12 Singapore AL Vs Paño 1983 Abandonment
12 Singapore AL Vs Paño 1983 Abandonment
12 Singapore AL Vs Paño 1983 Abandonment
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FIRST DIVISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Twenty six days thereafter, or on October 26, 1974, Cruz entered into an
"Agreement for a Course of Conversion Training at the Expense of Singapore
Airlines Limited" wherein it was stipulated among others:
Claiming that Cruz had applied for "leave without pay" and had gone on leave
without approval of the application during the second year of the Period of
five years, petitioner filed suit for damages against Cruz and his surety,
Villanueva, for violation of the terms and conditions of the aforesaid
Agreement. Petitioner sought the payment of the following sums: liquidated
damages of $53,968.00 or its equivalent of P161,904.00 (lst cause of action);
$883.91 or about P2,651.73 as overpayment in salary (2nd clause of action);
$61.00 or about P183.00 for cost of uniforms and accessories supplied by
the company plus $230.00, or roughly P690.00, for the cost of a flight manual
(3rd cause of action); and $1,533.71, or approximately P4,601.13
corresponding to the vacation leave he had availed of but to which he was no
longer entitled (4th cause Of action); exemplary damages attorney's fees;
and costs.
In his Answer, Cruz denied any breach of contract contending that at no time
had he been required by petitioner to agree to a straight service of five years
under Clause 4 of the Agreement (supra) and that he left the service on "valid
compassionate grounds stated to and accepted by the company so that no
damages may be awarded against him. And because of petitioner-plaintiff's
alleged ungrounded causes of action, Cruz counterclaimed for attorney's fees
of P7,000.00.
The surety, Villanueva, in his own Answer, contended that his undertaking
was merely that of one of two guarantors not that of surety and claimed the
benefit of excussion, if at an found liable. He then filed a cross-claim against
Cruz for damages and for whatever amount he may be held liable to
petitioner-plaintiff, and a counterclaim for actual, exemplary, moral and other
damages plus attorney's fees and litigation expenses against petitioner-
plaintiff.
The issue of jurisdiction having been raised at the pre-trial conference, the
parties were directed to submit their respective memoranda on that question,
which they complied with in due time. On October 28, 1977, respondent
Judge issued the assailed Order dismissing the complaint, counterclaim and
cross-claim for lack of jurisdiction stating.
We are here confronted with the issue of whether or not this case is properly
cognizable by Courts of justice or by the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor
Relations Commission.
Upon the facts and issues involved, jurisdiction over the present controversy
must be held to belong to the civil Courts. While seemingly petitioner's claim
for damages arises from employer-employee relations, and the latest
amendment to Article 217 of the Labor Code under PD No. 1691 and BP Blg.
130 provides that all other claims arising from employer-employee
relationship are cognizable by Labor Arbiters, 3 in essence, petitioner's claim
for damages is grounded on the "wanton failure and refusal" without just
cause of private respondent Cruz to report for duty despite repeated notices
served upon him of the disapproval of his application for leave of absence
without pay. This, coupled with the further averment that Cruz "maliciously
and with bad faith" violated the terms and conditions of the conversion
training course agreement to the damage of petitioner removes the present
controversy from the coverage of the Labor Code and brings it within the
purview of Civil Law.
Squarely in point is the ruling enunciated in the case of Quisaba vs. Sta. Ines
Melale Veneer & Plywood, Inc.4 the pertinent portion of which reads:
Although the acts complied of seemingly appear to
constitute "matter involving employee employer" relations
as Quisaba's dismiss was the severance of a pre-existing
employee-employer relations, his complaint is grounded not
on his dismissal per se, as in fact he does not ask for
reinstatement or backwages, but on the manner of his
dismiss and the consequent effects of such
Stated differently, petitioner seeks protection under the civil laws and claims
no benefits under the labor Code. The primary relief sought is for liquidated
damages for breach of a contractual obligation. The other items demanded
are not labor benefits demanded by workers generally taken cognizance of in
labor disputes, such as payment of wages, overtime compensation or
separation pay. The items claimed are the natural consequences flowing
from breach of an obligation, intrinsically a civil dispute.
SO ORDERED.
2 p. 112, Ibid.
(a) The labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving
all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: