Case Digest Part III

TORTS AND
DAMAGES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Republic vs. Luzon Stevedoring, 21 SCRA 279 (1967)

 II. Añ onuevo v. CA, Gr. No. 130003,
III. Picart vs Smith, G.R. No. L-12219
IV. BPI vs Sps Quiaoit, G.R. No. 199562 (2019)
V. Kane vs Roggenkamp, G.R. No. 214326 (2020)
VI. Ambassador Hotel vs SSS, G.R. No. 194137(2017)
VII. Casumpang vs. Cornejo, G.R. No. 171127(2015) 
VIII. Citystate Savings Bank vs. Tobias, G.R. No.
227990(2018) 
IX. Fil-Estate Properties vs Sps Ronquillo, G.R. No.
185798( 2014)
X. Yon Mitori vs Union Bank, G.R. No. 225538, (2020) 

I. Republic vs. Luzon Stevedoring, 21 SCRA 279 (1967)

FACTS:
Barge owned by Luzon Stevedoring Corporation(defendant, LSC for brevity) was being
towed down the Pasig river by tugboats belonging to the same corporation.`
The barge rammed against one of the wooden piles of the Nagtahan Bailey Bridge,
smashing the posts and causing the bright to list. The river, at that time, was swollen and
the current swift, on account of the heavy downpour of Manila and the surrounding
provinces.
Republic of the Philippines (PH) sued LSC for actual and consequential damages caused by
its employees.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the collision of LSC’s barge with the supports or piers of the Nagtahan
bridge was in law caused by fortuitous event or force majeure.
RULING:
No. Considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an immovable and stationary object and
uncontrovertibly provided with adequate openings for the passage of water craft,
including barges like of NSC’s, it is undeniable that the unusual event that the barge,
exclusively controlled by appellant, rammed the bridge supports raises a presumption
of negligence on the part of appellant or its employees manning the barge or the tugs
that towed it. For in the ordinary course of events, such a thing does not happen if
proper case is used. Res ipsa loquitur.
NLS stresses the precautions (due diligence) taken by it: (1) that it assigned two of its
most powerful tugboats to tow down river its barge, and (2) that it assigned to the task
the more competent and experienced among its patrons, (3) had the towlines, engines
and equipment double-checked and inspected; (4) that it instructed its patrons to take
extra precautions. These very precautions, completely destroy the NLS’defense.
Caso fortuito or force majeure by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or
avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were
inevitable.” It is, therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or
anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to
avoid. The more difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the
same. The very measures adopted by NSC prove that the possibility of danger was not
only foreseeable, but actually foreseen, and was not caso fortuito.
LSC, knowing and appreciating the perils posed by the swollen steam and its swift
current, voluntarily entered into a situation involving obvious danger; it therefore
assured the risk, and cannot shed responsibility merely because the precautions it
adopted turned out to be insufficient.
 II. Añonuevo v. CA, Gr. No. 130003
FACTS:
Villagracia was traveling along Boni Ave. on his bicycle, while Añ onuevo, traversing the
opposite lane was driving a Lancer car owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer
of Añ onuevo’s brother. Añ onuevo was in the course of making a left turn towards
Libertad Street when the collision occurred.
Villagracia sustained serious injuries and had to undergo four operations. Villagracia
instituted an action for damages against P&G Phils., Inc. and Añ onuevo before the RTC.
He had also filed a criminal complaint against Añ onuevo before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Mandaluyong, but the latter was subsequently acquitted of the criminal charge.
Añ onuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he failed to register
his bicycle or install safety gadgets. He posits that Article 2185 of the Civil Code applies
by analogy. Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a
person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was
violating any traffic regulation.
ISSUES:
A. Whether or not Art. 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply to non-motorized
vehicles, making Villagracia presumptively negligent.
B. Whether or not Villagracia was negligent for failure to comply with traffic
regulations.
C. Whether or not Villagracia is guilty of contributory negligence
RULING
A. No. Application of Article 2185

Aonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he failed to

register his bicycle or install safety gadgets thereon. He posits that Article 2185 of
the New Civil Code applies by analogy. The provision reads:
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person
driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was
violating any traffic regulation.
Aonuevo hypothesizes that Article 2185 should apply by analogy to all types of
vehicles. He points out that modern-day travel is more complex now than when the
Code was enacted, the number and types of vehicles now in use far more numerous
than as of then. He even suggests that at the time of the enactment of the Code, the
legislators must have seen that only motor vehicles were of such public concern that
they had to be specifically mentioned, yet today, the interaction of vehicles of all
 types and nature has inescapably become matter of public concern so as to expand
the application of the law to be more responsive to the times.
At the time Article 2185 was formulated, there existed a whole array of non-
motorized vehicles ranging from humanpowered contraptions on wheels such as
bicycles, scooters, and animal-drawn carts such as calesas and carromata. These
modes of transport were even more prevalent on the roads of the 1940s and 1950s
than they are today, yet the framers of the New Civil Code chose then to exclude
these alternative modes from the scope of Article 2185 with the use of the term
motorized vehicles. If Aonuevo seriously contends that the application of Article
2185 be expanded due to the greater interaction today of all types of vehicles, such
argument contradicts historical experience. The ratio of motorized vehicles as to
non-motorized vehicles, as it stood in 1950, was significantly lower than as it stands
today. This will be certainly affirmed by statistical data, assuming such has been
compiled, much less confirmed by persons over sixty. Aonuevos characterization of
a vibrant intra-road dynamic between motorized and non-motorized vehicles is
more apropos to the past than to the present.
There is pertinent basis for segregating between motorized and non-motorized
vehicles. A motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion. Is
capable of greater speeds and acceleration than non-motorized vehicles. At the sam
etime, motorized vehicles are more capable in inflicting greater injury or damage in
the event of an accident or collision. This is due to a combination of factors peculiar
to themotor vehicle, such as the greater speed, its relative greater bulk of mass, and
greater combustibility due to the use of fuel.
B. No. Negligience on the part of Villagracia

The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by the personal

judgment of the actor in a given situation, but rather, it is the law which determines
what would be reckless or negligent. Añ onuevo asserts that Villagracia was
negligent as the latter had transgressed traffic regulations. However, Añ onuevo was
speeding as hemade the left turn, and by his own admission, he had seen Villagracia
at a good distance of ten (10) meters. Had he been decelerating, as he should, as he
made the turn, Aonuevo would have had ample opportunity to avoid hitting
Villagracia, such negligent act was the proximate cause of the accident. Even
assuming that Añ onuevo had failed to see Villagracia because the bicycle was not
equipped with headlights, such lapse on the cyclist’s part would not have acquitted
the driver of his duty to slow down as he proceeded to make the left turn.

C. No. Contributory Negligence

 To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he
performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of
an impending danger to health and body.[60] To prove contributory negligence, it is
still necessary to establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the
negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is
contributory only when it contributes proximately to the injury, and not simply a
condition for its occurrence.[61] As between Añ onuevo and Villagracia, the lower
courts adjudged Añ onuevo assolely responsible for the accident. The petition does
not demonstrate why this finding should be reversed. It is hard to imagine that the
same result would not have occurred even if Villagracia’s bicycle had been equipped
with safety equipment

III. Picart vs Smith, G.R. No. L-12219

FACTS:
On 12 December 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union, Amado Picart
was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Frank
Smith Jr. approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of
about 10 or 12 miles per hour. As Smith neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and
blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had
taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man
on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.
Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being
perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the
pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the
left. As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being the
proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing Smith assumed that the horseman
would move to the other side. The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider
had made no sign for the automobile to stop.
Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, Smith, instead of veering to the right while
yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the
horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no
possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, Smith quickly turned his car
sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it was
then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the
animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head
toward the railing. In so doing, it was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange
of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with
some violence. As a result of its injuries the horse died. Picart received contusions
 which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several
days.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Smith is guilty of negligence.
RULING:
Yes. Smith, in maneuvering his car in the manner described, was guilty of negligence such
as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done. In the nature of things the
control of the situation had passed entirely to Smith, and it was his duty either to bring his
car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take
the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision.
Instead of doing this, Smith ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse.
When Smith exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was negligent in the eye of the
law. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person
would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
What would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be
always determined in the light of human experience and in view of thefacts involved in the
particular case. Abstract speculation cannot be of much value; as reasonable men govern
their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them, and hence
they can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or
warn of danger.
Reasonable foresight of harm is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. In
fine, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this:
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would
have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his
foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences.

