NDCP Executive Policy Brief

A PUBLICATION SERIES ON NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES 12 October 2017

BY THE NATIONAL DEFENSE COLLEGE OF THE PHILIPPINES No. 2017-01

Strengthening Manila’s Maritime Security Posture in the South China Sea:

The Role of the Philippines-Japan Strategic Partnership
Mico A Galang

Introduction

Last January 2017, Japanese Prime Minister

Shizo Abe visited the Philippines. The third summit A strategic partnership has
meeting between the Philippines and Japan in less
than a year after the inauguration of President relatively low commitment
Rodrigo Duterte, the visit was widely seen as a sign
of continuing enhancement of Philippines-Japan
costs and is therefore a
relations. Enjoying warm ties since the more flexible platform of
normalization of diplomatic relations in 1956, the
Philippines and Japan elevated their bilateral security cooperation.
relationship to a higher level of cooperation when
they issued Philippines-Japan Strategic Partnership
Strategic Partnership: A Form of Security
Declaration (PJSPD) in 2011.1 Four years later,
Cooperation
Manila and Tokyo announced that their relations
have “entered the state of Strengthened Strategic
The concept of “strategic partnership” is
Partnership.”2
relatively new in the discipline of international
relations, having originally come from the field of
The close ties between the two countries are
business and organizational studies.4 One of the
forged within the milieu of an increasingly complex
scholars who developed a theory to understand
and uncertain security landscape spawned largely
strategic partnership is Thomas Wilkins, who
by an emerging power shift in the region, as
conceptualized “strategic partnership” as a form of
manifested by the tensions surrounding maritime
security cooperation similar to alliance and
and territorial disputes in, among others, the South
coalition.5 For purposes of discussion, Wilkins’
China Sea (SCS). Indeed, China’s rise and its
theory shall be called in this paper as the Strategic
assertiveness in the SCS has served as an impetus
Partnership Framework (SPF). Strategic
for an increased cooperation within and among the
partnership is defined as a “structured
members of the US-led hub-and-spokes system of
collaboration between states (or other actors) to
alliances. As one scholar noted, the deepening
take joint advantage or economic opportunities, or
security relations between Manila and Tokyo are
to respond to security challenges more effectively
signs that the two US allies are “cementing the links
than could be achieved in isolation.”6
between two spokes.”3
SPF is composed of three elements:
This paper aims to discuss how the
formation, implementation, and evaluation. States
Philippines-Japan Strategic Partnership strengthens
form strategic partnerships largely because of two
Manila’s maritime security posture in the SCS. In
major imperatives: environmental uncertainty and
particular, this article seeks to address the following
strategic fit. The uncertainty in the international
questions: (1) What is a strategic partnership?; (2)
environment, spawned largely by anarchy in the
Why is there a strategic imperative for the
international system, drives states to form strategic
Philippines and Japan to forge such a partnership?;
partnership in order to, among others, develop their
and (3) How does the PJSPD bolster Manila’s
capabilities and initiate actions aimed at mitigating
maritime capabilities?
such uncertainty. Strategic fit pertains to the
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 1

