FINGER IN THE DIKE, HEAD IN THE SAND: DEP’s Crumbling Water Supply Infrastructure Riverkeeper, Inc.* July 2001 *Member, Clean Drinking Water CoalitionReport authored with the support and assistance of Cathleen Breen, New York Public Interest Research Group Photos by Tony Bonavist, Jeffrey Odefey, William Wegner, Mare A. Yaggi, and unidentified source. Cover ill tration by Daniel Baxter, Daniel Baxter Illustrations, Red Hook, NY. Caricature by Rob Acosta, 310 S. Jefferson #32A, Placentia, CA 92870 (714) 223 1480, [email protected], Figures depicting water demand/deficit by Nona Sullivan, New York, NY ‘Watershed Map by Bonnie Donato Layout by WINN Graphics, Ine., Yorktown Heights, NY Printing by Posthaste, Elmsford, NY The Clean Drinking Water Coalition consists of The Catskill Center for Conservation and Development ‘New York Public Interest Research Group Open Space Institute Riverkeeper Trust for Public Land Portions of this report were provided to DEP officials. DEP declined to provide specific details refuuting certain aspects of this report. However. several conversations with DEP employees suggest the veracity of allegations contained herein,FINGER IN THE DIKE, HEAD IN THE SAND: DEP's Crumbling Water Supply Infrastructure INTRODUCTION . TABLE OF Cot TENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY PART L. Antique and Dilapidated Infrastructure Undermines DEP’s Water Supply Capability ................. A. New York City’s Reservoir Infrastructure B, DEP’s Engineering and Operations Staff: A Depleted Resource 1. The District Engineers 2. Systems Operations Staff Recommendation #1 Recommendation #2: Recommendation #3: Recommendation #4: Recommendation #5: Recommendation #6: Recommendation Recommendation #8: DEP Should Repair Catskill Aqueduct Leaks Near the Garrison Golf Course and in Other Locations. DEP Should Remove Toxics From the Croton Aqueduct The City Should Create Forms For the Catskill Aqueduct DEP Should Renovate the Catskill Aqueduct Headworks and Assure an Adequate Inventory of Spare Parts. ‘The City Should Insure an Orderly Transition in the District Engineer Offices by Recruiting and Training High Quality Replacement Engineers DEP Should Contract With Expert Engineering Consultants to Create a Manuel on How to Operate and Repair the City Water System DEP Should Repair the Submerged Section of the Old Croton Aquecuet DEP Should Repair Debilitated Shafts & GatehousesRecommendation #9: DEP Should Provide Safe and Potable Drinking Water For Its Employees and Visitors PART II. Leaks in the Delaware Aqueduct Threaten This Critical Source of Water A. DEP Has Concealed the Crisis from the Public B. The Leak in the Aqueduct Is Growing With Each Passing Year C. DEP's Procedures Are Aggravating the Leak D. The City’s Inaction Has Squandered Repair Opportunities For Over a Decade E, Alternative Emergency Sources Available to the City in the Event of a Delaware Aqueduct Collapse Will Not Keep the City From Running Out of Water 1. The Crisis Is Compounded Because the Hudson River Is No Longer Available As a Supplemental Supply During Emergency Water Shortages 2. Emergeney Water Conservation Mea Significant Savings . s Will Not Result In 3. Pumping Increases in the Catskill and Croton Reservoirs, and the Queens Groundwater System Will Not Provide Adequate Supplementary Water 4, Other Minor Sources a, The Croton Falls Pump Station b. Commissioner Miele’s Claim That The City Can Get an Emergency Water Supply From New Jersey Is Absurd F, Running The Numbers: Catastrophic Water Shortages Face the City G. Impacts From the Loss of the Delaware Aqueduct Will Be Felt Upstate H, Recommendations: Repairing the Aqueduct and Preventing a Crisis, Recommendation #10: DEP Should End 10 Years of Delay and Inaction and Immediately Pursue Concrete Remedies to This Potential Crisis ...... 16 30 31 33 33 38 38Recommendation #11 Recommendation #12 Recommendation #13 Recommendation #14: Recommendation #15 Recommendation #16: Recommendation #17; DEP Should Accelerate the Schedule For Test Borings and Geologic Investigations Near the Roseton Leak Site, Including Tests to Determine the Structural Stability of the Tunnel Reaches Adjacent to and Under the Hudson River . 38 DEP Should Accelerate the Deployment of the Woods Hole Constructed Submersible and Take Other Steps to Determine the Precise Leak Locations oe - 38 DEP Must Begin an Adequate Planning Effort in Advance of Final Test Results a 38 DEP Must Immediately Begin to Plan Alternative Sources of Water For Use While the Delaware Aqueduct is Out of Service 38 As Part of Its Efforts to Secure Alternative Sources of Water Delivery, DSP Must Begin Planning a Third Hudson River Tunnel. 39 DEP Must Immediately Begin Repairs and Upgrades to the Catskill and Croton Aqueducts to Ensure That They Will Be Able to Safely Meet the City’s Water Delivery Needs While the Delaware Aqueduct Is Out of Service 39 DEP Should Sto} ncealing Critical Information From Elected Officials and the Public 39, PART III: DEP Has Allowed Toxic Chemicals to Contaminate Its Facilities and Threaten the Water Supply cones e eee 41 A. Sluice Gate Operators Throughout the System Are Contaminated 43 B. Actuators and Manometers Leak Mereury and PCBs 45 CC. Numerous Mercury Spills Endanger Employee Health and Water Quality 4s D, Pollutant Spills Create Workplace Risks for DEP Employees .................48 E, EPA Has Launched An Investigation of DEP's Record of Spills 52 1. EPA Finds Mercury Spills in Gatehouses 54 2. Mercury in Our Drinking Water and Reservoirs cee : 543. PCBs Also Contaminate DEP Facilites 4, DEP's Keystone Cleanup PART IV. Other Infrastructure Issues Raise Water Quality Concerns: Turl CONCLUSION ... y Adds Contamination To The Water Supply 56 56FINGER IN THE DIKE, HEAD IN THE SAND: DEP’S CRUMBLING WATER SUPPLY INFRASTRUCTURE Introduction ‘This is the third of five reports analyzing the New York City Department of Environmental Protection’s (DEP's) performance in safeguarding the City’s drinking water supply and implementing the terms of the 1997 Watershed Memorandum of Agreement.' ‘This report examines DEP’s aging infrastructure, including the potentially devastating consequences of leaking aqueduets, contaminated gatchouses, ard other water quality and quantity concerns. Executive Summary Over nine million New Yorkers living in New York City, Westchester, Putnam, Orange, and Ulster Counties enjoy clean, unfiltered drinking water from the Croton, Catskill, and Delaware watersheds. The 6,000-mile network of pipes, shafts, and subterranean aqueducts carries an average 1.4 billion gallons of pristine water each day from 19 upstate reservoirs. The City water delivery system is a remarkable engineering achievement and the single largest man-made financial asset in New York State. But the City’s reservoir infrastructure is in a state of disrepair that threatens its capacity to protect the City’s water supply. Four decades ago, the City of New York was known as the Mecca of basic civil engineering and water delivery, and the City water supply was regarded among American civilization’s proudest engineering accomplishments. The brilliant engineers of DEP’s haleyon days have departed and the City is left with an ossified, worm-eaten engineering staff, which presides over the gradual deterioration of the system. Their greatest energies seem to be devoted to protect- ing perks and positions, pursuing whistleblowers, and keeping the public in the dark about important issues affecting community health and safety. Instead of taking the necessary steps to restore DEP’s prestige and safeguard the City water supply, DEP leadership in the agency’s LeFrak City headquarters in Queens and the upstate supervising engineers, who know the condition of the system, seem to be counting their days to retirement, hoping they make it before the dike burst. "nis report is prt of series of Clean aking Water Colton report authored hy Riverkospe. The fist report, released in Febrary of 1999 sd entitled "Cops in Cuffs,” otined the Cy’ lure to adequately stand suppor the Bureau of Water Sap Paice, DEP's enforcement and security arm, The seond repo released in November of 1999 and ented "Watershed for Sale" examined DEP's Bureau of Water Supply, Quality and Protections Engineering Section, the branch of DEP chargod with, among other things, reviving new development Broposl to rs thr orsistney wt water quality and regulary ont The Ciy’s water comes from thre component systems of 19 reservist 3 contol lakes in Westchester, Panam, Use, Greene, Schobarie, Delaware and Sulivan Counties in upstate New York. Undet normal cordon, the Delaware System suppis 0% - Me ofthe total water used the Catskill Sytem supplies 20% 40% ofthe ttl water uted, snd the Croton System supplies the remaining 10%Westchester County's Kensico Reservoir - the terminal reservior for 90% of New York City’s drinking woter supply. Photo by William Wegner. This report is in four sections, each covering a critical subject area affecting the perform- ance and security of the City’s water supply. Each section describes a looming crisis with the potential to interrupt the flow of high quality drinking water to City consumers and thereby jeopardize public health and safety. Part I of this report deals with DEP’s chronic failure to ensure adequate maintenance of the water supply infrastructure; some DEP facilities are literally crumbling into ruin, Part IT describes a serious leak in the Delaware Aqueduet, New York City’s newest and most important water supply tunnel, Part IIT examines how poor maintenance and outdated, malfunctioning equipment have caused numerous toxic spills at key water supply facilities. In some cases, mercury, PCBs, lead, and other chemicals have entered the drinking water supply. Part IV of the report describes another growing threat to our water quality; increasing levels of suspended solids (turbidity) in our drinking water pose a real public health threat, ‘This report documents serious flaws in DEP’s management of the water supply infrastruc- ture and offers eonerete and workable recommendations for reform. In general, DEP needs to provide meaningful support to its field personnel, to fully fund maintenance and repair programs, to begin immediate repairs to the Delaware Aqueduct, and to ensure that toxi ‘materials can never again threaten the City’s drinking water supply.WATERSHED MAP CATSKILL ; WATERSHED DELAWARE WATERSHEDM Part | Antique and Dilapidated Infrastructure Und ermines DEP’s Water Supply CapabilityThe City’s water supply infrastructure is in critical condition. Dilapidated shaft houses, crumbling aqueducts, and antique machinery all contribute to the City’s eroding ability to deliv- er reliable quantities of safe drinking water. Coxtamination of water supply facilities by toxic materials threatens the health of not only DEP employees, but of nine million water consumers. This deplorable state is the result of both institutional neglect and political shortsightedness. As a result of these maladies, infrastructure maintenance has suffered decades of fiscal starvation A. New York City’s Reservoir Infrastructure The City’s water supply comes from three upstate reservoir systems through a complex sys- tem of aqueduets, reservoirs, and pipes that deliver water from as far away as 125 miles. The Delaware system, constructed between 1937 and 1945 and the farthest system from the City, is comprised of four reservoirs ~ the Cannonsville, Pepacton, Neversink, and Rondout.? Water is drawn through the East Delaware Tunnel, West Delaware Tunnel, and Neversink Tunnel to the Rondout Reservoir, from which the water is sen: through the 84-mile-long Delaware Aqueduct + The Delaware Aqueduct was built from 31 vertical shafts and is three distinet pressure tunnels on an approximate two percent grade.° The Delaware system supplies between 50% and 80% of the City’s daily water demand and services several upstate communities.* ‘The Catskill watershed system drains 571 square miles of land surface and contains two drinking water reservoirs. The Ashokan Reservoir in Ulster County covers 12.8 square miles and has a capacity of 123 billion gallons.’ The Schoharie Reservoir covers 1.8 square miles overlapping Schoharie, Delaware and Greene Counties, and has a capacity of 17.6 billion gal- lons.* The Schoharie Reservoir is connected to she Ashokan Reservoir by the Shandaken Tunnel, which travels 18 miles underground and joins with the Esopus Creek near the Village of Shandaken.? The joined waters then flow to the Ashokan Reservoir, which covers parts of the Towns of Olive, Hurley and Marbletown, ‘The Catskill Aqueduct connects the Ashokan Reservoir to the Kensico Reservoir in Westchester County, passing through Ulster, Orange and Putnam Counties and traveling 1,114 feet beneath the Hudson River at Comwall in Orange County. From the Kensico Reservoir, the aqueduct continues to the Hillview Reservoir in Yonkers. Total length of the aqueduct is 92 miles. It consists of $5 miles of cut-and-cover tunnel, 14 miles of grade tunnel, 17 miles of pressure tunnel, and 6 miles of steel siphons." 3 Merete on the Debary cb nd Pat i, The Rotates Bran Tae ras ale te Ronn Res ear chant of Laskawach othe West Bench Reserve in he Croton Uc tunel sues eos the Hon Re Vale hugh the towne of Whang. Roches Cand, Pnail nd Mosboro ls Cony. ‘he Town of Newburgh in range Coun the Towns af Wiper Fl nd Hat Fc y Duss Cay. athe Town of Ken, Patan aly and Cant natn Coun Sve Duos Gat gu Ase A Hiro on Ni Yons hrs Waren Sean 17-80 (109) alr D8 Aas ‘The West Banlekeco Tune [a] fe seston cone he Wes Brash Resn in Put ad he Rese Reso Wester px of ‘he aed sought Tow of Caos te Weekes Coty Roto Sore Neth Salem, Las, Blow on Novi Casi 2 om by ss ti as contol Hen the Wes Binh Renovo ands 2 ys el e8 fet below ses eel was bee the Keo wall Delite mater‘ aed with hit. Coonan Casi woes espetve” fa I, The Kel en Talos water 19s an Kensie toshesti af they delve sytem nh tof Tilsen Rese he iy Tn eae Pena and Gch he Cy of Yorkers Meira ‘Ascodng 1997 DEP schema te Delavae Alt ui wi the illu sate omanies- Martboove To of Newb, ‘igen thd Chen's Hep: Wester Jt Water Works Wrage Coy Wate tes Ae Flin fm the Rese p- ples Non Cele, Whi Pls Sal Esc. Merona Yokes Sev Nr en Cty Debate oe Enns: Pret New [You Cie Waren Sunni: Urstare Conacnes 997 ect DEP Ursa Co Wud 27, conan Th tn he agus tat TowIn addition to supplying New York City with drnking water, the Catskill Aqueduct serves many upstate communities.'! The Croton watershed system draws from 3 branches of the Croton River and its principal tributaries, the Titicus, Cross, Kisco and Muscoot Rivers, in a 375-square-mile watershed that provides approximately 10 percent of New York City’s drinking water supply (250 million gal- Jons per day (MGD)).!?