Uvalde Survivor Lawsuit
Uvalde Survivor Lawsuit
Uvalde Survivor Lawsuit
I.
INTRODUCTION
1. M.Z. woke up on May 24, 2022 excited for the day to come—it was awards day at
Robb Elementary and she knew that she would receive several awards. Her father, Ruben Zamora,
was going to take her to school that day. She planned to leave school after the awards ceremony
to continue to spend time with him rather than stay at school. Ruben’s work schedule required him
to work five days in a row, and then he had the next five days in a row off of work, and M.Z. loved
spending time with him working on projects around the house when he was on his off-week at
home. Ruben treated M.Z. to a special breakfast on her way to school that day—a Starbucks
Vanilla Bean Frappuccino and two bacon, egg, and gouda breakfast sandwiches. Later that
morning, both M.Z.’s parents, Ruben and Christina, looked on with pride as she received three
awards—for Skills Mastered in Math, for participating in the Robotics Program, and for
Excellence in the AB Honor Roll. M.Z. was very proud and excited to have her parents present at
the awards ceremony. M.Z. had so much fun at awards day with her friends that instead of leaving
afterwards to spend time with Ruben as planned, she changed her mind and decided to stay at
school. She knew she only had a few days left to spend with her friends before the summer and
Ruben Zamora and M.Z. proudly showing off M.Z.’s award certificates.
2. On the morning of May 24, 2022, K.T.’s dad had to leave early for work in the oil
fields, and her mom was away in Oklahoma, so K.T.’s grandmother (who was staying with the
family) got K.T. ready for school. K.T. was looking forward to the awards ceremony at the school
and the plans that her class had to blow bubbles and fly paper airplane outside. K.T. was new in
town, but she had made a good friend in her fourth-grade class, and she was worried that her friend
wouldn’t have her own bubbles, so K.T.’s grandmother stopped at the store on the way to school
so they could buy her friend extra bubbles. The awards ceremony was exciting, and K.T. was
happy and proud to be given an “Outstanding Citizen” award, even though she was so new to her
class.
3. On May 24, 2022, at around 11:30 a.m., Salvador Ramos walked into Robb
Elementary in Uvalde, Texas, armed with a Daniel Defense DDM4 V7 rifle and carrying hundreds
of rounds of ammunition. He entered a set of connected classrooms (Rooms 111 and 112) where
he murdered 19 children and two teachers and wounded at least 17 other children.
4. Ramos remained in the connected classrooms for a total of 77 minutes from the
beginning of his murderous rampage to the end, before the police entered. For more than an hour,
hundreds of peace officers from dozens of agencies stood by in the hallway intentionally
barricading the kids in the classrooms with the shooter as the children in the classroom bled, died,
5. M.Z. and K.T. were in classroom 112. M.Z. was shot repeatedly, and very nearly
died. She had to be airlifted to San Antonio. Her parents spent two months sleeping in her hospital
room. She has undergone over sixty surgeries, and she still faces a long road to recovery. K.T. was
hit by shrapnel. K.T. knew that she needed to pretend to be dead to survive, so she lay in blood
with her eyes open because she saw that her dead and dying classmates had their eyes open. Both
K.T. and M.Z. live with fear, anxiety, and distress. They, and all of Uvalde, will never be the same.
6. Outside of the school, parents and relatives of students amassed as word spread of
an active shooter at Robb Elementary School. Uncertain of their loved one’s fate, many in the
crowd—including M.Z.’s and K.T.’s families—begged for help, pleaded for their children, and
some even tried to enter the school themselves to try to rescue their children, only to be restrained,
7. Reports soon spread of children whose bodies had to be identified by their clothing
because of the destructive nature of the high-power rifle that was used in the shooting. Ramos was
able to carry out these heinous actions because he was armed with a destructive weapon modeled
8. So how did Salvador Ramos, who had never previously used a firearm, come to
buy an assault rifle manufactured by Daniel Defense, a company that most Americans had not
heard of before the Uvalde shooting? Through a foreseeable and entirely preventable chain of
9. Daniel Defense marketed its products by using militaristic imagery to suggest that
civilian consumers could (and should) use their weapons the way service members are sometimes
asked to: to engage in offensive combat missions directed at other humans. They furthered this
message by placing their products in Call of Duty, and then using social media like Instagram to
amplify their product placement, even suggesting that consumers reenact the video games in real
life with their products in hand. Salvador Ramos was an ideal customer for Daniel Defense: young,
isolated, troubled, violent, and open to the message that guns can and should be used for illegal
purposes. Thus, it was no accident that a young man with a history of violence who associated the
military with killing people, and was fascinated with Call of Duty purchased a Daniel Defense AR-
10. But Daniel Defense is not the only party that played a role in facilitating—or failing
11. The gun store that delivered the Daniel Defense assault rifle to Ramos—Oasis
Outback—bears legal responsibility as well. It was apparent to multiple individuals who saw
Ramos in Oasis Outback that he was not fit to purchase firearms. One customer who saw Ramos
at the store remarked that Ramos looked like a school shooter. The owner of Oasis Outback
questioned this quiet loner, dressed in all black, on how he could afford the guns and ammunition
he was purchasing. But knowing there were these reasons to be concerned, including that Ramos
was in a big hurry to acquire thousands of dollars of deadly weaponry within days of turning 18,
Oasis Outback nevertheless sold and transferred to him enough guns, accessories, and ammunition
to fight off a small army¾or, as it tragically turned out, slaughter 19 children and two teachers.
12. As a federal firearms licensee, Oasis Outback had a legal duty to not sell guns to
prospective purchasers who it knew, or reasonably should have known, planned to use them to
harm others. Given the many obvious red flags, it was a reckless dereliction of that duty for Oasis
13. Daniel Defense and Oasis Outback set the stage for the tragedy on May 24, 2022,
but the horror was compounded exponentially by the unconscionable failures of the responding
law enforcement officers to follow active shooter protocols that required them to immediately
engage the gunman without waiting for orders or backup. Even though the first law enforcement
responders entered the school building three minutes after Ramos, local, state, and federal officers
waited 74 additional minutes before entering the classroom and killing Ramos. Law enforcement
has admitted this was “the wrong decision.” Their decision to disregard the safety and well-being
of the children and adults in the school—without doubt one of the most tragic failures of law
enforcement in U.S. history—meant that Ramos continued killing, and M.Z., K.T., and their
classmates lay suffering for an unconscionably long period of time, without access to emergency
medical services and rescue (from another law enforcement agency or from private actors) that
might have saved their lives and without the possibility of being comforted by their families, who
were so close. These delays cost children their lives, prevented access to medical intervention and
services, made their physical injuries worse, and compounded their suffering.
14. Jamie Torres was in Oklahoma when she heard there had been a shooting at Robb.
She immediately started driving to Uvalde, but as she panicked, she kept getting lost. Jamie’s drive
from Oklahoma was the longest day of her life. As she drove the nine seemingly endless hours to
Uvalde, she was able to talk to K.T.’s dad, who was in touch with his sister who was at the hospital
with K.T. When Jamie’s sister-in-law arrived at the hospital, she found K.T. covered from head to
toe in her classmates’ blood, and with blood and brain matter in her hair. K.T. was hit by shrapnel
and transported to the hospital after the shooting. K.T. exhibited the courage that so many law
enforcement officers lacked when she risked her own life to call 911 in a bid to stop the shooter.
Despite offering to open the door, she was instructed to continue laying on the ground in wait.
K.T. bears the scars of the shrapnel that hit her, but she also remains psychologically scarred by
what she saw as she lay on the ground of classroom 112 for 77 minutes covered in the blood of
her classmates and desperately hoping that she would not be shot.
15. M.Z. was shot in her chest, arm, and hand. It is a miracle that she did not die as she
lay in classroom 112, bleeding, in pain, wondering if help would ever reach her classroom.
Seventy-seven minutes of suffering, blood loss, and despair. Her parents searched for her at the
school, at the hospital, and at the civic center in increasing terror that their daughter was among
the wounded or the dead. They only later learned that, after having been taken from the school in
the back of a pickup truck, then transferred to an ambulance, and then taken to Uvalde Memorial
Hospital, M.Z. had been belatedly put on a helicopter to the level 1 trauma hospital in San Antonio.
M.Z. lived, but she has undergone upwards of sixty surgeries and has many more months of
rehabilitative therapy and surgeries as she recovers. Like K.T., M.Z. was traumatized by what she
witnessed inside classroom 112 as law enforcement officers kept her from rescue and life-saving
II.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
16. This case is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under state law. Jurisdiction is
conferred on this Court based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1343. This Court also has supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims and over Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1367 because
17. Venue is proper within the Western District of Texas, Austin Division, under 28
U.S.C. § 139(b)(1) and (2) because at least one Defendant resides within this district, Defendants
regularly conduct business in this district, and the events and omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’
III.
PARTIES
A. Plaintiffs
18. Plaintiff Christina Zamora is a resident of the State of Texas, and during the time
of the events giving rise to the lawsuit, resided in Uvalde, Texas. Christina Zamora is the biological
mother of M.Z., one of the children wounded in the Uvalde school massacre, and sues individually
19. Plaintiff Ruben Zamora is a resident of the State of Texas, and during the time of
the events giving rise to the lawsuit, resided in Uvalde, Texas. Ruben Zamora is the biological
father of M.Z., one of the children wounded in the Uvalde school massacre, and sues individually
20. Minor Plaintiff M.Z. is a resident of the State of Texas, and during the time of the
events giving rise to the lawsuit, resided in Uvalde, Texas. M.Z. was wounded in the Uvalde school
massacre and is represented in this lawsuit by next friends Christina Zamora and Ruben Zamora.
21. Plaintiff Jamie Torres is a resident of the State of Texas, and during the time of the
events giving rise to the lawsuit, resided in Uvalde, Texas. Jamie Torres is the biological mother
of K.T, one of the children wounded in the Uvalde school massacre, and sues individually and as
22. Minor Plaintiff K.T. is a resident of the State of Texas, and during the time of the
events giving rise to the lawsuit, resided in Uvalde, Texas. K.T. was wounded in the Uvalde school
B. Defendants
23. Defendant Daniel Defense, LLC, is a Georgia limited liability company that
manufactured and marketed the firearm used to wound M.Z. and K.T. Its principal place of
business is 101 Warfighter Way, Black Creek, Georgia 31308, where it may be served with process
by its registered agent and Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”), Marvin C. Daniel. Daniel Defense,
LLC also does business under the name Daniel Defense, Inc., which has an identical control
number registered with the Georgia Secretary of State. Collectively, Daniel Defense, LLC and
24. Defendant Oasis Outback, LLC (“Oasis Outback”), is a Texas limited liability
company that transferred to Salvador Ramos the weapon used to wound M.Z. and K.T. It also sold
Ramos another AR-15-style weapon and hundreds of rounds of ammunition. Its principal place of
business is 2900 East Main Street, Uvalde, Texas 78801, and it may be served with process by
serving its registered agent and CEO, William R. Klein, at 236 East Nopal Street, Uvalde, Texas
78801.
25. Defendant City of Uvalde is a municipality organized under the laws of the State
of Texas. The Uvalde Police Department (“UPD”) is an agency of the City of Uvalde. At all
relevant times, the City of Uvalde was charged by law with the administration and operation of
the UPD, including employment, control, supervision, discipline, training and practices of the
UPD’s personnel and employees, and with the formulation of its policies, practices and customs.
In addition, the City of Uvalde is responsible for ensuring that the personnel of UPD obeyed the
laws of the United States and of the State of Texas. The City of Uvalde is legally responsible for
the acts and omissions of the UPD. The City of Uvalde may be served with process through Mayor
26. Defendant Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District (“UCISD”) was, at all
relevant times, responsible for the care, safety, management, and security of all students, teachers,
staff, campuses, and public-school business within its jurisdiction, including Robb Elementary.
agency of UCISD. At all relevant times, UCISD was charged by law with the administration and
operation of the school district and UCISC-PD, including employment, control, supervision,
discipline, training and practices of all school district and UCISCD-PD personnel and employees,
and with the formulation of its policies, practices, and customs. In addition, UCISD is responsible
for ensuring that the personnel of the school district and UCISD-PD obeyed the laws of the United
States and of the State of Texas. UCISD is legally responsible for the acts and omissions of the
UCISD. Defendant UCISD may be served with process through its interim Superintendent, Gary
27. Robb Elementary was not adequately prepared for the risk of an active shooter on
campus. For example, the school’s five-foot tall exterior fence was inadequate to impede an
intruder; there was a culture of noncompliance with the security policies to lock exterior and
internal classroom doors; the school did not treat the maintenance of doors and locks with any
urgency; there was poor internet and cellular phone service throughout the building, which
impeded the use of warning or alarm systems; and the school’s lockdown alert system was
overused to alert parents to “bailouts,” a term used to describe police car chases involving human
smugglers, which sometimes end in crashes and shootouts, so that when there was a more
immediate emergency on May 24, 2022, parents and staff were desensitized to the alert.
