Psychological Review

1972, Vol. 79, No. I, 58-67

COGNITIVE CONTROL
KENNETH R. HAMMONDs AND DAVID A. SUMMERS
University of Colorado University of Kansas

The theory developed here proposes that performance in cognitive tasks in-
volves two distinct processes: acquisition of knowledge and cognitive control
over knowledge already acquired. A conceptual and analytic framework is
presented which allows for the disentanglement of knowledge and control,
and for the quantification of each. Evidence from studies of multiple-cue
probability learning, clinical judgment, and interpersonal conflict supports
the theoretical usefulness of this framework and indicates that poor perform-
ance in cognitive tasks can often be attributed to incomplete cognitive control,
rather than incomplete knowledge. The importance of cognitive feedback—•
as opposed to traditional outcome feedback—for the development of cognitive
control is illustrated.

Although learning theorists have long habits"), and that a good share of the "use of
emphasized the distinction between learn- habits" depends on current motivation [p. 287].
ing and performance, little attention has Other theorists, also stressing the import-
been given to skill in the application of ance of distinguishing between learning and
knowledge in tasks which do not involve performance, have suggested additional
motor performance. Rather, there is an determinants of the application of knowl-
implicit assumption that once knowledge edge ; for example, fatigue (Hilgard, 1956)
has been acquired, the application of this and instructions (Mandler, 1967). Indeed,
knowledge is largely dependent on certain Mandler goes somewhat further and sug-
experimental circumstances. gests that a distinction be made between
For example, Deese and Hulse (1967) "the conditions under which a subject will
point out that discover a particular rule [and] his abilities
sometimes we have good reason to believe that an to use ... it [p. 22; italics added]."
organism is simply not demonstrating what it has Although the explanations for the inap-
learned because we have not chosen the proper condi- propriate application of knowledge men-
tions which will assure the overt display of the ap- tioned above are by no means identical,
propriate behavior [p. 62].
they are (with the exception of Mandler)
Leeper (1970) makes a similar point, but quite similar in one important respect.
draws attention specifically to motivational Specifically, they all assume that the po-
factors: tential for full application of knowledge
One of the distinctive points of cognitive learning
accompanies full acquisition of knowledge—
theory—a principle developed by Lashley (1929), except in psychomotor tasks.
Tolman (1932), and others—is that a clear distinc- The position taken here, however, is that
tion must be made between learning (or the "acquisi- acquisition and application are independent
tion of habits") and performance (or the "use of components of learning in cognitive tasks
1 as well as psychomotor tasks. Conse-
This paper is based on research undertaken at quently, we argue that the development of
the Institute of Behavioral Science, University of
Colorado, and is Publication 140 of the Institute. skill—or control—in the application of
The research was supported by National Institute knowledge already acquired is a matter to
of Mental Health Grant MH-16437-02. The be investigated. The purpose of this paper,
authors wish to thank Thomas Stewart for his therefore, is to introduce the concept of
assistance. We are particularly indebted to Berndt
Brehmer of the University of Umea for his valuable cognitive control, to indicate its theoretical
contributions made while he was a visiting Re- and methodological context, and to illus-
search Associate at the University of Colorado. trate its empirical significance in studies
2
Requests for reprints should be sent to Kenneth
R. Hammond, Institute of Behavioral Science, Uni- of human learning, judgment, and inter-
versity of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado 80302. personal behavior. In addition, traditional
 COGNITIVE CONTROL 59
outcome feedback is identified as an im-
pediment to the development of cognitive
control.
THEORY
Fundamental to our treatment of cogni-
tive control is a methodological and con- S'l
ceptual framework developed for studying CRITER10N JUDGMENT

