MANILA ELECTRIC VS.

ASSESSOR

Summary:

MERALCO argues that it is notliable for real property tax on its transformers, electric posts (or
poles), transmission lines, insulators, and electric meters, beginning 1992.

Doctrine:

It is settled that tax exemptions must be clear and unequivocal. A taxpayer claiming a tax
exemption must point to a specific provision of law conferring on the taxpayer, in clear and
plain terms, exemption from a common burden. Any doubt whether a tax exemption exists is
resolved against the taxpayer.

It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing,
act, or consequence excludes all others as expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius
est exclusio alterius.

Facts:

MERALCO is a private corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws to operate as
a public utility engaged in electric distribution. MERALCO has been successively granted
franchises to operate in Lucena City beginning 1922 until present time.

On February 20, 1989, MERALCO received from the City Assessor of Lucena a copy of Tax
Declaration No. 019-650013 covering the following electric facilities, classified as capital
investment, of the company: (a) transformer and electric post; (b) transmission line; (c)
insulator; and (d) electric meter, located in Quezon Ave. Ext., Brgy. Gulang-Gulang, Lucena
City. Under Tax Declaration No. 019-6500, these electric facilities were subjected to real
property tax as of 1985.

MERALCO appealed Tax Declaration No. 019-6500 before the LBAA of Lucena City, which was
docketed as LBAA-89-2. MERALCO claimed that its capital investment consisted only of its
substation facilities and that MERALCO was exempted from payment of real property tax on
said substation facilities.

The Local Board of Assessment Appeals cited the 1964 case of Board of Assessment Appeals
v. Manila Electric Company16 (1964 MERALCO case) in which the Court held that: (1) the
steel towers fell within the term "poles" expressly exempted from taxes under the franchise of
MERALCO; and (2) the steel towers were personal properties under the provisions of the Civil
Code and, hence, not subject to real property tax.

The City Assessor of Lucena filed an appeal with the Central Board of Assessment Appeals
(CBAA), which was docketed as CBAA Case No. 248. The CBAA affirmed the assailed LBAA
judgment. Apparently, the City Assessor of Lucena no longer appealed said CBAA Decision
and it became final and executory.
Six years later, on October 29, 1997, MERALCO received a letter dated October 16, 1997
from the City Treasurer of Lucena, which stated that the company was being assessed real
property tax delinquency on its machineries beginning 1990.

MERALCO appealed Tax Declaration Nos. 019-6500 and 019-7394 before the LBAA of Lucena
City on December 23, 1997 and posted a surety bond dated December 10, 1997 to guarantee
payment of its real property tax delinquency.

RULING OF LBAA:

In its Decision dated June 17, 1998 regarding Tax Declaration Nos. 019-6500 and 019-7394,
the LBAA declared that Sections 234 and 534(f) of the Local Government Code repealed the
provisions in the franchise of MERALCO and Presidential Decree No. 551 pertaining to the
exemption of MERALCO from payment of real property tax on its poles, wires, insulators,
transformers, and meters. The LBAA refused to apply as res judicata its earlier judgment in
LBAA-89-2, as affirmed by the CBAA, because it involved collection of taxes from 1985 to
1989, while the present case concerned the collection of taxes from 1989 to 1997.

RULING OF CBAA:

The CBAA, in its Decision dated May 3, 2001, agreed with the LBAA that MERALCO could no
longer claim exemption from real property tax on its machineries with the enactment of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.

MERALCO filed a petition for Review under Rule 43 of the ROC with the CA.

CA DECISION:

The Court of Appeals further ruled that there was no more basis for the real property tax
exemption of MERALCO under the Local Government Code and that the withdrawal of said
exemption did not violate the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.

Issues Ratio:

1. Whether or not the transformers, electric posts, transmission lines, insulators and electric
meters are subject to real property tax

Held:

YES.
The Court finds that the transformers, electric posts, transmission lines, insulators, and
electric meters of MERALCO are no longer exempted from real property tax and may qualify
as "machinery" subject to real property tax under the Local Government Code.

The decisions in CBAA Case No. 248 and the 1964 MERALCO case recognizing the exemption
from real property tax of the transformers, electric posts, transmission lines, insulators, and
electric meters of MERALCO are no longer applicable.

In the 1964 MERALCO case, the City Assessor of Quezon City considered the steel towers of
MERALCO as real property and required MERALCO to pay real property taxes for the said steel
towers for the years 1952 to 1956. MERALCO was operating pursuant to the franchise
granted under Ordinance No. 44 of the Municipal Board of Manila. Under its franchise,
MERALCO was expressly granted tax exemption privilege.

Similarly, it was clear that under the 20-year franchise granted to MERALCO by the Municipal
Board of Lucena City through Resolution No. 2679 dated June 13, 1972, the transformers,
electric posts, transmission lines, insulators, and electric meters of MERALCO were exempt
from real property tax.

The CBAA in its Decision dated April 10, 1991 in CBAA Case No. 248 sustained the exemption
of the said properties of MERALCO from real property tax on the basis of paragraph 13 of
Resolution No. 2679 and the 1964 MERALCO case.

Just when the franchise of MERALCO in Lucena City was about to expire, the Local
Government Code took effect on January 1, 1992 Sections 193 and 234 of which provide:

Section 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. - Unless otherwise provided in this
Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether
natural or juridical, including government-owned or controlled corporations, except local
water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and nonprofit
hospitals and educational institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.

