Kerala Law Academy Law College First Moot: Upon Submission To The Hon'Ble Judges of The High Court of Falres

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

A1

Kerala Law Academy Law College


First Moot

BEFORE
THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF FALRES

CIVIL WRIT PETITION / OF 2022

IN THE MATTER OF:

Bismillah Allam & Others ...................................................................... Petitioners


Vs.
Union of Armington & Anr.................................................................. Respondents

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE JUDGES OF THE HIGH COURT OF FALRES

TABLE OF CONTENTS
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................. 3


INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................... 4
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION...................................................................................... 7
STATEMENT OF FACTS...................................................................................................... 8
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ................................................................................................... 10
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ......................................................................................... 11
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED .............................................................................................. 13

1 WHETHER ARMINGTON CITIZENSHIP (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2019 VIOLATES ARTICLE


14 AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION ........................................................................................... 13
2 WHETHER BISMILLAH ALAM AND HIS FAMILY IS THE RIGHTFUL CITIZEN OF
ARMINGTON .................................................................................................................................. 17
3 WHETHER THE CHARGES AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT IS MAINTAINABLE OR NOT?
.................................................................................................................................................... 19
4 WHETHER THE ARMINGTON CITIZENSHIP (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2019 VIOLATES THE
BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF BEING A SECULAR STRUCTURE OR
NOT? ................................................................................................................................................ 24

PRAYER................................................................................................................................. 30

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

& AND

¶ PARAGRAPH

AIR ALL INDIA REPORTER

ANR. ANOTHER

ART. ARTICLE

ACT ARMINGTON CITIZENSHIP ACT, 2019

CONST. CONSTITUION OF ARMINGTON

CrPC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1973

HC HIGH COURT OF FALRES

HON’BLE HONOURABLE

i.e., THAT IS

IBID IBIDEM

ICCPR INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON


CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
IPC INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860

ORS OTHERS

SCC SUPREME COURT CASES

SCR SUPREME COURT RECORD

SEC. SECTION

V. VERSUS

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

1. Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen, (2017) 2 SCC 629 ............................................ 29


2. Alsia Pardhi v. State of M.P., (2014) 2 SCC 72 .......................................................... 29
3. Asha Ranjan v. State of Bihar, (2017) 4 SCC 397 ....................................................... 21
4. Capital and Counties Bank v. Henty & Sons, (1882) 7 A.C. 741................................ 23
5. Deepak Kumar Biswas v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 2006 Gau. 110.............. 23
6. E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) AIR 555 SCR (2) 348 .......................... 15
7. Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator (1981) 2 SCR 516 ................................ 17
8. Francis Corlie v. Union Territory of Delhi (1981)2 SCR 516 ..................................... 17
9. Goutam Sahu v. State of Orissa, 1999 CriLJ 838, 1998 II OLR 194 .......................... 23
10. H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, (1955) 1 SCR 1150 ................................................... 21
11. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) SC 2299 ................................................... 14
12. Jones v. Hulton & Co. (1909) 2 K.B. 444, at 454........................................................ 24
13. K. Krishna v. Union of India and Ors, 2007(7) SC 258 .............................................. 19
14. K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 ................................................ 26
15. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 ....................................... 26
16. Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1963) AIR 1295, 1964 SCR (1) 33 ............. 17
17. Madras Bar Association v Union of Armington, (2014) 10 SCC 1 ............................. 26
18. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) SC 4321 ................................................ 16
19. Pritam Nath Hoon v. Union of India, (1980) 4 SCC 525 ............................................. 20
20. R.K Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar (1958) SC 538 ........................................................ 14
21. RK Garg and Ors. v. Union of India (1982) 133 ITR 239 SC ..................................... 16
22. S.A. Aziz vs Pasam Haribabu and Anr., (2003) 6 Cri.L.j. 2462(A.P .......................... 22
23. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1 ........................................................ 26
24. Sharma Transport v. State of AP (2002) 2 SCC 188 ................................................... 15
25. Sim v. Stretch, (1936) 52 T.L.R. 669, 671 .................................................................. 23
26. State of Bihar v. Bihar State (2007) SC 1948 .............................................................. 14
27. State of Karnataka v. Praveen Bhai Thogadia (Dr.), (2004) 4 SCC 68 ....................... 25
28. Subhash Krishnan v. State of Goa, (2012) 8 SCC 365 ................................................ 21
29. Sunil Batra v. Delhi Admn., (1978) 4 SCC 494 .......................................................... 21
30. West Bengal v. Anawar Ali Srakar (1952) SCR 284 .................................................. 14

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

BOOKS

• Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, Indian Penal Code, LexisNexis (2014).


• K.I. Vibhute, Criminal Law, LexisNexis (2019).
• K.D. Gaur, The Indian Penal Code, Universal Law Publishing (2013).
• R.V. Kelkar, Criminal Procedure, Eastern Book Company (2019).
• Avtar Singh, Principles of the Law of Evidence, Central Law Publications (2010).
• Narender Kumar, ‗Constitution of India ‘Allahabad Law Agency 12th Ed (2014)
• H.M. Seervai, ‗Constitutional law of India ‘Universal Book Traders., 4th Ed, (2002).
• V.N. Shukla, ‗Constitution of India ‘s Eastern Book Company ‘11th Ed (2008).
• MP Mallick, ‗Writs (Law and PrActice) ‘Eastern Law House, Second Ed., (2008).
• P.M. Bakshi, ‗The Constitution of India ‘Universal Law Publishing Co. Ltd, (2015).

