12 Singapore AL Vs Paño 1983 Abandonment

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Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-47739 June 22, 1983

SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, petitioner,


vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO as Presiding Judge of Branch XVIII, Court of
First Instance of Rizal, CARLOS E. CRUZ and B. E.
VILLANUEVA, respondents.

Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala Pecson, Azucena & Bengzon Law


Offices for petitioner.

Celso P. Mariano Law Office for private respondent Carlos Cruz.

Romeo Comia for private respondent B. E. Villanueva.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

On the basic issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner company has elevated to


us for review the two Orders of respondent Judge dated October 28, 1977
and January 24, 1978 dismissing petitioner's complaint for damages in the
first Order, and denying its Motion for Reconsideration in the second.

On August 21, 1974, private respondent Carlos E. Cruz was offered


employment by petitioner as Engineer Officer with the opportunity to undergo
a B-707 I conversion training course," which he accepted on August 30,
1974. An express stipulation in the letter-offer read:

3. BONDING. As you win be provided with conversion


training you are required to enter into a bond with SIA for a
period of 5 years. For this purpose, please inform me of the
names and addresses of your sureties as soon as possible.

Twenty six days thereafter, or on October 26, 1974, Cruz entered into an
"Agreement for a Course of Conversion Training at the Expense of Singapore
Airlines Limited" wherein it was stipulated among others:

4. The Engineer Officer shall agree to remain in the service


of the Company for a period of five years from the date of
commencement of such aforesaid conversion training if so
required by the Company.

5. In the event of the Engineer Officer:

1. Leaving the service of the


company during the period of five
years referred to in Clause 4 above,
or

2. Being dismissed or having his


services terminated by the company
for misconduct,

the Engineer Officer and the Sureties hereby bind


themselves jointly and severally to pay to the Company as
liquidated damages such sums of money as are set out
hereunder:

(a) during the first year of the period of five


years referred to in Clause 4
above ..................................................................
.................... $ 67,460/

(b) during the second year of the period of five


years referred to in Clause 4
above ..................................................................
............... $ 53,968/

(c) during the third year of the period of five


years referred to in Clause 4
above ..................................................................
.................... $ 40,476/

(d) during the fourth year of the period of five


years referred to in Clause 4
above ..................................................................
................ $ 26,984/

(e) during the fifth year of the period of five


years referred to in Clause 4
above ..................................................................
..................... $ 13,492/

6. The provisions of Clause 5 above shall not apply in a


case where an Engineer Officer has his training terminated
by the Company for reasons other than misconduct or
where, subsequent to the completion of training, he -

1. loses his license to operate as a Flight


Engineer due to medical reasons which can in
no way be attributable to any act or omission on
his part;

2. is unable to continue in employment with the


Company because his employment pass or
work permit, as the case may be, has been
withdrawn or has not been renewed due to no
act or omission on his part;

3. has his services terminated by the Company


as a result of being replaced by a national Flight
Engineer;

4. has to leave the service of the Company on


valid compassionate grounds stated to and
accepted by the Company in writing. 1
Cruz signed the Agreement with his co-respondent, B. E. Villanueva, as
surety.

Claiming that Cruz had applied for "leave without pay" and had gone on leave
without approval of the application during the second year of the Period of
five years, petitioner filed suit for damages against Cruz and his surety,
Villanueva, for violation of the terms and conditions of the aforesaid
Agreement. Petitioner sought the payment of the following sums: liquidated
damages of $53,968.00 or its equivalent of P161,904.00 (lst cause of action);
$883.91 or about P2,651.73 as overpayment in salary (2nd clause of action);
$61.00 or about P183.00 for cost of uniforms and accessories supplied by
the company plus $230.00, or roughly P690.00, for the cost of a flight manual
(3rd cause of action); and $1,533.71, or approximately P4,601.13
corresponding to the vacation leave he had availed of but to which he was no
longer entitled (4th cause Of action); exemplary damages attorney's fees;
and costs.

In his Answer, Cruz denied any breach of contract contending that at no time
had he been required by petitioner to agree to a straight service of five years
under Clause 4 of the Agreement (supra) and that he left the service on "valid
compassionate grounds stated to and accepted by the company so that no
damages may be awarded against him. And because of petitioner-plaintiff's
alleged ungrounded causes of action, Cruz counterclaimed for attorney's fees
of P7,000.00.