Produced by the Research and Special Studies Division, National Defense College of the Philippines
For inquiries, please call Tel/Fax. (63-2) 912-9125 * Trunkline: 911-6001 local 4591/4558 * www.ndcp.edu.ph
compatibility of interests of the parties.7 In development—the emerging power shift in the
implementing the strategic partnership, states may Asia-Pacific region. It is important to note that the
use various platforms including executive, seas play vital role in international affairs.
ministerial, military, among others. Although it may Geopolitical strategist A.T. Mahan argued that the
cover a wide range of issues, the focus of the effective control of the seas was a key to achieving
partnership is mainly on economic and/or politico- the status of a world power.12 It is therefore not
security affairs. To ensure its long-term surprising why China, now the second largest
sustainability and effectiveness, the strategic economy in the world13, seeks to dominate the SCS
partnership must also be evaluated by states. To possible as a precursor to its possible grand design
note, this paper shall cover only the formation and of dominating the Asia Pacific—a region in which
implementation elements. the US, since the Second World War, has enjoyed
pre-eminence. The rise of a state that challenges the
In common usage, J. Amador observed that status quo will ultimately aim for a change in
“strategic partnerships are conflated with strategic leadership in the international order. The US, under
alliances as if they are one and the same.”8 A major President Barack Obama, responded by countering
distinction between strategic partnership and China through its “Rebalance/Pivot” strategy.14 In
alliance, however, is that whereas the latter is a other words, the objective of Beijing is to replace
formal type of security cooperation (i.e. enacted Washington at the apex of regional hierarchy—thus
through a treaty), the former is usually an informal spawning greater uncertainty in the regional
arrangement (i.e. in the form of declarations, security environment which, as the SPF suggests,
statements, etc.).9 With this distinction, a strategic drives states to forge a strategic partnership.15
partnership has relatively low commitment costs
and is therefore a more flexible platform of security It is interesting to note that China has a plan
cooperation.10 to achieve such objective of displacing the US from
its dominant position in the region. In 1982, China’s
Stemming from these theoretical People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) developed a
underpinnings, this paper argues that Manila and grand strategy which called for a Chinese
Tokyo forged a strategic partnership largely dominance of the First-Island Chain and the Second-
because of their shared concern over the Island Chain, both of which includes the Philippines
uncertainty in the regional security environment and Japan, as well as the SCS and ECS.16 This Island-
caused by China’s rise, as manifested by its Chain Strategy (ICS) is largely similar to the 19th
increasing assertiveness in the SCS. In this context, century Monroe Doctrine of the US, which declared
the Philippines-Japan Strategic Partnership’s that “The American continents … are henceforth not
objective of promoting peace and stability in the to be considered as subjects for future colonization
SCS is operationalized by strengthening Manila’s by any European powers.”17
maritime security posture through: 1) enhancing
maritime domain awareness; 2) conducting As the main feature of the ICS, the “Anti-
bilateral capacity-building initiatives; and 3) Access/Area-Denial” (A2/AD) concept appears to be
coordinating measures in managing tensions at the the guiding principle of China’s SCS statecraft.18
multilateral level. Whereas A2 is “intended to slow deployment of
friendly forces into a theater or cause forces to
operate from distances farther from the locus of
Forming the Philippines-Japan Strategic conflict than they would otherwise prefer,” AD is
Partnership: The Imperatives “intended to impede friendly operations within
areas where an adversary cannot or will not
In the immediate years before 2011, the prevent access.”19 Although these are not
strategic imperative that brought Manila and Tokyo necessarily new concepts in warfare, A2/AD
closer together was China’s increasing assertiveness becomes threatening given the technological
in the maritime domain. Various incidents in the advancement that will translate strategies into
SCS and the East China Sea (ECS)—where Beijing actions in the operational theater. Indeed, aside
and Tokyo have overlapping claims—were the from initiating a reorganization within the PLA,
immediate preceding events before the PJSPD was Beijing is also acquiring new surface combatants,
issued.11 From a broader perspective, however, the developing stealth strike fighters, as well as an
uncertainty in the SCS arises from a larger strategic expansion of air, naval and land-based missile
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 2

Produced by the Research and Special Studies Division, National Defense College of the Philippines
For inquiries, please call Tel/Fax. (63-2) 912-9125 * Trunkline: 911-6001 local 4591/4558 * www.ndcp.edu.ph
forces.20 More importantly, China’s land abandonment and/or entrapment which parties to
reclamations activities indicate the militarization of an alliance sometimes come across. In turn,
the dispute. From Tokyo;s perspective, the SCS is strategic partners can have clear expectations of the
inextricably linked with its own dispute with Beijing objectives of areas of bilateral cooperation and
over the ECS. focus their attention on specific collaborative
initiatives.
Clearly, by virtue of their geography, the
Philippines and Japan are at the forefront of the Second, a strategic partnership offers the
high stake geopolitical chessboard game between two countries flexibility in their respective foreign
the two great powers in the region. As the SPF policy while pursuing their mutual goals. A strategic
suggests, Manila and Tokyo have shared interests— partnership offers flexibility in two ways. First,
called as strategic fit—in this regard. The 2015 unlike an alliance, a strategic partnership does not
PJSPD defined such interests unambiguously: 1) create a formal alignment with one power and
“maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific therefore, does not create a perception that two
region at a time when the security environment in states are ganging up on a third state. In turn, while
the region is faced with many challenges;”21 and 2) the partners pursue their strategic objectives, they
mindful of the threats to freedom of navigation and can have tactical shifts in their respective foreign
over flight by China’s assertiveness, “[m]aintaining policy without causing major diplomatic friction.
open and stable seas is essential in ensuring For example, the Philippines25 and Australia26
regional stability and is an imperative issue [for would have found it rather difficult to have closer
both countries] as maritime nations”22 not only for diplomatic ties with China had they forged a treaty
security reasons but also for economic alliance—instead of a strategic partnership—with
considerations. These objectives reinforced the Japan. Second, a strategic partnership is more
2011 PJSPD which noted that “the [SCS] is vital, as it flexible in the sense that the terms of the
connects the world and the Asia Pacific region, and partnership are relatively easy to amend compared
that peace and stability therein is of common to the
interest to the international community.”23 In other commitments in
words, as one scholar argued, Manila and Tokyo a formal treaty
have a “converging strategic priorit[y]” of alliance. This Clearly, by virtue
“constraining China’s maritime expansion.”24 To allows the
fulfill the goals of the PJSPD, the Philippines and strategic partners of their geography,
Japan must raise the costs for China’s maritime to easily adjust the Philippines and
expansion and this can be done by strengthening their agreement
Manila’s maritime security posture. should Japan are at the
circumstances
warrant doing so. forefront of the
Implementing the PJSPD: Strengthening Indeed, changes high stake
Manila’s Maritime Security Posture in the terms of
the strategic geopolitical
As noted earlier, strategic partnership, as a partnership
form of security cooperation, is less formal could be revised
chessboard game
compared to an alliance. As such, strategic through politico- between the two
partnership has low commitment costs compared to diplomatic
a formal treaty alliance. This distinction is channels alone great powers in the
significant because a strategic partnership, when and would no region.
compared to an alliance, offers the Philippines and longer require
Japan at least two diplomatic advantages. First, a the concurrence
strategic partnership does not bind states in a of respective
military commitment to defend one another in the legislatures.
event of an armed aggression. As result, Manila and
Tokyo will not experience the anxiety over

