CASE 1

WARREN E. BUFFETT, 2005

Teaching Note

Synopsis and Objectives

Set in May 2005, this case invites the student to assess Berkshire Suggested
Hathaway’s bid, through MidAmerican Energy Holdings Company, its complementary case
about investment
wholly owned subsidiary, for the regulated energy-utility PacifiCorp. managers and superior
The task for the student is to perform a simple valuation of PacifiCorp performance: “Bill Miller
and to consider the reasonableness of Berkshire’s offer. Student analysis and Value Trust”
(UVA-F-1481).
readily extends into the investment philosophy and the remarkable
record of Berkshire’s chair and CEO, Warren E. Buffett.

The case is an introduction to a finance course or a module on capital markets. The

analytical tasks are straightforward and intended to provide a springboard into discussion of the
main tenets of modern finance. Thus, the case would be useful for:

 setting themes at the beginning of a finance course, including risk-and-return, economic

reality (not accounting reality), the time value of money, and the benefits of alignment of
agents and owners
 linking valuation to the behavior of investors in the capital market
 modeling good practice in management and investment using Warren Buffett as an
example by returning to the image of Buffett repeatedly during a finance course to ask
students what Buffett would likely do in a situation
 characterizing stock prices as equaling the present value of future equity cash flows
 exercising simple equity-valuation skills

While the numerical calculations in the case are simple, novices will find it to be a meaty
introduction to a number of important concepts in finance. Ideally, the case could be positioned
near the beginning of a course or module, after which it can be reinforced by other cases and
exercises.
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Suggested Questions for Advance Assignment

1. What is the possible meaning of the changes in stock price for Berkshire Hathaway and
Scottish Power plc on the day of the acquisition announcement? Specifically, what does
the $2.55 billion gain in Berkshire’s market value of equity imply about the intrinsic
value of PacifiCorp?
2. Based on the multiples for comparable regulated utilities, what is the range of possible
values for PacifiCorp? What questions might you have about this range?
3. Assess the bid for PacifiCorp. How does it compare with the firm’s intrinsic value? As an
alternative, the instructor could suggest that students perform a simple discounted cash-
flow (DCF) analysis.
4. How well has Berkshire Hathaway performed? How well has it performed in the
aggregate? What about its investment in MidAmerican Energy Holdings?
5. What is your assessment of Berkshire’s investments in Buffett’s Big Four: American
Express, Coca-Cola, Gillette, and Wells Fargo?
6. From Warren Buffett’s perspective, what is the intrinsic value? Why is it accorded such
importance? How is it estimated? What are the alternatives to intrinsic value? Why does
Buffett reject them?
7. Critically assess Buffett’s investment philosophy. Be prepared to identify points where
you agree and disagree with him.
8. Should Berkshire Hathaway’s shareholders endorse the acquisition of PacifiCorp?

Suggested Supplemental Readings

As the case indicates, there is a growing library of books and articles about Buffett and
his investment style. The instructor may choose to assign readings from one or more of the
publications listed in Exhibit TN1. Alternatively, it may be appropriate simply to share the list
of books with students to illustrate the breadth of scholarship and reportage about the Sage of
Omaha, Warren Buffett.

Suggested Teaching Plan

The following questions could be used to motivate a 90-minute discussion of the case:

1. What does the stock market seem to be saying about the acquisition of PacifiCorp by
Berkshire Hathaway?
This opening offers the opportunity to develop the notion that stock prices are the present
value of expected cash flows. Moreover, it deals with the immediate opening problem of
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the case: the market’s response to the PacifiCorp announcement. Finally, it should help to
motivate a discussion of Buffett’s investment philosophy.
2. Based on your own analysis, what do you think PacifiCorp was worth on its own before
its acquisition by Berkshire?
This question expands upon the opening question and helps deepen the mystery about the
acquisition—the bid price seems to be a fairly full-price offer for PacifiCorp.
3. Well, maybe Buffett is overpaying—does he have a record of overpaying in the past?
Here, the discussion should shift to an analysis of Berkshire’s general record, its
experience with MidAmerican, and its experiences buying equity positions in the Big
Four. The general conclusion will be that Buffett has done very well as an investor and as
the manager of Berkshire.
4. Here are the major elements of Buffett’s philosophy. What do those elements mean? Do
you agree with them?
On a sideboard, one could list the major topic headings given in the case. The aim here
should be to discuss the intuition behind each point: why Buffett holds those views and
what they imply for his work. If the students already have been exposed to the major
underpinnings of modern finance, this segment of the discussion would take the form of a
quick review. For novices, this segment would warrant slower development.
5. Let’s return to the basic issue. Is the PacifiCorp acquisition a good or bad deal? Why?
This question returns the discussion to the opening and aims to rationalize some of the
contradictions that will have emerged during class. The main contradiction is the full
price and the positive market reaction to the announcement. As a value investor, Buffett
would probably say that he sees something that others do not—the positive market
reaction is just the market revising its expectations about the future profitability of
PacifiCorp.
6. Take a vote on whether the shareholders should endorse the acquisition. For those of you
who believe that PacifiCorp will be a good purchase, what justifies your belief? For
those of you who voted no, why did you oppose it?
Hearing from both sides will serve as a summary of the major themes in the case and will
invite a discussion about the sustainability of Buffett’s record.