28. Defendant Uvalde County is a county organized under the laws of the State of
Texas. The Uvalde County Sheriff’s Office (“UCSO”) is an agency of Uvalde County. The Uvalde
County Constables are an agency of Uvalde County. At all relevant times, Uvalde County was
charged by law with the administration and operation of the UCSO and Constables, including
employment, control, supervision, discipline, training and practices of the UCSO’s personnel and
employees, and Constables, and with the formulation of its policies, practices and customs. Uvalde
County is legally responsible for the acts and omissions of the UCSO and Constables. In addition,
Uvalde County is responsible for ensuring that the personnel of UCSO and Constables obeyed the
laws of the United States and of the State of Texas. Uvalde County may be served with process
through the County Judge, The Honorable William R. Mitchell, at 100 N. Getty Street, Uvalde,
Texas 78801.
Texas. At all relevant times, Arredondo was a council member of the City of Uvalde and the Chief
of Police for the UCISD-PD. Arredondo, as the chief policymaker, with final policymaking
authority, for the UCISD and the UCISD-PD acted, or failed to act, with deliberate indifference to
the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs, and the rights of Plaintiffs under state law, and is liable to
Plaintiffs. At all relevant times, Arredondo was acting in the scope of his employment, under color
of state law, and in his individual and official capacities. Arredondo may be served with process
at his home address in the state of Texas. Out of concern for the privacy of the individual
Defendants, that address is not included here. Defendant Arredondo is sued in his official and
individual capacities.
30. Defendant Mariano Pargas is an individual residing in Texas. At all relevant times,
Pargas was a lieutenant and acting chief of the UPD. Pargas, as the chief policymaker, with final
policymaking authority for the City of Uvalde and UPD acted, or failed to act, with deliberate
indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs, and the rights of Plaintiffs under state law,
and is liable to Plaintiffs. At all relevant times, Pargas was acting in the scope of his employment,
under color of state law, and in his individual and official capacities. Pargas may be served with
process at his home address in the state of Texas. Out of concern for the privacy of the individual
Defendants, that address is not included here. Defendant Pargas is sued in his official and
individual capacities.
31. Defendant Jesus “J.J.” Suarez is an individual residing in Texas. At all relevant
times, Suarez was a UCISD Board Member and an officer of UPD, acted, or failed to act, with
deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs, and the rights of Plaintiffs under
state law, and is liable to Plaintiffs. At all relevant times, Suarez was acting in the scope of his
employment, under color of state law, and in his individual capacity. Suarez may be served with
process at his place of employment, Southwest Texas Junior College, at 2401 Garner Field Road,
32. Defendant Daniel Coronado is an individual residing in Texas. At all relevant times,
Coronado was a sergeant of the UPD. Coronado, as a sergeant of the UPD acted, or failed to act,
with deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs, and the rights of Plaintiffs
under state law, and is liable to Plaintiffs. At all relevant times, Coronado was acting in the scope
of his employment, under color of state law, and in his individual capacity. Coronado may be
served with process at his place of employment, UPD, at 964 W. Main Street, Uvalde, Texas 78801.
33. Defendant Justin Mendoza is an individual residing in Texas. At all relevant times,
Mendoza was an officer of the UPD. Mendoza, as an officer of the UPD acted, or failed to act,
with deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs, and the rights of Plaintiffs
under state law, and is liable to Plaintiffs. At all relevant times, Mendoza was acting in the scope
of his employment, under color of state law, and in his individual capacity. Mendoza may be served
with process at his place of employment, UPD, at 964 W. Main Street, Uvalde, Texas 78801.
times, Dorflinger was an officer of the UPD. Dorflinger, as an officer of the UPD acted, or failed
to act, with deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs, and the rights of
Plaintiffs under state law, and is liable to Plaintiffs. At all relevant times, Dorflinger was acting in
the scope of his employment, under color of state law, and in his individual capacity. Dorflinger
may be served with process at his place of employment, UPD, at 964 W. Main Street, Uvalde,
35. Defendant Ruben Nolasco is an individual residing in Texas. At all relevant times,
Nolasco was the Sheriff of Uvalde County. Nolasco, as the chief policymaker, with final
policymaking authority, for the County of Uvalde and Uvalde County Sheriff’s Office (“UCSO”)
acted, or failed to act, with deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs, and the
rights of Plaintiffs under state law, and is liable to Plaintiffs. At all relevant times, Nolasco was
acting in the scope of his employment, under color of state law, and in his individual and official
capacities. Nolasco may be served with process at his place of employment, 121 E. Nopal Street,
Uvalde, TX 78801. Defendant Nolasco is sued in his official and individual capacities.
times, Zamora was an elected Constable. Zamora, as an elected law enforcement officer, acted, or
failed to act, with deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs, and the rights of
Plaintiffs under state law, and is liable to Plaintiffs. At all relevant times, Zamora was acting in the
scope of his employment, under color of state law, and in his individual capacity. Zamora may be
served with process at his place of employment, 629 Nicholas Street, Uvalde, Texas 78801.
37. Defendant Johnny Field is an individual residing in Texas. At all relevant times,
Field was an elected Constable. Field, as an elected law enforcement officer, acted, or failed to act,
with deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs, and the rights of Plaintiffs
under state law, and is liable to Plaintiffs. At all relevant times, Field was acting in the scope of
his employment, under color of state law, and in his individual capacity. Zamora may be served
with process at 700 E. Nopal Street, Uvalde, Texas 78801. Defendant Field is sued in his individual
capacity.
38. Defendant Joel Betancourt is an individual residing in Texas. At all relevant times,
Betancourt was a captain of the TDPS. Betancourt, as a captain of the TDPS acted, or failed to act,
with deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs, and the rights of Plaintiffs
under state law, and is liable to Plaintiffs. At all relevant times, Betancourt was acting in the scope
of his employment, under color of state law, and in his individual capacity. Betancourt may be
served with process at his place of employment, TDPS, 5805 North Lamar Blvd., Austin, Texas
39. Defendant Juan Maldonado is an individual residing in Texas. At all relevant times,
Maldonado was a sergeant of the TDPS. Maldonado, as a sergeant of the TDPS acted, or failed to
act, with deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs, and the rights of Plaintiffs
under state law, and is liable to Plaintiffs. At all relevant times, Maldonado was acting in the scope
of his employment, under color of state law, and in his individual capacity. Maldonado may be
served with process at his home address in the State of Texas. Out of concern for the privacy of
the individual Defendants, that address is not listed here. Defendant Maldonado is sued in his
individual capacity.
times, Kindell was a Ranger of the TDPS. Kindell, as a ranger of the TDPS acted, or failed to act,
with deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs, and the rights of Plaintiffs
under state law, and is liable to Plaintiffs. At all relevant times, Kindell was acting in the scope of
his employment, under color of state law, and in his individual capacity. Kindell may be served
with process at his home address in the State of Texas. Out of concern for the privacy of the
individual Defendants, that address is not included here. Defendant Kindell is sued in his
individual capacity.
41. Defendant Doe 1 is an officer of the UCISD-PD who was present at Robb
Elementary on May 24, 2022, and acted, or failed to act, with deliberate indifference to the
constitutional rights of Plaintiffs, and the rights of Plaintiffs under state law, and is liable to
Plaintiffs. At all relevant times, Doe 1 was acting in the scope of their employment, under color of
state law, and in their individual capacity. Doe 1 is sued in their individual capacity.
42. Defendants Does 2-17 are officers of the UPD who were present at Robb
Elementary on May 24, 2022, and acted, or failed to act, with deliberate indifference to the
constitutional rights of Plaintiffs, and the rights of Plaintiffs under state law, and are liable to
Plaintiffs. At all relevant times, Does 2-17 were was acting in the scope of their employment, under
color of state law, and in their individual capacities. Does 2-17 are sued in their individual
capacities.
43. Defendants Does 18-32 are officers of the UCSO who were present at Robb
Elementary on May 24, 2022, and acted, or failed to act, with deliberate indifference to the
constitutional rights of Plaintiffs, and the rights of Plaintiffs under state law, and are liable to
Plaintiffs. At all relevant times, Does 18-32 were was acting in the scope of their employment,
under color of state law, and in their individual capacities. Does 18-32 are sued in their individual
capacities.
44. Defendants Does 33-119 are officers of the TDPS who were present at Robb
Elementary on May 24, 2022, and acted, or failed to act, with deliberate indifference to the
constitutional rights of Plaintiffs, and the rights of Plaintiffs under state law, and are liable to
Plaintiffs. At all relevant times, Does 33-119 were was acting in the scope of their employment,
under color of state law, and in their individual capacities. Does 33-119 are sued in their individual
capacities.
45. Defendants Daniel Defense and Oasis Outback are referred to in this complaint as
the “Gun Industry Defendants.” The remaining Defendants are referred to in this complaint as the
Consolidated Independent School District and Uvalde County, and all constituent units thereof,
IV.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
46. This mass shooting was enabled by the illegal, reckless, and negligent actions of
Defendant Daniel Defense, which profited from the unfair marketing of its AR-15 rifles, including
the DDM4 V7 rifle that Ramos purchased, in a manner that encouraged civilian consumers to
“Ninety percent of [Daniel Defense]’s sales are direct to civilian consumers, but the company’s
marketing emphasizes the tactical nature of its products.” This is no accident. Daniel Defense has
illegally marketed its rifles to civilian consumers in a manner that implies that civilians can use
their weapons for offensive combat-like missions and that appeals to the subset of adolescent and
young men attracted to violent combat and military fantasies, thereby increasing the risk that one
of these adolescent or young men will use the rifle to perpetrate an act of mass violence.
48. Daniel Defense’s marketing includes militaristic and combat imagery as well as
content specifically aimed at young consumers, referencing video games and the irreverent tone
of internet meme culture. This has enabled Daniel Defense to appeal to young male civilian
consumers, which can in turn translate to market growth by priming young buyers to purchase AR-
49. Daniel Defense markets its products to adolescent and young men using a range of
channels, including social media content, product placements, and print advertising. For example,
Daniel Defense promotes its products heavily on Instagram, a platform with a young user base.
The company does not use “age-gating” to limit access to its social media accounts to those who
cannot legally purchase guns. Daniel Defense also places its products in video games, and then
heavily promotes the video game tie-ins in the company’s social media accounts.
50. Ramos was the perfect customer for Daniel Defense: a troubled, violent loner who
spent much of his free time on the internet and social media and who fantasized about reenacting
video game combat in real life. Daniel Defense knew the risks of its marketing strategy and, like
Ramos, was drawn to notoriety. The shooting at Robb Elementary was an all-too-foreseeable
outcome of Daniel Defense’s decision to market its products in a manner that encouraged their
illegal misuse.
51. Daniel Defense currently manufactures and sells over two dozen models of
semiautomatic rifles, including 21 models of AR-15-style rifles and eight large-caliber models of
AR-10-style rifles. Unlike many manufacturers of firearms, Daniel Defense sells its firearms
directly from its website (in addition to selling through third-party sellers).
52. The DDM4 V7 rifle—the assault rifle used by Salvador Ramos—comes equipped
with a high-capacity, 32-round magazine and a magazine well that is designed “for the fastest,
most secure reloads possible.” On its website, Daniel Defense has explained that the “M4” in
“DDM4 V7” is a nod to the “iconic M4 carbine used by U.S. military forces,” after which Daniel
Defense models its DDM4 rifles. The company describes it as “extremely maneuverable and easy
to move around barriers” in a promotional video for the DDM4 V7 on its website.