__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 3

Produced by the Research and Special Studies Division, National Defense College of the Philippines
For inquiries, please call Tel/Fax. (63-2) 912-9125 * Trunkline: 911-6001 local 4591/4558 * www.ndcp.edu.ph
 as establishing and maintaining a common maritime
operating picture.30
Manila and Tokyo forged a MDA is a very significant aspect of the
strategic partnership Philippines-Japan strategic partnership and has
become increasingly more relevant to both
largely because of their countries since the inception of physical changes in
shared concern over the the security environment as a result of “unilateral
actions to change the status quo in the [SCS]
uncertainty in the regional including large-scale land reclamation and building
of outposts.”31 Hence, under the “Action Plan”
security environment annexed to the 2015 PJSPD, Manila and Tokyo
caused by China’s rise, as agreed to cooperate in “information sharing on
security environment and challenges in regional
manifested with its and global context, and enhancement of information
security in relation to information sharing.”32
increasing assertiveness in
the South China Sea. It is the mutual strategic interest of the
Philippines and Japan to monitor Chinese activities
in the SCS because Beijing may eventually control
It must be emphasized that in the context of the area through a “Strategic Triangle.” An
the SCS, China’s assertiveness does not strictly observation first made by retired Vice Admiral Yoji
follow the balance-of-power stratagem in the sense Koda of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
that it relies solely on its military forces. To the (JMSDF), the Strategic Triangle pertains to the
contrary, Beijing also employs civilian forces (e.g. militarization of Woody Island, Fiery Cross Reef,
coast guard) to promote its claim—as China did and Scarborough Shoal.33 The first two
during the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff with aforementioned features would connect
Manila.27 Indeed, China is employing what has been Scarborough Shoal with the two major group of
termed as “grey-zone coercion” which refers to islands in the SCS—Paracels and Spratlys. If China
“activity that is coercive and aggressive in nature, indeed gains effective control of the SCS through the
but that is deliberately designed to remain below Strategic Triangle, Beijing would have the ability to
the threshold of conventional military conflict and consolidate its 9-dash line claim and, eventually,
open interstate war.”28 enforce its ICS—which, as noted earlier, includes
domination of the ECS—through the A2/AD.
Mindful of these considerations, the PJSPD’s
objective of promoting peace and stability in the Second, the more significant area of
SCS can be operationalized by supporting Manila’s cooperation under the PJSPD is the bilateral
efforts in strengthening its maritime security capacity-building initiatives. As noted in both the
posture in the SCS. Specifically, the PJSPD can 2011 and 2015 PJSPD, capacity-building is an
strengthen Philippine maritime security posture in important pillar of the Manila-Tokyo strategic
the SCS through cooperation on the following areas. partnership. Mindful of the limited capacity of
Philippine maritime agencies in addressing security
First, Manila and Tokyo can enhance challenges in the SCS, the PJSPD focuses capacity-
maritime domain awareness (MDA). Also known building on three fronts: 1) defense equipment and
as maritime situational awareness, MDA “refers to technology transfer;34 2) joint training activities and
the 24/7 knowledge obtained from the integrated exercises;35 and 3) education and research
collection, analysis and exchange of information exchanges.36
that relates to the maritime environment which are
all used to support decision-making for governance, The transfer of defense equipment and
development, and security undertakings.”29 Efforts technology appears to be a top priority for the
toward building an effective MSA architecture Philippines and Japan. Indeed, in 2016, the two
require, among others, the collection of data, as well countries signed an Agreement on the “Transfer of
Defense Equipment and Technology” (ATDET) to
formalize this initiative.37 In 2013, under the
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 4

