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EXIDBITB

MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED BY THE NATIONAL SECURIT\~;_'~dif!Ntt IN 3: I 4

· CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGEI'I;f;E, ",_ _
INFORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTlttLIGEN-dif I
SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED

Section 1 - Applicability and Scope (U)

These National Secmity Agency (NSA) minimization procedures apply to the acquisition,
retention, use, and dissemination of non-publicly available infonnation conceming
unconsenting United States persons that is acquired by targeting non-United States persons
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States in accordance with section 702 of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended ("the Act"). (U)

IfNSA determines that it must take action in apparent departure from these minimization
procedures to protect against an immediate threat to human life (e.g., force protection or
hostage situations) and that it is not feasible to obtain a timely modification of these
procedures, NSA may take such action immediately. NSA will report the action taken to the
Office of the Director ofNational Intelligence and to the National Security Division of the
Department of Justice, which will promptly notify the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court of such activity. (U)

Section 2 - Definitions (U)

In addition to the definitions in sections 101 and 701 of the Act, the following definitions
will apply to these procedures:

(a) Acquisition means the collection by NSA or the FBI through electronic means of a non-
public conmmnication to which it is not an intended pmiy. (U)

(b) Communications concerning a United States person include all communications in which
a United States person is discussed or mentioned, except where such communications
reveal only publicly-available information about the person. (U)

(c) Communications of a United States person include all conmmnications to which a United
States person is a party. (U)

(d) Consent is the agTeement by a person or organization to permit the NSA to take particular
actions that affect the person or organization. To be effective, consent must be given by
the affected person or organization with sufficient knowledge to understand the action
that rnay be taken and the possible consequences of that action. Consent by an
organization will be deemed valid if given on behalf of the organization by an official or
governing body determined by the General Counsel, NSA, to have actual or apparent
authority to make such an agreement. (U)
Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20070108
Declassify On: 20320108
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(e) Foreign communication means a communication that has at least one conununicant
outside of the United States. All other conununications, including communications in
which the sender and all intended recipients are reasonably believed to be located in the
United States at the time of acquisition, are domestic communications. (S//SI)

(f) Identification of a United States person means the name, unique title, address, or other
personal identifier of a United States person in the context of activities conducted by that
person or activities conducted by others that are related to that person. A reference to a
product by brand name, or manufacturer's name or the use of a name in a descriptive
sense, e.g., "Monroe Doctrine," is not an identification of a United States person. (S//SI)

(g) Processed or processing means any step necessary to convert a co1mnunication into an
intelligible fonn intended for human inspection. (U)

(h) Publicly-available infommtion means information that a member of the public could
obtain on request, by research in public sources, or by casual observation. (U)

(i) Technical data base means information retained for cryptanalytic, traffic analytic, or
signal exploitation purposes. (S//SI)

(j) United States person means a United States person as defined in the Act. The following
guidelines apply in determining whether a person whose status is unknown is a United
States person: (U)

(1) A person known to be cunently in the United States will be treated as a United States
person unless positively identified as an alien who has not been admitted for
pem1anent residence, or unless the nature or circumstances of the person's
communications give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is not a United
States person. (U)

(2) A person known to be cmrently outside the United States, or whose location is
unknown, will not be treated as a United States person unless such person can be
positively identified as such, or the nature or circumstances of the person's
communications give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is a United States
person. (U)

(3) A person known to be an alien admitted for permanent residence loses status as a
United States person if the person leaves the United States and is not in compliance
with 8 U.S.C. § 1203 enabling re-entry into the United States. Failure to follow the
statutory procedures provides a reasonable basis to conclude that the alien has
abandoned any intention of maintaining his status as a permanent resident alien. (U)

(4) An unincorporated association whose headquarters or plimary office is located

outside the United States is ixesumed not to be a United States person unless there is
information indicating that a substantial number of its members are citizens of the
United States or aliens lawfully admitted for pennanent residence. (U)

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Section 3- Acquisition and Processing- General (U)

(a) Acquisition (U)

The acquisition of information by targeting non-United States persons reasonably believed to

be located outside the United States pursuant to section 702 of the Act will be effected in
accordance with an authmizationmade by the Attomey General and Director ofNational
Intelligence pursuant to subsection 702(a) of the Act and will be conducted in a mmmer
designed, to the greatest extent reasonably feasible, to minimize the acquisition of
infonnation not relevant to the authmized purpose of the acquisition. (S//SI)

(b) Monitoring, Recording, and Processing (U)