53. Like all AR-15-style rifles, Daniel Defense’s DDM4 V7 rifle is descended from
military rifles developed for combat. AR-15-style rifles now sold in the civilian market, including
Daniel Defense’s models, are based on military rifles designed to kill soldiers on the battlefield.
54. Faced with the task of marketing $2,000 AR-15-style rifles with limited legitimate
civilian uses beyond the shooting range, Daniel Defense chose to promote their illegal and
dangerous misuse.
Marketing the Illegal Misuse of Military Combat Weapons to Civilian Young Men
55. Daniel Defense regularly promotes its weapons and accessories through appeals to
civilian consumers attracted to the military and thrill, excitement, and violence of combat. While
many companies employ marketing that extols the virtues of military service, Daniel Defense’s
marketing illegally promotes the company’s AR-15-style rifles in a context that implies they may
be used by civilians for offensive, combat-like missions. Stated differently, their advertisements
encourage civilian viewers to imagine that, once they purchase a Daniel Defense rifle, they will be
Image from Daniel Defense 2022 print catalog (catalog is available for viewing on the website)
56. Other Daniel Defense ads contain imagery suggesting even more explicitly that
their rifles can be used by civilians for combat-style operations against non-combatants, including
a picture featuring a bolt-action rifle taken through a rifle scope on a rooftop, targeting a car on a
public street as if to carry out an assassination. An Instagram user asked, in response to the
“Rooftop Ready” post: “Is this an assassins setup? And can I buy this?” Daniel Defense’s official
account’s response was to suggest that “anyone” could use this “assassin’s setup”: “More geared
toward MIL/LE but adaptable to anyone. Yes, our Delta 5 Pro 16” is live on our site right now!”
57. Another advertisement, captioned “Saturdays are for the boys,” shows three men in
military fatigues, weapons drawn as they climb a set of stairs on a freight ship, as if in a combat
situation. The implicit message: you, the civilian consumer, should reenact wartime exercises with
our guns. This social media post also expressly states that these advertisements are intended for
58. Other marketing focuses on the use of Daniel Defense’s AR-15-style rifles by the
military and for offensive, military-style missions, even though the targeted audience is clearly the
civilian market. For instance, the company uses its social media presence to encourage “MK18
Mondays.” In the following post, the company pairs its MK18 rifle with a handgun equipped with
a flashlight and a camouflage combat vest that carries three large-capacity magazines and is
emblazoned with a U.S. flag. Among the hashtags are #gunporn, which appeals to younger
consumers and encourages violent fantasies, and #cqbr, which the company assumes its followers
will understand to refer to “close quarter battle receiver,” which is an adaptation to the M4 rifle
used by the military in close combat. Again, the company is suggesting that civilian consumers
should imagine themselves in close combat with the company’s AR-15-style rifles.
59. In the following post, Daniel Defense exhorts that those who don’t participate in
60. The company’s marketing sometimes intersperses online meme culture with
combat imagery to sell military-grade weaponry to the civilian population. In the following two
posts, the company trades on the “Heading into the weekend like” meme:
61. Along with Instagram content and print advertisements, Daniel Defense has
produced videos depicting fictional military service members using its weapons and uses these
62. In one such video posted on the company’s website and on YouTube, Daniel
Defense introduced a “revolutionary” new rifle that pairs the company’s “DD4 lower receiver”
with its rail system “modeled after the proven RIS II developed for SOCOM.” A rail system on an
AR-15-style rifle allows users to mount various optics—including iron sights, scopes, and
holographic sights—as well as lights, aiming lasers, grips, and other accessories in various
positions along the length of the rail system. In general, it allows consumers to customize their
AR-15-style rifles. The marketing pitch assumes that the target civilian consumer understands,
without being told, that “SOCOM” stands for “Special Operations Command,” and trades on the
cachet of our nation’s special operations soldiers. The video intercuts footage of a civilian target
shooter with footage of what appears to be an armed military team moving in formation, all set to
a pounding rhythm. But there is no “don’t try this at home” warning; the message of this
Still image from Daniel Defense promotional video. YouTube (Jan. 18, 2022)
63. Another video below portrays a (fictional) military raid on a campus of abandoned
buildings, one of which appears to be a former school building. It features sweeping shots of a
dramatic helicopter arrival, professional stunt work, and suspense-building soundtrack, all in the
Still image from Daniel Defense promotional video. YouTube (Jan. 9, 2017)
64. Daniel Defense’s video marketing frequently depicts military and law enforcement
operations and/or gear encouraging the civilian consumer to “use what they use.” While the U.S.
government does buy certain firearm components from Daniel Defense (including rail systems),
the only publicly available documentation indicates that, aside from an $87,000, limited-time
contract for the sale of rifles to the U.S. Navy in 2018, the company does not in fact sell its
65. Nevertheless, Daniel Defense has chosen to aggressively market its rifles so that
consumers will associate them with the U.S. and foreign militaries. The company’s strategy is to
position itself as a purveyor of weapons trusted by real-life soldiers, thereby making the military
that consumers should use Daniel Defense rifles to reenact combat (“extremely maneuverable and
easy to move around barriers”), even on American streets. For a young consumer, like Salvador
Ramos, who is attracted to the excitement and risk of combat missions and highly susceptible to
suggestive marketing, Daniel Defense offers civilians a taste of the military experience via its
weapons.
66. Daniel Defense also markets its rifles’ placement in violent first-person-shooter
video games. This form of marketing appeals to young, disaffected men, a demographic that is
through online and social media channels. The Daniel Defense DDM4 V7S rifle—a short-barreled
version of Ramos’s DDM4 V7—is featured in Call of Duty: Modern Warfare, and the company’s
social media account references and tags Call of Duty in many of its posts:
67. Call of Duty is a video game that allows users to have a “first-person” experience
of being in the military. That is to say, it gives the user a point-of-view experience of shooting at
others as if in combat. It simulates being in a war zone, and one can use AR-15 rifles styled after
those made by Daniel Defense in the game. Violent first-person-shooter video games like Call of
Duty allow Daniel Defense to indirectly market the firepower of their DDM4 V7 to teenagers and
young adults through product insertion and realistic depictions of their rifle. The allure of the video
game is that it allows users to experience extreme carnage through fantasy killing. Games like Call
of Duty are popular among teenagers and young adults, including the Uvalde, Parkland, and El
Paso mass shooters. And Daniel Defense has benefited from the use of AR-15-style rifles in Call
of Duty. In social media posts, Daniel Defense uses hashtags such as #callofduty and #cod to make
68. Daniel Defense promotes its connection to the Call of Duty franchise with staged
photos in its social media feeds, featuring actors dressed up like video game avatars on sets
designed to look like settings within the game, holding Daniel Defense products. The not-subtle
message to young consumers (like Salvador Ramos) is that Daniel Defense products can be used
Caption reads: “Verdansk never looked so good. Tag your Duos buddy below!” “Verdansk” is
the name of a fictional city in the Call of Duty franchise. “Duos” is a term referring to a pair of
people who play a video game together in a specific “duos” game mode. Instagram (May 26,
2021)
69. Daniel Defense directs much of its marketing—including marketing that suggests
that consumers should illegally use its products to carry out combat operations—at teens and
young men, who are a population that is likely to be influenced by the militarist imagery displayed
70. Daniel Defense’s marketing draws on pop culture themes and relies on online
meme culture to attract teens, many of whom are too young to legally purchase a firearm. The
company has engaged in marketing stunts to generate “viral” internet activity and publishes
content referencing celebrities and pop culture characters that are popular with teenagers. Coupling
this marketing that suggests that Daniel Defense Weapons are suitable for offensive civilian usage
with viral meme content links the militaristic marketing to the population most likely to succumb
to it. This strategy makes it more likely that the demographic most likely to be susceptible to the
message that these weapons are suitable for offensive use—young men—are the ones who are
71. Daniel Defense uses these viral meme tactics to sell highly lethal weapons—the
kind that are often used by young, disturbed mass shooters. Daniel Defense knew that young
people who this sort of marketing targets have used AR-15-style rifles in mass shootings from
72. For example, on Halloween of 2021, Daniel Defense tweeted out this picture of a
tattooed man wearing a jack-o-lantern on his head, carrying a Daniel Defense rifle, and packing
several additional large-capacity magazines in a carrier on his chest. The caption of the post asked
viewers what costume they had chosen. This sort of content that actively engages users by asking
them to comment on the post—and suggesting pranks they might play—appeals to the younger
73. The same goes for this image of Santa Claus, smoking a cigar and holding a Daniel
Defense MK18 assault rifle. The image upends traditional Christmas imagery mixing military
themes with Santa Claus—a childhood icon. This form of mixing jokes and pranks with the
74. The company also uses images from popular (and violent) TV shows and movies
in its marketing. In one post, the company features a photograph of an actor dressed up like a guard
or executioner, with the caption, “#SquidGame would’ve been better if they used MK18s.” The
implication? This ultraviolent show would have had a higher body count if they’d use Daniel
Defense’s products.
Individual dressed as an executioner from Squid Game, a hyperviolent Netflix show. Instagram
(Oct. 31, 2021)
75. The company also appeals to younger consumers by posting images of celebrities
holding its products, as in the image below of musician Post Malone, which is captioned, “MK18
got me feeling like a rockstar,” and is followed by two emojis. The post also uses the #gunporn
and #pewpew hashtags, both of which are designed for younger consumers immersed in online
culture.
Image of Post Malone, a popular musician and producer, holding a Daniel Defense rifle.
Instagram (Jan. 23, 2020)
76. Teenagers and young men comprise a disproportionate share of the nation’s most
destructive mass shooters. They are the group most likely to internalize Daniel Defense’s
promotion of the illegal offensive civilian use of rifles. Daniel Defense markets AR-15-style rifles
against the backdrop of decades of mass shooters selecting these rifles to commits acts of horrific
violence.
77. From Parkland to El Paso to Uvalde, AR-15-style rifles have been the weapon of
choice for the young male shooters who disproportionately commit the most destructive mass
78. Through its marketing, Daniel Defense exploits the heightened susceptibility of
teenage boys and young men to produce advertising that plays on this group’s propensities for
79. This marketing strategy was to court controversy, seek out meme-able content, and
push out violent, combat imagery that was certain to appeal to young, video-game-playing men
80. In directing much of its advertising at young men and adolescents, Daniel Defense
chose to target a group that was particularly susceptible to advertising and disproportionately likely
81. Decades of scientific evidence demonstrate that the onset of intense, thrill-seeking
urges associated with puberty outpaces the development of the area of the brain responsible for
judgment and impulse control, which continues into young adulthood. As a result, adolescents and
post-adolescents have less capacity for mature judgment and self-control than older adults and are
more likely to engage in risky behaviors. Adolescents and young men are particularly receptive to
82. Negative emotions such as anger, depression, and anxiety—which are more
strongly felt by adolescents—can dilute the already weak control adolescents and post-adolescents
83. At the same time, adolescents and young adults are more likely than other age
groups to engage in risky, thrill-seeking, violent, and impulsive behavior. Young people’s
disproportionate amount of violent crime in the United States is committed by individuals between
the ages of 15 and 24, and 18- to 20-year-olds are offenders in gun homicides at a rate nearly three
84. Daniel Defense knew that certain adolescents and young adult men are susceptible
to advertising that plays on negative emotions and are particularly at risk of misusing AR-15 rifles,
85. Despite this knowledge, Daniel Defense continued to market the DDM4 V7 in a
manner that would appeal to thrill-seeking young men, who wanted the power and destruction of
a military weapon, fully knowing and appreciating that the increase in sales of DDM4 V7 was due
in part to its appeal to a younger demographic of users. Daniel Defense’s continuation of this
87. In the fall of 2021, Ramos was 17 years old, but he had only progressed as far as
ninth grade in school. As a result of poor academic performance and attendance, he was
88. Following his withdrawal from high school, Ramos became increasingly socially
withdrawn. His sister had graduated from high school and moved away. He had always struggled
socially, and a close friend moved away to San Antonio. His relationship with a girlfriend ended,
and he began harassing his ex-girlfriend and her social circle. His few remaining friends teased
89. Ramos had long had a poor relationship with his mother, with whom he lived. In
2022, things worsened. According to a report issued by the Investigative Committee on the Robb
Elementary Shooting of the Texas House of Representatives (the “Robb Committee Report”), in
early 2022, Ramos livestreamed “a blowout argument” with his mother, and not long after, he
moved into his grandmother’s home in Uvalde, located just blocks away from Robb Elementary.
