OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

(GR. No. L-27760. May 29, 1974.]

CRISPIN ABELLANA and FRANCISCO ABELLANA, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE GERONIMO R.
MARAVE, Judge, Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch II; and GERONIMO
CAMPANER, MARCELO LAMASON, MARIA GURREA, PACIENCIOSA FLORES and ESTELITA
NEMEÑO, Respondents.

Prud, V. Villafuerte, for Petitioners.

Hon. Geronimo R. Marave in his own behalf.

DECISION

FERNANDO, J.:

This petition for certiorari is characterized by a rather vigorous insistence on the part of petitioners
Crispin Abellana and Francisco Abellana that an order of respondent Judge was issued with grave
abuse of discretion. It is their contention that he ought to have dismissed an independent civil action filed
in his court, considering that the plaintiffs, as offended parties, private respondents here, 1 failed to
reserve their right to institute it separately in the City Court of Ozamis City, when the criminal case for
physical injuries through reckless imprudence was commenced. Such a stand of petitioners was sought
to be bolstered by a literal reading of Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111. 2 It does not take into account,
however, the rule as to a trial de novo found in Section 7 of Rule 123. 3 What is worse, petitioners
appear to be oblivious of the principle that if such an interpretation were to be accorded the applicable
Rules of Court provisions, it would give rise to a grave constitutional question in view of the constitutional
grant of power to this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure being
limited in the sense that they "shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights." 4 It thus appears
clear that the petition for certiorari is without merit.

The relevant facts were set forth in the petition and admitted in the answer. The dispute had its origins in
a prosecution of petitioner Francisco Abellana of the crime of physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in driving his cargo truck, hitting a motorized pedicab resulting in injuries to its passengers,
namely, private respondents Marcelo Lamason, Maria Gurrea, Pacienciosa Flores, and Estelita Nemeño.
The criminal case was filed with the city court of Ozamis City, which found the accused Francisco
Abellana guilty as charged, damages in favor of the offended parties likewise being awarded. The
accused, now petitioner, Francisco Abellana appealed such decision to the Court of First Instance. 5 At
this stage, the private respondents as the offended parties filed with another branch of the Court of First
Instance of Misamis Occidental, presided by respondent Judge, a separate and independent civil action
for damages allegedly suffered by them from the reckless driving of the aforesaid Francisco Abellana. 6
In such complaint, the other petitioner, Crispin Abellana, as the alleged employer, was included as
defendant. Both of them then sought the dismissal of such action principally on the ground that there
was no reservation for the filing thereof in the City Court of Ozamis. It was argued by them that it was not
allowable at the stage where the criminal case was already on appeal. 7

Respondent Judge was not persuaded. On April 28, 1967, he issued the following order: "This is a
motion to dismiss this case or the ground that in Criminal Case No. OZ-342 which was decided by the
City Court and appealed to this Court, the offended parties failed to expressly waive the civil action or
reserve their right to institute it separately in said City Court, as required in Section 1, Rule 111, Rules of
Court. From the Records of Criminal Case No. OZ-342, it appears that the City Court convicted the
accused. On appeal to this Court, the judgment of the City Court was vacated and a trial de novo will
have to be conducted. This Court has not as yet begun trying said criminal case. In the meantime, the
offended parties expressly waived in this Court the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
and reserve their right to institute a separate action as in fact, they did file. The Court is of the opinion
that at this stage, the offended parties may still waive the civil action because the judgment of the City
Court is vacated and a trial de novo will have to be had. In view of this waiver and reservation, this Court
would be precluded from judging civil damages against the accused and in favor of the offended parties.
[Wherefore], the motion to dismiss is hereby denied. . . ." 8 There was a motion for reconsideration which
was denied. Hence this petition.

The only basis of petitioners for the imputation that in the issuance of the challenged order there was a
grave abuse of discretion, is their reading of the cited Rules of Court provision to the effect that upon the
institution of a criminal action "the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charge
is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party . . . reserves his right to institute
it separately." 9 Such an interpretation, as noted, ignores the de novo aspect of appealed cases from city
courts. 10 It does likewise, as mentioned, give rise to a constitutional question to the extent that it could
yield a meaning to a rule of court that may trench on a substantive right. Such an interpretation is to be
rejected. Certiorari, to repeat, clearly does not lie.