STATUTES

• Constitution of India, 1950


• The Citizenship Act, 1955
• The Army Act, 1950
• Indian Penal Code, 1860
• Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
• Indian Evidence Act, 1872

DICTIONARIES

• Black Law ‘s Dictionary, 8th ed.


• Judicial Dictionary, J.L.P Singh & PK Majumdar, 2nd ed.
• Stroud ‘s Judicial Dictionary, 4th ed.

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

• Lexicon Law Dictionary (1979), West group, 3rd ed.

WEBSITES

• www.manupatra.com
• www.scconlinne.com
• www.casemine.com
• www.cis-india.com
• www.shodhganga.com
• www.lawfinderlive.com
• www.lexology.com
• www.meity.gov.in
• www.indiankanoon.com

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The counsel on the behalf of the Respondent in the instant matter, hereby, humbly submits to
the Jurisdiction of the Hon’ble High Court of Falres under article 226 of the Constitution. This
Memorial sets forth the facts and the laws on which claims are based.

226. POWER OF HIGH COURTS TO ISSUE CERTAIN WRITS

(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32 every High Court shall have powers,
throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any
person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those
territories’ directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus,
mandamus, prohibitions, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose

(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any
Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising
jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of Action, wholly or in
part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such
Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories

(3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay
or in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under
clause (1), without:

(a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the
plea for such interim order; and

(b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High
Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to
the party in whose favor such order has been made or the counsel of such party,
the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from
the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such
application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed
on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which
the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim
order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the
aid next day, stand vacated

(4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the
power conferred on the Supreme court by clause (2) of Article 32

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

STATEMENT OF FACTS

BACKDROP

The Armington National Register, mandated by Armington Citizenship Act, 1955 (as amended
in 2003) is a register where the names of all the citizens of Armington have to be mandatorily
registered. Purpose behind this Act is to differentiate the Citizens from the illegal immigrants
from neighbouring countries.

PROCEDURAL LAPSE IN ANR

Province of Flares faces a unique problem of illegal immigrants from the neighbouring country
of Jambia. ANR for the Province of Flares was created in the year 1951 but authorities failed
to maintain the said ANR in the province of Flares. Seeing the unsatisfActory progress in
maintain the said ANR, the Supreme Court took sue moto cognizance. The recent updated list
of ANR that is published for the province of Falres contained 3.1 crore names out of 3.3 crore
of population, leaving out 19 Lakhs names. Now these 19 Lakh citizens faced danger of losing
their citizenship and have fear of being sent to concentration camps and refugee centres.

GOVERNMENT PASSED CITIZENSHIP AMENDMENT BILL 2019

Present government of Armington passed the Armington Citizenship Amendment bill in


December 2019. Sec 2 (1) of the Armington Citizenship Amendment Act 2019 states that –

“ provided that any citizen belonging to Hindia, Keshabha, Padmabha, Veshabha, Zoarabha
and Jehowha community from Tahibic Republic of Mekimer, Republic of Jambia and Tahibic
Republic of Raminherb who entered into Armington on or before the 31st of December 2014
and who has been exempted by the central government under clause (c) of subsection (2) of
section 3 of the passport (Entry into Armington) Act, 1920 or Foreigners Act 1946 or any rule
or order made there under, shall not be treated as illegal migrants for the purpose of this Act”

Government also states that the residents of Falres have to produce documents proving that
they or their families lived in the country of Armington before march 24th 1971.

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

BISMILLAH ALAM

Bismillah Alam, grandson of Ekmuddin Alam (brother of the former president of Armington
Dara Alam (1975- 1977) also served in the National Armed Forces of Armington for 35 years
and was a war veteran, along with four other members of family (belonging to Tahibic
Community) were arrested on grounds that there name were not included in the list of ANR.
They were sent to concentration camps set up by the government for illegal migrants.

Bismillah Alam in an interview with the media house stated that this was done purposely
because they belong to a certain religious community which is Tahibas. He stated that he and
his family members were arrested and sent to concentration camps, due to which they faced a
lot of humiliation and harassment by the authorities which even caused mental trauma.

WRIT PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226

Writ Petition of Habeas Corpus was filed by Bismillah Alam via his legal representative under
article 226 in the High Court of Falres against the government on the grounds of violation of
his Fundamental Rights under article 14 and 21. Government authorities were also accused
under Wrongful Confinement u/s 343 and Defamation u/s 499 of the Union Penal Code of
Armington.

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

The Following issues have been placed before Hon’ble High Court of Falres to Adjudicate
upon:

~ISSUE 1~

WHETHER ARMINGTON CITIZENSHIP (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2019 VIOLATES


ARTICLE 14 AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION?

~ISSUE 2~

WHETHER BISMILLAH ALAM AND HIS FAMILY IS THE RIGHTFUL XITIZEN


OF ARMINGTON OR NOT?

~ISSUE 3~

WHETHER THE CHARGES AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT IS MAINTAINABLE


OR NOT?

~ISSUE 4~

WHETHER THE ARMINGTON CITIZENSHIP (AMENDMENT) ACT,2019


VIOLATES THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF BEING A
SECULAR STRUCTURE OR NOT?

