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Citizenship Studies
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Cultural citizenship, education and democracy: redefining the good society

Nick Stevensona
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School of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Nottingham, UK

Online publication date: 27 July 2010

To cite this Article Stevenson, Nick(2010) 'Cultural citizenship, education and democracy: redefining the good society',
Citizenship Studies, 14: 3, 275 — 291
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 Citizenship Studies
Vol. 14, No. 3, June 2010, 275–291

Cultural citizenship, education and democracy: redefining

the good society
Nick Stevenson*

School of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Nottingham, UK

(Received 1 November 2007; final version received 2 September 2009)

This article explores notions of the good society in relation to recent debates in cultural
citizenship. Criticising Kantian approaches to citizenship, the article urges scholars to
discuss competing notions of the good. In this respect, I critically outline the work of
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Hannah Arendt and her ideas concerning the importance of a sense of responsibility for
the maintenance of the public realm. In particular I focus on her ideas related to
education and the importance of political traditions. However, the argument suggests
that Arendt fails to outline an idea of a common citizenship where all citizens might
flourish. At this point I turn to the work of Raymond Williams and his idea of the long
revolution. This notion does indeed outline an idea of the good society that seeks to
describe the gradual evolution of an educated and participatory democracy. The long
revolution links ideas of education, political participation and the construction of a
culture in common. However, Williams’ vision cannot simply be returned to given the
rise of multiculturalism, globalisation and the dominance of neoliberalism. In the final
sections of the article I look at more cosmopolitan answers to the idea of the good
society, but suggest that they need to be reconnected to the traditions of ethical
socialism. Cultural citizenship then becomes redefined as a future society where
citizens have access to a genuinely democratic education, a pluralistic public sphere
and a social state that would guarantee their welfare.
Keywords: cultural citizenship; education; democracy; neoliberalism; good society

One of the contentions of this article is the need for any account of cultural citizenship to
engage with the question as to what counts as a good society. That question arguably takes
the debate on the practice of citizenship in contemporary societies beyond Kantian
approaches that have been concerned with ideas of social contract (Rawls 1972) or
procedural norms (Habermas 1996). These approaches have little connection with the
social and cultural organisation of the practice of citizenship within contemporary society,
and neglect to analyse the continued importance of local and national political traditions
and histories of organising political sentiment and connection. I am also concerned that
they offer an overly minimal understanding of how historical understandings of the ‘good
society’ might become reformulated over time.
Alternatively, debates by Turner (2006) and others have sought to emphasise the ways
in which citizenship is being transformed by questions of human rights. Such a view tends
to suggest that a closer relationship between human rights and citizenship will enable
humanity to build a future that is both cosmopolitan and socially inclusive. While I have

*Email: [email protected]

ISSN 1362-1025 print/ISSN 1469-3593 online

q 2010 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/13621021003731823
http://www.informaworld.com
 276 N. Stevenson

some sympathy with this view, I think that it radically underestimates the continuing
importance of the locality in organising the central features of citizenship as well as the
thinning out of citizenship by neoliberalism. Indeed my starting point is that power in a
communications-based society depends upon the ability to rule through the domain of
ideas, beliefs and culture in terms of either consent or fear. As Gramsci (1971, p. 182)
argued, dominant groups become hegemonic by transcending narrow definitions of
economic interest in order to take on the concerns of subordinate groups. Here my
argument is that the central ideological and cultural struggle of our network-based global
society concerns the extent to which our ways of life and dominant institutions are defined
by neoliberal capitalism or more democratic logics and practices.
The idea of cultural citizenship, on the other hand, has been more concerned with
issues related to respect. Cultural understandings of citizenship are not only concerned
with ‘formal’ processes, such as who is entitled to vote and the maintenance of an active
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civil society, but crucially with whose cultural practices are disrespected, marginalised,
stereotyped and rendered invisible. As Renato Rosaldo (1999, p. 260) argues, cultural
citizenship is concerned with ‘who needs to be visible, to be heard, and to belong’.
Similarly I have sought to argue that cultural citizenship is about the ability in a shared
cosmopolitan context to participate in the polity while being respected and not reduced to
an Other (Stevenson 2001, 2003). Cultural citizenship then becomes the struggle for a
communicative society that is fearful of the threat of normalisation, exclusion and silence.
These features all seek to investigate the ways in which cultural diversity, technology and
globalisation foster a sense of an overlapping and contested cultural domain.
However, while these remain important debates, I have more recently been concerned
with the extent to which they currently fail to map the declining fortunes of the nation-
state, widespread public cynicism, the drop in election turnouts, the rise of privatised
living patterns and more general forms of disengagement from the political sphere
(Castells 1997, Putnam 2000). In addition, we might add that the growing environmental
crisis, consumerism, neoliberal policies of privatisation and the widening of the gap
between rich and poor pose substantial problems for democratic societies. Current
formulations of cultural citizenship seemingly underestimate the impact of capitalism on
cultural practices, and fail to take account of the relative durability of the idea of the public
sphere and democratic forms of participation. Here I follow Castoriadis (1991) in arguing
that democracy is itself a social and historical creation that allows individuals to both
formulate laws and place these rules under critical scrutiny.
It is, then, the struggle for a democratic and autonomous society as opposed to a
society ruled by neoliberalism or an authoritarian state that should be central to the
concerns of cultural citizenship. Here cultural citizenship needs to engage with more
worldly contexts while connecting with the need to foster respectful, democratic, engaged
and learning societies. Democratic ways of life then need to be culturally represented and
become ‘ordinary’ features of daily practice. Yet, as we shall see, not only is democracy
currently under threat, but it needs to find wider forms of expression within wider cultural
institutions such as the media and education. Only when public spaces become
participatory and democratic spaces can we say that the project for an autonomous society
has come to fruition. These are essential requirements, given that modern citizens are
capable through cultural and democratic engagements of reformulating their current
identities and reimagining their sense of self and of connection to others.
 Citizenship Studies 277