1. In the language of the petition, this is the legal proposition submitted for the consideration of this
Court: "That a separate civil action can be legally filed and allowed by the court only at the institution, or
the right to file such separate civil action reserved or waived, at such institution of the criminal action,
and never on appeal to the next higher court." 11 It admits of no doubt that an independent civil action
was filed by private respondents only at the stage of appeal. Nor was there any reservation to that effect
when the criminal case was instituted in the city court of Ozamis. Petitioners would then take comfort
from the language of the aforesaid Section 1 of Rule 111 for the unwarranted conclusion that absent
such a reservation, an independent civil action is barred. In the first place, such an inference does not
per se arise from the wording of the cited rule. It could be looked upon plausibly as a non-sequitur.
Moreover, it is vitiated by the grievous fault of ignoring what is so explicitly provided in Section 7 of Rule
123: "An appealed case shall be tried in all respects anew in the Court of First Instance as if it had been
originally instituted in that court." 12 Unlike petitioners, respondent Judge was duly mindful of such a
norm. This Court has made clear that its observance in appealed criminal cases is mandatory. 13 In a
1962 decision, People v. Carreon, 14 Justice Barrera, as ponente, could trace such a rule to a 1905
decision, Andres v. Wolfe. 15 Another case cited by him is Crisostomo v. Director of Prisons, 16 where
Justice Malcolm emphasized how deeply-rooted in Anglo-American legal history is such a rule. In the
latest case in point, People v. Jamisola, 17 this Court, through Justice Dizon, reiterated such a doctrine
in these words: "The rule in this jurisdiction is that upon appeal by the defendant from a judgment of
conviction by the municipal court, the appealed decision is vacated and the appealed case `shall be tried
in all respects anew in the court of first instance as if it had been originally instituted in that court." 18 So
it is in civil cases under Section 9 of Rule 40. 19 Again, there is a host of decisions attesting to its
observance. 20 It cannot be said then that there was an error committed by respondent Judge, much
less a grave abuse of discretion, which is indispensable if this petition were to prosper.

2. Nor is the above the only ground for rejecting the contention of petitioners. The restrictive
interpretation they would place on the applicable rule does not only result in its emasculation but also
gives rise to a serious constitutional question. Article 33 of the Civil Code is quite clear: "In cases of . . .
physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may
be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." 21 That is a substantive right, not to be frittered
away by a construction that could render it nugatory, if through oversight, the offended parties failed at
the initial stage to seek recovery for damages in a civil suit. As referred to earlier, the grant of power to
this Court, both in the present Constitution and under the 1935 Charter, does not extend to any
diminution, increase or modification of substantive right. 22 It is a well-settled doctrine that a court is to
avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as would give rise to a constitutional doubt.
Unfortunately, Petitioners, unlike respondent Judge, appeared to lack awareness of the undesirable
consequence of their submission. Thus is discernible another insuperable obstacle to the success of this
suit.

3. Nor is this all that needs to be said. It is understandable for any counsel to invoke legal propositions
impressed with a certain degree of plausibility if thereby the interest of his client would be served. That is
though, merely one aspect of the matter. There is this other consideration. He is not to ignore the basic
purpose of a litigation, which is to assure parties justice according to law. He is not to fall prey, as
admonished by Justice Frankfurter, to the vice of literalness. The law as an instrument of social control
will fail in its function if through an ingenious construction sought to be fastened on a legal norm,
particularly a procedural rule, there is placed an impediment to a litigant being given an opportunity of
vindicating an alleged right. 23 The commitment of this Court to such a primordial objective has been
manifested time and time again." 24

WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari is dismissed Costs against petitioners.

G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano,
deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said
minor, defendants-appellees.

Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.

Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.

BARREDO, J.:

Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case
No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of
defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor,
married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living
and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of
which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not
criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."

Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:

1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of
the Revised Rules of Court;

2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;

3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as
guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by marriage.

(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])

was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants of such
denial, reiterating the above grounds that the following order was issued:

Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14, 1965 and after
thoroughly examining the arguments therein contained, the Court finds the same to be meritorious and
well-founded.

WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by ordering the
dismissal of the above entitled case.

SO ORDERED.

Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)

Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our resolution the
following assignment of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF
DEFENDANTS THAT -

I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE
107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE
111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;

II

THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;

III

THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE
INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and

IV

THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL
BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH
EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)

It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald
Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City.
After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to
kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us with a copy of the decision
of acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in the
court's decision. And so, when appellants filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father,
Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss above-
referred to.

As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented for Our resolution
are:

1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein
the action for civil liability, was not reversed?

2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill,
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a
minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?

The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further clarification of the
dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly
established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated, on
the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation
to culpa criminal or delito and mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same
given act can result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus,
the opinion holds:

The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist. come under both the Penal
Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent killeth unjustified and fraudulent and
therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper
subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer
and not the employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1

It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case
because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is
therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter either of a criminal
action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent
civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the
separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly
recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted
and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this
civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2

It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil
Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple
negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence,
nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3

The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this
case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood, in the past, it might
not he inappropriate to indicate their foundations.

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If
we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished
by law, accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of  culpa
aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and
damage to property- through any degree of negligence - even the slightest - would have to be Idemnified
only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere
would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to
bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed
to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of
the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902
to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.

Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in
damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable
doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should
be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there
would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on
this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and
for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown
up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime,
forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless
and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-
contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is
high time we pointed out to the harms done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility
for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we
caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters
may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the
better safeguarding or private rights because it realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the
further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a
criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure
adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)

Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from the
opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to
contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal
that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually extends to fault
or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain
of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article
1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations
"which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene
shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely
the underline qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an
ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth
lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost
lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-
delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And
so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of the
new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no
longer uses the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa
aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary
or matter. Thus, the corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162,
simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2,
Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article
2177 of the new code provides:

ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling,
is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The
former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient
origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such
distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained
by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by
Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an
accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a
subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a
quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the Code)
Commission, p. 162.)

Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same
argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that
which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And
considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes
the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles
29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same
separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with
modern progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co.,
7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not
only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not
he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed,
if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in
such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for
the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. 4

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability
for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the
possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of
appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil
Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full
or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of
age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father
or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or
guardian."

Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of
his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." In
the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and
getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald
was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of
presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise
their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons.  5 On the other hand,
the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not,
nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not
carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See
Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action.
Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that
the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or
encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent.
(Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)

Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation
by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of
equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in
accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.

G.R. No. 155800             March 10, 2006

LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,
vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love
transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always
disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in the
modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouse’s capability to fulfill the marital
obligations even more.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals dated

29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment 3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie
Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and affirm instead
the trial court.

Antecedent Facts

Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36
years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel 4 at
the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding 5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish,
Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990. 6 Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April
1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.

On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void.
He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that
respondent’s incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the
present.8

As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent

persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment
and other events or things, 9 to wit:

(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, 10 and instead introduced
the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the boy’s
parentage when petitioner learned about it from other sources after their marriage. 11

(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in
fact, no such incident occurred. 12

(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told
some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither. 13

(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company
(Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the
group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in
her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect 14 but petitioner discovered per certification by
the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken place. 15

(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy
letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in
the commercial industry worth P2 million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one
who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels. 17 He likewise
realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when he discovered
they were not known in or connected with Blackgold. 18

(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it
appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner
that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer. 19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended
up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.20

(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to
monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in
August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her
for good in November 1991.21

In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist,
and Dr. Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner
was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they
observed that respondent’s persistent and constant lying

to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on
love, trust and respect.22 They further asserted that respondent’s extreme jealousy was also pathological.
It reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was
having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. 23

In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending to
all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated
stories, told lies and invented personalities.24 She presented her version, thus:

(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her
husband.25

(2) She told petitioner about David’s attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent from
David’s act of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot. 26

(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the
Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years.27

(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she
had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson &
Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she
was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She
claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8
December 1979.28

(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were not
fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes
Santos was employed with Saniwares.29

(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked the
latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor
her husband’s whereabouts.30

(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her
monthly budget of P7,000.00.31

In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the other
lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality
of the evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part. 32

In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the
allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by
his assistant,33 together with the screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological
Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that respondent was not psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive behavior, gross
neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are signs that might point to the
presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent. 34

In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i)
he was not the one who administered and interpreted respondent’s psychological evaluation, and (ii) he
made use of only one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the
results of such test.35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that respondent’s propensity
to lying about almost anything−her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among
others−had been duly established. According to the trial court, respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and
fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her
psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her
marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.

Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila
annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the
parties.37 During the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunal’s
ruling was affirmed with modification by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held
instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion. 38 Subsequently, the decision of
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican. 39

Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate
court reversed the RTC’s judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been completely
honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented
was insufficient to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in
the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals 40 governing the application and interpretation of psychological
incapacity had not been satisfied.

Taking exception to the appellate court’s pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He
contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondent’s psychological incapacity.

In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by the
RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner. 41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions
of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate
courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving
testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof. 42 The Court is likewise guided by the fact that
the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the
appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to establish the psychological incapacity
of respondent.43

Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the
crucial question remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the
standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These
standards were definitively laid down in the Court’s 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals 44 (also
known as the Molina case45), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing
the RTC in the case at bar. 46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to squarely
affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. 47 In fact, even
before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,48 wherein
the Court definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.

This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by Article
36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned. 49 Yet what Molina and the
succeeding cases did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner
seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity under the proper
circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised
the bar for its allowance.

Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36

Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization."50 The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in
our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of
a marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full
enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting marriage." 51 Marriages with such persons were
ordained as void,52 in the same class as marriages with underage parties and persons already married,
among others. A party’s mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the Divorce Law of
1917,53 but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was cited
as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929. 54 Divorce on the ground of a spouse’s
incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese occupation. 55 Upon
the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was
classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage. 56 The mental capacity, or lack
thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab
initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is
one contracted by a party of unsound mind.58

Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity impinges
on consent freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract. 59 The initial common
consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute
a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code
revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of
consent, and conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but
was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations. 60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the
1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological incapacity to comply with
the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage." 61

There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code
committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be

juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage
only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for
annulment of the marriage only." 62 At the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were
psychological incapacity to understand the essential marital obligations, because then this would amount
to lack of consent to the marriage." 63 These concerns though were answered, beginning with Santos v.
Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be  truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage."65

The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of
marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in the  Molina66 case.
Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence
[to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereto." 67 Jurisprudence since then
has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume." 68

It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal
wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply

with the essential marital obligations of marriage." 69 At the same time, it has been consistently
recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to allow
some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was
for "the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on

the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law." 70

We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage,
depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged,
not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In
regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is
on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. 72

The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision
committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may
be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in
psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate
ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently
applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework that guides
courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time,
the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case
perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36.
There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely
primarily on that precedent. There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as well which should
govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.

Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered
opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable,
considering that the Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological
incapacity was derived from canon law,73 and as one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the
problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law. 74 It would
be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation and
subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged that interpretations
given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. 75 Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic
Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept
may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial
interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church thought on psychological
incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting
psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts.76

Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in
denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which
respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that
"[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded
to the institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social
institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal
aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-
political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative
enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the
legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This
has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage
and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and
family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation.
While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the
constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of
marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant,
Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account
in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically
incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of
marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which
in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend
against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not
further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among
persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the
essential obligations of marriage.

These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.

Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case

As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of

petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in
1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:

1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected"’ by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological–not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear
and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive
weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally—subject to our law on evidence—
what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void. 77

Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification stating
his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition. 78 This requirement however was dispensed
with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. 79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code
mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the consistent vigorous
opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscal’s participation in
the hearings before the trial court is extant from the records of this case.

As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the
great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals
to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently
lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality. The question remains whether her
pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and
generally, the Molina guidelines.

We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.

First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his
spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his
wife’s behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which
disputed respondent’s claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert
witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was
tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered petitioner’s evidence
as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with
petitioner.80

As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be able to
establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot be
considered as a non-public matter between private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the
Family Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or
Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of
respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among the parties would necessarily
negate such proofs.

Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial court’s
decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and
abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities
and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual
occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background, among others. 81

These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical causes
by expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in
particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2)
major hospitals,82 testified as follows:

WITNESS:

Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are a couple
of things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems ( sic) to be
repeated over and over again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying
of the "respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal
or pathological. x x x

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent she is then
incapable of performing the basic obligations of her marriage?

A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of concern, the
lack of love towards the person, and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You see,
relationship is based on communication between individuals and what we generally communicate are
our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to
tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen as far as this
relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be based on love,
trust and respect.

Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying and
fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?

xxx

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the petitioner,
testified that the respondent has been calling up the petitioner’s officemates and ask him (sic) on the
activities of the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on
page six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr. witness?

A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that there is no actual
basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme,
then that is pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every
now and then; but everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or pathological. If there is no
basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having an affair with another woman and if she persistently
believes that the husband is having an affair with different women, then that is pathological and we call
that paranoid jealousy.

Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically incapacitated to

perform the basic obligations of the marriage?

A- Yes, Ma’am.83

The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of
respondent, but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a]
pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself." 84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record, particularly
the trial transcripts of respondent’s testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While
these witnesses did not personally examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v.
Marcos85 that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. 86 We deem the methodology utilized by petitioner’s witnesses as
sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopez’s common conclusion
of respondent’s psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioner’s version
as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioner’s factual
premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by
petitioner’s expert witnesses.

Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of
psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:

To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically incapacitated
to perform the essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that
respondent has that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of
health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories
and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not in a position
to give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to
petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on
love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is
abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity. 87

Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and
even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious
characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural
child’s real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage.

Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little
over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance
speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondent’s
psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life
was dubitable.

It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to
induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to
distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were
emphatic on respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths,
which according to them, were revelatory of respondent’s inability to understand and perform the
essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality
would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic
meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to
adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.

The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a
reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not
convinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage
hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations.
Respondent’s ability to even comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at best.
Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondent’s ability to adhere to the truth, her
avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.

At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage may be
annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the
circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or
deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for
action for the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between misrepresentations
made by respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article
45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying
spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her
marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.

Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by
Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial
court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets
of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.

Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the
marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this
detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite
petitioner’s efforts to bring the matter to its attention. 88 Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention
of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.

As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the
marriage in question in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the
part of respondent.90 Such decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican. 92 In fact, respondent’s psychological incapacity was
considered so grave that a restrictive clause 93 was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting
respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunal’s consent.