90. Ramos associated military service with killing people, an association recounted by
a former friend and one that may have been heightened by Ramos’s obsession with first-person-
shooter games like Call of Duty. Games like Call of Duty can have an outsized influence on the
lives of teenagers, particularly teenagers like Ramos who are socially isolated and have difficult
home lives. Further, according to the Robb Committee Report, “Those with whom he played
videogames reported that he became enraged when he lost. He made over-the-top threats,
especially towards female players, whom he would terrorize with graphic descriptions of violence
and rape.”
91. Ramos’ hatred towards women and obsession with violence against women and
girls can be seen through his interactions on social media and through text messages he sent to
young women. He sent explicit messages to other people, especially women and girls, online, and
he also frequently threatened girls he met online with sexual assault. He became increasingly
drawn to violent, sexual content, as well as videos of suicides and beheadings. Even his usernames
and email address “reflected themes of confrontation and revenge,” according to the Robb
Committee Report.
92. In early 2022, Ramos began making plans to carry out a school shooting in Uvalde.
At the time he started planning, Ramos was 17 years old and thus could not legally purchase guns
or ammunition. He asked other people to buy guns for him, which they refused to do. Instead, he
and a Hellfire trigger system (which dramatically increases the rate of fire of a semiautomatic
firearm and makes it operationally similar to a fully automatic firearm). He searched online for
93. Daniel Defense’s marketing of its rifles to teenage and young adult men contributed
to the shooting at Robb Elementary, and is responsible, in part, for the injuries to M.Z. and K.T.
Daniel Defense markets its AR-15-style rifles to young male consumers by using militaristic
imagery and video game references, by marketing on various social media platforms, and by
suggesting that its rifles can be used by civilians for offensive combat-style operations against non-
combatants. These advertisements were tailor-made for someone like Salvador Ramos: a loner
with a history of making violent threats, fantasies of notoriety, and a fixation on video games
(including Call of Duty), violence, and gore, and someone who was a prolific user of social media,
94. Daniel Defense’s unfair and illegal marketing tactics worked. The company was
not a household name, and Salvador Ramos knew little about guns and had never fired one
previously, but he went to Daniel Defense’s online store, instead of a website that sold multiple
brands/manufacturers’ products. This was not chance or a coincidence; nor was it typical. Instead,
on information and belief, it was exposure to Daniel Defense’s marketing, as described above, that
influenced Ramos and led him to steer his web browser to DanielDefense.com and decide to
purchase and then use one of their most lethal weapons, paying over $2,000 for a gun that he had
neither held nor fired. Of course, he had virtually fired rifles styled after those made by Daniel
95. A week after he purchased the Daniel Defense DDM4 V7, Salvador Ramos used it
96. The Daniel Defense DDM4 V7, a semiautomatic rifle that accepts detachable high-
capacity magazines, enabled Salvador Ramos to discharge many rounds over short periods of time.
97. In addition to their high rates of fire, AR-15-style rifles like the DDM4 V7
discharge rounds that are larger and travel much faster than handgun bullets. This combination
means these bullets have more kinetic energy. When that bullet hits a person, this kinetic energy
translates to more lethal damage to the human body. While handgun bullets typically travel in a
linear path through the body and create relatively small entry and exit wounds, AR-15 rounds hit
the human body with such speed that they can shred organs, destroy large swaths of tissue, and
98. And destruction it wrought. The bodies of several victims, disfigured beyond
recognition, were identified by their DNA; one 10-year-old victim’s body was identified based on
her green Converse sneakers. M.Z.’s right hand was nearly torn apart by a bullet from the DDM4
V7, and she has undergone numerous reconstructive procedures on that hand.
99. Salvador Ramos pulled the trigger of the DDM4 V7 that killed, wounded, and
traumatized the teachers and students of Robb Elementary. Daniel Defense’s unfair and
irresponsible marketing tactics put their assault rifle in Salvador Ramos’s mind, delivered it into
his hands, and influenced him to select it to carry out a horrific massacre, resulting in more carnage
100. K.T., M.Z., and their families could not reasonably avoid the destruction caused by
Daniel Defense’s illegal marketing. Plaintiffs are school children and parents who are
consumers—they purchase pens, pencils, erasers, notebooks, sneakers, and backpacks, among
other things, as part of the educational process. But none of that—or anything else—allows them
to reasonably avoid the harms from a young man armed with a Daniel Defense assault rifle,
encouraged by Daniel Defense’s marketing, and intent on carrying out a school massacre. Mass
shootings occur in schools across Texas and the United States with alarming frequency. Children
in schools routinely undergo active shooter trainings, but they cannot avoid being in places where
they are at risk of mass shootings, and their parents, too, have no way of ensuring that their children
avoid these injuries. They cannot avoid the consequences of Daniel Defense’s illegal marketing
campaigns.
101. The risk of these catastrophic harms occurring again could be reduced if Daniel
Defense took reasonable steps to reform its marketing. Daniel Defense could tailor its marketing
to less vulnerable purchasers, cease the use of combat imagery, and/or highlight the serious known
dangers associated with its weapons. These would not be burdensome reforms. And such reforms
102. Daniel Defense’s marketing tactics are unfair and violate the Federal Trade
Commission Act.
purchases. First, he paid $1,761.50 to purchase 1,740 rounds of ammunition for use in an AR-15
rifle from an online retailer. And second, he steered his browser to Daniel Defense’s webstore,
where he ordered a DDM4 V7 AR-15-style rifle. Ramos requested that the DDM4 V7 be shipped
to Oasis Outback, a gun store in Uvalde. Ramos paid $2,054.28 to purchase the rifle.
104. The next day (May 17), Ramos went to Oasis Outback in person and bought a Smith
105. The day after that (May 18), Ramos went to Oasis Outback to buy an additional
106. And then Ramos returned to Oasis Outback again two days later (May 20) to pick
up his Daniel Defense assault rifle. Upon information and belief, Ramos paid a $50 transfer fee to
Oasis Outback to pick up this rifle. This was his third visit to the store in a four-day period. In that
short period, Ramos had picked up or bought well over $3,000 worth of guns and ammunition,
including two AR-style rifles. Oasis Outback was required to report this multiple sale of rifles to
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”) pursuant to a letter issued by
the ATF on July 12, 2011. Fulfilling its reporting requirements, however, would not have absolved
Oasis Outback of its obligation to block a sale on other relevant grounds, including when Oasis
Outback knew or reasonably should have known that the purchaser was likely to harm himself or
others.
107. On Ramos’ May 20th visit to Oasis Outback to pick up his rifle, he also had
employees install a holographic weapon sight on the rifle. Such a sight allows a user to look
through a small glass window and see holographic crosshairs superimposed on a target.
Holographic sights are designed for rapid short-range shooting and help users quickly acquire
targets, as they do not have to align traditional front and rear iron sights, for example, which
requires marksmanship training. Once the crosshairs highlight a target, the user can fire, and
shooters may also keep both eyes open when using a holographic sight to identify more targets in
their periphery.
108. Oasis Outback had a duty not to sell weapons to the just-turned 18-year-old shooter,
who it knew or reasonably should have known was likely to harm himself or others. The shooter
was described by patrons of the store as having a nervous disposition and behaving suspiciously.
According to the Robb Committee Report, one witness at the store said Ramos “appeared odd and
looked like one of those school shooters.” He was wearing all black, and a different witness
described him as giving off “bad vibes.” The owner of Oasis Outback described him as alone and
quiet, and questioned Ramos about how he could afford $3,000 worth of rifles. He also knew
Ramos was purchasing a massive arsenal of firepower with a suspicious urgency within days of
turning 18. But he went ahead anyway and sold and transferred to him the rifles and ammunition.
109. Oasis Outback knew or should have known that the shooter was not purchasing the
assault rifles for recreational purposes. The shooter had purchased two extraordinarily lethal
assault weapons and enough ammunition to fight off a small army, as well as a holographic sight
and Hellfire Gen 2 trigger system, spending thousands of dollars within days of his 18th birthday.
110. Uvalde CISD adopted an active shooter response policy on April 15, 2020, as
directed by legislation passed by the Texas legislature in 2019. Every school officer in Texas must
be trained on how to respond to an active shooter. The main tenets of active shooter response stem
from lessons learned from the Columbine High School mass shooting in 1999. Priority number
one is to “stop the killing.” Responding officers must have the tools and training to immediately
make entry and stop an active shooter. And if they lack one or both, officers were still expected to
stop the shooter. The “Priority of Life Scale” dictates that innocent civilians are prioritized over
law enforcement and other responders. According to active shooter training from the ALERRT
Center—which the FBI has recognized as the national standard—after Columbine, “[f]rom that
moment forward, every law enforcement officer was expected to be willing to risk his or her life
without hesitation.” Once the shooter has been stopped, the next step is to “stop the dying,” that is
111. TDPS Director Steven McCraw confirmed this was the standard all the responding
officers to Robb Elementary were expected to meet during a press conference three days after the
shooting. McCraw said every officer was trained to immediately stop active shooters. “When there
is an active shooter, the rules change,” he said at the press conference. “Texas embraces active
shooter training, active shooter certification, and that doctrine requires officers—we don’t care
what agency you’re from. You don’t have to have a leader on the scene. Every officer lines up,
stacks up, goes and finds where those rounds are being fired at and keeps shooting until the subject
is dead, period.”
112. Four days after picking up the Daniel Defense rifle at Oasis Outback, and after
posting on his Instagram a picture of that rifle and the other AR-15 rifle he had purchased, on May
24, 2022, Salvador Ramos fired a gun for the first time in his life in what would turn out to be a
sadistic and tragic mass murder of school children and teachers. He began his rampage with an act
of domestic violence: he tried to kill his grandmother, shooting and injuring her.
113. After shooting his grandmother, Ramos drove a few blocks from his home to Robb
Elementary School, where he crashed his car in a ditch several hundred feet away from the school
at 11:28 a.m. Two people from a funeral home across the street from the crash site walked toward
the truck. Ramos opened fire on them. They ran away and called 911.
114. Ramos fled the crash scene at 11:29 a.m. wearing dark clothing and carrying a bag.
According to witness accounts, after the crash, Ramos tried to exit through the driver-side door
but was unable to do so because the door was jammed. Ramos then tossed out two backpacks and
exited through the passenger-side door. He picked up only one backpack, leaving the other one
behind. He then climbed a five-foot chain-link fence to enter school grounds and walked through
115. Coach Yvette Silva was outside with a group of third graders and witnessed Ramos
climbing the fence with a gun. He raised his gun and began to shoot. Silva used her radio to report
the shooting and ran towards students to get them to lockdown. She expected to, but did not, hear
116. Officers of the Uvalde Police Department, including Defendants Pargas and
Coronado, were among the first law enforcement officers to arrive on the scene. Sergeant Eduardo
Canales, who was responding to a report of a car crash and shots fired, saw Ramos shooting his
gun as he arrived at the school. Sergeant Canales was the commander of the Uvalde PD SWAT
team.
117. Principal Mandy Gutierrez heard Coach Silva’s radio report and attempted to
initiate a lockdown on the school’s Raptor application but could not do so because of a poor Wi-
Fi signal. She called Uvalde CISD Police Chief Arredondo, who told her to shut the school down,
and she then instructed the janitor to lock all of the doors.
118. The west building, which housed the fourth graders, began to lock down on an ad
hoc basis as word spread of the shooting from teachers and students yelling and returning from
119. It was common knowledge that people at Robb Elementary, and other UCISD
schools, often left doors unlocked, used rocks to prop open exterior doors, and used door stops,
wedges, and magnets to keep exterior and interior doors open. Additionally, Robb Elementary
school had a key shortage, and substitute teachers were often advised to circumvent the door lock.
120. In March 2022, Robb Elementary school administrators received a report that the
door to classroom 111 did not lock as it should and could not be locked from inside. Principal
Gutierrez testified in front of the Texas House of Representatives Committee investigating the
Robb Elementary shooting that school administration knew about the issues with the door to
classroom 111.