_ Croton watershed reservoirs include the New Croton Reservoir (the terminus for all Croton System reservoirs and lekes), Boyd’s Comers Reservoir, West Branch Reservoir, Middle Branch Reservoir, East Branch Reservoir, Bog Brook Reservoir (connected to the East Branch Reservoir by a 1,778-foot tunnel), Amawalk Reservoir, Titicus Reservoir, Muscoot Reservoir, Cross River Reservoir, Croton Falls Main Reservoir, and Croton Falls Diverting Reservoir (connected to the main reservoir by a 3,500-foot paved channel)."° Three controlled lakes in the Town of Carmel, Putnam County, include Lake Gleneida, Lake Gilead and Kirk Lake. The New Croton Aqueduct connects the terminal New Croton Reservoir in Westchester County to the Jerome Park Reservoir in the Bronx and the 135th Street Gatehouse in Manhattan. It passes 300 feet beneath the high water mark of the Harlem River.'* As with the Delaware and Catskill Aqueducts, the Croton also supplies drinking water to upstate communities.'6 In some cases, this extraordinary infrastructure is literally crumbling, Recently, DEP’s former Deputy Commissioner William Stasiuk acknowledged the agency's failure to maintain its crucial water supply facilities. “At the time of the financial crisis back in the early *70s, since that time, the City has not invested a nickel in the water infrastructure upstate... there really has been gross neglect of the infrastructure.”" The admission is astonishing for its candor since Stasiuk himself was one of the top officials charged with overseeing the water supply infrastructure and budgeting infrastructure repair and maintenance during much of the period, first as a New York State Department of Health (DOH) official and later as DEP's Deputy Commissioner. As alarming as it is, Stasiuk’s estimate may be conservative. Another former DEP employee goes even further stating, “{tJhere has been no attention to infrastructure maintenance since the turn of the [20th] century. It is literally an embarrassment to the City.” ‘Stewart Aion St. oveph's, City of Newhursh, Comval-ow-Hudson. New Winksor. Col Spring. Grayinore, Puan Vly. Costinetal Village. Peekskill ae 18 Deputy Commisstonct Dr. Willan Stsiuk, New York City Department of En:ironmentl Protection, Address to the City Club of New York (May 31, 20000,Many of the water system’s tunnels, mains, and control facilities are over 100 years old. Because of their age and design, they pose sericus maintenance issues. In several cases, crucial elements of the supply infrastructure are so old that DEP engineers avoid using them altogether. For instance, the control valves in Water Supply Tunnels #1 and #2 are over 100 years old and are effectively inaccessible.!” DEP engineers will not use them out of fear that the valves might break and cannot be repaired. ‘The loss of these valves due to DEP mismanagement cripples DEP's ability to manipulate water flows to City neighborhoods and provides one justification for the approximately $6 billion construction of Tunnel #3. Other problematic facilities include the Croton Falls Dam, where the intake tower has cracked and settled, preventing DEP engineers from inserting the wooden planks that act as gates. Without these planks, flow from the reservoir cannot be stopped. Aging and vulnerable valves at the base of the dam could, if not repaired, lead to an uncontrollable release of water and potentially result in the dam’s failure.’* Greater concerns surround the condition of the Catskill Aqueduct. Simple structures, such as fences and gates controlling access to the aqueduct, are not maintained. Asa result, cars, trucks, and ATVs frequently travel on top of this cut-and-cover tunnel, eroding the soil cover and weakening the aqueduct’s structure." Similar problems with aging equipment prevent DEP. from making the best use of stored water supplizs. Crumbling and decaying facilities, such as the Hudson River Drainage Chamber and the Foundry Brook Siphon, can no longer provide safe storage capacity for this critical source of drinking water.” The structural security of the Catskill Aqueduct is critically important since the City may soon have to shut down the Delaware or Croton aqueducts for repair Former DEP Police Director, Michael Collins, characterized the condition of the water supply infrastructure as a grave risk to the safety of New York City residents. According to Collins, We could very well spend in excess of a billion dollars on the [Filtration] Avoidance and Watershed agreements to ensure water quality and face the reality that our failure to address the security and viability of the storage and delivery infrastructure has left us with a system that could potentially fail to deliver the water we are attempting to protect! Collins was demoted and reassigned after his infrastructure report was leaked to the press. 1 ee Lou Asser. pa at 4 2S. '8 Se tee Conn Ni You: CY DERARDMENT oF Basaran Porc tN, VUEMEAAGLITY Rbk Assmann Ussrar® New Yous Cry {hoes Stamey Sera 31977 fescnairWon rear Reon), 2 Seid atAnother indication of the increasingly decrepit condition of the infrastructure is the Ashokan headworks. Originally, this facility was designed to allow DEP engincers to draw water from different levels of the Ashokan Reservoir in order to send the best water to the City. The gates that control this flow were constructed of wood when the dam was built in 191 these antique gates are still in place, although they cannot be made to operate properly. In the past year, when water quality levels from the Ashokan dropped precipitously, DEP engineers were forced to manipulate the Ashokan gates, a procedure they had ignored for decades. Unsure of the correct procedure, DEP eventually pressed a crane into service to lift the heavy gates. This crucial facility is in dire need of upgrades to ensure its regular and trouble-free operation. The Bureau of Water Supply constructed the Catskill Aqueduct headworks in 1915, These structures have not been rehabilitated since they were built, The aqueduct is also deteriorating rapidly. In many sections of the Catskill aquedact, such as the Foundry Brook siphon, the base of the aqueduct is visibly collapsing. Concrete has eroded, metal reinforcement is exposed and corroding and internal pipes are visible through gaping holes in the aqueduct wall. According to one DEP employee, “a leak in the Catskill acueduct is causing an estimated loss of up to 5% of Catskill water daily."=> Afier an anonymous caller reported a leak in the Catskill Aqueduct near the Garrison golf course, Riverkeeper investigators discovered a small brook running par- allel to the aqueduct. The brook’s source appeated to be the aqueduct, and water could be seen ‘gurgling out from the cut-and-cover tunnel. It was also evident that maintenance personnel had been cutting trees to prevent their root systems from puncturing the aqueduct. Nevertheless, a continuous stream of water still pours out from the aqueduct. Many miles of the Catskill Aqueduct are in a similar dilapidated state and ave suffered from no efforts at repair. Astonishingly, the Catskill Aqueduct does not have forms that might be used to fabricate aqueduct sections quickly for repair or replacement. DEP bigwigs have for years neglected this basic maintenance precaution, despite the fleas of mid-level staffers that forms be created immediately. B. DEP's Engincering and Operations Staff: A Depleted Resource. The institutional neglect of the water supply infrastructure can be attributed chiefly to poor management and a declining sense of mission within DEP. During the past decades, top-down mismanagement has turned a once proud agency into a collection of warring fiefdoms controlled by the district engineers who leverage their positions mainly for political and person- al privilege. Furthermore, decisionmaking within the agency has become inercasingly secre- tive, and competent, conscientious workers are routinely sidelined in favor of loyal favorites without regard to theit abilities, ‘The arrival of William Stasiuk from the DOH in March 1996 had little beneficial effect on the institutional culture he was brought in to reform,Instead, Stasiuk retained the worst environmental performers within the agency and promoted inappropriate and inexperienced employees, based upon loyalty, to positions of great authority over infrastructure and operations. In 1996, Stasiuk elevated Thom Hook, one of DEP's most notorious environmental offenders, to head the Division of Operations and Engineering Unit. Hook is woefully under-qualified for this position, having no formal education or experience with the operation of sewage treatment plants or the upstate water supply. Hook, in turn, named Ed Polese as the Chief of Engineering Operations, a position that entails responsibility for all engineering both East- and West-Of-Hudson, and Lynn Sadosky as Deputy Chief of Engineering for East-of-Hudson, Less qualified or committed indi viduals could hardly be found within the agency. These appointments and the job performance of these individuals are discussed in detail in Riverkeeper’s 1997 publication, Culture of Mismanagement2> Ostensibly, Stasiuk (before his retirement), Hook and Polese would oversee the district engineers, who are responsible for the daily operation of the water supply infrastructure. In reality, the holders of these powerful positions Fave no real masters; they run their districts with little, if any, effective oversight. 1. The District Engineers The three district engineers, one for each main component of the water supply system ~ East-of-Hudson (Croton), Catskill and Delaware ~ have presided, in some cases listlessly, over a dramatically deteriorated infrastructure. As operators of the City’s sewer facilities and water delivery plants, the district engineers are among the worst and most persistent environmental violators in the watershed and are historically hostile to environmental oversight and regulation. Tight-lipped secrecy characterizes their management styles. They often conceal problems associated with sloppy engineering or failing in‘rastrueture. Despite their managerial defi ;, at least two of the three district engineers are highly competent at their central job — water delivery. On many occasions, the district engineers have performed heroically to keep the water supply system functioning and to obtain sufficient resources from their pernicious agency to maintain their physical plants. Their knowledge of the system and their ability to manipulate water quality make them extraordinarily powerful. Several DEP commissioners have found it impossible to fire the district engineers, even after acts of deliberate indifference or incompetence. For example, according to DEP sources, on at least two occasions, Delaware District Engineer Kevin Cloonan has been demoted or threatened with termination and then reinstated because there was no one who could run the system, Of DEP’s three district engineers, Carl Picha, until recently the East-of- Hudson District Engineer, had been described consistently as the best and most competent, at least when it came to running the water system infrastructure. “He's great on the nuts and bolts of the aqueduct system." Picha’s admirers describe him as mercurial but extremely knowledgeable. sve Rober F Kemah Cla of Maange, 15 Par Ee Res 253 Wh PHD.“He's like the nutty professor,” says one former DEP employee, “he knows the system better than anybody. He could run and repair the system all by himself” In January 2001, Picha was reportedly forced to resign, allegedly due to the EPA and FBI investigation into mercury mishandling.”* There is concer that Picha was made a scapegoat and forced out to make room for Tim Lawler, a favorite of former Deputy Commissioner Bill Stasiuk. In 1999, Stasiuk brought in his friend Tim Lawler and promoted him to the number two position under Carl Picha. Prior to Lawler’s arrival, Picha’s heir apparent was Frank Barquette. But Barquette’s years of experience as successor to Picha were trumped by Lawler’s close relationship to Stasiuk Many of the engineers who work with Lawler resent his promotion. ‘They claim that he has very little knowledge of the mechanical engineering functions of the system. One DEP employee claims, “his [Lawler’s] ability in that area is almost high school level. Picha’s resignation created a leadership crisis in the East-of-Hudson District Engineer’s office. With Barquette sidelined, and Lawler seemingly unfit for the job, the agency appointed ‘Thom Hook to at least temporarily take over the Distriet Engineer position. Hook’s appoint- ment does little to inspire confidence. His management and environmental record raises grave concerns that little will be done to address development and pollution issues in the critical sast-of-Hudson watershed or to reform DEP management of facilities in this area Lawler's ascendancy to the District Engineer's position may have been frustrated by mis- givings about his leadership. According to former DEP employee Ed Redmond, on Fi day, January 8, 1999, Lawler ordered a draw down of the West Branch Reservoir. District Engineer Carl Picha had been out sick most of the month and Lawler had taken over Picha’s duties, sending out a memo that he was the engineer in charge. However, Lawler neglected to order his crew to raise the lower elevation valve that feeds the West Branch of the Croton River below the West Branch Reservoir. On Monday afternoon, plant personnel discovered that the lake level had dropped below the high elevation valve. The spillway was “bone dry” and there ‘was no water left in the West Branch River. DEP was notified by United States Geological Survey —the agency that maintains flow measurement devices in the West Branch. Lawler and his erew concealed the incident by claiming that debris lodged in the valve and caused the inter- ruption in flow. According to witnesses, the valve did have some small amount of debris, but nothing abnormal and certainly nothing that weuld impair the flow of water, Trash racks on the upstream side prevent larger debris from clogging the valves. The disturbing fact about the incident is not the engineering error, which can be attributed to inexperience, but the cover-up which is already so much a patt of DEP’s corrupt institutional culture. Tim Lawler is son of John Lawler, reportedly a friend and golf partner of Dr. Stasiuk. But John Lawler has an unsavory reputation among environmental groups in the Hudson Valley and has been known to pervert science on behalf of his industry and developer clients. Lawler, Matusky & Skelley (LMS) frequently contracts with DEP and DOH on private and public proj- ects overseen by these agencies. LMS won the Kensico Waterfowl Management contract for controlling bird populations on the reservoir in 1997 after Stasiuk arrived. 