WK8 - Security PDF
WK8 - Security PDF
WK8 - Security PDF
8 – Security
(Draft)
• Security usually refers to ensuring that users can perform only the
tasks that they are authorized to do and can obtain only the information
that they are authorized to have.
CommView DriftNet
• http://www.worldwidewardrive.org/
• By Renderman
[email protected]
• These are by no means rules that must be followed, but they are a
collection of suggestions for safe, ethical, and legal stumbling. I
encourage you to follow them and to inform others of them to help
keep this hobby safe and legal.
• 1. Do Not Connect!!:
• At no time should you ever connect to any AP's that are not your own.
Disable client managers and TCP/IP stacks to be sure. Simply
associating can be interpreted as computer trespass by law
enforcement.
• 2. Obey traffic laws:
• It's your community too, the traffic laws are there for everyone's safety
including your own. Doing doughnuts at 3am gets unwanted attention
from the authorities anyways.
Rick Graziani [email protected] 10
Stumbler Code of Ethics v0.2
• 3. Obey private property and no-trespassing signs:
• Don't trespass in order to scan an area. That's what the directional
antenna is for :) You wouldn't want people trespassing on your property
would you?
• 4. Don't use your data for personal gain:
• Share the data with like-minded people, show it to people who can
change things for the better, use it for education but don't try and make
any money or status off your data. It's just wrong to expect these
people to reward you for pointing out their own stupidity.
• 5. Be like the hiker motto of 'take only pictures, leave only footprints':
• Detecting SSID's and moving on is legal, anything else is irresponsible
to yourself and your community.
• 6. Speak intelligently to others:
• When telling others about wardriving and wireless security, don't get
sensationalistic. Horror stories and FUD are not very helpful to the
acceptance of wardrivers. Speak factually and carefully, Point out
problems, but also point out solutions, especially how we are not the
problem because we don't connect.
Rick Graziani [email protected] 11
Stumbler Code of Ethics v0.2
• 7. If/When speaking to media, remember you are representing the
community:
• Your words reflect on our entire hobby and the rest of us. Do not do
anything illegal no matter how much they ask. They may get pissed off,
but at least you have demonstrated the integrity that this hobby
requires.
• This document is merely a set of suggestions for the Wardriving
community, assembled over time from the Wardriving community. This
is a living document so it will be updated from time to time.
Suggestions and comments should be sent to [email protected].
Feel free to copy, just make sure to leave the credits intact and a link
back to the original if possible.
AirSnort
• Most clients will associate to the access point with the strongest signal.
If an unauthorized AP, which is generally a rogue AP, has a strong
signal, clients will associate to the rogue AP.
• The rogue AP will have access to the network traffic of all associated
clients.
• The rogue AP can also use ARP and IP spoofing to trick clients into
sending passwords and sensitive information.
Rick Graziani [email protected] 15
CiscoWorks WLSE detects Rogue APs
AirSnort
• Attacks against WEP include Bit Flipping, Replay Attacks, and Weak IV
collection.
• Many WEP attacks have not been released from the laboratory, but
they are well documented.
• One utility, called AirSnort, captures weak Initialization Vectors to
determine the WEP key being used.
• Many WLANs used the Service Set Identifier (SSID) as a basic form of
security.
• Some WLANs controlled access by entering the media access control
(MAC) address of each client into the wireless access points.
• Neither option was secure, since wireless sniffing could reveal both
valid MAC addresses and the SSID.
• Most access points have options like "SSID broadcast" and "Allow any
SSID".
• These features are usually enabled by default and make it easy to set
up a wireless network.
• The "Allow any SSID" option permits the access point to allow access
to a client with a blank SSID.
• The "SSID broadcast" sends beacon packets that advertise the SSID.
• Disabling these two options does not secure the network, since a
wireless sniffer can easily capture a valid SSID from normal WLAN
traffic.
• SSIDs should not be considered a security feature.
Rick Graziani [email protected] 23
AP: "Allow any SSID"
No Client SSID,
but Associated!
AP Default
Changed to NONE
• Setting the Guest Mode SSID to NONE, will not allow clients that do
not have and SSID to be able to associate.
• Remember, it s not difficult for someone to get the SSID, so this
should not be a security measure.
• The next step should be configuring WEP, WPA, or some other
authentication/encryption on your AP.
• You cannot have the same SSID set as Guest Mode and
authentication/encryption.
Rick Graziani [email protected] 25
Wired equivalent privacy (WEP)
AP
• The client:
– Sets the Authentication Algorithm Number to 0 (open-system)
– Set Authentication Transaction Sequence Number to 1
• The AP:
– Sets the Authentication Algorithm Number to 0 (open-system)
– Set Authentication Transaction Sequence Number to 2
– Status Code set to 0 (Successful)
Rick Graziani [email protected] 31
Open Authentication
• Shared key requires the client and the access point to have the same
WEP key.
• An access point using Shared Key Authentication sends a challenge
text packet to the client.
• If the client has the wrong key or no key, it will fail this portion of the
authentication process.
• The client will not be allowed to associate to the AP.
