CHAPTER IV: LEGISLATIVE INTENT

I. THE SOLE OBJECT OF INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION

JOEMAR ORTEGA vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 151085
August 20, 2008

Facts:

In two (2) separate informations filed before Branch 50, RTC Bacolod City, herein petitioner, Joemar
Ortega, who was then 14 yrs old, was charged with the crime of rape committed against, AAA, who, at
the time of the commission of the crime, was only 6 years old.

The RTC ruled that petitioner’s defense of denial cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
petitioner as the perpetrator by the victim AAA, and her brother BBB, who testified with honesty and
credibility. The RTC also cannot perceive any ill-motive for AAA's family to impute a serious crime of Rape
to petitioner, considering the close relations of both families.

The RTC’s decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition.

However, while the said petition is pending before the Supreme Court, RA 9344, or the Juvenile Justice
Law of 2006, which is an act lowering the age of criminal liability among CICLs was enacted.

Issues:

WON the pertinent provisions of RA 9344 applies to the petitioner’s case.

Rulings:

The court rules in the affirmative.

Penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of R.A. No.
9344’s unambiguous language, coupled with clear lawmakers’ intent, patented in the deliberations, is
most favorable to herein petitioner. No other interpretation is justified, for the simple language of the
new law itself demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the CICL.

It bears stressing that the petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of the alleged
rape. This was duly proven by the certificate of live birth, by petitioner’s own testimony, and by the
testimony of his mother. Furthermore, petitioner’s age was never assailed in any of the proceedings
before the RTC and the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the commission of the crime, was
below 15 years of age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal liability.

Doctrine in Statutory Construction:

Intent is the spirit of the law.

Intent is the vital part and the essence of the law and the primary rule in construction is to ascertain the
meaning and intent of the authors of the law as to give effect thereto. Courts will not follow the letter of
a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.
MACONDRAY & CO. v. URBANO EUSTAQUIO
G.R. No. 43683
July 16, 1937

 Petitioner sold to the defendant a De Soto car, sedan for Php 595, through a NOTE;
 Under this note, the defendant has undertaken to pay for the car in 12 monthly installments with
12% annual interest and likewise has agreed that should he fail to pay any monthly installment
together with the interest, all remaining monthly installments shall be deemed due and payable
and that the defendant shall pay 20% upon the principal for payments for atty’s fees and other
costs the plaintiff might incur upon recovery.
 To guarantee the performance of his obligation, the defendant mortgaged the purchased car in
favor of the plaintiff under the conditions stipulated in the Note.
 However, the defendant was only able to pay the 1 st monthly installment and failed to pay any
remaining monthly installment.
 In accordance with the terms of the mortgage, the plaintiff sought upon the sheriff to recover the
possession of the car but the defendant refused. The plaintiff then brought the replevin sought
and thereby succeeded in getting possession of the car.
 Plaintiff brought the action before the Court of First Instance Manila against defendant to obtain
the possession of an automobile mortgaged by the latter, and to recover the balance owing upon
a note executed by him, the interest thereon, attorney’s fees, expenses of collection, and the
costs. However, the complaint was dismissed. Hence, this appeal.

Issues:
One of the issues raised by the petitioner involves the interpretation of “unpaid balance” in a
certain provision of the statue as regards vendor’s remedies.

Rulings:

1. One of the vendor’s remedies states, "…if the vendor has chosen to foreclose the mortgage he
shall have no further action against the purchaser for the recovery of any unpaid balance owing
by the same, and any agreement to the contrary shall be null and void."

The mortgage contract being referred thereto in this case is the one entered into by Eustaquio in
favor of the petitioner in order to guarantee the performance of his obligation under the same
conditions as the Note. Should the petitioner choose to foreclose the mortgage, and the proceeds
obtained from the sale of the mortgaged property is insufficient to cover the full amount of the
secured obligation, in this case, in accordance to the note and mortgage contract applies, refers
to the interest, attorney’s fees, and other fees related to the recovery of possession. It was held
in the decision that, if it were the intention of the Legislature to limit its meaning to the unpaid
balance of the principal, it would have so stated. Therefore, the assignment of error is untenable.

