Buddhist Logic and Apologetics in 17 th Century

China: an Analysis of the Use of Buddhist

Syllogisms in an Anti-Christian Polemic

Jiang Wu'

I. Introduction

The sophistication of Buddhist logic represented by "Buddhist  thinkers  such 

as  Dignaga  (ca.  6th centu.i:y)  and DharmakIrti (ca.  7th century)  often inspires 
scholarly research .from a philosophical and logical perspective. In this  view, 
Buddhist logic is  regarded as  a  tool  for  reaching logical  conclusions.  How-
ever,  because  of the  religious  nature  of Buddhist  philosophy,  when  Bud-
dhist logic  is  applied  to  solve  a  real  case  of reasoning,  it is  often  tainted by 
an  apologetic  purpose.  In  this  essay,  I  will analyze  the use  of Buddhist syl-
logisms,  a  special  form  of ｩｮｦ･ｲｾ｣Ｌ＠ in  an  anti­Christian  polemic  in  seven­ . 
teenth­century  China  to  illustrate  the  indispensable  relationship  between 
logic  and  apologetics  in  the  Buddhist  tradition.  I  argue  that  for  Buddhist 
believers  logic  is  not  only  a  way  of correct  reasoning  but also  a  powerM 
apologetic tool for  the purpose of religious  propagation. Therefore, the phi-
losophical approach  to Buddhist logic  should be supplemented by a  careful 
consideration  of the ·usage of Buddhist logic  and the  context of such appli-
cations. 
The focus  of this  article is  the use of Buddhist syllogisms articulated by 
Feiyin  Tongrong ｦｩｬｾＺＮｴ［ｭＧ｀＠ (1593­1661),  a  seventeenth­century Chan  master 

• Assistant Professor, Department  of East Asian  Studies, The  University  of Amana, P. O.  

Box 210105, Tucson, AZ 85721.  ECmaiJ:  [email protected],edu.  

Dao: A Journal ofComparative Philosophy June 2003, VoL  II, No.2, pp.  273­289.  

©  2003  by  Global Scholarly Publications.  
274  Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy

in  China,  whose  polemical  essays  repudiated  the  first  several  chapters  of 
Matteo  Ricci's  The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven (7(±' ｾ ＩＮ＠ The  Bud-
dhist syllogism is a type of inference in the Buddhist logical tradition (Ch.
Yinmzng fZJSJ.l; Skt. Hetu-vicjya) that was fully developed in India and Tibet.
Buddhist logicians constructed inference by using three steps of reasoning:
thesis, reason, and example. The study of this branch of Buddhist knowl-
edge in China, however, was not prominent except for a short period of
time in the Tang ｾ dynasty (618-907), when Xuanzang Ｕｲｾ＠ (602?-664) first
introduced it to China. It seems strange that Buddhist syllogisms "sud-
denly" reappeared in a seventeenth-century anti-Christian polemic. Basically,
in his use of Buddhist logic, Feiyin Tongrong devised three syllogisms ac-
cording to the rules of Buddhist logic. The last of these syllogisms is a hy-
pothetical Christian argument that he fabricated. Pointing out the logical
inconsistency of this imagined syllogism, Feiyin Tongrong sought to invali-
date the Christian belief in the existence of a creator God.
To facilitate an understanding of the content of these Buddhist syllo-
gisms and the historical context in which Buddhist logic was used, I will
first introduce some historical backgrounds, especially the rise .of Chan
Buddhism and the spread of Yogacara studies. Then, special attention will
be given to the content of Feiyin Tongrong's three syllogisms. Finally, I will
elaborate on the relation between logic and apologetics in the Buddhist tra-
dition.

II. The Rise of Chan Buddhism and the Spread of Yogacara Studies
In Seventeenth-century China

The arrival of Jesuit missionaries in sixteenth-century China resulted in an:

interesting cultural confrontation between Christianity and Chinese culture.
Jacques Gernet ascribes this conflict to the fundamental barriers of the dif-
ferent "mental categories and modes of thought" between the two (see
Gernet: 246).1 It appears that Confucianism and Christianity had the two
leading roles in this cross-religious dialogue and that Buddhism was only
marginal, either echoing or assuming the Confucian voice. Within the major
anti-Christian ' polemical collection Poxie Ji ＨｾＮＤ ｾＩ＠ compiled by XU
Changzhi ＱＪｾ､＠ (1582-1672) or reprinted in Japan as the Collected Esserys on

1 The field of early Jesuit mission in China and the Sino-European cultural exchange is well

developed 00 the basis of the archival studies of Jesuit materials in Rome, Paris, and Shang-
hai. For representative studies, see Zurcher; Muogello 198'9 and 1994; Standaert 1988 and
1995.
 Wu: Buddhist Logic & Apologetics in Seventeenth-Century China 275

