Agustine and Acquinas On The State PDF
Agustine and Acquinas On The State PDF
Agustine and Acquinas On The State PDF
Augustine and
Aquinas:
Church and State
Max Charlesworth
the Church is the only authentic political authority) and fideism (the
view that faith is the only authentic avenue of knowledge) tend to go
hand in hand. Other Christians recognized the role of the State and
groped tentatively towards some kind of theory about the rela-
tionship that ought to obtain between the Church and the State- the
supernatural society and the natural society - just as in the sphere
of knowledge certain Christian thinkers attempted to define the
relationship between what is known by 'faith' through revelation and
what is known by 'natural reason' alone. 1
'society'.) For the Greeks the 'polis' was the supreme form of society
(superior to the family and the clan), but for Augustine political
society is subordinated to the higher form of society brought into
being with the Christian church. One can see from this how radically
different Augustine's perspective is from that of Plato and Aristotle.
The supernatural society that is the Church is in effect founded by
God and it is sustained by His spiritual help or grace; it is only in this
society that people can be 'saved' and made fully happy through
union with God; again, this society is based upon the altruistic love
of its members for God and for each other.
. By way of contrast with this supernatural society, the city of God
or the Church, Augustine describes the 'earthly society' (civitas
terrena), that is the secular society, with its laws and institutions,
which exists outside the Church. Augustine's attitude to the 'earthly
society' is ambivalent: thus at times he appears to admit that it has its
own proper place and role in providing for our non-spiritual welfare
and that from this point of view it is good in itself; at other times he
appears to suggest that the earthly society only comes into being
because of human sinfulness after the Fall, so that if the Fall had not
taken place then the State would not have been necessary and the
Church would have been sufficient; at other times again, he says
quite explicitly that secular society originates in human selfishness or
'self love' and that it is typified by conflict and power. Augustine
says:
These two cities derive from two different loves - the earthly city
derives from the love of self which rejects God: the heavenly city
derives from the love of God which rejects love of self. The first seeks
human glory; the second desires only to bear witness to God, the
greatest glory ... The first is governed by ambitious tyrants led by the
lust for power: the second is one in which all work together in love,
both the rulers in ruling and the subjects in obeying. 3
In the area of political society this implies that the State has its
own intrinsic value as securing the peace and order necessary for
living the good life and in maintaining the basic human 'virtues'.
Whether or not a society is a good and just society has therefore
nothing to do with the Church since the Church's function - the
spiritual and supernatural good of its members - is quite distinct
from that of the State. As said before, Church and State are viewed
as two distinct societies with diverse but complementary purposes
and aims. To paraphrase the dictum mentioned before, the Church
does not destroy or overrule the State or make it unnecessary, but
presupposes it and complements it.
This new view was given its clearest formulation in the thirteenth
century by St Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), and it is largely
Aquinas' position on Church and State that was adopted later by the
Catholic Church.
Aquinas' views on political society are developed mainly in 'The
Treatise on Law' which is part of the vast work, the Summa
Theologiae. 7 In the Treatise Aquinas provides a subtle and detailed
analysis of what he calls 'natural law' (ius naturale), that is the basic
moral rules or laws on which political society depends, and positive
civil law (ius civile), that is the body of law promulgated by the ruler
of the State. He also discusses the 'divine positive law', that is the
laws or regulations promulgated within the Christian Church and
which apply only to members of the Church.
Like his Greek philosophical masters, Aquinas thinks that it
is possible to elaborate a detailed set of moral rules by rational
reflection on 'human nature'. Whatever fulfils or actualizes the basic
potentialities or needs of human beings is morally good in that it
makes us more fully human, and whatever frustrates these basic
human 'inclinations' is morally bad in that it makes us less human.
Aquinas' theory is in fact very similar to that of Aristotle in that for
both the morally good person is the one who is fully actualized as a
human being.
According to Aquinas the laws of the State ought to be framed in
accordance with the moral law: in fact the function of the State is to
translate into concrete political practice in particular circumstances
those moral rules which are concerned with others. The civil law
therefore acts as a moral pedagogue in that its function is to make the
citizens more morally virtuous. 'It is evident', Aquinas says, 'that
the proper effect of law is to lead its subjects to their proper virtue:
and since virtue is that which makes its subject good, it follows that
the proper effect of law is to make those to whom it is given, good,
either simply or in some particular respect'. 8 Aquinas recognizes,
however, that the law is a crude instrument for inculcating morality
and that there are severe limits to what the law can do in making
people virtuous. There are many immoral acts which do not directly
affect others and the law does not concern itself with these.
