Idolatry and representation

MOSHE HALBERTAL and AVISHAI MARGALIT

The prohibitions against idolatry are an attempt to possibility that the very revelation that forbade the making
dictate the ways in which God may be represented. It is of images and pictures would be conceived as a revelation
forbidden not only to worship other gods such as Ba'al in which a shape of God was seen, and so would be a
but also to represent God himself by means of a statue or cause of the making of images and pictures.2 But the
picture. This aspect ofthe ban on idolatry raises many chapter does not tell us why a linguistic description of
questions: What are the proper methods of representing God's hand is permitted while a drawing of his hand is
God, and which methods are forbidden? Why are forbidden.
representations in pictures and statues forbidden, and At first glance it would seem that gods can be
why are linguistic representations permitted? What are represented by any one of three types of representation.
representations of God by idols supposed to mean? Are There are similarity-based representations such as
they an attempt to represent him by means of something sculptures and pictures, m?tonymie representations such as
that resembles him, and thus forbidden because there is the Ark of the Covenant and the cherubim, and
nothing that resembles God? Or can they be regarded as conventional representations such as linguistic descriptions
representations in which there is a special presence ofthe of a god. The different relations between the types of
gods, thus narrowing the gap between the world and God representation and the prohibitions on representations are
to a greater degree than can be tolerated by the the subject of this essay.
monotheistic religions?
According to the view that distinguishes the ban on the
Similarity-based representations
worship of other gods from the making of images and
likenesses of the God of Israel, the two consecutive verses Idols, the error of substitution, and fetishes
in the Ten Commandments, "You shall have no other gods
The prophets describe idol worship as the worship of
besides Me" and "You shall not make for yourself a wood and stone. When the idolater bows down to the
sculptured image or any likeness" (Exodus 20:3-4), must be
idol, according to Isaiah, he worships the image itself and
understood as two separate prohibitions. The second verse,
not what the image represents. In their polemics the
in other words, must be understood as a second
prophets taunt the idol worshipers with the idiocy of
prohibition: it is forbidden to worship other gods, and in
worshiping wood and stone; the ?mage is not a sign or
addition it is forbidden to make images and likenesses of
symbol of god, the prophets flatly state, it is god.3 This
God himself.1 Such an understanding ofthe prohibition
view of the function of the ?mage as a fetish was clearly
seems explicitly called for in Deuteronomy: "Be most
influenced by the biblical polemics that attempted to
careful?since you saw no shape when the Lord your God
portray the idolaters as identifying their god with wood
spoke to you at Horeb out of the fire?not to act wickedly
and stone.4 The other extreme in describing the function
and make for yourselves a sculptured image in any likeness
whatever: the form of a man or woman" (4:15-16). Since
the Israelites did not see any image on Mount Sinai, they 2. Did the giving of the Torah on Mount Sinai involve only the sense
are forbidden to make images or pictures?a clear of hearing? In Exodus we find the verse, "The Lord came down upon
expression of the fear of the representation of God himself Mount Sinai" (19:20), while in Deuteronomy the following is written:
"From the heavens He let you hear His voice to discipline you; on earth
in images and pictures. In the same chapter in
He let you see His great fire; and from amidst that fire you heard His
Deuteronomy, the revelation at Sinai is described as words" (4:36). Concerning the tension between vision and hearing
hearing the voice of God without seeing any shape: "You during the giving of the Torah on Mount Sinai, see A. J. Heschel, Torah
heard the sound of words but perceived no shape?nothing min ha-Shamaim be-Aspaclaria shel ha-Dorot (New York: Shonstin,
but a voice" (4:12). This emphasis, which is repeated 1962), pt. 1, pp. 262-294; pt. 2, pp. 58-67.
3. See Isaiah 40:18-20, 44:9-20; Jeremiah 10:1-5; Habakkuk2:18-19.
several times in the chapter, is intended to eliminate the
4. The biblical reduction of paganism to mere fetishism can be
understood as an intentional misrepresentation for the sake of polemics.
Excerpted and adapted from Idolatry, by Moshe Halbertal and Y. Kaufman explains that the Bible never confronts pagan myths or other
Avishai Margalit, copyright ? Harvard University Press 1992, to be conceptions of the pagan gods aside from the fetishistic elements, not as
published in fall 1992. Reprinted by permission of publisher. a result of intentional ridicule of paganism but as a sign that the pagan
1. Concerning the connection between the two verses, see B. Childs, religions were not truly understood. According to Kaufman the
The Book of Exodus (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974), pp. 406-409. "monotheistic revolution" in Israel was successful to the extent that the
20 RES 22 AUTUMN 1992

of images and their place in worship is the view that attitude to the holy vessels. The presence of the Ark of the
images and icons are mere signs, with no unique powers, Covenant could bring life and death: it brought disaster
capable of serving only as reminders and transparent upon the Philistines and killed thousands of Israel's
representations ofthe gods. Icons, according to this view, people in Beth Shemesh.7 Thus there is a "substitution" in
inspire and teach; they are mainly didactic artifacts and idol worship of the symbol for the thing symbolized, in
not active forces. Such attitudes were expressed by those which some of the traits of the symbolized thing are
who defended icons in the church during the iconoclastic transferred to the symbolizing thing. In this substitution
debate ofthe seventh century and by Catholics in arguing the two prohibitions?the one against the making of
against the Reformation in the sixteenth century.5 These sculptures and pictures and the one against the worship of
two extreme views, of course, must be distinguished from other gods?are actually joined. The prohibition against
the more complex views of the worshipers themselves. making sculptures and pictures is explained by the
Between the two extremes is a variety of attitudes potential for them to be eventually transformed from
regarding the relationship ofthe gods to their icons. Those representations of god or other gods to other gods
attitudes, free from either polemics or apologetics, themselves. Thus the prohibition against the ?con in this
describe and reflect more faithfully the role of icons as conception has two components. First, the gap between
representations. Not mere transparent signs, icons have the god and the world is blurred by the representation
independent power; they heal and perform miracles and that possesses the features of the god itself. Second, this
therefore are addressed and worshiped. Their unique creates a very deep fear of substitution, in which the idol
power is due not to the identity between God and the takes the place of the god in the eyes of the worshiper.
material makeup of the icon but to the special The nonpagans' great fear of similarity-based
relationship between the two. The relationship is only representation is the possibility of a substitutive error, in
partly based on the similarity between the symbol and the which the idol ceases to be the representation or symbol
thing symbolized. The icon also shares some ofthe of God and comes to be seen as God himself or part of
features ofthe thing it represents. This special relationship him. In such a case, the idol is regarded as a fetish that
is described in a variety of forms. The idol is one of the slowly and gradually acquires the traits ofthe thing it is
manifestations ofthe god?sometimes his place of representing. In a certain sense it becomes the body ofthe
residence (like the soul in the body) and sometimes a god, the residence of its soul, and an independent object
direct concentration of his powers. Moreover, in certain of ritual worship. The purpose ofthe prohibitions
ritual contexts there are special causal connections dictating proper methods of representation is to prevent
between the god and its icons. By means of these causal errors of substitution of the representations for God.
connections an act performed on the icon becomes an The understanding of idolatry as an error of
act upon the god itself.6 In the Bible itself there is a similar substitution was central to Maimonides' thought. The
transition from belief in a first cause, which Maimonides
considered a chronologically prior belief, to the worship
Bible recognized only marginal pagan practices and nothing more. See
Y. Kaufman, The Religion of Israel: From Its Beginnings to the
Babylonian Exile, trans. Moshe Greenberg (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago 1984), pp. 303-305; D. Freedberg, The Power of Images (Chicago:
Press, 1960), pp. 7-20,133-147. For an unfetishistic rabbinic view of Univ. of Chicago Press, 1984), chaps. 2,14; E. Kitz'inger, "The Cult of
Roman icons, see Midrash Exodus Rabbah 15:17, and S. Liberman, Images in the Age Before Iconoclasm," Dumbarton Oaks Papers 8
Hellenism in Jewish Palestine (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, (1954); 85-150; and M. Camille, The Gothic Idol (Cambridge:
1962), p. 126. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989), chaps. 1, 5. For an extensive discussion
5. For information on the iconoclastic debate, see Icon and Logos: of the origin and concept of the fetish, see W. Pietz, "The Problem of
Sources in Eighth-Century Iconoclasm, trans, and intro. D. J. Sahas the Fetish, I, II, and III," RES: Anthropology and Aesthetics 9 (Spring
(Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1986). Concerning the claim that 1985); RES: Anthropology and Aesthetics 13 (Spring 1987); and RES:
there is no divinity in the icon, see ibid., pp. 64, 65, 76, 84-86. For an Anthropology and Aesthetics 16 (Autumn 1988).
example ofthe counterclaim, see pp. 68, 77. Concerning iconoclasm in 7.1 Samuel 5:1-7:1. It is interesting to examine the Philistines'
the sixteenth century, see C. M. N. Eire, War against the Idols reactions to the ark when it was brought by Israel to the war against
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986). For additional references them. The Philistines first identify the ark with Israel's God: "When they
on the attribution of powers to symbols in the worship of saints, see learned that the Ark of the Lord had come into the camp, the Philistines
Eire, p. 15, n. 32; on the iconoclastic debate in the seventh and eighth were frightened; for they said, 'God has come to the camp'" (I Samuel
centuries, see p. 19, n. 50. 4:6). Israel on the other hand regarded the ark as a representation of
6. For descriptions of the function of images, see E. Bowen, Holy God because it is God's footstool and throne, and God is called Lord of
Images: An Inquiry into Idolatry and Image-Worship in Ancient Hosts Enthroned on the Cherubim. On this difference see J. Milgrom,
Paganism and Christianity (London: G. Allen and Un win, 1940); H. TheJPS Torah Commentary: Numbers (Philadelphia and New York:
Frankfort, Kingship and the Gods (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, Jewish Publication Society, 1990), pp. 373-375.
 Halbertal and Margal it: Idolatry and representation 21