Taking into account the above-mentioned provisions, the evident intent of the Local
Government Code is to withdraw/repeal all exemptions from local taxes, unless otherwise
provided by the Code.

Section 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. - The following are exempted from payment
of the real property tax:

(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions
except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a
taxable person;

(b) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques,

nonprofit or religious cemeteries and all lands, buildings, and improvements actually, directly,
and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes;

(c) All machineries and equipment that are actually, directly and exclusively used by local
water districts and government-owned or controlled corporations engaged in the supply and
distribution of water and/or generation and transmission of electric power;
(d) All real property owned by duly registered cooperatives as provided for under R.A. No.
6938; and

(e) Machinery and equipment used for pollution control and environmental protection.

Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax previously
granted to, or presently enjoyed by, all persons, whether natural or juridical, including all
government-owned or controlled corporations are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of
this Code

The last paragraph of Section 234 had unequivocally withdrawn, upon the effectivity of the
Local Government Code, exemptions from payment of real property taxes granted to natural
or juridical persons, including government-owned or controlled corporations, except as
provided in the same section.

2. Whether or not the Local Government Code is controlling in determining whether

machinery is real property subject to real property tax

YES

Under Section 199(o) of the Local Government Code, machinery, to be deemed real property
subject to real property tax, need no longer be annexed to the land or building as these "may
or may not be attached, permanently or temporarily to the real property," and in fact, such
machinery may even be "mobile."

The same provision though requires that to be machinery subject to real property tax, the
physical facilities for production, installations, and appurtenant service facilities, those which
are mobile, self-powered or self-propelled, or not permanently attached to the real property
(a) must be actually, directly, and exclusively used to meet the needs of the particular
industry, business, or activity; and (b) by their very nature and purpose, are designed for, or
necessary for manufacturing, mining, logging, commercial, industrial, or agricultural
purposes.

Article 415, paragraph (1) of the Civil Code declares as immovables or real properties "[l]and,
buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil." The land, buildings, and
roads are immovables by nature "which cannot be moved from place to place," whereas the
constructions adhered to the soil are immovables by incorporation "which are essentially
movables, but are attached to an immovable in such manner as to be an integral part
thereof." Article 415, paragraph (3) of the Civil Code, referring to "[ejverything attached to
an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without
breaking the material or deterioration of the object," are likewise immovables by
incorporation. In contrast, the Local Government Code considers as real property machinery
which "may or may not be attached, permanently or temporarily to the real property," and
even those which are "mobile."
Article 415, paragraph (5) of the Civil Code considers as immovables or real properties
"[machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement
for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and
which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works." The Civil Code,
however, does not define "machinery." These properties, including machinery, become
immobilized if the following requisites concur: (a) they are placed in the tenement by the
owner of such tenement; (b) they are destined for use in the industry or work in the
tenement; and (c) they tend to directly meet the needs of said industry or works. The first
two requisites are not found anywhere in the Local Government Code.

As between the Civil Code, a general law governing property and property relations, and the
Local Government Code, a special law granting local government units the power to impose
real property tax, then the latter shall prevail.

It is a finely-imbedded principle in statutory construction that a special provision or law

prevails over a general one. Lex specialis derogant generali

Therefore, for determining whether machinery is real property subject to real property tax,
the definition and requirements under the Local Government Code are controlling.

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court PARTLY GRANTS the instant Petition and
AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Decision dated May 13, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 67027, affirming in toto the Decision dated May 3, 2001 of the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals in CBAA Case No. L-20-98.

Capitol Wireless Inc v The Provincial Treasurer of Batangas

Summary:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul and set aside a Court of Appeals
judgment denying the appeal of the petitioner against the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
The petitioner, Capitol Wireless Inc (Capwire), is a Philippine corporation in the business of
providing international telecommunications services. It has signed agreements with other
local and foreign telecommunications companies covering an international network of
submarine cable systems such as the Asia Pacific Cable Network System (APCN) (which
connects Australia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Japan,
Indonesia and the Philippines); the Brunei-Malaysia-Philippines Cable Network System (BMP-
CNS), the Philippines-Italy (SEA-ME-WE-3 CNS), and the Guam-Philippines (GP-CNS)
systems. The agreements provide for co-ownership and other rights among the parties over
the network.

Capwire claims that as co-owner, it does not own any particular physical part of the cable
system but, consistent with its financial contributions, it owns the right to use a certain
capacity of the said system. This property right is allegedly reported in its financial books as
"Indefeasible Rights in Cable Systems."

Capwire claims that it is co-owner only of the so-called 'wet segment' of the APCN, while the
landing stations or terminals and Segment E of APCN located in Nasugbu, Batangas, are
owned by PLDT. Moreover, it alleges that the wet segment is laid in international, and not
Philippine, waters. Capwire claims that it is therefore not liable to pay taxes on the cable
system as determined by the Provincial Assessor.

Moreover, it alleges that the Wet Segment is laid in international, and not Philippine waters.
For loan restructuring purposes, petitioner engaged an appraiser to assess the market value
of the international submarine cable system and the cost to CapWire. It then submitted a
Sworn Statement of True Value of Real Properties at the Provincial Treasurer’s Office in
Batangas City, for the Wet Segment of the system. Respondent Provincial Assessor of
Batangas had determined that the submarine cable systems described in CapWire’s Sworn
Statement are taxable real property. Petitioner contested this by reasoning that the cable
system lies outside of Philippine territory i.e. international waters. Petitioner received a
Warrant of Levy and a Notice of Auction Sale from respondent.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Prohibition and Declaration of Nullity of Warrant of Levy, Notice
of Auction Sale and/or Auction Sale with the RTC of Batangas City.