The surety, Villanueva, in his own Answer, contended that his undertaking
was merely that of one of two guarantors not that of surety and claimed the
benefit of excussion, if at an found liable. He then filed a cross-claim against
Cruz for damages and for whatever amount he may be held liable to
petitioner-plaintiff, and a counterclaim for actual, exemplary, moral and other
damages plus attorney's fees and litigation expenses against petitioner-
plaintiff.

The issue of jurisdiction having been raised at the pre-trial conference, the
parties were directed to submit their respective memoranda on that question,
which they complied with in due time. On October 28, 1977, respondent
Judge issued the assailed Order dismissing the complaint, counterclaim and
cross-claim for lack of jurisdiction stating.

2. The present case therefore involves a money claim


arising from an employer-employee relation or at the very
least a case arising from employer-employee relations,
which under Art. 216 of the Labor Code is vested
exclusively with the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor
Relations Commission. 2

Reconsideration thereof having been denied in the Order of January 24,


1978, petitioner availed of the present recourse. We gave due course.

We are here confronted with the issue of whether or not this case is properly
cognizable by Courts of justice or by the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor
Relations Commission.

Upon the facts and issues involved, jurisdiction over the present controversy
must be held to belong to the civil Courts. While seemingly petitioner's claim
for damages arises from employer-employee relations, and the latest
amendment to Article 217 of the Labor Code under PD No. 1691 and BP Blg.
130 provides that all other claims arising from employer-employee
relationship are cognizable by Labor Arbiters, 3 in essence, petitioner's claim
for damages is grounded on the "wanton failure and refusal" without just
cause of private respondent Cruz to report for duty despite repeated notices
served upon him of the disapproval of his application for leave of absence
without pay. This, coupled with the further averment that Cruz "maliciously
and with bad faith" violated the terms and conditions of the conversion
training course agreement to the damage of petitioner removes the present
controversy from the coverage of the Labor Code and brings it within the
purview of Civil Law.

Clearly, the complaint was anchored not on the abandonment per se by


private respondent Cruz of his job as the latter was not required in the
Complaint to report back to work but on the manner and consequent
effects of such abandonment of work translated in terms of the damages
which petitioner had to suffer.

Squarely in point is the ruling enunciated in the case of Quisaba vs. Sta. Ines
Melale Veneer & Plywood, Inc.4 the pertinent portion of which reads:
Although the acts complied of seemingly appear to
constitute "matter involving employee employer" relations
as Quisaba's dismiss was the severance of a pre-existing
employee-employer relations, his complaint is grounded not
on his dismissal per se, as in fact he does not ask for
reinstatement or backwages, but on the manner of his
dismiss and the consequent effects of such

Civil law consists of that 'mass of precepts that determine or


regulate the relations ... that exist between members of a
society for the protection of private interest (1 Sanchez
Roman 3).

The "right" of the respondents to dismiss Quisaba should


not be confused with the manner in which the right was
exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismiss
was done anti-socially or oppressively, as the complaint
alleges, then the respondents violated article 1701 of the
Civil Code which prohibits acts of oppression by either
capital or labor against the other, and article 21, which
makers a person liable for damages if he wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy, the sanction for
which, by way of moral damages, is provided in article
2219, No. 10 (Cf, Philippine Refining Co. vs. Garcia, L-
21962, Sept. 27, 1966, 18 SCRA 107).

Stated differently, petitioner seeks protection under the civil laws and claims
no benefits under the labor Code. The primary relief sought is for liquidated
damages for breach of a contractual obligation. The other items demanded
are not labor benefits demanded by workers generally taken cognizance of in
labor disputes, such as payment of wages, overtime compensation or
separation pay. The items claimed are the natural consequences flowing
from breach of an obligation, intrinsically a civil dispute.

Additionally, there is a secondary issue involved that is outside the pale of


competence of Labor Arbiters. Is the liability of Villanueva one of suretyship
or one of guaranty? Unquestionably, this question is beyond the field of
specialization of Labor Arbiters.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of respondent Judge are hereby set


aside. The records are hereby ordered remanded to the proper Branch of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, to which this case belongs, for further
proceedings. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.,


concur.
Footnotes

1 Annex "B ", p. 12, CFI Records.

2 p. 112, Ibid.

3 Article 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the


Commission.

(a) The labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving
all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:

1. Unfair labor practice cases;

2. Those that involve wages, hours of work and other terms


and conditions of employment;

3. All money claims of workers, including those based on


non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime
compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided
by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for
employees compensation, social security, medicare and
maternity benefits;
4. Cases involving household services and

5. All other claims arising from employer-employee


relations, unless expressly excluded by this Code.

(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate


jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters.

4 68 SCRA 771 (1974).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

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