Dus-Point 3
Dus-Point 3
Dus-Point 3
Tokyo would find it difficult to deal with tensions with both Beijing and Seoul at the
same time. Japan does not want to upset China, for this purpose. In actuality, no
countries that has a marine or land border with China is eager to openly confront
Beijing. Due of this, the Quad is hampered in its range. AUKUS advances in part
because it mainly encompasses counties lacking close borders with China.
For the Indo-Pacific zone, the trilateral security agreement between Australia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS) is significant. The organization
takes the blame away from other frameworks for international cooperation, like the
Triangular prism Security Dialogue (Quad) comprising Australia, India, Japan, and
the U.S., since its debut on September 15, 2021. The fact that the new coalition has
emerged as the primary strength against China's aims of military expansion is likely to
spark regional discontent, ultimately belittling ASEAN and disrupting Asia.
The trilateral alliance spans much beyond the eight nuclear-powered submarines that
AUKUS plans to give Australia over the next twenty - five years, which has received
the preponderance of media attention. As well as integrating security and military
capabilities, its members seek to integrate information and technology. To the interest
of nations like Australia, it aims to advance the current "international rules-based
order," which was built by the Anglo-American alliance after World War II. In the
current global system, AUKUS also aims to "defend... shared values and promote
security and prosperity." In short, the group wants to counter China's ambitions as a
"revisionist" force by upholding the status quo.
AUKUS is more than a two-ocean response to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
and other expansionist projects, although the Indo-Pacific continues to be the principal
theatre of conflict. A new way of thinking about world politics seems necessary due to
the UK's pivotal role in AUKUS, it brings the Atlantic Ocean into the Indo-Pacific
equation. Beijing will feel more encircled and irritated as a result of the three-ocean
projection. Maritime countries such as The United and the Great Britain will prosper
from this move to the sea, while traditional land powers like China and Russia will
likely find themselves on the defensive.
The immediate consequences of AUKUS are not difficult to identify. The Quad's
objectives were not achieved since China was not addressed by the combined weight
of India and Japan. India may have problems with China, but its independence
prevents it from joining the Anglo-Saxon arch against Beijing. In a similar vein, Japan
views China as a geopolitical challenger and security challenge, but it must decide
how to approach Beijing on its own. Tokyo's latitude in vital spots, including all the
Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, is restricted by recent fights with South Korea.
Tokyo would find it difficult to deal with tensions with both Beijing and Seoul at the
same time. Japan does not want to upset China, for this purpose. In actuality, no
government that has a marine or land border with China is eager to publicly provoke
Beijing. Due of this, the Quad is hampered in its range. AUKUS advances in part
because it generally includes counties without close borders with China.
AUKUS is deeply consequential for both the UK and the European Union. For the
UK, being out of the EU means having to carve out its own niche. But for that,
London must ask itself what kind of great power it wants to be. Australia does not
lack strategic clarity in this regard; Canberra wants to be a strong, solid middle power
that will stand tall in pursuit of its national interest. The UK, however, is unclear
about where it wants to go with AUKUS. Being a great power, as appears to be the
UK’s intent, requires resources. It is a status that cannot be acquired on the cheap.
AUKUS could further alienate the UK from the EU, which has its own Indo-Pacific
strategy. Yet the UK’s connection with Australia through AUKUS is unlikely to
revive old British imperial relations or boost commonwealth bonds. Australia sees the
UK more as a partner and peer rather than a former colonial overlord.
For the EU’s “strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,” AUKUS is an existential
challenge. It comes on the heels of Brexit, whereby the UK essentially snubbed the
EU by leaving the bloc after nearly 50 years of membership. By further undermining
the European project, AUKUS has intensified Brexit’s impact. The maintenance of
the rules-based international order, a primary objective of the EU’s Indo-Pacific
strategy, will be harder to achieve because the AUKUS pact is aimed directly at
containing China.
Moreover, AUKUS particularly enraged the French by not just hijacking a submarine
procurement deal but also by posing a diplomatic affront to France. French relations
with the three AUKUS countries will be difficult, complicating EU strategic
engagements with Canberra, London, and Washington. It will be more demanding to
maintain EU unity in the Indo-Pacific because France, which has the most forward-
deployed maritime capabilities and interests in the Indo-Pacific among EU members,
will likely be an outlier in its opposition to AUKUS.
Refrence
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3151700/aukus-alliance-what-it-what-does-it-
have-do-china-and-why
https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/aukus-alliance-poses-challenges-to-other-
powers.html
https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-134-southeast-asian-
responses-to-aukus-arms-racing-non-proliferation-and-regional-stability-by-william-choong-and-ian-
storey/