VIOLATION OF DOMICILE

What are the crimes known as violation of domicile?

1. Violation of domicile by entering a dwelling against the will of the owner thereof or
making search without
previous consent of the owner (Art. 128).
2. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally
obtained (Art. 129)
3. Searching domicile without witnesses (Art. 130)

Acts Punishable under Art. 128.

1. By entering any dwelling against the will of the owner thereof; or
2. By searching papers or others effects found therein without the previous consent of
such owner; or
3. By refusing to leave the premises, after having surreptitiously entered
said dwelling and after having been
required to leave the same.

Elements common to three acts:

1. That the offender is a public officer or employee
2. That he is not authorized by judicial order to enter the dwelling and/ or to make a
search therein for papers or
other effects.

If the offender who enters the dwelling against the will of the owner thereof is a private
individual, the crime committed is trespass to dwelling. (Art. 280).

Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained, and abuse in the service of those
legally obtained.

Acts punishable in connection with search warrants.

1. By procuring a search warrant without a just cause
2. by exceeding his authority or by using unnecessary severity in executing a search
warrant legally procured.

Elements of procuring a search warrant without just cause:

a. That the offender is a public officer or employee
b. That he procures a search warrant
c. That there is no just cause.

Search warrant, defined.

A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the
Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to
search for personal property described therein and bring it before the court.

Personal property to be seized.

A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:
a) subject of the offense;
b) stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offenses; or
c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense (Sec.3, Rule
126, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure).
Requisites for issuing search warrant. –
A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may
be anywhere in the Philippines. (Sec.4, Rule 126, Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure).

Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two witnesses. –

No search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made except in the
presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence
of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.
(Sec. 8, Rule 126, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure).

Validity of search warrant.-

A search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from its date. Thereafter, it shall be
void. (Sec. 10, Rule 126,Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure).

Receipt of the property seized.-

The officer seizing property under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same
to the lawful occupant ofthe premises in whose presence the search and seizure were
made, or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of at least two
witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality, leave a receipt
in the place in which he found the seized property. (Sec. 11, Rule 126, Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure).

Search incidental to lawful arrest.-

A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a
search warrant. (Sec. 13, Rule 126, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure).

Elements of exceeding authority or using unnecessary severity in executing a

search warrant legally procured:
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.
2. That he has legally procured a search warrant.
3. That he exceeds his authority or uses unnecessary severity in executing the same.

Example of exceeding authority in executing search warrant.

If the public officer, in executing a search warrant for opium, seized books, personal
letters, and other property having a remote or no connection with opium, even if he
believed or suspected that they had some relation with opium, such public officer may
be held under Art. 129. (Uy Kheytin, et. al. vs. Villareal, 42 Phil 886).

Examples of using unnecessary severity in executing search warrant.

If in searching a house, the public officer destroys furniture therein without any
justification at all, he is guilty under Art. 129, as having used unnecessary severity in
executing the search warrant.

Art. 130. Searching domicile without witnesses. –

Elements:
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.
2. That he is armed with search warrant legally procured.
3. That he searched the domicile, papers, or other belongings of any person.
4. that the owner, or any member of his family, or two witnesses residing in the same
locality are not present.
Milo vs Salanga, 152 SCRA 113

FACTS
An information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against herein private respondent
(accused Barrio Captain Tuvera, Sr.) and some other private persons for maltreating
petitioner Valdez by hitting him with butts of their guns and fist blows. Immediately
thereafter, without legal grounds and with deliberate intent to deprive the latter of his
constitutional liberty, accused respondent and two members of the police force of
Mangsat conspired and helped one another in lodging and locking petitioner inside the
municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven (11) hours. Accused-
respondent then filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts
charged do not
constitute the elements of said crime and that the proofs adduced at the investigation
are not sufficient to support the filing of the information. Petitioner Asst. Provincial
Fiscal Milo filed an opposition thereto.
Consequently, averring that accused-respondent was not a public officer who can be
charged with Arbitrary Detention, respondent Judge Salanga granted the motion to
quash in an order. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not accused-respondent, being a Barrio Captain, can be liable for the crime
of Arbitrary Detention.

HELD
Yes. The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to
detain or order the detention of persons accused of a crime. One need not be a police
officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that other public officers
like judges and mayors, who act with abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this
crime. A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors would show that they are
similar to those of a barrio captain except that in the case of the latter, his territorial
jurisdiction is smaller. Having the same duty of maintaining peace and order, both must
be and are given the authority to detain or order detention. Noteworthy is the fact that
even private respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with the aid of his rural police, he
as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of petitioner Valdez.