Destrrying Heterodo:ry ＨｾＺｯｊｚＡｦｬＩＬＲ＠ six volumes were contributed by Confu-

cian literati, and essays compiled by Buddhist clergy were only placed in the
last two volumes. Nonetheless, Iso Kern, through his study of Buddhist .
response to the Christian presence in seventeenth-century China, warns us
that scholars must consider the role of Buddhism in this inter-religious en-
counter because most of the sources we have today about the Chinese reac-
tions to Christianity were compiled or edited by Buddhist clergy and lay
people (see Kern 1992; Dudink).
In my recently completed dissertation, I examined the histoncalback-
ground of this encounter from the Buddhist side. According to my study, .
two new changes in the Buddhist world, the rise of Chan Buddhism and the
revival of Yogadira studies, explain the popularity of Buddhistlogic among
Buddhist scholars and its use against the Christians. First, a prominent
Chan lineage, largely unknown to scholars of Chinese Buddhism, had
played a decisive role in the anti-Christian movement from 1634 to 1640.
This lineage started with Chan monk Miyun Yuanwu ,&;¥ilmm (1566-1642),
the 29 th generation dharma master in the Linji ｴＺｩｬ［ｾ＠ school, and comprised a
group of his dhanna heirs, including Feiyin Tongrong, Bruchi Xingyuan B
'i;ijj-ff5t; (1610-1662), and XU Changzhi, who had actively participated in the
anti-Christian movement. We now have a better understanding of this line-
age through the Obalru school in Japan because Feiyin Tongrong's dharma
heir Yinyuan Longqi ｾＵｴ［ｉｩｦＮｲ＠ (1592-1673) emigrated to Japan in 1654.
Within the Japanese Obalru tradition, Miyun Yuanwu, Feiyin Tongrong, and
Yinyuan Longqi were revered as three early Huangbo Ｚｊｩｾ＠ (Obalru) patri-
archs in China. . .
This group of Chan monks joined the polemics in the second phase of
the anti-Christian movement, according to Iso Kem's periodization. Kern
suggests that the Buddhist reaction to Christianity can be roughly divided
into three stages: As early as 1608, Monk Zhuhong :t** (1535-1615) and
his follower YU Chunxi ｓｩｷｾ＠ (?-1621) repudiated Matteo Ricci's opposi-
tion to Buddhist vegetarianism and Buddhist cosmology. The second phase,
characterized by the compilation of the Collected Essqys on Destroying Hetero-
do:ry in 1640, Ｎ ｾ｡ｳ＠ the climax of the whole campaign. The participation by
Ouyi Zhixu ｾＺｉﾧＬ＠ in 1642/43, one of the so-called "Four Eminent
Monks" in the late Ming aJj, was considered the third stage (see Kern 1992;
see also S. Zhang 1975).
In the present article, my investigation of the use of Buddhist syllo-
gisms focuses primarily on the second phase of the Buddhist reaction,
which was largely organized and coordinated by Miyun Yuanwu and his

2 The maj or existing edition is a Japanese reprint in 1855: However, Prof. XlA Guiqi IOll'l:J
found another earlier edition and published it in Hong Kong. See Xia.
276 Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy

disciples. According to my study, lvIiyun Yuanwu ascended to the zenith of

his power around 1630. Based ill Mount Tiantong ｾｩｉ＠ ill Nillgbo $iJilZ,
Zhejiang Wfrr province, his monastic network extended from Zhejiang to
Fujian ｪｦｩｬｾ＠ where Mount Huangbo was a stronghold. Therefore, when lvIi-
yun Yuanwu was illvited by the literati to joill the anti-Christian movement,
he accepted the illvitation and organized his followers' to initiate the po-
lemic 3
The appearance of Buddhist logic in the Buddhist-Christian encounter,
however, seems unexpected because Yogacara, a philosophical school di-
rectly associated with the knowledge of Buddhist logic, was in serious de-
cline ill the seventeenth century. Thus, Iso Kern, briefly studying Feiyin's
use of syllogism, suggests that ill Feiyll's time, the study of Buddhist logic
was largely a forgotten tradition, and Feiyin learnt it from several printed
texts about logic in the Buddhist canon. Kern thus regards Feiyin's use of
Buddhist syllogisms as the most "merkwiirdig"(odd), showing his unfamili-
arity with logic (Kern 1992: 155). However, as several studies suggest, dur-
illg the late Ming dynasty, there was a revival of Buddhist scholasticism,
illcluding the study of Buddhist logic. .
Attention to Buddhist logic accompanied the rise of the study of
Yogacara. Master Sanhuai Hong'en ］ｾｽｉＬ＠ (1545-1608) or Xuelang
Hong'en was instrumental ill the promotion of Yogacara studies. 4 Since the
Yogacara school no longer existed, Sanhuai Hong'en assembled essential
Yogacara texts and compiled a collection, entitled the Eight Essential Texts of
Yogacara ＨｴｅｬＪｊ｜ｾＩＬ＠ which laid out the foundation of the revival of
Yogacara studies. Among these eight texts, the NyayapraveSa (T no. 1630,
32: ii-B), attributed to Sankara-svamin, became the basic source for sev-
enteenth-century Chi.nese Buddhists to comprehend Buddhist 10gic. s This
text was supposed to be written by Sankara-svamin as an introductory