( 1) Personnel will exercise reasonable judgment in determining whether infonnation

acquired must be minimized and will destroy inadvertently acquired communications
of or conceming a United States person at the earliest practicable point in the
processing cycle at which such communication can be identified either: as clearly not
relevant to the authorized purpose of the acquisition (e.g., the co111111mlication does
not contain foreign intelligence infom1ation); or, as not containing evidence of a
crime which may be disseminated under these procedures. Such inadvertently
acquired conmmnications of or concerning a United States person may be retained no
longer than five years in any event. The communications that may be retained
include electronic communications acquired because of limitations on NSA's ability
to filter commmlications. (S//SI)

(2) Communications of or concenling United States persons that may be related to the
authorized purpose ofthe acquisition may be forwarded to analytic personnel
responsible for producing intelligence infonnation from the collected data. Such
communications or infonnation may be retained and disseminated only in accordance
with Sections 4, 5, 6, m1d 8 of these procedures. (C)

(3) Magnetic tapes or other storage media that contain acquired communications may be
processed. (S)

(4) As a communication is reviewed, NSA analyst(s) will detennine whether it is a

domestic or foreign communication to, from, or about a target and is reasonably
believed to contain foreign intelligence infmmation or evidence of a crime. Only
such conm1mlications may be processed. All other communications may be retained
or disseminated only in accorda11ce with Sections 5, 6, and 8 of these procedures.
(S//SI)

(5) Magnetic tapes or other storage media containing communications acquired pursuant
to section 702 may be scmmed by computer to identify m1d select conmmnications for
analysis. Computer selection terms used for scanning, such as telephone numbers,
key words or phrases, or other discriminators, will not include United States person

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names or identifiers and will be limited to those selection terms reasonably likely to
retum information about foreign intelligence targets. (S//SI)

( 6) Further processing, retention and dissemination of foreign communications will be

made in accordance with Sections 4, 6, 7, and 8 as applicable, below. Further
processing, storage and dissemination of inadvertently acquired domestic
communications will be made in accordance with Sections 4, 5, and 8 below. (S//SI)

(c) Destruction of Raw Data (C)

Communications and other infon11ation, including that reduced to graphic or "hard copy"
fon11 such as facsimile, telex, computer data, or equipment emanations, will be reviewed for
retention in accordance with the standards set forth in these procedures. Conununications
and other information, in any form, that do not meet such retention standards and that are
known to contain conmmnications of or conceming United States persons will b~ destroyed
upon recognition, and may be retained no longer than five years in any event. The
conm1mucations that may be retained include electronic communications acquired because of
limitations on NSA's ability to filter conmmnications. (S//SI)

(d) Change in Target's Location or Status (S//SI)

(1) In the event that NSA detennines that a person is reasonably believed to be located
outside the United States and after targeting this person leams that the person is inside
the United States, or ifNSA concludes that a person who at the time of targeting was
believed to be a non-United States person is in fact a U11itcd States person, the
acquisition from that person will be tenllinated without delay. (S//SI)

(2) Any communications acquired through the targeting of a person who at the time of
targeting was reasonably believed to be located outside the United States but is in fact
located inside the United States at the time such con1111unications were acquired, and
any communications acquired by targeting a person who at the time of targeting was
believed to be a non-U11ited States person but was in fact a United States person, will
be treated as domestic communications under these procedures. (S//SI)

Section 4- Acquisition and Processing- Attorney-Client Communications (C)

As soon as it becomes apparent that a commurucation is between a person who is known to

be under criminal indictment in the United States and an attomey who represents that
individual in the matter under indictment (or someone acting on behalf of the attomey),
monitoring of that communication will cease and the conunmucation will be identified as an
attorney-client communication in a log maintained for that purpose. The relevant portion of
the communication contaiiung that conversation will be segregated and the National Security
Division of the Department of Justice will be notified so that appropriate procedures may be
established to protect such communications from review or use in any criminal prosecution,
wlule preserving foreign intelligence inforn1ation contained therein. Additionally, all
proposed disseminations of infonnation constituting United States person attomey-client

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privileged communications must be reviewed by the NSA Office of General Counsel prior to
dissemination. (S//SI)

Section 5- Domestic Communications (U)

A conununication identified as a domestic conununication will be promptly destroyed upon

recognition unless the Director (or Acting Director) ofNSA specifically detennines, in
writing, that: (S)

(1) the conmmnication is reasonably believed to contain significant foreign intelligence

information. Such communication may be provided to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) (including United States person identities) for possible
dissemination by the FBI in accordance with its minimization procedures; (S)