US vs Cabanag, 8 Phil 64, GR No. 3241

Facts
The accused, Tomas Cabanag, was charged with unlawful detention whereby an act
of depriving a private person in his/her liberty. An orphan named Gumaya 13 yrs. of
age has been taken from possession of her grandmother in the province of Nueva
Vizcaya. In order to pay the debt of her family and to consider it a help on them, a guy
named Eusebio sold her to Tomas Cabanag for 100 pesos. In respect to the sale, the
testimony of Tomas, Antonia and the girl agreed that Cabanag has been instructed to
buy the girl by one name Mariano Lopez of Caoayan, Isabela. Gumaya has become
the house servant and was deprived with her liberty.

Issue
Whether or not the accused is guilty of unlawful detention?

Rulings
Tomas Cabanag has been acquitted for there are no law for punishing the offense
made by the accused. Aside from that, there can be no unlawful detention under the
Art.481 without the confinement or restraint of person, such did not exist in this case.

PEOPLE v. CHRISTOPHER BRINGAS Y GARCIA, GR No. 189093, 2010-04-23

Facts:
accused-appellants... were indicted for Carnapping or violation of RA 6539.
The same accused were likewise indicted for Kidnapping for Ransom or violation of
Art. 267 of the RPC.

Version of the Prosecution

Eric's house helper Maricel received a phone call purportedly from Eric's brother-in-
law, Johnson, informing that a gift will be delivered for Patrick, and she was instructed
to wait for the driver who will be arriving soon. Peering through the gate she saw two
men, whom she came to know later on to be Rosales and Calaguas with the latter
holding a large gift in Christmas wrapper. Since the gift could not fit the aperture in the
gate, Maricel opened the gate. Calaguas then poked a gun at Maricel and pulled her
towards Eric's house. Maricel, Sweeney, and the other house helpers, Dina and
Melanie were herded by Calaguas to the children's room at the second floor together
with Eric's children, Patrick and Mikee. Pajarillo then tied the hands and feet of Maricel
while the others did the same to Sweeney, Dina and Melanie. However, Dina's feet
were not tied. Maricel identified Ross as among those who took Patrick. The
kidnappers also took Eric's red Toyota Corolla. After the girls extricated themselves
from their bindings, they immediately called Kim Teng (Kimbol), the brother of Eric,
who rushed to Eric's house. Kimbol called Eric to tell him about the kidnapping of his
son, Patrick. Eric received the first call from one of the kidnappers (negotiator)
demanding a ransom of PhP 10 million for his son and ordered him not to report the
matter to the police else Patrick will be harmed. A friend of the grandparents of Patrick,
however, reported the kidnapping to the PACC Special Operations Task Force
Habagat.

Through another call, the negotiator instructed Eric to produce six individuals for them
to interview and choose from to deliver the money, the qualifications given was
"kailangang matalik ninyong kaibigan na mapapagkatiwalan ng pera, hindi ninyo
kamag-anak, mukhang instik at... marunung managalog." The negotiator interviewed
both Chung and John Tuang on the phone. By lunchtime, the ransom was reduced to
PhP 8 million which was further reduced to PhP 5 million at 4:00 p.m. Eric was then
instructed to have the ransom money delivered, which at that time was significantly
reduced to PhP 2.5 million and which he was able to raise that day Chung called Eric
telling him that he was intercepted by two cars which he had to follow. The PACC then
suspected Chung to be in cahoots with the kidnappers. Eventually, Chung, bringing
Patrick, arrived at Eric's place past midnight. Chung reported to Eric that "hinarang ako
inipit ako sa dalawang kotse at nakita ko si Johnson sa isa sa mga sasakyan." Five
minutes after Chung's arrival, Gen. Lacson and his men arrived and arrested Chung.
Eric received a call from Gen. Lacson informing him that the ransom money was
recovered except for PhP 100,000 which was given by Chung to Navarro. Chung
apologized to Eric saying, "Sorry, ginawa ko sa inyo ito, napipilitan lang ako" and
"[T]utulong naman ako sa PACC ibinigay ko na yung... dalawang pangalan." PACC
further informed Eric that they have arrested the other kidnappers who were pointed
out by Jimboy Bringas.
Version of the Defense
From their testimonies, Navarro and Chung similarly asserted being implicated by the
other in the crime and pointed at each other as the mastermind thereof. Calaguas,
Sulayao, Pajarillo and Ross uniformly point to Chung and Navarro as the brains behind
the kidnapping who were assisted by Rosales and Jimboy Bringas, and that they were
merely implicated for they were merely hired as factory workers (Calaguas and
Sulayao), for a driving job (Ross) or was only doing a favor for Rosales (Pajarillo).
Jimboy Bringas maintained that he was only implicated by Chung and Navarro for he
was neither involved with the crime nor participated in its commission as he was only
tasked to look for factory workers by Chung and for tourist guides by Navarro. Bobby
Bringas strongly protested his innocence as he was in Pampanga on the days material
and was never involved in the crime but was merely implicated by Rosales.