3 For detail of Miyun Yuanwu and his involvement in the anti-Christian campaign, see Wu
2002: 197-204.
4 Master Hong'en was usually called Master Xuelang ｾｬｴＧＺＮ＠ The Jesuit sources indicate that he
had a debate with Matteo Ricci. However the author of Fonti Riccione mistakes his name as
Sanhuai ］ＭｾＮ＠ See Spence: 254 and Elia: 2/75-76. According to his biography written by his
good friend Hanshan Deqing, Master Hong'en was attracted to doctrinal studies at the age
of 12 an<;l thus entered the sangha. Residing at Bao'en ﾥｾｽＬ＠ monastery in Nanjing WJ*, he
studied with Master Wuji Mingxin ｾｅｪＬｦｩ＠ (1512-1574) who had traveled to Beijing and
transmitted the knowledge of Huayan learning-and Yogacara teaching to the south. See Z no.
1456,73: 676c-679a. For a detailed study of the rise of Yogacara studies in the late Ming
dynasty, see Z. Zhang: ＲＹＱＭＴｾＮ＠
5 It must be noted that the Nyayapravesa, an introductory essay, only represented a small
portion of Buddhist logic because Xuanzang only translated Dignaga's early .works,
Nyayamukha and Nyayapravesa. After Dignaga, some significant changes were made by
DharmakTrti.
 Wu: Buddhist Logic & Apologetics in Seventeenth-Century China 277

commentary to Dignaga's Nyayamukha. Stcherbatsky characterizes this text

as follows:
Botb these works by Dignaga are very short tracts containing summaries of the
formal ｰｾ＠ of the logic of Dignaga with unimportant changes and additions by
his pupil Sankara-svamin. The philosophic and epistemological part, as well as
all controversies with non-Buddhist systems, are ignored in them. They bear the
character of short manuals for beginners from which every difficult problem has
been carefully eliminated. (Stcherbatsky: 1/54)

Stcherbatsky thinks that the Nyayapravda was largely written by

Dignaga but supplemented by his disciple Sankara-svam1n. 11u:ough Xuan-
zang, these two texts were introduced to China. However, Xuanzang only
transmitted a part of Buddhist logic. According to Stcherbatsky, ''Prainfu:ta-
samuccaya, the fundamental work of Dignaga, as well as the seven treatises
of DharmakIrti, and enormous literature of commentaries with their divi-
sion .in schools and sub schools is quite unknoWn .in China and Japan"
(Stcherbatsky: 1/54). That is to say, these two texts, Nyayapravdaand
Nyayamukha, served as the basic sources for Chinese Buddhists to under-
stand Buddhist logic. Therefore, a large number 6f commentaries on these
texts emerged during the Tang dynasty.
Although several new commentaries of the Nyayapravesa were written
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the theoretical value of
these commentaries is perhaps less important to the whole scholarship of
ｂｵ､ｨｩｾｴ＠ logic because the authors of these works were unable to use pri-
mary sources from India and Tibet to enrich their arguments. The unique-
ness of the revival of Yoga cara studies, as I see it, lies in Buddhist scb.olars'
eagerness anp willingness .to apply this rediscovered technique to real intel-
lectual debates. Feiyin Tongrong's use of Buddhist syllogisms in the anti-
Christian movement was not the first case in which Hetu-vidya was em-
ployed in late Ming Buddhist debates. For example, Kongyin Zhencheng ｾ＠
ｅｐｩｾ＠ (1547-1617), a follower of the Huayan tradition at Mount Wutai,
wrote Wubuqian zhengliang lun ＨｾＯｦｭｬｅｩＩ＠ (The Correct &asoning on the
Immutabiliry of Things) to refute ｓ･ｮｧｺｨ｡ｯＧｳｭｾ＠ (384-414) treatise, Things Do
not Shift ＼Ｑｾ］ｦｭＩ Ｎ Ｖ＠

6 The remarkable development in his work is that Zhencheng was able to use Buddhist logic.
to point out the illherent errors in Sengzhao's reasoning. Using Buddhist syllogisms com-
posed of thesis, reason, and example, he commented that Sengzbao's argument is incorrect
. because Sengzhao concludes, according to Zhencheng, that things are immutable since their
nature is permanently abiding. However, the standard Madhyamaka theory should assert that.
things are not shifting because there is no existence of the inherent nature. Therefore, while
Sengzhao's conclusion is similar to the Madhyamaka thought, his reason is entirely wrong.
Zhencheng's real purpose was not to develop a theory of Buddhist logic; instead , he tried to
use syllogisms as a tool to structure his argument. JIANG Canteng ｲｊＱＺｾＬ＠ who has con-
278 Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy

This historical background suggests that the use of Buddhist logic in

a
the seventeenth century was result of the revival of Buddhism in general.
First of all, the ｾ･ｳｵｲｧｮ｣＠ of Yogacara studies disseminated the knowledge
of logic among Buddhist monks; second, through the active participation of
Chan monks, Buddhist logic was used in the anti-Christian polemic. Be-
cause Buddhist logic was employed under a special circumstance in which
polemics occurred between Buddhism and Christianity, the application of
logic inevitably became apologetic. In the following section, I shall examine
the three syllogisms constructed by Feiyin Tongrong.