Produced by the Research and Special Studies Division, National Defense College of the Philippines
For inquiries, please call Tel/Fax. (63-2) 912-9125 * Trunkline: 911-6001 local 4591/4558 * www.ndcp.edu.ph
Benigno Aquino III presidency, it was announced exercise on the Code for Unplanned Encounters at
that the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) would Sea (CUES).44 With regard to the TC-90 aircrafts,
acquire 10 multi-role response vessels (MRRVs) Japan not only allowed the lease of the same but
from Tokyo through the Japan International also agreed to train the Philippine Navy (PN) pilots
Cooperation Agency (JICA), with the aim of who would use them.45
enhancing Manila’s capability to patrol its large
coasts and further strengthening maritime law It is also interesting that the 2011 PJSPD
enforcement functions.38 To date, since 2016, six noted the “training [activities]” of the PCG.46 In
out of the ten MRRVs have been turned over to the 2006, five years before Manila and Tokyo declared
Philippines: Barko ng Republika ng Pilipinas (BRP) their strategic partnership, the Japan Coast Guard
Tubbataha, BRP Malabrigo, BRP Malapascua, BRP (JCG) and the PCG, along with the Japan
Capones, BRP Suluan, and BRP Sindangan.39 It is International Cooperation Agency (JICA), conducted
expected that the other four MRRVs will be the first seminar and exercise on maritime search
delivered to the Philippines within the term of and rescue.47With the PJSPD, this training and
President Duterte.40 In addition, during President exercise continued and was institutionalized.
Duterte’s state visit to Japan in 2016, the two Indeed, in January 2017, PCG, JCG, and JICA held the
countries signaled their intention to further deepen 11th iteration of their annual activity, with a
their cooperation on particular focus on
enhancing the maritime maritime law
capabilities
Philippines
of
with
the
the
The Philippines-Japan enforcement.48 Overall,
the key objective of such
issuance of the “Exchange Strategic Partnership joint training and exercise
of notes on loan from is to promote
Japan on Maritime Safety Declaration’s objective of interoperability between
Capability Improvement
Project for the Philippine
promoting peace and the maritime forces of the
strategic partners.
Coast Guard (Phase II).”41 stability in the South China
The heavy investment on Education and
coast guard capabilities is Sea can be operationalized research exchanges,
important in the context
of China’s grey zone
by supporting Manila’s cooperative initiatives
outlined in the MOUDC,
coercion. Also, in the past efforts in strengthening its are other platforms by
administration, the which Manila and Tokyo
Philippines and Japan maritime security posture. could enhance their
negotiated an agreement capabilities.49 This area of
under which the latter cooperation is important
agreed to lease to the former five Beechcraft TC-90 in order to broaden the knowledge and skills of
King Air advance trainer aircraft, two of which were both military and civilian officers in both countries’
turned over to the Philippines in March 2017.42 defense establishments.

Beyond the transfer of defense equipment Third, coordination of measures in

and technology, joint training activities and managing maritime tensions at the multilateral
exercises are other areas by which the PJSPD can level. As a founding member, the Philippines has
promote capacity building. The 2015 PJSPD noted underscored the importance of ASEAN, especially in
that the memorandum of understanding on the context of the broader Asia-Pacific regional
“Defense Cooperation” (MOUDC), signed in January security architecture.50 Japan, a dialogue partner of
2015, provided a framework by which the two the organization, has likewise noted the importance
countries can conduct training activities and of ASEAN. In its 2013 NSS, Tokyo emphasized the
exercises. In June of that year, the navies and air “the influence ASEAN has on peace, stability and
forces of the strategic partners conducted their first prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.”51
joint search and rescue training and exercise off the
coast of Palawan, which is near the disputed area in The strategic partners agreed in the 2015
the SCS.43 In January 2017, pursuant to the PJSPD, PJSPD—noting the necessity for “close coordination
the navies of both countries conducted a joint in the international arena”52—to “strengthen the
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 5