The good society and political theory

Recent writing on questions related to contemporary citizenship has tended to ignore the
idea of the good society. More often there is a consideration of the competing traditions of
liberalism, republicanism and communitarianism before moving into a discussion about
global transformations (Faulks 2000, Delanty 2000). While these debates inevitably deal
with issues that are related to notions of political community, participation and individual
liberty, they often fail to deal with more specific cultural contexts and political traditions
of thinking. In particular most of these accounts neglect to analyse ideas related to host
political traditions and a number of contextual features such as the ways in which the
public sphere becomes constructed in the context of everyday life. Ideas of the ‘good
society’ are sometimes utilised by American communitarian thinkers, but these debates
are mainly authoritarian in character and conceive of the cultural in an overly unified way
(Etzioni 2000).
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The reasons for the neglect of the idea of the ‘good society’ are multifarious. The first
has been the contemporary dominance of neoliberal practices and ideas which aim to
reproduce a view of the social as a place of atomised competition and free markets that
actively excludes any notion of the good society. To reintroduce such ideas would
seemingly seek to resurrect an age of state patronage where bureaucracies sought to
govern what was in the ‘common interest’. Neoliberalism not only argues that the
individual is the best decider of his or her best own interests, but that the market is the most
efficient mechanism for the allocation of cultural and economic resources. A society built
upon a lean state, minimal form of democracy and mass consumerism has little need of
extended discussions on the nature of the good society. Indeed one of the key ideological
mechanisms of capitalism is to banish the possibility of such exchanges as the market
seeks to take hold of and extend its influence over the fabric of cultural institutions and
practices. Of course someone may object that it is market capitalism and consumerism’s
ability to be able to define the quality of the good life that ensures their continued
popularity. This is of course partially true. However, the current inability of modern
societies to engage in radical thinking in respect of alternatives to the current order tends to
suggest that modern citizens are not only losing their appetite for democracy, but for
critical thinking as well. Democratic citizenship, as Castoriadis (1991, p. 113) argues,
depends upon a shared culture of critical thought and questioning that potentially offers
citizens an equal chance to speak for themselves and to do so authentically. However,
neoliberalism has not only presided over widely reported widening gaps in wealth, the
running down of the social state and enhanced forms of insecurity: it currently has no
answer to a number of more global crises from environmental degradation to the
widespread hostility towards asylum seekers and immigrant populations (Bauman 2006,
Harvey 2006). Here the need becomes central for an idea of the good society that is able to
question the privatisation of the public domain which has increasingly been given over to
the requirements of capitalism and business elites.
Secondly, much current political theory is currently preoccupied by ideas of the ‘right’
rather than the ‘good’. These features are deeply embedded in the philosophical history of
the West and are a practical barrier making it difficult for citizens to think of alternatives.
This has meant that philosophers have tended to understand the social through a minimal
set of public rules describing the universal rules of citizenship. There is in this respect, a
considerable reluctance to engage in ideas of the good society should they be perceived as
illiberal. The not unreasonable concern is that any idea of the ‘good society’ could be
normalising. Yet there is a tradition of thinking on the nature of the good society that can
 278 N. Stevenson

be traced back to Aristotle and could also be connected to ethical socialist traditions of
thought. An Aristotelian approach is mainly concerned with how citizens might be said to
live well and be relatively virtuous, while flourishing in the context of shared
communities. Aristotle (2004) argues that the ultimate aim of life is happiness and that this
is sought through practices that are ends in themselves. Ethics then is a matter of practical
activities where the teacher seeks to become a better teacher and the journalist better at
communication. In other words, to be happy, human beings seek self-realisation and
fulfilment. In this tradition of thinking, citizens become virtuous by both living and acting
well. As Alasdair MacIntyre (1998) points out, such views are in stark contrast to accounts
that seek to formulate universal laws in order to regulate the duties of the citizen. Usually
inspired by Kant, such approaches seek to tell the citizen what he should not do. A point
not considered by McIntyre is that perhaps it is not surprising in the context of European
history (including two world wars, colonialism and slavery, and the holocaust) that this
kind of thinking has become prevalent. In the European context much philosophical
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reflection that emphasises the ‘right’ over the ‘good’ has taken place in the context of
human catastrophe. However the regime instituted by contemporary liberal society is far
from ‘neutral’ and has been progressively colonised by a capitalist imaginary that is hostile
to more democratic sentiments and understandings. Here the good society is not only the
democratic society but also enables the production of public spaces that allow citizens to
deliberate upon what it means to live in a community where other human-beings flourish
and citizens are able to live virtuous lives (MacIntyre 1999, p. 77).
A key consideration of much of the ethical thinking in the context of the holocaust has
been how to make sure that similar events never happen again. Norman Geras (1998)
argues that the ‘indifference’ of many ordinary Germans to the fate of the Jews is what is
horrifying in the study of this period. The holocaust was made possible because people did
not care enough about one another. To counteract this problem, Geras proposes the
universal principle that unless I am prepared to come to the aid of others then I should not
reasonably expect anyone to help me when I am in danger. In our troubled world Geras
argues that the reasons that are commonly offered for not attending political meetings are
merely excuses designed to veil a lack of concern for fellow human beings. Similarly,
while Zygmunt Bauman (1993) is critical of the need to the need to formulate universal
ethical codes, his arguments are centrally concerned with issues related to bystander
ethics. Bauman seeks to recover an argument related to our shared responsibility for the
other. The moral person then is the person who does not shrug off his or her
responsibilities onto society. We have then a primary duty to care for one another. Terry
Eagleton (2003) has remarked that Kantian-inspired arguments are largely built upon the
necessity of self-sacrifice in troubling circumstances. In this regard, there is surely no
vision of the good society without a willingness to behave responsibly. It is just that to be
moral can be equally about the discovery of a society based upon human happiness and
fulfilment.
Charles Taylor (1989a) has observed that the idea of the good society switches our
emphasis from what is the right course of action to what is good for all. There is no vision
of the good society without also an idea of what it means to be a good person. This is a
shared language of discrimination that allows us to distinguish and evaluate between a
number of different acts. There is then no fully inclusive culture as any description of the
good society will of necessity seek to foster certain ways of life rather than others. In other
words, the idea of the good society allows us to consider what it is good to do even if we do
not feel obligated to do so. Such features inevitably require a shift in language into a
discussion of human potential and the possibility of cultural development and learning
 Citizenship Studies 279