10LMS’ contract to remove geese and gulls from the Kensico Reservoir is worth $1.6 million over two years. City inspectors had been successfully conducting goose removal at the Kensico for a fraction of the cost and were livid when the program was taken from them. Judging by its track record, LMS is likely to bid on the filtration contract or on various related subcontracts should filtration be ordered, Delaware District Engineer Kevin Cloonan is said to be competent and knowledgeable. He is also described as territorial. Cloonan and his fellow Catskill engineers govern their upstate districts as feudal fiefdoms. According to one DEP employee, “{t]hey are lords of the land up there.” Cloonan operates by his own rules and sometimes this means violating the environmen- tal laws that apply to everyone else. In 1989, Riverkeeper sued the City for illegally dumping a flocculent, aluminum sulfate (alum), and a disinfectant, chlorine, into the West Branch Reservoir without a federal Clean Water Act permit in order to treat inferior quality water drawn from the Hudson River.* In another incident reported by DEP sources, on Saturday, November 28, 1997, DEP Police Officer Joe Kennedy smelled an overwhelming ail stench at the Grand Gorge sewer plant from the road outside the plant, When the security guard let him in, he found a pool of oil flowing through the snow of the facility compound. ‘The guard told Kennedy he had reported the spill to his supervisor (Cloonan) and showed Kennedy the log where he had recorded his report two days earlier, DEP failed to report the spill within two hours of discovery, as required by law. DEC issued a summons to DEP for violating state regulations that prohibit the discharge of petroleum products into waters of the state or onto lands from which it might flow into said waters, and require that spills be reported within two hours.2° This summons resulted in a January 23, 1998, order on consent whereby DEP was fined $500. Even more serious doubts have been raised about Cloonan’s replacements in the Delaware District. A lack of attention to grooming skilled replacements has already resulted in a serious accident. In the winter of 1995, Cloonan’s staff was recharging the Neversink tunnel between the Neversink and the Rondout. Without Cloonan’s supervision, the workers neglected to open the downstream valve to bleed air from the aqueduct ~ a fundamental precaution that a well- trained team would have taken, The error caused a wall of water to rush down the aqueduct south from the Neversink like a speeding freight train. Its power compressed the trapped air within the tunnel, forcing the water to recoil back with such strength that a column of water exploded the Neversink headworks facility, blowing through the floorboards and sending steel grates skyward to punch an eight-foot-wide hole in the conerete slab roof. At least two DEP engineers dove from the windows to save their lives. “It looked like a Scud missile hit the building,” said one witness to the aftermath. The “water hammer” that exploded the Neversink gatehouse was a predictable outcome of a fundamental error that a skilled engineer would not commit Se MY Con Coos He eos tk acon 619K nAccording to several DEP employees, Catskills District Engineer Joe Boek is simply a problem, ‘They claim that Joe Boek has no operational experience and no treatment credentials. Critics describe Boek as “the most dangerous person in the whole system.” Former Commissioner Al Appleton considered firing him, Appleton has said that he believes Boek tried to kill the Watershed Agreement by releasing turbid water from the Ashokan into the Kensico in November 1993. During that incident, Bock allegedly left the wrong gate open at the Ashokan reservoir, draining the turbid West Basin of the Ashokan, instead of the settled F: Basin, into the Kensico Reservoir, To deal with the cloud of turbidity that hit the Kensico, the City had to dump tons of alum directly into the Kensico Reservoir in violation of the 1990 Federal Court Order forbidding the City to dump treatment chemicals into its reservoirs without a federal Clean Water Act discharge permit? Under the care of the district engineers, the state of the water supply infrastructure is truly frightening, Basic capital maintenance, a fundamental responsibility of the district engineers, has been largely ignored. DEP insiders suspect that the engineers, who have good reason to know the condition of the system, are counting their days to retirement, hoping they make it before the dike bursts.** In fairness to district engineers, Thom Hook, who has been in charge of that unit as Deputy Director of the Division of Operations and Engineering, or as Acting Director for over four years, also bears responsibility. Hook has continued the tradition of skimping support for maintenance and repair. Hook’s feud over this issue with Delaware District Engineer Kevin Cloonan has aggravated the infrastructure crises. Cloonan routinely requests funding for infrastructure repairs and maintenance, but without Hook’s support, his requests are denied. Picha’s advocacy for greater resources over infrastructure maintenance has also been ignored and Picha himself was pushed aside by Hook and Stasiuk. Their bullying has seriously damaged Systems Operations. 2. Systems Operations Staff In addition to his role as East-of-Hudson District Engineer, Carl Picha until recently ran Systems Operations. This division within DEP is responsible for the “hardware” aspects of ‘water supply. Systems Operations controls the flow of water from the reservoirs and through the aqueducts. Systems Operations also is responsible for the addition of chlorine and fluoride to the drinking water supply. They respond to calculations provided by DEP Laboratories based upon daily chemical measurements in the reservoirs. System Operations chooses the best batches of water to deliver to City consumers. For example, when algal levels are high on the surface of a reservoir, Systems Operations may opt to draw water from that reservoir’s lower depths. During times of high turbidity, Systems Operations is responsible for adding alum to the water in order to bring turbidity levels down to meet the requirements of the Safe Drinking Water Act” have oan s-cls “emceesy SPDES perm fam Sit Oca: Nosh pe ens uncer Flaw. Ser 33 USC, setions RAlmost everyone agrees that this group works miracles when the water quality breaks down in the Ashokan Reservoir.” This happens when the sediment-choked Esopus Creek is running high and fast or when one of the upstate engineers mistakenly sends sediment-laden water south in the aqueduct, Observers credit this unit with saving the system from a filtration order on more than one occasion by manipulating the gatzhouse valves and using the best water from the Croton System to dilute the sometimes turbid brew from the Catskills to safe levels.\! According to many witnesses, Picha and his lieutenant Mark Donecker “have bailed [DEP] out a bunch of times.” A high-level DEP official from another unit told Riverkeeper about Hook's impact on System’s Operations, Hook has totally demoralized this group. He took away their agency cars and began scrutinizing their overtime and cutting staff levels. According to this DEP official, “these guys are not being paid to be on-call, but you could call them at two or three in the morning and BOOM, they are down there wrestling with the gates, saving the City. Those guys were a bunch of heroes, but now there is a severe morale issue that is a problem.” According to one maintenance engineer, the “maintenance unit is doing 40% of what they are supposed to be doing because they are understaffed. The [East-of-Hudson] maintenance unit is 50% staffed because [DEP Deputy Director] Thom Hook does not like stationary en; neers.” DEP also skimps on its budget for spare parts. During the March 1998 turbidity inci- dent described infra Part IV, operations staff were doubly worried because they knew there were no spare parts to replace or repair the Croton gates or the ancient hardware that was falling off in every direction as the emergency team manipulated the giant gates. The same shortages pre- vail in the Delaware and Catskill systems. Recently, DEP had to replace a valve in the Neversink chamber, but the companies that manufactured the original mechanisms are long gone. It took DEP one year to fabricate and install a new valve. ‘One of the most skilled members of the water delivery team is Joe Hadden, Hadden, the Hillview Reservoir Supervisor, skillfully blends Croton and Catskill water and is likely the only DEP employee with sufficient knowledge to do so. Like other DEP engineering divisions, there are no competent replacements. According to one DEP employee, “if he [Joe Hadden} had a heart attack today, no one would know how to run the system down there.” ‘The crumbling condition of the infrastructure is a disaster waiting to happen. When coupled with the operations expertise lost as the current generation of engineers retires, DEP faces a future of uncertainty. If New York City :s to continue to enjoy a ready supply of safe drinking water, City officials must take immediate steps to reverse decades of neglect. 30 Te prin wi of the Ashen Reservior e Fspus Crs # wor: Hot fry. Te tenn fong Shaken Tuo tives wae he Scan Reserv the Espa ou 10 is ups rate Alan Sl ne Scr sae later wl cys hh ap SS ine ing severe rar vst che teresa fs tae with ala mens, Tete shy ashe ged ih sap Chek a ‘me the wa othe Asbo. oreo! he enentaton pas he Akan dv as Th ayes he Wes in ele, ‘te sbineniton at a ply mb sh he eye te ses oF esa sin fd th Schou Bsn cys Toe Cy a arely fa wae om he Es Basin fhe Ala, seni lately sediments vat dwn the Rese Reser Wester Cum el dng $M inne Sure War Tima lS Cy woul esd ris wnt een sue wats eaceaS neplneaiy tis NTU on neon moccasins in ay nn pido aren re oss aer Hive yas, Se 4D CR con 17s ea cen to feel egos hoes bee ng wat aap lay spn: conceal peal dangers pshgey sachs psp oe BRecommendation #1: | DEP Should Repair Catskill Aqueduct Leaks Near the Garrison Golf Course and in Other Locations. As noted above, DEP employees claim that the Catskill leaks are costing this system 5% of its daily flow. One important leak appears to be located near the Garrison golf course. DEP should immediately repair any and all leaks in the Catskill Aqueduct, particularly in light of the possibility of a Delaware Aqueduct catastrophe, Recommendation #2: | DEP Should Remove Toxi Croton Aqueduct. Toxic contamination has forced DEP to all but shut down the Croton Aqueduct. This critical link in the water supply infrastructure must be returned to full operational capacity, especially if DEP contemplates shutting down the Delaware Aqueduct to repair its leaks. DEP must locate and completely remediate the source of perchloroethylene (perc) contamina- tion that currently limits water flow through the tunnel. In addition, the Department must locate reported methyl tert-butyl ether (MTBE) sources and devise a cleanup plan. Past contamination events, such as the unremediated 1997 heating oil leak from the Ardsley Public Library, continue to threaten water transported through the Croton. Because the aqueduct’s ancient mortar construction is crumbling and its walls are now largely pervious, its waters are vulnerable to penetration by toxic chemicals from accidental spills or contaminated groundwater infiltration. DEP must therefore develop a plan for keeping toxic chemicals ata safe distance from the aqueduct and for tracking plumes of toxic groundwater. From the Recommendation #3: The City Should Create Forms For the Catskill Aqueduct. As the second largest of the City’s aqueduets, the Catskill will be the primary water lifeline during any repairs of the Delaware Aqueduct, However, the very nature of its construction is its greatest weakness, While the Delaware Aqueduct is a pressurized deep rock tunnel, the Catskill is a cut-and-cover aqueduct. For 55 miles, water is conveyed through a structure that is essentially a trench with un-reinforced concrete liner and cover. The concrete liner, topped by only three feet of earth, is vulnerable to damage from vehicle traffic, accidents, and even weather-induced erosion. In the event of a leak or collapse in one of the cut-and-cover sections of the tunnel, DEP has no way to effect prompt repairs. The forms used to construct the horseshoe-shaped tunnel have long since been destroyed. DEP needs to maintain a supply of forms that can be used to quickly fabricate replacement sections for emergency repairs. 