122. By 11:32 a.m., Ramos reached the west teachers’ parking lot and fired several shots
through a window. These shots can be heard in the background of the teacher’s 911 call.
123. Ramos entered the west building at 11:33 a.m. through an unlocked door. Earlier
in the day the door had been propped open by a rock, but that rock was removed, and the door was
closed by the time Ramos reached it. He began firing into classrooms from the hallway.
124. At 11:33 a.m., another 911 call was placed by a man who frantically told the
125. Ramos entered unlocked classroom 111—at 11:33 a.m. and began shooting.
Classrooms 111 and 112 were adjoining and had a connecting door that allowed Ramos to go
between the classrooms without having to go through the hallway. K.T. and M.Z. were in
classroom 112. After entering the classrooms, Ramos dropped to his knees and told the children it
was “time to die.” Over the next 77 minutes, Salvador Ramos committed a massacre in classrooms
Uvalde PD stated that he and the other initial responders heard shots being fired as the approached
the building. Many students in classrooms 111 and 112 would die that day, but many did not die
127. At 11:34 a.m., only one minute after Ramos entered M.Z.’s, and K.T.’s classroom
and while he was shooting children and teachers, Defendant Maldonado parked his TDPS car at
128. Less than three minutes after the shooting began, officers entered the west building
and approached classrooms 111 and 112 from the north side of the building. Defendant Pargas,
the acting chief of the Uvalde PD, was right behind the initial group. At the same time, Defendants
Coronado and Arredondo approached the classrooms from the south side of the building. At 11:35
a.m., three Uvalde police officers with body armor, two rifles, and three pistols took up positions
near classrooms 111 and 112. They had heard the shots being fired in the classrooms. Defendant
Arredondo stated the day after the shooting that he heard “plenty” of gunshots as he initially
approached and saw gunshots coming out through the walls. According to training and prior policy,
officers are required to engage active shooters immediately. They did not do so.
129. Defendant Pargas, as acting chief of the Uvalde PD, was a policymaker with final
policymaking authority. By choosing not to follow the active shooter policy, Defendant Pargas
created a new policy. This policy was to barricade children, including M.Z. and K.T., inside a
classroom with an active shooter, delaying emergency medical and rescue services and depriving
130. As Defendant Daniel Coronado approached the building at 11:35 a.m., he yelled
“oh shit, shots fired, get inside,” according to the recording from his body camera.
131. Once officers on site realized that Ramos was armed with an AR-15 rifle, many
became alarmed and backed away from classrooms 111 and 112. They requested additional
equipment, instead of doing what was required under the active shooter policy, to breach the
classroom immediately and to stop the killing. This delay was particularly unreasonable given the
prevalence of AR-15 rifles in Texas and the fact that some officers themselves were armed with
rifles. The officers violated active shooter protocols and began implementing the new policy of
132. At 11:36 a.m., four additional officers arrived inside the building, including the
Uvalde SWAT team commander, Sgt. Canales, and Defendant Arredondo. Arredondo, who had
co-authored UCISD’s active shooter plan, was required by policy to set up a command post and
serve as the on-site commander. He did not do so. A minute after their arrival, Ramos resumed
shooting inside Classrooms 111 and 112 and continued intermittently firing his gun for several
minutes.
133. Like Defendant Pargas, Defendant Arredondo was a policymaker with final
policymaking authority. By choosing not to follow the active shooter policy, Defendant Arredondo
created a new policy. Defendant Arredondo explained in an interview shortly after the shooting
that he “had him [Ramos] contained” and “kn[e]w there’s probably victims in there” with the
shooter. Defendant Arredondo created a policy to barricade children, including M.Z. and K.T.,
inside a classroom with an active shooter, delaying rescue and emergency medical services and
depriving them of the comfort of their family. He intentionally trapped children in the room with
the shooter.
134. There was no central command post set up outside of the building, causing a
dangerous lack of coordination and an ineffective response. No one was evaluating the information
as it came in and ensuring that there were adequate supplies and equipment. Each of these failures
worsened the situation. And each of these was directly in contravention of the principles of active
shooter response, principles in which every Law Enforcement Individual Defendant should have
135. The gunman continued actively firing his weapon until 11:36 a.m. At this time, the
Law Enforcement Individual Defendants were aware that the gunman was barricaded in the
classroom with victims that were dead or dying. Indeed, Monica Martinez, a STEM teacher hiding
in a closet, called 911 at 11:36 a.m. to report somebody banging at the school and said in a muffled
voice “I’m so scared.” But the other law enforcement officers on site took no steps to rescue the
children and teachers slowly dying inside classrooms 111 and 112.
136. At 11:37 a.m., four minutes after Ramos entered classrooms 111 and 112, a group
of Uvalde PD Officers approached and prepared to breach the classrooms but retreated after Ramos
fired and Sgt. Canales and another officer were grazed with shrapnel.
137. As the officers were retreating, UCISD-PD Officer Ruben Ruiz said, “that’s my
wife’s classroom,” referring to the room the shots were coming from. Officer Ruiz’s wife, Eva
Mireles, was a fourth-grade teacher in classroom 112. Several officers were within earshot of
138. At 11:37 a.m., Defendant Maldonado from the Texas Department of Public Safety
approached the school building. As he approached, Sgt. Canales of the UPD was exiting after
being hit with the building fragments. Defendant Maldonado asked Sgt. Canales, “is he in there?”
Defendant Sgt. Canales responded, “he is in the class.” Sgt. Canales also told Defendant
139. Defendant Maldonado did not respond to this information by running toward the
gunfire, as active shooter protocol dictates. Instead, he stood outside the building and said, “D.P.S.
is sending people.”
140. While other officers approached the classrooms at 11:37, Defendant Pargas of the
Uvalde PD can be seen on body camera footage standing back from the classroom, disengaged
141. A minute later, at 11:38 a.m., the first agents from the U.S. Border Patrol arrived
on scene.
142. At 11:38 a.m., Defendant Coronado told other officers that the suspect was
“contained” and “barricaded.” A “contained subject” is a term of art used for a non-active shooter
situation. This was factually incorrect since the shooter was actively firing his gun even as
Coronado relayed this information. On information and belief, the Law Enforcement Individual
Defendants knew that there were dying children in the classroom with him who needed, but could
not access, medical treatment. And as periodic gunfire continued, each Law Enforcement
Individual Defendant knew that this was an active shooter situation and NOT a barricaded subject
situation. Defendant Coronado in particular had heard gunfire as he approached the school and had
been standing in the hallway when Ramos shot at the officers. It was during this retreat that he
exited the building through the south door and erroneously announced on his radio that the shooter
was “contained.” Around this time, Defendant Coronado used his radio to request ballistic shields
143. Defendant Coronado subsequently told the Texas House Committee that he thought
the suspect had probably fled to the school during an immigration “bailout”—a term used in border
communities for car chases involving human smugglers, which sometimes end in crashes and
shootouts. In the three months before the shooting, there had been nearly 50 school lockdown and
144. No officer attempted to enter the classrooms where Ramos was located. They did
the opposite: the Law Enforcement Individual Defendants treated Ramos as a “barricaded subject,”
and furthered that by setting up two “fronts” of law enforcement officers on either side of the doors
to rooms 111 and 112. The Law Enforcement Individual Defendants sought out a bullhorn and
made no effort to disguise their presence. And they did not enter the classroom and shoot Ramos,
as they knew (or should have known) was the only proper response in a situation with an active
shooter.
145. The effect was to trap the injured and dying and prolong the time Ramos had to
shoot additional children and adults, including M.Z. and K.T., inside classrooms 111 and 112 with
Ramos.
146. During those seventy-seven minutes, M.Z. and K.T. were deprived of access to
rescue (by law enforcement, other emergency personnel, or private citizens), emergency medical
services, and the comfort of their families—who were just outside the law enforcement
147. M.Z. was deprived of access to rescue (by law enforcement, other emergency
personnel, or private citizens), emergency medical services, and the comfort of her family as she
lay with multiple gunshot wounds, including a gunshot to the chest. M.Z. heard the voices of law
enforcement officers in the hallway outside classroom 112 and told a friend who had been shot
and later succumbed to her wounds that they would soon be rescued because the police had arrived.
148. K.T. was deprived of access to rescue (by law enforcement, other emergency
personnel, or private citizens), emergency medical services, and the comfort of her family as she
lay wounded and covered in the blood and brain tissue of her friends. She spent seventy-seven
minutes laying with her eyes open, so that she would appear to be dead. What she witnessed during
149. One survivor from one of the classrooms recalled that after the police arrived at
Robb, they instructed from the hallway that children who needed help should yell for help. One
child in the room did so. Ramos came into that classroom and shot that child.
150. By 11:38, Defendant Nolasco had responded to Ramos’s grandmother’s house, and
was speaking to her. She told him that her grandson had shot her and told Defendant Nolasco his
name. Defendant Nolasco did not share this information with other law enforcement officers
responding to the shooting at Robb, even as they asked for that information.
151. At 11:40 a.m., Defendant Arredondo called police dispatch and sought additional
officers to participate in the barricade. He said “he’s [Ramos] in one room. I need a lot of fire
power, so I need this building surrounded. I need it surrounded by as many AR-15s as possible.”
He did not request or set up for a breach of the classroom; rather, he requested additional officers
152. Around 11:41 a.m., more officers arrived, including officers from TDPS. Three of
the officers on scene, Defendants Field, Zamora, and Zamora were instructors at the regional police
academy.
153. At 11:43 a.m., Chief Arredondo called the Uvalde police asking for a radio, rifle,
and additional ammunition. He gave orders to officers to stand down while the shooter was actively
154. At 11:43 a.m., someone over the radio announced that classrooms 111 and 112
“should be in session,” which could be heard in Defendant Coronado’s body camera footage.
Instead of following active shooter protocol and entering the building based on this information,
Coronado remained outside the building for 30 more minutes, warning entering officers about a
“fatal funnel” if they lined up incorrectly in the hallway. A “fatal funnel” is a law enforcement
term for a doorway where one can be easily seen but have difficulty moving out of in the case of
incoming projectiles. Had the law enforcement officers followed active shooter protocol and
immediately entered the room with the shooter, this concern would have not existed. Instead,
Defendant Coronado’s warning provided an excuse for delay and is an example of responding
officers considering their own safety ahead of the children and teachers they had barricaded inside
155. At 11:44 a.m., Ramos started shooting again. No officer responded, including the
police academy instructors, Defendants Field, Zamora, Suarez, and Mendoza. Though it was or
should already have been evident to the Law Enforcement Individual Defendants that this was an
active shooter situation, the renewed gunfire at 11:44 a.m. was further proof that treating Ramos
as a “barricaded subject,” and trapping him inside a classroom with dozens of victims, made the
situation much more dangerous than it had been before law enforcement arrived. The students,
including M.Z. and K.T., could hear the officers in the hallway. Upon information and belief, there
were 18 law enforcement officers in the school building by this time. By virtue of this show of
authority and barricading everyone inside, no reasonable person would have felt free to leave the
classroom.
156. Defendant Mendoza’s body camera footage shows that he was standing or pacing
in the hallway, barricading students inside by virtue of his show of authority, from 11:43 a.m.-
12:02 p.m.; 12:08-12:16; and from 12:20 until at least 12:33. Gunshots can audibly be heard on
his body camera footage at approximately 12:20, but Defendant Mendoza continues to maintain
the barricade, slowly moving toward the door. He then resumed pacing in the hallway. Officers
157. Concerned family members of students began amassing near the school around the
158. At 11:47 a.m., the officers began searching for a negotiator and a bullhorn to
negotiate with the shooter. This would have been an appropriate response for a barricaded subject,
but it went counter to all training on how to respond to an active shooter. Defendant Arredondo
159. Law enforcement continued to arrive at the school in large numbers. These officers
continued their fortification of the barricade rather than attempting to engage the shooter.
160. At 11:48 a.m., Officer Ruiz told other officers in the hallway that his wife, Eva
Mireles, had called him from inside room 112 and told him she had been shot and was dying.
Officers escorted him outside and took away his gun for safety. No officer attempted to enter room
161. At 11:49 a.m., Robb Elementary parents received an email from the school
informing them that “Robb Elementary is under a Lockdown Status due to gun shots in the area.