(Taylor 1989b). Such a view arguably shifts our shared discussion into questions related to
a critical humanism, but also suggests that any radical movement for change needs to be
concerned with issues related to education in the broadest sense. How we might build a
good society on our shared capacities to dialogue, engage in processes of critical reflection
while valuing the ways in which we become interconnected with one another and nature is
part of what I shall explore here. In particular notions of the good society would ask us to
jettison concerns about liberal neutrality for a project that was more explicitly concerned
with what Anthony Giddens (1999, p. 76) has called a ‘democratising democracy’.
As Giddens argues, many have become cynical and sceptical about democracy as it mainly
operates at the national levels distant from more ordinary concerns and has failed to deal
with the challenge of more globally orientated times or foster a robust civic culture.
It seems to me however that this is not just a matter of localising democracy, but, as John
Dewey (1977) understood, we are born relational (and I would add emotional) beings but
not democratic beings. Unless the ability to deliberate upon matters of common concern is
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an ordinary feature of everyday life, such features are unlikely to take root in the wider
community.
It is then only through democratic dialogue that society is able to put itself into
question and distance itself from previously held beliefs and perspectives. Such a view
necessitates the operation of a diversity of public spheres. Charles Taylor (1995, p. 259)
has argued that we can talk coherently about public space the extent to which it allows for
common spaces of deliberation on matters of shared interest. The issue as to what is in the
common good needs to become a matter of on-going controversy. It is then less a matter of
returning to Aristotle’s definition of the good society, but more of recognising that what
we take for the common good is the matter of ongoing social and historical creation.
The common good then has to be the outcome of a diversity of perspectives and
intellectual challenge rather than simply being imposed by powerful interests and media
forms of control. Democratic forms of deliberation, criticism and argument are central to
any notion of the good society helping fellow citizens explore crucial questions of
autonomy, solidarity and the care of vulnerable others. However, the ‘cultural’ dimension
of the argument means that these questions should not simply be explored through the
formal public sphere but also need to be questioned by the media and just as crucially
within education. Here my argument is that a society that has learned to respect the Other
has done so as a consequence of upholding democratic virtues of voice, learning to listen
to others and of course encountering the freedom to shift position. These features, as we
shall see through the work of Hannah Arendt and Raymond Williams, are a matter of
changing historical perspective and ongoing debate.

Hannah Arendt and the politics of thinking

If we begin our concerns about citizenship from the position of how we can be responsible
and prevent the re-emergence of mass genocide, then this will be different from the
attempt to build a society where the vast majority of human beings can be said to flourish.
Even Hannah Arendt (2003), whose work is explicitly focused upon the need to defend a
pluralistic public sphere against the threat of totalitarianism, could not be said to have
articulated a vision of the good society beyond the need to foster a sense of personal
responsibility amongst citizens and a republic built upon equal rights. However, the part of
Arendt’s thought I would seek to recover is based upon the importance of building a
political culture based on ‘thinking’.
 280 N. Stevenson