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE 1: Whether Armington Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 violates Article 14


and 21 of the Constitution?

i. It is most humbly presented before the Hon’ble Court that the Armington Citizenship
(Amendment) Act, 2019 violates article 14 and 21 of the Constitution as it clearly
discriminates on the basis of religion and causes violation on humanitarian grounds.
ii. Moreover, this Act does not pass the twin classification test as differentia has no nexus
with the objective sought to be achieved. Furthermore, it is arbitrary in nature which
makes it crystal clear that it is violative of Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution

ISSUE 2: Whether Bismillah Allam and his family is the rightful citizen of Armington or
not?

i. Bismillah Allam and his family is the rightful citizen of Armington as he has served in
the army for 35 years and as per Section 11 of The Army Act, 1950 only the citizens of
the country can enroll themselves in the army. Hence, he is the rightful citizen of the
country.
ii. Moreover, they are eligible to seek citizenship as per section 6 of Citizenship Act, 1955.
Furthermore, it is humbly submitted that Bismillah Alam and his family is the rightful
citizen of the country as they satisfy the required conditions mandated by the
Government.

ISSUE 3: Whether the charges against the Government is maintainable or not?

i. The charges against the Government are maintainable as they have committed wrongful
confinement u/s 343 and Defamation u/s 499.
ii. Bismillah Alam was illegally detained and put into circumscribed limits by the
government without any reasonable justification. Moreover, Bismillah Alam and his
family were humiliated by the unjustified Acts of the government. Furthermore, the
arbitrary Act of Government of sending them to concentration camps has degraded their
image in the society. Therefore, it is humbly submitted that the charges against the

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

government are maintainable as all the essentials of wrongful confinement and


defamation stands proved.

ISSUE 4: Whether the Armington Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 violates the basic
structure of the Constitution of being a secular structure or not?

i. The Citizenship Act is violative of the Basic structure doctrine as it deliberately


excludes Tahibic Community to take up Armington’s Citizenship and deprives of
the privilege given to other communities in neighboring states
ii. The impugned Act lays down an arbitrary criterion for the classification of religions
and states to get citizenship of Armington as it excludes various persecuted sects in
the neighboring states.

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
MOST RESPECTFULLY SHOWETH-

ISSUE: 1 WHETHER ARMINGTON CITIZENSHIP (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2019


VIOLATES ARTICLE 14 AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION

1. It is most humbly presented before the Hon’ble Court that the said amendment Act
violates the art 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
2. This would be proved under several grounds separately for art 14 and art 21
1.1 Article 14: provides “The state shall not deny to person equality before law or equal
protection of laws within the territory of India”1
3. The concept of equality has been held basic to the rule of law and is regarded as the
most fundamental postulate of republicanism.
4. In Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain2 the majority of the Supreme Court has held that
the right to equality conferred by Article 14 is a basic structure of the constitution and
an essential feature of the democracy or rule of law. It has been held to be “a right
which more than any other is a basic postulate of the constitution.”

1.1.1 ARBITRARNESS IN STATE ACTION

1. In EP Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu3 Supreme Court held that


“The court took its view and decided equality is a dynamic concept thus it cannot be
cribbed, cabined, and confined within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a
positivistic view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness, this equality and arbitrariness
are sworn, enemies. Thus, any Act which is arbitrary constitutes inequality in political
logic and constitutional law.”
2. Thus, it states that any law that is arbitrary constitutes inequality and thus violates art
14 of the constitution. Moreover, the arbitrary classification of the aforesaid countries
without any rationale, or standard principles constitutes manifest arbitrariness and
violates Article 14 of the Armington Constitution.

1
Constitution of India, 1950 art 14
2
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) SC 2299
3
E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) AIR 555 SCR (2) 348

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

3. The Hon’ble Court in Sharma Transport v. Govt. of A. P4 wherein Para 25 states that
“the expression “arbitrarily” means: in an unreasonable manner, as fixed or done
capriciously or at pleasure, without adequate determining principle, not founded in the
nature of things, non-rational, not done or acting according to reason or judgment,
depending on the will alone” the country-based classification of the impugned act is
manifestly arbitrary. It permits people who are persecuted from only the aforesaid
countries. However, does not provide any standard principle behind choosing these
countries whereby it does not extend the benefit to religious minorities belonging to
other countries.
4. Also, in the case of RK Garg and Ors. v. Union of India5 it was observed by the
Supreme Court that Article 14 prohibits parliament from enacting laws that are
arbitrarily or irrationally differentiate between groups of persons.
5. Since, the aforesaid Act differentiates persons on the basis of religion, thus is arbitrary
in nature and violates article 14 of the constitution.

1.1.2 COULD NOT PASS THE TWIN CLASSIFICATION TEST

6. Article 14 provides a ‘twin test’ of reasonable classification6. This means that a


legislation is valid only if it differentiates or classifies on the basis of ‘intelligible
differentia’ (i.e., with clear criteria) and this differentiation has a reasonable ‘nexus’
(connection) to the objective sought to be achieved by the legislation.
7. Article 14 forbids the class legislation but it does not forbid reasonable classification,
however, these classifications must not be ‘arbitrary, artificial or evasive’.
8. In the case of State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar7, the Supreme Court, stated that
the twin test for reasonable classification. What the court Actually said was (in the
words of Justice SR Das): “Article 14 does not insist that every piece of legislation
must have universal application and it does not take away from the State the power to
classify persons for the purposes of legislation but the classification must be rational
and in order to satisfy this test (i) the classification must be made on intelligible
differentia which distinguished those that are grouped together from others and (ii) that

4
Sharma Transport v. State of AP (2002) 2 SCC 188
5
RK Garg and Ors. v. Union of India (1982) 133 ITR 239 SC
6
R.K Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar (1958) SC 538, State of Bihar v. Bihar State (2007) SC 1948
7
West Bengal v. Anawar Ali Srakar (1952) SCR 284

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

the differentia must have a reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved by
the Act”
9. Therefore, The classification in the Act is not founded on the basis of intelligible
differentia. The yardstick for the purpose of differentiating is that the religious
persecuted minorities belonging to the three selected countries i.e., Tahibic Republic of
Mekimer, Republic of Jambia, and Tahibic Republic of Ramingherb. It only includes
six selected communities excluding other minorities those are facing discrimination and
persecution on the basis of religion.
10. Moreover, The denial of similar benefits to these communities constitutes unreasonable
classification and denial of their protection does no satisfy the aim of this classification
of protecting religious persecuted minorities. Thus, there is no rational nexus between
the differentia and the aim sought to be achieved.