RTC rendered its Joint Decision finding accused-appellants and the other accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. CA rendered the assailed
Decision affirming the trial court.

Issues:
The foregoing issues or assignment of errors can actually be reduced and summarized
as follows: first, on the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses in
general and, in particular, of Maricel Hipos and of the state witness Rosales; and,
second, on the finding of conspiracy.

Ruling:
Second Core Issue: Presence of Conspiracy
Kidnapping for ransom proven beyond reasonable doubt.

The crime of Kidnapping and serious illegal detention, under Art. 267 of the RPC, has
the following elements:
(1) the offender is a private individual; not either of the parents of the victim or a public
officer who has a duty under the law to detain a person;
(2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
(3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and
(4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present:
(a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days;
(b) it is committed by simulating public authority;
(c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained or threats to kill him are made or
(d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public official.

The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty,
coupled with indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect the same. Moreover, if
the victim is a minor, or the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of
extorting ransom, the duration of his detention becomes inconsequential. Ransom
means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a
captured person that will release him from captivity. In the instant case, all the
elements of the crime of kidnapping for ransom has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. The accused are all private individuals. The kidnapping of Patrick Teng, then
three years old, a minor is undisputed. That ransom was demanded and paid is
established.

Duly-Proven Conspiracy
Our assiduous review of the records of the case shows the presence of conspiracy.
However, we fail to appreciate the direct participation of Bobby Bringas in the
conspiracy.
Thus, accused-appellants Jimboy Bringas, Chung and Navarro together with the other
accused Pajarillo, Sulayao, Ross and Calaguas are equally guilty and liable for the
crime charged for having conspired to commit and did commit kidnapping for ransom of
Patrick.
To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be
shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity--
mere presence when the transaction was made does not necessarily lead to an
inference of concurrence with the criminal design to commit the crime.

The testimony of state witness Rosales is the lynchpin by which the conspiracy is
proven.
Jimboy Bringas brought together Rosales, Calaguas and Sulayao from Pampanga,
while Rosales brought in Ross and Pajarillo from Laguna. They thus formed the team,
although Jimboy Bringas did not join the team but was in on the sharing of the ransom.
Together with Ricky Castillo and Rosales, accused Ross, Pajarillo, Sulayao and
Calaguas actively participated in the kidnapping. Jimboy Bringas evidently participated
in the planning and the subsequent execution of the conspiracy by bringing in
Calaguas and Sulayao from Pampanga. As to Bobby Bringas, it is undisputed that he
did not participate in the actual kidnapping. It may be true that the other accused
brought Patrick to Bobby Bringas' place but it was not shown that Bobby Bringas took
care of Patrick as the group moved to different places.
It was neither clearly shown that Bobby Bringas recruited the other accused to carry
out the kidnapping. It was only Rosales' testimony that Bobby Bringas asked him to
drive. Aside from that, the fact alone that the other accused went to his place does not
point to his direct involvement in the conspiracy considering that he knows them. There
is therefore no clear and convincing evidence of Bobby Bringas' direct involvement
either in the kidnapping of Patrick or in the conspiracy to its commission.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appeals of accused-appellants Christopher Bringas, John

Robert Navarro and Eden Sy Chung are DENIED; while the appeal of accused-
appellant Bryan Bringas is GRANTED. Accordingly, the January 3, 2006 Decision and
June 6, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00911 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION insofar as the amount of the damages
awarded and the acquittal of Bryan Bringas.