of idols did not occur in one direct leap. Rather, it took idols were only representations of heavenly forces, but
place through intermediate stages in which the worshiped even the priests and the wise men made the substitutive
heavenly forces and their images first served as error of regarding the heavenly forces themselves as gods
intermediaries between the worshiper and God and only rather than as intermediaries for the Rock of Ages. The
subsequently became gods. Maimonides describes this only difference between the masses and the priests was
development at the beginning of the section on the laws that the latter made the substitutive error in a later stage
relating to idolatry in his Code of Jewish Law. Initially, and attributed less transparency to the intermediaries as
worshipers thought that worshiping the intermediaries was representations. The masses erred at the stage of the idols
a way of showing respect for God, just as honoring the themselves, in relating to them as if they were fetishes,
servants of a king is a way of showing respect for the king. although they were only representations ofthe heavenly
This view led the people to begin worshiping the moon forces. The priests erred in their fetishistic attitude toward
and the stars, but still as intermediaries?"They did not say the heavenly forces, although these were only
that there was no god but this star." Afterward false representations of God. Since it is the error of substitution
prophets arose who said that God had commanded them to that is the cause of idolatry, according to Maimonides the
worship a certain star or all the stars, and so they built purpose ofthe prohibitions against idolatry is to ensure
temples and filled them with idols representing the stars. that such errors will not be made. This is the reason that
The gap between God himself and worship of him was the worship of created beings and symbols was forbidden,
increased further by the claim that God had commanded even if the worshipers were aware that they were only
not only that the stars, which were intermediaries, should being worshiped as intermediaries.8
be worshiped but also that the images of the stars, which Whatever historical validity Maimonides' description
were intermediaries upon intermediaries, should be may have, what interests us in his description is the
worshiped. The motivation for worshiping these analysis of the error of substitution. According to
intermediaries was supported by the assertion that they Maimonides, the cause of the error of substitution is the
were capable of causing good and evil events to occur, and act of worship, as beliefs follow actions. The confusion
that success was dependent on worshiping them. In the results from the fact that in a situation of representation
next stage, there were more false prophets who claimed only the ways of relating are supposed to be transferred,
that these stars had commanded that they should be and not the predicates applying to the represented thing.
worshiped, that is, these intermediaries were given the The king's representative is not the king himself, although
additional status of being able to give commands and some of the ways of relating to the king are transferred to
prophecies. The end of this process, as described by the representative because of his role. The error of
Maimonides, was as follows: substitution occurs in the next stage, when the thing

And as the days progressed the name of the revered and

awesome God was forgotten from the entire universe and no 8. There is a similar description in Maimonides, The Guide ofthe
one knew of Him. Thus all the ordinary folk, including Perplexed, trans. S. Pines (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1963), 1:36.
women and children, did not know of anything but the The attribution of powers to sacred objects that represent God is
images of wood and stone and the stone temples, as they had widespread within the nonpagan religions themselves. In certain
been taught from childhood to bow down to them and to kabbalistic traditions the prohibition against erasing even a single letter
worship them and to swear by them. The wise men among in the Torah scroll is interpreted as a prohibition against erasing God
himself. The extreme caution involved in the laws for writing a Torah
them, such as the priests and others, pretended that there was
no God but the stars and the constellations in whose form the scroll thus derives from the fact that the obligation to write the scroll is
connected with the act of multiplying the presence of God in the world
images were made. But there was not one who knew the
through the Torah scrolls. For conceptions of such immanent
Rock of Ages. representations ofthe divinity in Kabbalah, see M. Idel, Kabbalah: New
(Laws of Idolatry 1:2) Perspectives (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1988), pp. 188-189. One
of the manuscripts Idel cites says that someone who writes a Torah
At the end of the process, according to Maimonides, there scroll is making God. In contrast to such views we can cite the attitude
was a fetishistic folk religion, and the masses forgot that of Maimonides toward those who turn the mezuzah into a good-luck
the idols in the temples were representations of the stars charm by adding holy names on its parchment: "It is not enough for
and not independent forces. these fools that they have voided the fulfillment of the commandment
[adding the names makes the parchment unfit as a mezuzah], but they
One of the most important components in the process
have also taken a great commandment which is the unification of the
ofthe transformation ofthe representation into an
name of God and His worship, and used it as if it were a good-luck
independent power was the use of representations of the charm for their own benefit" (Maimonides, Code of Jewish Law, Laws of
representations. The religious elite was aware that the Mezuzah, 5:4).
22 RES 22 AUTUMN 1992