In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:

The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered ontologically
defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and
employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical
understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral
significance and implications of the marriage vows.

The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based on the
depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert
Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option in tenure of adverse personality
constracts that were markedly antithetical to the substantive content and implications of the
Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent in
terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired
in its practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse action and reaction
pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial consent.
There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of due
discretion on the part of the Petitioner.94

Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by
canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in
this case. They hold sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the
veracity of petitioner’s allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondent’s version as
correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this
matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of
facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.

Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals
reversed the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that
respondent’s condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect. 95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her, desiring
to make their marriage work. However, respondent’s aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she
continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the
conclusion that respondent’s condition is incurable.

From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondent’s condition is
incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondent’s psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a
remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioner’s expert witnesses characterized
respondent’s condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the psychological
incapacity was curable or incurable.

But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts’ taciturnity on this point.

The petitioner’s expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision on
10 August 1995. These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit
the requirement that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the Family
Code.

On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion by first
citing the deliberations of the Family Code committee, 96 then the opinion of canonical scholars, 97 before
arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity. 98 Santos did refer to
Justice Caguioa’s opinion expressed during the deliberations that "psychological incapacity is
incurable,"99 and the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability." 100 However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological
incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a characteristic of psychological
incapacity.101

This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its own
ruling that remained silent on whether respondent’s psychological incapacity was incurable.
Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be
established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time
of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial court’s decision that required a
medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case
was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.

We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument that Molina and Santos should

not apply retroactively

with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a part
of that law as of the date the statute in enacted. 103 Yet we approach this present case from utterly
practical considerations. The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion.
Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondent’s
psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal necessity yet to
elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. If we
apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried
before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where presumably the
respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of
incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is
actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.

We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on
a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or
clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence
to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of
the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent’s psychological incapacity
has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the
Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological
incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the
degree that annulment was warranted.

All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the
trial court.

There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as having
been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains
in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the
appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondent’s avowed commitment to remain in the marriage.
Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal
contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live together.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is
REINSTATED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

SBC Case No. 519 July 31, 1997

PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant,
vs.
SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., respondent.

RESOLUTION

ROMERO, J.:

In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon Barranco,
Jr. be denied admission to the legal profession. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar examinations on
the fourth attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and 1968. Before be could take his oath,
however, complainant filed the instant petition averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts,
that a child out of wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to
many her.

The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F. Sevilla in June and July 1971.
Respondent and complainant were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both in
their teens, they were steadies. Respondent even acted as escort to complainant when she reigned as
Queen at the 1953 town fiesta. Complainant first acceded to sexual congress with respondent sometime
in 1960. Their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael Barranco, born on December 11, 1964. 1 It was after the
child was born, complainant alleged, that respondent first promised he would marry her after he passes
the bar examinations. Their relationship continued and respondent allegedly made more than twenty or
thirty promises of marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the child on the latter's birthdays. Her trust in him
and their relationship ended in 1971, when she learned that respondent married another woman. Hence,
this petition.

Upon complainant's motion, the Court authorized the taking of testimonies of witnesses by deposition in
1972. On February 18, 1974, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case
citing complainant's failure to comment on the motion of Judge Cuello seeking to be relieved from the
duty to take aforesaid testimonies by deposition. Complainant filed her comment required and that she
remains interested in the resolution of the present case. On June 18, 1974, the Court denied
respondent's motion to dismiss.

On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on the ground of abandonment
filed by respondent on September 17, 1979. 2 Respondent's third motion to dismiss was noted in the
Court's Resolution dated September 15, 1982. 3 In 1988, respondent repeated his request, citing his
election as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active
participation in civic organizations and good standing in the community as well as the length of time this
case has been pending as reasons to allow him to take his oath as a lawyer. 4

On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of complainant to
prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the
lawyer's oath upon payment of the required fees.5

Respondent's hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when the Court, in response to
complainant's opposition, resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking. On June 1, 1993, the Court
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.

The IBP's report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and that respondent be
allowed to take the lawyer's oath.

We agree.

Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer's oath in 1971 because of the charge of gross
immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child with his
sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he
passes the bar examinations.

We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of
respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and
promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not constitute
grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained
of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and
false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high
degree."6 It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of
respectable members of the community.7

We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang8 quite relevant because mere intimacy between a man and a
woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit
on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of
disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result of such relationship a child was born out of
wedlock.9

Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently consensual. We
do not find complainant's assertions that she had been forced into sexual intercourse, credible. She
continued to see and be respondent's girlfriend even after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until
1971. All those years of amicable and intimate relations refute her allegations that she was forced to
have sexual congress with him. Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued
their relationship and was not an innocent young girl who could be easily led astray. Unfortunately,
respondent chose to marry and settle permanently with another woman. We cannot castigate a man for
seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be
entered into because of love, not for any other reason.