As modified, the dispositive portion of the March 26, 1999 Joint Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 258 in Parañaque City, pertaining to Criminal Case No.
95-137, for Kidnapping for Ransom, shall read:
 In Criminal Case No. 95-137, for KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM, defined and
penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act no. 7659, finding accused CHRISTOPHER BRINGAS y Garcia;
JOHN ROBERT NAVARRO y Cruz; ARUEL ROSS y Picardo; ROGER
CALAGUAS y Jimenez; and EDEN SY CHUNG guilty beyond reasonable doubt,
they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.

 The instant criminal charge is DISMISSED as to accused ERICSON

PAJARILLO y Baser and EDGARDO SULAYAO y Petilla on account of their
death pursuant to Article 89, 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
  The accused JOHN ROBERT NAVARRO y Cruz is hereby directed to pay Eric
Teng the sum of PhP100,000.00 as actual damages with interest thereon at the
legal rate of 12% from December 15, 1994 until fully paid.

 The accused CHRISTOPHER BRINGAS y Garcia; JOHN ROBERT NAVARRO

y Cruz; ARUEL ROSS y Picardo; ROGER CALAGUAS y Jimenez; ERICSON
PAJARILLO y Baser; EDGARDO SULAYAO y Petilla and EDEN SY CHUNG
are directed to pay Eric Teng jointly and severally the amount of PhP50,000.00
as civil indemnity, PhP200,000.00 as moral damages; and PhP100,000.00 as
exemplary damages and to pay the costs.

 Accused BRYAN BRINGAS y GARCIA is hereby ACQUITTED for reasonable

doubt as to his involvement.

LINO V. FUGOSO,
77 PHIL. 937

TOPIC/DOCTRINE
One accused, of "conspiracy" to overthrow the Government has actually and voluntarily
accepted appointment by the conspirators as an officer of armed forces, raised or to be
raised for the furtherance of the designs of the conspirators, may be taken into
consideration as evidence of the. criminal connection of the accused with the
conspiracy.

FACTS
Pascual Montaniel was arrested without warrant by the police officers of Manila on
November 8, 1946 for inciting to sedition, and Pacifico Deoduco on November 7, 1946
for resisting arrest and disobedience to police orders. On November 11, 1947, when
this petition for habeas corpus was filed, these two petitioners were still under arrest.
They were thus held in confinement for three days and four days, respectively, without
warrants and without charges formally filed in court. The papers of their cases were not
transmitted to the City’s Fiscal office until late in the afternoon of November.

Upon investigation by that office, no sufficient evidence was found to warrant the
prosecution of Pascual Montaniel for inciting to sedition and of Pacifio Deoduco for
resisting arrest, but both remained under custody because of information filed with the
municipal court charging Montaniel of unjuxt vexation and Deoduco of disobedience of
a person in authority. And so far, no warrants of arrest or orders of commitment are
shown to have been issued by the municipal trial court pursuant to the information thus
filed.

ISSUE
Is the detention of Montaniel and Deoduco Illegal?

RULING
The court held in the affirmative.
The court held that even assuming that they were legally arrested without warrant, their
continued detention became illegal upon the expiration of six hours without their having
ben delivered to corresponding judicial authorities.
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.
39 PHIL 778
March 25, 1919

FACTS:
Respondent Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, for the best of all reasons, to
exterminate vise, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had
been permitted for a number of years in the City of Manila, closed. The women were
kept confined to their houses in the district by the police. At about midnight of October
25, the police, acting pursuant to the orders from the chief of the police and Justo
Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons,
and placed them aboard the steamers ―Corregidor and ―Negros. They had no
knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. The two steamers with their
unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25, 1918.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of the Mayor of the City of Manila is constitutional.

HELD:
The Supreme Court condemned the Mayor‘s act. Respondent‘s intention to suppress
the social evil was commutable. But his methods were unlawful.

Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippines in conformity with an act of
Congress. The Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a
hearing from the Islands. One can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation,
which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the City of Manila or the Chief of Police of
that City to force citizens of the Philippine Islands, and these women despite their
being in a sense, lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens
protected by the same constitutional guarantees as other citizens.

 Law defines power. The law is the only supreme power in our system of government,
and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more
strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which gives
itself and imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives.
 