behavior in multiple-cue probability learn-

ing tasks. A major reason for the emphasis CUE CUE
VALIDITIES DEPENDENCIES
on multiple-cue probability learning tasks
is the fact that such tasks have essential CUESU/)
features in common with a broad range of FIG. 1. Brunswik's lens model.
inference tasks human subjects routinely en-
countered outside the laboratory. Aside wik's "lens model" has been used to convey
from this, there are two additional reasons a pictorial model of the relation between
for studying the problem of cognitive con- subject and task. The mathematical speci-
trol in the framework of multiple-cue fication of the relation between cue valid-
probability learning tasks: (a) Multiple- ities and cue dependencies in Figure 1 was
cue probability learning tasks can be varied introduced by Hursch, Hammond, and
sufficiently in complexity and uncertainty Hursch (1964), and modified in various
so that both knowledge and cognitive ways subsequently (Dudycha & Naylor,
control can be varied extensively, and (b) 1966; Rozeboom, 1971; Tucker, 1964).
quantitative separation of knowledge and
control has been accomplished within this Tucker's (1964) development of the lens
framework. model equation will be used here. It reads
as follows:
Variations in Complexity and Uncertainty
ra = GReRs + C Vl -R? Vl -R3* [1]
Multiple-cue probability learning tasks
can be varied in both complexity and un- where
certainty in at least three ways: (a) the ra = the correlation between Fe and Y,\
number of cues related to a criterion can G = the correlation between the linear
be varied, (&) the uncertainty associated prediction of Ye and Y, from the
with each cue can be varied by creating cue values;
differential cue validities, and (c) the form
of the relation between cue and criterion can Re = the multiple correlation between
be varied; either positive linear relations, the cues and Y,\
negative linear relations, or various non- Rs = the multiple correlation between
linear relations may be used (see Brehmer the cues and Ya;
& Lindberg, 1970; Knowles, Hammond, C = the correlation between the vari-
Stewart, & Summers, 1971; Naylor & ance in the task system and the
Clark, 1968; Sheets & Miller, in press; subject's judgmental system which
Summers, 1969; Summers & Hammond, is unaccounted for by the linear
1966; Uhl, 1963). component G.
Quantitative Denotation of Knowledge and When the systematic variance in the
Control criterion can be accounted for by a linear
function of the cue values, then the contribu-
The analysis of multiple-cue probability tion of the second term on the right-hand
learning has typically been carried out side of Equation 1 will be negligible. Equa-
within the Brunswikian framework (Bruns- tion 1 then reduces to
wik, 1956)1^3 modified by Hammond
(1966). As illustrated in Figure 1, Bruns- ra = [2]
60 KENNETH R. HAMMOND AND DAVID A. SUMMERS

Equation 2 may, of course, be applied to perfect knowledge), if R, were less than

nonlinear functions in the case where the unity (indicating imperfect control), per-
appropriate transformation can be effected formance would be less than the limit of
—as in all the studies described below. It achievement (Re) would permit. Con-
is Equation 2 that makes the distinction versely, R, might equal 1.00, thus indicating
between knowledge and control most ap- that the perfectly controlled cognitive
parent. Therefore, each term in Equation system was not appropriate to the task
2 is discussed separately below. system, thus preventing achievement (r0)
ra (achievement): This term measures from reaching its upper limit (R,).
performance; specifically, ra represents the Two subjects, therefore, might have
covariation of the subject's judgments (F«) identical achievement indexes for different
with the criterion (Ye). reasons; one because of perfect knowledge
G (knowledge): This term measures the (G = 1.00) but imperfect control (R,
extent to which the subject has correctly < 1.00) and the other because of perfect
detected properties of the task. Specifi- control (R, = 1.00), but imperfect knowl-
cally, this term reflects the covariation be- edge (G < 1.00). Variations between these
tween the least-squares prediction of the extremes could also occur, of course.
criterion (Fe) and the least-squares^ predic-
tion of the subject's judgments (F8) from APPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY
the cues. When systematic task variance
can be identified and represented in a Applications of the theory will be illus-
regression equation, G denotes the degree trated in regard to (a) individual learning
to which the subject's cognitive system is in complex, multiple-cue inference tasks,
isomorphic with the task system indepen- (&) clinical judgment, and (c) conflict be-
dent of uncertainty in the task system tween two persons working together in a
(Re) or control in the subject's response multiple-cue probability learning task.
system (Ra). Individual Multiple-Cue Probability
Isomorphism as used here does not, of Learning
course, imply identity; G may reach unity,
as it should, when the regression coefficients In a recent experiment (Deane, Ham-
in the task system and the subjects cogni- mond, & Summers, 1972), subjects were
tive system are proportional (see Castellan, studied in two three-cue probabilistic
1971). tasks: one in which the relation between
R, (task uncertainty): This term mea- each cue and the criterion was linear, and
sures the predictability of the criterion ( Ye) one in which the relation between each cue
from the cues (Xi) in the task system. It and the criterion was nonlinear. It should
sets a limit on the extent to which achieve- be noted that previous research involving
ment (ra) may occur, even if knowledge (G) nonlinear inference tasks has shown the
and control (R,) are perfect (see Hursch learning of nonlinear relations to occur
et al., 1964, also Hammond, Hursch, & slowly, if at all (see Brehmer, 1969; Ham-
Todd, 1964, for a discussion of the limits mond & Summers, 1965). Typically, the
of achievement under conditions of uncer- poor performance observed in complex non-
tainty). Re, of course, may be determined linear tasks is attributed to an inability of
by the experimenter. most subjects to detect the task relation—
R, (cognitive control): This term mea- in short, poor performance is usually ex-
sures the extent to which the subject con- plained in terms of the subject's inability to
trols the execution of his knowledge; it acquire full knowledge of these tasks.
indicates the predictability of the subject's In the effort to evaluate the role of con-
response (F8) from the cues (Xi)- Note trol, however, Deane et al. (1972) provided
that R, is statistically independent of G. subjects in both the linear and nonlinear
Such independence is critical, for it means task conditions (after 20 warm-up trials)
that even should G reach unity (indicating with the knowledge necessary for highly
 COGNITIVE CONTROL 61
LINEAR TASK NONLINEAR TASK
/-_.— ..-
'
/ ./— •\.^~ ^.^'-'
/ .***w. -- - . /— -\ /
/