represented is described as if it were the thing it Although the claim that God has no image is
represents. This is what occurs with respect to the considered by Maimonides as a principle of faith, it is not
heavenly forces and the idols. Substitution occurs again so clear that it is accepted in the Bible or in the rabbinic
when the attitudes that were derived from the fact that the traditions. In the Bible it seems that God does indeed
object is a representation continue to exist even after the have an image, except that to represent this image in any
object is no longer perceived as such. The attitude of way is forbidden. Thus, for example, when Moses asks to
respect and worship toward the heavenly powers was see God's face, God answers, "You cannot see My face,
derived from their being representations of God, but this for man may not see Me and live" (Exodus 33:20).
attitude persisted even after they were no longer Elsewhere it is said of Moses that "he beholds the likeness
perceived in this way. In Maimonides' view the purpose of the Lord" (Numbers 12:8), and of the elders of Israel
of the prohibitions against idolatry was to ensure that the that "they beheld God, and they ate and drank" (Exodus
worship of God would be free of the possibility of the 24:11). Isaiah saw the Lord "seated on a high and lofty
substitutive error. Here we see an absolute shift to the throne" (Isaiah 6:1), and Ezekiel describes him as having
worship of one God, which is the crucial meaning of the "the semblance of a human form" (Ezekiel 1:26). It thus
prohibition on idolatry. seems that the prohibition against representation is
associated not with the metaphysical question of whether
God has an image but with the methods of representing
Erroneous representation or inappropriate representation?
God in ritual worship.
There is another problem with similarity-based The Bible itself does not resolve the question of
representation even where there is no fear of substitution. whether God has an image. Moshe Weinfeld claims that
In the painting on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel in biblical literature does ascribe an image to God, for
which Michelangelo painted God creating Adam, there is example, when the priestly source speaks of God as
no problem of substitution. No one has ever claimed that dwelling within the sanctuary. At the same time,
God is present in this painting or confused the painting according to Weinfeld, in Deuteronomy there is a more
with God. Those who interpret the prohibition against abstract concept of God as having no image. In
images most strictly will oppose this painting, however, Deuteronomy God's dwelling in the sanctuary is replaced
because there is something forbidden in the very act of by his name's dwelling there.10 It is not clear in
representing God in a painting. The prohibition against Deuteronomy how one should interpret the verse "since
representing God in a sculpture or painting is the you saw no shape when the Lord your God spoke to you"
prohibition against a representation that seems to be (4:15): is this a negation of the existence of a shape of
based on similarity. Why is it forbidden to represent God God or only a stipulation that the Israelites did not see
in this way? If it is assumed that God has no image, then any such shape? At any rate it seems that there is a view
any similarity-based representation of God must embedded in the Bible that ascribes a shape to God, and
necessarily be a wrong representation, a diminution of the issue is whether there is any tension within the Bible
what he really is. The error is in the very act of making an concerning this question.
image of something that has no image.9 Representation is These trends within the Bible are developed further in
prohibited as a result ofthe metaphysical claim that since the Shi'ur Komah literature, a form of mystical literature
God has no image, any representation of God, and from the second and third centuries that discusses the size
naturally any worship of such a representation constitutes of the parts of God's body. This literature is filled with
the worship of a false god. The problem in this case is that visual descriptions of God and describes experiences of
any similarity-based representation is mistaken and seeing him directly. It is entirely possible that this tradition
causes an error in the conception of God for anyone who is not a mystic tradition on the edge of the mainstream
sees or worships such a representation. Judaism but is found within the very heart of rabbinic
Judaism, as Saul Lieberman claims. He points out that the
9. Two arguments may be found in the iconoclastic literature ofthe midrash on the Song of Songs tells us about traditions of
sixteenth century. One is that the worship of statues is a substitute for God being seen?at the crossing of the Red Sea and at the
the worship of God; the other is that the statues are not capable of giving of the Torah; the midrash about the song at the
representing the deity properly because the infinite and the spiritual
cannot be given material representation. The material representation of
God would lead to the conception that he is a material being. This
claim is repeated many times by Calvin and others; see Eire, War 10. See M. Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomistic School
against the Idols, p. 201. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), pp. 191-209.
 Halbertal and Margal it: Idolatry and representation 23

crossing of the Red Sea tells us specifically that the one is to distribute pictures of the king everywhere, and
Israelites saw God at the sea when they said, "This is my the other is to prevent anyone from ever seeing the king.
God and I will enshrine Him" (Exodus 15:2). The claim
The prohibition against making images and pictures is a
that God has no image, which was turned into one of the facet ofthe second approach, which is based on mystery
foundations of Judaism by Maimonides, does not reflect and distance. This prohibition is independent ofthe
either the Bible or the rabbinic tradition. It would
metaphysical view that God has no image and relates
therefore be very difficult to say that the prohibition only to the issue of the permitted methods of
against idols and pictures was based on this claim.11 representation. The problem here is not one of the error in
In keeping with this approach, we argue that the representation but of the degree of exposure of what is
difference between the worship of God and the worship being represented on the basis of similarity, where this
of idols is not in the issue of whether the divinity has an exposure is independent of the problem ofthe substitutive
image but rather in the issue of whether it is permitted to error. The representation is not mistaken, it is
make a representation of this image. The important inappropriate.
question is thus the following one: if God actually does The distinction between the idol worshipers and their
have an image, why is it forbidden to make a similarity opponents is not in the image of God in the minds of the
based representation of this image? One answer is that worshipers but in the methods of representing him in
God does indeed have an image, but no person has seen ritual worship. In the view of Maimonides, however, the
it, and so there is a danger that any representation will be image of God in the mind of the worshiper is the crucial
incorrect. From this argument it would follow that if element. He, therefore, insists that those who ascribe a
someone should happen by some chance to see God's corporeal image to God are heretics and will have no
?mage he or she would be permitted to make a share in the world-to-come. Rabad, in his commentary on
representation of it. A possible rejoinder to this is that Maimonides' Code of Jewish Law (Laws of Repentance
even someone who had seen God's image would be 3:7), disagrees with Maimonides and returns the focus of
forbidden to make a representation of it, because every the discussion from what is in the worshiper's head to
representation constitutes a diminution of respect for the what is represented in the act of worship.13
represented object. God would lose his uniqueness in the
process of representation and in the fact of having many
imitations, and his value would decline, just as the value Metonymie representations
of a work of art declines when there are many The biblical tradition, which so clearly forbids
reproductions of it. The sense of the gap between God similarity-based representations of God, permits
and his worshipers is based on the fact that they can m?tonymie representations of him. Even in the Jewish
never see his image, even in a representation. This may temple, when one passes from the courtyard to the outer
be compared to the kings of Persia, who would speak to part of the temple building, and from the outer part to the
their subjects from behind a screen and were never inner part, the Holy of Holies behind the curtain, one
seen.12 In general, there are two opposite approaches to does not see any image of God, as is the custom in pagan
the task of creating a feeling of remoteness and authority:
13. R. Abraham ben David differs with Maimonides' opinion in the
11. See S. Lieberman, "Mishnat Shir ha-Shirim," a Hebrew appendix Code of Jewish Law, Laws of Repentance, 3:7: "Three types of people
to G. Scholem, Jewish Gnosticism, Merkabah Mysticism, and Talmudic are called heretics: one who says that there is no deity and the world
Tradition (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1965). For a has no ruler, one who says there is a ruler but there are two or more,
discussion ofthe Shi'ur Komah literature, see Scholem, On the Mystical one who says that there is one sovereign but he is a body and has an
Shape ofthe Godhead: Basic Concepts in the Kabbalah, trans. J. image." R. Abraham ben David comments as follows: "Even though this
Neugroschel (New York: Schocken, 1991), pp. 15-55. On notions of is a principle of our faith, one who believes that He is a body due to his
the image of God, see Idel, Kabbalah, pp. 119-136 and n. 14. understanding ofthe language ofthe biblical verses and the Midrash
Traditions of seeing God directly exist therefore in the Bible, early according to their literal meaning is not worthy of being called a
Jewish mystical literature, and the midrash. In one ofthe earliest heretic." There are other versions of this criticism that are expressed
midrash?m, the Torat Kohanim, sec. 1, chap. 2, pt. 2, we find: "R. Dosa much more sharply; e.g., "Many who are better than he [Maimonides]
said: God said, 'No man may see Me and live?they cannot see Me believe in the corporeality of God." For a detailed analysis ofthe
when they are alive but they can do so after their death.'" Also see Sifrei controversy, see I. Twersky, Rabadof Posquieres (Cambridge, Mass.:
on Numbers, sec. 103. Harvard Univ. Press, 1962), pp. 282-286.
12. The Sassian monarch sat on a throne with a veiled face or On the controversy that evolved around the Maimonidean denial of
behind a curtain. He was therefore inaccessible and unseen. On this anthropomorphism and the opposition that supported anthropomorphic
practice, see G. Windengren, "The Sacral Kingship in Iran," in The views, see B. Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture in Transition
Sacral Kingship (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1959), p. 247. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1982), pp. 75-103.
24 RES 22 AUTUMN 1992

