Alfelor, Sr. VS Intia

G.R. No.
L-27590 April 30, 1976
FELIX O. ALFELOR, SR., REMEDIOS R. ALFELOR, CIRIACO R. ALFELOR, FELIX

R. ALFELOR, JR., ERNESTO RIGOROSO, ELEUTERIO SALAZAR, PORFERIO
TURIANO, ROMEO CATANGUI, JOSE IBARRIENTOS, MOISES FERNANDEZ,
GREGORIO BALCUEVA, GREGORIO DELENA, JACINTO PALOMARES,
BRAULIO PRESENTACION, JOSE MECEDA, RODOLFO DELENA, PEDRO
FERNANDEZ and FLORENTINA DELENA, Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
BONIFACIO C. INTIA, Municipal Judge, and FELIX A. FUENTEBELLA, Respondents.
Raymundo R. Armovit for petitioners.
Anastacio M. Prila for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
The Judiciary Act 1 and the Rules of Court 2 set forth with clarity the jurisdiction of a
municipal court over crimes. That was the point stressed by petitioners to respondent
Judge. 3 It did not avail, their motion to dismiss a falsification charge against them
having been denied. They did point out that in the very complaint itself it was admitted
that it was in another municipality where such alleged falsification took place.
Respondent Judge was not persuaded; he accepted the view set forth in the objection to
the motion to dismiss that the municipal court of Tigaon, his station, was vested with
jurisdiction as it "is one of the intervening municipalities where the jeep carrying the
ballot box (the contents of which were allegedly falsified) passed through." 4 He
maintained that falsification is a continuing offense. He did not budge, notwithstanding
his attention being called to authoritative decisions that affirmed the contrary. Clearly
then, there is merit to this petition. certiorari and prohibition lie. virtual law library
The principal petitioner, Felix O. Alfelor, and respondent Felix A. Fuentebella were
congressional candidates in the second district of Camarines Sur in the 1965 elections,
with the latter being proclaimed as winner resulting in the filing of an electoral protest
by the former. 5 Respondent Fuentebella in turn charged his opponent and the other
petitioners in the municipal court of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, presided by respondent
Judge, with falsification of public or official documents contained in the ballot box of a
precinct in Parubcan, Camarines Sur, the alleged criminal act having taken place in still
another municipality, Iriga, Camarines Sur. 6 There was on the part of petitioners a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the situs of the alleged
falsification being in another municipality, Iriga, Camarines Sur. 7 Respondent Judge in
the challenged order issued on April 29, 1967 denied the motion to dismiss on the
ground that falsification was a continuing offense. 8 A motion for reconsideration was
filed. It was denied. 9 Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
As noted at the outset, the petition merit.

1. Reference was previously made both to the Judiciary Act and the Rules of Court as to
the jurisdiction of municipal courts to try criminal cases being confined only to such
offenses committed within the limits of the territories appertaining to their position. 10In
the latest case in point, Lopez v. City Judge, 11 Justice Dizon, as ponente, restated the basic
rule thus: "It is settled law in criminal actions that the place where the criminal offense
was committed not only determines the venue of the action but is an essential element
of jurisdiction (U.S. v. Pagdayuman, 5 Phil. 265). Thus, under the provisions of Section
86 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, municipal courts have original jurisdiction only over
criminal offenses committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction." 12 As was
pointed out by him, such a doctrine goes back to U.S. v. Pagdayuman, 13a 1905
decision. Beltran v. Ramos, 14 Ragpala v. Justice of the Peace of Tubod, 15 People v.
Yumang 16 and People v. San Antonio 17 may likewise be cited on this point.
2. That much, as was pointed out by Justice Dizon, is settled law. It is to be assumed
that respondent Judge would not deliberately ignore what it commands. His persistence
can be ascribed to his view that falsification is a continuing offense. He was led to
conclude, therefore, that an ingredient thereof took place within his jurisdiction. Here
his stand is decidedly opposed to what this court has uniformly and consistently held.
Again, Lopez v. City Judge 18 points the way: "We now come to consider the question of
when and where is the offense of falsification of a private document deemed
consummated or committed? Upon this point, We have ruled clearly and definitely
in U.S. v. Infante, ... that the crime of falsification of a private document defined and
penalized by Article 304 of the Penal Code (now paragraph 2, Article 172 of the Revised
Penal Code) is consummated when such document is actually falsified with the intent
to prejudice a third person, whether such falsified document is or is not thereafter put
to the illegal use for which it was intended." 19 United States v. Infante 20 was decided as
far back as 1917, almost sixty years ago. Less than a month later that same year, United
States v. Barreto, 21 which spoke to the same effect, was promulgated. As was pointed out
by Justice Carson who likewise penned the Infante opinion: "It is evident, therefore, that
the place where the crime is committed is the place where the document is actually
falsified, and that the improper or illegal use of the document thereafter is in no wise a
material or essential element of the crime of falsification of a private document; and
even if it were otherwise, the charge that the crime was committed in a specific place
would seem to be a sufficient allegation that all of the acts necessary to its
consummation were in fact done at the place indicated." 22 There is also this opinion of
Chief Justice Avancena in People v. Villanueva: 23 "The falsification of each of these six
money orders committed separately by means of different acts constitutes independent
crimes of falsification. (U.S. v. Infante and Barreto, 36 Phil. 146), and the appropriation
of the respective amounts thereof by the defendant, likewise constitutes different crimes
of malversation." 24 All of the above cases explicitly ruled on the specific point at issue. It
does not admit of doubt though that while no such categorical statement may be found
in other decisions of this Court, it has always been assumed that falsification is not a
continuing offense. 25
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted and the order of respondent Judge of
April 29, 1967 and the order of May 25, 1967 denying the motion for reconsideration are
reversed, nullified and set aside and declared to be of no force and effect. The writ of
prohibition is likewise granted, respondent Judge being enjoined to desist from taking
any further action on the complaint for falsification of public and/or official documents
filed against petitioners in his sala except for the purpose of dismissing the same. No
costs.
Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

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G.R. No.

L-27590 April 30, 1976

FELIX O. ALFELOR, SR., REMEDIOS R. ALFELOR, CIRIACO R. ALFELOR, FELIX

Raymundo R. Armovit for petitioners.

Anastacio M. Prila for respondents.

As noted at the outset, the petition merit.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

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