4Recommendation #4: DEP Should Renovate the Catskill Aqueduct Headworks and Assure An Adequate Inventory of Spare Parts, The dire condition of these structures has caused crisis after crisis in recent years as the City’s efforts to avoid a filtration order have caused City engineers to frequently and often violently manipulate its gates and valves, putting new pressures on its aging infrastructure, Recommendation #5: The City Should Insure an Orderly Transition in the District Engineer Offices by Recruiting and Training High Quality Replacement Engineers. Carl Picha has already resigned, and Kevin Cloonan and Joe Boek are approaching retirement. According to current and former DEP employees, there are no manuals showing the operation of the system, and the new recruits slated to replace the current crop of district engineers do not seem up to snuff. ‘There has been very little grooming of successors. Recommendation #6: DEP Should Contract With Expert Engineering Consultants to Create a Manual on How to Operate and Repair the City Water System. DEP has made no provision for educating new engineers about how the extraordinarily complex water system works, Rather, the engineers rely on a highly secretive oral tradition within an old boys network to pass vital information to the next generation, According to a current DEP employee, “[i}f you toe the line and give them what they want and tell them What they want to hear, you'll be part of the network.” This system will not preserve the knowledge necessary to run the water supply reliably. Recommendation #7: DEP Should Repair the Submerged Section of the Old Croton Aqueduct. A submerged section of the Old Croton Aqueduct may threaten the operation of the New Croton System. Portions of the 160 year-old Old Croton system were covered by water when the New Croton Dam was constructed in the early 1900s. One section that carries water from Gatehouse #1 at New Croton Dam to the New Croton Gatehouse is now underwater and subject to stress and loadings for which it was not designed. As a result, this section is decaying and in danger of collapse." This collapse would limit DEP’s ability to bring in the highest quality water from the Croton. Instead, the agency wotld be forced to send more turbid water through the system.Recommendation #8: | DEP Should Repair Debilitated Shafts and Gatehouses. In the early to mid-1990s, DEP personnel began noticing that the roof was rotting at Shaft 9 on the New Croton Aqueduct in Tarrytown, The amount of chlorine that has to be added at the Croton Lake Gatehouse because of poor water quality produces excessive chlorine vapors that are corrosive, ‘These heavy chlorine vapors were rotting the copper roof of the shaft. According to DEP sources, there is an exhaust fan in Shaft 9 to draw the fumes out, but it was not in operation, After one former employee notified DEP officials about the roof, it was torn down, Astonishingly, DEP did not replace the roof until some time in 2000. For several years, instead of replacing it, DEP relied on plastic sheeting spread on the floor to keep falling leaves, branches, and other debris from entering the drinking water." The floor of Shaft 9 is grated and visitors could view Croton water running below the grates. Again, DEP's mis- feasance regarding basic infrastructure needs created a situation that left the Croton system astonishingly vulnerable. Recommendation #9: DEP Should Provide Safe and Potable Drinking Water For Its Employees and Visitors. Emblematic of DEP’s growing level of engireering incompetence are the drinking water fountains at the Croton Lake Gatehouse. The fountains were designed to provide potable water from Croton Lake. The chlorine feed system was so poorly engineered that chlorine residuals cannot be maintained across the building. The water supply also does not meet potable stan- dards for a variety of other reasons, including coliform and turbidity levels. The Croton lab has no source of safe potable water for drinking, washing, coffee, safety showers, or eye wash in violation of OSHA and state DOH regulations. Furthermore, the water that is accessible to employees and the public is not labeled as non-potable. Ironically, DEP now must purchase bottled water for its upstate staff.Mart II Leaks in the Delaware Aqueduct Threaten This Critical Source of WaterRain and snow falling on the mountain farms and forests of Delaware County drain into the Cannonsville, Pepacton, Neversink, and Rondout reservoirs and flow to New York City through the Delaware Aqueduct ~ the longest continuous tunnel in the world. The Delaware Aqueduct, n 1937 and 1945, is actually three distinct pressure tunnels driven through bedrock at depths ranging from 300 to 1,550 feet below the surface, Water runs by gravity on an approximate two percent grade carrying the surest Catskill mountain water as far as 125 miles to New York City consumers without the aid of pumps. ‘The aqueduct is 13.5 to 19.5 feet in diameter and travels 83.8 miles, connecting the Rondout Reservoir in Ulster County to the Hillview Reservoir in Yonkers. The tunnel crosses the Hudson River 600 feet beneath the river’s surface at Roseton, in the Town of Newburgh, Orange County, and carries the great bulk of the City’s drinking water supply to downstate consumers. The Delaware Aqueduct supplies ly 80% of the water for drinking, fire fighting, and sanitary purposes to over nine million people. Of the 1.4 billion gallons per day (BGD) consumed throughout the City’s water sys- tem, the Delaware Aqueduct can provide more than 900 million gallons. constructed betw ee, a hi Delaware Aqueduct under construction. Photo from DEP archives.‘The aqueduct’s deteriorating condition threatens this critical flow of water. At several points between the Rondout Reservoir and the West Branch Reservoir, the Delaware Aqueduct is leaking. The leaks are growing and may threaten the aqueduct with significant water loss or a catastrophic collapse. DEP has been aware of these leaks for more than 10 years, yet has squandered this time and failed to apply the enormous ingenuity necessary to address the erisis. ‘Two principal leaks occur as the tunnel runs for 44 miles from the Rondout Effluent Chamber to the West Branch Reservoir Influent Chamber: the first is at Wawarsing where the aqueduct passes beneath Rondout Creek; the second is near the Central Hudson Gas and Bleetri (CHG&E) power plant at Roseton. According to initial DEP reports obtained by Riverkeeper under the New York State Freedom of Information Law (FOIL),"S DEP's engineering consult- ants concluded that “the data collected over more than four years of testing leads to the conclu- sive fact that there are substantial leaks in the tunnel.” DEP personnel discovered the Roseton leak in 1990 when flow from the Rondout Effluent Chamber (the facility at Rondout Dam where water enters the aqueduct) appeared to be sub- stantially greater than the flows at the opposite end of the aqueduct, where it empties into the West Branch Reservoir. Concurrently, a steady flow of water appeared on the hillside above the Roseton power plant. Tests confirmed that this water was from the Delaware Aqueduct.” Subsequently, DEP launched a series of tests to determine the extent and approximate location of the leaks. Dye tests conducted between October 1996 and December 1998 showed that the leak rate oscillated between 33 and 37 million gallons per day (MGD) — more water than is used daily by the entire city of Rochester! According to confidential conversations with inside sources, some DEP engineers believe the leak rate is far greater than suggested by these te up to 100 million gallons per day! The results of more recent tests have confirmed that the problem is growing, Engincers believe that holes or cracks on top of the high-pressure aqueduct are forcing the water upward with such power that it has created the equivalent of a 36-square-foot channel up through over 650 feet of limestone. A large porcion of the flow has broken the surface, filling a pond and creating a wetland in the town of Newburgh.” Almost directly across the street from the entrance to its Roseton power plant, CHG&E has installed a pipe into the hillside and erect- ed permanent housing to protect what locals considered an “artesian well” that broke surface above the Roseton power plant. Engincering tests reveal that the supposed spring water is from the Delaware Aqueduct leak more than 600 feet below surface.*! 35. Pon Ov. Law ssn ‘mca Pros EcTO®. Ti DELAvaRE TUNNEL LEAKADE INVESTING, RERKT #19, 1 (1895) ear gyn Pei a 10 Aachen Ip Seow Wore Crt Death oF Exons Provan Demne Tone Lakice ssoaion, Rar tt 7 (1200) feria 9New York City drinking water leaking from the Delaware Aqueduct 600 feet below! Photo by Marc A. Yaggi. While the size of the subsurface channel is “alarming” in the words of a consulting engineer retained by DEP to review leak data, surface flow measurements at Warwarsing and Roseton do not account for all of the water missing from the aqueduct. According to this expert, a more worrisome scenacio is the prospect that the rest of the leak is in the portion of the tunnel that passes through fiactured rock underneath the Hudson River. A leak there would ke frighten- ingly close to the interface between the subsurface limestone and the Hudson River; only 350 feet of rock separate the tunnel from the bottom of the riverbed." Because the tunnel leaks with sufficient force to push water through over 650 feet of rock, its effect on shallower rock is likely to be more dramatic. According to DEP engineers, the worst-case scenario, a catastrophic aqueduct collapse, is a real possibility. The great danger is the leak’s potential to dissolve the limestone geology surrounding the tunnel and cause a structural failure. A sinkhole could form around the leaks, either surfacing on the shores of the Hudson near the Roseton power plant, or under the Hudson itself. In cither case, the result would be disastrous, as an aqueduct collapse would cut New York City off from the bulk (up to 80%) of its water supply. 2 DEP comiracted wih Mr, Victor Feigelman, a retired DEP engineer, to review the findings contained in Delaware Tunnel Leaking Investignons, Report 3, «ed 1) 18 199, See DE? Reon spire a 36, Aare AM Pl este ha the lek as ana he que 036 saute ot {tnnelsup tough fete, bs on leaagequaty an loc cnn! i ep. Me Fegan esha hr i omer eance of & ‘Nua ek om tae i aos bees he Hedon Rie occ hts ema opersedsaaensble be developed pomp" sctely esti aon eels. Sve wa 20DEP engincers also worry that, even if acute structural failure does not oceur in the near future, the erosion of the tunnel lining and subsurface geology may already be so severe that the opportunity to fix the leak has passed. They fret that this section of the aqueduct may now be held together only by the internal pressure of the water. If this is true, any attempt to drain the aqueduct for repairs would cause the tunnel to collapse. The urgency of this cris evident even in the stilted engineering vernacular of an internal DEP memorandum. “If there is a local failure of the lining due to tensile overstress, then the dangers of unwatering against residual external hydrostatic pressure are quite real.”* Plainly put, the pressure exerted by the loose rock on the outside of the tunnel may be greater than the dewatered tunnel can withstand. DEP’s highest-level engineers view the threat of the aqueduct’s massive collapse seriously. According to a current DEP employee, “they are afraid it will collapse! ... [Delaware District Engineer Kevin] Cloonan, [Croton District Engineer Carl] Picha, and [Catskill District Engineer Joc] Boek don’t want to give the order [to dewater the tunnel] because it probably would be the last order they ever gave." is A consultant retained by DEP to review the department’s investigations has poirted out that the pressure in the water tunnel as it passes beneath the river may be sufficient to stressing of the concrete liner” This overstressed condition raises fears not only of a tunnel collapse, but of the possibility that the rock strata surrounding the tunnel are so weakened that a failure of the concrete liner may lead to an underground blowout, Such a blowout would send a high-pressure jet of aqueduct water up through the bed of the Hudson River, and lead to the failure of the aqueduct. use over- ‘Six hundred feet above the fractured aqueduct, New York City drinking water fills this sinkhole in the forest floor near Roseton. Photo by Wiliam Wegner. Bwce th tine st ur sry on he aqua ref Nove 200 andthe ne of hsp pub, Ci Pe resale eh oe Blimesipxion dase a Pu fs See DEP Reon #3, mp hte ot Atal TpA. DEP Has Concealed the Crisis From the Public Although DEP engineering staff have known about the leak for over a decade, the agency has taken none of the dramatic steps necessary to address the potential catastrophe. “No one will shut down the aqueduct and risk their reputation and career. [DEP’s district engineers and higher-ups] are all just hoping to make it to retirement,” says one high level DEP official. Another official interviewed in 1999 agreed, He predicted that “[Catskill District Engineer] Joseph Boek, [Delaware District Engineer] Kevin Cloonan and [Former Deputy Commissioner Dr. William] Stasiuk intend to be long gone before the dam bursts.” Stasiuk retired in June of 2000. Prior to October 2000, DEP never voluntarily discussed the leaks. DEP dragged its feet for 15 months before responding to Riverkeeper’s FOIL request for documents relevant to the leak, Riverkeeper finally obtained the documents, bu: only after threatening a lawsuit. Coincidental to releasing information on the leak to Riverkeeper pursuant to its FOIL request,*® DEP issued a press release indicating that the agency was “dealing with those leaks” — its first public acknowledgement of the leak. In the only forum in which DEP officials discussed the leak before Riverkeeper broke the story, agency officials minimized its significance. During a ‘wrongful termination lawsuit brought by former DEP Police Director Michael Collins (who claims to have been fired because he voiced concems about the vulnerability of the water sys- tem, including the Delaware Aqueduct leaks), Commissioner Joel Miele testified that the leak was approximately 20 MGD, depending on pressure in the tunnel.** In fact, tests conducted eatlicr the same year had confirmed the higher estimate of 34 MGD.*! Even after being forced to acknowledge the leak’s existence, DEP has consistently minimized its significance. Typical of DEP’s unwillingness to face the gravity of the potential crisis is Commissioner Miele’s blithe response to questions about the threat during the Collins’ trial. “We were aware of the leak. The leak is of such a consequence that it doesn’t threaten the integrity of the water supply system..." 48 rye Fa pons in sv neering reps skein eek eh oso at which New York City inking water wa ond spss sound it Newb = 60 fo above esac {Bevin Cs Durarren or Carmonsnctne Pricing, New Yonk Cr 0 Rina sts a Snr 6 Cre (Ot 2 200, The DEF res geste bel nan md inet sen, epg pol cn. Se testonony fot Ni, Mice Cols Wil Sask & Joe! Mle 95 Ci. 7805 (SDI ly 2, 20) 0 165-6 51 Sr aatcou Pie. Inoarenoes Anat of NYC DEP Leek ace QuAMTCATION MEASUREMENTS a Exe, Sump. (My 200 his {ysteo Pee ron) Seat DEP Reon pant ‘etn fle Mk, Mh oll» Willan Sink & fe Mie, 98Ca. 7406 (SI.NY. aly 2, 200019B. The Leak in the Aqueduct is Growing With Each Passing Year In their most recent internal reports, DEP engineers investigating the leak conclude that it is getting worse over time. In 1995 tests, DEP engineers measured the leak at 15 MGD.*" Over the next five years, continued test results revealed an increase in the measured leak. By January 2000, DEP engireering consultants at Malcolm Pimie agreed that the leak had grown to 34 MGD.* DEP uses this measuring weir to monitor the millions of gallons of leaking Delaware Aqueduct water that rise daily to the surface in Newburgh. Photo by William Wegner. 5 Soe Naw Yon hry Dennen oF ENvioSENTAL PROTRECTO, THE DeLawate Agutoecr LeakaneIerstcaions Reso 3 (1V1S95) erie FP 198 Lev Raven, ‘Se MaLcoor Pa Ree, pate, at Exe, Si pa 2 23C. DEP’s Procedures Are Aggravating the Leak Prior to 1966, DEP rarely operated the aqueduct at full capacity and flows rarely exceeded 800 MGD.* Since then, flows through the tunnel have steadily increased, with maximum flows reaching 960 MGD by the 1990s (total water demand by New York City is approximately 1.3 billion gallons per day).