Arendt wrote in the context of totalitarian Europe and what she perceived as the rise of
blatant criminality. The morality of the holocaust and the gulag is made possible through
the undermining of the rule of law and when citizens lack a sense of responsibility for the
public realm. Arendt’s (1977) reflections on the links between morality and politics find its
most concrete form of expression in her discussion of the trial of Eichmann. Here Arendt
famously describes Eichmann as a fairly average sort of person who was motivated to do
his duty. In this respect, common sense had seemingly offered a weak barrier against
political evil given Eichmann’s participation in crimes against humanity. Eichmann then
sought to defend himself by claiming that he was simply doing his job. This defence
reveals not only someone who was willing to submit to externally defined bureaucratic
rules and procedures, but who had also established a career in the Nazi order. Elsewhere
Arendt (2000) suggests that the fact that many ordinary Germans were willing to consider
themselves as cogs and functionaries detracts from the idea that each of us is individually
responsible for our actions. She further suggests that the SS and the Gestapo were not so
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much fanatics as they were relatively normal ‘jobholders and family men’ (Arendt 2000,
p. 152). In other words, it was the background of mass unemployment and a lack of regard
for civic virtues that converted the ordinary ‘bourgeois’ into the mass man capable of
playing his part in administered murder. Corey Robin (2007) argues that for Arendt the
politics of genocide is as much about faceless bureaucracy as it is about careerism. It is
then careerism as much as the pervasiveness of ideologies of hatred that paves the way for
genocide and mass murder. Notably such an argument poses difficult questions for those
who would seek to support the connection between liberal ideas of freedom and
capitalism. This means that inhumanity is as much a problem for the ideologue as it is for
those who seek to be pragmatic and reject all forms of critical thinking and public forms of
engagement.
Elsewhere Arendt (1958) defends a pluralistic public realm where citizens are able to
act creatively together and institute new projects while appreciating a diversity of
perspectives and viewpoints. Hence whereas totalitarianism represents the attempt to
eradicate human plurality, Arendt sought by returning to the philosophy of Ancient Greece
to remind us of the republican potential of more contemporary societies. Politics is a
matter for plural and public reflection and shared public spaces that allow individuals to
propose and try out new thoughts, dialogue with others and engage in common forms of
action.
Given these conclusions it is perhaps not surprising that Arendt emphasises the
importance of thinking. Ultimately it is Eichmann’s reliance upon clichés, stereotypes and
absence of a capacity to think for himself that attracted Arendt’s attention. Notably it is the
idea of thinking as an activity that is emphasised rather than either access to knowledge or
educational qualifications. In this respect, ‘thinking’ emphasises less the ability to produce
a list of moral commandments and more an engaged practice that is constantly involved in
processes of revision and argument. Arendt (2003, p. 45) argues that:
The dividing line between those who want to think and therefore have to judge by themselves,
and those who do not, strikes across all social and cultural or educational differences.
For Arendt the evidence from totalitarian societies indicates that many people will simply
adapt themselves to fit into the status quo. The Nazi order was able to exert its dominance
over the mass of the population not because they were criminals but because they were
‘respectable’ people who refused or failed to think. It is the ability to doubt and to be
sceptical that best ensures resistance. Evil then is most likely to be perpetuated by
people who pragmatically adopt themselves to society without engaging in processes of
 Citizenship Studies 281

self-examination. Here Arendt is not only referring back to the Socratic maxim that ‘the
unexamined life is not worth living’, but is also nodding in the direction of Kant.
According to Arendt, moral behaviour is less connected to self-love or obligations towards
a shared community, but rather motivated through ideas of self-regard and self-respect.
In other words, it is the desire not to let the self down and the ability to recognise that we
will have to live with ourselves afterwards that motivates moral behaviour. In this regard,
those who refused to participate in the crimes of the Nazi regime were more often people
to whom it was fairly self-evident after a short bout of thinking that such actions were
wrong. As Arendt (2003, p. 95) comments: ‘The greatest evildoers are those who don’t
remember because they have never given thought to the matter, and without remembrance,
nothing can hold them back.’
Despite these considerations, Arendt did not take the view that it was possible to create
a society of thinkers. The best defence against the reoccurrence of totalitarianism was a
rights-based society where citizens are encouraged to be public-spirited (Canovan 1992,
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p. 163). Further, Arendt also underestimates the extent to which public forms of reflection
presuppose communities to which citizens have a shared sense of connection. Without a
bond to a number of overlapping and complex communities it is not clear why we should
wish to listen to others or indeed care about their future (Taylor 1995, pp. 276 –277).
Finally Arendt’s conservatism is compounded by the fact she did not really explore the
possibility of a shared democratic culture. For Arendt (1993) art and culture were being
radically undermined by a consumer society that was more concerned with the
instantaneous than the durable. Art becomes undermined in a world where the vast
majority of production is governed by functionality rather than the creation of relatively
durable objects. In this respect, mass society is less interested in culture and more involved
in the production of entertainment. While I would not wish to dismiss these reflections out
of hand, it is notable that little consideration is given as to how ‘culture’ could become
democratised so as to produce a society of collective reflection and engagement.
However, Arendt was deeply concerned with questions of education and learning.
More specifically, she warns that most revolutionaries of the past have simply sought to
indoctrinate children (Arendt 1977). However within education, adults have to assume a
responsibility for the well-being and development of the child. There is then no education
without responsible forms of authority. This authority does not simply rest at the level of
the teacher’s qualifications, but rather ‘authority rests on his assumption of responsibility
for that world’ (Arendt 1977, p. 189). It is through education, suggests Arendt, that we
learn to balance freedom, authority and responsibility. It is the place where we renew a
public world by communicating our traditions and an understanding of the past while
leaving these projects open enough to become revisable by the citizens of the future. In this
respect, responsibility does not lie in neglecting our children or leaving their education to
consumerism and the ideologies of markets or to processes of indoctrination. The citizens
of the future require an education that not only reconnects them to the rich literatures and
understandings of the past, but also helps provide them with critical knowledge as we seek
to negotiate the future. Yet despite these crucial insights Arendt fails to consider the
possibility of a democratic education system. Ultimately what is missing from the
accounts of those who seek to articulate a vision of a human society built upon a minimal
set of public rules or autonomous thinking is any idea as to how citizens might be said to
flourish while becoming autonomous and democratic citizens. Such a view would need to
recognise the role that critical education or media culture could play in empowering
people to address moral and ethical questions in the context of their everyday lives. This
would mean inevitably closing the gap between democracy as a set of norms and as a
 282 N. Stevenson

practice that is part of everyday experience and culture. Such a view would argue that
democratic societies require pluralistic forms of discussion on the nature of virtue, but also
that democratic cultures themselves are dependent upon the development of certain ethical
sensibilities. This, with some qualification, is what Raymond Williams sets out to do
through his idea of the long revolution.