We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman scorned, bitter and
unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to make respondent suffer severely and it seems, perpetually,
sacrificing the profession he worked very hard to be admitted into. Even assuming that his past
indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer
constitute sufficient punishment therefor. During this time there appears to be no other indiscretion
attributed to him.10 Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age, should thus be allowed, albeit
belatedly, to take the lawyer's oath.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. is
ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper fees. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 49549 August 30, 1990

EVELYN CHUA-QUA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his capacity as Presidential Executive Assistant, and TAY TUNG
HIGH SCHOOL, INC., respondents.

William C. Gunitang and Jaime Opinion for petitioner.

Laogan Law Offices for private respondent.

REGaLADO, J.:

This would have been just another illegal dismissal case were it not for the controversial and unique
situation that the marriage of herein petitioner, then a classroom teacher, to her student who was
fourteen (14) years her junior, was considered by the school authorities as sufficient basis for terminating
her services.

Private respondent Tay Tung High School, Inc. is an educational institution in Bacolod City. Petitioner
had been employed therein as a teacher since 1963 and, in 1976 when this dispute arose, was the class
adviser in the sixth grade where one Bobby Qua was enrolled. Since it was the policy of the school to
extend remedial instructions to its students, Bobby Qua was imparted such instructions in school by
petitioner. 1 In the course thereof, the couple fell in love and on December 24, 1975, they got married in
a civil ceremony solemnized in Iloilo City by Hon. Cornelio G. Lazaro, City Judge of Iloilo. 2 Petitioner was
then thirty (30) years of age but Bobby Qua being sixteen (16) years old, consent and advice to the
marriage was given by his mother, Mrs. Concepcion Ong. 3 Their marriage was ratified in accordance
with the rites of their religion in a church wedding solemnized by Fr. Nick Melicor at Bacolod City on
January 10, 1976. 4

On February 4, 1976, private respondent filed with the sub-regional office of the Department of Labor at
Bacolod City an application for clearance to terminate the employment of petitioner on the following
ground: "For abusive and unethical conduct unbecoming of a dignified school teacher and that her
continued employment is inimical to the best interest, and would downgrade the high moral values, of the
school." 5

Petitioner was placed under suspension without pay on March 12, 1976. 6 Executive Labor Arbiter Jose
Y. Aguirre, Jr. of the National Labor Relations Commission, Bacolod City, to whom the case was certified
for resolution, required the parties to submit their position papers and supporting evidence.
Affidavits 7 were submitted by private respondent to bolster its contention that petitioner, "defying all
standards of decency, recklessly took advantage of her position as school teacher, lured a Grade VI boy
under her advisory section and 15 years her junior into an amorous relation." 8 More specifically, private
respondent raised issues on the fact that petitioner stayed alone with Bobby Qua in the classroom after
school hours when everybody had gone home, with one door allegedly locked and the other slightly
open.

On September 17, 1976, Executive Labor Arbiter Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr., without conducting any formal
hearing, rendered an "Award" in NLRC Case No. 956 in favor of private respondent granting the
clearance to terminate the employment of petitioner. It was held therein that —

The affidavits . . . although self-serving but were never disputed by the respondent pointed out that
before the marriage of respondent to Bobby Qua, fourteen (14) years her junior and during her
employment with petitioner, an amorous relationship existed between them. In the absence of evidence
to the contrary, the undisputed written testimonies of several witnesses convincingly picture the
circumstances under which such amorous relationship was manifested within the premises of the school,
inside the classroom, and within the sight of some employees. While no direct evidences have been
introduced to show that immoral acts were committed during these times, it is however enough for a
sane and credible mind to imagine and conclude what transpired and took place during these times. . . . 9

Petitioner, however, denied having received any copy of the affidavits referred to. 10

On October 7, 1976, petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission claiming denial of
due process for not having been furnished copies of the aforesaid affidavits relied on by the labor arbiter.
She further contended that there was nothing immoral, nor was it abusive and unethical conduct
unbecoming of a dignified school teacher, for a teacher to enter into lawful wedlock with her student. 11

On December 27, 1976, the National Labor Relations Commission unanimously reversed the Labor
Arbiter's decision and ordered petitioner's reinstatement with backwages, with the following specific
findings:

Affiant Maselliones deposed and said that he saw appellant and Qua sitting on the student desk inside a
classroom after classes. The depositions of affiants Despi and Chin are of the same tenor. No
statements whatever were sworn by them that they were eyewitnesses to immoral or scandalous acts.

xxx xxx xxx

Even if we have to strain our sense of moral values to accommodate the conclusion of the Arbiter, we
could not deduce anything immoral or scandalous about a girl and a boy talking inside a room after
classes with lights on and with the door open.