RTC issued an order dismissing the petition: (1) for failure to follow the requisite of payment
under protest; as well as (2) failure to appeal to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals
(LBAA), as provided for in Sections 206 and 226 of R.A. 7160 or the Local Government Code.
The Court of Appeals sustained the ruling of the RTC – for petitioner failed to avail of
remedies before administrative bodies like the LBAA and the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals (CBAA).

Petitioner claims that its petition raises purely legal questions, but the C.A.
noted that the case raises questions of fact, such as the extent to which parts of the
submarine cable system lie within the territorial jurisdiction of the taxing authorities, the
public respondents.

Issue:

Whether the submarine communications cable classified as taxabale resl property by the
Local Government.

Held:

Yes. Submarine or undersea communications cables are akin to electric transmission lines
which this Court has recently declared in Manila Electric Company v. City Assessor and City
Treasurer of Lucena City as "no longer exempted from real property tax" and may qualify as
"machinery" subject to real property tax under the Local Government Code. To the extent
that the equipment's location is determinable to be within the taxing authority's jurisdiction,
the Court sees no reason to distinguish between submarine cables used for communications
and aerial or underground wires or lines used for electric transmission, so that both pieces of
property do not merit a different treatment in the aspect of real property taxation. Both
electric lines and communications cables, in the strictest sense, are not directly adhered to
the soil but pass through posts, relays or landing stations, but both may be classified under
the term "machinery" as real property under Article 415(5) of the Civil Code for the simple
reason that such pieces of equipment serve the owner's business or tend to meet the needs
of his industry or works that are on real estate. Even objects in or on a body of water may be
classified as such, as "waters" is classified as an immovable under Article 415(8) of the Code.
A classic example is a boathouse which, by its nature, is a vessel and, therefore, a personal
property but, if it is tied to the shore and used as a residence, and since it floats on waters
which is immovable, is considered real property. Besides, the Court has already held that "it
is a familiar phenomenon to see things classed as real property for purposes of taxation
which on general principle might be considered personal property."

Thus, absent any showing from Capwire of any express grant of an exemption for its lines
and cables from real property taxation, then this interpretation applies and Capwire's
submarine cable may be held subject to real property tax.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BANTIGUE POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

G. R. No. 162322

March 14, 2012

FACTS:

Respondent filed with the RTC of Rosario, Batangas an application for original registration of
title over a parcel of land located at Barangay Barualte, San Juan, Batangas. Petitioner
Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration while the records were still with
the RTC. The RTC Clerk of Court transmitted motu proprio the records of the case to the MTC
of San Juan, because the assessed value of the property was allegedly less than ₱100,000.
Thereafter, the MTC entered an Order of General Default and commenced with the reception
of evidence.9 Among the documents presented by respondent in support of its application are
Tax Declarations, a Deed of Absolute Sale in its favour, and a Certification from the DENR
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Batangas City that the lot
in question is within the alienable and disposable zone. Thereafter, it awarded the land to
respondent Corporation.

Acting on an appeal filed by the Republic, the CA ruled that since the petitioner had actively
participated in the proceedings before the lower court, but failed to raise the jurisdictional
challenge, petitioner is thereby estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court
on appeal.

The CA further found that respondent Corporation had sufficiently established the latter’s
registrable title over the subject property after having proven open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by itself and its predecessors-in-
interest even before the outbreak of World War II. Dissatisfied with the CA’s ruling, petitioner
Republic filed this instant Rule 45 Petition and raised the following arguments in support of its
appeal that the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the application for original registration
of land title. The CA upheld the jurisdiction of the MTC, but remanded the case to the court a
quo for further proceedings in order to determine if the property in question forms part of the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

ISSUE:

WON the Republic of the Philippines is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the MTC
over the land registration case

RULING:

Petition is DENIED.

Petitioner is not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court, even if the
former raised the jurisdictional question only on appeal. The rule is settled that lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. It is
conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It cannot be acquired through a waiver or
enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court.
Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time on
appeal. The CA’s ruling with regards to questioning jurisdiction upon active participation of
the ROP is based on the doctrine of estoppel by laches. The MTC properly acquired
jurisdiction over the case. In assailing the jurisdiction of the lower courts, petitioner Republic
raised two points of contention: (a) the period for setting the date and hour of the initial
hearing; and (b) the value of the land to be registered.

First, petitioner argued that the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the application,
because the RTC set the date and hour of the initial hearing beyond the 90-day period
provided under the Property Registration Decree. While the date set by the RTC was beyond
the 90-day period provided for in Section 23, this fact did not affect the jurisdiction of the
trial court. We ruled that the lapse of time between the issuance of the Order setting the date
of initial hearing and the date of the initial hearing itself was not fatal to the application. The
RTC’s failure to issue the Order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing within five
days from the filing of the application for registration, as provided in the Property Registration
Decree, did not affect the court’s its jurisdiction. Observance of the five-day period was
merely directory, and failure to issue the Order within that period did not deprive the RTC of
its jurisdiction over the case. However, the MTC had jurisdiction because the value of the lot
in this case does not exceed ₱100,000.