temples. There is an expectation of seeing God, or at least golden calves in the northern kingdom idolatry is to
an image of him, behind the curtain, but the only things attribute similarity-based representation to what is only
to be seen there are the cherubim. The cherubim do not m?tonymie representation.16
represent God by resembling him; rather, they are a This very same process may be applied in reverse to
m?tonymie representation of God: they represent God permit what seems to be idolatry, or what seems mistaken
because they are directly associated with him, being his from a theological viewpoint, and to make it legitimate.
chariot. (We do not believe that the cherubim are That is, similarity-based representations may be
similarity-based representations of m?tonymie transformed into m?tonymie ones in order to solve serious
representations, that is, that the cherubim in the temple problems. For example, when the translator-commentator
are representations that resemble the heavenly chariot; in Onkelos encounters biblical verses describing God as
our opinion the cherubim themselves are the chariot.)14 appearing in a cloud or in a fire, he transforms them into
Metonymie representations are permitted because they manifestations of objects that God created for the purpose
do not lead to error in the conception of God, as they do of revelation, instead of seeing them as manifestations of
not represent him by being similar to him. Moreover, God God himself or of something resembling him.17 There is
is not revealed in a m?tonymie representation to the indeed a direct causal relation between God and the
degree that he is in one based on similarity. An ?mage of cloud, but it is not a relation of similarity. The process of
God is not the same as his chariot, if the intention is to transforming the similarity-based representation into a
prevent direct exposure of the image of God himself. The m?tonymie one thus legitimizes the representation.
fact that m?tonymie representations of God are permitted
supports our contention that the basis for the prohibition
Conventional representations
against images and pictures is not the fear of substitution
but the struggle against mistaken or inappropriate Although the biblical tradition regards the making of
representations. Substitution can occur just as easily in sculptured images and pictures as a grave sin, it permits
m?tonymie as in similarity-based representations. Didn't
16. The prohibition against making m?tonymie representations may
the Israelites treat the Ark of the Covenant as a fetish
be found in Mekhilta, commentary on the verse: "You shall not make
when they took it to the war with the Philistines on the for yourselves any gods of silver or any gods of gold" (Exodus 20:20).
assumption that it would grant them victory? If the Concerning the extension of this prohibition to pictures and sculptures
of human form or the constellations even in nonritualistic context, see
primary fear was a fear of the substitution of the
the Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Rosh Hashanah 24a-b; Tractate
representation for the represented thing, then m?tonymie
Avodah Zarah 43a-b. The scope of the prohibition against painting and
representations should have been forbidden as well. sculpturing was debated by medieval commentators ofthe Talmud; see
Often the accusation of idolatry is hurled at some Ramban Tractate Avodah Zarah 43b "Hah de-Akshinan."
person or group because the accuser has failed to Images from Hellenistic mythology dating from the second century
a.D. have been found in mosaics in synagogues and in tablets affixed to
distinguish between m?tonymie and similarity-based
coffins in the Galilee. These discoveries raise deep questions about the
representations. Thus, for example, some scholars claim
strictness of the practical observance of the prohibition against the making
that equating worship of the golden calves in the northern of sculptures and images in Jewish society ofthe Hellenistic period. E. R.
kingdom of Israel with idol worship is a mistake.15 The Goodenough, in his book Jewish Symbols in the Graeco-Roman Period
worshipers ofthe golden calves, according to this claim, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1953-1956), IV, 2-44, claims that the
did not worship them as similarity-based representations existence of these images in synagogues in a context of ritual worship
of God but as a substitute for the cherubim and the Ark of implies that the rabbis did not determine the lifestyle of the communities
and that their leadership had become undermined at that time. Opposing
the Covenant, which were in Jerusalem. (There are those opinions are expressed by E. Urbach, "The Rabbinic Laws of Idolatry in
who explain the sin of worshiping the golden calf in the the Second and Third Centuries in the Light of Archeological and
desert in the same way.) To consider worship of the Historical Facts," Israel Exploration Journal (1959-1960), no. 3,149ff.,
no. 4, 229ff. Urbach claims that these pictures did not have any symbolic
ritual significance but served only for aesthetic purposes, and furthermore
that this usage derived from a change in attitude toward the prohibition
14. On the nature ofthe cherubim and the ark as God's throne and on the making of sculptures and pictures during the second and third
therefore as his representations, see M. Haran, "The Ark and the centuries, a change that took place within the world of the sages. For a
Cherubim: Their Symbolic Significance in Biblical Ritual," Israel further discussion of Jewish attitudes to visual art, see No Graven Images:
Exploration Journal 9 (1959): 39-48, 89-94. Studies in Art and the Hebrew Bible, ed. J. Gutmann (New York: Ktav
15. Views that the northern golden calves functioned like the ark in Publishing House, 1971).
Jerusalem are discussed in M. Aberbach and L. Smolar, "Aaron Jerobam 17. It is Onkelos's policy to replace representations of God with things
and the Golden Calves," Journal of Biblical Literature 86 (1900): 135 he created in order to avoid corporealization. Maimonides discusses this
and n. 34. many times in The Guide ofthe Perplexed; see, e.g., 1:21, 27, 28.
 Halbertal and Margal it: Idolatry and representation 25

linguistic representations of God. In many synagogues the The strategy for defending such a view is to abolish the
hymn An'im Zemirot(\ will sing songs) is sung at the end existing distinction between linguistic representations,
of Sabbath morning services. One of the lines of the hymn which are based on convention, and the similarity-based
describes God thus: "His head is covered with curls of
representations occurring in pictures. This is the view of
light, his hair is like fragments ofthe night." Imagine if Nelson Goodman, who believes that what is called
this line were illustrated and God drawn with a head of
similarity-based representation is not a natural form of
curly hair! The idea of drawing such a picture would not representation that is innocent of all conventions and
enter the mind of any observant Jew, in spite of the fact prior knowledge.18 A smile in a painting of one of Jesus'
that the linguistic description in the hymn is one of the apostles might be interpreted as an expression of
accepted parts ofthe Sabbath service. A never-failing amiability, but if it turns out to be a painting of Judas
source of blatant anthropomorphic images may be found Iscariot the smile will be seen as a representation of guile
in the Song of Songs. The song, which is interpreted as an and cynicism. In other words, the identification of what
allegory for the love between God and Israel, is full of the smile represents is not dependent on similarity alone.
bold linguistic descriptions of God as lover, whose cheeks In general, according to Goodman, everything is similar
are like beds of spices, whose hands are rods of gold, to everything else, and the similarity that is attributed may
whose belly is a tablet of ivory, and whose legs are like sometimes be based on a certain trait ofthe representing
marble pillars (see Song of Songs 5:13-15). It is not by thing to the exclusion of its other traits. The painting of a
chance that this song aroused the imaginations of the dog beside a knight represents the knight's loyalty, in
authors of the Shi'ur Komah literature, who extended and spite of the fact that there is no other relevant similarity
deepened the linguistic descriptions ofthe attributes and between the dog and the knight. Moreover, the very trait
shape of God. The astounding degree of freedom of loyalty possessed by the dog is not a trait that can
accorded to linguistic descriptions of God, as opposed to easily be seen in a picture of a dog outside a specific
the strictness with which pictorial descriptions were cultural context. The process of singling out the similar
judged, confronts us with a crucial question in the traits depends on various conventions. The difference
understanding of idolatry: what is the distinction between between similarity-based and convention-based
linguistic representations of God, which seem to be not representations evaporates, and with it the distinction
only permitted but even accepted, and pictorial between linguistic and pictorial representations of God.
representations of him? Is there a real difference between
speaking about the hand of God and drawing it? Three
The essential distinction
approaches to this question are discussed below.
There is another view, however, which distinguishes
Representation as metaphor between linguistic and pictorial representations in that the
linguistic representation does not present the worshiper
One view holds that just as linguistic expressions can with an object that can be confronted in an attitude of
have metaphorical interpretations, so can pictures. A worship, as an intermediary of God or a fetish. In a
picture has a transparent quality, and just as the pictorial representation, the believer is actually
expression "the hand of God" is a metaphor for his confronted by an object. Even if the object is as
power, so a drawing of God's hand can be such a transparent as language, and even if it can be given a
metaphor. Michelangelo's famous painting can thus be metaphorical interpretation and need not be perceived as
interpreted as a metaphor for God's primacy, creativity, a similarity-based representation, there is nevertheless a
and power. The fact that the painting has a reference is possibility that the believer will transform the object into
not grounded in similarity-based representation. We are a focus of his attitude, into a ritual center of gravity. Thus
not required to say that the painting refers to something idols not only represent on a basis of similarity but also
because it resembles the thing it refers to; it can also become the bearers of the power they represent, because
represent something based on a convention. There is no of their similarity to it. This blurring of the distinction
real distinction between a linguistic picture and an actual between the symbol and the thing symbolized, which is
picture. Thus if the linguistic expression is taken at its face so common in idolatry, does not occur in language
value, then the picture, too, should be permitted; and if because in the latter there is no concrete object that can
the linguistic expression is interpreted metaphorically,
why shouldn't the picture also be considered a candidate 18. See N. Goodman, The Languages of Art (Indianapolis: Bobs
for metaphorical interpretation? Merrill, 1976), pp. 3-43.
26 RES 22 AUTUMN 1992