The fundamental rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, considered as
individual possessions, are secured by those maxims of constitutional law which are
the monuments showing the victorious progress of the race in securing to men the
blessings of civilization under the reign of just and equal laws, so that, in the famous
language of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights, the government of the commonwealth
may be ―government of laws and not of men.
US v. SALVADOR VALLEJO ET AL
11 Phil 193

Hilario Camino Moncado v. People's Court, 80 Phil 1 (1948)

Facts:
Petitioner stands accused of treason before the people’s Court, the information against
him having been filed by Prosecutor Ladaw on February 28, 1946. Almost a year
before, on April 4, 1945, at about 6:00 p.m., petitioner was arrested by members of the
Counter Intelligence Corps of the United States Army at his residence at 199-A San
Rafael St., Manila, without any warrant of arrest, and taken to the Bilibid Prison at
Muntinglupa, where he was detained.

On April 11, 1945, petitioner's wife, who transferred to their house at 3 Rosario Drive,
Quezon City, was approached by several CIC officers, headed by Lt. Olves, and
ordered to accompany them to the house at San Rafael to witness the taking of
documents and things belonging to petitioner. Upon hearing from the officers that they
did not have any search warrant for the purpose, she refused to go with them, but after
the officers told her that with or without her presence they would search the house at
San Rafael, Mrs. Moncado decide to accompany them. Upon arrival at the house, Mrs.
Moncado noticed that their belongings had been ransacked by American officers and
that the trunks which she had kept in the attic and in the garage when she left the
house, had been ripped open and their contents scattered on the floor. Lt. Olves
informed Mrs. Moncado that they were going to take a bundle of documents and
things, which were separated from the rest of the scattered things, because they
proved the guilt of her husband. Mrs. Moncado protested in vain. No receipt was
issued to her. Subsequently, after making an inventory of their belongings at San
Rafael, Mrs. Moncado found the important documents and correspondence missing.

Issue:  Whether or not illegally seized evidence is admissible in court.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court, following the U.S. case of Wolf V. Colorado, rules that evidence
illegally obtained is not necessarily excluded if is otherwise admissible under the rules
of evidence in such case, the evidence admitted, without prejudice to any criminal, civil
or administrative liability of the officer who illegally seized it. In other words, the
admissibility of the evidence is not effected  by the illegality of the means by which it
was acquired.

The evidence illegally seized is still admissible as long as it is not excluded by the rules
of court, on the theory that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely
because “the constable has been blundered”.

Alvarez v. CFI, 64 Phil 33 (1937) 

FACTS:
On June 3, 1936, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the
Department of Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding
over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, an affidavit alleging that according to
reliable information, the petitioner kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books,
documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his
activities as a money-lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law.
In his oath at the end of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his
answers to the questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did
not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon
the information received by him from a reliable person. Upon the affidavit in question
the Judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is the subject matter of the petition,
ordering the search of the petitioner's house at any time of the day or night, the seizure
of the books and documents above-mentioned and the immediate delivery thereof to
him to be disposed of in accordance with the law. 

With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner's store
and residence at seven o'clock on the night of June 4, 1936, and seized and took
possession of the following articles: internal revenue licenses for the years 1933 to
1936, one ledger, two journals, two cashbooks, nine order books, four notebooks, four
checks stubs, two memorandums, three bankbooks, two contracts, four stubs, forty-
eight stubs of purchases of copra, two inventories, two bundles of bills of lading, one
bundle of credit receipts, one bundle of stubs of purchases of copra, two packages of
correspondence, one receipt book belonging to Luis Fernandez, fourteen bundles of
invoices and other papers many documents and loan contracts with security and
promissory notes, 504 chits, promissory notes and stubs of used checks of the
Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation. 

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the search warrant obtained is illegal.
 
RULING:
YES, In view of the foregoing and under the above-cited authorities, it appears that the
affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and
fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, it
is hereby held that the search warrant in question and the subsequent seizure of the
books, documents and other papers are illegal and do not in any way warrant the
deprivation to which the petitioner was subjected:
 That the search and seizure made are illegal for the following reasons: (a) Because
the warrant was based solely upon the affidavit of the petitioner who had no
personal knowledge of the facts of probable cause, and (b) because the warrant
was issued for the sole purpose of seizing evidence which would later be used in
the criminal proceedings that might be instituted against the petitioner, for violation
of the Anti-Usury Law;

 That a detailed description of the person and place to be searched and the articles
to be seized is necessary, but whereby, by the nature of the articles to be seized,
their description must be rather general, but is not required that a technical
description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue;

 That as the warrant had been issued unreasonably, and as it does not appear
positively in the affidavit that the articles were in the possession of the petitioner
and in the place indicated, neither could the search and seizure be made at night;
at the petitioner did not waive his constitutional rights because the offer of
compromise or settlement attributed to him, does not mean, if so made, that he
voluntarily tolerated the search and seizure; and

 That an appeal from the orders questioned by the petitioner, if taken by him, would
not be an effective, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and,
consequently, the petition for mandamus filed by him, lies.

Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff

G.R. No L-64261
December 26, 1984

Facts:
Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of
“Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to
have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and
that respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against
petitioner.

Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two
warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized
subject to the warrant were real properties.

Issue: Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.

Held:
The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the
court as a typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the
place sought to be searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to
search two distinct premises was evident in the issuance of the two warrant.
As to the issue that the  items seized were real properties, the court applied the
principle in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling “that machinery which is
movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement,
property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other
person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the
owner.” In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or
building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in
question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to
seizure under a search warrant.

However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.

Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched.

The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not
satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having
been mere generalizations.
Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants.
(Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant of the
items to be searched and seized did not indicate with specification the subversive
nature of the said items.

Papa vs. Mago, 22 SCRA 857 (1968) 

FACTS:
Martin Alagao, the petitioner herein and the head of the counter-intelligence unit of the
Manila Police Department, acting upon a reliable information regarding a certain
shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be
released the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on
two trucks.

Accordingly, he conducted surveillance at gate no. 1 of the customs zone upon orders
of the petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of
the Bureau of Customs. When the trucks left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the afternoon
of November 4, 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks
and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila.

The load of the two trucks consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were
seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed
ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of
Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in
the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit.

However, Remedios Mago, the herein respondent, filed with the CIF petition "for
mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction claiming that she was the
owner of the goods seized and hired the trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa.

Particularly, she contended that:

  she purchased them from the Sta. Monica Grocery in San Fernando, Pampanga;
she hired the trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa to transport, the goods from said
place to her residence at 1657 Laon Laan St., Sampaloc, Manila;
 the goods were seized by members of the Manila Police Department without
search warrant issued by a competent court;
 Manila Chief of Police Ricardo Papa denied the request of counsel for Remedios
Mago that the bales be not opened and the goods contained therein be not examined;
 then Customs Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had illegally assigned appraisers to
examine goods because the goods were no longer under the control and supervision
of the Commissioner of Customs;
 the goods, even assuming them to have been misdeclared and, undervalued,
were not subject to seizure under Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs Code
because Remedios Mago had bought them from another person without knowledge
that they were imported illegally.

Respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte restraining the

petitioners from opening the nine bales in question, and at the same time set the
hearing of the petition for preliminary injunction on November 16, 1966

However, when the restraining order was received by herein petitioners, some bales
had already been opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence
of officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city fiscal and a representative
of herein respondent Remedios Mago.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Customs bureau has the jurisdiction to seize the goods and institute
forfeiture proceedings against them.

RULING:
Yes. The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others,
(1) to assess and collect all lawful revenues from imported articles, and all other dues,
fees, charges, fines and penalties, accruing under the tariff and customs laws;
(2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the customs; and
(3) to enforce tariff and customs laws.  The goods in question were imported from
Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal
Entry".  As long as the importation has not been terminated the imported goods remain
under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of customs. Importation is deemed terminated only
upon the payment of the duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles, or secured
to be paid, at the port of entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been
granted.  The payment of the duties, taxes, fees and other charges must be in full.

Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question had been brought out
of the customs area the Bureau of Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same,
nevertheless, when said goods were intercepted at the Agrifina Circle on November 4,
1966 by members of the Manila Police Department, acting under directions and orders
of their Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, who had been formally deputized by the Commissioner
of Customs, 9 the Bureau of Customs had regained jurisdiction and custody of the
goods. Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes upon the Collector of
Customs the duty to hold possession of all imported articles upon which duties, taxes,
and other charges have not been paid or secured to be paid, and to dispose of the
same according to law. The goods in question, therefore, were under the custody and
at the disposal of the Bureau of Customs at the time the petition for mandamus,
docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila on
November 9, 1966. The Court of First Instance of Manila, therefore, could not exercise
jurisdiction over said goods even if the warrant of seizure and detention of the goods
for the purposes of the seizure and forfeiture proceedings had not yet been issued by
the Collector of Customs.