IV. BPI vs Sps Quiaoit, G.R. No. 199562 (2019)

FACTS:
Sps. Quiaoit filed a complaint against BPI alleging that encashed dollar bills by Lambayong
which were placed in a large Manila envelope were counterfeit. That the bank had been
negligent in not listing down the serial numbers of the dollar bill and failure to inform
Lambayong about the Chapa;
ISSUE:
Whether or not BPI failed to exercise due diligence in the transaction;
RULING:
Yes, the High Court held that BPI failed to exercise the highest diligence that is not only
expected but required of a banking institution. It is well-settled that the diligence required
of banks is more than that of a good father of a family. Banks are required to exercise the
highest degree of difference n its banking transaction. In releasing the dollar bills without
listing down their serial numbers, BPI failed to exercise the highest degree of care and
diligence required of it. Likewise, BPI had the last clear chance to prove that al the dollar
bill it issued to the spouses Quiaoit were genuine and that the counterfeit bills did not come
from it if only it listed down the serial numbers of the bills.

V. Kane vs Roggenkamp, G.R. No. 214326 (2020)

FACTS:
On March 30, 2006, an Information for violation of Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-
Violence Against Women and Children Act of 2004 was filed against Alastair John, with
Patricia as the private complainant. The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-0413, was
then raffled to Branch 260 of the Regional Trial Court of Paranaque City.
According to Patricia, she and Alastair John attended a party hosted by her son, Ashley
Richard Cayzer (Ashley Richard) on November 30, 2004. The next day, December 1, 2004,
after they had just arrived at their residence at about 1:00 a.m., Patricia confronted Alastair
John for allegedly looking at the underwear of other female guests at the party. Ignoring
Patricia, Alastair John went on to lie down on the bed. Patricia then sat on a nearby chair.
Alastair John, angered by Patricia's remarks, allegedly approached Patricia, lifted her off
the chair, and dropped her on the floor. Patricia further claimed that Alastair John punched
her in the head, dragged her by the hair to the bed, and pushed her head against the pillow.
Patricia fought back and, when she had the chance, ran to the bathroom and locked herself
inside.
On February 4, 2005, Patricia finally reported the incidents to the police. She explained
that, prior to the December 1, 2004 incident, there were already prior incidents of abuse
committed against her by Alastair John. After preliminary investigation, probable cause for
violation of Republic Act 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act
of 2004 was found against Alastair John.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 260, Paranaque City acquitted Alastair John on
the ground of reasonable doubt.
Thereafter, Patricia filed a Complaint for Damages based on Article 33 of the Civil Code
before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, praying for actual, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Patricia argued that the right of action provided in
Article 33 in cases of physical injuries is entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action earlier commenced against Alastair John.
Opposing the civil action, Alastair John filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of  res
judicata and improper venue. Alastair John claimed that the dismissal of the criminal case
barred the filing of the civil case, because the cases allegedly involved identical causes of
action. He emphasized that the cases were both based on his alleged physical abuse of
Patricia, a matter already found to be not "in accord with human experience." With respect
to the venue, Alastair John argued that it was improperly laid. The action for damages was a
personal action, yet none of the parties resided in Mandaluyong City where the civil action
was filed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Alastair John Kane may still be held civilly liable because his
acquittal was based on reasonable doubt
RULING:
Yes. ARTICLE 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Article 33 is explicit that in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries., the civil action
is "entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action" and shall "proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution." Accordingly, Article 33 "contemplates a civil
action for the recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to the purely criminal aspect
of the case." Even the quantum of proof required—preponderance of evidence, as opposed
to the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases—is different, confirming that the
civil action under Article 33 is independent of the criminal action.
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution
absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.  In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist. 
It is essential to indicate whether the act or omission from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist. Without such declaration, it must be presumed that the acquittal was
due to reasonable doubt, and the accused is civilly liable ex delicto. Thus, the general rule
shall apply: every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.
Having been acquitted due to reasonable doubt, petitioner is not exempt from civil liability.
This is true even if his guilt was not satisfactorily established.
 VI. Ambassador Hotel vs SSS, G.R. No. 194137(2017)
FACTS:
SSS filed a complaint with the City Prosecutor's Office of Quezon City against Ambassador
Hotel and its officers for non-remittance of SSS contributions and penalty liabilities for the
period from June 1999 to March 2001.  Yoland Chan (President of the Hotel) and other
officers were charged for the violation of Section 22(a), in relation to Section 22(d) and
Section 28(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1161, as amended by R.A. No. 8282. Only Yolanda
was arrested. Upon arraignment, she pleaded not guilty.
RTC held that Yolanda could not be held criminally liable for the non-payment of SSS
contributions because she was not performing the duties of the hotel's president from June
1999 to March 2001. The RTC, however, ruled that the acquittal of Yolanda did not absolve
Ambassador Hotel from its civil liabilities.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ambassador Hotel should pay its civil liabilities (including non-remittance
of SSS contributions) even their president (Yolanda) acquitted from the said criminal case.
RULING:
Yes. The Social Security System is a government agency imbued with a salutary purpose to
carry out the policy of the State to establish, develop, promote and perfect a sound and
viable tax-exempt social security system suitable to the needs of the people throughout the
Philippines which shall promote social justice and provide meaningful protection to
members and their beneficiaries against the hazards of disability, sickness, maternity, old-
age, death and other contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial burden.
Under Section 8(c) of R.A. No. 8282, an employer is defined as "any person, natural or
juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries on in the Philippines any trade, business,
industry, undertaking, or activity of any kind and uses the services of another person who
is under his orders as regards the employment, except the Government and any of its
political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, including corporations owned or
controlled by the Government." Ambassador Hotel, as a juridical entity, is still bound by the
provisions of R.A. No. 8282. Section 22 (a) thereof states:
Remittance of Contributions. (a) The contributions imposed in the preceding section shall
be remitted to the SSS within the first ten (10) days of each calendar month following the
month for which they are applicable or within such time as the Commission may prescribe.
Every employer required to deduct and to remit such contributions shall be liable for their
payment and if any contribution is not paid to the SSS as herein prescribed, he shall pay
besides the contribution a penalty thereon of three percent (3%) per month from the date
the contribution falls due until paid. If deemed expedient and advisable by the Commission,
the collection and remittance of contributions shall be made quarterly or semiannually in
advance, the contributions payable by the employees to be advanced by their respective
employers: Provided, That upon separation of an employee, any contribution so paid in
advance but not due shall be credited or refunded to his employer.