A certification from the CENRO is not sufficient proof that the property in question is alienable
and disposable land of the public domain. Even as we affirm the propriety of the MTC’s
exercise of its delegated jurisdiction, we find that the lower court erred in granting
respondent Corporation’s application for original registration in the absence of sufficient proof
that the property in question was alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The
applicant must also show sufficient proof that the DENR Secretary has approved the land
classification and released the land in question as alienable and disposable.

The Regalian doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State. The
applicant for land registration has the burden of overcoming the presumption of State
ownership by establishing through incontrovertible evidence that the land sought to be
registered is alienable or disposable based on a positive act of the government.

Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be accompanied by
(1) a CENRO or PENRO48 Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved
by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. Here, respondent Corporation only presented a CENRO certification in support of its
application. Clearly, this falls short of the requirements for original registration.

Secretary of DENR vs Yap

Natural Resources and Environmental Laws: Regalian Doctrine

GR No. 167707; Oct 8, 2008

FACTS:

This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming
that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo Aklan, which granted the petition for
declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al, and ordered the survey
of Boracay for titling purposes.

On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island
as a tourist zone and marine reserve. Claiming that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from filing
an application for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling
purposes, respondents-claimants filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo,
Aklan.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition
countering that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part
of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which was not available for disposition
pursuant to section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code.
ISSUE:

Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural land,
therefore making these lands alienable.

HELD:

No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigative reports of the
Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of state ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be
a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable
public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that
the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either
by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.

Castillo v Escutin (2009, G.R. No. 171056)

Dinah C. Castillo v. Antonio Escutin et al.

March 13, 2009, G.R. No. 171056

Castillo's tax declaration was cancelled and around the same time, Summit Realty's TCT over
the same lot was issued based on the title of Catigbac. As ROD and City Assessor's Office has
processed the documents of Summit, Castillo charged them with violation of RA 3019 on
corrupt practices. SC: the title of Catigbac has superior right over the tax declaration of
Castillo. Absent any sign of irregularities, the officers cannot be charged with corrupt
practices.

Facts:

Castillo filed charges against the respondents for violation of RA 3019 for allegedly
cancelling her TCT in favor of Summit Realty. Castillo was a judgement credit of Moratilla,
and to satisfy said judgment Castillo went after Lot 13713 co-owned by Moratilla. Said lot was
part of the area which Summit applied for conversion from agricultural landholding to
residential, commercial, and recreational uses.
 To satisfy the judgment credit, said lot was subject to public auction sale in May 2002, and
Castillo bought 1/3 pro-indiviso share of the lot. Castillo then obtained Tax Declaration
00942-A for the same. When Castillo attempted to pay real estate taxes, she found out that
her TD was cancelled, and the area was encompassed in TCT No. 129642 and TD 00949-A in
the name of Francisco Catigbac, and supposedly sold to Summit.

In July 2002, TCT 129642 was cancelled and TCT T-134609 was issued in favor of Summit.
As such, Castillo charted several public officers for the said cancellation and transfer of
ownership of the subject lot.

Issue: W/N the tax declaration of Castillo can be cancelled on the basis of Section 109 of PD
1529.

Held: Petition has no merit. Section 109 provides for the issuance of a lost duplicate
certificate of title, and not related to the cancellation of Castillo's tax declaration. The
cancellation of Castillo's TD was based on the fact that the same lot is covered by TCT 181
and subsequently by TCT No. 129642.

Accordingly, Summit bought Lot 1-B from Catigbac (through his AIF, Yagin), and thus TCT
No. 181 in the name of Catigbac was issued covering the purchased lot, on which the sale
was registered in Summit's favor. Lot 1-B was separated from Lot 1, and TCT 129642 was
issued in the name of Catigbac and then the same was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-
134609 in the name of Summit. Since Lot 1-B is already covered by a tax declaration in the
name of Catigbac, accordingly, any other tax declaration for the same property or portion
thereof in the name of another person, not supported by any certificate of title, such that of
petitioner, must be cancelled; otherwise, the City Assessor would be twice collecting a realty
tax from different persons on one and the same property.

Title v Certificate of title

Title: lawful cause or ground of possessing that which is ours the foundation of ownership of
property (real or personal) that which constitutes a just cause of exclusive possession
Certificate of Title: mere evidence of ownership not the title of the land itself.
Villarico v. Sarmiento, 442 SCRA 110, 115 2004

FACTS:

Spouses Villarico sought for the confirmation of title over a parcel of land to which they allege
that they absolutely own the land. This was opposed to by a person who posed himself also
to be the rightful owner of the land, as well as by the Director of Forestry who said that the
subject land is part of forest land and may not be appropriated. Trial and appellate court
dismissed application of petitioners.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the plaintiff-appellant has acquired a right of way over the land of the
government which is between his property and the ninoy aquino avenue.

RULING:

There has been no showing that a declassification has been made of the land in
question as disposable or alienable. And the record indeed disclosed that applicants
have not introduced any evidence which would have led the court a quo to rule
otherwise.

Forest lands cannot be owned by private persons. Possession thereof, no matter how long
doesn’t ripen to a registrable title. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant
or title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of
the public domain.