The students and staff are safe in the building. The building is secure in a Lockdown Status. Your
cooperation is needed at this time by not visiting the campus.” No one trapped in the school was
free to leave and the school intentionally diverted away means of rescue other than the officers
162. Defendant Betancourt was 70 miles away from Uvalde when the shooting began.
While driving to Robb Elementary, Betancourt called the mayor of the City of Uvalde and the
Chief of the Uvalde Police Department, and he then instructed TDPS officers on the scene that
163. This further ensured that M.Z., K.T., and the other victims would remain trapped
inside classrooms 111 and 112 with their murderer, unable to access rescue, emergency medical
164. By 11:49, Defendant Nolasco had arrived at Robb. He had been in regular text
contact with Defendant Betancourt. Around this time, Nolasco texted Betancourt, “Barricaded at
the school,” although he had access to information that should have indicated to him that Ramos
165. Also around this time, Defendant Nolasco told his deputies, “DPS is coming. I got
the captain. We need to, we need to get this contained and see who’s in charge.” Likewise, it
should have been apparent to Nolasco that “containment” was an inappropriate response to an
active shooter.
166. Defendant Nolasco had not completed a state active shooter training, and his office
did not have an active shooter policy in place on May 24, 2022.
167. By 11:51 a.m., officers from at least seven different agencies were on site. Officers
had rifles and body armor. No officer attempted to enter the classroom at this time. In total, 376
law enforcement officers from 23 law enforcement agencies would arrive on scene that day. Upon
information and belief, by 12:00 p.m.¾27 minutes after the shooter entered the school¾there
168. At 12:09 p.m. Defendant Arredondo instructed officers not to perform a breach of
the classroom. He told officers that “time is on our side right now,” despite the fact that “we
probably have kids in there [Classrooms 111 and 112].” Time was not on the trapped children’s
side. They were dying in the classrooms that officers had surrounded.
169. A minute later, at 12:10 p.m, as desperation grew in the classroom, K.T. found her
teacher’s phone. She wiped the blood off of the screen and called 911. She told the 911 dispatcher
that there were a lot of bodies in her classroom and that her teacher, Ms. Mireles, was alive but
had been shot. K.T. asked for an ambulance. Ms. Mireles continued to suffer, even though she had
called her husband, Officer Ruiz, before 11:48 a.m. The law enforcement delay proved fatal for
her. K.T. begged the dispatcher for help, and she stayed on the phone with the 911 dispatcher for
17 minutes, risking her life if the shooter had realized that she was making that call. At one point,
the dispatcher asked her how many people were alive in the classroom with her. K.T. can be heard
counting: “One, two, three, four, five, six, six people. Seven, eight.” She hung up when she feared
that the shooter, who was taunting the children, was about to discover her.
170. At 12:12 p.m., the Law Enforcement Individual Defendants received a radio
dispatch that one of the classrooms was “full of victims.” This information was communicated
directly to Defendants Pargas and Nolasco, among others. Defendant Pargas stepped out of the
school building to contact the dispatcher for more information about the K.T.’s 911 call. He was
even given her name. This confirmation of what should have already been obvious did not change
the response of the Law Enforcement Individual Defendants. They did not make any attempt to
“stop the killing,” the primary tenet of all active shooter training and responses. Instead, they
171. By 12:13 p.m., the U.S. Border Patrol Tactical Unit (“BORTAC”) commander,
Paul Guerrero, arrived on scene. He informed other officers that it was “going to take time” to
breach the door. He was then told by other officers that there were students in the classroom with
the gunman. His response was to leave the building to retrieve a breaching tool from his car.
172. A student in classroom 111 called 911 at 12:16 p.m., and stayed on the phone for a
minute and 17 seconds. Also at 12:16 p.m., Defendant Pargas called his UPD dispatchers to get
further details about the radio message concerning a classroom “full of victims” that he received
four minutes earlier. He was told by dispatch that the call came from a student (who we now know
to have been Plaintiff K.T.) and that eight or nine were still alive in the room, but the student
couldn’t be sure of the exact number because it was hard to tell who was injured versus who was
already dead. Defendant acting Chief Pargas said, “Ok, ok, thanks,” and ended the call with
dispatch. He entered the school briefly at 12:17 p.m., mentioned victims to a Border Patrol officer,
and walked back out of the school at 12:20. He spent the next 30 minutes outside and never
173. Around 12:19 p.m., Defendant Zamora suggested, without evidence, that perhaps
Ramos had shot himself. He was wrong. He also continued to stand in the hallway, barricading the
174. At 12:20 p.m., Defendant Arredondo told another officer, “We have victims in there.
I don’t want to have any more. You know what I’m saying?” He continued to make no attempt to
immediately enter the classrooms instead opting to continue his policy of treating Ramos as a
barricaded subject. Indeed, when at one point it appeared a group of officers were preparing for a
breach Defendant Arredondo said, “tell them to f*****g wait.” Defendant Arredondo’s flagrant
disregard for the lives of the children in the classroom was apparent, as he even stated in an
interview that “the thought crossed my mind to start shooting through that wall” into the
175. At 12:21 p.m., after a 37-minute break in shooting, Ramos began firing again from
inside the classroom. A team of law enforcement officers with rifles and tactical gear approached
the classroom but made no attempt to enter the classroom. Among those that did not attempt to
approach the classroom in response to the shots fired was Defendant Kindell. He continued to
confer with Border Patrol agents instead of rushing the classroom as active shooter protocol
requires. This conference clogged the hallway and contributed to barricading the students and
176. Detective Kindell was later fired by TPDS. Upon information and belief, TDPS
director Stephen McCraw wrote to Kindell in a letter that, “[y]ou should have recognized the
incident was and remained an active shooter situation which demanded an active shooter response
rather than a barricaded subject situation.” Upon information and belief, his firing was justified
under chapters of the TDPS manual that require officers to “maintain sufficient competency to
properly perform their duties and assume the responsibilities of their positions,” and directs
officers to take action “for the detection, prevention and prosecution of violators of any criminal
law … not part of their regular police duties” if “the exigencies of the situation require immediate
police action.”
177. At 12:30 p.m., Defendant Betancourt arrived (he later told investigators he had not
arrived until 12:45 p.m., which was false). Defendant Betancourt instructed state police officers
on site to remain outside and establish a perimeter, rather than rush inside, as active shooter
178. At 12:34 p.m., Defendants Coronado and Arredondo conferred and agreed that
there were people in the room with Ramos and casualties as well.
179. At 12:36 p.m., K.T. called 911 again. She told the dispatcher, “There’s a school
shooting.” She was told to stay on the line and keep quiet. Because she could hear the police
outside her classroom door, K.T. asked the dispatcher, “Can you tell the police to come to my
room?” K.T. told the 911 dispatcher that she could open the door to her classroom so that the
police gathered outside could enter. The dispatcher told her not to do that. K.T. complied with the
911 dispatcher’s order and did not open the classroom door.
180. M.Z. also heard the law enforcement officers gathered outside the door to
classroom 112. Her friend lay next to her, dying, and M.Z. told her, “don’t worry. They’re coming
to save us.” M.Z. had to wait many more minutes for rescue, and during that time she watched her
friend die.
181. As these events were unfolding in the building, parents and family members of the
students gathered in large numbers outside of the school. Parents yelled at officers to go in. Many
family members, hearing gunfire and seeing no discernable police response, wanted to go into the
classroom themselves. Defendant Nolasco kept parents from entering the school, even as parents
182. Officers, including Defendants Dorflinger and Suarez, began yelling at, shoving,
restraining, and tackling people outside. A fence was destroyed as police threw a man into it. Other
parents were tased, handcuffed, and pepper sprayed outside the building, all while the police failed
183. During this time, Plaintiff Ruben Zamora was outside Robb Elementary. Plaintiff
Ruben Zamora had asked his father-in-law to bring a rifle to the school, with the hope that he could
help rescue his daughter and the other children in classrooms 111 and 112. He was prevented from
mounting a rescue operation by the law enforcement defendants, and in particular the law
184. The law enforcement delays were so lengthy that the local Wal-Mart store learned
that there was an active shooter at Robb and had time to deliver a pallet of water bottles to be
handed out to first responders. Plaintiff Ruben Zamora, kept away from engaging in rescue
operations, had to resort to handing out water to the first responders who were doing nothing to
rescue his daughter, M.Z., and the other children in classrooms 111 and 112.
185. Inside classrooms 111 and 112, children and teachers lay dying. Some lay in their
own blood, some in the blood of their friends. One child waited so long in his hiding spot under a
table that he began to fall asleep. For 77 minutes, the Law Enforcement Individual Defendants
were present and armed but inexplicably failed to breach the classroom and stop the killing. Their
delays lengthened the time that Plaintiffs Christina Zamora, Ruben Zamora, and Jamie Torres
suffered emotional distress, waiting for news of what happened to their beloved children. And their
delays lengthened the time that the children and teachers in classrooms 111 and 112, including
M.Z. and K.T., were exposed to Ramos’s murderous rampage and lay suffering.
186. While standing outside, doing nothing, before the breach, Defendant Maldonado
187. By 12:48 p.m., a BORTAC-led group of officers was finally preparing to breach
the door. However, Defendant Betancourt came over the radio with a message: “Hey, this is D.P.S.
Captain Betancourt. The team that’s going to make breach, I need you to stand by.” Thankfully,
188. Finally, around 12:50 p.m.—77 agonizing minutes after police first arrived, and 37
minutes after BORTAC arrived—a BORTAC-led tactical team breached the door and shot Ramos,
killing him. At least one of the deceased students still had a pulse after the classroom was breached.
189. Even after the BORTAC team killed Salvador Ramos, the Law Enforcement
Defendants continued to fail to follow their active shooting training, because they did not “stop
the dying.” During the 77 minutes preceding the killing of Ramos, there was no systematic attempt
to plan for the many casualties who would need emergency medical treatment and transport.
Because of the barricade, ambulances were unable to park directly next to the entrance to the
school since law enforcement vehicles blocked their way. And helicopters that offered to land at
the school with supplies of blood and the ability to transport victims to Level I trauma facilities
were turned away. There were so few available ambulances that injured children were transported
190. Plaintiff M.Z. experienced pain and suffering when she was removed from the
classroom. She could not be placed directly in an ambulance, and instead was initially transported
in the bed of a Border Patrol pickup truck. M.Z. experienced pain and suffering because she was
not immediately placed on a helicopter to be flown to a Level I trauma facility, and instead was
taken to a local hospital that was ill equipped to treat her catastrophic injuries. She recalls an EMT
continuously saying “stay with me” as she was transported back and forth. Upon information and
belief, this was because the Law Enforcement Defendants turned away helicopters that offered to
191. Plaintiff K.T. was carried out of the classroom by an employee of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security. She was in shock and was so traumatized that she did not know
her own name. The DHS employee handed K.T. to a first responder who placed K.T. onto a school
bus with other injured children. The school bus took them to the hospital, but there were no medical
F. The Law Enforcement Defendants’ Actions Were a Proximate Cause of Harm to the
Plaintiffs.
192. Throughout this period, officers employed by the Law Enforcement Municipal
193. Reports have indicated that, as of May 24, 2022, approximately half of the Uvalde
Police Department Officers had not received active shooter training. And of the Uvalde County
Plaintiffs’ clearly established constitutional rights in treating the situation as a “barricaded subject”
situation when all indications were that the situation involved an active shooter. Their actions
were reckless, unconscionable, unreasonable, and contrary to clearly established protocols for
195. Thus, they did not follow the first principle of active shooter response: immediately
distract, isolate, and neutralize the active shooter. They did not do what they should have been
196. The Law Enforcement Municipal Defendants failed to train and supervise their
employees, resulting in a law enforcement response to the shooting at Robb Elementary that
worsened the danger and resulted in children being trapped in two classrooms with their murderer
for 77 minutes as he continued killing and as M.Z., K.T., and their classmates lay dying and
suffering.
Arredondo, and Nolasco, overrode active shooter protocol and made a new policy to treat Ramos
as a barricaded subject, contrary to the clear facts in front of them as well as the existing active
shooter policy. Arredondo stated the day after the shooting that he was “certain” he heard the
shooter reload one time¾which should have signaled to him that 1) the threat was not over and 2)
198. The Law Enforcement Municipal Defendants’ failures also caused harm to the
Plaintiffs because, even after the BORTAC team “stopped the killing,” the Law Enforcement
Municipal Defendants, through their officers, failed to “stop the dying,” another requirement of all
active shooter responses. As detailed above, not only did they fail to render lifesaving medical
treatment, but many officers’ actions also made it much more difficult for emergency medical
responders to triage, treat, and transport the injured and dying children and teachers.