III. Buddhist Syllogisms from a Logical Point of View

The Buddhist syllogisms composed by Feiyin Tongrong are aimed at Mat-

teo Ricci (1552-1610) and his influential book The True Meaning of the urd oj
Heaven. Matteo Ricci was a pioneering] esuit missionary who laid out a mis-
sionary approach that has been often acclaimed as a model of "cultural ac-
.commodation." This approach sought to establish links between Christian-
ity and the indigenous culture without a radical disruption of the commonly
accepted religious ideas and practices. However, this policy was applied
only to Confucianism and not to Buddhism. Moreover, Ricci described
Buddhism as a religion of nihilism. For him the Buddhist concept of "void-
ness" or "emptiness" simply means "absolutely nothing" (Ricci: 103). In
this sense, the early encounter between Christianity and Buddhism was not
a "dialogue." Both Christians and Buddhists in the seventeenth century
wereexttemely apologetic and polemical.
In his syllogisms, Feiyin Tongrong followed all basic rules of Buddhist
inference. According to these rules, there are two kinds of inference: infer-
ence for one's own sake (fvCirthCinumiina ｾ El ttiil:) without verbal expres-
sions, and inference for the sake of others (parCirthiinumCina ｾｦｴｈ＠ ) ex-
pressed in language. In this sense, most inferences are actually inferences
for the sake of others. Before Dignaga, Buddhist logic was influenced by
the Nyaya school that used a five-membered (thesis, reason, example, appli-
cation, and conclusion) fonn of inference. After Dignaga's refonn, Bud-
dhist inference adopts the three-membered form that is composed of only
three parts: thesis, reason, and example. For example, a typical Buddhist
syllogism can be expressed in this way:

ducted a detailed study of this debate, argues that Zhencheng's use of the Buddhist syllogism
in the late Ming Buddhist doctrinal debates "was the fJ.rst time [in Chinese Buddhism] when
speculative tools were used to conduct theoretical analy·sis and to evaluate whether a notion
is true or false" Giang 1996: 106).
 Wu: Buddhist Logic & Apologetics in Seventeenth-Century China 279

Thesis: Sound is impermanent.

Reason: because (it) is created by others.
The statement of similor example: If it is created by others, it can be seen that it is
impermanent.
The real case of the exampk. like a bottle.
The statement of dissimilor example: If it is permanent, it can be seen that it is Dot
created by others.
The real case oJthe exampk. like space.

In this full-fledged Buddhist syllogism, the logical functiori of each part is

. different. The thesis (Skt. pratijna, Ch. zong *) is composed of two parts: a
subject (literally, property-possessor, Skt. dbarmin; Ch. youfa ｾｬＧＡＩ＠ that refers
to a substratum having certain properties. The predicate that qualifies the
subject is the property of the substratum (dharma l'!). According to the the-
ory of anumana (inference), a valid  thesis  should  not contradict perceptions 
and one's  own statement.  Both  the subject and  the  predicate should be  ac-
cepted by both parties in  the debate  (See Bhatt: 106). 
.  Reason is  a  pivotal part of the  whole inference.  It must guarantee  the 
logical  necessity  of  the  reasoning;  otherwise,  the  whole  syllogism  will be 
invalid.  If we are allowed to draw an analogy with Aristotelian syllogisms, it 
should  fulfill  the  function  of the  major premise  and minor premise.  More-
over,  in  order  to  ensure  the  soundness  of a  syllogism,  Buddhist  logicians 
developed  three  rules  to  govern  the  use  of reason,  usually  called  the  three 
aspects  of the logical reason (tn'riipa-hetu ｾ］ｦﾧＩｊ＠
The part of exemplification is  actually  the  extension  of reasoning and 
fulfills  the  last two  aspects  of the  tririipa-hetu by  numerating similar and dis-
similar examples. It is  composed of two  parts:  the statement of the  example 
(yuti ｐｴｵｾＩ＠ which  asserts  the  causal  relation  between  thesis and reason,  and 
the real  case  of the example  (yuyi ｄｴｵｾＩ＠ that gives  a real example from which 
the  statement  is  induced.  In addition,  a  valid  Buddhist  syllogism  requires 
two  examples:  similar  (tongyu Ii'iJDtu; Skt.  sadharmyadrstanta) and dissimilar  (yryu
ｾｐｴｵＬ＠ Skt.  ｶ｡ｩ､ｨｲｭｹｾｴｮＩＮ＠ The  similar  ･ｸｾｰｬ＠ must  affirm  the  causal 
relation  between  the  predicate of the  thesis  (zongfa *l'! )  and  the  predicate 
of reason  (yinfa ｾｬＧＡＩ＠ through  the  use  of the  real  example.  The  dissimilar 
example negates  both predicates  by using the real example  to  prove that the 
opposite of the reason is  not true. 
The following three syllogisms  composed by Feiyin Tongrong have in-
ternal  logical  connections,  according  to  the  rules  of Buddhist  logic.  First, 
Feiyin  Tongrong  presented  a  so­called  "syllogism  commonly  accepted  by 

7  Dignaga's  version  of these  three  aspects  is  as  follows:  "1.  Its  presence  in  the  subject  of 
inference.  2.  Its  presence  in  similar  instances.  3.  Its  absence  in  dissimilar  instances."  Dhar­. 
maklrti modified it as  follows:  "1.  The necessary presence of the reason in  the s";bject's  total-
ity.  2. Its  necessary  presence  in  Similars  only,  although  Dot  in  their  totality.  3.  Its  necessary  . 
absence from  Dissimilars in  their totality."  For detail, see Stcherbatsky: 243­45. 
278 Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy

This historical background suggests that the use of Buddhist logic in

a
the seventeenth century was result of the revival of Buddhism in general.
First of all, the resurgence of Yogacara studies clisseininated the knowledge
of logic among Buddhist monks; second, through the active participation of
Chan monks, Buddhist logic was used in the anti-Christian polemic. Be-
cause Buddhist logic was employed under a special circumstance in which
polemics occurred between Buddhism and Christianity, the application of
logic inevitably became apologetic. In the following section, I shall examine
the three syllogisms constructed by Feiyin Tongrong.