Heirs | of Malabanan vs Republic (2013)Summary

Cases: Heirs of Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines (Resolution)●

Subject: Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title; Tacking of Period of Possession;

Classifications of land according to ownership; Classifications of public lands according
to alienability; Disposition of Patrimonial Property of the State.

Facts:

This is a motions for reconsideration of the parties who both assail the decision promulgated
on April 29,2009, whereby the Court denied the application for the registration of a parcel of
land in Silang, Cavite on the ground that petitioners (Malabanan) had not established by
sufficient evidence their right to the registration in accordance with either Section 14(1) or
Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529(Property Registration Decree).The applicant
Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, claimed that the
property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he
and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and
adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him
to the judicial confirmation of his title To prove that the property was an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated
June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)
of the DENR. The RTC granted Malabanan’s application for land registration. However, on
appeal of the OSG, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the ruling of the RTC. Noting that the
CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and
disposable only on March 15, 1982, the CA, relying on the ruling in Republic vs Herbieto,
declared that Velazco’s possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes
of computing Malabanan’s period of possession. As earlier stated, the Supreme Court denied
the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish possession and
occupation of the property on his part and on the part of his predecessors-in interest since
June 12, 1945, or earlier. Hence, this MR.

Held:

Petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-
in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the
requisite character and period of possession – possession and occupation that is open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier – the land cannot be
considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it
as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the
land has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a
proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth.

G.R. No. 160453

November 12, 2012REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS

III, and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., Respondents.

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:

Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent ArcadioIvan
A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot4998-B (the
property) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parañaque City.

On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include
Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the latter’s co-ownership of the property. He
alleged that the property had been formed through accretion and had been in their joint
open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years.

The City of Parañaque (the City) opposed the application for land registration, stating that it
needed the property for its flood control program; that the property was within the legal
easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that assuming that the property was not
covered by the legal easement, title to the property could not be registered in favor of the
applicants for the reason that the property was an orchard that had dried up and had not
resulted from accretion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 457 of the Civil Code was applicable herein; and Whether or not
respondents could claim the property by virtue of acquisitive prescription pursuant to Section
14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).

HELD:

Respondents as the applicants for land registration would be held entitled to claim
theproperty as their own and apply for its registration under the Torrens
system only if they established that, indeed, the property was an accretion to their land.

Respondents did not show that the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil through the
effects of the current of the river had formed Lot 4998-B.Respondents as the riparian owners
had no legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B.Considering that the clear and categorical
language of Article 457 of the Civil Code has confined the provision only to accretion,
we should apply the provision as its clear and categorical language tells us to.

The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its
right of ownership. Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their
natural beds are public dominion of the State.

The State is its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that
the dried-up river beds should belong to some other person.

Under Articles 420(1) and 502(1) of the Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek, including its natural
bed, is property of the public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and
acquisitive prescription. And, absent any declaration by the government, that a portion of the
creek has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character.

All river beds remain property of public dominion and cannot be acquired by acquisitive
prescription unless previously declared by the Government to be alienable and
disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to be already declared
to be alienable and disposable, respondents could not be deemed to have acquired the
property through prescription.

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the Government, such
as a presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action, investigation
reports of the

Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless
public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it
remains part of the inalienable public domain.

The Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on May 27, 2003; DISMISSES the application for registration of Arcadio C.
Santos, Jr. and Arcadio Ivan S. Santos III respecting Lot 4998-B with a total area of 1,045
square meters, more or less, situated in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City,
Metro Manila; and DECLARES Lot 4998-B as exclusively belonging to the State for being
part of the dried—up bed of the Parañaque River.

ANNOTATIONS:
 Accretion is the process
whereby the soil is deposited along
the banks of rivers. The
deposit of soil, to be considered
accretion, must be:
(a) gradual and imperceptible;
(b) made through the effects of the
current of the water; and
(c) taking place on land adjacent to
the banks of rivers.
 In Celestial v. Cachopero, Since
property of public dominion is
outside the commerce of
man and not susceptible to private
appropriation and acquisitive
prescription, the adverse
possession which may be the basis
of a grant of title in the
confirmation of an imperfect
title refers only to alienable or
disposable portions of the public
domain.
 Under the Regalian
doctrine, all lands not
otherwise appearing to be
clearly within
private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State.
 No public land can be acquired
by private persons without any
grant, express or implied,
from the Government. It is
indispensable, therefore, that there
is a showing of a title from
the State. Occupation of public land
in the concept of owner, no matter
how long, cannot
ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title.
ANNOTATIONS:
 Accretion is the process
whereby the soil is deposited along
the banks of rivers. The
deposit of soil, to be considered
accretion, must be:
(a) gradual and imperceptible;
(b) made through the effects of the
current of the water; and
(c) taking place on land adjacent to
the banks of rivers.
 In Celestial v. Cachopero, Since
property of public dominion is
outside the commerce of
man and not susceptible to private
appropriation and acquisitive
prescription, the adverse
possession which may be the basis
of a grant of title in the
confirmation of an imperfect
title refers only to alienable or
disposable portions of the public
domain.
 Under the Regalian
doctrine, all lands not
otherwise appearing to be
clearly within
private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State.
 No public land can be acquired
by private persons without any
grant, express or implied,
from the Government. It is
indispensable, therefore, that there
is a showing of a title from
the State. Occupation of public land
in the concept of owner, no matter
how long, cannot
ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title.
ANNOTATIONS:

Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. Thedeposit
of soil, to be considered accretion, must be:

(a) gradual and imperceptible;

(b) made through the effects of the current of the water; and

(c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.