K.T.
199. While the massacre unfolded on May 24, 2022, K.T. lay for over an hour with her
eyes open, pretending to be dead. She lay with her eyes open because she saw that her classmates
who were dead had their eyes open, and she wanted to do everything that she could to not rouse
the suspicions of the shooter as he moved back and forth between classrooms 111 and 112. Because
she couldn’t close her eyes, K.T. saw her classmates and friends dying. K.T. had only recently
transferred to Robb Elementary, but in that time she had become close to another student. When
she realized that her friend had been shot and was not moving, she crawled over to her and hugged
200. K.T. also witnessed Salvador Ramos taunting her classmates who still lived. He
sat at the teacher’s desk, playing scary music on his phone. At one point, he was in classroom 111
and called out, pretending to be the police, asking if anyone in classroom 112 needed help. K.T.
tried to convince the girl next to her not to call out for help, but that child did, and Ramos came
201. K.T. had shrapnel injuries, but when she arrived at the hospital, she was covered in
her classmates’ blood and brain tissue. She has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) and is in counseling. She also has a service dog who helps her with her PTSD. Despite
these services, K.T. is anxious and fearful. In new places, she needs to sit near an exit, so that she
can escape if she needs to; she also looks for hiding places in any room. She has told her mother
that walls don’t protect you from bullets, because Ramos was able to shoot through walls.
202. K.T. often has trouble sleeping, wanting to stay awake so she can keep watch. She
has not returned to school, and is instead doing remote learning, but she struggles to concentrate
and sometimes refuses to do schoolwork. She is often angry at the world for what she went through
and tells her mother that she will never trust the police to respond to an emergency. Sometimes
K.T. talks to survivors of other school shootings, and that helps her on her worst days.
Jamie Torres
203. On the day of the shooting, Jamie Torres was in Oklahoma, attending to family
business. Jamie and her family had recently relocated from Stillwater, Oklahoma, to Uvalde. When
she heard that something had happened at Robb, she immediately started the long drive to Uvalde.
She was panicking and took several wrong turns, and the trip back to Uvalde took many hours.
204. Jamie’s sister-in-law was at the hospital and found K.T. She called Ruben, K.T.’s
dad, who called Jamie as she was driving back to Uvalde. Ruben told her that K.T. was covered in
blood but did not have life-threatening physical injuries. It wasn’t until late that night that Jamie
was finally reunited with her daughter. The wait was excruciating.
205. Jamie Torres had to quit her job after the shooting. Caring for K.T. has become a
full-time job, especially on days when K.T. has not been able to sleep. Jamie regrets that she moved
to Uvalde and placed her daughter at Robb. She often thinks about how different things would be
if they had stayed in Oklahoma or if they had moved to San Antonio instead of Uvalde. She blames
206. Jamie knows that her daughter will recover, slowly, from the traumas she has
endured, and she is extraordinarily proud that her daughter showed bravery and courage on the
day of the shooting, even as the hundreds of law enforcement officers who responded to the
shooting did nothing to rescue K.T. and the other children in classrooms 111 and 112.
M.Z.
207. M.Z. was evacuated from classroom 112 in the back of a Border Patrol pickup truck.
From there, she was placed in an ambulance. The EMTs in the ambulance had wanted M.Z. to be
airlifted to a Level I trauma facility in San Antonio, but there were no helicopters standing by, so
they drove her to Uvalde Memorial Hospital, a Level IV trauma facility, which is the lowest trauma
level rating. Several hours later, M.Z. was airlifted to University Hospital in San Antonio. Upon
information and belief, that delay extended the time before she could receive the lifesaving care
208. M.Z. spent the next several days in a medication-induced coma and the next several
weeks in an intensive care unit. Over two months passed before she could safely be discharged
from the hospital. She has undergone over sixty surgeries, and many painful medical procedures.
She needs more surgeries and ongoing rehabilitative care. M.Z. has a long road ahead to her
physical recovery.
209. M.Z. struggles emotionally. She has been diagnosed with PTSD. Loud noises
terrify her, and she has nightmares. Her family has a sign asking visitors not to knock or ring the
doorbell, but some visitors still knock. When they do, M.Z. has to run and hide. She is frightened
to sleep alone many nights, so she sleeps in her older brother’s room or he sleeps in hers.
210. On May 24 around noon, Christina saw a Facebook post that there were shots fired
at Robb. The post was made by someone who was a janitor for UCISD and the dad of one of her
daughter’s friends. She and Ruben had been at the school earlier in the day for the awards
ceremony.
211. Christina assumed it was a “bailout” that caused the report of shots fired, but she
wanted to go to school anyway. Christina’s cousin, who worked with her, offered to drive Christina
to Robb Elementary, and when they arrived, they found many cars and nowhere to park—they had
to park far down the street and approach the school on foot. They were never able to actually go
into the school and instead were turned away by a police officer outside of the school grounds and
told to go to the Civic Center where students were being bussed. Christina still had no idea that
there was an active shooter at the school, only that there were reports of “shots fired.”
212. Ruben was able to get to Robb because he arrived at a different side of the school.
He handed out bottles of water to first responders, but he grew increasingly worried and concerned
213. At the Civic Center, there were no official updates, only rumors. Parents were
frantic and scared. Emergency vehicles were passing by. Christina kept thinking and hoping that
214. At the Civic Center, Christina called a relative who worked at the hospital. She
asked the relative to check for M.Z. There was someone who had been admitted who had a similar
215. At the hospital, Christina was taken upstairs. They told her M.Z. was not there,
though Christina later learned that this was wrong. So, Christina left the hospital and went back to
the Civic Center. She called Ruben and told him to go there as well.
216. Christina returned to the Civic Center, and her 24-year-old son met her there. It was
then that she learned from Irma Garcia’s sister that her sister, a teacher at Robb Elementary in
rooms 111 and 112, had been shot by a gunman who entered that room. Ms. Garcia’s sister shared
that she heard that her sister Irma was shot and injured, and that students in that classroom were
also shot and injured. Christina would later learn that Irma Garcia died from her gunshot wounds.
217. Terrified after learning that an active shooter was in her daughter’s classroom,
Christina received a call from the Uvalde Hospital. M.Z. was being airlifted, in critical condition.
Christina and Ruben rushed back to the Uvalde Hospital, hoping to catch the helicopter before it
took off because they did not want M.Z. to feel alone and scared. The helicopter had already taken
off by the time they reached the hospital, so Christina and Ruben immediately drove to San
Antonio, and they saw M.Z. for the first time at 6 p.m. in San Antonio.
218. During all this time, M.Z.’s older brother, Z.Z., was on lockdown at his middle
219. Christina and Ruben spent the next two months living in M.Z.’s hospital room in
San Antonio. Their older children lived at a Ronald McDonald House that was adjacent to the
hospital.
220. The family had to relocate to San Antonio from Uvalde, because M.Z. requires
daily physical therapy, occupational therapy, and counseling. Z.Z. misses his friends and his
routine in Uvalde, but they cannot return until M.Z. no longer requires daily visits to doctors,
221. When they left the hospital, Christina experienced serious anxiety. She felt that,
since her worst fears had happened to her family, the world no longer could ever feel safe to her.
222. Christina had to leave her job. She spends her days caring for M.Z. and Z.Z. and
223. Ruben took four months off from work. At work, he is more on edge now, because
the shooting made him realize that you can never know what will happen. His work has an element
of danger, and after the shooting, he is sometimes scared and has to get help for tasks he could do
alone previously. Ruben had to turn down a promotion at work because he couldn’t handle any
more stress. He is worried about all the days off he needs to take.
V.
CAUSES OF ACTION
224. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege the above paragraphs as if stated fully here.
225. Defendant Daniel Defense was subject to the general duty imposed on all persons
226. Defendant Daniel Defense had a duty to exercise reasonable care in selling, offering
for sale, marketing, and shipping its firearms, including AR-15 rifles, and to refrain from engaging
227. Defendant Daniel Defense’s marketing of its AR-15-style rifles breached its duty
to exercise reasonable care. The company’s marketing encouraged the illegal and dangerous
misuse of its AR-15-style rifles by marketing them to the civilian purchasers, including via social
media, with violent and militaristic imagery, unfairly and illegally implying that civilians can use
their weapons for offensive combat-like missions, and, in particular, by appealing to the thrill-
seeking and impulsive tendencies of susceptible teens and young men who are attracted to violence
and military fantasies. Aside from the notoriety gained through product insertion of the DDM4 V7
assault rifle into a popular video game such as Call of Duty, much of Daniel Defense’s illegal
marketing strategy is profit-driven. Both Daniel Defense and Call of Duty have profited
228. On or about May 16, 2022, Defendant Daniel Defense sold the rifle to Ramos that
229. Ramos’ purchase and illegal use of the Daniel Defense DDM4 V7 was a direct
result and foreseeable consequence of the way the company marketed its AR-15-style rifles.
230. Each of the above acts or omissions by Defendant Daniel Defense constitutes
negligence, and that negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries to the other Plaintiffs.
231. Defendant Daniel Defense also violated the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC
Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), by knowingly engaging in unfair trade practices. This claim is thus
exempted from immunity conferred by the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 7902.
232. Daniel Defense’s marketing practices were unfair because they encourage
purchasers to illegally misuse their AR-15-style rifles and because of the other ways in which it
marketed these rifles, all as described in this complaint. This foreseeably caused or was likely to
cause substantial injury to consumers and foreseeable victims of gun violence by increasing the
risk that disaffected purchasers predisposed towards committing acts of mass violence will carry
out those acts, and by encouraging them to choose especially lethal weapons to do so, such as the
233. Plaintiffs are consumers who could not reasonably avoid the injuries caused by
these marketing practices. They purchase school supplies, clothing, sneakers, and backpacks,
among other things, as part of the educational process, but they could not reasonably avoid the
harms caused by Daniel Defense’s marketing. For instance, K.T.’s father had trained her in how
to respond in the event of a mass shooting at her school, but she still suffered grave harms. Both
M.Z. and K.T. (and their families) had no way to avoid the risk that someone would do to them
exactly what Daniel Defense’s marketing encouraged: carry out a combat operation against
civilians.
234. Plaintiffs are also consumers of health care services—including medical and mental
health care services. As a proximate result of Daniel Defense’s actions, Plaintiffs have suffered
significant economic harm and have incurred substantial additional costs to address medical and
mental health care injuries and needs that they could not reasonably avoid.
235. The increased risk of mass violence perpetrated by adolescent and young men
caused by Daniel Defense’s marketing practices is not outweighed by any countervailing benefits
to consumers or competition. Daniel Defense could cease marketing its AR-15 rifles to adolescent
and young men through appeals to the military and the offensive combat capabilities of its rifles
without creating a burden on itself or any other individual or entity. Instead, it has continued these
activities after being confronted with the tragic consequences of its marketing strategy.
236. Ramos’s purchase of the especially lethal and destructive Daniel Defense DDM4
V7 rifle to carry out the massacre at Robb Elementary was, upon information and belief, influenced
by Daniel Defense’s marketing as described above, and the result was a more lethal attack, more
237. These knowing violations of the FTC Act were a proximate cause of Ramos’s
purchase and decision to use the Daniel Defense DDM4 V7 rifle and the injuries to M.Z. and K.T.,
both physical and psychological, and the psychological distress suffered by Christina and Ruben
238. Daniel Defense also caused, through its negligence, Christina and Ruben Zamora
to suffer emotional pain and suffering, economic losses, including considerable financial expense
for medical and mental healthcare and treatment, and diminished income capacity, and they will
239. Daniel Defense also caused, through its negligence, Jamie Torres to suffer
emotional pain and suffering, economic losses, including considerable financial expense for
medical and mental healthcare and treatment, and diminished income capacity, and she will
240. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege the above paragraphs as if stated fully here.