be endowed with some of the powers of the symbolized linguistic description is less intimate and more distanced
thing. With pictorial representations there is always the fear from direct contact of the senses, with respect to the object
that the representing object will at some stage be being described. Those philosophical standpoints that
transformed into the permanent dwelling place of God attacked this empiricist view of language, and described
himself or into a power with independent identity, whereas language as the mediator between objects and sense data,
language does not create an object that can undergo such a did not accept the approach that distances the linguistic
transformation. This argument must be qualified by the fact representation from the represented object. The tag
that names are sometimes considered bearers of the power attached to a painting in a museum creates a different view
of the thing they denote, and a Torah scroll can become a of the painting. Changing the tag will create a change in
fetish no less than any picture or image. perspective, so that people will see entirely different things
To the above argument can be added another reason in the painting. This is what would happen, in the example
for the prohibition of pictorial but not linguistic we gave before, if the tag under the painting of the smiling
representations, which is independent ofthe fear of apostle were changed from Peter to Judas.19
substitution. When one says, for example, that God has a As mentioned, the distinction between pictorial and
hand, the constituents of this hand, such as size and linguistic representations has been attacked from both
shape, remain undetermined. Even the addition of more directions. On one side are those who abolish the
linguistic details will not give the fullness of description distinction so as to permit pictorial as well as linguistic
that is provided by a picture ofthe hand. If the problem is representations; on the other are those who prohibit both
the degree of exposure of God in a pictorial forms of representation and liken preserving the
representation, then in the case of a linguistic description, distinction to belittling the force of language and the
since the representation always leaves some gaps, the serious consequences ofthe linguistic representation of
degree of exposure of the thing described is less than in a God. To the latter group, language is even more
picture. In accordance with this criterion, the Persian dangerous than pictures because it states propositions and
kings who spoke from behind a screen could be makes judgments. To say "God has a hand" is to assert a
described linguistically but not represented pictorially. proposition, whereas a drawing of this hand is not a
The source of this distinction is the notion that God may proposition. This propositional character of language can
be heard but not seen. To the extreme opponents of make it more dangerous than visual representations.
corporeality, this distinction is not meaningful, as they do According to this view, just as there is a ban on
not see a difference between attributing the power of representations in ?mages and pictures, so there should be
speech to God and attributing a physical shape to him. If, a ban on linguistic representations. The war against
however, the problem is not corporeality but the degree sculptured images and paintings is thus extended to
of exposure of God to the hearer or the beholder, then the linguistic images. The outstanding representative of this
distinction is useful. view is Maimonides, whose writings we discuss in the
The intuition that distinguishes between similarity following section.
based and convention-based representations gives priority
to the "internal image," created from an accumulation of
"The Torah speaks in the language of people"
sense data, over linguistic representations. The following
schema is often presented to describe the relationship To consider the third view?that there is no distinction
between language and sense data, especially sight: we between the two types of representation and that they are
see the same object many times and this gives us a both forbidden?we must understand the expression "the
picture in our mind that abstracts the fixed properties of Torah speaks in the language of people," which is central
the object from the many instances of the object that we to Maimonides' treatment of linguistic representations of
have seen. This is the "idea" of the object, to which we God, although it evolved from the talmudic sages. The
attach a word as a tag, and this gives us a linguistic primary meaning of the expression refers not to the use of
representation. language in describing God but to the application in the
The linguistic representation is thus distanced from the Torah of different rhetorical devices accepted in ordinary
concrete object because it depends on an idea that is language.
created from the repeated appearance of sense data. The
distance between language and object is mediated by the 19. In the opening paragraphs of Philosophical Investigations, trans.
"idea," which is an internal image that a person has of an G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), Ludwig Wittgenstein
object, and this mediation produces the feeling that the attacks the concept of meaning as a tag that refers to an internal picture.
 Halbertal and Margal it: Idolatry and representation 27