(2) the communication does not contain foreign intelligence infmn1ation but is
reasonably believed to contain evidence of a c1ime that has been, is being, or is about
to be committed. Such conmmnica6on may be disseminated (including United States
person identities) to appropriate Federal law enforcement authmities, h1 accordance
with 50 U.S. C.§§ 1806(b) and 1825(c), Executive Order No. 12333, and, where
applicable, the crimes reporting procedures set out in the August 1995 "Memorandum
of Understanding: Reporting ofinfonnation Concerning Federal Crimes," or any
successor document. Such communications may be retained by NSA for a reasonable
period of time, not to exceed six months unless extended in writing by the Attorney
General, to permit law enforcement agencies to detennine whether access to miginal
recordings of such conununications is required for law enforcement purposes; (S)

(3) the communication is reasonably believed to contain technical data base infom1ation,
as defined in Section 2(i), or infonnation necessary to understand or assess a
communications security vulnerability. Such communication may be provided to the
FBI and/or disseminated to other elements of the United States Govennnent. Such
conmmnications may be retained for a period sufficient to allow a thorough
exploitation and to permit access to data that are, or are reasonably believed likely to
become, relevant to a current or future foreign intelligence requirement. Sufficient
duration may vary with the nature of the exploitation. (S//SI)

a. In the context of a cryptanalytic effort, maintenance of technical data bases

requires retention of alJ communications that are enciphered or reasonably
believed to contain secret meaning, and sufficient dmation may consist of any
pe1iod oftime during which encrypted material is subject to, or of use in,
cryptanalysis. (S//SI)

b. In the case of cmm1mnications that are not enciphered or othervvise thought to

contain secret meaning, sufficient duration is five years unless the Signal
Intelligence Director, NSA, determines in wliting that retention for a longer
period is required to respond to authorized foreign intelligence or
counte1intelligence requirements; or (S//SI)

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(4) the conununication contains infonnation pertaining to a threat of serious hann to life
or property. (S)

Notwithstanding the above, if a domestic communication indicates that a target has entered
the United States, NSA may advise the FBI of that fact. Moreover, technical data regarding
domestic communications may be retained and provided to the FBI and CIA for collection .
avoidance purposes. (S//SI)

Section 6 - Foreign Conmmnications of or Concerning United States Persons (U)

(a) Retention (U)

Foreign connnunications of or concerning United States persons collected in the course of an

acquisition authorized under section 702 of the Act may be retained only:

(1) if necessary for the maintenance of technical data bases. Retention for this purpose is
permitted for a period sufficient to allow a thorough exploitation and to pennit access
to data that are, or are reasonably believed likely to become, relevant to a cmTent or
future foreign intelligence requirement. Sufficient duration may vary with the natme
of the exploitation.

a. h1 the context of a cryptanalytic effort, maintenance of technical data bases

requires retention of all communications that are enciphered or reasonably
believed to contain secret meaning, and sufficient duration may consist of any
period oftime during which encrypted material is subject to, or of use in,
cryptanalysis.

b. In the case of communications that are not enciphered or otherwise thought to

contain secret meaning, sufficient duration is five years unless the Signals
Intelligence D:iJ:ector, NSA, determines in writing that retention for a longer
period is required to respond to authorized foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence requirements;

(2) if dissemination of such communications with reference to such United States persons
would be permitted under subsection (b) below; or

(3) if the infonnation is evidence of a c1ime that has been, is being, or is about to be
committed and is provided to approp1iate federallaVi' enforcement authorities. (S//SI)

(b) Dissemination (U)

A report based on communications of or conceming a United States person may be

disseminated in accordance with Section 7 or 8 if the identity of the United States person is
deleted and a generic tem1 or symbol is substituted so that the information cannot reasonably
be connected with an identifiable United States person. Otherwise, dissemination of
intelligence reports based on communications of or concerning a United States person may

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only be made to a recipient requiting the identity of such person for the perfom1ance of
official duties but only if at least one of the following criteria is also met:

( 1) the United States person has consented to dissemination or the information of or

concerning the United States person is available publicly;

(2) the identity of the United States person is necessary to understand foreign intelligence
information or assess its impmiance, e.g., the identity of a senior official in the
Executive Branch;

(3) the communication or information indicates that the United States person may be:

a. an agent of a foreign power;

b. a foreign power as defined in Section 1Ol(a) of the Act;

c. residing outside the United States and holding an official position in the
government or military forces of a foreign power;

d. a corporation or other entity that is owned or controlled directly or indirectly by a

foreign power; or

e. acting in collaboration with an intelligence or security service of a foreign power

and the United States person has, or has had, access to classified national seculity
infmmation or material;

(4) the communication or information indicates that the United States person may be the
target of intelligence activities of a foreign power;