The instructor could close with a discussion of the core tenets of finance and then discuss
how the class will return to those themes repeatedly during the course. The instructor could also
augment the discussion of tenets with more reading of material about Buffett. Finally, students
could be updated on Berkshire Hathaway’s performance since the date of the case. See the firm’s
Web site, http://www.berkshirehathaway.com, for updated reports as well as a compilation of
Buffett’s letters to shareholders.
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Case Analysis

Investor reaction to the PacifiCorp announcement

The investor reaction suggests that the deal will not only create value for Discussio
PacifiCorp’s acquirer, Berkshire Hathaway, but also for the seller, Scottish Power. n question
In fact, as a relative matter, it would appear that the market sees more value 1
accruing to Scottish Power because of its divestiture of PacifiCorp than to
Berkshire, as a result of its acquisition of the company. Students could be encouraged to consider
why this might be so (i.e., why Scottish Power would seem to gain more benefit from the deal
than Berkshire Hathaway).

The $2.55 billion increase in Berkshire Hathaway’s market value indicates an expected
benefit to Berkshire from the acquisition. Some students will measure the extent of this benefit as
a gain of $2.55 billion in Berkshire’s market value of equity divided by PacifiCorp’s 312.18
million shares outstanding or $6.95 per PacifiCorp share more than Buffett is paying. Berkshire
is offering $5.1 billion in cash for PacifiCorp’s equity, for a per-share price of $16.34; altogether,
this would imply a per-share expected value for PacifiCorp’s shares of $23.29. Is this a fair
estimate of PacifiCorp’s intrinsic value? Students must perform their own valuation of
PacifiCorp in order to arrive at an independent judgment about this value.

Valuation of PacifiCorp

Because PacifiCorp is a privately held company that does not pay a Discussion
dividend, the case does not contain enough information to derive a valuation for questions 2
PacifiCorp using market values or the dividend discount model. It is necessary, and 3
therefore, to rely on an implied valuation for the firm using multiples from
comparable regulated utilities. Case Exhibit 9 provides financial data for the comparable firms,
and case Exhibit 10 presents implied valuations for PacifiCorp using averages and medians of
those firms’ multiples. Table 1 presents a summary of the range of valuations provided in the
case:

Table 1. Summary of PacifiCorp valuation estimates.

Enterprise Value as Multiple of: MV Equity as Multiple of:

Net
Rev. EBIT EBITDA Income EPS Book Value
   
6,252 8,775 9,023 7,596 4,277 5,904
6,584 9,289 9,076 7,553 4,308 5,678

Because the case states that it would take 12 to 18 months for the deal to acquire
PacifiCorp to close, the instructor may wish to solicit a present value for Berkshire Hathaway’s
offer for the equity portion of PacifiCorp. An appropriate discount rate may be derived using the
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capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Footnote 13 in the case explains that the yield on the 30-
year U.S. Treasury bond was 5.76% and that Berkshire’s beta was 0.75, and the case states that
the long-run market return was 10.5%. So Berkshire’s cost of equity may be estimated as 9.32%.
Using this rate to discount Berkshire’s $5.1 billion offer over 12 or 18 months, we get a present
value of about $4.7 billion.

Berkshire’s offer for PacifiCorp was, therefore, roughly in line with the range of peer
firm valuations. This does not explain why the market reacted so positively to the news of the
acquisition. It is possible that the investors perceived potential synergies between PacifiCorp and
MidAmerican, but in the highly regulated and regionally focused electric-utility business, such
synergistic benefits may be weak. Was there perhaps something in Buffett’s record as an investor
that led to the market’s response?