242. By marketing the illegal misuse of its products, Daniel Defense violates the FTC
Act, which prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” 15 U.S.C. §
45(a)(1). An unfair act or practice “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers
which is not reasonably avoided by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing
243. Daniel Defense marketed its rifles in a manner that encourages illegal activities,
namely engaging in offensive combat, against civilians, on American soil. It targets this marketing
at the group most likely to engage in violent and/or impulsive behavior: adolescent and young men.
244. These marketing practices proximately caused the harms suffered by Plaintiffs.
245. Plaintiffs are consumers who could not reasonably avoid the injuries caused by
246. The risk of injury from Daniel Defense’s marketing is not outweighed by benefits
to consumers or competition. Daniel Defense chose to push the envelope in its marketing strategy
to gain “notoriety.” There is no reason Daniel Defense could not focus its marketing on the lawful
247. The Plaintiffs are within the class of people that the FTC Act is designed to protect.
This claim is thus exempted from immunity conferred by the Protection of Lawful Commerce in
248. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege the above paragraphs as if stated fully herein.
249. Defendant Oasis Outback had a duty to exercise reasonable care in transferring
firearms, including AR-15-style rifles, and to refrain from engaging in any activity creating
250. Defendant Oasis Outback’s transfer of the Daniel Defense DDM4 V7 rifle to
251. Despite his youth and having just turned 18 days before, Ramos spent thousands of
dollars on multiple guns and large quantities of ammunition at and through Oasis Outback over a
four-day period, which was so unusual that it caused Oasis Outback’s owner to question Ramos
252. Other patrons at the store noticed Ramos acting unusual and nervous during these
repeat visits. He dressed in all black and, as one customer described him, he looked “like one of
253. Oasis Outback knew or reasonably should have known that Ramos was a dangerous
person who was likely to use the rifle he obtained from Oasis Outback for unlawful purposes,
when it knew, or reasonably should have known, that the person to whom the firearm being
supplied, Ramos, was likely to use the product in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical
injury to other persons; and in fact, Ramos did so use it. This claim is thus exempted from
immunity conferred by the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7902.
257. These acts were a but for and proximate cause of the injuries to M.Z. and K.T., both
physical and psychological, and the psychological distress suffered by Christina and Ruben
258. Oasis Outback also caused, through its negligence, Christina and Ruben Zamora to
suffer emotional pain and suffering, economic losses, including considerable financial expense for
medical and mental healthcare and treatment, and diminished income capacity, and they will
259. Oasis Outback also caused, through its negligence, Jamie Torres to suffer emotional
pain and suffering, economic losses, including considerable financial expense for medical and
mental healthcare and treatment, and diminished income capacity, and she will continue to incur
260. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege the above paragraphs as if stated fully herein.
261. Defendant Oasis Outback had a duty to exercise reasonable care in selling firearms
and ammunition, including AR-15 rifles, and to refrain from engaging in any activity creating
262. Defendant Oasis Outback’s sales of ammunition and an AR-15-style rifle to Ramos
263. Despite his youth and having just turned 18 days before, Ramos spent thousands of
dollars on multiple guns and large quantities of ammunition at and through Oasis Outback over a
four-day period, which was sufficiently unusual that it caused Oasis Outback’s owner to question
264. Other patrons at the store noticed Ramos acting unusual and nervous at the store
during these repeat visits. He dressed in all black and, as one customer described him, he looked
265. Oasis Outback knew or reasonably should have known that Ramos was a dangerous
person who was likely to use the firearms and ammunition he obtained from Oasis Outback for
267. Oasis Outback is a licensed seller of firearms. It sold ammunition and a firearm to
Ramos when it knew, or reasonably should have known, that the person to whom the ammunition
and firearm being supplied, Ramos, was likely to use the product in a manner involving
unreasonable risk of physical injury to other persons; and in fact, Ramos did so use it. This claim
is thus exempted from immunity conferred by the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act,
15 U.S.C. § 7902.
268. These acts were a but for and proximate cause of the injuries to M.Z. and K.T., both
physical and psychological, and the psychological distress suffered by Christina and Ruben
269. Oasis Outback also caused, through its negligence, Christina and Ruben Zamora to
suffer emotional pain and suffering, economic losses, including considerable financial expense for
medical and mental healthcare and treatment, and diminished income capacity, and they will
270. Oasis Outback also caused, through its negligence, Jamie Torres to suffer emotional
pain and suffering, economic losses, including considerable financial expense for medical and
mental healthcare and treatment, and diminished income capacity, and she will continue to incur
271. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege the above paragraphs as if stated fully herein.
272. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States protects individuals,
including Plaintiff, from unreasonable seizures at the hands of law enforcement. This protection
has been incorporated as against state and local actors, via the Fourteenth Amendment.
273. By using force and authority to involuntarily confine M.Z., K.T., and other students
and teachers inside classrooms 111 and 112 with Ramos, the Law Enforcement Individual
Defendants illegally seized M.Z. and K.T. in violation of the clearly established rights secured to
274. The Law Enforcement Individual Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the
constitutional rights of M.Z., K.T., and the other victims of the shooting at Robb Elementary.
275. As a direct and proximate result of the Law Enforcement Individual Defendants’
misconduct detailed above, Plaintiffs Christina Zamora, Ruben Zamora, M.Z., Jamie Torres, and
276. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege the above paragraphs as if stated fully herein.
277. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States creates a right
278. While this protection may not always require governmental actors to protect the
public from private actors, where harm inflicted by a private party also flows from a danger a state
actor has knowingly created, that violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process
protections.
279. A second exception to the rule exists where individuals are in the custody of the
state. In cases in which an individual is in the custody of the state, the state has a duty of care
280. By using force to barricade M.Z., K.T., and other students and teachers inside
classrooms 111 and 112 with Ramos, the Law Enforcement Individual Defendants illegally created
a dangerous environment for M.Z. and K.T. in which they were stripped of means to defend
themselves and cut off from sources of aid and rescue, in violation of the rights secured to them
281. M.Z. and K.T. were in the custody of the Law Enforcement Individual Defendants
because they took steps to “establish a perimeter,” and also stood in the hallway involuntarily
barricading them within classrooms 111 and 112. The Law Enforcement Individual Defendants
thus had a duty of care to M.Z. and K.T. which they breached by delaying their entry to the
classroom for well over an hour, thus denying them access to rescue and emergency medical
services.
282. The Law Enforcement Individual Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the
constitutional rights of M.Z., K.T., and the other victims of the shooting at Robb Elementary.
283. As a direct and proximate result of the Law Enforcement Individual Defendants’
284. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege the above paragraphs as if stated fully herein.
285. A municipality may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for “failure to supervise
or train,” where “(1) the supervisor either failed to supervise or train the subordinate official; (2) a
causal link exists between the failure to train or supervise and the violation of the plaintiff’s rights;
and (3) the failure to train or supervise amounts to deliberate indifference.” Goodman v. Harris
286. After the Columbine school shooting in 1999, 23 years before the events at Robb
Elementary School, law enforcement nationwide changed tactics on active shooter situations inside
schools—first responders began being trained to “immediately make entry and neutralize an active
shooter threat.” Another adaptation was the “Priority of Life Scale” which provided that saving the
lives of innocent civilians come before the lives of law enforcement and other responders.
287. Despite these national standards, the Uvalde Police Department, the Uvalde
Consolidated Independent School District-Police Department, and the Uvalde County Sheriff’s
Office failed to ensure that their police officers were adequately trained and failed to develop
meaningful plans to address an active shooter incident. Half of the Uvalde Police Department
officers and only 20% of Uvalde County Sheriff’s Office employees had received active shooter
288. This lack of training and egregious delay in response showed that Defendants
Arredondo, Pargas, and Nolasco were deliberately indifferent to the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of M.Z., K.T., and the other students and teachers whom they knew to be trapped
289. The failure to follow the active shooter trainings and policies by Defendants
Arredondo, Pargas, and Nolasco and the responding Law Enforcement Individual Defendant
officers was the driving force behind and actual cause of M.Z.’s and K.T.’s constitutional injuries.
290. The Law Enforcement Municipal Defendants failed to adequately train, supervise,
and discipline the Law Enforcement Individual Defendants regarding how to identify and respond
to an active shooter situation. The result was that law enforcement officers employed by the Law
Enforcement Municipal Defendants used force and authority to involuntarily barricade M.Z., K.T.,
and other students and teachers inside classrooms 111 and 112 with Ramos, and the Law
Enforcement Individual Defendants illegally seized M.Z. and K.T., in violation of the clearly
291. By virtue of these actions, the Law Enforcement Municipal Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to the constitutional rights of M.Z., K.T., and the other victims of the
292. As a direct and proximate result of the failure to adequately train, supervise, and
discipline the Law Enforcement Individual Defendants regarding how to identify and respond to
293. A municipality may also be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for action taken
pursuant to a municipal policy. “A single decision by a policy maker may, under certain
circumstances, constitute a policy for which the County may be liable.” Brown v. Bryan County,
294. Defendant Arredondo, as Chief of Police for the Uvalde Consolidated Independent
School District Police Department (UCISD-PD), was a final policymaker for the Uvalde
Consolidated Independent School District with regard to the tactics, arrests, and training of UCISD-
295. Defendant Pargas, as Acting Chief of Police for the Uvalde Police Department
(UPD), was a final policymaker for the City of Uvalde with regard to the tactics, arrests, and training
296. Defendant Nolasco, as Sheriff of Uvalde County, was a final policymaker for the
County of Uvalde with regard to the tactics, arrests, and training of UCSO officers at all relevant
times herein.
297. Defendants Arredondo, Pargas, and Nolasco, acting as final policymakers, decided
to disregard the active shooter policy and instituted a policy that was the exact opposite of “stop
the killing and then stop the dying” and all other written active shooter policies. Their new policy
was to barricade M.Z., K.T., and the other students and teachers inside two classrooms with a killer,
thus seizing them unreasonably and depriving them of emergency medical and rescue services and
298. As a direct and proximate result of this policy, Plaintiffs sustained the damages
alleged herein.
299. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege the above paragraphs as if stated fully herein.
300. A municipality may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for “failure to supervise
or train,” where “(1) the supervisor either failed to supervise or train the subordinate official; (2) a
causal link exists between the failure to train or supervise and the violation of the plaintiff's rights;
and (3) the failure to train or supervise amounts to deliberate indifference.” Goodman v. Harris
301. For the reasons set forth above, the Law Enforcement Individual Defendants have
violated M.Z.’s and K.T.’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
302. The Law Enforcement Municipal Defendants failed to adequately train, supervise,
and discipline the Law Enforcement Individual Defendants regarding how to identify and respond
to an active shooter situation. The result was that law enforcement officers employed by the Law
Enforcement Municipal Defendants used force to barricade M.Z., K.T., and other students and
teachers inside classrooms 111 and 112 with Ramos and illegally created a dangerous environment
for M.Z. and K.T. in which they were stripped of means to defend themselves and cut off from
sources of aid and rescue, in violation of the rights secured to them by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Further, M.Z. and K.T. were in the custody of law enforcement officers employed by the Law
Enforcement Municipal Defendants because they took steps to “establish a perimeter,” and also
stood in the hallway involuntarily barricading them within classrooms 111 and 112. This denied
her access to emergency medical and rescue services. And additionally, the custom of disregarding
safety policies, including maintaining and locking doors, placed M.Z. and K.T. in greater peril
303. By virtue of these actions, the Law Enforcement Municipal Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to the constitutional rights of M.Z., K.T., and the other victims of the
304. As a direct and proximate result of the failure to adequately train, supervise, and
discipline the Law Enforcement Individual Defendants regarding how to identify and respond to
305. A municipality may also be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for action taken
pursuant to a municipal policy. “A single decision by a policy maker may, under certain
circumstances, constitute a policy for which the County may be liable.” Brown v. Bryan County,
306. Defendants Arredondo, Pargas, and Nolasco acting as final policymakers, decided
to disregard the active shooter policy and instituted a policy to barricade M.Z., K.T., and the other
students and teachers inside classrooms with a killer, thus taking them into their custody and
increasing the danger to them, while also depriving them of emergency medical and rescue services
307. As a direct and proximate result of this policy, Plaintiffs sustained the damages
alleged herein.
VI.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
at trial;
b. Punitive damages against the Gun Industry Defendants and the Law
e. Such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.