1.1.3 CLASSIFICATION IS IMPERMISSIBLE

11. Religion based classification is impermissible and thus violates article 14 of the
constitution.
12. The section 2 (1) b of the Act amended the definition of illegal migrant and excluded
Hindia, Keshabha, Padmabha, Veshabha, Zoarabha and Jehowha community from the
definition of illegal migrants. Moreover, the religion-based classification of the act is
an impermissible classification and violates article 14 of the constitution.
13. The classification based on religion ipso facto violates article 14 of the constitution,
wherein the legislation effectuate discrimination on the basis of the intrinsic and core
identity of the individual i.e., the religious identity of the individual.
14. The ACT 2019 explicitly discriminates against the Tahibas. The Act extends benefit to
the individuals belonging to Hindia, Keshabha, Padmabha, Veshabha, Zoarabha and
Jehowha but excludes the same benefit to the individuals belonging to Tahibic
community.
15. Since, ACT 2019 discriminates on the basis of core and intrinsic trait of the individual
i.e., religion of the individual, it cannot form a reasonable classification and thus is
impermissible.

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

16. In Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India8 the Supreme Court observed that

“Where a legislation discriminates on the basis of an intrinsic and core trait of an


individual, it cannot form a reasonable classification based on the on the intelligible
differentia”.

17. Nonetheless, The religion-based classification is impermissible principle to be used for


the purpose of classification. That, if the classification is founded on the intrinsic and
core element of the individual ground such as race, sex, religion, place of birth and
caste. Such classifications are prima facie are impermissible classification under article
14. The ACT 2019 has made intelligible differentia on the basis of religion, which id
core identity of an individual and this clearly constitutes discrimination on the based on
impermissible or invalid classification. Hence, the act in is violation of article 14.
1.2 ARTICLE 21: “No person shall be deprived of life and personal liberty except according
to the procedure established by law.”9 The impugned Act is violative on both grounds of
this Act as it is depriving Tahibas to live a life with dignity and freedom. Grounds on which
it is violative of article 21 of the Constitution of Armington is stated below.

1.2.1 VIOLATION ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS

18. Every individual in the state of Armington is entitled to life and liberty and by the term
‘life’ here used, something more is meant than mere animal existence10. Article 21
embodies a constitutional value of supreme importance in democratic society.11
19. In Francis Coralie v. Union Territory of Delhi12 court observed that, the right to live
includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes with it, basic necessities
of life such as shelter, adequate nutrition etc. and act of 2019 is depriving people of
these basic necessities that are required by an individual for existence. People from
Tahibic community are facing violation as they are being sent to concentration camps.
They are being harassed and humiliated by the authorities which is causing them mental
trauma. Depriving them to live a life full of dignity is clear violation of article 21 of the
constitution.

8
Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) SC 4321
9
Constitution of India 1950, art 21
10
Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1963) AIR 1295, 1964 SCR (1) 332
11
Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator (1981) 2 SCR 516
12
Francis Coralie v. Union Territory of Delhi (1981)2 SCR 516

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

ISSUE: 2 WHETHER BISMILLAH ALAM AND HIS FAMILY IS THE RIGHTFUL


CITIZEN OF ARMINGTON
20. It is most humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that Bismillah Alam and his family
is the rightful citizen of Armington. It is submitted that Bismillah Alam has served in
the army for 35 years which makes him the rightful citizen of Armington.

2.1 SERVED IN NATIONAL ARMED FORCES FOR 35 YEARS


21. Ineligibility of aliens for enrolment. No person who is not a citizen of India shall,
except with the consent of the Central Government signified in writing, be enrolled in
the regular Army: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall bar the
enrolment of the subjects of Nepal in the regular Army.13
22. It is humbly submitted before this hon’ble court that it is a well-established principle
that only the citizens of the country can serve in the army. No one except citizens of the
country can qualify to be the part of Armed Forces. Moreover, the consent of
government is necessary to be enrolled in the army.
23. As Bismillah Alam has served in The National Armed Forces of Armington for 35
years, he must have gone through the procedures mentioned in aforesaid statute which
in itself is sufficient proof to verify his citizenship. Hence, Bismillah Alam and his
family is the rightful citizen of the country.
24. The similar case took place in India where an army official, after serving for 30 years
in the army, was asked to prove his citizenship.14This was very disheartening as even
after providing loyal service to the country for 30 years, he was still considered illegal
migrant from Bangladesh.
25. Later on, this came as a mistake of the authorities. Assam DGP Sahay said, “The matter
is looked into by the director general and the Superintendent of police (SP) of Kamrup.
It appears that it is a matter of mistaken identity due to the close similarity in the names
of JCO and the suspected foreigner on whom the notice was intended to be served.”15

13
Army Act, 1950, Section 11, Number 46, Acts of Parliament, 1950 (India)
14
Utpal Parashar, After 30 years of service, retired army officer from Assam branded as a Bangladeshi,
Hindustaan Times, Oct 01, 2017 11:22 PM IST
15
Bikash Singh, accusing retired Army JCO Mohd Azmal Haque as a foreigner is a case of mistaken identity',
The Economic Times, Oct 03, 2017, 09:19 PM IST

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

26. Moreover, Bismillah Alam is grandson of Ekmuddin Alam (brother of the former
president of Armington Dara Allam 1975-1977). This implies that his cousin
grandfather was the citizen of Armington and it can further be implied that Bismillah’s
grandfather was also the citizen of the country. Hence, Bismilllah Alam is the citizen
as this is a stated provision of the Act that if grandfather is the citizen, then the grandson
shall be the citizen by default.