/ X ^*— — — •—•x s
//1 ^' ' A
s' \\
>•
/ /
/ "*'

•
1 .6
'
'
^v ''
^-'^^-~S
S

2
tZsv
\:
i I
11
11
t t p8 II
. . G
•i

4 5 6 8 9 3 4 5 6
BLOCK BLOCK

FIG. 2. Indexes of achievement (ra), knowledge (G), and control (J?,) in two multiple-cue
probability learning tasks. (In each task condition, n = 20.)

accurate performance; that is, subjects (R3) was far below optimal for subjects in
were told how each cue was related to the the nonlinear task, even after 200 trials.
criterion dimension and how each cue For subjects in the linear task condition,
should be weighted. Moreover, this infor- control (Ra) was hardly distinguishable
mation was provided to the subjects in two from knowledge (G).
different ways; verbally or pictorially. These findings indicate that knowledge
Following each learning trial, the subject and control can be disentangled empirically,
was given the usual outcome feedback; as well as statistically, and demonstrate
that is, the subject was informed of the that even when knowledge is complete,
correct answer. imperfect cognitive control can prevent
The results of this experiment indicated high achievement.
that poor performance in complex inference It is important to note that the findings
tasks (e.g., those involving nonlinear rela- summarized above are not peculiar to tasks
tions) can be attributed to difficulties in involving probabilistic cue-criterion rela-
cognitive control, as well as to difficulties tions ; that is, irreducible error. For ex-
in acquiring knowledge about the task. ample, Brehmer (1969) studied perform-
At the conclusion of training (200 trials), ance in four different multiple-cue tasks—
the level of predictive accuracy (ra) all permitting perfect accuracy (Re = 1.00)
achieved by subjects in the nonlinear task —and found considerable differences ac-
condition was significantly lower than that cording to the type of task relation the sub-
achieved by subjects in the linear task con- jects were required to learn and use. When
dition (.58 and .84, respectively). Yet, as the criterion was a simple linear function of
can be seen in Figure 2, knowledge, as the cues (Ye = X\ + X^), the subjects had
measured by G, was essentially the same little difficulty in rapidly achieving a high
in these two tasks by the end of training. level of performance. When the task re-
In contrast, however, cognitive control quired the subjects to utilize a complex
62 KENNETH R. HAMMOND AND DAVID A. SUMMERS

LINEAR TASK NONLINEAR TASK

1.0

UJ
o

1
cc
.6
o
li-
ce /
UJ
Q.

z .4

4 5 4 5
BLOCK BLOCK

FIG. 3. Indexes of achievement (ra], knowledge (G), and control (R,) in two multiple-cue
learning tasks in which perfect achievement is possible. (In each task condition, n = 10.)