** On September 13, 1999, as DEP prepared to conduct another in a series of dye tests relating to the leaks, flow through the tunnel was 930 MGD. It is quite clear that DEP is forcing through the Delaware Aqueduct flows that exceed its safe operating capacity, and that the increased pressure from these high maximum flows is likely to accelerate the size of the leaks.* DEP has ignored the recommendation of its own engineers to limit flow through the aqueduct to a safer level of 770 MCD. Over a Decade juanderet i ir Instead of responding decisively and aggressively, DEP's leadership has squandered nearly a decade, ordering up an anemic series of tests and studies, many of which have been botched and the rest of which constitute an indefensibly minimalist response to the crisis. After the ini- tial discovery of the problem in 1991, DEP did aot begin investigating it until 1993. The agency then commissioned dye and other tests imed at determining the magnitude and location of the leaks, These tests have been repeated over and over because of poor planning, irrelevant data production, flawed testing methodology, ard deteriorating water supply infrastructure.*' AS of October 2000, over ten years after discovering the problem, DEP had not even completed bore tests of the geology surrounding the broken tunnel, It did not expect to do so before April of 2001. A possible follow-up series of tests in 2002 will delay the release of any findings, until June 2002. The agency's molasses-like research and inept testing strategy seems calcu- lated to delay the discovery of bad news until Mayor Giuliani’s term has expired. While DEP has adopted more reliable testing methodologies over the past three years, the agency has failed to implement meaningful contingency plans or repair timetables to address the crisis. 33 seeiga ae. Samm. 4 56 Se "Tm ingen he 99s ve seen cl sna lo ils Tigh an hss he revi 30ye8 pce yo tly lbs oa gprs 10 ard again 198. Se DEP Ren Sap eA, 6 Desens, 20 rng eet New York Cy Camel Envionnent Carat, Comisoner Mice sha the Deore Acie dhs ‘ancy of890 NOD DEP cond shy tn og fe Actin! Pet exo seve Ser sg, New Yonx Gry Dest OF [pumonareran Proves, Rouxtour Este Cnaben Drea Recone 1985-198, Arr A, bua VN Reco a 1S, 36 37,38 ‘Sr Me rn hd amas, DER o Keone. Meret, DEP Uae | 199} oe we ashes Av Be 79 MD ate, DEP enpinests alive ht Ais lek wil done by approx Soe kPa pst coon ewer ites lehage as an te inseam Now goal nah he name by DE. Ser Macon Pee Repo, pra me i, Exo Sar. ps5. See DEP 95 Lae Reront pre note 3.3 ‘61 EP as ac oat hd is feted tes i 19 er alight he it wo sees, ding foes 1998 an 1897 had re ae satan econ dit Soe; DEP Kero yg ote 601, Masi Pa eieing the DED est proces, hs ht it elas wih ‘maton another sjapent a EC a Sa 6 ly hove cent ecarces DEP' je ess See MALU MPN RENT su oe 3, {Seema om Gc yas, DEP (et 31, 200 nS with author) [bi Oot Ryan Men} SoutDEP tests reveal thet leaking aqueduct water fills this cemetery pond in Newburgh. Photo by Mare A. Yogi For the past year, as reports of the Delaware Aqueduct leak began to surface, DEP has trum- peted its plans to use a submersible remotely operated vehicle (ROV) to examine the condition of the aqueduct’s interior, DEP has repeatedly pointed to the submarine construction project as an achievement to counter criticism that the agency has been sitting on its hands for 10 year as the leak worsened, However, statements made by agency officials regarding the submersible have proven to be misstatements. From Commissioner Miele on down, DEP has repeatedly misled the public about the existence of the submersible or a contraet to construct one. Commissione: Miele and other DEP officials repeatedly claimed that DEP had a contract for this ROV, nearly a decade after the need for such an examination became apparent. “The plan,” according 10 DEP Commissioner Joel Miele’s sworn testimony, is to use an untehered subaqueous vehicle that has to be built specifically for the tunnel, because there is no other way to get at it. We got a contract to build that, and we have a contract basically to enter this vehicle into the tunnel and to have the vehicle go down to the area where the leak appears to be, so we can determine the extent of it. Once we get the information from direct on-site viewing of what problems there are with the tunnel, then ou engineering firm is supposed to put together a solution for that so that it can be sealed. tyne teimoay athe Mise! Clin ti Commisionse Mile rest he aeons ed forthe ROV ws aperen a ya 9% dem the ct hat DEP had enigatedthe eak feveyeas by ta de See Tesinny of ot Mik, Michel Calis Willa tk Jo! Mile, C7806 (§ON¥- Joy 21,2009 a 25Later in this same testimony, Commissioner Miele testified, under oath, that DEP had signed a contract with Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute to construct a submarine to investigate the leak. Commissioner Miele subsequently repeated this statement in an October 2, 2000 DEP press release that coincided with DEP’s release of documents relevant to the leak in response to Riverkeeper’s FOIL request.” The commissioner clearly affirmed that a submersible “is now being built for DEP by Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute."** The Commissioner and his staff further repeated their representations in interviews with New York Newsday and the New York Post. In each instance, the commissioner and his representatives claimed that the department had awarded a contract to Woods Hole, and that the submersible was already under construction, Alll of these statements were, in fact, false. As of the date that each was made, no contract existed for construction of the submarine, and a: the time of this writing, nearly seven months after Commissioner Miele’s first deceptive claim, no submarine was under construction for DEP. A November 17, 2000, telephone call to tie Director of Media Relations for Woods Hole revealed that the Institute had responded two years ago to a Request for Proposals issued by DEP for the construction of a submarine. However, Woods Hole had no further communication from DEP regarding the proposed submersible until December 2000 following a deluge of news reports questioning the commissioner’s earlier statements.”” In October 2000, after Riverkeeper publicly exposed the issue, DEP scurried to make basic contingency plans that should have been made a decade ago. Geoff Ryan, DEP spokesperson, claimed that a contractor finally was retained to prepare specifications for materials, equipment, and repair contracts “as contingency in case of tunnel failure.”"" ‘The lack of contingency planning is DEP’s most irresponsible omission. According to DEP engineers contacted by Riverkeeper, the agency is operating on the optimistic estimate that repairing the leaks will take cight months, if all goes well. Recently, however, DEP Chief of Staff Charles Sturcken told New Yorkers that the repair “may take a couple of years.”” If repairs to the aqueduct are not possible, then the only feasible way to solve the problem is by building a bypass aqueduct around the leaking section. This was the recommendation made by former DEP Commissioner Marilyn Gelber in 1995, just before her dismissal by Mayor Giuliani. DEP has never acted on that recommendation. DEP's construction of City Tunnel #3, now delayed decades beyond its projected completion date, testifies to the expense and com- plexity of large, subsurface aqueduct construction, In more than five years as Commissioner, Joe! Miele has not made provisions for emergercy construction of a Delaware bypass, nor has DEP even estimated the time this construction would require. © $k Pe Ramng on Eng’ LX Nawab, No.4, 29 A Se i asi Seti, Hr Tree es iin pan Lk 6 oo, 9sAse DEP pon lind Wondsne ns tale mele Sx Tey of nh Showa DEP 85. Raman Hoes DEF fal aed Reva ae pny mo pnd er OL ee cot to a hon eiThe City has, for example, no contingency plans for water replacement if the repair work requires shutting down the Delaware Aqueduct.” Even under the City’s best-case scenario, the eight-month repair timeline is still well beyond the existing six-month, of less, capacity of the rest of the water supply. Under a worst-case scenario, with low reservoirs and high turbidi- ty conditions, the City's water reserve may dwindle to as little as 80 days. The City would run out of water at least five months before repairs could be completed. Should the Delaware the nation’s financial center and Aqueduct actually fail, the City will be stranding for y. nearly 10 million people who depend on the system During a December 8, 2000, New York City Council hearing, Commissioner Miele claimed that a collapse of the Delaware Aqueduct would not deprive the City of water because the City could supply one billion gallons per day for an indefinite period.’* Miele was mistaken. Should the Delaware Aqueduct be forced to shut down, the City would be left with only the Catskill and Croton systems to provide drinking water. These two systems would not be able to supplement the supply adequately, and the City, after draining the West Branch Reservoir, could run out of water in less than 80 days. As one current DEP employee claimed, “after 60 to 80 days, | wouldn’t want to be in their [DEP's] shoes.” Commissioner Miele based his overly optimistic estimate on misleading and irrelevant numbers, such as reservoir capacities and aqueduct flow rates.” A realistic accounting of the City’s alternative drinking water sources paints a far less optimistic picture. ‘The theoretical combined capacity of the Croton and Catskill systems contributes only 50 percent of the City’s ‘water; even when operated at maximum capacity, that figure would not rise appreciably. At current rates of water use, the full capacity of both systems would be exhausted in approximate- ly 80 days. However, the real capacity of the system has been reduced through poor operations and maintenance practices.” E. Alternative Emergency Sources Available to the City in the Event of elaware Aquedi ct se Will Not Ker ‘ity From Running Out of Water New York City draws almost all of its drinking water from the three northern reservoir sys tems: the Delaware, Catskill, and Croton. A Delaware Aqueduct collapse would decommission the four reservoirs that comprise the Delaware system. At this point, the City would be limited to the supply available in the Croton and Catskil systems. According to DEP, as of November 1, 2000, the reservoirs in these two watersheds had a combined capacity of 192 billion gallons. At current usage rates of 1.3 BGD, the Croton and Catskill reservoirs have enough water to supply the City’s water consumers for 147 days, but only if every last drop of water could be rained from behind the dams, 11 Eratnoe Cun DIVERSION Recon 19854098, Armor Anon Yer Recon, Th Cy mc Sony see Chesnais 00ND dy ges Hao ie war New Yor iy ese o cons sts with resend Former DEP fl Reser FOIL ets to DEPHowever, itis impossible to draw down a reservoir completely in order to turn its entire contents into usable drinking water. A reservoir's volume is usually described in terms of its “safe yield." As the City has shown in the past, safe yield figures are certain to over-exagger- ate the amount of water actually available “because the capacity of a reservoir cannot be drawn down to zero and there is no assurance that the reservoirs would be full of water at the begin- ning of the period, as is assumed.” A reservoir’s inability to be drawn down to zero stems from both the inherent design of water impouncment structures and from the fact that water quality declines as a reservoir’s level drops. Much of the water behind the Catskill dams is, undrinkable because of high levels of turbidity (cloudiness caused by suspended sediment) during spring and summer months.” Should the City need to rely on the full amount of water stored in the Catskill and Croton reservoirs, it would not be able to guarantee that this water ‘would meet federal drinking water quality requirements, Over-reliance on the Catskill’s turbid ‘waters, particularly in the spring, may trigger a filtration order by EPA in the midst of water shortage emergency." In any event, these reservoir capacity numbers do not tell the real story. With the collapse of the Delaware Aqueduct, the water supply reaching New York City will be limited by the flow capacities of the Catskill and Croton Aqueducts, The duration of the City’s water supply is determined not by how full the reservoirs are, but by how effectively the infrastructure can deliver it. Because the City’s water supply system is gravity fed, meaning that it does not use pumps to move water from the reservoirs to the City, the flow of water through the aqueducts is entirely dependent upon the force of hydraulic pressure, When reservoirs are drained, their “hydraulic head” diminishes. As the hydraulic head diminishes, so does a reservoir’s ability to force water through an aqueduct. In other words, DEP cannot force the full capacity of the Catskill reservoirs through the outlet into the Catskill aqueduct, Likewise, as the Croton Reservoir level drops, DEP’s ability to push water through the Croton Aqueduct also drops. DEP's reservoirs work reasonably well when they have high water levels; their ability to deliver water declines dramatically as their levels drop. So precipitous is this decline that the Kensico Reservoir, for example, will lose its ability to fill the aqueducts leading to the City when its level drops by as little as 23 feet. While DEP regularly quotes the reserve capacity of the Kensico as 30 days and 30 billion gallons, the useable capacity of the reservoir is only 12 billion gallons, which will last between 10 and 18 days.*! Similar conditions govern the flow from the reservoirs in the Catskill system, Therefore, DEP’s claim that it has stored enough water to ast for 147 days is misleading. Only about half of the water sitting behind the dams is actually accessible, ‘The City will run out of water in approximately 80 days, and much earlier than that, the City will be sending highly degraded water to consumers. 