DOCTRINE: Article 1197. If The Obligation Does Not Fix A Period, But From Its

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DOCTRINE: Article 1197.

If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its


nature and the circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended,
the courts may fix the duration thereof.

CASE TITLE: SOCORRO T. CLEMENTE, as substituted by SALVADOR


T. CLEMENTE, Petitioner vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES (Department of Public Works and Highways,
Region IV-A), Respondent. G.R. No. 220008 February 20,
2019
FACTS:
Clemente siblings were the owners of parcel of land during their
lifetime, they executed a Deed of Donation in favor of Republic of the
Philippines, District Engineer, Ciceron A. Guerrero of DPWH Region
IV- A accepted the said donation, in accordance with the Deed of Donation,
the construction of a building for hospital was started in the following year,
however the construction was never completed and only its foundation
remains today. Socorro Clemente and Rosario wrote a letter to District
Engr. Asking for information, and then subsequent letter, then after the
District Engr. Informed the DPWH had no longer a plan to construct a
hospital since the DPWH had no budget. Almost 41 years after the Deed of
Donation executed, as heir and successor in interest of Mayor
Clemente filed a complaint for revocation of Donation/ Recovery of
possession alleging that Republic of the Philippines failed to comply with
the condition, Thereafter the trial RTC dismissed the case and held that
since the parties did not fix the period within which to comply with the
condition, but the period was indeed intended, the court may fix period for
the performance of the donee’s obligation under Article 1197 of CC.
However, since Socorro failed to pray for the fixing the period. The RTC
dismissed the case, then filed a motion for reconsideration but denied. In
appeal, the CA denied. Motion for reconsideration but denied. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the action is premature or laches.
Whether or not it barred by the contrary doctrine of prescription.

HELD:
We find that this action is not premature and has not been barred by
prescription or laches. An action for conveyance based on a violation of a
condition in a Deed of Donation should be instituted within ten (10)years
from the time of such violation. Moreover, an action to revoke a donation
based on non-compliance of the condition prescribes after four (4) years
from such non-compliance. Thus, in both cases, to be able to determine
whether the action has prescribed, the time of non-compliance must first be
determined. This is because the failure to comply with the condition
imposed will give rise to the cause of action against the obligor-done, which
is also the starting point of when to count the prescriptive period.

It is imperative to determine the period within which the donee has to


comply with the condition to construct a government hospital and use the
site solely as a hospital site, because it is only after such time that it can be
determined with certainty that there was a failure to comply with the
condition. Without such determination, there is no way to determine
whether the donee failed to comply with its obligation, and consequently,
whether the prescriptive period to file an action has started to run.
Prescription cannot set in if the period to comply with the obligation cannot
be determined with certainty. In this case, the Deed of Donation is bereft of
any period within which the donee should have complied with the condition
of constructing a government hospital. Thus, the action has not yet
prescribed.

Based on the Deed of Donation, however, it is apparent that a period


was indeed intended by the parties. By agreeing to the conditions in the
Deed of Donation, the donee agreed, and it bound itself to construct a
government hospital and to use the Subject Property solely for hospital
purposes. The construction of the said hospital could not have been
intended by the parties to be in a state of limbo as it can be deduced that
the parties intended that the hospital should be built within a reasonable
period, although the Deed of Donation failed to fix a period for such
construction.

In this situation, Article 1197 of the Civil Code squarely applies:


Article 1197. If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and
the circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the courts
may fix the duration thereof. The courts shall also fix the duration of the
period when it depends upon the will of the debtor.

In every case, the courts shall determine such period as may under
the circumstances have been probably contemplated by the parties. Once
fixed by the courts, the period cannot be changed by them. Based on the
foregoing provision, the RTC reasoned that the action is premature
because there can be no breach before the court fixes a period to comply
with the obligation.

We disagree. While ideally, a period to comply with the condition


should have been fixed by the Court, we find that this will be an exercise in
futility because of of the fact that it has been more than fifty (50) years
since the Deed of Donation has been executed; and thus, the reasonable
time contemplated by the parties within which to comply with the condition
has already lapsed. In Central Philippine University v. Court of Appeals,
which had a similar factual background with this case, the Court held:

Thus, when the obligation does not fix a period but from its nature
and circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the
general rule provided in Art. 1197 of the Civil Code applies, which provides
that the courts may fix the duration thereof because the fulfillment of the
obligation itself cannot be demanded until after the court has fixed the
period for compliance therewith and such period has arrived.

For the same reason, we find that laches has not set in. Laches is
defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within
a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

Because of the failure of the Deed of Donation to specify the period


within which to comply with the condition, there can be no delay in
asserting the right against respondent. In contrast, respondent is guilty of
unreasonable delay and neglect in complying with its obligation to construct
a government hospital and to use the Subject Property as a hospital site.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The 17 October 2014


Decision and the 14 August 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 91522 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional
Trial Court of Mauban, Quezon, Branch 64, is ORDERED to cause the
cancellation by the Register of Deeds of Quezon of TCT No. T-51745 and
the issuance, in lieu thereof, of the corresponding certificate of title in the
name of the heirs of Amado A. Clemente, Dr. Vicente A. Clemente, Judge
Ramon A. Clemente, and Milagros A. Clemente.

SO ORDERED.

Perlas-Bernabe, J. Reyes, Jr., and Hernando,* JJ., concur.

Caguioa, J., see separate concurring opinion.

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