VII. Casumpang vs. Cornejo, G.R. No. 171127(2015)

FACTS:
Edmer Cortejo (Edmer) was brought to the emergency room of San Juan de Dios Hospital
(SJDH) by his mother, Mrs. Jesusa Cortejo (Jesusa) due to difficulty in breathing, chest
pains, stomach pain, and fever. Dr. Ramoncito Livelo (Livelo), a family doctor, initially
attended to Edmer and after a few tests had the initial impression of Bronchopneumonia.
Dr. Livelo then gave Edmer some antibiotics to lessen his fever and loosen his phlegm.
Jesusa did not know anyone from SJDH. Jesusa used her fortune card and was referred to a
Fortune Care Coordinator, who was then absent.
She got assigned to Dr. Noel Casumpang (Casumpang) who appeared to be an employee of
the hospital. Dr. Casumpang examined Edmer for the first time and merely used a
stethoscope and determined that it was Bronchopneumonia. Not satisfied, she stated that
Edmer had high fever, no colds or cough; Dr. Casumpang that it was normal for
Bronchopneumonia. The following day early morning, Edmer had now a fever, throat
irritation and even stomach and chest pains. Despite being known to such information, Dr.
Casumpang mere inquired if Edmer had asthma, reassured that the illness was
Bronchopneumonia. Later in the morning, Edmer began vomiting phlegm with blood
streak. Nelson Cortejo (Nelson), Edmers father, thus called for a doctor and Dr. Ruby
Miranda-Sanga (Sanga) came to their call. Dr. Sanga examined Edmer and found that he had
a low grade non continuing fever, rashes that were not typical of dengue fever. Dr. Rubi had
told Dr. Casumpang of the symptoms.
She failed to positively diagnose the patient immediately because the blood streak was
washed by the Nelson, thus she ordered the next time it occurred Nelson should preserve
the same. Upon acquiring a sample she positively determined that it was Dengue
Hemorrahgic Fever. Dr. Casumpang advised that Edmer be bought to the ICU, to which the
spouses Cortejo agreed to but the ICU was full, thus they opted to go to Makati Medical
Center. Upon arriving it was declared that it was already at stage IV and thus irreversible.
Edmer died.
Nelson instituted an action for damages against Dr. Casumpang, Dr. Sanga, SJDH before the
RTC of Makati City for the negligent and erroneous diagnosis of his doctors. RTC ruled in
favor of Nelson and deemed Drs. Casumpang and Sanga liable since Dengue was
foreseeable based on the medical record of Edmer, and that their testimonies were self-
serving providing no other evidence. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto, hence
this petition.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether Drs. Casumpang and Sanga committed inexcusable lack of precaution in
diagnosing and in treating the patient
2.) Whether SJDH is solidarily liable with the doctors
RULING:
1.) Only Dr. Casumapang was negligent;