(Gluttony, for example, is a moral fault but we do not expect there to
be a law against gluttony.) Again, in many cases the attempt by the
law to control immorality may bring about more harm than good. In
these cases the principle of lesser evil enjoins that no law should be
enacted and that the immorality in question should be tolerated. For
example, prostitution is a moral evil but the attempt to forbid
prostitution by laws may bring about more harm than good, so that
it is better for the State to tolerate prostitution. As Aquinas says:
And again:
The purpose of human law is to lead men to virtue, not suddenly, but
gradually. Wherefore it does not lay upon the multitude of imperfect
men the burdens of those who are already virtuous, viz. that they
should abstain from all evil. Otherwise these imperfect ones, being
unable to bear such precepts, would break out into yet greater
evils ... 9
However, Aquinas insists very firmly that unless the civil law of
the State is in accordance with the moral law it does not have the
force of law at all. Following Augustine he says that a law which is
not just (i.e. not in line with the moral law) 'seems to be no law at
all': 'if in any point it deflects from the law of nature (the moral law)
it is no longer a law but a perversion of law'. 10 Thus a law may be
duly promulgated by the authorities of the State and it may be
enforceable in the courts, but if it is contrary to the moral law it has
no real force so that a citizen may legitimately refuse to obey it
11 The Virtues, (Cambridge, 1977), p. 128. See also John Finnis, Natural Law and
Natural Rights, (Oxford, 1980), pp. 363-6 on 'Lex injusta non est lex'.
12 See my essay 'Catholics and the Free Society' in Max Charlesworth, Church, State
and Conscience, (St Lucia, 1973). See also J .E.A. D' Arcy, Conscience and its Right
to Freedom, (London, 1961).
Augustine and Aquinas 47
ought to be, a coincidence between what the Church enjoins upon its
members and the moral law and the civil law of the State, but the
Church cannot dictate to the State nor interfere directly in the
political order.
Since the law of the State is subordinate to the moral law any kind
of political absolutism is ruled out for Aquinas. In other words,
might is not right and the mere will of the ruler does not have the
force of law. But Aquinas goes further than this in holding that
political authority and power spring from the community which, so
to speak, transfers its political authority and power to the rulers. The
political sovereign, Aquinas says, 'has not the power to frame laws
except as representing the people'. 13 Aquinas therefore rejects any
theocratic idea - political authority and power come from the
Church - or any divine right of kings theory - political power is
given by God directly to the ruler. The ruler is the representative
(vice gerens) of the people and his power is legitimate in so far as it
furthers their 'common good'. The citizens have no obligation to
obey a ruler who flouts the moral law or who does not rule for the
good of all the people. At the same time civil disobedience is not to
be undertaken lightly since it may foster contempt for the law.
Following Aristotle's Politics Aquinas distinguishes three dif-
ferent forms of government or 'regimes': monarchy (government by
one), aristocracy (government by the elite few), democracy (govern-
ment by all the people). Which regime will be chosen will depend
upon the circumstances of the people. However, Aquinas argues that
a 'mixed regime' is best:
This is the best form of polity, being partly monarchy, since there is
one at the head of all; partly aristocracy, in so far as a number of
persons are set in authority; partly democracy, i.e. government by the
people, in so far as the rulers can be chosen from the people and the
people have a right to choose their rulers. 14
Developments
The big question, which Aquinas leaves unresolved, is who is to
interpret the moral law and judge when there is a conflict between it
13 Summa Theologiae, 1, 11, 97, 3.
14 ibid., 1, 11, 105, 1.
48 Political Thinkers
and the civil law? In the Middle Ages from time to time the Church
tended to claim to be the interpreter of the moral law and the judge
of any conflicts between it and the law of the State. But there is
nothing in Aquinas' theory which gives the Church this right. The·
interpretation of the moral law is the business of 'natural reason' and
the Church authorities have to· use the ordinary processes of reason
just like the rest of us. If one were to follow out the logic of Aquinas'
position one would have to say that they have no more competence in
the sphere of 'natural law' than they have in the sphere of the natural
sciences. The Church has special rights only within the area of its
own competence, the spiritual welfare of its members.