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner-appellee naively insisted that the clearance application was precipitated by immoral acts which
did not lend dignity to the position of appellant. Aside from such gratuitous assertions of immoral acts or
conduct by herein appellant, no evidence to support such claims was introduced by petitioner-appellee.
We reviewed the the sequence of events from the beginning of the relationship between appellant
Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua up to the date of the filing of the present application for clearance in search
of evidence that could have proved detrimental to the image and dignity of the school but none has come
to our attention. . . . 12

The case was elevated by private respondent to the Minister of Labor who, on March 30, 1977, reversed
the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission. The petitioner was, however, awarded six (6)
months salary as financial assistance. 13

On May 20, 1977, petitioner appealed the said decision to the Office of the President of the
Philippines. 14 After the corresponding exchanges, on September 1, 1978 said office, through
Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave, rendered its decision reversing the appealed decision.
Private respondent was ordered to reinstate petitioner to her former position without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges and with full back wages from the time she was not allowed to work until the
date of her actual reinstatement. 15

Having run the gamut of three prior adjudications of the case with alternating reversals, one would think
that this decision of public respondent wrote finis to petitioner's calvary. However, in a resolution dated
December 6, 1978, public respondent, acting on a motion for reconsideration 16 of herein private
respondent and despite opposition thereto, 17 reconsidered and modified the aforesaid decision, this time
giving due course to the application of Tay Tung High School, Inc. to terminate the services of petitioner
as classroom teacher but giving her separation pay equivalent to her six (6) months salary. 18

In thus reconsidering his earlier decision, public respondent reasoned out in his manifestation/comment
filed on August 14, 1979 in this Court in the present case:

That this Office did not limit itself to the legal issues involved in the case, but went further to view the
matter from the standpoint of policy which involves the delicate task of rearing and educating of children
whose interest must be held paramount in the school community, and on this basis, this Office deemed it
wise to uphold the judgment and action of the school authorities in terminating the services of a teacher
whose actuations and behavior, in the belief of the school authorities, had spawned ugly rumors that had
cast serious doubts on her integrity, a situation which was considered by them as not healthy for a
school campus, believing that a school teacher should at all times act with utmost circumspection and
conduct herself beyond reproach and above suspicion; 19

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner relies on the following grounds for the reversal of the aforesaid
resolution of public respondent, viz.:

1. The dismissal or termination of petitioner's employment, despite Tay Tung's claim to the contrary, was
actually based on her marriage with her pupil and is, therefore, illegal.

2. Petitioner's right to due process under the Constitution was violated when the hearsay affidavits of
Laddy Maselliones, Eleuterio Despi, Pina D. Chiu, and Ong Lee Bing, were admitted and considered in
evidence without presenting the affiants as witnesses and affording the petitioner the right to confront
and cross-examine them.

3. No sufficient proofs were adduced to show that petitioner committed serious misconduct or breached
the trust reposed on her by her employer or committed any of the other grounds enumerated in Article
283 (Now Article 282) of the Labor Code which will justify the termination of her employment. 20

We first dispose of petitioner's claim that her right to due process was violated. We do not agree. There
is no denial of due process where a party was afforded an opportunity to present his side. Also, the
procedure by which issues are resolved based on position papers, affidavits and other documentary
evidence is recognized as not violative of such right. Moreover, petitioner could have insisted on a
hearing to confront and cross-examine the affiants but she did not do so, obviously because she was
convinced that the case involves a question of law. Besides, said affidavits were also cited and
discussed by her in the proceedings before the Ministry of Labor.

Now, on the merits. Citing its upright intention to preserve the respect of the community toward the
teachers and to strengthen the educational system, private respondent submits that petitioner's
actuations as a teacher constitute serious misconduct, if not an immoral act, a breach of trust and
confidence reposed upon her and, thus, a valid and just ground to terminate her services. It argues that
as a school teacher who exercises substitute parental authority over her pupils inside the school
campus, petitioner had moral ascendancy over Bobby Qua and, therefore, she must not abuse such
authority and respect extended to her. Furthermore, it charged petitioner with having allegedly violated
the Code of Ethics for teachers the pertinent provision of which states that a "school official or teacher
should never take advantage of his/her position to court a pupil or student." 21

On the other hand, petitioner maintains that there was no ground to terminate her services as there is
nothing wrong with a teacher falling in love with her pupil and, subsequently, contracting a lawful
marriage with him. She argued that she was dismissed because of her marriage with Bobby Qua This
contention was sustained in the aforesaid decision of the National Labor Relations Commission thus:

. . . One thing, however, has not escaped our observation: That the application for clearance was filed
only after more than one month elapsed from the date of appellant's marriage to Bobby Qua Certainly,
such belated application for clearance weakens instead of strengthening the cause of petitioner-
appellee. The alleged immoral acts transpired before the marriage and if it is these alleged undignified
conduct that triggered the intended separation, then why was the present application for clearance not
filed at that time when the alleged demoralizing effect was still fresh and abrasive? 22