Produced by the Research and Special Studies Division, National Defense College of the Philippines
For inquiries, please call Tel/Fax. (63-2) 912-9125 * Trunkline: 911-6001 local 4591/4558 * www.ndcp.edu.ph
role of regional frameworks such as ASEAN, countries by providing the legal basis for field
including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN exercises and enhanced training activities.59
Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), and the Otherwise, as Aquino emphasized, “An agreement
[ADMM]-Plus, and the East Asia Summit (EAS), as even for humanitarian concerns that exists only in
well as of relevant international organizations and paper will not be effective when there comes the
thereby to utilize them more effectively.”53 time that you would need to be in coordination and
in corporation or in joint operation with your
It must be noted, however, that the SCS strategic partner.”60 Under the Duterte
dispute has exposed some of the divisions among administration, the talks on the proposed SOVFA
ASEAN member-states (AMS).54 Nevertheless, there appear to be still on track. During the 5th Vice
is still a possibility for ASEAN to initiate measures Defense Ministerial Meeting held in Tokyo last
that will not further undermine unity among its February 2017, it was announced that Manila
members. With diplomatic support from Japan, “stressed the need for the two countries to conclude
Manila, as the 2017 ASEAN chair, may propose the a [SOVFA].”61
inclusion of the Plus-countries in the ASEAN
Defense Ministers Meeting’s (ADMM) Direct Second, conduct joint maritime patrols in
Communication Link (DCL) initiative, which aims to the SCS. During his visit to Japan in 2016, President
provide direct hotline among the AMS defense Duterte announced that Manila is open to the
ministers.55 The Philippines would have this possibility of joint maritime patrols in the SCS.62
opportunity when it hosts the biennial ADMM-Plus. Joint maritime patrols will further strengthen the
In addition, Japan can likewise offer diplomatic commitment of the strategic partners not only in
support to the Philippine defense and security the overall goal of promoting peace and stability in
initiatives relating to the maritime security during the region, but also to the freedom of navigation and
the latter’s chairmanship of ASEAN, including, but over flight—principles reaffirmed by the two
not limited to, the Concept Paper on Guidelines of countries during the aforementioned Tokyo visit of
Maritime Interaction, Concept Paper on the President Duterte.63
Principles for ADMM-Wide Education and Training
Exchanges, and the Concept Paper on Establishment Third, increase service to service, and
of Ad-Hoc Working Group to Develop Guidelines on education and research exchanges. Greater
Air Encounters between Military Aircraft.56 exchanges among military officials, as well as
defense education and research officers and the
Beyond these ASEAN-related platforms, the conduct of joint publications/conferences, will
Philippines and Japan also participate in the provide further avenues for exchange of views on
Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), which is issues of mutual concerns, in particular the SCS, as
a “forum designed to promote mutual well as to build trust and confidence.
understanding among navies of the region and
increase naval cooperation in the western Pacific by
providing a forum to discuss maritime issues.”57 Conclusion

As the SPF suggests, the Philippines-Japan

Policy Considerations Strategic Partnership was formed largely because of
the uncertainty caused by the rise of China and its
To further strengthen Philippines-Japan implications for the security situation of the Asia-
strategic partnership, the countries may consider Pacific, in particular in the SCS. This strategic
the following initiatives. partnership offers not only flexibility but also the
diplomatic advantage of avoiding
First, continue of the negotiation of a abandonment/entrapment risks that is inherent in
Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA). an alliance which, in turn, allows countries to focus
During his 2015 state visit to Japan, then- their attention on joint initiatives. Like the
Philippines President Benigno Aquino III Philippines, Japan has an interest in countering
announced that Manila “will be initiating all the China’s maritime expansionism in the SCS. As such,
diplomatic requirements to come up with a Visiting the objective of Philippines-Japan strategic
Forces Agreement.”58 Indeed, a SOVFA will enhance partnership of promoting peace and stability in the
the interoperability between the military of both SCS can be achieved by raising the costs of Beijing’s
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 6