The long revolution and public culture

Raymond Williams was formed by a different intellectual and political climate to that of
Hannah Arendt. More easily placed in a tradition of post-war democratic socialism he
explicitly sought to create the conditions of an ‘educated democracy and a common
culture’ for everyone (Williams 1965, p. 176). Like many democratic socialists of his time
Williams saw the development of the ‘social state’ as a means of promoting a more
‘civilised’ and democratic human society (Crossland 1956). However, Williams makes his
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distinctive contribution in that he did not merely seek to utilise state power to promote a
good society, but both sought to democratise the state while promoting the conditions for
common forms of cultural engagement. For Williams, ideas of culture are not simply to be
contrasted to a debased mass society, as Arendt had a tendency to do. Questions of culture
matter because they help to define the very process of learning and self-transformation
within contemporary society. Rather than simply defending certain works of ‘civilisation’,
Williams sought to emphasise the public role that mass communication, art, education and
popular culture might play within modern society. In doing this, Williams (1962a)
emphasised a Romantic tradition of writers from Mathew Arnold to William Morris who
had sought to find within art a place of social and cultural reflection. This tradition not only
sought to question the increasing dominance of market-place forms of rationality, but also
potentially helps us link issues of culture to the public sphere. In this respect, Williams
(1965) described the struggle for a learning and communicating society as the ‘long
revolution’. For Williams the development of cultural institutions such as broadcasting,
the education system, and the press were essential features within a mass democracy.
These ideas, as many have recognised, have a marked family resemblance with those
of Jurgen Habermas on the public sphere. Like Arendt, Habermas (1989) does not so much
describe a ‘good society’ but more explicitly seeks to outline what we might minimally
expect from a society that sought to call itself democratic. Yet unlike either Arendt or
Habermas, Williams is seeking to discover a society where we all might flourish while
participating in an energetic civil society built upon autonomous and above all creative
forms of cultural production. Indeed Habermas’ writing is more closely connected to
liberal ideals that seek to prioritise the right over the good. In other words, a liberal society
should not seek to defend substantive doctrines but seek to institute a liberal public sphere
enabling them to have access to a diversity of opinion and perspective. Here there is
considerable confusion as to what counts as a ‘substantive doctrine’ and I remain
unconvinced there could ever be such a thing as a neutral society, public sphere or
education system (Stevenson 1999, pp. 41 – 42). This is not simply to jettison the concerns
of liberal political theory, however. I would argue that a more pressing question than
‘neutrality’ is how modern society might institute democratic forms of debate and
reflection within a common realm.
For Williams (1965, p. 10) the democratic revolution could be said to be ‘at a very
early stage’. Despite the development of mass literacy, the prospect of participating in
democratic elections and new communications technology and labour organisations that
represented the subaltern classes society remained dominated by the needs of capitalism.
 Citizenship Studies 283

Only the gradual emergence of a complex socialist society could give full expression to
individuals’ capacity to be creative and live more realised lives. In these respects,
Williams resisted the divisions of the mental and manual divide instituted by a class
society. Art and cultural forms of communication could be described as similarly creative
activities that were concerned with:
the sharing of common meanings, and thence common activities and purposes; the offering,
reception and comparisons of new meanings, leading to the tensions and achievements of
growth and change. (Williams 1965, p. 55)
Here Williams (1965, p. 56) was arguing against those who like Arendt sought to abstract
art as a ‘special experience’, but aimed to see how they were both part of ‘ordinary’
processes of communication while being located in specific historical periods. Williams
(1962b) notes that cultural conservatives during his own time continued to argue that the
state should preserve high culture both against democratic tendencies and the market.
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Williams noted that such features had a great deal in common with the commercial culture
that it was meant to oppose. The strict separation between an elite high culture and the
more populist concerns of the market divides ‘our culture into separate areas with no
bridges between them’ (Williams 1962b, p. 108). During the 1960s Williams became
interested in a new generation of dramatists (Ken Loach, Tony Garnett, John McGrath)
whose work in film, television and stage sought to question prevailing attitudes and
assumptions particularly in respect of class politics. These dramatists helped to make a
public contribution by raising critical questions about the so-called classless society that
many had assumed had emerged in the 1960s.
Further, like Habermas (1989), Williams was concerned about what happens to
cultural forms once they become overly commodified. There is an important distinction to
be made between different forms of cultural production that aims to educate, inform and
provoke and those that simply aim to make money. If Habermas (1989) expresses this as
the functional separation between democracy and capitalism, Williams is more explicitly
concerned to struggle for a culturally complex society where citizens feel empowered to
become cultural producers. He asks the question as to what kinds of institutions would be
required to create the possibility of a democratic public culture. Here he argues for an
educative and above all publicly informed culture that can only be sustained through the
eventual abolition of capitalism. He reasons that capitalism could never allow the learning
and creative potential of all of its citizens to flourish as it requires hierarchy,
commodification and educational failure. Education then would always be limited in a
society where economic interests prevailed over the need to develop cultural capacities. In
this sense Williams passionately argues that the labour movement should not settle for the
undoubted historical achievements of social democracy, but should seek to create a
genuinely democratic culture in common.
For Williams (1989a), a culture in common had several aspects, but overall it was an
instituted culture of dialogue rather than agreement. To be able to talk of a culture in
common meant rejecting the choice between either atomised privatisation or cultural
communalism. However, it did mean the development of democratic public spaces of
engagement built upon a shared education system that had broken with the class-bound
logic of the past. The common element of Williams’ argument concerns the ability of
ordinary people – not just paid professionals – to contribute, criticise and re-interpret
aspects of their culture. Within this process the meanings of ‘high’ or indeed ‘popular’
culture are not fixed in stone but require open criticism by members of the community.
Notably, Williams’ work also provides a defence of the ability of literature and drama to
 284 N. Stevenson