In Celestial v. Cachopero, Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man
and not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the adverse
possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in the confirmation of an imperfect title
refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain.

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.

No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied,
from the Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that there is a showing of a title from
the State. Occupation of public land in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot
ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.
NAVY OFFICERS' VILLAGE ASSOCIATION v. REPUBLIC, GR No. 177168, 2015-08-03

Facts:

TCT No. T-15387, issued in NOVAI's name, covers a 475,009 square-meter parcel of land
(the property) situated inside the former Fort Andres Bonifacio Military Reservation (FBMR) in
Taguig, Metro Manila.

Barely a month after, or on October 25, 1965, Pres. Macapagal issued Proclamation No.
478[11] "reserving for the veterans rehabilitation, medicare and training center site
purposes" an area of 537,520 square meters of the land previously declared as

AFP Officers' Village under Proclamation No. 461, and placed the reserved area under the
administration of the Veterans Federation of the Philippines (VFP).

On November 15, 1991, the property was the subject of a Deed of Salebetween the Republic
of the Philippines, through former Land Management Bureau (LMB) Director Abelardo G.
Palad, Jr., (Dir. Palad) and petitioner NOVAI.

The deed of sale was subsequently registered and from which TCT No. T-15387 was issued in
NOVAI's name.

In its complaint[13] filed with the RTC on December 23, 1993, the Republic sought to cancel
NOVAFs title based on the following grounds: (a) the land covered by NOVAFs title is part of a
military reservation; (b) the deed of sale conveying the property to

NOVAI, which became the basis for the issuance of TCT No. 15387, is fictitious; (c) the LMB
has no records of any application made by NOVAI for the purchase of the property, and of the
NOVAFs alleged payment of P14,250,270.00 for the property; and (d) the presidential...
proclamation, i.e., Proclamation No. 2487, claimed to have been issued by then President
Corazon C. Aquino in 1991 that authorized the transfer and titling of the property to NOVAI,
is fictitious.

In its answer (which was later amended) to the Republic's complaint, NOVAI counter-argued
that the property was no longer part of the public dominion, as the land had long been
segregated from the military reservation pursuant to Proclamation No. 461.

In its decision, the RTC ruled that: (a) the property is alienable and disposable in character,
as the land falls within the area segregated from the FBMR pursuant to Proclamation No. 461

The CA reversed and set aside the RTC's decision. It ruled that the property is inalienable
land of the public domain; thus, it cannot be disposed of or be the subject of a sale. It
pointed out that, since NOVAI failed to discharge its burden of proving the existence of

Proclamation No. 2487 - the positive governmental act that would have removed the property
from the public domain — the property remained reserved for veterans rehabilitation
purposes under Proclamation No. 478, the latest executive issuance affecting the property.

Since the property is inalienable, the CA held that the incontestability and indefeasibility
generally accorded to a Torrens title cannot apply because the property, as in this case, is
unregistrable land; that a title issued by reason or on account of any sale, alienation, or...
transfer of an inalienable property is void and a patent nullity; and that, consequently, the
Republic's action for the cancellation of NOVAI's title cannot be barred by prescription.

NOVAI alleges that the CA erred in declaring that: (a) the property is inalienable land of the
public domain

Issues:

The character of the property in question, i.e., whether the property in question was part of
the FBMR, and hence, inalienable.

Ruling:

The property is non-disposable land of the public domain reserved for public or quasi-public
use or purpose

We agree with the CA that the property remains a part of the public domain that could not
have been validly disposed of in NOVAI's favor. NOVAI failed to discharge its burden of
proving that the property was withdrawn from the intended public or quasi-public use or...
purpose.

While the parties disagree on the character and nature of the property at the time of the
questioned sale, they agree, however, that the property formed part of the FBMR - a military
reservation belonging to the public domain. We note that the FBMR has been the subject of...
several presidential proclamations and statues issued subsequent to Proclamation No. 423,
which either removed or reserved for specific public or quasi-public use or purpose certain of
its portions.

As the property remains a reserved public domain land, its sale and the title issued pursuant
to the sale are void

As the property remains a reserved public domain land, it is outside the commerce of man.
Property which are intended for public or quasi- public use or for some public purpose are
public dominion property of the State and are outside the commerce of... man. NOVAI,
therefore, could not have validly purchased the property in 1991.

We reiterate and emphasize that property which has been reserved for public or quasi-public
use or purpose are non-alienable and shall not be subject to sale or other disposition until
again declared alienable by law or by proclamation of the President.

Any sale or disposition of property of the public dominion is void for being contrary to law and
public policy.

Since the sale of the property, in this case, is void, the title issued to NOVAI is similarly void
ab initio. It is a well-settled doctrine that registration under the Torrens System does not, by
itself, vest title as it is not a mode of acquiring ownership;[71] that registration under the
Torrens System merely confirms the registrant's already existing title.

Accordingly, the indefeasibility of a Torrens title does not apply in this case and does not
attach to NOVAI's title. The principle of indefeasibility does not apply when the sale of the
property and the title based thereon are null and void. Hence, the Republic's action to...
declare the nullity of NOVAI's void title has not prescribed.
CITY OF LAPU-LAPU v. PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY, GR No. 184203, 2014-11-
26

FACTS:

These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari the City of Lapu-Lapu and the
Province of Bataan separately led against the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA).