III. Buddhist Syllogisms from a Logical Point of View

The Buddhist syllogisms composed by Feiyin Tongrong are aimed at Mat-

teo Ricci (1552-1610) and his influential book The Tme Meaning ojtheI..1Jrd of
Heaven. Matteo Ricci was a pioneering Jesuit missionary who laid out a mis-
sionary approach that has been often acclaimed as a model of "cultural ac-
.commodation." This approach sought to establish links between Christian-
ity and the indigenous culture without a radical disruption of the commonly
accepted religious ideas and practices. However, this policy was applied
only to Confucianism and not to Buddhism. Moreover, Ricci described
Buddhism as a religion of nihilism. For him the Buddhist concept of "void-
ness" or "emptiness" simply means "absolutely nothing" (Ricci: 103). In
this sense, the early encounter between Christianity and Buddhism was not
a "dialogue." Both Christians and Buddhists in the seventeenth century
were extremely apologetic and polemical.
In his syllogisms, Feiyin Tongrong followed all basic rules of Buddhist
inference. According to these rules, there are two kinds of inference: infer-
ence for one's own sake (Jvarthanumana ff.& 13 tUt ) without verbal expres-
sions, and inference for the sake of others (pararthiinumana .fflftjJ,lt ) ex-
pressed in language. In this sense, most inferences are actually inferences
for the sake of others. Before Dignaga, Buddhist logic was influenced by
the Nyaya school that used a five-membered (thesis, reason, example, appli-
cation, and conclusion) form of inference. After Dignaga's reform, Bud-
dhist inference adopts the three-membered form that is composed of only
three parts: thesis, reason, and example. For example, a typical Buddhist
syllogism can be expressed in this way:

due ted a detailed study of this debate, argues that Zhencheng's use of the Buddhist syllogism
in the late Ming Buddhist doctrinal debates "was the first time [in Chinese Buddhism] when
speculative tools were used to conduct theoretical analysis and to evaluate whether a notion
is true or false" Giang 1996: 106).
280 Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy

both parties" eCho Gong bi liang ｾｴ ｴＮｒＺ Ｌ＠ Skt. siidhiiralJa-iinumiina). It was in-
tended to serve as the common ground for further debate. Therefore, it
must be accepted as true by both parties. The second syllogism expresses
Feiyin Tongrong's thesis that is inferred from the first syllogism. The pur-
pose of this reasoning is to prove the validity of a Buddhist point of view,
which Feiyin Tongrong supported. However, the third -syllogism is sup-
posed to express Feiyin Tongrong's opponent's (Ricci's in this case) thesis.
Based on the first syllogism, which is accepted by both Feiyin Tongrong
and Matteo Ricci, the third syllogism should be demonstrated as invalid. In
addition, the structure of these three syllogisms was designed to ward off
the accusation of partiality: both parties' theses are grounded on a com-
monly agreed proposition and no one will introduce additional as sumptions.
Therefore, as a result of Feiyin Tongrong's reasoning, the Buddhist position
is true because it is a logical inference of the first syllogism and Ricci's posi-
tion is wrong because logical contradictions were discovered.
In this following section, I will first give an outlined form of these syl-
logisms according to Feiyin Tongrong's presentation . .Because Buddhist
syllogisms follow a format different from Aristotelian logic, as conclusion
rather than the premise is stated flrst, it is not easy to comprehend the
meaning of the syllogisms in the beginning. Therefore, I will explain their
content by using the concepts and terms of Aristotelian logic, which we are
accustomed to. However, this way of explanation by no means implies the
commensurability of the two logical systems .

Syllogism One:
Subject. The completely true great Way (iij"$ [dhamnn) : Ｊｪｬｅﾣｾ＠
Them-. [The completely true great Way) contains the myriad things in the world
entirely (7.i<: ｾﾱｴｬＱｯＯＩｊｩ Ｎ＠ .
Reason: [The completely true great Way] is equal to what is beginningless and
･ｮ､ｬｳｾ Ｚ＠ ＭｾＪ ｾＩＮ＠ . .
Similar example: Like space, because space is continuous and unlimited, arid con-
tains myriad things (fCllljj.]: Ｙ ｄｾＬ＠ ＮＭｪＬｾｗ［ｍｬｋ］ＱＧｉｔ＠ｊ ｦｾｬｩｊｴ＠
ｾＩＮ＠
Dissimilar example: Like turde hair and rabbit horn which do not exist. They ru:e
different from what is beginningless and endless and cannot contain myr-
iad things entirely ＨｾｉｊｬｕＺ＠ Ｙｄ［ｊｩ］ｂｾｦｴＧｬ＠ Ｌ＠ ＪｾｰｦｩＬ＠ ｾｔＱＡ｜ｩＬ＠ =1'mii! ....
ｾｦｴｭ ＩＮ＠ .