Produced by the Research and Special Studies Division, National Defense College of the Philippines
For inquiries, please call Tel/Fax. (63-2) 912-9125 * Trunkline: 911-6001 local 4591/4558 * www.ndcp.edu.ph
maritime assertiveness. Specifically, this goal can be
operationalized by strengthening Manila’s maritime 2017); The World CIA Factbook, “Field Listing :: GDP (Official
security posture in the SCS through the Exchange Rate),” Central Intelligence Agency, 2017,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
enhancement of maritime domain awareness, factbook/fields/2195.html (accessed October 10, 2017);
bilateral capacity building initiatives, and the 14 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy,

coordination of measures in managing tensions at October 11, 2011,

the multilateral level. http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-
century/ (accessed April 30, 2017).
15 Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s
### Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower
________________________________ (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2015), 17.
16 Anthony Cordesman and Steven Colley, Chinese Military

Mico A Galang is a Defense Research Officer at the Research Modernization in 2015: A Comparative Analysis (Washington,
and Special Studies Division of the National Defense College DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2015), 134.
17 Office of the Historian, "Monroe Doctrine, 1823," Office of the
of the Philippines (NDCP). The views expressed in this policy
brief are those of the author alone and do not necessarily Historian of the US Department of State, undated,
reflect the views of NDCP. The readers are free to reproduce https://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/monroe
copies or quote any part provided proper citations are made. (accessed April 30, 2017).
18 US Department of Defense, Air Sea Battle: Service
For comments and suggestions, please email
[email protected] Collaboration to Address Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenges
(Arlington, VA: US Department of Defense, 2013), 2.
Notes 19 Ibid., 2. emphasis added.
20 Cordesman and Colley, Chinese Military Modernization in

1 Government of the Republic of the Philippines [GRP] and the 2015, 475-480.
21 2015 PJSPD, par. 4.
Government of Japan [GOJ], Japan-Philippines Joint Statement 22 2015 PJSPD, par. 6.
on the Comprehensive Promotion of the “Strategic Partnership” 23 2011 PJSPD, par 4 (2), italics added.
between Neighboring Countries Connected by Special Bonds of 24 Renato De Castro, “21st Century Japan–Philippines Strategic
Friendship, 2011, Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.
Hereafter referred to as the “2011 Philippine-Japan Strategic Partnership: Constraining China's Expansion in the South
Partnership Declaration” [PJSPD]. China Sea,” Asian Affairs: An American Review, 44, no. 2 (2017):
2 GRP and GOJ, Japan-Philippines Joint Declaration A 37.
Strengthened Strategic Partnership for Advancing the Shared
25 Aaron Jed Rabena, “Philippines-China Relations: A
Principles and Goals of Peace, Security, and Growth in the Region Deepening Partnership,” Asia Pacific Pathways to Progress Inc
and Beyond, 2015, Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Commentaries, March 21, 2017,
Hereafter referred to as the “2015 PJSPD.” http://appfi.ph/publications/commentaries/1311-
3 Renato De Castro, “21st Century Trilateral US-Japan- philippines-china-relations-a-deepening-partnership (accessed
Philippine Security Partnership: Cementing the Links Between July 20, 2017).
26 Grant Wyeth, “Where Do Australia-China Ties Go in the
Two Spokes?,” National Security Review (2015): 9.
4 Thomas Wilkins, “Russo-Chinese Strategic Partnership: A Trump Era?” The Diplomat, February 09, 2017,
New Form of Security Cooperation?,” Contemporary Security http://thediplomat.com/2017/02/where-do-australia-china-
Policy 29, no. 2 (2008): 358-383. ties-go-in-the-trump-era/ (accessed July 20, 2017).
27 Renato Cruz De Castro, “Facing Up to China’s Realpolitik
5 Ibid., 358-383.
6 Ibid., 363. Approach in the South China Sea Dispute: The Case of the 2012
7 Ibid., 364. Scarborough Shoal Stand-off and Its Aftermath,” Journal of
8 Julio Amador, “The Rise of Strategic Partnerships in East Asian Security and International Affairs 3, no.2 (2016): 2.
28 Hal Brands, “Paradoxes of the Gray Zone,” Foreign Policy
Asia,” FSI Insights 1, no. 5 (2014): 1.
9 H.D.P Envall, and Ian Hall,“Asian Strategic Partnerships: New Research Institute, February 5, 2016,
Practices and Regional Security Governance,” Asian Politics & http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/02/paradoxes-gray-zone/
Policy 8, no. 5 (2016): 90. (accessed April 30, 2017).
29 Philippine Navy, Active Archipelagic Defense Strategy
10 Wilkins, “Russo-Chinese Strategic Partnership,” 361.
11 Sheila Smith, “A Sino-Japanese Clash in the East China Sea,” (Manila: Office of the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff, Philippine
Council on Foreign Relations Contingency Planning Navy, 2014), 14. Hereafter referred to as the “AADS.”
30 Ibid., 15
Memorandum, no. 18 (2013): 1-11; Antonio Carpio, “South 31 2015 PJSPD, par. 13.
China Sea/West Philippine Sea Dispute,” Maritime Review 32 GRP and GOJ, Action Plan for Strengthening of the Strategic
(March-April 2016): 24-28.
12 Ramesh Dutta Dikshit, Political Geography: The Discipline and Partnership (Annex of the Joint Declaration) (Tokyo: Ministry of
Its Dimensions (New Delhi: Tata McGraw-Hill, 1994), 101. Foreign Affairs of Japan, June 4, 2015), par. 1 (1). Hereafter
13 This is terms of GDP (Official Exchange Rate). However, in referred to as the “Action Plan for the 2015 PJSPD.”
33 Yoji Koda, “Japan’s Perceptions of and Interests in the South
terms of GDP (Purchasing Power Parity) China is the largest
economy. Sources: The World CIA Factbook, “Country China Sea,” Asia Policy, 7 (2016): p. 30
34 2015 PJSPD, par. 4.
Comparison :: GDP (Purchasing Power Parity),” Central 35 Action Plan for the 2015 PJSPD, par. 1 (4).
Intelligence Agency, 2017, 36 GRP and GOJ, Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html#ch (accessed October 10, Exchanges Between the Department of National Defense of the
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 7