DR. CASUMPANG WAS NEGLIGENT IN DIAGNOSIS: It will be recalled that during Dr.
Casumpang's first and second visits to Edmer, he already had knowledge of Edmer's
laboratory test result (CBC), medical history, and symptoms (i.e., fever, rashes,
rapid breathing, chest and stomach pain, throat irritation, difficulty in breathing,
and traces of blood in the sputum). However, these information did not lead Dr.
Casumpang to the possibility that Edmer could be suffering from either dengue
fever, or dengue hemorrhagic fever, as he clung to his diagnosis of broncho
pneumonia. This means that given the symptoms exhibited, Dr. Casumpang already
ruled out the possibility of other diseases like dengue.

In other words, it was lost on Dr. Casumpang that the characteristic symptoms of
dengue (as Dr. Jaudian testified) are: patient's rapid breathing; chest and stomach
pain; fever; and the presence of blood in his saliva. He was selective in appreciating
the symptoms.
2. YES, under the doctrine of vicarious liability (apparent authority).
We hold that, under the doctrine of apparent authority, a hospital can be held
vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a physician providing care at the hospital,
regardless of whether the physician is an independent contractor, unless the patient
knows, or should have known, that the physician is an independent contractor.
The doctrine of apparent authority, a plaintiff must show that:
(1) the hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to
conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent
of the hospital;
(2) where the acts of the agent create the appearance of authority, the plaintiff must
also prove that the hospital had knowledge of and acquiesced in them; and
(3) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent,
consistent with ordinary care and prudence.
The first factor focuses on the hospital’s manifestations and is sometimes described as
an inquiry whether the hospital acted in a manner which would lead a reasonable
person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an
employee or agent of the hospital. In this regard, the hospital need not make express
representations to the patient that the treating physician is an employee of the hospital;
rather a representation may be general and implied.
The second factor focuses on the patient's reliance. It is sometimes characterized as an
inquiry on whether the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its
agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.