ask critical questions of both historical and more contemporary societies. In this respect,
complex works of art and criticism did not belong to the dominant class, but could be
potentially commented on by everyone.
A culture in common requires the provision of institutions that transmit the knowledge,
skills and resources that allow for full participation. This was no longer the Arnoldian
(1987) project of simply transmitting ‘the best’ works of civilisation, but of enabling
citizens to realise their critical potential. Inevitably such a project required an education
system willing to break with ‘the sorting and grading process natural to class society’
(Williams 1965, p. 168). For Williams educational institutions not only needed to
familiarise working-class students with ‘high’ forms of culture, but also to allow them to
develop their own arguments and perspectives that might well stop short of traditional
forms of reverence. Such a project does not rely upon an image of unified public sphere,
but of interlocking and competing public spheres from education to the media and from the
arts to more overtly popular forms of expression.
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Raymond Williams’ working-class background meant that his initial experience of

‘culture’ was one of inequality. Culture then was primarily experienced through a sense of
being excluded from high culture (Williams 1968). Raymond Willliams most acutely
explores these features through his first two novels Border country (1960) and Second
generation (1964). Here, rather than simply resting on the argument that education needs
to develop critical forms of understanding, Williams explores the tensions within
subjective experiences involved in the moving across cultural borders and boundaries.
More specifically these novels give expression to some of the pain and uncertainty that is
encountered by people from working-class backgrounds who move across the borders of
class. Wendy Kohli (1993) notes that despite Williams’ emphasis upon feeling, most of his
theoretical work is concerned to develop the democratic practice of critical reflection
while remaining connected to broader communities of interest such as the labour
movement. It is then only through Williams’ novels that feelings of alienation, detachment
and disconnection become apparent.
For Williams democratic socialism remained connected to the capability of citizens to
both learn through the education system and through democratised public spheres. Later
Williams would describe socialism as ‘not only the general “recovery” of specifically
alienated human capacities, but also, and much more decisively, the necessary institution
of new and very complex communicative capacities and relationships’ (Williams 1980,
p. 62). This noted, Williams was perceptive enough to recognise that since the early 1970s
a much harsher version of capitalism had become apparent, leading to what he called ‘the
actual defeat of major sections of the working-class’ (1980, p. 249).
This historical transformation can only be understood through the wider educative role
played by hegemonic forms of domination. Henry Giroux (2004) has reminded us that
Williams’ idea of ‘permanent education’ is crucial in helping us understand the
transformation of the public sphere brought about by neoliberalism. By ‘permanent
education’ Williams sought to point to the view that public pedagogy has multiple sites
within modern societies (including television, magazines, popular culture and civil society
more generally) and cannot be contained in debates which simply focus upon the
education system. The progressive privatisation and commodification of the public not
only offers a dominant idea of the good life as the consuming life, but also marks a direct
challenge to more critical ideas of public space and value.
The idea of ‘the long revolution’ offers an answer to the question of what a good
society and a good life might be. The answer that Williams gave was a place where
ordinary people could become creative, be actively involved in the key decisions that were
 Citizenship Studies 285

made in their society and develop themselves through education (Rustin 2007). The long
revolution as the learning society also had to be permanently open to the challenge of new
voices and perspectives, and in this respect would in more contemporary times have had to
adopt a more self-consciously multicultural vocabulary. The guiding aspect of a
democratic culture in common is its ability to be able to promote dialogue across a number
of cultural divides and enclaves while developing a common capacity to become a cultural
producer and critic. Similarly Bhikhu Parekh (2000) argues that a multicultural society
needs a shared common culture fashioned out of diversity. In a multicultural society
diverse cultures constantly encounter one another and change due to the presence of the
other. Unless we are content to live in a society of cultural apartheid and fragmentation
then institutional conditions must be created to foster intercultural dialogue. While a
‘common culture’ cannot be engineered, the opportunities for a common dialogue need to
be politically created. Just as Williams argued that literature and creative practices need to
be criticised by working-class voices, so Parekh argues that similar privileges need to be
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extended to ‘minorities’. Within this process both Williams and Parekh highlight the
centrality of cultural and educational institutions. They are both critical of monocultural
institutions that aim to impose a collective conformist culture. Since Williams’ time a
multitude of groups have sought to interrupt the dominant culture and sought to carve out a
realm of relatively authentic forms of public expression and concern. These features can
perhaps be seen as a means by which the long revolution has continued since Williams’
death in the late 1980s.
However, arguments related to multiculturalism necessarily move the analysis on from
the culturally ‘bounded’ national society and cultural nationalism that is assumed by much
of Williams’ writing. The main problem with the preceding argument is the nationalist
assumption that notions of the public are constituted by exclusively national public spaces.
It presents an image of publics emerging inside of exclusively national borders. Such a
view is of course not without a certain resonance; however, it is blind to the ways in which
cultures and publics can be said to cross over borders. If Williams significantly
underestimated these features in his work he was undoubtedly correct to warn against the
idea that an unrestrained capitalism could ever deliver the common conditions for a
cultural democracy. Further we need to remind ourselves that Williams wrote at a time
when the democratic transformation of the state, media and education seemed like a
realistic prospect. In the next section, I argue how questions of culture and the good society
might become relinked in our more cosmopolitan and global times.