Produced by the Research and Special Studies Division, National Defense College of the Philippines
For inquiries, please call Tel/Fax. (63-2) 912-9125 * Trunkline: 911-6001 local 4591/4558 * www.ndcp.edu.ph
Republic of the Philippine and the Ministry of Defense of Japan Seminar and Joint Exercise on Maritime Search and Rescue,”
(Quezon City: Philippine Department of National Defense, JICA, 2006,
January 29, 2015), par. 2 (g). Hereafter referred to as the “2015 https://www.jica.go.jp/philippine/english/office/topics/news
Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation” /whats23.html (accessed April 30, 2017).
[MOUDC]. 48 Philippine Coast Guard, “PCG conducts the 11th Sea-Borne
37 GRP and GOJ, Agreement Between the Government of the MARLEN Training Exercise with JCG and JICA in Manila,”
Republic of the Philippines and the Government of Japan Philippine Coast Guard, January 25, 2017,
Concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology http://www.coastguard.gov.ph/index.php/11-news/1455-
(Quezon City: Philippine Department of National Defense, pcg-conducts-the-11th-sea-borne-marlen-training-exercise-
February 29, 2016). Hereafter referred to as the “2016 with-jcg-and-jica-in-manila (accessed April 30, 2017).
Agreement on the Transfer of Defense Equipment and 49 2015 MOUDC, par. 2 (g).

Technology” [ATDET]. 50 Rodrigo Duterte, “Speech of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte

38 Jerry E. Esplanada, “Coast Guard to acquire 10 patrol ships during the Opening Ceremony of the 30th ASEAN Summit,”
from Japan Read,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 4, 2013, ASEAN 2017, April 29, 2017,
http://globalnation.inquirer.net/79707/coast-guard-to- https://www.asean2017.ph/speech-president-rodrigo-roa-
acquire-10-patrol-ships-from-japan (accessed April 30, 2017). duterte-opening-ceremony-30th-asean-summit/ (accessed
39 Rosette Adel, “Japan-made BRP Malapascua joins Coast May 2, 2017).
Guard fleet,” The Philippine Star, March 7, 2017, 51 GOJ, National Security Strategy of Japan, 2013, Tokyo: Office

http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/03/07/1678868/j of the Prime Minister of Japan, 24.

apan-made-brp-malapascua-joins-coast-guard-fleet (accessed 52 2015 PJSPD 2015, part 5.

April 30, 2017); Evelyn Macairan, “Vessel from Japan to be 53 2015 PJSPD, par 13.

used vs piracy,” The Philippine Star, May 21, 2017, 54 A Ibrahim Almuttaqi, “Renewing the Multilateral Response:

http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/05/21/1702016/v Building an ASEAN Coalition,” Albert Del Rosario Institute for

essel-japan-be-used-vs-piracy (accessed May 22, 2017); Strategic and International Studies [ADRi], July 2015, 2016,
Philippine Coast Guard, “PCG’s fifth Multi-Role Response Vessel from https://adrinstitute.org/2016/07/26/renewing-the-
from Japan arrives in Manila,” Philippine Coast Guard, August 7, multilateral-response-building-an-asean-coalition/ (accessed
2017, http://www.coastguard.gov.ph/index.php/districts/cgd- May 2, 2017).
southwestern-mindanao/11-news/1722-pcg-s-fifth-multi- 55 ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting, Concept Paper on

role-response-vessel-from-japan-arrives-in-manila (accessed Establishing a Direct Communications Link in the ADMM Process