It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive
jurisdiction over imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws,
from the moment the goods are actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant
of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in
connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the present case, the Bureau of
Customs actually seized the goods in question on November 4, 1966, and so from that
date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of
the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the regular courts.
Much less then would the Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the
goods in question after the Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and
detention on January 12, 1967. 10 And so, it cannot be said, as respondents contend,
that the issuance of said warrant was only an attempt to divest the respondent Judge
of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

The court presided by respondent Judge did not acquire jurisdiction over the goods in
question when the petition for mandamus was filed before it, and so there was no need
of divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it follows
that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned
order of March 7, 1967 releasing said goods.

PEOPLE v. CRISANTO EVANGELISTA

57 Phil. 372

OSTRAND, J.:
In case No. 41830 (No. 36277 in the Supreme Court) the herein accused, Crisanto
Evangelista and Abelardo Ramos, were charged in the Court of First Instance of
Manila with a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292, as amended. Upon trial the court
below found the accused guilty and sentenced each of them to six months'
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P400 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and each of the accused to pay one-half of the costs. Thereupon the
defendants appealed to this court.

The acts which gave rise to this accusation were as follows: On the first day of May,
1931, a parade was to be held by the communists in the municipality of Caloocati,
within two and a half miles of the city limits of Manila, but as the permit for the parade
had been revoked, a Constabulary officer appeared with his soldiers at the place to
prevent the holding of the parade. The appellant, Crisanto Evangelista, who apparently
was the leader of the people therein assembled to take part in the parade, held a
conversation with the Constabulary officer about the permit and its revocation, after
which Evangelista was allowed by the Constabulary officer to say a few words to the
people for the purpose of informing them that the parade could not be held and that
they should retire. But instead of telling the people to retire, he raised his fist, which the
people approved by shouting "mabuhay", and then said: "Comrades or brethren, the
municipal president, Mr. Aquino, has allowed us to hold the parade, but for reason
unknown to me, the permit has been revoked. This shows that the big ones are
persecuting and oppressing us, who are small, which they have no right to do." Then
shouts were heard from' the audience saying, "Let us fight them". The accused
Abelardo Ramos, who was among the people, shouted "Let us fight them until death".
Evangelista proceeded saying, "My heart bleeds", but could not continue because the
officer stopped him and placed them both, Crisanto Evangelista and Abelardo Ramos,
under arrest. Thereupon the mass began to advance against the Constabulary officer
and soldiers, in an attempt to wrest Evangelista from the Constabulary and to continue
the parade, but the soldiers made use of a water pump and dispersed them. There
were found on the body of Crisanto Evangelista the permit issued by the municipal
president and its revocation.

The appellants testified denying having said the words above quoted and attributed to
them. They further claimed that the people were peaceful, but the trial court found the
facts as above stated, and the appellants' brief does not point out any data or reason
why the finding of the trial court should not be upheld.

Under the circumstances of the case, the statements made by the accused on the
occasion above related are clearly seditious. It must be noted that the disorder took
place on May 1, 1931, that is, several months after the inauguration of the Communist
Party and after the communists had already filled the minds of their followers with their
revolting ideas in several meetings. That the said utterances were really inciting the
people to revolt, is shown by the fact that the mass, not only shouted a protest against
the officers of the law, but did actually advance against them, and the latter had to use
force in order to enforce the law. The defense arguing upon the authority of United
States vs. Apurado (7 Phil., 422), maintains that there is no sedition here, because a
mere disorder is not sedition, but the comparison is inadmissible. In the Apurado case,
the people assembled at the chamber of the municipal council to ask for the removal of
the municipal treasurer on account of religious differences. This court did not find any
disorder in that case. It was a petition for redress of grievances made in more or less
excited language, but the affair on the whole was peaceful and orderly; whereas in the
instant case, there was an inducement to fight, an actual though unexpected fight and
resistance against the authorities. It was simply the practical expression and repetition
of the previous instigations to overthrow the government, made by the communist
leaders before.

For these reasons and those given in cases G. R. Nos. 36275 [1] and 36276,[2] the
judgment appealed, from will be affirmed with the costs against the appellants. So
ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Villa-Real, Hull, Vickers, and Imperial,
JJ., concur.

CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS, General Campaign Manager of Coalesced Minority

Parties, petitioner,
vs.
VALERIANO E. FUGOSO, Mayor of City of Manila, respondent.
G.R. No. L-1800
January 27, 1948

FACTS:
An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the respondent Mayor
Fugoso to issue a permit to them to hold a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress
of grievances to the government. The reason alleged by the Mayor Fugoso in his
defense for refusing the permit is, “that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing
upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the
losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending
to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the
duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a
disruption of public order.”