nonlinear function (Ye =Xi/Xz), however, suboptimal performance in the nonlinear

performance was generally poor and im- task was lack of full cognitive control over
proved quite slowly. knowledge acquired; that is, Ra improved
One plausible explanation for Brehmer's far more slowly than did G, and remained
findings is, of course, that the subjects in significantly (p < .05) less than that at-
the latter condition were unable to detect tained in the linear task at the conclusion
the task relations; that is, that subjects of training (.78 and .90, respectively).
were unable to acquire the appropriate
task knowledge. As can be seen in Figure Cognitive Control in Clinical Judgment
3, however, a reanalysis of his data using The analyses described above illustrate
the framework proposed here suggests the usefulness of cognitive control as an ex-
quite a different explanation. Note that in planatory concept in laboratory studies of
the linear task, both knowledge (G) and human learning. There is growing evidence
control (Ra) were high; as a consequence, that this concept is also useful in accounting
performance (ra) was near perfect. In con- for performance in nonlaboratory situations
trast, performance (ra) in the nonlinear as well—such as those involving clinical
task improved slowly, and remained signi- judgment.
ficantly (p < .01) below that attained in Several investigators of judgment proc-
the linear task—even at the end of 400 esses (e.g., Dudycha & Naylor, 1966;
trials. The Rs and G curves, however, Ward & Davis, 1965) have argued that
indicate that this poor performance in the judgment policies (in a variety of domains)
nonlinear task cannot be attributed solely
are frequently "correct" (implying high G),
to the subjects inability to learn the task
relations. Indeed, G improved rapidly, and but are executed in an inconsistent manner
at the conclusion of training was virtually (implying low ./?„). This point has been
indistinguishable from that attained by elaborated by Goldberg (1970) who made
subjects in the linear task (.98 and .99, use of Tucker's version of the Lens Model
respectively). The primary source of the Equation to demonstrate how clinical
 COGNITIVE CONTROL 63

judgment is influenced by inconsistency;

that is, by failure of control. Specifically,
Goldberg reanalyzed the judgments of 29
clinical psychologists about 861 Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory profiles
and found that while G was typically high r0 (AGREEMENT)
(G = .68), judgmental accuracy was low
(ra = .28).
Although there is evidence that this poor
performance was partially due to an ina-
CUES
bility to detect nonlinearity in the judg-
ment tasks, there is also evidence that it
resulted from lack of control; that is, low JUDGMENTS

Rs. For when Goldberg produced perfect FIG. 4. Brunswik's lens model as applied to the
control by replacing the clinical judge with two-person case. (Note that characteristics of the
a perfectly consistent linear model (in judgment task are represented on the left, while
characteristics of each person's cognitive system are
effect setting R, = 1.0), performance (ra) represented on the right.)
improved for 86% of the judges. Similar
findings have been reported by Dawes arise under these conditions, and all have
(1971) in a study involving judgments found that the reduction of conflict occurs
made by graduate admissions committees.
slowly, if at all, even when subjects are
These results support Dudycha and given outcome feedback which clearly in-
Naylor's (1966) contention that dicates to each that his cognitive system is
humans tend to generate "correct" strategies but inadequate (Hammond & Brehmer, in
then, in turn, fail to use their own strategy with any press). A commonsense explanation sug-
great consistency . . . One is left with the con- gests that the slow reduction in conflict
clusion that humans may be used to generate infer-
ence strategies but that once the strategy is obtained merely reflects the reluctance of most
the human should be removed from the system and people to alter their beliefs (even in the
replaced by his own strategy [p. 127]. face of contradictory evidence). Examina-
tion of conflict behavior using the theoreti-
The results also confirm our views concern-
cal analysis proposed here, however, points
ing the theoretical distinction between
to a different interpretation.
knowledge and control.
Such analysis is enhanced by the fact
Cognitive Control and Interpersonal Conflict that not only can each subject's behavior be
examined in relation to an environmental
There is evidence that the framework task system, but each subject's behavior can
proposed here is significant not only for also be examined in relation to the response
individual performance, but for certain system of the other (Hammond, Wilkins,
kinds of two-person interactions as well. & Todd, 1966). As can be seen in Figure 4,
Of particular concern here are those inter- the theoretical framework outlined earlier
personal conflicts (quarrels) which arise —including the concept of cognitive con-
when two persons must exercise their judg- trol—is directly applicable to this type of
ments under conditions of uncertainty. interpersonal situation as well as to the
Such quarrels are studied in settings in individual learning and judgment tasks
which two or more individuals who have described above: r represents agreement
a
learned to utilize probabilistic cues in between the responses of the two subjects,
quite different ways (different cue weights G represents the convergence between the
and/or different function forms) are re- two systems, and RI and Rz represent the
quired to reach joint agreement in multiple- cognitive control exerted by Si and Sz,
cue probability learning tasks. respectively.
A large number of studies have investi- The results from interpersonal conflict
gated the conflict, or disagreement, which studies conducted in eight different nations
64 KENNETH R. HAMMOND AND DAVID A. SUMMERS