Buffett’s record

The case affords three opportunities to analyze Berkshire Hathaway’s Discussio

historical record. n
questions
Berkshire Hathaway’s historical wealth creation: The case offers a range 4 and 5
of evidence about shareholder wealth creation at Berkshire Hathaway. The case
gives a rate of 24% compound annual growth in stock prices from 1965 to 1995. In comparison,
wealth creation for large firms averaged 10.5% per year over the same period. The first chart in
the case helps students visualize the supernormal performance of Berkshire Hathaway. Novices
to finance should be encouraged to consider how difficult it is to beat the market by such a wide
margin.

Berkshire’s experience with MidAmerican: Data in the case and case Exhibit 6 give
information with which to perform a simple analysis of Berkshire’s return on investment in
MidAmerican. Beginning in 2000, Berkshire Hathaway made an outlay of $1.642 billion for an
eventual 80.5% economic interest in MidAmerican. Berkshire’s economic interest in
MidAmerican was composed of both equity and debt investments such that the cash flows to
Berkshire included interest payments, common dividends, and preferred dividends. Therefore,
Berkshire’s return on investment can be approximated by computing Berkshire’s share of
MidAmerican’s free cash flows, the cash flows available to all debt and equity claims. The
income statement and balance sheet data in case Exhibit 6 may help us derive Berkshire’s share
of MidAmerican’s free cash flows from 2001 to 2004, revealing that Berkshire had an internal
rate of return (IRR) on this investment of 71%. Exhibit TN2 presents those calculations.

Berkshire’s experience with equity investments: The data in case Exhibit 3 give a
foundation for a simple assessment of the major equity investments by Berkshire. With a class of
novices, the instructor could motivate them to observe that all those issues have market values
considerably higher than their costs. With a class of students more experienced in finance, it
would be possible to estimate a holding-period return for Berkshire’s investments in the Big
Four. Using the information in this exhibit and its footnote, we find that Berkshire’s investments
in American Express, Coca-Cola, Gillette, and Wells Fargo generated a compound annual
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growth rate of 16.07%. Students could be encouraged to compare this return with the long-term
return for all large stocks, 10.5%.
Buffett’s Investment Philosophy

Buffett’s investment philosophy reads mostly like a summary of the theory Discussion
of modern finance. As the subheadings in the case indicate, the elements of the questions 6
philosophy are as follows: and 7

1. Economic reality, not accounting reality

2. Account for the cost of the lost opportunity
3. Focus on the time value of money
4. Focus on wealth creation
5. Invest on the basis of information and analysis
6. The alignment of agents and owners is beneficial to firm value

Buffett strongly disagrees, however, with three other elements of modern finance:

1. Use of risk-adjusted discount rates: The method he uses seems rather similar to the
certainty equivalent approach to valuation (i.e., discount certain cash flows at a risk-free
rate). Although it seems doubtful that the cash flows he discounts are truly certain, the
very fact that he matches riskless cash flows with a risk-free discount rate implies an
approach consistent with the risk-and-return logic of the CAPM.
2. Benefits of portfolio diversification: Although Buffett disavows portfolio diversification,
the breadth of Berkshire Hathaway’s holdings probably approaches efficient
diversification. Case Exhibit 2 gives a breakdown of Berkshire’s diverse business
segments (also described in the case); case Exhibit 3 gives a listing of Berkshire’s 10
major investees. From the list, students could be asked whether the portfolio looks
diversified—this should stimulate a discussion of what diversification means to them and
what it might mean in finance theory.
The case does not provide the data with which to complete an analysis based on market
values and asset allocations, but by just looking, one might identify possible industry
concentrations in Berkshire’s holdings. Those concentrations do not seem to account for
the bulk of Berkshire’s market value. The firm’s portfolio consists of an assortment of
odd manufacturing and service businesses suggested in the case, plus some major equity
holdings (case Exhibit 3) that are not easily classified in the concentration groups. The
mass of research on portfolio diversification suggests that it does not require very many
different equities to achieve the risk-reduction benefits of diversification. Despite his
public disagreement with the concept of diversification, Buffett seems to practice it.
3. Capital-market efficiency: Buffett’s emphasis on the value of information asymmetries
seems to confirm some appreciation for efficiency in security prices. From his public
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statements as reported in the case, Buffett’s disagreement with efficiency focuses on two
aspects:
 The concept of passive portfolio management (i.e., indexing)
 The implication that quoted prices equal intrinsic values
The theory of efficiency does not absolutely preclude benefits of active management or
the possibility that prices may not equal intrinsic values. But it does suggest that without
an information advantage or some unusual skill, it would be very difficult to earn
supernormal returns consistently over time. It is in this context that Warren Buffett
appears to be a major anomaly. The supernormal returns of Berkshire Hathaway suggest
that it is possible to beat the market by a wide margin. Still, Buffett’s investment style is
consistent with efficiency in some important ways:
 Discipline and rationality: If one is trying to beat the market, it makes no sense to
invest in shares that are fairly priced. Buffett’s quotations in the case and his
acquisition philosophy in case Exhibit 8 suggest that he is looking for the market’s
pricing anomalies. Looking for the anomalies (the rationality part) and waiting to find
them (the discipline part) are not inconsistent with a market that generally prices
securities efficiently. Indeed, one could argue that the activities of investors such as
Buffett help to create the efficiency that he denies.
 Information: By virtue of Berkshire’s large stockholdings in selected firms, Buffett
holds directorships and enjoys an informational advantage unavailable to outside
investors. Information advantages are valuable in a world of only semi-strong
efficient markets.