In appearance, the meaning of this syllogism is obscure because its format

and the logic of its reasoning do not conform to our common sense of syl-
logism that is primarily Aristotelian. Instead of giving major and miIior
premises first and reaching a conclusion at the end, Buddhist logicians re-
verse the sequence of reasoning: a conclusion .is put forward first, followed
by the reason and two examples. Moreover, in the examples, Feiyin Ton-
282 Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy

This syllogism is similarly inscrutable. Again, for the convenience of our intui-
tive  understanding,  I will  convert it  to  an Aristotelian syllogism,  although some 
logical relationships entailed  in the original syllogism are unfortunately lost: 

Major Premise: The beginningless and endless  contaips all  things.  

Minor Pmnise: Mind­only is  beginningless  and endless.  
Conclusiorr. Mind­only contains all  things.  

The subject of this  sylloglsm is  Mind­only. As  Iso Kern notes, Mind­only is 

a  typical  concept of Huayan philosophy because  the  basic  tenet  of Huayan 
philosophy  is  that  "no  beings  exist  outside  the  mind"  (Kern  1992:  170). 
Again,  evoking  the  two  cliches  used in his  first  sylloglsm,  Feiyin  Tongrong 
tried  to  prove  that  the  mind  also  contains  myriad  things  on  the  basis  that 
the .mind is  without  temporal  and spatial limits.  If we  accept his  first  syllo-
glsm  that  formulates  the  thesis  that  the  Great  Ultimate  Way  contains  all 
things, we  will identify the mind with what he calls  the Great Ultimate Way. 
Therefore, the  origin  of the world can  be explained simply by  the  existence 
of the  hUman  mind. In  other words,  the  Ultimate  Way  or  ontological  sub-
stance  of the  universe  is  immanent  in the  human  world  and  Feiyin  Ton-
grong was proposing an ontology of immanence. 
.  This  ontology  of immanence,  however,  is  in  sharp  contrast  to  the 
Christian  notion  of a  creator  God.  The very  idea  of a  creator  outside  this 
world,  according  to  Feiyin  Tongrong,  is  a  self­contradiction  by  nature  be-
cause  we  cannot  assume  that  nothing  exists  before  creation  except  God. 
Feiyin  Tongrong  thus  constructed  Ricci's  argument in  the  form  of a  Bud-
dhist syllogism.  Certainly,  this  syllogism was  out of Feiyin Tongrong's  own 
imagination because it is  unlikely  that Ricci would have used Buddhist IOglc 
in his  argumentation. Let us review  the  following highly polemical inference. 

Syllogism Three:  
Subject The Lord of Heaven  m$: ［ｒｾＩ＠
Thesis: [The  Lord  of Heaven]  is  able  to  create  birds,  animals,  grass,  and  wood  
that have a beginning and an  end  (*:  ｾｧＱｈＵＮｬｴＡｪ｛Ｚ［Ｙ＠
fuasorr. [The Lord of Heaven]  is not created by what is  beginningless and endless 
(t2SI:  El  ｴＩＺｊＡｬｩｦＵｾﾥ｝ｆＮｰｓＳ＠
Similar example: Like  that  turtle  hair creates  things.  Because turtle  hair  is  not cre-
ated  and  is  originally  non­existen('it  has  no  reason  to ·create  things  ([5] 
DIM:  ｦｲｏｾＧＵＺｬｯＯｊＬ＠ ｴＩｊ［ＧＵ｝ｆＮｰｦｩｅｬＳｾＬ＠ ＪｾｰｦｩＬ＠ ｊｬｕｾＺｯＯｚＩＮ＠
Dissimilar example: Like  that  human  beings  create  human  beings.  Because  hu-
mans  are  the  same  species,  they  are  different  from  the  beginningless  and 
endless  Lord of Heaven who was  not created  but is  able  to produce what 
has  a  beginning and an  end,  such  as  grass  and  wood  (J!,Il!iV: frOA1:.,A,  tJ.
 Wu: Buddhist & China 283

The of this

entity has no way to create

Ricci was supposed to argue Tongrong's view that
only things of the same can jJ.1.'JUl.'--C. Thus, a being that
was not cannot produce
Again, we may convert this syllogism to an Aristotelian
that the inherent logical fallacies· could be to us:

The is originally nothing and thus

no reason to
Tht minorpmmJ<: The nrr.rlnr..rl by the beg:ummgless and
endless.
Conclusion;; The Lord of Heaven Drc,duces all

in the above form of do not sup-

the conclusion that "the Lord of Heaven "  On the 
ability  of creation  by  the  Chtis-
tian  God.  as  a  because  it 
rule  of non­contradiction  between  thesis 
Because  ｴｨ･ｾｩｳ＠ and  reason  ate 
the  of the  Lord  of Heaven is  not  bu-
Skt.  Aprasiddha, the  un:lccepted, 
minor  terms  by both  
tioned  the  following fallacies  ill his  essay as  
of  tile  three  members   sanzhi
contradiction between  thesis and reason  (zongyuyin xiaflJ'lVlJi /.K'*L2S1­tE:lJi!'c 
contradiction  between  reason  and  thesis  (yin yu zong XUl1lp./Vet
and  the  contradiction  between  and  thesis  and  reason  (yu yu zong