Mayor Fugoso also invoked the delegated police power to local government. The
Philippine Legislature has delegated the exercise of the police power to the Municipal
Board of the City of Manila. The Municipal Board is also granted the following
legislative powers, to wit: “(p) to provide for the prohibition and suppression of riots,
affrays, disturbances and disorderly assemblies, (u) to regulate the use of streets,
avenues, . . . parks, cemeteries and other public places” and “for the abatement of
nuisances in the same,” and “(ee) to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and
proper for sanitation and safety, the furtherance of prosperity and the promotion of
morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and
its inhabitants.”

Section 844 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibits as an offense against public
peace, and section 1262 of the same Revised Ordinance penalizes as a misdemeanor,
“any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or
excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose;
or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly.” Included
herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.

HELD:
Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section provides for two
constructions: (1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion
to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting,
parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; (2)
The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine or specify the
streets or public places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping,
to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide
adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court favored the
second construction. First construction tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit
the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of government no such unlimited
power may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in
cases of national emergency.

The Mayor’s first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify
suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from
the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be
reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There
must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There
must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one.
The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is
not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to
the state.
People vs. Baes
68 Phil. 203
FACTS: Baes, the parish priest of the
Roman Catholic Church of Lumban,
Laguna, charged the accused
with an offense against religion for causing
the funeral of a member of the “Church of
Christ” to pass
through the churchyard fronting the Roman
Catholic Church, belonging to said church
and devoted to the
religious worship thereof. The parish
priest opposed this, but through force
and threats of physical
violence by the accused, was compelled to
allow the funeral to pass through the said
churchyard.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act complained
of is notoriously offensive to the religious
feelings of the
Catholics, thereby violating Article 133 of
the RPC.
HELD: The facts alleged in the complaint
constitute the offense defined and penalized
in article 133 of the
Revised Penal Code, and should the
fiscal file an information alleging the said
facts and a trial be
thereafter held at which the said facts should
be conclusively established, the court may
find the accused
guilty of the offense complained of, or that
of coercion, or that of trespass under article
281 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Whether or not the act complained of is
offensive to the religious feelings of the
Catholics, is a question of
fact which must be judged only according to
the feelings of the Catholic and not those of
other faithful
ones.
Laurel dissent: Offense to religious feelings
should not be made to depend upon the more
or less broad
or narrow conception of any given particular
religion, but should be gauged having in
view the nature of
the acts committed and after scrutiny of all
the facts and circumstance which should be
viewed through
the mirror of an unbiased judicial criterion.
Otherwise, the gravity or leniency of the
offense would hinge
on the subjective characterization of the act
from the point of view of a given religious
denomination or
sect, and in such a case, the application of
the law would be partial and arbitrary,
withal, dangerous,
especially in a country said to be "once the
scene of religious intolerance and
persecution.
People vs. Baes
68 Phil. 203

FACTS:
Baes, the parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Lumban, Laguna, charged the
accused with an offense against religion for causing the funeral of a member of the
“Church of Christ” to pass through the churchyard fronting the Roman Catholic Church,
belonging to said church and devoted to the religious worship thereof. The parish
priest opposed this, but through force and threats of physical violence by the
accused, was compelled to allow the funeral to pass through the said churchyard.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the act complained of is notoriously offensive to the religious feelings of
the Catholics, thereby violating Article 133 of the RPC.

HELD:
The facts alleged in the complaint constitute the offense defined and penalized in
article 133 of the Revised Penal Code, and should the fiscal file an information
alleging the said facts and a trial be thereafter held at which the said facts should
be conclusively established, the court may find the accused guilty of the offense
complained of, or that of coercion, or that of trespass under article 281 of the Revised
Penal Code.

Whether or not the act complained of is offensive to the religious feelings of the
Catholics, is a question of fact which must be judged only according to the feelings of
the Catholic and not those of other faithful ones.

Laurel dissent: Offense to religious feelings should not be made to depend upon the
more or less broad or narrow conception of any given particular religion, but should be
gauged having in view the nature of the acts committed and after scrutiny of all the
facts and circumstance which should be viewed through the mirror of an unbiased
judicial criterion. Otherwise, the gravity or leniency of the offense would hinge on the
subjective characterization of the act from the point of view of a given religious
denomination or sect, and in such a case, the application of the law would be partial
and arbitrary, withal, dangerous, especially in a country said to be "once the scene of
religious intolerance and persecution.