Conclusion

The final issue raised by the case has to do with the sustainability of Buffett’s record. A
bid for PacifiCorp of $9.4 billion does not seem unreasonable relative to current comparable
valuations. For the PacifiCorp acquisition to be a success in the sense of matching historical
returns at Berkshire, Buffett’s expectations for PacifiCorp must be radically different from
current, implied, and expected values for peer firms. With an investment of this size, a mistake
will have lasting adverse consequences for Berkshire and Buffett. Even if Buffett’s bet on
PacifiCorp in May 2005 is correct, the need to deploy larger amounts of money will invite
mistakes—as Buffet said, “A fat wallet is the enemy of superior investment results.” With more
than $40 billion in cash and cash equivalents, Buffett would have been mindful of this
admonition.

As described here, the case gives the novice a broad introduction to the valuation of, and
investment in, equities. The elements of this introduction include the following:
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 ex post analysis of investment returns (Berkshire, MidAmerican, and the Big Four) and
comparison of those returns with a benchmark, such as the S&P 500 Index or the
Ibbotson total return figures
 peer multiples valuation analysis of PacifiCorp
 discussion of the meaning of share-price movements following the announcement of the
PacifiCorp acquisition
 review of the major tenets of finance in the context of Buffett’s investment philosophy
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Exhibit TN1
WARREN E. BUFFETT, 2005
Bibliography for Warren E. Buffett

Buffett, Mary, and David Clark. The New Buffettology: The Proven Techniques for Investing
Successfully in Changing Markets That Have Made Warren Buffett the World’s Most Famous
Investor. (New York: Simon & Schuster), 2002.
Cunningham, Lawrence A. How to Think Like Benjamin Graham and Invest Like Warren Buffett.
(New York: McGraw-Hill), 2002.
———. The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons for Corporate America. 1st rev. ed. (New York:
Cunningham Group), 2001.
Hagstrom, Robert G. The Warren Buffett Way. 2nd ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons), 2004.
Heller, Robert. Business Masterminds: Warren Buffett. (Dorling Kindersley Publishing), 2000.
Kilpatrick, Andrew. Of Permanent Value: The Story of Warren Buffett. (New York: Andy
Kilpatrick Publishing Empire), 2004.
———. Warren Buffett: The Good Guy of Wall Street. reprint ed. (New York: Plume), 1995.
Lowe, Janet. Warren Buffett Speaks: Wit and Wisdom from the World’s Greatest Investor. 2nd
ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons), 1997.
Lowenstein, Roger. Buffett: The Making of an American Capitalist. (Main Street Books), 1996.
Morio, Ayano. Warren Buffett: An Illustrated Biography of the World’s Most Successful
Investor. (New York: John Wiley & Sons), 2004.
O’Loughlin, James. The Real Warren Buffett: Managing Capital, Leading People. (London:
Nicholas Brealey Publishing), 2003.
Reynolds, Simon. Thoughts of Chairman Buffett: Thirty Years of Unconventional Wisdom from
the Sage of Omaha. (New York: Collins), 1998.
Steele, Jay. Warren Buffett: Master of the Market. (New York: Harper Paperbacks), 1999.
Train, John. The Midas Touch: The Strategies That Have Made Warren Buffett America’s
Preeminent Investor. Reprint ed. (New York: HarperCollins), 1988.
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Exhibit TN2
WARREN E. BUFFETT, 2005
Example of Completed IRR Analysis for Berkshire
Hathaway’s Investment in MidAmerican
($ in millions except per-share figures)