Doctine:

The fundamental rule which should govern the interpretation of laws is to ascertain the intention
and meaning of the Legislature and to give effect thereto. The purpose of the enactment of Act
4122 is to protect both of the parties in a contract of sale of personal properties, under
installment basis, from onerous conditions.

xxx
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. VENANCIO CONCEPCION,
G.R. No. L-19190
November 29, 1922

FACTS:

Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, sent telegrams

and a confirmation letter to the manager of the Aparri branch of PNB, authorizing an
extension of credit in favour of Puno y Concepcion, S. en C. in the amount of P300,000.00 . This
special authorization limited the discretional power of the local manager of the Aparri branch to
grant loans and discount negotiable documents to P5,000, which in certain cases, could be
increased to P10,000. Pursuant to this authorization, credit aggregating P300,000 was granted
to Puno y Concepcion, S. en C., the only security required consisting of six demand notes. This
Puno y Concepcion, S. en C., in reality is a co-partnership capitalized at P100,000 wherein,
Venancio Concepcion’s wife owns half of the co-partnership. Venancio Concepcion was found
guilty by the CFI for violation of Section 354 of Act 2747 which provides that: : "The National
Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of the members of the board of directors
of the bank nor to agents of the branch banks."

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the co-partnership was

an “indirect loan” within the meaning of Section 35 of Act 2747.

YES. In the interpretation and construction of statutes, the primary rule is to ascertain
and give effect to the intention of the Legislature. In this instance, the purpose of the
Legislature is plainly to erect a wall of safety against temptation for a director of the
bank. The prohibition against indirect loans is a recognition of the familiar maxim that
no man may serve two masters — that where personal interest clashes with fidelity to
duty the latter almost always suffers. If, therefore, it is shown that the husband is
financially interested in the success or failure of his wife's business venture, a
loan to partnership of which the wife of a director is a member, falls within the
prohibition. Various provisions of the Civil Code serve to establish the
familiar relationship called a conjugal partnership. (Articles 1315, 1393, 1401, 1407,
1408, and 1412 can be specially noted.) A loan, therefore, to a partnership of which the
wife of a director of a bank is a member, is an indirect loan to such director. That it was
the intention of the Legislature to prohibit exactly such an occurrence is shown by the
acknowledged fact that in this instance the defendant was tempted to mingle his
personal and family affairs with his official duties, and to permit the loan P300,000 to a
partnership of no established reputation and without asking for collateral security.

xxx
 II. ASCERTAINMENT OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT

Litex Employees Association v. Eduvala

Case No. 149 G.R. No. L-41106 (September 22, 1977) Chapter II, Page
53, Footnote No.22

FACTS:

Respondent, Officer-in-Charge of Bureau of Labor Relations, required referendum election

among Petitioners to ascertain their wishes as to their affiliation with Federation of Free
Workers. Petitioners contended that there was no statutory authorization for the Respondent
to require referendum election and that Respondent and the Bureau were beyond jurisdiction.

ISSUE: W/N there is a statute authorizing Respondents and giving them jurisdiction.

HELD:

In the comment of the then Acting Solicitor General, it states that the basic end and aim of the
present Labor Code is to confer on the Department of Labor and its bureaus the competence to
pass upon and decide labor controversies and thus minimize judicial intervention.

Article 226 of the New Labor Code specifically provides the original and exclusive authority of
the Department of Labor to act on all grievances arising from labor management in all
workplaces, among other things, all in the interest of industrial peace and for the promotion of
the salutary constitutional objectives of social justice and protection to labor. Thus, all concerns
regarding such shall entrusted to the executive department. It cannot be misread to signify that
the authority conferred on the Secretary of Labor and the officials of the Department is limited
in character.

The law has ends to achieve, when the literal words of the law casts doubts on its readers, such
as doubts as to the limits set out on a statutory power which should not be there, in this case,
the Order of the Secretary of Labor to conduct of referendum, all must come down to the
legislative intent.
REPUBLIC FLOUR MILLS INC., vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS
and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS,
G.R. No. L-28463

FACTS:

Petitioner, Republic Flour Mills, Inc., is a domestic corporation, primarily engaged in the manufacture and
export of wheat flour, and produces pollard (darak) and bran (ipa) in the process of milling.

The respondent assessed the petitioner by way of wharfage dues on the said exportations in the sum of
P7,948.00, which assessment was paid by petitioner under protest claiming that it should not, under its
interpretation of the Tariff and Customs Code, be liable for wharfage dues on its exportation of bran and
pollard as these were not "products of the Philippines” but are mere wastes incidental to the milling of
wheat grains.