(see Brehmer, Azuma, Hammond, Kostron, come feedback—learning in a complex

& Varonos, 1970; Hammond & Brehmer, clinical inference task was practically
in press) have been analyzed in the above nonexistent.
terms. The results of these studies all Of equal importance, however, are nu-
point in the same direction: the subjects' merous findings that the removal of out-
cognitive systems converged (G increased), come feedback typically results in an in-
but cognitive control diminished (R, de- crease in response consistency (Azuma &
creased) as a result of the interaction. Thus Cronbach, 1966; Bjorkman, 1965; Brehmer
the quarrels—differences in judgments— & Lindberg, 1970). These findings suggest
continued despite increased agreement in that in addition to its limited usefulness in
principle (increased G); loss of cognitive the acquisition of knowledge, outcome feed-
control (decreased R,) produced disagree- back may be detrimental to control, as well.
ment in fact. These results imply that
cognitive control plays a significant part in Cognitive Material as Feedback
interpersonal learning and conflict as well An alternative approach, more in keeping
as in individual learning and clinical with cognitive theory, is to provide feed-
judgment. back that contributes to the exercise of
control rather than feedback that prevents,
FEEDBACK AND CONTROL or at least slows, the development of con-
trol. Feedback which contributes to con-
Why does cognitive control (R,) exhibit trol should consist of cognitive material—
such a slow growth curve relative to knowl- not response-oriented material—which will
edge (G) ? If subjects know what to do, enable the subjects to perceive not only
why do they not apply their knowledge that their judgment was in error, but why
more effectively? The answer appears to it was in error. Such cognitively oriented
lie in the heretofore unexamined traditional feedback must enable the subject to com-
form of feedback in human learning
pare (a) the properties of his cognitive
experiments. system with (b) the properties of the task
Outcome Feedback as an Impediment to system with which he is trying to cope,
Control, whether a content-neutral learning task or
the cognitive system of another person. Of
As in the above experiments, it is cus- particular importance in this respect are
tomary to expect subjects to learn by pro- two essential parameters: (a) differential
viding them with the correct answer on cue weights and (b) the form of the function
every trial. But that tradition follows from relating each cue to the criterion.
an unexamined assumption which cognitive The critical question is: Once the subjects
theory has inherited from trial and error have been given such feedback, can they
and S-R theories of learning. Indeed, out- exercise sufficient cognitive control (R,) to
come feedback is still an integral part of the increase their overall performance (r ), with-
a
learning research paradigm used by all out loss in their grasp of the properties of
psychologists—even cognitive theorists. the task (G)? The results of two experi-
Recently, however, it has become ap- ments indicate that they can.
parent that outcome feedback does not The first of these studies (Todd & Ham-
provide much help for subjects attempting mond, 1965) employed two different proba-
to acquire knowledge about the properties bilistic tasks in which the subject was
of complex inference tasks, particularly instructed to use the information afforded
when the task requires learning of complex by three geometric cues to predict a numeri-
relations under conditions of uncertainty cal criterion. One of these tasks, which
(e.g., Todd & Hammond, 1965). Dramatic required the subjects to weight all three
confirmation of this conclusion is provided cues equally, was particularly difficult to
by Goldberg (1968) who reported that even learn; performance in this task is therefore
after 4,000 trials—each followed by out- of primary interest here.
 COGNITIVE CONTROL 65
OUTCOME FEEDBACK MIXED FEEDBACK COGNITIVE FEEDBACK

2 3 2 3 4 ' I 2 3
BLOCK BLOCK BLOCK

FIG. 5. Indexes of achievement (ra), knowledge (G), and control (R,) in a multiple-cue proba-
bility learning task under conditions of outcome, mixed, and cognitive feedback. (In each feed-
back condition, n = l2.)