The second-century discussion, which is the source of Torah describes God in terms of heightened human
the expression, arose in the context of a debate between perfection, because most people are unable to imagine
the schools of R. Akiva and R. Ishmael over how to any other sort of perfection than their own. Thus the
interpret the doubled expressions that occur frequently in Torah depicts God in material terms that the masses are
the Torah. When these expressions are translated into able to grasp, and attributes to God those mental
English, the doubling is omitted, as there is no such form characteristics that people regard as perfection because
of expression in English. To translate the expression these characteristics represent perfection when applied to
literally, one would have to say, "Walk you walked," people. The masses believe that "God would not exist if
instead of simply "You walked," or "Kidnap I was He did not have a body with a face ... except that it is
kidnapped," instead of simply, "I was kidnapped." larger and brighter" (Cuide ofthe Perplexed, 1:1).
R. Akiva interpreted these expressions as conveying some Maimonides applies the words "the Torah speaks" in the
additional meaning because he believed that there is no expression to speech about God, and the words "the
redundancy in the Torah. R. Ishmael, by contrast, asserted language of people" to the language that people are
that one should not try to find the source of any halacha capable of understanding, not necessarily the language
in these doubled expressions because the Torah simply that they speak. "People" at this stage is a term whose
speaks in the language of people. In his view, these precise denotation is the masses?people who are unable
expressions were not meant to convey an additional to imagine the proper image of God. Thus Maimonides
meaning that was not present in the first term but interprets each of the three parts of the expression
constitute a rhetorical device, as in ordinary speech, for differently from how the talmudic sages did.
the sake of emphasis.20 The controversy here concerns the Maimonides' use of this expression brings us to the
proper rules of interpretation that must be applied to a relation between language and idolatry. The first part of
sacred text. At the heart of the issue of interpretation, this The Cuide ofthe Perplexed is devoted almost entirely to
issue is not whether the rules of interpretation are being liberating the perplexed person from the difficulties of the
used correctly, or which rules should be used, but language used with respect to God. At the beginning of
whether or not a sacred text requires its own special the book Maimonides attempts to liberate the reader from
interpretive code because its language is essentially the hold of the language of the Bible concerning the
different from ordinary language. metaphysical image of God. This is the reason that
Interpretation ofthe expression "the Torah speaks in biblical interpretation has such a central position in
the language of people" underwent an essential change Maimonides' book. The language used in the Bible (and
before it reached Maimonides. This change, which began our taking this language at its face value) constitutes one
during the post-talmudic period,21 culminated in the of the primary causes of an incorrect image of God,
writings of Maimonides, who treated it as his guiding whether in the attribution of material existence or in the
principle in his great philosophical work, The Guide of attribution of emotionality. Maimonides teaches the
the Perplexed. Whereas the previous controversy was reader that the language in which the Bible speaks of God
about the redundancy of language, and whether the is figurative language.
Torah uses the same language that ordinary people use, An example is the use of the word "sitting" as
Maimonides turned the phrase into an expression of how attributed to God, which Maimonides discusses in
the Torah speaks about God. In his view, the Torah chapter 11 of part 1. He says that the word is not
describes God not according to the correct metaphysical attributed to God with the same literal meaning it has in
picture but in a way people are able to understand. The the expression "Reuben is sitting" but is like the
metaphorical biblical expression whose literal translation
is "Judea will sit forever." In this expression the word "sit"
20.1. Heinemann, in his book Darchei ha-Haggadah (Jerusalem:
refers to stability, as it does when it is used to refer to
Magnes, 1954), p. 12 and n. 106, attempts to bridge the controversy by
claiming that everyone interprets doubled expressions as saying two
God. "Going up" and "going down" with respect to God
different things, and there is no one who believes that the Torah speaks also have a slightly altered meaning?something like
in the language of people. However, it seems that this is not the case going up or down in status rather than in space. Many
and that there is an essential difference between the schools of R. Akiva
expressions of physicality are used figuratively with
and R. Ishmael on the issue.
respect to God just as they are used figuratively in
21. The extension of the expression to the theological realm already
appears in the literature ofthe post-talmudic sages. See Teshuvutha
ordinary language to speak of social relations. We say
Geonim, ed. J. Musafia responsa of R. Hai Gaon, 98, Jerusalem 1967; that a person is "the center of attention," clearly a
and B. Lewin, Ozar ha-Geonim, Berakhot, 1:131, and Hagigah, p. 30. reference not to a point in space but to a position in a
 28 RES 22 AUTUMN 1992

social system. Understanding a figurative expression as a general from being able to describe God by any positive
literal one with respect to God is, according to attributes. He devotes this section of the book not to
Maimonides, the great linguistic fallacy that leads to an biblical interpretation or to an attempt to liberate the
erroneous metaphysical picture of God. In Maimonides' perplexed reader from the hold of biblical language but to
own words: a general attack on the very attempt to describe God in
language. This attack is directed even at those who
When they [the rabbinic sages] said, "The Torah speaks in the
understand quite well that the Torah uses figurative
language of people," they meant whatever all people are able
expressions to speak about God.
to understand at first thought.... Therefore they described
Hegel distinguished between religious discourse about
Him in terms that refer to material being, in order to teach
that He exists, since the masses cannot grasp existence at first the absolute, which is metaphorical, and philosophical
glance unless it is the existence of a body. discourse about the absolute, which is conceptual.
(Guide of the Perplexed, 1:26) Conceptual discourse, he asserted, is free ofthe distortions
and imprecision of metaphorical language. But
Thus metaphorical language blurs rather than clarifies Maimonides' criticism of linguistic representation includes
distinctions, and it leads people astray because they tend not only metaphorical religious language but also
to read the metaphors literally. A metaphor may often be conceptual philosophical language. In his view even
clearly identifiable, as in the case ofthe sentence whose conceptual language is not transparent in issues relating to
literal meaning is "Judea will sit forever" but whose God. At this stage "the language of people" does not mean
obvious intended meaning is "Judea will be established the language of the masses who are incapable of abstract
forever." When the subject matter concerns God, speech but refers to language itself. Maimonides' purpose
however, the identification ofthe metaphor requires an is to liberate the philosopher from what Wittgenstein
extensive philosophical background. People know would have called the mythological layer inherent in
enough about Judea as a state to be able to identify language in general. The discussion ofthe connection
"sitting" as a metaphor, but they do not know anything between language and the erroneous picture of God,
about God that would enable them to identify expressions which is the heart of part 1 of The Guide ofthe Perplexed,
referring to him as metaphors. If all people's knowledge confronts us with a similarity between various points in the
of Judea were derived from the quoted sentence, then it philosophy of language and in Maimonides' discussion of
would not be so easy to interpret "sit" as a metaphor. the limitations of religious language. Maimonides
Since the masses do not have independent information expresses his criticism of language in general as follows:
about God, whose source is an external metaphysics, they "And these subtle matters cannot be distinguished by
do not have the capability of identifying expressions in customary words, which constitute the great cause of
religious language as metaphorical, even though they can misapprehension." Later in the same chapter Maimonides
do this easily in other areas of language. In the chapters discusses the words "pr?existent" and "one" and their
that deal with figurative language in part 1 of The Guide attribution to God, commenting: "None of these
ofthe Perplexed, Maimonides often shows that an expressions are anything but the language of people." Here
expression is figurative by citing an example of its he is obviously referring to language in general.
figurative use in a place where it is immediately What is this misapprehension that results from the use
understood as a metaphor, thus demonstrating that the of language with respect to God? Maimonides offers two
expression is metaphorical when used to refer to God as principal answers. One is that the use of attributes impairs
well. This procedure is necessary because ofthe difficulty the simple unity of God. The structure of the sentence
of identifying expressions as metaphorical with respect to "God exists" or "God is one" creates a picture of an
God, in contrast to the ease with which metaphors about object to which different predicates can apply. But God's
ordinary objects are identified. unity is his essence, not something added to his essence,
So far it has been assumed that there exists a pure, and this is true of his existence as well. If, however, we
nonmetaphorical language that is free of this type of consider these attributes not as predicates or accidents
fallacy. In such a conceptual language, it would be but as part of the definition of God, then we are creating a
possible to speak correctly about God, without the heavy plurality in the very definition from a number of aspects.
burden of the use of figurative expressions for the This criticism of the attribution of positive predicates to
purposes ofthe masses. Later in part 1 of his book, God is based on the negation of nominalist arguments
however, Maimonides takes an even more radical stance that oppose granting predicates a different ontological
regarding religious language. He disqualifies language in status from that ofthe object being described. Indeed,
 Halbertal and Margal it: Idolatry and representation 29