The CTA denied the claim and ruled that the company was liable for the wharfage dues.

ISSUE:

Whether or not wharfage dues on the export of pollard and bran was in accordance with law.

RULING:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.

The provision of Section 2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code is a clear legislative mandate stating that as
long as the goods are produced in the country, regardless if it is just a mere “waste” of production as the
petitioner identifies it, it still falls within the terms of the above section.

Rules on construction and interpretation need not be resorted to when the words of the law are clear and
that the application of such will not deviate from its intent. The law shall be observed by the Court as it
is.

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 III. RULES IN DETERMINING LEGISLATIVE INTENT

A. LITERAL RULE

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs CAYETANO TEJANO

G.R. No. 173615
October 16, 200

DOCTRINE:

Thereby, it must be noted that where the law is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without any interpretation or even construction. This is
based on the presumption that the words employed therein correctly express its intent and
preclude even the courts from giving it a different construction. (Verba legis)

FACTS:

 Cayetano Tejano, who was then the Vice-President and Manager of the PNB, Cebu City,
along with several other PNB employees, were administratively charged before the PNB
Management Hearing Committee for their alleged irregular and fraudulent transactions
with several corporate accounts.

 The respondent was found guilty of grave misconduct in misappropriating funds and
gross negligence in extending unwarranted credit accommodations to certain corporate
accounts.

 Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the BOD. He then filed
an appeal before the CSC in which he submitted a Memorandum of Appeal.

 During the pendency of the case before the CSC, PNB, by virtue of EO No. 80, ceased to
be a GOCC and was then converted into a private banking institution.

 The CSC dismissed respondent’s appeal for being filed out of time. Respondent filed a
Motion for Reconsideration on which CSC required the PNB to file its Comment.

 In its comment, the PNB theorized that even granting that respondent’s appeal was filed
on time, the motion shall nonetheless be dismissed on account of the privatization of
PNB thereby removing the jurisdiction of the case from the CSC. This argument was
given merit, thus, CSC dismissed respondent’s Motion on such grounds.

 Respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court found
merit in the appeal and held that the case was filed on time and that CSC has not lost
 jurisdiction over the case despite the privatization of PNB, for jurisdiction once acquired
generally continues until the final disposition of the case. The appellate court reversed
CSC’s decisions, and remanded the case to the latter for further proceedings.

Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not E.O No. 80 has the effect of removing jurisdiction from the CSC the
appeal of respondent by virtue of the privatization of PNB.
RULINGS:

The Supreme Court gives no merit to the petition.

Section 6 of E.O. No. 80, also known as the Revised Charter of PNB, treats of the effects of
converting the bank into a private financial and banking institution. It provides for the
consequences of opening to private ownership the majority of the bank’s voting equity and that
as PNB ceases to be a government depository, it will be governed by the set of laws and rules
applicable to all other private corporations incorporated under the general incorporation law.
And upon its privatization, it would no longer be subject to the coverage of government service-
wide agencies such as the CSC and the Commission on Audit (COA).

In a language too plain to be mistaken, no amount of reasonable inference may be derived

from the terms of the said Section to the effect that it intends to modify the jurisdiction of the
CSC in disciplinary cases involving employees of the government. Therefore, the jurisdiction of
the appeal of respondent which was already pending in CSC even before the said law converted
PNB into a private bank is not removed from the commission.

XXX
BOLOS v. BOLOS
G.R. No. 186400,
October 20, 2010.

DOCTRINE:

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is if the law is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, there is no
room for construction or inerpretation, there is only a room for application.

Verba legis or the plain meaning rule. When the language of the law is clear, it should be given its
natural meaning
Verba legis non est recendum, from the words of the statute there should be no departure.

FACTS:

Cynthia Bolos filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to Respondent
Danilo Bolos under Article 36 of the Family Code.

After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City rendered judgment declaring that the
marriage between petitioner Cynthia Bolos and Respondent Danilo is null and void ab initio on the ground
of psychological incapacity on the part of both of them with legal consequences provided by law. It was
declared as final and executory.

Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul
the order of the RTC as it was rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction and prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render the essential marital
obligations.

The CA granted in favor of the respondent on the basis that their marriage was solemnized on February
14, 1980 long before the Family Code took effect, thus making A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled “Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages” not applicable.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling because the phrase “under the Family
Code” in A.M. 02-11-10-SC pertains to the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages”

RULING:

The interpretation of the petitioner that the phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
refers to the word "petitions" rather than to the word "marriages" cannot be given merit by the Court as
basic is the rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation—there is only room for application. Verba
legis.