VIII. Citystate Savings Bank vs. Tobias, G.R. No.227990(2018)

FACTS:
Rolando Robles was the branch manager of the Baliuag, Bulacan branch of Citystate
Savings Bank (CSB). Robles was introduced to Teresita Tobias, a meat vendor at the
Baliuag Public Market, by the latter’s youngest son. Robles was able to persuade Tobias
to open an account with CSB and to place her money in some high interest rate
mechanism. Thereafter, he would frequent Tobias’ stall at the public market to deliver
the interest earned by her deposit accounts which amounted to Php 2,000.
Tobias would then turnover the passbook to Robles for updating. The passbook was
returned the following day with typewritten entries, but without the corresponding
counter signatures. Robles later offered Tobias to sign-up in CSB’s back-to-back scheme
which is supposedly offered only to the bank’s most valued clients. Under this scheme,
the depositors authorize the bank to use their bank deposits and invest the same in
different business ventures that yield high interest. Robles assured Tobias that the
interest she previously earned would be doubled, so the latter signed the pertinent
documents without readings its contents and invested a total of Php 1,800,000. When
Tobias became sickly, she included her daughter and Shellidie Valdez as codepositor in
her accounts with CSB. Unfortunately, Robles failed to remit to Tobias and Valdez the
interest as scheduled. They tried to reach Robles, but he cannot be found anymore.
The siblings of Robles disclosed to them that Robles withdrew the money and
appropriated the money for his personal use. Robles promised to return the money by
installments, but he failed to comply with his promise. CSB also refused to make
arrangements for the return of Tobias’ money despite several demands. A complaint for
sum of money was filed against Robles and CSB alleging that Robles committed fraud in
the performance of duties as branch manager when he lured Tobias in signing several
pieces of blank documents under the assurance, as bank manager of CSB, that
everything was in order.
 The RTC ordered Robles to pay Tobias the sum of money and absolved the bank of any
liability. However, the CA reversed the decision of the lower court and ruled that CSB
and Robles are jointly and severally liable to pay Tobias the sum of money set forth. CSB
denied its liability by arguing that Robles acted in his personal capacity in dealing with
Tobias, who agreed with full knowledge and consent to the back-to-back loans and it
was not privy to the transactions between them. CSB also alleged that the doctrine of
apparent authority is not applicable in this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CSB can be held liable for the transactions entered into by Robles, as its
bank manager, with Tobias, as depositor?
RULING:
YES, CSB is solidarily liable to Tobias and Valdez for the damages caused by the acts of
Robles as its employer.
The bank, in its capacity as principal, may be liable under the doctrine of apparent
authority wherein its liability is solidary with that of his employee. Under the said
doctrine, it imposes liability because of the actions of a principal or an employer in
somehow misleading the public into believing that the relationship or the authority
exists.
The liability of a bank to 3 rd persons for acts done by its agents or employees is limited
to the consequences of the latter’s acts which it has ratified, or those that resulted in the
performance of acts within the scope of actual or apparent authority it has vested. In
this case, the proximate cause of the loss of Tobias is the misappropriation of Robles,
but CSB is still liable under Art. 1911 of the NCC. Art. 1911 Even when the agent has
exceeded his authority, the principal is solidarily liable with the agent if the former
allowed the latter to act as though he had full powers. CSB is estopped in denying
Robles’ authority, because, as the branch manager, he is recognized within his field as to
third persons as the general agent and is in general charge of the corporation, with
apparent authority commensurate with the ordinary business entrusted him and the
usual course and conduct thereof.
Moreover, the bank admitted the authority of its branch manager to transact outside of
the bank premises. The act of honoring the accounts of Tobias so opened is an
acknowledgement by CSB of the authority of Robles.

IX. Fil-Estate Properties vs Sps Ronquillo, G.R. No. 185798

(2014)
FACTS:
Petitioner Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. is the owner and developer of the Central Park Place
Tower while co-petitioner Fil-Estate Network, Inc. is its authorized marketing agent.
Respondent Spouses Conrado and Maria Victoria Ronquillo purchased from petitioners an
82-square meter condominium unit for a pre-selling contract price of P5,174,000.00. On 29
August 1997, respondents executed and signed a Reservation Application Agreement
wherein they deposited P200,000.00 as reservation fee. As agreed upon, respondents paid
the full downpayment of P1,552,200.00 and had been paying the P63,363.33 monthly
amortizations until September 1998.
Upon learning that construction works had stopped, respondents likewise stopped paying
their monthly amortization. Claiming to have paid a total of P2,198,949.96 to petitioners,
respondents through two (2) successive letters, demanded a full refund of their payment
with interest. When their demands went unheeded, respondents were constrained to file a
Complaint for Refund and Damages before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB). Respondents prayed for reimbursement/refund of
P2,198,949.96 representing the total amortization payments, P200,000.00 as and by way of
moral damages, attorney’s fees and other litigation expenses.
On 13 June 2002, the HLURB in favor of herein respondents. The Arbiter considered
petitioners’ failure to develop the condominium project as a substantial breach of their
obligation which entitles respondents to seek for rescission with payment of damages.
The Arbiter also stated that mere economic hardship is not an excuse for contractual and
legal delay.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Asian financial crisis constitute a fortuitous event which would
justify delay by petitioners in the performance of their contractual obligation;
2. Assuming that petitioners are liable, whether or not 12% interest was correctly
imposed on the judgment award
HELD:
1. NO. The Supreme Court held that the Asian financial crisis is not a fortuitous event
that would excuse petitioners from performing their contractual obligation.
The Court ruled that “we cannot generalize that the Asian financial crisis in 1997 was
unforeseeable and beyond the control of a business corporation. It is unfortunate that
petitioner apparently met with considerable difficulty e.g. increase cost of materials and
labor, even before the scheduled commencement of its real estate project as early as
1995. However, a real estate enterprise engaged in the pre-selling of condominium
units is concededly a master in projections on commodities and currency movements
and business risks. The fluctuating movement of the Philippine peso in the foreign
exchange market is an everyday occurrence, and fluctuations in currency exchange
rates happen everyday, thus, not an instance of caso fortuito.”
 2. NO. The Court held that 6% is the proper legal interest rate.
The resulting modification of the award of legal interest is, also, in line with our recent
ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames, embodying the amendment introduced by the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board in BSP-MB Circular No. 799 which pegged the
interest rate at 6% regardless of the source of obligation.