nominalist arguments were used by various philosophers Language is thus limited and misleading in its
against the theory of negative attributes. For example, Ibn descriptions of God for two reasons. One is that the basic
Rushed criticizes Ibn Sina on this very point, and the structure of the sentence creates a duality of subject and
argument was used by Gersonides and Crescas against predicate. The second is that there is a misapprehension
Maimonides himself.22 in a description of God using the same linguistic
Maimonides' second argument against the ascription of categories that are based on the existence of our familiar
positive attributes to God is that describing God with reality. Language serves as an instrument for projection of
universal predicates such as existence puts him into the the sort of perfection that is familiar to us onto God, who
same category as other things to which these predicates is the absolute other. Language thus crosses its natural
apply. For example, we attribute existence both to God boundary into another reality, and in this extension of
and to a table, but actually God's existence is of a language a misapprehension is created with respect to
different type, to which the familiar usage of existence God. Maimonides summarizes these two claims in
does not apply. To give another example, if one says that chapter 59: "And know that whenever you attribute some
God is pr?existent to the world in a positive sense, then other thing to Him, you will be distant from Him in two
one is attributing the concept of time to God and putting different ways, the one because whatever you attribute to
him into a chronological relation to the world. But since, Him is perfection for us, and the second because there is
according to Maimonides?who uses the Aristotelian nothing that belongs to Him, but rather His perfections
definition of time?time is dependent on motion, the are His essence." The degree of criticism of language in
concept of time does not apply to God at all. One cannot the theory of negative attributes depends on one's
say that God is pr?existent; one can say only that since he understanding of the starting point from which the theory
has no motion the concept of time does not apply to him. is approached. One way to describe the motive for this
The attribution of predicates to God in language is theory is the skeptical way. The meaning of the theory of
nothing but a category mistake, like the attribution of negative attributes is that we do not know anything
length to taste. This mistake causes people to perceive positive about God: all we are able to know is what God
God as belonging to the same category as other familiar is not (not what he is). This theory is thus essentially
things to which the same attribute applies. skeptical. Maimonides uses this line of argument when he
This error, in Maimonides' opinion, is so grave that the describes the limits of understanding of the greatest of the
ascription of an attribute to God is an error with respect to prophets, Moses. All he was able to grasp were the
his identity as a whole. A person who ascribes attributes descriptions of God through his actions, while everything
to God should not be regarded as talking about God and else was negative. That is, to say that God is not
making some mistake about him. Rather, such a person is nonexistent is not the same as to say that God exists. Even
not talking about God at all but about something else though the negation of nonexistence is logically
entirely. Extending familiar language to apply to God equivalent to the attribution of existence, in the case of
creates a category mistake rather than an ordinary error the theory of attributes the negation of nonexistence is not
(Guide ofthe Perplexed, 1:58). When we speak about the negation of an attribute but a categorical negation.
God, it is not really God we are speaking about but This may be compared to our saying of the wall that it
something else, and this is independent ofthe question of cannot see, which does not mean that the wall is blind,
what we say about him. According to this view, the because we are negating the use of the concepts of sight
theory of negative attributes is meant to determine not the and blindness as applicable to walls in general. It would
simple unity of God (as in the first view) but the absolute be more correct to say that the category of sight and
otherness of God and the essential categorical difference blindness does not apply to walls. What characterizes a
that exists between him and all familiar objects. The category mistake is that the negation of the proposition is
nominalist argument cannot be used against this claim wrong in the same sense as the positive proposition. A
because it relates to the problem of speech about God categorical negation does not imply anything positive. It
and the world with the same categories of predication in thus turns out that the proposition that God is not existent
language, and not to the ontological duality that exists, so is logically equivalent to the proposition that God is not
to speak, between the subject and the predicate. nonexistent. The familiar category of existence that may
be predicated of an object does not apply to God. The
22. See H. A. Wolfson, Studies in the History of Philosophy and fact that we say, "God is not nonexistent," and that this
Religion, ed. I. Twersky and G. Williams, vol. 2 (Cambridge, Mass.: expression is considered preferable to saying, "God is not
Harvard Univ. Press, 1977), chaps. 6, 7. existent," is a matter of determining which way of
 30 RES 22 AUTUMN 1992

speaking is appropriate to God and no more than that describe this type of reality. The issue confronting us
(Guide ofthe Perplexed, 1:58). resembles the question discussed by the positivists
Another view of the theory of negative attributes is that concerning the meaninglessness of metaphysical
the problem is not in the impossibility of knowing God's expressions in language: does this meaninglessness
essence but in its linguistic expression, as any attempt to express a skeptical attitude with respect to all possible
formulate this knowledge in words creates an error. metaphysics, or does it only negate the possibility of
Behind the negative attributes, according to this view, a expressing metaphysical ideas in words?
great deal of positive knowledge about God's essence is In our discussion we distinguished among three senses
hidden, and it is only the attempt to formulate this ofthe expression "the Torah speaks in the language of
knowledge in words that fails and is thus misleading. We people." The first sense is that the Torah speaks the way
know that all of God's attributes are his essence and not
people speak, and so redundancies in biblical language
something added to it, but how could this be expressed do not require a special type of interpretation that differs
positively without creating a duality between his essence from the way we interpret people's speech. The second
and the attributes? This interpretation of the theory of sense is that the Torah speaks about God in a way that
negative attributes, which is not fundamentally skeptical, the masses are capable of understanding, that is,
is taken by Harry Wolfson, and also, in a different metaphorically. The third sense is that the language of
version, by Julius Gutman. It constitutes a direct criticism people is language in general in its attempt to describe
of language. As Maimonides says: "Silence and limiting God, and the Torah had to speak about God in language.
oneself to the apprehensions of the intellect are more The last two senses are directly related to the issue of
appropriate." Beyond negation there is an intellectual language and idolatry. Biblical language creates a
understanding of God. It is possible "to understand mistaken picture of God if its metaphors are taken
appropriately," but the attempt to express this literally, and so the reader must be liberated from this
understanding in words is immediately misleading and language in its literal sense. Moreover, the hold of
creates error.23
descriptive language creates a duality in the description of
The two trends found in Maimonides' discussion of this
God and impairs his simple unity. It also applies the same
issue reflect two different attitudes toward the critique of descriptive categories to the world and to God and thus
language. One claims that there is a congruence between impairs the absolute separation between God and the
the possibilities of linguistic expression and of cognition, world. Maimonides devotes most of part 1 of The Guide
as according to this view the theory of negative attributes ofthe Perplexed to liberating the reader from the hold of
is based on the fact that nothing can be known about language, and the climax of this process is the silence
God's essence and thus there is obviously no possibility recommended by the theory of negative attributes. Just as
of expressing such knowledge. The second trend delimits pictorial representations of God are forbidden, so are
not the boundaries of cognition but the boundaries of linguistic representations.
speech, and in this view there is no congruence between
linguistic expressions and intellectually conceived
knowledge about God. The attempt to give this The appropriate linguistic representation
knowledge linguistic expression is what causes error, Even those who did not share Maimonides' view?that
since language is fundamentally limited in its attempts to all linguistic representations of God are improper
metaphysical descriptions and are thus forbidden?saw
the need for constraints on representation. They perceived
23. Guide ofthe Perplexed, 1:59. For a moderate view of the theory
the limits of linguistic representation not in the
of negative attributes as a criticism of language, see Wolfson, Studies in
representation itself but in the question of whether a
the History of Philosophy and Religion, II, chap. 5; J. Gutman, Dat u
Mada Gerusalem, 1955), pp. 103-118. For a more skeptical view about particular representation is an appropriate one. This view
the possibility of any metaphysical knowledge of God that is connected categorized linguistic representations differently, as can
to the theory of negative attributes, see S. Pines, "The Limitations of be seen in various passages from the midrash. Consider,
Human Knowledge according to al-Farfabi ibn Bajja and Maimonides," for example, the following midrash dealing with the
in I. Twersky, ed., Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature
revelation in the burning bush:
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1979), pp. 89-110. For an
important discussion of this issue, see J. Stern in lyyun 38 (1989): 137
166. On Maimonides' epistemology see A. Altman, "Maimonides on the R. Eliezer said, "Why did God reveal Himself from the high
Intellect and the Scope of Metaphysics," in Von der Mittelalterlichen zur heavens and speak to Moses from the bush? Just as this bush
modern Aufklarung (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1987), pp. 60-129. is the lowest of all the trees in the world, so did the Israelites
 Halbertal and Margalit: Idolatry and representation 31