Later Catholic thinkers distinguish between the 'direct power' of
the Church over the political order, and what they call the 'indirect
power' of the Church vis-a-vis the State. They reject the first, but
they argue that in pursuit of its proper spiritual and religious
purposes the Church may sometimes run up against a certain law of
the State. Thus for example the Church might, in pursuit of its
religious mission, set up its own educational system; but then it
might come into conflict with a law of the State decreeing that only a
State-controlled education system will be tolerated. In this case the
Church may, in defence of its own proper religious interests,
legitimately protest against the policy of the State. 15 To that extent it
may (indirectly or obliquely) 'play politics'.
Clearly the theory of the 'indirect power' of the Church can be
interpreted in a very permissive way so that the Church is allowed a
good deal of interference in politics. But, by and large, later Catholic
thinkers, including the nineteenth and twentieth century Popes in
their statements on social questions (Leo XIII, Pius XII, John
XXIII), have resisted this temptation and kept fairly closely to the
position established by Aquinas.
Aquinas' ideas have also been developed by certain twentieth
century Catholic thinkers with reference to liberal democratic
'pluralist' societies where the State largely opts out of the realm of
private morality and restricts itself to providing a framework of
peace and order within which people can, as Mill puts it, follow out
their own 'experiments in living'. Catholic political philosophers
such as John Courtney Murray welcome the advent of the liberal
democratic state in that it has no religious (or anti-religious)
commitment. The Church, like any other group, is free to live
within such a society and to fulfil its specific religious task without
being tempted to play politics. In the older 'confessional' societies
(sixteenth and seventeenth century France, nineteenth century
Austro-Hungary) in which the Church had a privileged place, the
15 J. Maritain,The Things That Are Not Caesar's, (London, 1939). J. Leder, The
Two Sovereignties, (London, 1952).
Augustine and Aquinas 49
Conclusion
What point do the ideas of Augustine and Aquinas have for
contemporary political theory? No doubt, the medieval debates over
the relations between Church and State do not now have much
application in modern liberal democratic societies where the Chris-
tian churches have for the most part lost their special and favoured
position and churchmen no longer wish to 'play politics'. There are,
however, still some (like the 'Moral Majority' in the United States)
who argue that the State should actively espouse specific religious
views, and in Islamic societies such as Iran there is a strong tendency
towards theocracy with the religious authorities assuming political
power and using the law to enforce Islamic beliefs and precepts. The
theory of the two societies elaborated by Augustine and Aquinas
obviously has something to say with regard to these theocratic
tendencies.
In more general terms, Augustine's political 'realism' has con-
tinuing relevance in that it reminds us that in practice in the political
order self-interest remains a pervasive factor, and in that it warns us
not to expect too much from politics. As it has been put, for
Augustine
the two major defects of fallen man, perversity of will and ignorance
... infect every action that the State takes through its all too human
agents. Since all those who bear political power - rulers, officials,
judges, policemen, soldiers- are only men, their judgement is fallible,
their information is inevitably inadequate and often incorrect, and
their decisions are frequently biased by passion and self-interest.
Their actions, even when they are successful, never dispose of the
problems that they face, whether these be domestic issues or foreign
relations. 17
Further Reading
On St Augustine:
Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo, (London, 1967). The best general
introduction to St Augustine - man and work.
Herbert A. Deane, The Political and Social Ideas of St Augustine, (New
York, 1963). A good survey of Augustine's political thought.
J.N. Figgis, The Political Aspects of St Augustine's 'City of God', (London,
1921). An old but still useful commentary.
On St Thomas Aquinas:
A.P. d'Entreves, Natural Law: An Introduction to Legal Philosophy, (Lon-
don, 1970). A little dated but still valuable as an introduction.
John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, (Oxford, 1980). A sophisti-
cated and up-to-date analysis of Aquinas' natura1law theory by an Oxford
legal philosopher.
T. Gilby, Principality and Polity: Aquinas and the rise of State theory in the
West, (London, 1958). Quirky but illuminating on Aquinas' political
theory.
General:
Max Charlesworth, Church, State and Conscience, (St Lucia, 1973). Essays
on contemporary aspects of Church-State relations.
J. Leder, The Two Sovereignties, (London, 1952). A scholarly treatment of
Catholic Church-State relations.
J. Maritain, The Things That Are Not Caesar's, (London, 1939). An old but
still excellent analysis of the theory of 'indirect power'.
John Courtney Murray, We Hold These Truths, (New York, 1960). An
illuminating attempt to reconcile traditional Church-State theory with
liberal-democratic society by a great American Jesuit thinker.