77 sey ital amount of wae a cn be take om a sore spy oe pai of ers Wik tng hs sue eon i aby 0 be [Raton River Pahemen'sAar'n, New Yad Ch. 71 Sig. 108, 1092:S.D 1990, Sesh Pat IV tors sets os Cal by se. ‘9 Decener 200 he iy wae geting hi of ore tan 18 NTU in he Aska Reserv, heh uy kvl cd bi evel in th Keio Reser ech sppinaly 3.2 NTU. Ty evel of SNTU nt corse monte wank ger anasto ation Sw 40 CFR sexton AV tint cburesed by 199 nel DEP el caning that he Kec sup io 18 ys 28Furthermore, the New Croton Aqueduct, which brings Croton system water into the City’s distribution network, cannot be operated safely until DEP isolates and cleans up a pool of pere and possible MTBE that have contaminated that aqueduct. Perc is a colorless, non-flammable liquid largely used in the dry-cleaning industry that harms human health and the environment in varying degrees depending upon, among other things, the length and frequeney of exposure. MTBE is one of a group of chemicals commonly known as “oxygenates” because they raise the oxygen content of gasoline. Introduced in 1979 as an octane enhancer to replace lead, it has been used at much higher concentrations since 1992. MTBE is a volatile, flammable and color less liquid that at room temperature dissolves easily in water and even low levels can render water undrinkable. EPA banned MTBE, as a gasoline additive, in 2000, Finally, DEP’s optimistic calculations assume that the Catskill and Croton Reservoirs will be at full capacity on the day that the Delaware Aqueduct fails. There is, of course, no ‘guarantee that the reservoirs would be at such high levels if the aqueduct should collapse Normal storage for November, for example, is cited by DEP as being closer to 69%. During the drought of 1985, reservoir levels dropped to as little as 53%." By then, the City had declared a Stage III Drought Emergency, instituted severe water use restrictions, and begun to use the Chelsea Pump Station to pump 100 MGD of polluted Hudson River water into the system in an effort to provide sufficient drinking water. 1. The Crisis is Compounded Because the Hudson River is No Longer Available «as a Supplemental Supply During Emergency Water Shortages. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the City ccnsistently maintained that the Hudson River was its only viable emergency source of water ir the event of shortages. According to a 1986 Draft Environmental Impact Statement for re-opening the Chelsea Pump Station (to allow DEP to pump Hudson River water into drinking water system), DEP asserted that the City had no other emergency water supply sources; “[tJhe Hudson River pumping station at Chelsea represents the only currently available, fully operational emergency source of water supply for the City of New York. Other alternatives have been investigated: however, none are currently available....’* This assurance was repeated in 1990 by Joe Conway, DEP Chief of the Bureau of Water Supply. ‘The City can no longer rely on this short-term alternative. First, since 1990, zebra mussels have invaded the river and the City cannot risk introducing them to the water supply. Second, a court order obtained by Riverkeeper in a suit against the City in 1990 prevents DEP from restarting the Chelsea pumps until the agency ottains a Clean Water Act state pollutant dis charge elimination system permit.® The City has not applied for a Clean Water Act permit and is unlikely to qualify for one. or ceasing m= tvs Now 1, 2000. the 6 eas Coo aa Cal sytem, nelaing Kenn wren, woul ve nna oy onl At cat sage hi um oa Sang al supply ee SSXcMatcoun Pant: Drove Orrean or tat tunon Riven Porn Puakt owt ar Cust DuTewes Gout, No YOR, Dstt Eyommomsear imac Seat, Nove 986 ecaierCees DES Miia Commis Hae) Sena 3 Hee Catsta DES, spe nore 22 55) tan Ries Fahonna' Aan hy of New York, 75 Supp OME 18S (S.A. 190, »Third, without dilution with Delaware Aqueduct water, Hudson River water is not suitable for human consumption. According to DOH, the Hudson River water is suitable for emergency use only “with proper chlorination and treatmert with alum*” and dilution with not less than four parts of additional water from the Delaware system.”** This dilution is required under the state water supply permit (Water Supply Application No. 4974), which allowed the pump station to operate briefly in the drought emergencies of the 1960s and 1980s. Since the Delaware Aqueduct will not be able to deliver Delaware system water, it would be impossible to dilute Hudson River water to safe drinking levels. 2. Emergency Water Conservation Measures Will Not Result in Significant Savings Water conservation measures will not save the City. During the 1980-81 and 1985 droughts, the City implemented dramatic conservation measures and was able to reduce demand by approximately 200 MGD.*' Two things work against repetition of such suecess. First, many of the measures instituted 15 years ago are still in place — such as water meters and reduced flow toilets and showerheads. They continue to save water today, and therefore will not be able to produce additional savings in the event of a future shortage." For instance, some of the 250 MGD decline in water consumption between 1591 and 1998 can be attributed to the installation of water meters and 1.34 million low flow toilets. DEP cannot reap any further benefit from. such measures. Second, the population served by the NYC drinking water system has increased by over one million consumers since 1985: from eight million to nine million.” The City's pre- vious conservation efforts largely resulted from reducing individual water consumption from 195 gallons per day to 169 gallons per day. Because there are now more people, even if DEP were to limit daily use to 169 gallons, the City would not see the conservation benefits realized previously, The 200 MGD saved in the 1980s represented 13% of the pre-drought flow. If DEP can convince us all to save 13% of the water we use today, these savings would bring daily water use down to 1.18 BGD. However, as discussed below, even these measures would not relieve the water shortage. Under various scenarios described below, DEP would have a daily supply deficit between 435 and 942 million gallons. 7 tum is camila 2 a angle tpn is fr wa Cs DENS. pte 83. Afni a Commies Havey Sele, 8 eng ed) "Sa 2-28 "Daring his rh (128081 he iy wa complld a taper severe waters Fes on at osu ese war syesmation ey 1884 mad nT 1.37 mg oso 133% recone "The City's agressive meng cena. 58. ed water mete appoint 40.0 aos, Cry. ly 30.00 asus ems so ‘bemeera The Chy ease expe op signs sigs fm hs fe rein ean Ss eng lore ny Come of New Vrs Commits ah [prone Pons, I 2 3001 tanec 68, ® SeeNew Yon: Cry DressoNext of ExvioQOENTA Pore New Yuk Cry Wart Ser Se. Brtow Nomst: Ware ConsPrraos| Spreamrs vo ne Encovesorn De, 199%, aval ot gua yeaa tpl» ht ited Mar 2.200), St Chess DEIS, sp ot 3a 218."The ys mae spy stom ect pvnes wae bt appa br 7.9 mon people in New ook Cty Appoint 525000 prone sn wuern Que ae edb heats Wier Supply Cory nang, he Cys soem proves we for shout TH. vss un 0 pple Washer, Puma, Orage ae Uber Came 1 [For encase populist of sey 9 il ee fp rea es “Se Hearn bere Cy Cove of New Yok Commies on Enna! Pot. My pchsl hc aocs Wate Supply sorpany in relate em nse’ Now 7 200, Ol mci at 403. Pumping Increases in the Catskill and Croton Reservoirs, and the Queens Groundwater System Will Not Provide Adequate Supplementary Water Supply Even if the Catskill Aqueduct can deliver its advertised maximum of 500 MGD and the Croton can deliver a further 275 MGD (for a total of 775 MGD from upstate reservoirs).'* the City will still be at least 435 MGD short of irs current daily usage. There are no realistic alternatives to make up the missing water required to meet the City’s needs and lost when the Delaware Aqueduct is off-line Commissioner Miele claims that DEP could get flow through the Croton up to 275 MGD in 48 hours. DEP engineers have strong doubts about this claim because of the deteriorating condition of the Croton Aqueduct. Today, the acueduct is largely closed down while DEP tries to locate and repair several sources of contamination, including unidentified sources of perc that are leaking into the aqueduct somewhere in the Bronx or Harlem. These contamination problems limit DEP’s ability to use the Croton Aqueduct; currently, only 40 MGD can be sent through this tunnel. As of now, there is no estimate as to when it will be safe to bring the Croton fully back on line. Other factors conspire to limit the relief available through the Croton Aqueduct. First, even the agency’s rosiest documents repeatedly put the maximum flow through the Croton Aqueduct at 240 MGD — 35 MGD short of Miele’s estimate, Second, because the aqueduct is already providing water to the City at a rate of 40 MGD, Commissioner Miele’s promise does not add 275 MGD in additional flow to the City. Theoretically, the City can add only 235 MGN, still far less than is required to make up for the shortZall when the Delaware Aqueduct goes down.” DEP engineers believe that the crumbling, weakened condition of the Croton Aqueduct makes it impossible to force additional capacity through this structure. Commissioner Miele also has claimed in City Council testimony and elsewhere the DEP can get more water from wells in Jamaica, Queens.”” This small system currently provides about 30 MGD to 525,000 residents of that area. Although it is theoretically possible to increase the production of these wells, that small increase is unlikely to add meaningfully to the City’s emergency supply. On an ordinary day, 30% of the water supplied to the residents of this, area must come from the City’s upstate reservoirs. The wells do not produce enough water to meet local demand, let alone supply water for the rest of the City. Indeed, the City system is the only alternative source of water for these communities, and DEP has not confirmed that it will be able to meet their needs in an emergency. It is also likely that infrastructure problems ‘would prevent any meaningful contribution of Queens water to the City. Already, water main connections between the City and Jamaica systems are too small to maintain sufficient pressure in the Jamaica area.'® ‘The lack of existing infrastructure and permits, as well as pollution problems with the aquifer, will prevent any increase in water supply from the Queens wells, at feast in the near term. Thus, the Queens wells are an improbable source of extra water for the City, °% Genel, DEP manne ha ie Cron yen sips proximately 1% te Cis pking water eso aproinsely 4D MGD. the Cron ware pene this neal opersing eh extra ety tse whe Dee Agu Tal only 120 NED. scien fhe New You Cy Cone Comite on Eon Pro, bee KD. Tac a TSK 7680 Se i, New YX CY Dernaner of Exmonnaae Paornenon. Avante Warts Rests ie Even & Deter St ara an) seins Rem Ro 2 rong Gores Acuirn Sere. Soe Soucy Aguien Sumo Docu ot avi ona _ estan tanto ska ths visto NO 1,200) Soe SOUR: AGE oh Soe 3The language of DEP’s Drought Management Plan asserts that in a time of water shortage, DEP would attempt to “maximize the normal ottput of the wells in Queens County...and close selected interconnections to the surface water supply.”""" As a water crisis deepens, DEP would “close additional connections to the surface water supply.” " This procedure suggests, Commissioner Miele’s claim notwithstanding, that DEP has neither the intention nor the ability to transfer Queens well water to the rest of the City’s distribution system. Its response in times of crisis is to cut Queens residents off from the -eservoirs and supply them solely with well water. Raising production levels from the Queens wells should therefore free up significant quantities of extra water to the City system. However, the benefit to the rest of the City is lim- ited to the amount of water that DEP no longer has to send to Queens to supplement the water supplied by the wells. Because DEP typically supplies 30% of Queens residents’ needs with reservoir water, and the wells typically produce around 30 MGD, increasing well production will only free up 13 to 15 MGD for distribution to residents of the other four boroughs. DEP also has named the Brooklyn-Queens Aquifer as an additional source of emergency drinking water." It is somewhat alarming that DEP would even suggest this, let alone give it serious consideration. This underground reservoir is essentially the same body of water that supplies the Jamaica-Queens wells." According to EPA, the Brooklyn-Queens Aquifer System ighly vulnerable to contamination.” Already, the groundwater in this system suffers from dangerous levels of nitrates from pollution by fertilizers, landfills, and septic and sewer leaks." When excessive groundwater is pumped out of the aquifer, saltwater from the Atlantic intrudes to the underground reservoir, making the water ‘00 salty to drink. An interagency study of the aquifer determined that pumping 100 MGD would render the aquifer unusable in 10 months.! Despite its low quality, wells in Queens provide the primary source of drinking water for over half.a million people. ‘The greatest threat to this source of drinking water is nothing other than precisely what DEP proposes to do: increase the Queens wells’ pumping rates. Commissioner Miele’s claim that DEP can cbtain 20 MGD from wells in Jamaica that are owned by Nassau County also is misleading. Taese wells draw water from the same aquifer as the City’s wells and increased draws would amplify the pollution and saltwater intrusion. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that Nassau County would respond positively to the City’s request. DEP has not made any showing that a) Nassau County would be willing to supply a significant portion of its groundwater supply to the City, b) that Nassau County has the extra capacity to deliver this water, ¢) that the City’s water mains are even connected to Nassau County’s, and d) that the infrastructure in place is sufficient to convey Nassau County water to New York City in any realistic fashion. Until such questions are answered, it is far safer to ‘omit Nassau’s wells from any catalog of additional sources of water for thirsty New Yorkers. TET Ne enx Gry Dearie or Exton, Proracrion Datos ManAceuns Pan & RULES 612298) tone 10 Sx Gol yan Maroy 62 ven al be mene sugges by Mi Ryan wore vl dts at plas repletion wil ot oi lus 23 Se. Tar See Sone Agora sp mo 8 "Sec i T(D). “In ation w lowering round water eve. stanzas as deepen f the pound wae sen King ad Ques Cos have ‘aul sere rion of proto uly. The mos sing care ws swat nrg tse rags casos doe "own, Oe Sure of comatose of whi were pre ro thet sige of develope lu rnd ak leaks an sk ps tad ‘See Sutbist New Yack nersveniental Water Spy Adis Commies, Comite Repos, ew syns. 24. Other Minor Sources a. The Croton Falls Pump Station An additional, small possible source of water could be obtained by pumping water from one of the Croton system reservoirs, Croton Falls, dizectly into the Delaware Aqueduct at a point cast of the Hudson River. While this reportedly would add 60 MGD to the daily supply @ able to the City, the Croton Falls Pumping Station is scheduled to be taken off-line in conjune- tion with dam reconstruction work and will be altogether out of service for several years begin ning in 2002." In any event, use of the Croton Falls Pump Station is no panacea in that the pumps actually waste more water than can be delivered. Because of the configuration of the pumps, nearly 180 million gallons must be spilled from Croton Falls Reservoir in order to send 60 million gallons through the pumps. This spilled water flows into Croton Reservoir, and almost certainly would wind up going over the spillway and into the Hudson River. Thus, the City would be using 240 MGD to send 60 MGD to consumers, quickly drawing down the Croton Falls, Middle Branch, East Branch, Dive-ting and Bog Brook Reservoirs. Such pump- ing would reduce the overall reserve capacity of the reservoirs; any water pumped to the Delaware Aqueduct from Croton Falls will not be available for later delivery through the Croton Aqueduct. While daily supply might be temporarily inereased, the number of days that supply will last would be significantly shortened, b. Commissioner Miele’s Claim That the City Can Get an Emergency Water Supply From New Jersey is Absurd At the December 8, 2000 City Council Hearing, Commissioner Miele claimed that in the event of an aqueduct collapse, New York City could obtain water from New Jersey. When questioned by Council members, Miele said that a pipe already exists across the George Washington Bridge. The only known pipe extending across the Hudson to New Jersey was intended for the City to send water to New Jersey during a Delaware River basin drought threat in the 1950s. The pipe is not designed to bring water to New York from New Jersey. Moreover, it is hard to imagine any such pipe would be sufficient to replace the nine- teen-foot diameter Delaware Aqueduct, DEP has not presented any hard information to the public about this imaginative water source. Where, for example, would this water come from? Sy New Yous Co Drea of Even Proverbs, Dror Mase Law Ao RULES Tale fh 1. A papi on Jygheniite sana ond eget Cis Retna fn tl wi ee 2008 Se Se Hering foe Cy Cou New Yok Comte on Envomnetal Poet, Dee. 200, a 58 3BF. Run ¢ the Numbers: Catastrophic Water Shortages Face the City DEP’s own best-case scenario numbers still spell disaster for downstate New Yorkers. Commissioner Miele’s prediction that DEP “will cope” assumes the following estimates, which we have shown above to be wildly optimistic: the Catskill Aqueduct will be able to provide 500 MGD, the Croton Aqueduct can safely deliver 275 MGD, and the Queens/Jamaica Wells somehow can contribute an additional 60 MGD." The Croton Falls pumps will supply another 60 MGD. DEP will somehow be able to obtain an additional 20 MGD from wells in Jamaica that are owned by Nassau County. Under these lofty, improbable conditions, the total available supply would be 915 MGD, This best-case scenario still leaves the City with a shortage of 435 MGD in the winter when water use is lower. Water conservation measures would have some impact on this deficit, but even if it were possible to repeat the 13% reduction realized as a result of the drought measures of the 1980s, there would be a savings of only 175 MGD. According to its own figures, DEP would be at least 260 MGD short even in the wet, winter months. Under the best conditions, the City will run dry in six months. The deficit would be far higher and judgment day will come much sooner in summer months, when reservoir levels drop and water demand climbs as high as 1.7 BGD.'"' The water shortage is far greater under a more conservative scenario, one that tempers DEP's wild claims with a dose of reality. Structural limitations make it likely that the Catskill Aqueduct can safely deliver a maximum of only 500 MGD. Similar structural issues limit the Croton Aqueduct to a maximum flow of 225 MGD,""? while the Queens/Jamaica wells possibly may be upgraded to contribute 60 MGD. No water is available from the Nassau County-owned wells, due to infrastructure limitations and political obstacles. The Croton Falls Pumping Station, unused for years, remains off-line due to operating inefficiencies. The total supply under these circumstances would be 785 MGD, or 565 MGD short of water users” wintertime needs. The shortage would grow to as much as 785 MGD during thirsty summer months. While conservation measures will likely lower cemand, even under this conservative estimate, DEP can supply only approximately two-thirds of the water currently required. "0 See Nn You Cay Debacie o Esomonanotae Paonac rte Avast Waren Roos i BYPNTOF 8 DEL AWAKE AQUEDLC {gjss memo) fon wih aubars tis me, DEP ass a Ie Cab System ea prove SBI MD: he ron 275" ‘Se Chetes DEIS. pro at). 2.24 Two apr sonra hE s sy op het wst oweve Fhe wae he Csi Ste otros hi flay sane artes. DED eat provide Cal wr cos th lig Fea Sate ike Wer ‘ny ulin. Ths neu ater hn pees ber of Dah comms. Plans feos tale od ptogse sur = bse rand Coney ty be bred peel sien pari, masking on teal pln fad fom eto Tan bedimcw meres ‘ithe crim pose. See Navman. Rasta Comme Wasenas Msueatins Fons eames Wares ScreAsss New own Crs ‘Arrwosci 126 1098), coat the Cael Agee Now a Sv MD enable wat the Cal to wn Novo 27-2000 fire ll ‘itis ons DEP web sos tha the tw Cail Reserve Seana Asha nr at 2% and Papacy. reagent Nebr 7. 3M. Se hyo asastuaLiedaaplsl2 hl ised Mover 3,200) Tisbvl bested ha DE? regula clas tit he Cec sii pea the Cas weno, oughly LAD MGD by cron sth, May gine li ahi elle the on posible!A Delaware failure today, or in the near future, would create the most likely and most devastating worst-case scenario, Under these easily envisioned circumstances, the Croton Aqueduct remains in its current contaminated state, but the need for water forces DEP to reacti- vate the tunnel to supply 225 MGD, even though doing so exposes city residents and visitors to toxic pollutants. The Catskill Aqueduct, the City’s remaining lifeline, is operated at its maxi- mum safe level, or 500 MGD. The wells in Queens can do little more than supply the 33 MGD. to the residents who already depend on them for 70% of their water, and so contribute nothing to the rest of the thirsty City. This scenario is probably the most accurate prediction of the con- ditions that would confront the City should it be cut off from Delaware System water. ‘The total available water supply would be 758 MGD: about half of what City water users would require. DEP has no available sources that can provide the missing $92 million gallons we would need every day. During summer, with water demand approaching 1.7 BGD, the deficit facing City ‘water consumers would rise to almost 942 MGD. The City could run dry in as little as 80 days! 35CURRENT WATER SUPPLY With the Delaware Aqueduct out of ‘commission, the City will run out of water in 80 days - no air conditioning,| | no drinking vater, no fire protection! 2. 36 ‘SUMMER DEFICIT = 7as MCD TOTAL SUPPLY =916 460 .E.P.'S SCENARIO ‘SunWeEn DEFICIT = 842 aD nen DERCIT = 682 NGO TOTAL SUPPLY =768 GD MOST REALISTIC SCENARIOacts From the Loss of the Delaware Aqueduct Will Also routinely overlooked in DEP’s assessments are the water supply impacts on upstate communities from the closure of the Delaware Aqueduct. Many towns and villages in ‘Westchester, Putnam, Orange, and Ulster Counties rely on the New York City Drinking Water System for their drinking water. ‘The City of Newburgh, for instance, obtains most of its drinking water from the Delaware Aqueduct. Without this source, Newburgh and the other communities will have to scramble to institute alternative water supplies. A severe impact on Catskill communities mey not arise from too little water, but from too much of it, With the Delaware Aqueduct out of service, the 900 MGD or so that normally flow through the tunnel will have to go elsewhere. For some time, this water can be collected behind the four reservoirs of the Delaware system. However, their ability to retain water that is normally siphoned off will depend on the length of time repairs to the Aqueduct require and the amount of water already in the reservoirs. ‘The reservoirs will not be able to hold the additional 900 MGD indefinitely and DEP will be forced to increase flows over the spillways and back to the Neversink River and East and West Branches of the Delaware River. These rivers were originally dammed to create the reservoirs and still carry unstored flow into the main stem of the Delaware River DEP is currently required to release up to 800 MGD through these rivers, per a Supreme Court decree that divides rights to the Delaware River between New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jetsey. The flow of the Delaware River will be significantly increased if DEP is forced to divert an additional 900 MGD over the spillways of the Neversink, Pepacton, Cannonsville, and Rondout Reservoirs. Suddenly engorged with twice their normal flow, the rivers will flood tow-lying property, erode banks and riverbeds, end threaten the stability of roadways and bridges. The impacts of this much water on down-river communities can only be estimated, based on historical records of similar size floods, Downstream communities that rely on these rivers for drinking water will be forced to deal with increasingly turbid and contaminated water The legal implications of such releases on the City’s obligations under the Delaware River Basin Compact must also be considered. With the Delaware Aqueduct out of commission, the City will run out of water in 80 days = no air conditioning, no drinking water, no fire protection,H. Recommendations: Repairing the Aqueduct and Preventing a Crisis Recommendation #10: DEP Should End 10 Years of Delay and Inaction and Immediately Pursue Concrete Remedies to This Potential Cri: The agency should take the following steps and any others required to bring urgent attention to this overdue repair Recommendation #11: DEP Should Accelerate the Schedule For Test Borings and Geologic Investigations Near the Roseton Leak Site, Including Tests to Determine the Structural Stability of the Tunnel Reaches Adjacent to and Under the Hudson River. Incredibly, ten years after discovering the leaks, DEP has yet to conduct a thorough geologic investigation of the leak sites. Given the likelihood that subterranean limestone may have been eroding through contact with the leak waters, and the possibly adverse impacts this process has on the structural integrity of the aqueduct, these tests must be conducted at the ear- liest opportunity. Geologic bore tests are the primary means for discovering the ramifications of dewatering the aqueduct and for charting the scope of repairs that will be required. Recommendation #12: DEP Should Accelerate the Deployment of the Woods Hole Constructed Submersible and Take Other Steps to Precisely Determine the Leak Locations. Commissioner Miele has contracted studies so that no results will be available until the Giuliani Administration has left office. These studies should be accelerated using the City’s emergency contracting procedures. This crisis should be recognized as an emergency and assigned the priority that its great risks merit, Recommendation #13: DEP Must Begin an Adequate Planning Effort in Advance of Final Test Results. Initial planning steps should evaluate possible repair technologies, their costs, and impacts upon water supply while repairs are underway. Any advance contracting and purchasing requirements should be identified and steps should be taken toward advance procurement of supplies and machinery. Recommendation #14: DEP Must Immediately Begin to Plan Alternative Sources of Water For Use While the Delaware Aqueduct is Out of Service. Despite the Department's public assertions, it is clear that there simply is no way, with current infrastructure, to meet the daily water nzeds of more than nine million people. DEP needs to identify possible water conservation measures, including rationing plans, as well as infrastructure improvements that can increase water supply. Planning today for the eventual loss of the Delaware Aqueduct will prevent difficult water shortages during repair work that could last years. 38Recommendation #15: As Part of Its Efforts to Secure Alternative Sources of Water Delivery, DEP Must Begin Planning a Third Hudson River Tunnel. This tunnel must have the capacity to carry water from both the Delaware and Catskill Aqueducts in order to ensure a constant supply should either of these two lifelines suffer damage west of the Hudson, Recommendation #16: DEP Must Immediately Begin Repairs and Upgrades to the Catskill and Croton Aqueduets to Ensure That They Will Be Able to Safely Meet the City’s Water Delivery Needs While the Delaware Aqueduct Is Out of Service. Recommendation #17: DEP Should Stop Concealing Critical Information From Elected Officials and the Public. Asa government agency, DEP and its officers have an obligation to be honest, forthright, and cooperative with the community it is charged to serve and protect. It is simply unaccept- able that DEP spent ten years covering up a problem as significant as a dangerous leak in the City’s primary water supply aqueduct. 