Shared-key = Shared-key =
RadiaPerlman RadiaPerlman
• The client:
– Sets the Authentication Algorithm Number to 1 (shared-key)
– Set Authentication Transaction Sequence Number to 1
• The AP:
– Sets the Authentication Algorithm Number to 1 (shared-key)
– Set Authentication Transaction Sequence Number to 2
– Status Code set to 0 (Successful)
– Challenge Text (later)
• The client:
– Sets the Authentication Algorithm Number to 1 (shared-key)
– Set Authentication Transaction Sequence Number to 3
– Challenge Text (later)
• The AP:
– Sets the Authentication Algorithm Number to 1 (shared-key)
– Set Authentication Transaction Sequence Number to 4
– Status Code set to 0 (Successful)
Rick Graziani [email protected] 39
Authentication Process
• Authentication
– Open-System
– Shared-Key (WEP)
• Encryption
– None only
or
– WEP
?
next
• Client
– Use Open Authentication on the client (does not use WEP, challenge
transaction, during authentication).
– Use WEP for Data Encryption.
• AP
– Use Open Authentication
– Use Mandatory WEP Encryption, Devices not using WEP are not allowed
to communicate.
Rick Graziani [email protected] 44
Wi-Fi WPA Presentation
Wi-Fi WPA
Presentation
http://www.wifialliance.org/
opensection/
protected_access.asp
• Welcome to the Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) Security Web page. Here you will find all
the latest updates on WPA and the Wi-Fi Alliance's wireless LAN security improvements.
• A 60-minute Web cast regarding WPA and the Wi-Fi Alliance's response to the need for
improved WLAN security was held on June 11, 2003. The Web cast included a 40-
minute presentation titled "Wi-Fi Protected Access: Locking Down the Link," in which
Michael Disabato (Senior Analyst, Burton Group) reviewed the features and benefits of
WPA, highlighted wired equivalent privacy (WEP) weaknesses, discussed wireless LAN
implementation issues, reviewed the second phase of WPA (WPA2) and provided WLAN
security recommendations. Mr. Disabato's presentation was followed by a 20-minute
question and answer session that included several of the industry's most knowledgable
WLAN security experts.
Mutual Authentication
• Mutual authentication is two-way authentication.
• Not only does the network authenticate the client, but the
client also authenticates the network.
• In Open and Shared Key authentication, the AP or network
authenticates the client.
• The client does not know for sure that the AP or network is
valid because no mechanism is defined in 802.11 to allow
the client to authenticate the network.
• A rogue AP or client posing as a valid AP can subvert the
data on the client s machine.
802.11i • User-based
authentication
• Mutual
802.1X (EAP) authentication
• Dynamic Key
Generation
WPA is a
subset
• IEEE has addressed the shortcomings of 802.11 authentication by
incorporating 802.1X authentication framework.
• 802.1X itself is an IEEE standard that provides all 802 link layer
topologies with extensible authentication, normally seen in higher layers.
• 802.1X is based on a Point-to-Point (PPP) authentication framework
known as Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP).
• In oversimplified terms, 802.1X encapsulates EAP messages for use at
Layer 2.
• 802.11i incorporates the 802.1X authentication framework requiring its
use for user-based authentication.
Rick Graziani [email protected] 55
1. The Authentication Framework
Access
802.3 802.5 802.11 Mechanism
• EAP (RFC 2284) and 802.1X do not mandate the use of any specific
authentication algorithm.
• Network administrator can use any EAP-compliant authentication type
for either 802.1X or EAP authentication.
• The only requirement is that both the 802.11 client (known as the
supplicant) and the authentication server support the EAP
authentication algorithm.
• This open and extensible architecture lets you use one authentication
framework in differing environments, each environment may use a
different authentication type.
Rick Graziani [email protected] 56
1. The Authentication Framework
Differing environments
Access
802.3 802.5 802.11 Mechanism
Data Integrity
• The MIC is a feature used to augment the ineffective Integrity Check
Value (ICV) of 802.11 standard. (More to be added on this at a later
date.)
• The MIC solves vulnerabilities such as the frame tampering/bit flipping
attacks (to be added later).
• The IEEE has proposed a specific algorithm, Michael, to augment the
ICV function in the encryption of 802.11 data frames.
• The MIC is a unique key that differs from the key used to encrypt data
frames.
• This unique key is mixed with the destination MAC address and the
source MAC address from the frame as well as the entire unencrypted
Rick data payload of the frame.
Graziani [email protected] 64
Rick Graziani [email protected] 65
AES
Associated
Open Auth. Open Auth.
WEP = 4321 WEP = 1234
Associated
Open Auth. Open Auth.
WEP = 1234 WEP = 1234
Authen.
EAP-Cisco EAP-TLS EAP-PEAP Method
Authen.
802.1X/EAP Framework
Access
802.3 802.5 802.11 Mechanism
• 802.1x requires support on the client, access point, and authentication server.
• 802.1x uses a RADIUS proxy to authenticate clients on the network.
• This proxy device could be a device such as a switch or an access point.
• This device operates at the access layer.
• The EAP client or supplicant sends authentication credentials to the
authenticator which in turn sends the information to the authentication server.
