Sultan Camid v. Office of The President - FANDIÑO

14.
SULTAN OSOP CAMID vs. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

G.R. No. 161414, January 17, 2005
Tinga, J., En Banc
FACTS:
The factual antecedents derive from the promulgation of our ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor
General in 1965. Then President Diosdado Macapagal issued several EOs creating thirty-three (33)
municipalities in Mindanao, one of which was Andong in Lanao del Sur which was created by EO No.
107. President Macapagal justified the creation of these municipalities citing his powers under the
Revised Administrative Code. Then Vice-President Pelaez filed a special civil action for a writ of
prohibition, alleging that the EOs were null and void. After due deliberation, the Court unanimously
held that the challenged EOs were null and void.
Petitioner Camid represents himself as a current resident of Andong suing as a private citizen
and taxpayer, alleging that Andong “has metamorphosed into a full-blown municipality with a
complete set of officials appointed to handle essential services for the municipality and its
constituents, even though he concedes that since 1968, no person has been appointed, elected or
qualified to serve any of the elective local government positions of Andong.
The petition assails a Certification dated 21 November 2003, issued by the Bureau of Local
Government Supervision of the DILG. The Certification enumerates eighteen (18) municipalities
certified as “existing,” per DILG records. Notably, these eighteen (18) municipalities are among the
thirty-three (33), along with Andong, whose creations were voided by this Court in Pelaez. Camid
imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DILG “in not classifying Andong as a regular
existing municipality and in not including said municipality in its records and official database as an
existing regular municipality.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not Andong is entitled to recognition as de facto municipal corporation.
RULING:
NO. The Court have since held that where a municipality created as such by executive order is
later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be
questioned.
In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., this Court considered the following
factors as having validated the creation of a municipal corporation, which, like the Municipality of
Sinacaban, was created by executive order of the President before the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor
General:
(1) The fact that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality had never
been challenged;
(2) The fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to question the
validity of the executive order creating such municipality; and
(3) The fact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth-class municipality, organized as
part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution
apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives.
Above all, it was held that whatever doubt there might be as to the de jure character of the
municipality must be deemed to have been put to rest by the Local Government Code of 1991 (R. A.
No. 7160), Sec. 442(d) of which provides that "municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential
issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective officials holding office
at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities."
The executive order creating Andong was expressly annulled by order of this Court in 1965. If
we were to affirm Andong’s de facto status by reason of its alleged continued existence despite its
nullification, we would in effect be condoning defiance of a valid order of this Court. Court decisions
cannot obviously lose their efficacy due to the sheer defiance by the parties aggrieved.
If there is truly a strong impulse calling for the reconstitution of Andong, the solution is
through the legislature and not judicial confirmation of void title. Yet we can hardly sanction the
retention of Andong’s legal personality solely on the basis of collective amnesia that may have
allowed Andong to somehow pretend itself into existence despite its judicial dissolution. But the
time has come for the light to seep in, and for the petitioner and like-minded persons to awaken to
legal reality.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

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14.

SULTAN OSOP CAMID vs. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Whether or not Andong is entitled to recognition as de facto municipal corporation.

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