2.2 CITIZEN BY NATURALISATION

27. Citizenship by naturalization.16―(1) Where an application is made in the prescribed


manner by any person of full age and capacity [not being an illegal migrant] for the
grant of a certificate of naturalization to him, the Central Government may, if satisfied
that the applicant is qualified for naturalization under the provisions of the Third
Schedule, grant to him a certificate of naturalization
28. Provided that, if in the opinion of the Central Government, the applicant is a person
who has rendered distinguished service to the cause of science, philosophy, art,
literature, world peace or human progress generally, it may waive all or any of the
conditions specified in the Third Schedule.
29. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that this section states that citizenship
can be attained by naturalization if the central government is satisfied about the
qualification of an applicant under third schedule.
30. Citizenship by naturalization can be extended to the persons who were not married to
the Armington citizens and not related to the Armington citizens by blood or by soil but
doing distinguished services to the cause of science, philosophy, art, literature and
world peace of human progress etc. or having long stay in Armington. For example,
Dalai Lama was granted the citizenship by naturalization. Hence, Bismillah Alam can
be granted citizenship as he has rendered his service to the world peace by being a war
veteran and serving in the National Armed Forces for 35 years.
31. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K. Krishna v. Union of India and Ors.17
observed that under Section 6 for claiming citizenship by naturalization, an individual
has no right to have it. It is the pleasure of the Government of Armington to grant or
not to grant. This clearly shows that citizenship by this method completely depends

16
The Citizenship Act, 1955, Section 6, Number 57, Acts of Parliament, 1955 (India)
17
K. Krishna v. Union of India and Ors, 2007(7) SC 258

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

upon the discretion of the government and hence, can be biased which furthers the case
of petitioners.
32. Therefore, it is humbly submitted before this hon’ble court that the grounds on which
citizenship has been denied to Bismillah Alam and his family are unconstitutional as
has been explained in ISSUE 1. Hence, Bismillah Alam and his family is the rightful
citizen of the country evident from all the fActs stated above.

ISSUE: 3 WHETHER THE CHARGES AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT IS


MAINTAINABLE OR NOT?
33. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the charges against the
government is maintainable as they have committed Wrongful Confinement u/s 343
and Defamation u/s 499 of the Union Penal Code of Armington.
3.1 WRONGFUL CONFINEMENT U/S 343
34. Wrongful confinement for three or more days. -Whoever wrongfully confines any
person for three days, or more, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.18
35. The inferential articulation of the Jurisprudence associated with Wrongful confinement,
leads to the enumeration of the following essentials:
There was an obstruction;
That the person obstructed must have a right to proceed in the direction concerned.
Imposition of Circumscribing Limits

3.1.1 ACTS OF GOVERNMENT WERE IN STARK VIOLATION OF THE


ESSENTIALS OF WRONGFUL CONFINEMENT

36. It is submitted that the arrest of Bismillah Alam was a targeted attempt to silence, detain
and circumscribe the members of Tahibic community in concentration camps.
37. Since Bismillah Alam and his family members were arrested, in arguendo, the
constitutional (and legal) safeguards for persons detained under preventive detention
laws have been construed by the Apex Court against the detaining authorities. For
instance, in Pritam Nath Hoon v. Union of India19 where the detaining authority
supplied copies of documents which formed the basis of the grounds of detention about

18
Section 343, IPC
19
Pritam Nath Hoon v. Union of India, (1980) 4 SCC 525

19
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

a month after they were detained, the detentions were held illegal on the ground of
denial of adequate opportunity to make representation against the detentions.
38. The Detention must be held illegal in nature because of two particular reasons-
No reasonable notice or adequate opportunity to defend was given to the petitioner
The person so detained (herein petitioner), was a rightful citizen of Armington.

3.1.2 PROCEDURAL LAPSE AND INEFFECTIVE ADMINISTRATION OF


CRIMINAL JUSTICE

39. It is humbly submitted that Hon’ble High Court must take into its cognizance the
procedural lapse in the recently updated Armington National Register (ANR), leaving
19 lakh names of people living in the province of Falres. The members of the Tahibic
community are peculiarly doubly handicapped.
40. Moreover, the concentration camps are a malevolent weapon to strike their citizenship.
the concentration camp is a walled- off world which is incommunicado for the human
world, with the result that the bonded inmates are invisible, their voices inaudible, their
injustices unheeded. So, it is imperative, as implicit in Article 21, that life or liberty,
shall not be kept in suspended animation or congealed into animal existence without
the freshening flow of fair procedure.20
41. In the case of Asha Ranjan v. State of Bihar21, the Court observed that it was the import
of the Preamble and Article 21 of the Constitution that the protection of the prisoner
would come within the rights that is needed protection under Article 32.
42. In H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi22, it was held that “the investigation consists of five
steps, namely, proceeding to the spot, ascertainment of fActs and circumstances of the
case, discovery and arrest of the suspected offender, collection of evidence relating to
the commission of the offence.” The Act of Investigation by the authorities is not in
consonance with the due process of law, does not abide section 173 of CrPc23 and
against the principles of Natural Justice.