Any  of these errors  can  the inference. 

the Christian  doctrine of the existence of the all­mighty God is 
wrong. He  even hinted  that Ricci should  follow  the  conventions  of such a 
debate often  held  in  India  between Buddhists  and  Hmdu"  the loser 
should  either  surrender under  the  red  banner  the winner  or 
reverse his  robe and leave from  the side door or sweat to  cut his  own head 
284

off 8:
i\t this point, it becomes evident to us that this polemic the
Christians was reinforced the use of The correct logical forms
were followed and .the basic of Knrlrl,h1 We
could con tinue to this a.UIi1.LH.d
logical of view and an of view. However, also ap-
parent m these is the apologetic of the author
and towards Although
claimed an imparti!Jl we can sense that the Christian view bad been
abstracted and ridiculed. conclusion of a logical of these
would make better sense if were ap-
pr()ac:nea as a new in the Buddhist apologetic tradition rather
than in its logical tradition. To illustrate this let us the rela-
tion between arid in the tradition
has been by the

IV. Logic and Apologetics in the Buddhist Tradition

m response
in the seventeenth as
Feiyin is first of
an intentional advancement of the
logtcal Buddhist apologetics was a conscious reaction to
LUlU'.""'",, from other religions. In Indian Buddhism, ap()logetlc ｾｕＢＧｊ＠
ｲＢＧｾｮｰｬ＠ sporadically in works "With other rel!g1()Us m
Sanskrit (Ch. waidoo Pali: """JUY,"', C()nCeDt refers
to who have taken a than the Buddhist one. Al-
though these paths are not
are acknowledged by Buddhists as
betans term it, tfrthikas are stones in the river.? In to this
mdusive of the presence of other religions, a more exclusive
version of as and harmful. In their
that respond to various tfrthikas, early Buddhist were
concerned the presence of other traditions and were eager
to distinguish themselves from the followers of other The
result of this kind of apologetic effort was various versions of ta.."{onomy of

9 For the clarification of. this llIlj:)On-4IH "m''-'+H,

Duff, ProfNobumi
servo The
and '.:nc:"v"y.
 Wu: Buddhist Logic & Apologetics in Seventeenth-Centu:ry China 285

firlhika, which classified all sorts of Indian religions according to their roots
of "fallacy." During encounters with other religions, the Buddhist apolo-
getic tradition was developed and closely related to the advance of Buddhist
logic (see Jackson).lo
In China, under the rubric of "protecting the dhanna" (hufa ｾＺＤＩＬ＠
Buddhist apologetic essays can be found in different historical periods.
Prior to the fifth century, apologetic treatises were collected in A Collection if"
EssC!)'s that Illuminate the Dharma ｻＵａｆﾥｬｾｽ＠ (T no. 2102, 52: 1-96) edited by
Sengyou fjiil/i (445-518). During the Tang dynasty, Damman ｾ 'Ef (596-667)
assembled a large amount of apologetic materials and compiled An Extensive
Collection if"Essqs that Illuminate the Dharma ＨＡｊｩ｢ｆﾥｬｾＩ＠ (T no. 2103, 52: 97-
362) and The Debates between Buddhism and Daoism in History ＨｾｴＵＴｦＺｭ＠
ｾＩ＠ (T no. 2104, 52: 363-396). Early apologetic works such as the Master
Mau's Treatise that Removes Our Doubts ＨｩｆｔＳＡｉｾＩ＠ in the fourth century
and The Treatise that Ridicules the Dao ＨｾＩ＠ in the sixth century focus
more on historical and moral arguments (see Keenan and Kohn).
After the Tang ｾ dynasty, the Buddhist religion was fumlygrounded
in ｃｨｩｮ･ｾ＠ society, and there were only a few public debates between Bud-
dhism and other religions. The most notable is perhaps the Buddhist-Daolst
debate during the Yuan 5t dynasty that resulted in the persecution ofDao-
ists. Most Buddhist apologetic writings in later times targeted Neo-
Confucianism and were written by literati followers. The rhetoric of the
"Unity of Daoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism" became the central ar-
gument of these works. For example, ZHANG Shangying ｾｲｭ＠ (1043-
1121), a Prime Minister during the Song dynasty, wrote the famous Trea-
tisl! an the Protection if"the Buddhist Dharma ＼ｾＦｬｦｪｽ＠ (T no. 2114 52: 637-645)
to repudiate critiasms of Buddhism by early Song Confucians OUYANG
Xiu ｉ［ｘｍｾ＠ (1007-1072), CHENG Yi ｾｭ＠ (1033-1107), and CHENG Hao
［ｦｩｾ＠ (1032-1085). LI Chunfu ＪｾＱｩ＠ (1185-1231), a scholar in theJin 3lz: dy-
nasty of Northern China controlled by the Jurchens, also compiled the
Comments on the Collection that Illuminates the W try ＨｂｪｾｉｄｬＩ＠ to defend Bud-
dhism against Neo-Confucian critiques. During the Ming Iljj dynasty, apolo-
getic works continued to be written: SONG Lian's *1ll (1310-1381) Records
if"Protecting the Dharma ＨｾｮＩＬ＠ Daoyan's ｾｉｄ＠ (or YAO Guangxiao ｾＬ＠
1335-1418) Records if"the Remainder if" the WC!)' ｻＳＱ｛ｾｽＬ＠ and Tu Long's ｊＡｾ＠
(1542-1605) Records if" the Protectors if" the Buddhist Dharma ＨｻｾｮＩ＠ were
- representative writings. .j<