Recovering hope and cultural politics

As Williams foresaw the rise of neoliberalism defeated the democratic socialist project
that sought to create an educated and egalitarian public culture. The end of the Cold War
did not offer new forms of hope for democratic socialism but the gradual winding up of the
so-called parliamentary road to socialism. The decline of the social democratic Left has
seen socialist parties across Europe adapt themselves to the harsh realities of
neoliberalism. Pierre Bourdieu (2003, p. 29) has described neoliberalism as instituting
‘a mode of domination based on the institution of insecurity, domination through
precariousness: a deregulated financial market fosters a deregulated labour market and
thereby casualisation of labor that cows workers into submission’. The concrete effect of
this new hegemony is an economy that increasingly makes divisions between low-paid and
low-status employment and the overworked and stressed middle classes. This division also
maps onto an equally worrying cultural divide between the dominant cosmopolitan
 286 N. Stevenson

orientations of elites and more locally orientated publics who sometimes take refuge in
vicious nationalism. Further, the increasing dominance of multinational corporations, the
development of a commercial culture built upon the rich lifestyles of well known
celebrities, the erosion of public service broadcasting, the corporatisation of the education
system and, of course, the withering of working-class institutions such as trade unions
have increased the dominance of capitalism over society more generally. However, as
Raymond Williams would have been among the first to point out, such developments fail
to emphasise some of the dialectical possibilities of transformation.
Cultural processes of globalisation offer us the possibility (sometimes if only for a
moment) of moving beyond the borders of the nation. In this respect, our shared media
space is more than the effect of the commodification strategies of media conglomerates; it
is better understood as a disorderly and plural space (Silverstone 2007). This at least offers
the possibility, along with the development of the Internet, of stretching our civic
imaginations beyond the nation. Hence the coming together of neoliberalism and
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globalisation speaks of a simultaneous impoverishment of our common culture while it

has been substantially reinvented in a world that continually poses questions concerning
cultural as well as geographical borders.
In part then modern societies have increasingly, through the impact of diverse popular
cultures, social movements and multiculturalism within education, sought to progressively
reconsider their relationship with issues related to cultural difference. This is inevitably an
on-going process without end. Alberto Melucci (1997, p. 42) argues that what ‘matters
today is no longer mere learning, but rather learning how to learn’. By this he means that
new technology permanently multiplies the range of our relationships with distant others.
In an age where the markers of class and party have been weakened, this has the effect of
introducing new possibilities as to who we might become. This may become converted
into a renewed search for ‘anchors’ for the self in a seemingly shifting world, but equally
opens the possibility of forging a new relationship with questions of difference and
Otherness. Such features obviously point towards the possibilities of living in a global
culture which is full of multicultural possibility even if these features are not often
realised. Further, one of the central features of living within an information-driven society
has been the enhancement of the capacity for reflexivity in an age that fears normalisation.
There are then new opportunities in our society for learning through the media, education
and other forms of cultural interaction for a society that welcomes the Other. David
Chaney (2002) argues that in terms of cultural citizenship one of the key transformations
has been the decline in the ability of the nation-state to sanction the culture of its citizens
through the policy arena. It is now more accurate to describe the state as a ‘facilitator of
diversity and a mediator between its citizens and global trends and markets’ (Chaney
2002, p. 132). The cultural institutions that the long revolution sought to reform to press an
agenda of democratic learning have declined in authority. However, if consumer-led
populism has contributed to a more relaxed attitude towards cultural diversity it has also
led to an enhanced capacity on the part of markets to define everyday life.
Not surprisingly perhaps, many educationalists and defenders of ideas similar to
Williams’ have struggled with this new world in that older cultural hierarchies and
relations of respect have been swept away by a more marketised world. If the other side of
arguments like those proposed by Williams was the continual threat of cultural
condescension, the problem with a market-driven society is its uneasiness on issues related
to cultural value. The question that capitalism in its current and previous manifestation
finds difficult to answer is what is indeed the point of learning (and, dare we say, thinking)
beyond the establishment of market opportunity and instrumentally defined criteria?
 Citizenship Studies 287

We can thank Hannah Arendt at this point for reminding us of some of the catastrophic
consequences that can become linked to careerism and instrumentalism.
If the long revolution in Williams’ formulation was driven by the progressive desire
and leadership of the labour movement, then it would seem that capitalism for now has
won this particular struggle. Does this now mean that there is indeed no alternative to the
continual development of the commodified and privatised self? In Geoff Eley’s (2002)
magisterial history of the Left in Europe, he argues that the struggle for socialism held
together ideas of collective organisation, notions of improvement and public service. As
the old working class has gone into decline since the 1970s and especially the 1980s, so
then have the notions that public culture or indeed education offer anything ‘better’
beyond what individuals may decide to choose for themselves. Since Williams’ time our
shared cultural worlds have simultaneously become more commodified and multi-
dimensional. Here I shall argue that we need to rethink the connection between democratic
forms of life and the good society. This can only be achieved by seeking to imagine what
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democratic public spaces might mean in the context of complex information-driven global
societies.