3.1.3 PETITIONER SHALL BE DELIVERED JUSTICE FOR ILLEGAL DETENTION


AND WRONGFUL CONFINEMENT

20
Sunil Batra v. Delhi Admn., (1978) 4 SCC 494
21
Asha Ranjan v. State of Bihar, (2017) 4 SCC 397
22
H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, (1955) 1 SCR 1150
23
Subhash Krishnan v. State of Goa, (2012) 8 SCC 365

20
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

43. In S.A. Aziz vs Pasam Haribabu and another24, the police officer arrested a person in
execution of non bailable warrant causing an apprehension of fear and kept him under
detention for a week and produced him before magistrate. The police officer was held
guilty for the offence of wrongful confinement under sec 343 and high court of Andhra
Pradesh held that use of physical force is not necessary for the offence of wrongful
confinement.
44. Moreover, the Act of respondent to arrest petitioner and his family and sending them to
concentration camps caused a reasonable apprehension of fear that the authorities may
cause them harm. The detention of Bismillah Alam was illegal on the grounds that it
was violative of the personal rights and liberties and hence is a stark violation to the
due process of law.
45. Moreover, When Armington ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights 1966 - in June 1978, it stipulated its reservation to the applicability of Article
9(5) of the Covenant, which read: “Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest
or detention shall have an enforceable right of compensation”.
46. Therefore, it is most humbly submitted that the arrest made by the government
authorities lacked legal basis and the act of putting Bismillah Alam and his family in
concentration camps amounts to wrongful confinement. The above stated actions of
the authorities extract faith from the government and render an image of ineffective
administration of the system and the government authorities must be held liable of the
wrongful confinement.

3.2 CRIMINAL DEFAMATION U/S 499

47. Criminal Defamation has been defined under Section 499 of IPC where it states that
“Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible
representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending
to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the
reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to defame
that person.”25

24
S.A. Aziz vs Pasam Haribabu and Anr., (2003) 6 Cri.L.j. 2462(A.P.)
25
Section 499

21
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

48. Therefore, there are certain essentials that need to be proved to show that the defamation
has been committed-
The statement or Act must be defamatory
The statement or Act must refer to the plaintiff
The statement or Act must be published

3.2.1 THE STATEMENT OR ACT MUST BE DEFAMATORY

49. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the Act committed by the
Government of Armington is defamatory in nature and therefore, fulfils the first
essential u/s 499.
50. Defamatory statement is one which tends to injure the reputation of the plaintiff.
Defamation is the publication of a statement which tends to lower a person in the
estimation of right-thinking members of society generally,26 or which tends to make
them shun or avoid that person.27 An imputation which exposes one to disgrace and
humiliation, ridicule or contempt, is defamatory. When the statement causes anyone to
be regarded with feelings of hatred, contempt, ridicule, fear, dislike or disesteem, it is
defamatory.28
51. Bismillah Alam and his family has been exposed to humiliation, ridicule or contempt
by the Act of the Government and hence, it fulfils the primary essential of defamation.
52. In "Salmond on the Law of Torts" the following proposition on the nature of defamatory
statement has been made29:—
“A defamatory statement is one which has a tendency to injure the reputation of the
person to whom it refers; which tends, that is to say, to lower him in the estimation of
right-thinking members of society generally and in particularly to cause him to be
regarded with feelings of hatred contempt ridicule, fear, dislike or disesteem.”
53. In Goutam Sahu v. State of Orissa (1999)30, the appellant married the plaintiff in a
temple by exchanging garlands. He stayed with her for several days before demanding
money and describing her as an unchaste woman with bad looks. According to the
Orissa High Court, the components of Section 500 were prima facie established, and
the accused was consequently subject to prosecution.

26
Sim v. Stretch, (1936) 52 T.L.R. 669, 671.
27
Winfield, Tort, 12th ed., 293.
28
Capital and Counties Bank v. Henty & Sons, (1882) 7 A.C. 741.
29
Deepak Kumar Biswas v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 2006 Gau. 110.
30
Goutam Sahu v. State of Orissa, 1999 CriLJ 838, 1998 II OLR 194

22
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

54. Therefore, it is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the government has
injured the reputation of Bismillah Alam and his family in the estimation of right-
thinking members of society.
55. Moreover, they belong to a prominent and respected family where his relative was the
former president of Armington and he himself is a war veteran and this Act of
government has caused them to be regarded with feelings of hatred contempt ridicule,
fear, dislike or disesteem. Hence, it is crystal clear that the Act done by government is
defamatory in nature.
3.2.2 THE ACT OR STATEMENT MUST REFER TO PLAINTIFF
56. In an Action for defamation, the plaintiff has to prove that the statement of which he
complains referred to him. It is immaterial that the defendant did not intend to defame
the plaintiff. If the person to whom the statement was published could reasonably infer
that the statement referred to the plaintiff, the defendant is nevertheless liable.
57. In Jones v. Hulton & Co.31, it was observed by the court that “If upon the evidence the
jury are of the opinion that ordinary sensible readers, knowing the plaintiff, would be
of opinion that the article referred to him, the plaintiff's case is made out.” Acting in
good faith and without any intention to defame the plaintiff is no defense.
58. Therefore, it is humbly submitted that the Act of arresting Bismillah Alam and his
family on the grounds that their names were not included in the recent updated final list
of ANR and sending them to the concentration camps set up by the government for the
illegal migrants has clearly injured their reputation in the estimation of the right-
thinking members of the society and it is crystal clear that this Act of government refers
to the petitioner. Thus, the second essential of defamation is fulfilled.