The use of Buddhist logic, however, was not present in these apolo-

10 For example, Dhannakirti, the most important Buddhist logician in the seventh centUry,
was deeply involved in the refutatioo of the Hindu theistic argUment for the existence of the
highest God fSvara. See Jackson. -
286 Dao: A Journal of Comparative PhiJosopfry

getic works. Even in the Tang dynasty, when the study of Buddhist logic
was promoted by Xuanzang, there Is no evidence that Buddhist logic was
successfully used in actual debates as an apologetic too1. l1 In this sense, the
emergence of Buddhist logic in the context of the seventeenth-century anti-
Christian movement signaled a new development in Buddhist apologetics.
This religious appropriation of logic in the seventeenth century be-
. came possible because logic in religious traditions often served an apolo-
purpose. From its genesis, logic is not by. nature apologetic. As a tool
reasoning, it was developed to master the rules of correct thinking.
However, when a religious tradition grows into a comprehensive system of
learning, logic is incorporated as an important branch of divine knowledge
and serves the purpose of validating faith and eliminating heterodoxy. The
Christian theologian Anselm (1033-1109), for example, employed Aristote-
lian logic, which is neutral to religion, to construct his ontol<;>gical argument
for the existence of God. In a similar way, Buddhist logic can be also trans-
fonned into an apologetic art of debate. As the author of the NyayapraveSa
states, "the property that is desired to be proved is whether it is eternal or
noneternal" (Stcherbatsk:y: 105). TIris shows that Buddhist logic should first
of all validate Buddhist doctrinal tenets. The Chinese translation of the
NyayapraveSa even clearly articulates that yinming, the Chinese translation
for hetu-vidyii, is intended to combat "heterodoxy" (xie $) and defend "or-
t:hodoxy" (zheng
This ideological intent, which is inherited in Buddhist logic, is not ob-
vious when we talk about logic as an independent branch oflearning within
the Buddhist tradition and judge this body of knowledge purely in tenns of
logic rather than in terms of religion. However, Buddhist logic is also a
subdivision of religious knowledge that was developed under the aegis of
religious dogmas. It cannot be separated from the context in which these
logical theories were nourished. Its application in a particular historicalpe-
riod IS often concomitant with the emergence of strong opposition to Bud-
dhism from other religious traditions. In the seventeenth century, when
Christianity became a strong challenge to l?uddhism, Buddhist logic was
once again appropriated as a powerful apologetic too1)2

11 The most notable use of syllogism by the Chinese was certainly Xuanzang's inference for
'vijiiaptimiitratii (zhcmveishi liang ｾｉｬｪﾣｕＬ＠ the inference of true consciousness-only) composed
in India, which might have inspired the sbenteenth-century Buddhists to use it in real de-
bates. However, this event occurred during Xuanzang's stay in India. See Frankenhauser
1996: 73-75:
12 The revival of the interest in Buddhist logic under pressure from other traditions is not
unique in Buddhist history. In the twentietb century;Jor example, when the Western threat
to Chinese Buddhism became imminerit, Buddhist logic was once again advocated by a
group of Buddhists, represented by OUYANG Jingwu ｾＱｉｬｩｴ｝＠ (1871-1943) and LU Cheng
 Wu: Buddhist Logic & Apologetics in Seventeenth-Century China 287

V.Conclusion

.A glimpse of the new application of Buddhist logic in the seventeenth cen-

tury leads us to reflect about our approach to logic in a .given religious tradi-
tion: Should we isolate a logical system from the very context that has given
rise to the genesis and development of such an intellectual apparatus?
Methodologically, we do have the legitimate right to approach Buddhist
logic from a purely logical point of view. However, when we study the ac-
tual use of Buddhist logic in the seventeenth-centUry anti-Christian polemic,
an analysis of its intentional application alloWs us to conclude that Buddhist
logic in the context of controversy is pnmarily apologetic. Therefore, with a
methodological concern, I suggest that philosophers and logicians should
reconsider the apologetic nature oflogic in any given religious tradition. 13

Abbreviations:
SCPX] Shl1ngchao poxigi ｏＱｅＡｪｩｂｬｧｴＤｾｽ＠ ,8 vols. Ed. by:XU Changzhi ｾﾧ＠
. 1639; reprinted in Japan, 1855-1856.
T Taisho shinsho daiiPkyo ＨＪｉｅｾＷ［ＺｪｩｕｄＬ＠ 100 vols. Edited by
Takakusu Junjir6 ｲＧＶｊＺｍｩｮｾ＠ et al. Tokyo: Daizo Shuppan, 1924-
32.
Z Shinsan dai Nihon zokuzfJkyo ＨｾＪｂＲｦ＾ＺｩｕｄＬ＠ 90 vois. Tokyo:
Kokusho Kank6kai, 1975-1989; originally published as Dainihon
zokuiPkyo ＪｂＺｺｴ［ＱｦｩｾＬ＠ 750 vols. Kyoto: Zoky6 Shoin, 1905-1.2.

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