• The authentication server is where the logon request is compared against a
user database to determine if, and at what level, the user may be granted access
to the network resources.
• The access point is called the authenticator.
• The authentication server is usually a RADIUS or an authentication,
authorization, and accounting (AAA) server.
• The authentication server needs to run extra software to understand the
authentication type that is used by the client.
Rick Graziani [email protected] 85
802.1x basics
• Any client that does not have built in 802.1x must use software called a
supplicant.
• The client must have some proof of identity.
• Forms of identity include a username and password, digital certificate,
or one-time password (OTP).
Rick Graziani [email protected] 86
EAP Authentication Process
• After the client has associated to the access point, the supplicant starts the
process for using EAPOL (EAP over LAN) by asking the user for their logon
and password.
• The client responds with their username and password.
• Using 802.1x and EAP the supplicant then sends the username and a one-way
hash of the password to the access point.
• The access point then encapsulates the request and sends the request to the
RADIUS server.
• The RADIUS server then checks the username and password against the
database to determine if the client should be authenticated on the network.
• If the client is to be authenticated, the RADIUS server then issues an access
challenge, which is passed to the access point and then sent to the client.
Rick Graziani [email protected] 89
How 802.1x
works
• The client sends the EAP response to the access challenge to the RADIUS
server via the access point.
• If the client sends the proper response then the RADIUS server sends an
access success message and session WEP key (EAP over Wireless) to the
client via the access point.
• The same session WEP key is also sent to the access point in a success
packet.
• The client and the access point then begin using session WEP keys.
• The WEP key used for multicasts is then sent from the access point to the
client. It is encrypted using the session WEP key.
• Upon client log off, the access point returns to the initial state, allowing only
802.1x traffic to pass.
Rick Graziani [email protected] 90
RADIUS Server Manager
• TKIP is also called WEP Key hashing and was initially referred to as
WEP2.
• TKIP is a temporary solution that fixes the key reuse problem of WEP.
• WEP periodically uses the same key to encrypt data.
• The TKIP process begins with a 128-bit temporal key that is shared
among clients and access points.
• TKIP combines the temporal key with the client MAC address.
• It then adds a relatively large, 16-octet initialization vector to produce
the key that will encrypt the data.
Rick Graziani [email protected] 99
Strengthening WEP
• This procedure ensures that each station uses different key streams to
encrypt the data. WEP Key hashing protects weak Initialization Vectors
(IVs) from being exposed by hashing the IV on a per-packet basis.
Rick Graziani [email protected] 100
Strengthening WEP
• In addition to the TKIP solution, the 802.11i standard will most likely
include the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) protocol.
• AES offers much stronger encryption.
• In fact, the U.S. Commerce Department National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) organization chose AES to replace the aging
DES.
• AES is now a U.S. Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS),
Publication 197.
• It defines a cryptographic algorithm for use by United States
government organizations to protect sensitive, unclassified information.
• The Secretary of Commerce approved the adoption of AES as an
official Government standard in May 2002.
Rick Graziani [email protected] 104
Second generation encryption
• AES specifies three key sizes, which are 128, 192, and 256 bits. It
uses the Rijndael Algorithm.
• If someone where to build a machine that could recover a DES key in a
second, then it would take that machine approximately 149 thousand-
billion (149 trillion) years to crack a 128-bit AES key.
• To put that into perspective, the universe is believed to be less than 20
billion years old.
• TKIP/WPA
– Successor to WEP
– Cisco s pre-standard TKIP has been shipping since Dec. 01
– Cisco introduced TKIP into 802.11i committee
– 802.11i-standardized TKIP part of Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)
– WPA software upgrade now available for AP1100 & AP1200
• AES
– The Gold Standard of encryption
– AES is part of 802.11i standard
• - AES will be part of WPA2 standard (expected in 2004)
• Enable MIC - MIC prevents attacks on encrypted packets called bit-flip attacks.
• During a bit-flip attack, an intruder intercepts an encrypted message, alters it
slightly, and retransmits it, and the receiver accepts the retransmitted message
as legitimate.
• The MIC, implemented on both the access point and all associated client
devices, adds a few bytes to each packet to make the packets tamper-proof.
• WEP Encryption must be set to Mandatory for MIC to be enabled.
Rick Graziani [email protected] 128
• Enable Per Packet Keying - EAP authentication provides dynamic
unicast WEP keys for client devices but uses static keys.
• With broadcast, or multicast, WEP key rotation enabled, the access
point provides a dynamic broadcast WEP key and changes it at the
interval you select in the Broadcast Key Change Frequency field.
• Broadcast key rotation is an excellent alternative to TKIP if your
wireless LAN supports wireless client devices that are not Cisco
devices or that cannot be upgraded to the latest firmware for Cisco
client devices.
Rick Graziani [email protected] 129
• AP has WEP (Optional) and host not using WEP.
• Associated.
• Would not be Associated if WEP was Mandatory.
Rick Graziani [email protected] 130
Authentication Process
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/wireless/ps430/
products_installation_and_configuration_guide_chapter09186a008014868e.html