X. Yon Mitori vs Union Bank, G.R. No. 225538, (2020)

FACTS:
The Petitioner deposited in its current account in Union Bank P420,000.00 through Bank of
the Philippine Islands (BPI) Check. The said check was drawn against the account of Angli
Lumber, one of Petitioner's alleged clients.
The BPI Check was entered in the Petitioner's bank record. The Petitioner withdrew from
the said account the amount of P480,000.00. The BPI Check was returned to Union Bank as
the account against which it was drawn had been closed. It was then that Union Bank
discovered that the Petitioner's account had been mistakenly credited. Thus, the branch
manager of Union immediately called the Petitioner to recover the funds mistakenly
released. However, the Petitioner refused to return the funds, claiming that the BPI Check
proceeded from a valid transaction between Angli Lumber and Yon Mitori.
Thereafter Union Bank sent a letter to the Petitioner demanding reimbursement of the
amount of P420,000.00, because the funds against said deposit were inadvertently allowed
due to a technical error on the system before the actual return of your check deposit which
was not yet clear on the withdrawal date, it appearing that BPI dishonored the BPI Check
for being drawn against a closed account. However, the Petitioner refused to return the
said amount. Union Bank then debited the available balance reflected in the Petitioner's
account amounting to P34,700.60 and, after that, instituted a Complaint for Sum of Money
before the RTC to recover the remaining balance amounting P385,299.40 plus
consequential damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the gross negligence of the claimant will bar him to recover the amount
erroneously given to the other.
RULING:
No. The Petition is denied.
Article 22 of the New Civil Code states that every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of
something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to
him.
The Petitioner is bound to return the proceeds of the dishonored BPI Check based on the
principle of unjust enrichment. In this case, the Petitioner deposited the BPI Check in his
account with Union Bank for collection. Clearly, Union Bank stands as the collecting bank in
this case. By receiving the BPI Check from the Petitioner, Union Bank obliged itself, as
collecting bank, to credit the Petitioner's account only after BPI, as drawee, shall have paid
the amount of the said check or after the check is cleared for deposit.
Union Bank was under no obligation to effect payment in favor of the
Petitioner precisely because the BPI Check which the Petitioner deposited for collection
had been dishonored. Allowing the Petitioner to retain the proceeds of the dishonored BPI
Check despite not being entitled thereto would permit unjust enrichment at Union Bank's
expense.
There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another
or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles
of justice, equity, and good conscience. The following requisites must concur for the
principle to apply: (i) a person is unjustly benefited, and (ii) such benefit is derived at the
expense of or with damages to another.
The requisites for the application of the principle of unjust enrichment are present in this
case. Here, it was unequivocally established that the Petitioner withdrew and utilized the
proceeds of the BPI Check fully knowing that he was not entitled thereto.
As stated, Union Bank's obligation to credit the Petitioner's account is contingent upon
actual receipt of the value of the BPI Check or notice of its clearance. Due to the dishonor of
the BPI Check, Union Bank's obligation to credit the Petitioner's account with its proceeds
did not attach. Conversely, the Petitioner's right to receive the proceeds of the said check
did not arise. Nevertheless, the Petitioner withdrew the proceeds of the BPI Check with full
and established knowledge that the account against which it was drawn had been closed.
The Petitioner, the depositor herein, was unjustly benefited because of the erroneous
credit made in his favor. Such benefit, in turn, was derived at the expense of Union Bank as
the collecting bank.
Thus, based on the principle of unjust enrichment, the Petitioner is bound to return the
proceeds of the BPI Check, which he had no right to receive.