In G.R. No. 184203, the City of Lapu-Lapu (the City) assails the Court of Appeals’ decision
dated January 11, 2008 and resolution dated August 6, 2008, dismissing the City’s appeal for
being the wrong mode of appeal. The City appealed the Regional Trial Court, Branch 111,
Pasay City’s decision finding the PEZA exempt from payment of real property taxes.

In G.R. No. 187583, the Province of Bataan (the Province) assails the Court of Appeals’
decision dated August 27, 2008 and resolution dated April 16, 2009, granting the PEZA’s
petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 115,
Pasay City gravely abused its discretion in finding the PEZA liable for real property taxes to
the Province of Bataan.

Issues:

Whether the PEZA is exempt from payment of real property taxes?

Ruling:

The PEZA is exempt from payment of real property taxes.

The PEZA is an instrumentality of the national government.

An instrumentality is “any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with
some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter.

With the PEZA as an attached agency to the Department of Trade and Industry, the 13-
person PEZA Board is chaired by the Department Secretary. Among the powers and functions
of the PEZA is its ability to coordinate with the Department of Trade and Industry for policy
and program formulation and implementation. In strategizing and prioritizing the
development of special economic zones, the PEZA coordinates with the Department of Trade
and Industry.

The PEZA also administers its own funds and operates autonomously, with the PEZA Board
formulating and approving the PEZA’s annual budget. Appointments and other personnel
actions in the PEZA are also free from departmental interference, with the PEZA Board having
the exclusive and final authority to promote, transfer, assign and reassign officers of the
PEZA.

As an instrumentality of the national government, the PEZA is vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law. Congress created the PEZA to operate, administer, manage and develop
special economic zones in the Philippines. Special economic zones are areas with highly
developed or which have the potential to be developed into agro-industrial, industrial
tourist/recreational, commercial, banking, investment and financial centers.
Being an instrumentality of the national government, the PEZA cannot be taxed by local
government units.

Although a body corporate vested with some corporate powers, the PEZA is not a
government-owned or controlled corporation taxable for real property taxes.

The law created the PEZA’s charter. Under the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, the PEZA
was established primarily to perform the governmental function of operating, administering,
managing, and developing special economic zones to attract investments and provide
opportunities for preferential use of Filipino labor.

Under its charter, the PEZA was created a body corporate endowed with some corporate
powers. However, it was not organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. Nothing in the
PEZA’s charter provides that the PEZA’s capital is divided into shares. The PEZA also has no
members who shall share in the PEZA’s profits.

The PEZA does not compete with other economic zone authorities in the country. The
government may even subsidize the PEZA’s operations. Under Section 47 of the Special
Economic Zone Act of 1995, “any sum necessary to augment [the PEZA’s] capital outlay shall
be included in the General Appropriations Act to be treated as an equity of the national
government.”

The PEZA, therefore, need not be economically viable. It is not a government-owned or

controlled corporation liable for real property taxes.

The PEZA’s predecessor, the EPZA, was declared non-profit in character with all its revenues
devoted for its development, improvement, and maintenance. Consistent with this non-profit
character, the EPZA was explicitly declared exempt from real property taxes under its charter.
Section 21 of Presidential Decree No. 66.

The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, on the other hand, does not specifically exempt the
PEZA from payment of real property taxes. Nevertheless, we rule that the PEZA is exempt
from real property taxes by virtue of its charter. A provision in the Special Economic Zone Act
of 1995 explicitly exempting the PEZA is unnecessary. The PEZA assumed the real property
exemption of the EPZA under Presidential Decree No. 66.

Section 11 of the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995 mandated the EPZA “to evolve into the
PEZA in accordance with the guidelines and regulations set forth in an executive order issued
for this purpose.” President Ramos then issued Executive Order No. 282 in 1995, ordering the
PEZA to assume the EPZA’s powers, functions, and responsibilities under Presidential Decree
No. 66 not inconsistent with the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995.

The non-profit character of the EPZA under Presidential Decree No. 66 is not inconsistent with
any of the powers, functions, and responsibilities of the PEZA. The EPZA’s non- profit
character, including the EPZA’s exemption from real property taxes, must be deemed
assumed by the PEZA.

In addition, the Local Government Code exempting instrumentalities of the national

government from real property taxes was already in force when the PEZA’s charter was
enacted in 1995. It would have been redundant to provide for the PEZA’s exemption in its
charter considering that the PEZA is already exempt by virtue of Section 133(o) of the Local
Government Code.

As for the EPZA, Commonwealth Act No. 470 or the Assessment Law was in force when the
EPZA’s charter was enacted. Unlike the Local Government Code, Commonwealth Act No. 470
does not contain a provision specifically exempting instrumentalities of the national
government from payment of real property taxes. It was necessary to put an exempting
provision in the EPZA’s charter.
Real properties under the PEZA’s title are owned by the Republic of the Philippines

Under Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code, real properties owned by the Republic
of the Philippines are exempt from real property taxes.

Even the PEZA’s lands and buildings whose beneficial use have been granted to other persons
may not be taxed with real property taxes. The PEZA may only lease its lands and buildings
to PEZA-registered economic zone enterprises and entities. These PEZA-registered
enterprises and entities, which operate within economic zones, are not subject to real
property taxes. Under Section 24 of the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, no taxes,
whether local or national, shall be imposed on all business establishments operating within
the economic zones.