Xxx
 B. PURPOSE RULE

DOCTRINE:

A statute derives its vitality from the purpose to which it is enacted, and to construe it in a manner that
diregards or defeats such purpose is to nullify or destroy the law. It is axiomatic that laws should be
given a reasonable interpretation not one which defeats the very purpose for which they were passed
or enacted.

Go v. Distinction Properties Development and Construction, Inc.

G.R. No. 194024

FACTS

 Philip L. Go, Pacifico Q. Lim and Andrew Q. Lim (petitioners) are registered individual owners of
condominium units in Phoenix Heights Condominium developed by the respondent.
 In August 2008, petitioners, as condominium unit-owners, filed a complaint before the HLURB
against DPDCI for unsound business practices and violation of the MDDR, alleging that DPDCI
committed misrepresentation in their circulated flyers and brochures as to the facilities or
amenities that would be available in the condominium and failed to perform its obligation to
comply with the MDDR.
 In defense, DPDCI alleged that the brochure attached to the complaint was “a mere preparatory
draft”.
 HLURB rendered its decision in favor of petitioners.
 DPDCI filed with the CA its Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition on the ground that HLURB acted
without or beyond its jurisdiction.
 The CA ruled that the HLURB had no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by petitioners as the
controversy did not fall within the scope of the administrative agency’s authority

ISSUE: W/N HLURB has the jurisdiction over the case.

RULINGS:

No.

Generally, the extent to which an administrative agency may exercise its powers depends largely, if not
wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency.  With respect to the HLURB,
to determine if said agency has jurisdiction over petitioners’ cause of action, an examination of the laws
defining the HLURB’s jurisdiction and authority becomes imperative. P.D. No. 957, specifically Section 3,
granted the National Housing Authority (NHA) the "exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade
and business." Then came P.D. No. 1344 expanding the jurisdiction of the NHA (now HLURB).

This provision must be read in light of the law’s preamble, which explains the reasons for enactment of
the law or the contextual basis for its interpretation.  A statute derives its vitality from the purpose for
which it is enacted, and to construe it in a manner that disregards or defeats such purpose is to nullify or
destroy the law. P.D. No. 957, as amended, aims to protect innocent subdivision lot and condominium
unit buyers against fraudulent real estate practices.

In this case, the complaint filed by petitioners alleged causes of action that apparently are not cognizable
by the HLURB considering the nature of the action and the reliefs sought. A perusal of the complaint
discloses that petitioners are actually seeking to nullify and invalidate the duly constituted acts of PHCC -
the April 29, 2005 Agreement entered into by PHCC with DPDCI and its Board Resolution which authorized
the acceptance of the proposed offsetting/settlement of DPDCI’s indebtedness and approval of the
conversion of certain units from saleable to common areas. All these were approved by the HLURB.

As it is clear that the acts being assailed are those of PHHC, this case cannot prosper for failure to
implead the proper party, PHCC. Without PHCC as a party, there can be no final adjudication of the
HLURB’s judgment. The CA was, thus, correct in ordering the dismissal of the case for failure to implead
an indispensable party.

Xxx

Municipality of Nueva Era, Ilocos Norte v. Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte,

GR No. 169435,
February 27, 2008.

Facts:

This petition for review on certiorari originated from a boundary dispute between the Municipality of
Nueva Era and Marcos in which the Court of Appeals granted Marcos an extension to its eastern
boundary up to the boundary line of Ilocos Norte-Apayao. Such extension would give a portion of Nueva
Era’s territory to Marcos.

Issues: W/N Marcos can extend its territory up that of Nueva Era’s

Rulings:

It cannot.

Only the barrios (now barangays) of Dingras from which Marcos obtained its territory are named in R.A.
No. 3753. To wit:

SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit in the
Municipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated from the said municipality and
constituted into a new and separate municipality to be known as the Municipality of Marcos, with the
following boundaries…”

Since only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos' source of territory, Nueva Era's territory
is, therefore, excluded.

Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of
another thing not mentioned. If a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything
else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and effect. This rule, as a guide
to probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and natural workings of the human mind.
Had the legislature intended other barangays from Nueva Era to become part of Marcos, it could have
easily done so by clear and concise language. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it
may not by interpretation or construction be extended to other matters. The rule proceeds from the
premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention
been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

Moreover, since the barangays of Nueva Era were not mentioned in the enumeration of barangays out of
which the territory of Marcos shall be set, their omission must be held to have been done intentionally.
This conclusion finds support in the rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est,  which states that a
person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.
xxx

C. MISCHIEF RULE

Doctrine:

The rule is similar to the purpose rule. The only difference is that the focus of this rule is the
mischief which the law seeks to suppress. The mischief is the problem or the evil which the
legislature wants to solve or put an end. Thus, in construing the law, the evil and the
remedy for its suppression should be kept in mind and the law should be construed in the
light of the evils sought to be remedied. So, if the law aims to solve a problem, any
ambiguity in the law should be resolved in such a way as to favor such aim.
 GOLDEN RULE
D.
Doctrine:

Ordinary words must be given their ordinary and natural meanings, and special or technical words their
special or technical meanings, unless the meaning would result to their absurdity. Stated differently, the
rule allows a departure from the literal interpretation if it would result to injustice or lead to absurdity.
Nothing is better settled than that courts are not to give words a meaning which would lead to absurd or
unreasonable consequences.

Brent School Inc. v. Zamora,

GR No. L‐48494,
February 5, 1990.

FACTS:

Doroteo Alegre was employed by Brent School as Director for Sports in a five-year contract. Five years
later, Alegre was given a copy of the report filed by Brent School with the Department of Labor advising
of the termination of his services effective on July 16, 1976. The stated ground for the termination was
"completion of contract, expiration of the definite period of employment." Although protesting the
announced termination stating that his services were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his
employer, and his employment lasted for 5 years, therefore, he had acquired the status of regular
employee, Alegre accepted the amount of P3,177.71, and signed a receipt thereof containing the phrase,
"in full payment of services for the period May 16, to July 17, 1976 as full payment of contract."

The Regional Director considered Brent School's report as an application for clearance to terminate
employment (not a report of termination), and accepting the recommendation of the Labor Conciliator,
refused to give such clearance and instead required the reinstatement of Alegre, as a "permanent
employee," to his former position without loss of seniority rights and with full back wages.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the provisions of the Labor Code, as amended, have anathematized "fixed period
employment" or employment for a term.

RULINGS:

Respondent Alegre's contract of employment with Brent School having lawfully terminated with and by
reason of the expiration of the agreed term of period thereof, he is declared not entitled to
reinstatement.

As it is evident that Article 280 of the Labor Code, under a narrow and literal interpretation, not only fails
to exhaust the gamut of employment contracts to which the lack of a fixed period would be an anomaly,
but would also appear to restrict, without reasonable distinctions, the right of an employee to freely
stipulate with his employer the duration of his engagement, it logically follows that such a literal
interpretation should be eschewed or avoided. The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to
preclude absurdity in its application. Outlawing the whole concept of term employment and subverting to
boot the principle of freedom of contract to remedy the evil of employer's using it as a means to prevent
their employees from obtaining security of tenure is like cutting off the nose to spite the face or, more
relevantly, curing a headache by lopping off the head.

Such interpretation puts the seal on Bibiso upon the effect of the expiry of an agreed period of
employment as still good rule—a rule reaffirmed in the recent case of Escudero vs. Office of the President
(G.R. No. 57822, April 26, 1989) where, in the fairly analogous case of a teacher being served by her
school a notice of termination following the expiration of the last of three successive fixed-term
employment contracts, the Court held:

Reyes (the teacher's) argument is not persuasive. It loses sight of the fact that her employment was
probationary, contractual in nature, and one with a definitive period. At the expiration of the period
stipulated in the contract, her appointment was deemed terminated and the letter informing her of the
non-renewal of her contract is not a condition sine qua non before Reyes may be deemed to have ceased
in the employ of petitioner UST. The notice is a mere reminder that Reyes' contract of employment was
due to expire and that the contract would no longer be renewed. It is not a letter of termination.

Paraphrasing Escudero, respondent Alegre's employment was terminated upon the expiration of his last
contract with Brent School on July 16, 1976 without the necessity of any notice. The advance written
advice given the Department of Labor with copy to said petitioner was a mere reminder of the impending
expiration of his contract, not a letter of termination, nor an application for clearance to terminate which
needed the approval of the Department of Labor to make the termination of his services effective. In any
case, such clearance should properly have been given, not denied.

xxx