The major innovation in this study is about the task. The G indexes for these
that one group of subjects received only two groups were quite high throughout,
cognitively oriented feedback during learn- and were near identical by the end of 200
ing (referred to as "lens model" feedback trials. On the other hand, control in the
by Todd and Hammond). Using an on- cognitive feedback condition was signi-
line computer arrangement, each subject ficantly (p < .01) higher than in the mixed
was periodically given information about feedback condition, even at the end of
task properties (cue validities), as well as training. (Note that neither knowledge
properties of his cognitive system (cue nor control improved substantially in the
utilization coefficients). A second group outcome feedback condition.)
was given only traditional outcome feed- In short, the cognitively oriented feed-
back ; that is, the correct answer after every back given to subjects in the cognitive and
trial. A third group was given both cogni- mixed feedback conditions facilitated the
tive and outcome feedback (referred to as acquisition of knowledge about task proper-
"mixed" feedback). ties. The addition of outcome feedback to
Using ra as a measure of performance, the mixed feedback condition, however,
Todd and Hammond found that the group served to decrease cognitive control and
which received only cognitive feedback per- thus contributed to the suboptimal per-
formed most accurately, followed by the formance achieved by these subjects.
mixed feedback group, and finally by the A second study employed the same non-
outcome feedback group. That the cogni- linear judgment task used by Deane et al.
tive feedback group performed better than (described earlier), but used an on-line
the outcome feedback group is theoretically computer graphics terminal as a means of
gratifying; but what is surprising is that providing feedback. This technique en-
subjects who received both the cognitive abled the subject to compare periodically
and outcome feedback ("mixed" feedback) his cue weights and function forms with the
performed less well than subjects who were properties of the task system in pictorial
given lens model feedback only. form. (Some practical implications of the
A reanalysis of the Todd and Hammond rapid learning associated with computer
data revealed that performance in the mixed graphics techniques are pointed out in
feedback conditions can be explicated in Hammond, 1971.) Even though a small
terms of cognitive control. As can be seen number of subjects was employed (N = 5),
in Figure 5, subjects in both the cognitive the experiment yielded clear results. Per-
and mixed feedback conditions were able formance (ra) reached the limit of achieve-
to achieve a high degree of knowledge ment after two or three comparisons. It
66 KENNETH R. HAMMOND AND DAVID A. SUMMERS

cognitive control (and thus to performance)

also points to the facilitating effect of
cognitive material as feedback. This shift
in conception of the notion of feedback
carries considerable practical as well as
theoretical significance, for it is now evident
that computer technology can be used to
produce such facilitating feedback. There-
(K
UJ
.0 • fore, it should be possible to improve per-
Q.
formance in complex cognitive tasks in
Z -.2
UJ
which improvement has heretofore been
2 unlikely.
REFERENCES
AZUMA, H., & CRONBACH, L. J. Cue-response cor-
relations in the attainment of a scalar concept.
American Journal of Psychology, 1966, 79, 38-49.
3
BJORKMAN, M. Studies in predictive behavior:
BLOCK Explorations into predictive judgments based on
functional learning and denned by estimation,
FIG. 6. Indexes of achievement (ra), knowledge categorization, and choice. Scandinavian Journal
(G), and control (R,) in a nonlinear inference task 0} Psychology, 1965, 6, 129-156.
when cognitive feedback is presented in the form of BREHMER, B. Cognitive dependence on additive
graphic displays. (Block = 10 trials.) and configural cue-criterion relations. American
Journal of Psychology, 1969, 4, 490-503.
BREHMER, B., AZUMA, H., HAMMOND, K. R., Kos-
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BREHMER, B., & LINDBERG, L. Retention of
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experiments. When subjects received only Experimental Psychology, 1970, 86, 331-334.
graphics feedback, however, control (R,) BRUNSWIK, E. Perception and the representative
as well as G was high (see Figure 6). In design of psychological experiments. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1956.
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DAWES, R. A case study of graduate admissions:
SUMMARY Application of three principles of human decision
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Our purpose has been to demonstrate 188.
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to quantification and experimental manipu- plex inference tasks. Journal of Experimental
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