Mateo v. Dar
Mateo v. Dar
Mateo v. Dar
DOCTRINE:
While the Court recognizes the primacy of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies in our judicial system, it bears emphasizing that the principle admits of
exceptions, among which is when there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that
irretrievably prejudices a complainant.
LEGAL BASES:
Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that the DAR is vested with ''primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters" and "exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform" except those falling under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
Section 57 confers "special" and "original and exclusive" jurisdiction to the SAC
over all petitions of landowners for the determination of just compensation.
In San Miguel Properties, Inc. v. Perez, the Court held that the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction bas been increasingly called into play on matters demanding the
special competence of administrative agencies even if such matters are at the
same time within the jurisdiction of the courts. A case that requires for its
determination the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of some
administrative board or commission because it involves technical matters or
intricate questions of fact, relief must first be obtained in an appropriate
administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts
although the matter comes within the jurisdiction of the courts. The application
of the doctrine does not call for the dismissal of the case in the court but only for
its suspension until after the matters within the competence of the administrative
body are threshed out and determined.
FACTS:
The Mateos were the registered owners of coconut and rice lands with a total area of
1,323,112 square meters situated at Fabrica, Bacon, Sorsogon and were covered by TCT
No. T-22822. A portion of the lands was brought under the coverage of the CARP of the
government. DAR entered the premises sometime in June 1994. LBP valued the land at
₱52,000.00 per hectare but, the Mateos rejected it.
The Mateos filed a complaint against LBP, DAR and the farmer-beneficiaries for just
compensation which was raffled to the SAC. The LBP and DAR filed their respective
answers arguing that since no summary administrative proceedings to determine the
amount of just compensation had been conducted yet, the complaint of the Mateos was
premature.
The SAC rendered judgment ordering LBP to pay the Mateos the amount of
₱71,143,623.00 as just compensation for 112.3112 hectares of coconut and rice lands
subject property, after consideration of many factors and reports for the fair valuation
of the land in Sorsogon.
LBP appealed and argued that the complaint of the Mateos was premature and that the
SAC failed to consider the guidelines provided for in Section 1718 of R.A. No. 6657 in
determining just compensation. The Mateos sought the dismissal of the appeal.
The CA rendered Decision setting aside the SAC's judgment and dismissing without
prejudice the complaint of the Mateos ratiocinating that the latter prematurely filed with
the court the complaint for determination of just compensation, thus failing to exhaust
the prescribed administrative remedy and, in the process, preventing the DARAB from
complying with the said administrative process which is mandatory.
The Mateos filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by CA. Hence, the
Mateos filed the petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in negating the jurisdiction of the RTC, as a SAC, to
determine in the first instance and in the absence of the conduct of prior administrative
proceedings, questions of just compensation to be paid to landowners.
RULING:
Yes. While the Court recognizes the primacy of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies in our judicial system, it bears emphasizing that the principle
admits of exceptions, among which is when there is unreasonable delay or official
inaction that irretrievably prejudices a complainant.
COMMENTS:
The exception is present in this case where the LBP and the DAR entered the property
of the Mateos sometime in 1994, but deposited cash and Agrarian Reform Bonds as
payment therefor only on December 13, 1996 and February 11, 1997. The LBP and the
DAR were indisputably aware that the Mateos rejected the price offered as just
compensation for the subject property. Still, at the time the Mateos filed their suit before
the SAC, no summary administrative proceeding was yet initiated by the DAR to make
further valuation. The SAC even had to issue no less than three orders dated November
12, 1997, January 7, 1998 and March 18, 1998 for the DAR to conduct the necessary
proceedings. DAR’s delay and inaction had unjustly prejudiced the Mateos and
precluding them from filing a complaint before the SAC shall result in an injustice,
which the law never intends.