After a painstaking perusal of the records, we are of the considered view that the determination of the
legality of the dismissal hinges on the issue of whether or not there is substantial evidence to prove that
the antecedent facts which culminated in the marriage between petitioner and her student constitute
immorality and/or grave misconduct. To constitute immorality, the circumstances of each particular case
must be holistically considered and evaluated in the light of prevailing norms of conduct and the
applicable law. Contrary to what petitioner had insisted on from the very start, what is before us is a
factual question, the resolution of which is better left to the trier of facts.
Considering that there was no formal hearing conducted, we are constrained to review the factual
conclusions arrived at by public respondent, and to nullify his decision through the extraordinary writ of
certiorari if the same is tainted by absence or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The
findings of fact must be supported by substantial evidence; otherwise, this Court is not bound thereby. 23

We rule that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion. As vividly and forcefully observed
by him in his original decision:

Indeed, the records relied upon by the Acting Secretary of Labor (actually the records referred to are the
affidavits attached as Annexes "A" to "D" of the position paper dated August 10, 1976 filed by appellee at
the arbitration proceedings) in arriving at his decision are unbelievable and unworthy of credit, leaving
many question unanswered by a rational mind. For one thing, the affidavits refer to certain times of the
day during off school hours when appellant and her student were found together in one of the
classrooms of the school. But the records of the case present a ready answer: appellant was giving
remedial instruction to her student and the school was the most convenient place to serve the purpose.
What is glaring in the affidavits is the complete absence of specific immoral acts allegedly committed by
appellant and her student. For another, and very important at that, the alleged acts complained of
invariably happened from September to December, 1975, but the disciplinenary action imposed by
appellee was sought only in February, 1976, and what is more, the affidavits were executed only in
August, 1976 and from all indications, were prepared by appellee or its counsel. The affidavits heavily
relied upon by appellee are clearly the product of after-thought. . . . The action pursued by appellee in
dismissing appellant over one month after her marriage, allegedly based on immoral acts committed
even much earlier, is open to basis of the action sought seriously doubted; on the question. The basis of
the action sought is seriously doubted; on the contrary, we are more inclined to believe that appellee had
certain selfish, ulterior and undisclosed motives known only to itself. 24

As earlier stated, from the outset even the labor arbiter conceded that there was no direct evidence to
show that immoral acts were committed. Nonetheless, indulging in a patently unfair conjecture, he
concluded that "it is however enough for a sane and credible mind to imagine and conclude what
transpired during those times." 25 In reversing his decision, the National Labor Relations Commission
observed that the assertions of immoral acts or conducts are gratuitous and that there is no direct
evidence to support such claim, 26 a finding which herein public respondent himself shared.

We are, therefore, at a loss as to how public respondent could adopt the volte-face in the questioned
resolution, which we hereby reject, despite his prior trenchant observations hereinbefore quoted. What is
revealing however, is that the reversal of his original decision is inexplicably based on unsubstantiated
surmises and non sequiturs which he incorporated in his assailed resolution in this wise:

. . . While admittedly, no one directly saw Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua doing immoral acts inside the
classroom it seems obvious and this Office is convinced that such a happening indeed transpired within
the solitude of the classrom after regular class hours. The marriage between Evelyn Chua and Bobby
Qua is the best proof which confirms the suspicion that the two indulged in amorous relations in that
place during those times of the day. . . . 27

With the finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral acts, it follows that the
alleged violation of the Code of Ethics governing school teachers would have no basis. Private
respondent utterly failed to show that petitioner took advantage of her position to court her student. If the
two eventually fell in love, despite the disparity in their ages and academic levels, this only lends
substance to the truism that the heart has reasons of its own which reason does not know. But,
definitely, yielding to this gentle and universal emotion is not to be so casually equated with immorality.
The deviation of the circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be
considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.

It would seem quite obvious that the avowed policy of the school in rearing and educating children is
being unnecessarily bannered to justify the dismissal of petitioner. This policy, however, is not at odds
with and should not be capitalized on to defeat the security of tenure granted by the Constitution to labor.
In termination cases, the burden of proving just and valid cause for dismissing an employee rests on the
employer and his failure to do so would result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified.
The charge against petitioner not having been substantiated, we declare her dismissal as unwarranted
and illegal. It being apparent, however, that the relationship between petitioner and private respondent
has been inevitably and severely strained, we believe that it would neither be to the interest of the parties
nor would any prudent purpose be served by ordering her reinstatement.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the resolution of public respondent, dated
December 6, 1978 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private respondent Tay Tung High School, Inc. is
hereby ORDERED to pay petitioner backwages equivalent to three (3) years, without any deduction or
qualification, and separation pay in the amount of one (1) month for every year of service.

SO ORDERED.