(5) the cmmnunication or infonnation indicates that the United States person is engaged
in the unauthorized disclosure of classified national security infonnation or the
United States person's identity is necessary to understand or assess a communications
security vulnerability, but only after the agency that originated the information
certifies that it is properly classified;

(6) the communication or information indicates that the United States person may be
engaging in international terrorist activities;

(7) the acquisition of the United States person's communication was authorized by a
court order issued pursuant to the Act and the communication may relate to the
foreign intelligence purpose of the surveillance; or

(8) the cmmnunication or infmmation is reasonably believed to contain evidence that a

crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed, provided that dissemination is
for law enforcement purposes and is made in accordance with 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(b)
and 1825(c), Executive Order No. 12333, and, where applicable, the crimes reporting

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procedures set out in the August 1995 "Memorandum ofUnderstanding: Reporting of

Information Conceming Federal Crimes," or any successor document. (U)

(c) Provision ofUnminimized Communications to CIA and FBI (S//NF)

(1) NSA may provide to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) umni:nimized
communications acquired pursuant to section 702 of the Act. CIA will
identify to NSA targets for which NSA may provide unminimized
communications to CIA. CIA will process any such umninimized
communications received from NSA in accordance with CIA minimization
procedures adopted by the Attomcy General, in consultation with the DiTector
ofNationallntelligence, pursuant to subsection 702(e) of the Act. (S//SI//NF)

(2) NSA may provide to the FBI unminimized communications acquired pursuant to
section 702 of the Act. The FBI will identify to NSA targets for which NSA may
provide unminimizcd communications to the FBI. The FBI will process any such
urnninimized conununications received from NSA in accordance with FBI
nunimization procedures adopted by the Attomey General, in consultation with the
Director of National Intelligence, pmsuant to subsection 702(e) of the Act. (S//SI)

Section 7- Other Foreign Communications (U)

Foreign communications of or conceming a non-United States person may be retained, used,

and disseminated in any fonn in accordance with other applicable law, regulation, and policy.
(U)

Section 8 - Collaboration with Foreign Govemments (S//SI)

(a) Procedures for the dissemination of evaluated and minimized infom1ation. Pursuant to
Section 1.7(c)(8) of Executive Order No. 12333, as amended, NSA conducts foreign
cryptolot,ric liaison relationships with certain foreign govennnents. Information acquired
pursuant to section 702 of the Act may be dissenunated to a foreign govenm1ent. Except
as provided in subsection 8(b) ofthcse procedures, any dissemination to a foreign
govemment of information of or conceming a United States person that is acquired
pursuant to section 702 may only be done in a manner consistent with subsections 6(b)
and 7 of these NSA minimization procedures. (S)

(b) Procedures for teclmical or linguistic assistance. It is anticipated that NSA may obtain
information or conmmnications that, because of their technical or linguistic content, may
require further analysis by foreign govemments to assist NSA in determining their
meaning or significance. Notwithstanding other provisions of these minimization
procedures, NSA may disseminate computer disks, tape recordings, transcripts, or other
information or items containing unminimized infonnation or communications acquired
pursuant to section 702 to foreign governments for further processing and analysis, under
the following restrictions with respect to any materials so disseminated: (S)

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(1) Dissemination to foreign govermnents will be solely for translation or analysis

of such information or communications, and assisting foreign governments
will make no use of any information or any cmmnunication of or concerning
any person except to provide teclmjcal and linguistic assistance to NSA. (S)

(2) Dissemination will be only to those personnel within foreign governments

involved in the translation or analysis of such infonnation or commumcations.
The number of such personnel will be restricted to the extent feasible. There
will be no dissemination within foreign governments of this umninimized data.
(S)

(3) Foreign governments will make no permanent agency record ofinfonnation or

communications of or concerning any person referred to or recorded on
computer disks, tape recordings, transcripts, or other items disseminated by
NSA to foreign govennnents, provided that foreign govennnents may
maintain such temporary records as are necessary to enable them to assist
NSA with the translation or analysis of such inforn1ation. Records maintained
by foreign governments for this purpose may not be disseminated within the
foreign govermnents, except to persmmel involved in providing teclmical or
linguistic assistance to NSA. (S)

(4) Upon the conclusion of such teclmical or linguistic assistance to NSA,

computer disks, tape recordings, transcripts, or other items or infonnation
disseminated to foreign governments will either be retumed to NSA or be
destroyed with an accounting of such destruction made to NSA. (S)

(5) Any infonnation that foreign govennnents provide to NSA as a result of such
technical or linguistic assistance may be disseminated by NSA in accordance
with these minimization procedures. (S)

Eric H. Holder, Jr.

Attomey General of the United

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