October 10, 2017); Evelyn Macairan, “PCG’s new multi- (Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar: 8th ASEAN Defense Ministers
response vessel to be deployed in Mindanao,” The Philippine Meeting, 2014).
Star, October 12, 2017, 56 ASEAN Leaders Summit, Chairman’s Statement 30th ASEAN

http://www.philstar.com:8080/nation/2017/10/12/1747800 Summit, 2017, Manila, Philippines: 30th ASEAN Summit, par. 26.
/pcgs-new-multi-response-vessel-be-deployed-mindanao 57 Joshua H. Ho, “Southeast Asia SLOC Security,” In Maritime

(accessed October 12, 2017). Security in the South China Sea: Regional Implications and
40 GMA News, “PCG to use newest ship in drive vs. terrorism, International Cooperation, ed. Shicun Wu and Keyuan Zou
illegal drugs,” GMA News, August 10, 2017, (United Kingdom: Ashgate, 2009), 175.
http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/621326/p 58 Louis Bacani, “Aquino: Philippines to craft VFA with Japan,”

cg-to-use-newest-ship-in-drive-vs-terrorism-illegal- The Philippine Star, June 5, 2015,

drugs/story/ (accessed October 10, 2017) http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2015/06/05/1462516/a
41 Pia Ranada, “LIST: Deals Duterte brought home from Japan,” quino-philippines-craft-vfa-japan (accessed October 11, 2017).
Rappler, October 28, 2016, 59 Renato De Castro, “21st Century Trilateral US-Japan-

http://www.rappler.com/nation/150606-list-deals-duterte- Philippine Security Partnership: Cementing the Links Between

japan-visit (accessed April 30, 2017). Two Spokes,” National Security Review (2015): 33.
42 Carmela Fonbuena, “PH Navy Recieves 2 TC-90 patrol planes 60 Bacani, “Aquino: Philippines to craft VFA with Japan”

from Japan,” Rappler, March 27, 2017, 61 Office of the Assistant Secretary for Assessments and

http://www.rappler.com/nation/165271-philippine-navy- International Affairs [OASAIA], Philippines Department of

japan-maritime-patrol-aircraft (accessed April 30, 2017). National Defense, “PH-Japan Vice-Ministerial Meeting in
43 Carmela Fonbuena, “MOA allows historic PH-Japan maritime Tokyo,” Office of the Assistant Secretary for Assessments and
exercises,” Rappler, June 23, 2015, International Affairs, Philippines Department of National
http://www.rappler.com/nation/97228-japan-philippines- Defense, February 2017, http://www.dndph.org/2017-
training-exercises (accessed April 30, 2017). updates/ph-japan-vice-ministerial-meeting-convenes-in-tokyo
44 Allan Macatuno, “PH, Japan navies hold war games,” (accessed October 11, 2017).
Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 8, 2017, 62 Pia Ranada, “Duterte open to joint maritime exercises with

https://globalnation.inquirer.net/151310/ph-japan-navies- Japan,” Rappler, October 27, 2016,

hold-war-games (accessed April 30, 2017). http://www.rappler.com/nation/150521-philippines-
45 Kyodo News, “Japan to train Philippine naval pilots to fly president-duterte-open-joint-maritime-exercises-japan
aircraft to be leased,” ABS-CBN News, November 22, 2016, (accessed July 21, 2017)
http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/11/22/16/japan-to-train- 63 The Philippine Star, “FULL TEXT: Joint statement of the

philippine-naval-pilots-to-fly-aircraft-to-be-leased (accessed Philippines and Japan,” The Philippine Star,

April 30, 2017). http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/10/27/1637860/f
46 2011 PJSPD, par. 4 (1) (ii). ull-text-joint-statement-philippines-and-japan (accessed
47 Japan International Cooperation Agency [JICA], “JICA, the October 11, 2017).
Japan Coast Guard and the Philippine Coast Guard Holds
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 8

Produced by the Research and Special Studies Division, National Defense College of the Philippines
For inquiries, please call Tel/Fax. (63-2) 912-9125 * Trunkline: 911-6001 local 4591/4558 * www.ndcp.edu.ph