, and such statements must be true.
The evidentiary value of extrajudicial confession instantly increases when it is supported by
other such evidence.
The statements of the confessor must prove his guilt like any other fact in issue is proven in
the judicial proceedings.
In State of M.P. Vs. Paltan Mallah (2005 S.C.), it has been held that extrajudicial confession is
good evidence but must be passed through a stringent test of corroboration and proof. It
cannot be the sole basis of conviction. Extrajudicial confession against a co-accused can be
used under Section 30.

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