Cosmopolitan localism and the good society

If globalisation can be described as ‘the intensification of worldwide social relations’ then
this has implications for any model of the good society we may wish to imagine (Giddens
1990, p. 64). In this context we would also need to consider evidence of the decline of
democracy as politics increasingly converts itself into a tightly managed spectacle under
the control of business and political elites (Crouch 2004). In more globally interconnected
societies power has been transferred upwards out of the hands of ordinary people into the
hands of cosmopolitan elites. This suggests the need to develop new forms of critical and
intellectual politics.
The idea of the cosmopolitan has been the focus of a considerable amount of critical
discussion recently (Held 2004, Beck 2006). Further, there has been much debate as to
how cosmopolitanism can be connected to questions of education (Nussbaum 1997,
Gunesch 2004). The idea of the cosmopolitan usually trades upon the mutual ideas of the
world or global citizen and as a form of citizenship that is able to welcome the Other.
There is, of course, no need to choose between these two different visions and indeed
many authors have sought to emphasise both strands within contemporary debates (Beck
2006). In our terms, Hannah Arendt offers a view of cosmopolitan citizenship where
international law and human rights conventions suggest that we are responsible for our
actions irrespective of their official role within the state. A society built upon human rights
would need to educate its citizens that crimes committed against different religions, ethnic
groups and others are an affront to our shared humanity (Fine 2000). These features
necessitate the view that citizenship education would need to emphasise the critical
importance of the role of human rights, democracy and pluralism.
However, through a discussion of Raymond Williams’ ideas of the long revolution, I
expressed the concern that this vision did not describe a good society in which we all might
flourish. Williams’ egalitarian emphasis upon education, plurality and creativity as human
goods pointed to a society where learning was not something which should be
instrumentalised or restricted to an elite. Such a view holds that we need to defend a view
of the human and learning that seeks to enrich our common lives. We cannot in this view
afford to be complacent of a society where education is being progressively converted into
a commodity and where it is estimated that six million people in the UK have no
 288 N. Stevenson

educational qualifications (Rutherford 2005, p. 303). Williams reminds us of the ways in

which a ‘right’ to a critical education is linked into broader political and economic
questions. Questions of culture in this account should not be reduced to ‘discourses’ or
‘resources’, as they are in some of the cultural policy literature (Osborne 2006). Many
accounts of culture influenced by structuralism simply reduce an understanding of culture
to something that needs to be administered or distributed. This cancels any connection that
culture has to issues related to meaningfulness, complexity, value and democratic
criticism. The critical educationalist Henry Giroux (2004, p. 112) describes culture as
narratives, images and metaphors through which we learn to understand ourselves and our
relation to others. For Williams (1989b) culture is the study of particular feelings,
traditions, patterns and ways of living.
Williams potentially offers a more rooted version of cosmopolitanism that
sympathetically welcomes the voice of the other, but does so through a recognition of
the host cultures’ internal complexity and mutual capacity to be creative. Similarly to
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Appiah’s (1998) version of cosmopolitanism, we can take pleasure in our own cultural
particularities while maintaining a dialogic interest in human differences. Such a view
means that we can be loyal to host traditions while seeking to re-read them through a
diversity of experiences and perspectives. Indeed Appiah’s (2005) arguments are that
educational attempts to facilitate cosmopolitan citizenship should be less concerned to
promote a detached global citizenship and more with the realisation that in being a local
citizen you can be a good global citizen. Along with Martha Nussbaum (1997) I would
seek to defend the critical importance of a liberal education for everyone. In a world of
overlapping and complex loyalties we should be careful that local attachments are not
dismissed as the bad Other of universal thinking. Here Nussbaum stresses the importance
of Socratic dialogue and deliberative argument that aims ‘to confront the passivity of the
pupil’ into thinking for themselves (1997, p. 33). Education should aim to critically
interrogate local traditions, to investigate how we are mixed in globalised others, and the
development of the imaginative capacity to understand our shared world from different
points of view. Such a view can respect local attachments while at the same time
subjecting them to deliberative arguments in terms of the common good. Cosmopolitan-
ism should not simply seek to transcend local attachments and traditions, but should
promote a critical dialogue between, say, human rights documents and the need for critical
thinking while respecting people’s sense of attachment to place. This is indeed what is
advocated by Paulo Freire (1997) who argued that our sense of being global citizens comes
less through abstract norms and will more likely emerge through a sense of connection to
particular places and how these locations link us to globally situate others.
Of course there are dangers in the return to the local, such as local retrenchment and an
increasing fear of outsiders. Here we might need to learn to balance the cosmopolitan and
the local at the same time. This suggests a form of cosmopolitan localism that could
criticise the placelessness evident in certain versions of global citizenship while seeking to
promote fluid and complex understandings of place. This perhaps only becomes possible
through movements and educational settings that mutually seek to explore more
democratic arrangements and a mutual sense of interconnectedness with other people and
with the natural world. Cultural citizenship needs to be redefined as a form of critical
theory that seeks to develop democratic public spaces while simultaneously promoting a
sense of lived connection with a number of complex and overlapping communities in time
and space. It would also need to balance the demand for autonomous reflection with the
recognition that citizens live within overlapping communities with which they are likely to
experience different levels of connection. Raymond Williams was able to imagine the long
 Citizenship Studies 289

revolution being carried through by the labour movement, but this is no longer adequate
for our shared global, neo-liberal and post-industrial times. The retreat of the democratic
state, the progressive commodification of culture and the self, the increasing power of
global capital and the erosion of national democracy all mean that cultural citizenship has
to be re-imagined in terms of a new set of co-ordinates that continue to connect citizens
with the practices of democratic community. If there is no vision of the good society
without an attempt to re-imagine the ways in which citizens learn and find community with
one another, then in the network age radical possibilities of transformation need to be
rethought (Castells 1997).
Cultural citizenship therefore is the struggle for a democratic society that enables a
diversity of citizens to lead relatively meaningful lives, that respects the formation of
complex hybrid identities, offers them the protection of the social state and grants them the
access to a critical education that seeks to explore the possibility of living in a future free
from domination and oppression. To be a cultural citizen means to engage in deliberative
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argument about who we might become, and to consider how we might lead virtuous and just
lives in specific cultural locations and contexts. In our complex global society, citizens
require an education and a media culture that is able to make sense of contemporary
transformations and which offers citizens the space to share and critically interrogate
diverse experiences and practices, enabling them to consider how we might best ensure the
flourishing of each and everyone of us in an increasingly interconnected world.

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