3.2.3 THE STATEMENT OR ACT MUST BE PUBLISHED

59. Publication means making the defamatory matter known to some person other than the
person defamed, and unless mat is done, no civil Action for defamation lies.32
Communication to the plaintiff himself is not enough because defamation is injury to
the reputation and reputation consists in the estimation in which others hold him and
not a man's own opinion of himself.

31
Jones v. Hulton & Co. (1909) 2 K.B. 444, at 454.
32
In the Criminal Law of Libel in England, even publication to the person defamed will be enough, if it is likely
to provoke a breach of peace, R. v. Adams, (1888) 22 Q.B.D. 66. Sec. 505, I.P.C. makes a similar provision and
makes insult with intent to revoke breach of public peace an offence although it is not deemed to be an offence
of defamation.

23
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

60. It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that this Act of the government has
gained wide coverage from the media as Bismillah Alam belongs to a prominent and
respected family where his relative was the former president of Armington and he
himself is a war veteran. Hence, the third and the last essential of defamation stands
proved.
61. Therefore, it is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the charge of
defamation u/s 499 against the government is maintainable as all the essentials of this
section stands proved.
62. Therefore, it humbly presented before the Hon’ble Court that the charges against the
government are maintainable as all the essentials of the aforementioned sections stands
proved.

ISSUE: 4 WHETHER THE ARMINGTON CITIZENSHIP (AMENDMENT) ACT,


2019 VIOLATES THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF BEING
A SECULAR STRUCTURE OR NOT?
63. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Armington Citizenship
(Amendment) Act, 2019 violates the basic structure of the Constitution of being a
secular state as it clearly attacks people on the basis of religion, gives unjustified
classification and violates the fundamental principles of welfare state.
4.1 SECULARISM AND THE BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE
64. Secularism means that the State should have no religion of its own, and each person,
whatever his religion, must get an assurance from the State that he has the protection
of law freely to profess, practice and propagate his religion and freedom of
conscience.33
65. The importance of communal harmony to welfare of people as a whole, the ultimate
goal of all laws and State Action, and above all the Constitution pointed out -
Secularism as a harmonious means to meet challenges of goal of "unity in diversity"
stressed Recent trends relating to religious fundamentalism deprecated - Constitution
of Union of Armington.
66. Moreover, the ultimate goal of Basic structure Constituents of Secularism held that
secularism is part of fundamental law and an unalienable segment of the basic structure
of the country's political system. The fundamental rights, enshrined in Part III of the

33
State of Karnataka v. Praveen Bhai Thogadia (Dr.), (2004) 4 SCC 684

24
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

Constitution, are inherent and cannot be extinguished by any constitutional or statutory


provision.
67. Furthermore, any law that abrogates or abridges such rights would be violative of the
basic structure doctrine.34 The Actual effect and impAct of the law on the rights
guaranteed under Part III has to be taken into account in determining whether or not it
destroys the basic structure.
68. “Two values whose protection is a matter of universal moral agreement: the innate
dignity and autonomy of man.”35 the impugned Act denies respect for personal identity,
undermines autonomy over fundamental personal choices, and damages plurality and
diversity. It stands, therefore, in stark violation over the universal and basic human right
to dignity.
69. The principle of secularism is an essential feature of the Armington Constitution, and a
part of the Constitution’s basic structure36. Armington secularism is defined by an equal
concern and respect towards all religions. Further, by making religion the basis of
citizenship (by naturalization) violates Armington secularism, as it privileges some
religions over others. It also goes against the founding basis of the Constitution and the
nation, which did not privilege any specific religion over the others.
70. As has been pointed out above, using religion as a proxy for determining whether or
not an individual has been subjected to persecution within Armington’s neighboring
countries is directly at odds with reality. In both its form and its effect, therefore, the
impugned Act treats refugees who belong to one religion as less worthy of equal
concern and respect than refugees who belong to a different religion. This, therefore, is
direct discrimination on the basis of religion, and is therefore a violation of the basic
structure of the Constitution.
71. In Madras Bar Association v Union of Armington37, this Hon’ble Court made it clear
that ordinary legislation in contravention of the basic structure could be struck down on
that basis. It is therefore respectfully submitted that the impugned Act ought to be held
unconstitutional on the ground that it violates the basic structure.

34
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225
35
K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1
36
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1
37
Madras Bar Association v Union of Armington, (2014) 10 SCC 1

25
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

72. Article 25(1) states - Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other
provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the
right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion.
73. Armington Citizenship Act (2019) in a joint nexus with Armington National Register
poses a behemoth threat to the status of the members of the Tahibic Community.
74. “Provided that any citizen belonging to Armington, Keshabha, Padmabha, Veshabha,
Zoarabha and Jehowha community from Tahibic Republic of Mekimer, Republic of
Jambia and Tahibic Republic of Ramingherb who entered into Armington on or before
the 31st day of December 2014 ……... shall not be treated as illegal migrant for the
purposes of this Act”.
75. Since, the Tahibas out of the 19-lakh people in the province of falres whose names were
left out, it is submitted that the impugned Act explicitly mentions array of religions and
deliberately misses Tahiba as a religion. The impugned Act cogently threatens the
individuals of Tahibic community who entered Armington before 2014, they would be
left with no means to obtain Armington’s citizenship and live their whole life as a
refugee.
76. In S.R. Bommai v. Union of India38, the apex court held that
“The Central Government would not be justified in exercising power under Art. 356(1)
unless it is shown that the ideology of the political party in power in State is inconsistent
with the Constitutional philosophy and, therefore, it is not possible for that party to run
the affairs of the State in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. It is
axiomatic that no State Government can function on a program which is destructive of
the Constitutional philosophy as such functioning can never be accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution.” Though this case dealt with the applicability of the
‘Basic Structure doctrine’39with respect to executive Actions and not legislative
Actions, it may now be said that the scope is extended to legislative enactments as well.”
77. Moreover, a serious lacuna in the Armington Amendment Act, 2019 based on Article
14 that grants right to equality and against discrimination based on religion, is that the
Act provides differential treatment to illegal migrants on the basis of their country of
origin, religion, date of entry into Armington, and place of residence in Armington.
Therefore, it is against the ideal’s pluralism, egalitarian, and democratic Armington,

38
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1
39
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225

26
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

where religion is not a brand that can condemn individuals to perpetual second class
citizenship and it must be opposed in the courts, as a flagrant violation of equality and
the rule of law.
78. Nonetheless, the importance of secular principles of a nation can be ascertained by the
following statement given by Dr Radhakrishnan:
“When India is said to be a secular State, it does not mean that we reject reality of
an unseen spirit or the relevance of religion to life or that we exalt irreligion. It does not
mean that secularism itself becomes a positive religion or that the State assumes divine
prerogatives. Though faith in the Supreme is the basic principle of the Indian tradition,
relations for that would be a violation of the basic principles of democracy and contrary
to the best interests of religion and Government”
79. Hence, this view of religious impartiality, of comprehension and forbearance, has a
prophetic role to play within the national and international life. No group of citizens
shall arrogate to itself rights and privileges, which it denies to others. No person should
suffer any form of disability or discrimination because of his religion but all like should
be free to share to the fullest degree

4.3 ARBITRARINESS OF THE CRITERION

80. The selective basis of this Act denies an Equally important idea, the idea that the
religious persecution or forced migration is not necessarily linked with the group’s
religiosity alone. Any group or individual including atheists irrespective of their
affiliation with minority or majority groups may be subjected to persecution or forced
migration from their country if their views do not conform to the dominant sectarian
clergy norms enjoying the support of the ruling establishment.
81. In K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India40, the Apex Court observed that “… the dignity
of the individual encompasses the right of the individual to develop to the full extent of
his potential. And this development can only be if an individual has autonomy over
fundamental personal choices.”
82. It is humbly submitted that in its ‘careful listing’ of protected communities, The
impugned Act explicitly and intentionally leaves out Tahibas. The limitation of to just
these three countries is completely arbitrary, as there is no underlying concept that binds
them. Additionally, the Act's architecture, which initially chooses nations with a

40
K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1

27
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

majority of Tahibas before granting amnesty to only religious minority living in such
nations, creates a division based on religion between individuals who are eligible for
protection and those who are not. This is an unlawful legislative goal since it offends
the secular principles of the Armington Republic and completely denies the persecution
of Tahibic sects in the theocratic states of Tahibic Republic of Mekimer, Republic of
Jambia and Tahibic Republic of Ramingherb.
83. Therefore, this criterion full of fallacies and arbitrariness is a full-fledged violation of
the primordial facets of the Armington Constitution and secularism has been declared
by this court as on the basic features of constitution41

4.4 VIOLATION OF ARMINGTON’S FEDERAL STRUCTURE

84. It is humbly presented before this Hon’ble Court the special emphasis and special
treatment insofar as the Armington Citizenship Act and Armington National Register
is concerned on the province of falres poses an unconscionable situation to other
provinces. If the federal structure is violated by any legislative Action, the Constitution
takes care to protect the federal structure by ensuring that the courts Act as guardians
and interpreters of the Constitution and provide remedy under Articles 32 and 226,
whenever there is an attempted violation.42
85. However, In the circumstances, any direction by the Supreme Court or the High Court
in exercise of power under Article 32 or 226 to uphold the Constitution and maintain
the rule of law cannot be termed as violating the federal structure. But, the fact and
matter of the impugned Act does not uphold the constitution in any manner in fact,
degenerates it in accordance to the basic structure.
86. The impugned Act also violates Armington’s binding obligations under the
International Covenants to which Armington is a signatory. It is submitted that
‘religious discrimination’ - including with respect to the grant of nationality - is
prohibited under international law. Article 26 of the ICCPR to which Armington is a
signatory, and which represents binding customary international law - stipulates that:
“... the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, color, sex,

41
Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen, (2017) 2 SCC 629
42
Alsia Pardhi v. State of M.P., (2014) 2 SCC 725

28
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth
or other status.”
87. In K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India43, the Supreme court observed that “individual
dignity and privacy are inextricably linked in a pattern woven out of a thread of
diversity into the fabric of a plural culture.

88. It is Therefore, most humbly submitted that In this context, the impugned Act
denigrates individuals on the basis of their religion and country of origin, and
undermines their dignity by sending a public message that those who belong to the
“different faith” or the “different country of origin” are less worthy of the State’s
concern and request (by ipso facto being ineligible for naturalization, regardless of the
persecution they may have suffered) which makes it crystal clear that it is violative of
the secular structure of the Constitution.

43
K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1

29
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

PRAYER

In the light of issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the Counsel for the

Petitioner most humbly prays that the Hon’ble High Court of Falres be pleased to

adjudge, hold and declare:

1. That Armington Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 is unconstitutional as it violates


Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution
2. That Bismillah Alam and his family is the rightful citizen of Armington.
3. That charges of wrongful confinement and defamation against the government are
maintainable.
4. That the Armington Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 violates the basic structure of
the Constitution of being a secular structure.

AND/OR

pass any order that this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the interest of equity, justice and good

conscience.

And for this Act of kindness, the counsel for the petitioner shall duty bound forever pray.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

-Sd

(Counsel for Petitioners)

30

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