9No, CAN'T GUARANTEE THe DELRIRRE FoNNEL WONT Caenpse Bui 1 ALSO Can'T GueRATee youlL- GET OUT oF mY OFFICE Ale I] wintour Suineng On A BaNAwh PEEL AAD BREAKING Yok Neck. NBC News Channel 4 interview with DEP Commissioner Joel Miele (November 2000) 0Bart Ill DEP Has Allowed Toxic Chemicals To Contaminate Its Facilities And Threaten The Water SupplyDEP’s lack of attention to infrastructure issues is exemplified by the ageney’s routine mis- handling of toxic substances at its shafis and practices put both water consumers and DEP employees at risk. Riverkeeper’s three- investigation has disclosed that DEP routinely mishandles deadly toxics in its watershed causing problems that have been agg been aware of the contamination and its potential impacts on human health and worker safety since at least 198: ee MERCURY AND/OR PCBs MAY BE ses. These irresponsible and often illegal ear avated by a pattern of secrecy and cover-ups. DEP has PRESENT AT THIS FACILITY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL MUST BE FAMILIAR WITH AND MUST FOLLOW SHAFT 17 HEALTH AND SAFETY PL?A. Sluice Gate Operators Throughout the System Are Contaminated Many New York City water consumers might be surprised to hear that the City’s Department of Environmental Protection is a major polluter of its own reservoirs with contami- nants that include deadly chemicals. Although DEP is supposed to be the front line environ- mental regulator in the almost 2,000-square-mile watershed, it is primarily an environmental facility operator and undoubtedly the biggest po.luter in its own watershed, New York City owns and operates five large sewer plants that discharge into reservoir tributaries, These plants have a long and dismal history of environmental violations. Further, DEP operates and approves hundreds of construction projects in the watershed each year, many of which have disastrous impacts on water quality. But few people know that the City also handles large amounts of dangerous toxic chemicals that pose a serious pollution risk to the water supply and the surrounding environment. The gatehouses and shafis that deliver water to the City resemble large industrial facilities. On the east side of the Hudson River, the flow of water through the Delaware Aqueduct is controlled by sluice gates which are raised and lowered by devices known as sluice gate operators. The sluice gate operators are connected to the sluice gates by long shafts that pass through vertical concrete chambers, known as gate wells. The sluice gate operators sit directly above the gate wells, The sluice gates are raised up in the gate wells when open and lowered to the base of the gate wells when closed. ‘These sluice gate operators have been contaminated for decades. ‘4 The most contaminated sluice gate operators are located in four buildings known as Shafts 9, 10, [7 and 18. Shaft 9 is on the West Branch Reservoir (inflow) in the town of Carmel, NY; Shaft 10 is on the West Branch Reservoir (outflow) in the town of Carmel, NY; Shaft 17 is on the Kensico Reservoir (inflow) in the town of North Castle, NY; and Shaft 18 is on the Kensico Reservoir (outflow) in the town of Mt. Pleasant, NY. Within these four Shafts, water from the Delaware Aqueduct and/or the reservoirs separates into several channels, each of which directs water through the base of a sluice gate well. The flow of water in any given channel may be regulated by opening or closing the sluice gate. The sluice gate operators in the four shafts were installed in the 1940s. Originally, each of the sluice gate operators contained lubricating oil and relied on mercury seals to prevent the oil from leaking. Mercury is a naturally occurring heavy metal that exists in the environment in three forms: elemental mercury, organic mercury, and inorganic mercury compounds." Organic mercury, especially methylmercury, and inorganic mercury compounds are neurotoxins, and present serious threats to human health, even at low doses." Methylmercury can accumu- late in the tissues of people, fish, and other animals, leading to increased health risks through cumulative exposure, Humans can be harmed through inhalation of mereury vapor, direct contact with bare skin, or through ingestion. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PotIc¥ CENTER, BRING Parex ow MiRcteY, Api 197, aaa npn rly efi Li aAs little as a teaspoon of mercury will contaminate a 1750-acre reservoir to the point that the fish in that reservoir are unsafe to eat."'” Humans exposed to mercury, or who eat contaminated fish, can suffer chronic mercury poisoning, which causes a wide variety of debilitating conditions that are often misdiagnosed because the symptoms mimic recognized diseases, Mercury has been identified as the responsible agent producing symptoms of at least 45 illnesses, including fibromyalgia, chronic fatigue, anorexia, depression and Alzheimer’s." Besides mimicking various illnesses, chronic exposure to mercury damages kidney, liver, and the central nervous system." Each sluice gate operator contained many pounds of this toxic material, In addition, oil in the sluice gate operators almost certainly contained PCBs. PCBs are a suspected carcinogen and endocrine disruptor that, like mercury, bioaccumulate in fish and humans. Modest prenatal exposure to PCBs affects brain development in children, causing learning deficits and lowered 1Qs. " More corcentrated exposure causes debilitating stomach pain, disfiguring skin eruptions, as well as a range of physical, behavioral, and cognitive disorders. PCBs are known to cause kidney, liver and lung damage as well as cardiac arrhythmia. Overexposure causes vomiting, jaundice and skin disorders.!22 Because the sluice gate operators sit directly above the wells through which water flows, it is possible that mercury or PCB oil that leaks from inside a sluice gate operator may enter the City’s drinking water supply. The sluice gate operators are also contaminated with lead in excess of the 5.0 milligrams per liter (mg/l) regulatory limit for hazardous wastes,'2" These excessive amounts of lead have been found in the interior of sluice gate operators, within the torque tube tub of a Shaft 18 sluice gate operator, on base assemblies inside most of the sluice gate operators at Shafts 10 and 18, and in other sites, Within the human body, lead damages the nervous system, circulatory system, reproductive system, kidneys, and gastro-intestinal tract. In adults, lead poisoning can cause various symptoms including fatigue, stomach disorders, memory loss, headaches, insom- nia, hypertension, anemia, impotence, dizziness, and weakness in the extremities. Lead expo- sure in children is far more serious. Because the brain has not yet completely developed in children, lead poisoning can cause learning disabilities, attention deficit disorders, lowered 1Q, and antisocial behavior. Elevated levels of lead over a sustained period can damage the central nervous system of children and adversely impact their development." "7 Jeep Ra Moar Rats FA Rip, 180 SCIENCE NEWS 1 19 tera Safety Dat Sts (SDS or Newey 20 Sneha Sada Wanton Joli pln a Ch Exe Plc pens a Uc 38 New Eons Jgysna OF Meine (Sepenber 12.1990), Soc RSDS or PC lao com. 2S 123 (ea ands ante dere Resource Comeration and Resor At as implemsting splot nes the ny ace ofS. ng er he Toney Chater Leaching Proce. OCR sacs 24124 AClwer casein a that cea, ile, eke or ath ‘Sts sll wat wn the ean he Act So 42 USC sector OA BE eK N Dich ta Le Espo ad the Captive Delano of Ut Pehl Chlr Te Cain Law Sd Cot Ae 4 Yor 13 Newnorostotaey & Raroceay 208411991) 44B. Actuators and Manometers Leak Mercury and PCBs The sluice gate operators are not the only pieces of equipment that pose a high risk of con- tamination to the drinking water system, Actuators, located in the sub-floor chambers at Shaft 10, control the outflow of water from Shaft 10 into the Delaware Aqueduct through increment or rectangular gate valves. ‘There are currently 12 actuators at Shaft 10. These actuators also contain mercury and may have contained PCB cil. The sub-floor chambers of Shaft 10 also house gauges called manometers, which are used to measure the volume of water flowing through Shaft 10. These manometers, also found in numerous other source facilities in the City’s water supply system, contain significant quantities of mercury. In several locations, leak- ing or broken manometers have been identified as the sources of mercury contamination. In 1985, DEP identified and tested 40 shaft sites for the presence of mercury vapor. DEP found mercury spills and/or high vapor levels in 36 of those sites. ‘The DEP study concluded, “the shafts registered very high levels of mereury vapor and are poorly ventilated.” DEP also tested 20 pumping station facilities for mercury vapor. Nineteen of those sites had mereury spills and/or high readings. In addition, DEP tested 22 East-of-Hudson locations for mercury vapor. Eleven of those sites had mercury spills and/or high readings." According to current and former DEP employees, the agency failed to provide timely wam- ing to the public or to DEP employees about dangerous mercury levels, in some eases waiting 14 years. Even though the agency had identified over 65 facilities contaminated with mercury, DEP field personnel were forced to work in conditions that directly threatened their health, without the information they needed to protect themselves. This same cavalier attitude go ered DEP’s response to the health threat to water consumers caused by mercury spills. DEP neither adequately cleaned up these spills nor inform the public about the dangers. Not infre- quently, spilled mercury remained where it fell for months or even years. 125 se Memo fo Ege Su, Dict of Libor Relist Os, DEP Adan Fos, Pie, Los 192 (Deb 24, 185) TT Set 45In an unidentified DEP facility, a barrel of hazardous waste sits next to a cardboard box of discarded materials and freestanding mereury (see photo below). Photo by unidentified source. - , as Freestanding pools of mereury in a cardboard box pose a threat to DEP employees and the water supply. Photo by unidentified source. 46Stationary engineers in Shaft 10 began noticing mercury spills as early as 1987. According to Ed Redmond, a former DEP stationary engineer, “there were pools of it in the basement of the shaft, down where the manometers blew out.” At times when the sump pumps were not working, the shaft would fill with water and DEP personnel would pump the water ~ mixed with the mercury and PCBs ~ out of the shaft. Originally, the employees thought they were pumping it into the reservoir, where they reasoned it would be diluted to safe levels in the eight billion gallon holding capacity of the West Branch Reservoir. (These DEP employees were clearly not toxicologists!) Later, after reviewing schematics, they realized the “water was being pumped into the downtake of the Delaware Aqueduct,” from where it would be sent directly into distribution.» In March 1998, Riverkeeper learned that a large amount of mercury had spilled from a bro ken manometer at Shaft 10 of the Delaware system." The manometers, used to measure and control water flow throughout the water supply retwork, are aging relics, loaded with up 10 60 pounds of mercury and subject to chronic failure, A single manometer contains enough mereu- ry to contaminate the City’s entire reservoir system. DEP"s manometers are prone to bursting, When they break, they often spill their entire contents. As a result, DEP has a tremendous problem controlling mercury spills throughout the distribution network DEP engineers discovered the broken manometer in Shaft 10 as early as February 16, 1995, when a DEP safety inspector performed a check of the site." The inspector discovered a broken sight glass on the meter but claimed to have found less than the one pound regulatory reporting threshold of mercury and, therefore, did not report the spill to DEC. Qver three years later, on March 11, 1998, having secured a Hypervac used to clean up a separate mercury spill at Shaft 18, the DEP’s Hazardous Material Response team revisited the Shaft 10 site to follow up on the spill. They discovered over six pounds of free mercury on the floor of the shaft, and belatedly reported the spill to DEC and commerced a hasty cleanup effort. When asked by DEC personnel to explain why the initial cleanup was incomplete and the original estimated amount of mercury was so far below the six pounds recovered, DEP engineer Thom Hook lamely responded that the “area below the manometer is dark and it is difficult to see.” Delaware District Engineer Kevin Cloonan and other engineers also failed to make timely reports to the DEC regarding a mercury spill. According to DEP sources, when news of the spills was reported in the New York Post, Cloonan was temporarily demoted." 12 a on svi cnet 29 Sex Anomymous memorandun, New York City Deparment of Environmenial Pratetion. Division af Environmental Remediation, Sumsmary of Reported Spills ye wea Ton or ena tater om Ten et. Denar Mai, DC Mac 2,199 on ew ar aus seth i vgn eS tpedegnmcer sa ae BE RGe Rothenberg FAP Se Ci Fle Pe fT Sl NV. ost Je 16,198,828. aAround 1996, former DEP Stationary Engineer Ed Redmond reported another mercury spill at the Croton Falls Pump Station. Due to an absence of heat in the building, a meter froze, blowing out approximately 50 to 60 pounds of mercury. DEP officials illegally failed to report the spill. According to Redmond, the spill was neglected for at least two and half to three years. During that time, water repeatedly entered the station, splashing the mercury and spread- ing it all over the station. At one point, DEP employees fashioned a dam out of rags to keep the mercury from spilling into an adjacent stream. These examples of mercury mishandling are only the tip of the iceberg for DEP. A 1998 memo reveals seven mercury spills reported March of that year alone." In addition, an even more widespread problem is revealed in a draft Mercury Inventory that DEC ordered DEP to prepare following the spills in early 1998. The three-page chart lists the locations at which ‘mercury is in use, or has been used in the past at DEP facilities. Most importantly, the chart includes a column captioned “visible spill?” For the East-of-Hudson Distriet, an astonishing 46 locations indicate that some form of “visible spill” had taken place,'™ D. Pollutant Spills Create Workplace Risks for DEP Employees In 1999, Delaware District Engineer Kevin Cloonan sent a memo to DEP’s Delaware District employees urging them to get tested for mercury contamination in their blood. According to DEP sources, DEP’s Deputy Commissioner Dr. William Stasiuk reprimanded Cloonan for sending the memo ~ fearing the memo would cause panic among workers or be released to the public. However, almost a year later, public attention to the mercury spills brought by Riverkeeper forced Stasiuk to send out his own memo. An April 19, 2000 memo from Stasiuk to Bureau of Water Supply Staff notified staff that the bureau was offering biolog- ical screening for mercury, lead, and PCBs to employees whose duties require them to enter shaft facilities for any reason."%* Stasiuk’s memo states that “[p]ast medical screening of DEP employees has indicated that working in the shafts does not present a health hazard to person- nel." Stasiuk’s statement was false. Earlier DEP memos relating to these tests, however, reveal the truth, Date Amount - ane "pwnd ere Nowe Sian 10(Cael sve neo pond Deliare Age Nowe Siah incu ane Few Dros ‘Wes Deke take Leng Manos ss Few Dro Ene Delo Releie aking Mamet se ow Drop ‘Never ake Charter Merry a in Hr Sites mon Few Drops st Detar Ts Ne Outs Ros Ren) wines Few Drops Ronde Fd Chamber ase See Anmymows remand. NYC DEF. Divison of Evonnetl Reins, Sma of Reyne Slt - NY Wats (Mey 108) ff wir suo. "Arter DEP mo ests hs pt mn se fom {850 of aon Dr Meany wvewny Geetha ah ata w emo fom Thoms. Hook PE Depry Dacor: Divo of Onions and Engng. DEP. Coa 3. Mane PE Dvn of Emel Quay, DE My Wh fo what Te etry eps ee Sil expla ise snl Were a tea) Sai, 1 Tea hs sil were vad lms pales Sat 7 spt St 1 fppltatsion 1 an 25 pear on | hema screnng che wie sampling rhe prose of een meta damping fr PCB ed ®Sre Memoranda fom Willan Susu ep Comenssner Hari of Yuet Sy, DE. to Drs Su (pe 9 STH nemo sacha ako 48