go down to the lowest level, and God went down with them ministers would come to him and say, 'Let us take the lantern
and redeemed them, as is written, 'I have come down to and light the way for your sons.' And he would say to them, 'I
rescue them from the Egyptians' (Exodus 3:8)." R. Joshua said, am not doing this because there is no one who will take the
"Why did God reveal Himself from the high heavens and lantern and light the way for my sons, but because I want to
speak to Moses from the bush? When Israel went down to let you see my affection for my sons so that you will treat
Egypt the shekhinah went down with them, as is written, 'I them respectfully.' Thus did God display his affection for
myself will go down with you to Egypt' (Genesis 46:4), and Israel to the nations of the world, so that they should treat
when they went out the shekhinah went out with them ..." them respectfully. Yet not only do they not treat them
R. Jose the Galilean said, "Why did God reveal Himself from respectfully, they even put them to death in harsh ways."
the high heavens and speak to Moses from the bush? Because (Mekhilta of R. Ishmael Va-Yehi, 6)
it was holy, as the nations of the world did not use it for
idolatry." As in the previous midrash, it only appears that the
(Mekhilta of R. Simeon bar Johai, on Exodus 8:3) problem is a metaphysical one: how is it possible for one
who is said to fill the world, and who is infinite and
The question asked by the three rabbis is a question that
immaterial, to confine himself into a pillar and go before
could be considered a metaphysical one: how could the
the camp in a pillar of cloud or of fire? The question
Infinite confine himself to a small bush in the desert? How
seems to call for a response that would try to show that
could the One who has no motion, as all motion is a
God did not really go before the camp but rather that an
deficiency, go down from this place and speak from a
angel who was his messenger or a miraculous cloud
bush? A metaphysical answer to this question would deny
appeared. But in this midrash as well one discovers the
that there was a revelation from the bush and would say
true nature of the question by studying the responses. The
that what happened there was only a prophetic vision,
question here is understood as how it can be appropriate
like a dream, or that the voice that spoke from the bush
for one whose presence fills the earth to go before the
was created by God for this purpose and there never was
camp: is it proper for him to go to this trouble, is it an
any presence ofthe speaker himself within the bush. But
appropriate appearance for one who fills heaven and
from the various answers that are given in the midrash we
earth? The midrash in its answer does not deny that God
see that the problem that was disturbing the rabbis was
indeed went before the camp in a pillar of cloud but
not a metaphysical type of problem at all. The question of
justifies this action by his wish to demonstrate his
why God revealed himself in the bush is not a question of
affection for Israel, just as Antoninus did for his sons with
how such a revelation is metaphysically possible, that is,
the lantern. The transition to the metaphor of father and
how a nonmaterial being can embody himself in the
sons explains the degree of closeness with which God
material. Rather, the question is why the king of kings behaves toward Israel and his deviation from the behavior
chose to reveal himself precisely from such a lowly object
expected of a king. The issue, again, is not whether the
as a bush. If a state hosts a president and gives him a
representation in question is metaphysically possible but
room in a cheap hotel, it is not performing a
whether it is appropriate, or, more precisely, what can be
metaphysically impossible act but is showing disrespect learned from the fact that God's attitude toward Israel is
for his status and putting him in an inappropriate place. not that of an authoritarian ruler but that of a father
Another example of this approach may be found in the
toward his sons. What needs explanation is not the
Mekhilta interpreting the verse, "The Lord went before
metaphysics of the Infinite that reveals itself in a finite
them in a pillar of cloud by day" (Exodus 13:21 ):
pillar but the type of attitude that is revealed in this
"The Lord went before them in a pillar of cloud by day"? appearance, which is neither sublime nor awesome. This
How is it possible to say this? Is it not written, "For I fill both is the reason that the transition to the father-son metaphor
heaven and earth?declares the Lord" (Jeremiah 23:24) and
provides the proper background for the answer.
"One would call to the other, 'Holy, holy, holy! The Lord of
There are thus two aspects to the problem of
Hosts! His presence fills the earth!'" (Isaiah 6:3) and "And
anthropomorphism. One is whether it provides an
there, coming from the east with a roar like the roar of mighty
waters, was the Presence of the God of Israel, and the earth
erroneous picture of God. The other aspect of the
was lit up by His Presence" (Ezekiel 43:2). So how can the problem is whether anthropomorphism provides a
Torah say, "The Lord went before them in a pillar of cloud by disrespectful and inappropriate picture of God. The
day"? R. Judah said, "The emperor Antoninus would midrash often discusses the problem in its second aspect,
sometimes be speaking on the dais, and it would grow dark and the answers it provides concern the understanding of
and it would be dark for his sons. When he left the dais he the relationship between God and Israel. God's
would take a lantern and light the way for his sons, and his confinement within the small bush in the desert is an
 32 RES 22 AUTUMN 1992

expression of his sharing in Israel's pain, and his going Positive attributes are forbidden in general, and every
before the people in a pillar of cloud is an expression of ascription of an attribute is erroneous because there is a
his affection for them.
categorical distinction between God's perfections and the
A different attitude toward the problem of linguistic perfections that man ascribes to God through the use of
description is demonstrated in Maimonides' interpretation language. It is thus in terms of quality rather than quantity
ofthe following story, which is related in the Babylonian that Maimonides explains the difference between gold
Talmud: and silver in the parable. Maimonides sees this passage as
a continuation of his system of negating positive attributes
The leader ofthe prayers in R. Hanina's presence prayed as
in general and recommending silence.
follows, "The God who is great and heroic and awesome and
The problem of representation can be viewed from two
mighty and bold and fearsome and strong and courageous
and respected." R. Hanina waited until he had finished the different perspectives. One understands the danger of
prayer and then said, "Have you finished all the praises of
representation as a medium that creates mistaken
your Master? What are all these for? The three praises that we conceptions of God. Therefore, God is not allowed to be
say?'the God who is great and heroic and awesome'?if represented in images and pictures because he has no
Moses had not said them in the Torah, and if the Rabbis of the image. If this is the logic ofthe constraints on
Great Assembly had not determined that they should be a representations, linguistic representations should also be
fixed part of our daily prayer, we would not be permitted to prohibited, and Maimonides followed that logic and
say them. How then could you add all the others?" This may abolished the distinction between language and image.
be compared to a king of flesh and blood who has a million
The other view on representation is more political than
gold coins and someone praises him for having silver coins.
metaphysical. Representations are prohibited either
This would be a sign of disrespect for the king.
because of the fear of substitution or because of the
(Berakhot, 33b)
approach that minimizes exposure. One may talk about
The extensive sequence of praises of God, which God's image, since the Bible suggests that he might
seems to constitute an attempt to exhaust his greatness, is actually have an image, but one may not look at his
disapproved of as being inappropriate. Moreover, it image.
constitutes an attitude of disrespect for the king whose
coins are of gold to praise him for having coins of silver,
as any praises one is able to offer to God cannot equal his
actual attributes. The multiplicity of praises beyond the
ones that are determined by the tradition constitute
disrespect rather than praise, and instead of increasing
God's honor they decrease it. The problem of God's
attributes here is the problem of appropriate
representation: it is preferable to express fewer rather than
more praises because it is precisely the multiplicity of
praises that is inappropriate to the king.
Maimonides, who quotes this passage, says about it,
"Look first and see how the midrash flinches and
distances itself from the multiplicity of positive attributes."
Later, in his explanation ofthe parable, Maimonides
stresses that the parable describes God's perfections as
gold coins and the praises of him as silver coins, "to teach
us that what are perfections for us are not of this type for
Him at all, but they are all deficiencies with respect to
Him. Whatever you may imagine in these attributes to be
perfection would be a deficiency for God if it was of the
same type as what is perfection for us" (Guide ofthe
Perplexed, 1:59). In Maimonides' view, as we might
expect, the story in the Talmud teaches the negation of all
linguistic representations, as every perfection is only a
perfection for us but is a deficiency with respect to God.