REPUBLIC v. LUIS MIGUEL O. ABOITIZ, GR No. 174626, 2013-10-23

Facts:

Aboitiz filed his Application for Registration of Land Title of a parcel of land... hearing thereon
ensued.

Aboitiz attached the original Tracing Cloth Plan... and the documents evidencing possession
and ownership of the land.

Aboitiz presented his witness,... (Sarah), his secretary, who testified that he entrusted to her
the subject property and appointed her as its caretaker; that he purchased the subject
property from

(Irenea)... that he had been in actual... owner... hat as per record of

(DENR)... the subject property had been... classified as alienable and disposable

(CENRO), Cebu City, the subject property was not covered by any subsisting public land
application;... had been... covered by tax... in his name.

(Luz), daughter of Irenea, the original owner of the subject property, testified that she was
one of the instrumental witnesses in the deed of sale of the subject property... that her
mother was in open, continuous, peaceful, and exclusive possession of the said property...
the Republic,... manifested that it would not adduce any evidence to oppose the application
for registration of Aboitiz.

the RTC granted Aboitiz's application for registration of the subject property.

the Republic appealed the RTC ruling before the CA.

the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC

The CA ruled that it was only from the date of declaration of such lands as alienable... that
the period for counting the statutory requirement of possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier
would commence.

Possession prior to the date of declaration of the lands... alienability was not included.

Aboitiz moved for reconsideration

Aboitiz asserted, among others, that although the subject land was classified as alienable and
disposable only in 1957, the tax... declarations, from 1963 to 1994, for a period of thirty one
(31) years, converted the land, by way of acquisitive prescription, to private property.

the CA reversed itself

Hence, this petition.

Aboitiz contends that the Republic is raising questions of fact which is beyond the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court. Consequently, the findings of fact by the RTC and affirmed by the
CA are final, binding and conclusive upon the Court. Aboitiz claims that sufficient evidence
was presented to establish the nature and character of his possession of the subject property
as required by P.D. No. 1529.

The court argues that Aboitiz failed to validly establish the alienability of the subject property
because he only adduced a CENRO... certification to that effect, without presenting a copy of
the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the
legal custodian of the official records. Further, a declaration that the property is alienable
and disposable is not... sufficient to make it susceptible to acquisitive prescription. An express
government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer intended for
public use, for public service or for the development for the national wealth pursuant to
Article 422[14] of the New Civil Code must also be shown.

Issues:

Whether Aboitiz is entitled to the registration of land title.

Ruling:

Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529

Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended by Section 4 of P.D. No. 1073, provides:

SECTION 14. Who may apply.The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.

applicants for registration of land title must establish and prove: (1) that the subject land
forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that the applicant
and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,... continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that it is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

The absence of any one requisite renders the application for registration substantially
defective... it is incumbent upon the applicant to present a CENRO or Provincial Environment
and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) Certification; and a copy of... the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records... the Court cannot find any evidence to show the subject land's alienable and
disposable character,... the Court declared that the CENRO is not the official repository or
legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring the alienability and
disposability of public... lands.

With regard to the third requisite, it must be shown that the possession and occupation of a
parcel of land by the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, started on
June 12, 1945 or earlier. A mere showing of possession and... Occupation for 30 years or
more, by itself, is not sufficient.

Alolina vs. Flores G.R. No. 198774 I April 04, 2016

FACTS:

Alolino is the registered owner of two (2) contiguous parcels of land. Alolino initially
constructed a bungalow-type house on the property. In 1980, he added a second floor to the
structure. He also extended his two-storey house up to the edge of his property. There are
terraces on both floors. There are also six (6) windows on the perimeter wall: three (3) on
the ground floor and another three (3) on the second floor.

In 1994, the respondent spouses Fortunato and Anastacia (Marie) Flores constructed their
house/sari sari store on the vacant municipal/barrio road immediately adjoining the rear
perimeter wall of Alolino's house. The structure is only about two (2) to three (3) inches away
from the back of Alolino's house, covering five windows and the exit door. The respondents'
construction deprived Alolino of the light and ventilation he had previously enjoyed and
prevented his ingress and egress to the municipal road through the rear door of his house.

Respondents on their part argued that they had occupied their lot where they constructed
their house in 1955, long before the plaintiff purchased his lot in the 70s. They further alleged
that plaintiff only has himself to blame because he constructed his house up to the very
boundary of his lot without observing the required setback. Finally, they emphasized that the
wall of their house facing Alolino's does not violate the latter's alleged easement of light and
view because it has no window.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not Alolino has acquired easement of light and view; and (2) whether or not
Alolino has acquired an easement of right of way.

Held:

Alolino does not have an easement of light and view or an easement of right of way over the
respondents' property or the barrio road it stands on. Articles 649-657 governs legal
easements of right of way. None of these provisions are applicable to Alolino's property with
respect to the barrio road where the respondents' house stands on.

On the other hand, an easement of light and view can be acquired through prescription
counting from the time when the owner of the dominant estate formally prohibits the
adjoining lot owner from blocking the view of a window located within the dominant estate.
Notably, Alolino had not made (and could not have made) a formal prohibition upon the
respondents prior to their construction in 1994; Alolino could not have acquired an easement
of light and view through prescription.