VILLAVICENCIO V.

LUKBAN (Justice Malcolm)

-Manila Mayor Lukban, together with Anton Hohmann, Manila’s Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 women at the
night of October 25 beyond the latter’s consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Davao where they were signed
as laborers.The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29.
-The women were landed and receipted for as laborers by Governor Sales and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The
governor and the haciendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous notification that the women were
prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of Manila.
-The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they were
being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao.
They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent
to the deportation.
-The attorney for the relatives and friends of the deportees applied for habeas corpus to the SC.
-respondent moved to dismiss saying that petitioners did not have any of the women under their custody or control, and
because their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila.
-The court ruled in favor of the petitioner. For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were
open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have
shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3)
they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present.
-They did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted; they did not show impossibility of
performance; and they did not present writings that waived the right to be present by those interested.
-Instead a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the women were contended with their life in Davao, some of
which have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That through ordinary diligence a considerable
number of the women, at 60 could have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated to be found in the municipality of
Davao, and that about this number either returned at their own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the
respondents.
-The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted summarily in finding the
respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non-
production of the persons were far from sufficient. The return did not show that every possible effort to produce the women
was made by the respondents.
-7 of the women had returned to Manila at their own expense. On motion of counsel for petitioners, their testimony was taken
before the clerk of the SC sitting as commissioners. On the day named in the order, none of the persons in whose behalf the
writ was issued were produced in court by the respondents. It has been shown that 3 of those who had been able to come back
to Manila through their own efforts, were notified by the police and the secret service to appear before the court.
-The fiscal appeared, repeated the facts more comprehensively, reiterated the stand taken by him when pleading to the
original petition copied a telegram from the Mayor of the city of Manila to the provincial governor of Davao and the answer
thereto, and telegrams that had passed between the Director of Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in Davao, and
offered certain affidavits showing that the women were contained with their life in Mindanao and did not wish to return to
Manila.
-Respondents Sales answered alleging that it was not possible to fulfill the order of the SC because the women had never
been under his control, because they were at liberty in the Province of Davao, and because they had married or signed
contracts as laborers.
-Respondent Yñigo answered alleging that he did not have any of the women under his control and that therefore it was
impossible for him to obey the mandate.
-The court promulgated a second order, which related that the respondents had not complied with the original order to the
satisfaction of the court nor explained their failure to do so, and therefore directed that those of the women not in Manila be
brought before the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and Yñigo, unless the women should, in written
statements voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce the right, or unless
the respondents should demonstrate some other legal motives that made compliance impossible.

ISSUES: Whether respondents had authority to deport the women to Davao? Whether the City of Manila has jurisdiction to
issue a writ of habeas corpus to Davao? whether respondents were in contempt of court?

HELD:
No authority to deport the women
No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The essential object and purpose of writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into
all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. If the mayor and the chief of
police could deport the women, they must have the means to return them from Davao to Manila.
The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to
change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty
has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not be easily evaded.

We cannot say that any of the respondents, with the possible exception of the first named, has flatly disobeyed the court by
acting in opposition to its authority. Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the orders of their
chiefs, and while, under the law of public officers, this does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful
mitigating circumstance.
Finding him innocent of any disrespect to the court, his counter-motion to strike from the record the memorandum of attorney
for the petitioners, which brings him into this undesirable position, must be granted. When all is said and done, as far as this
record discloses, the official who was primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to
accomplish the same, who made arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary, who conducted the negotiations with
the Bureau of Labor, and who later, as the head of the city government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of the
unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to suppress the social evil
was commendable. His methods were unlawful. His regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the court was only tardily
and reluctantly acknowledged.

Contempt of court
Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo, and Diaz are found not to be in contempt of court. They only followed the
orders of their chiefs, and while, under the law of public officers, this does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a
powerful mitigating circumstance.
The hacendero Yñigo appears to have been drawn into the case through a misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic
communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would seem to have done no more than to fulfill his duty as the legal
representative of the city government.

Lukban is found in contempt of court

MEJOFF VS DIR OF PRISONS
-second petition for habeas corpus by Boris Mejoff, the first having been denied.
-petitioner is an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country from Shanghai as a secret operative by the
Japanese forces during the latter's regime in these Islands. Upon liberation he was arrested as a Japanese spy, by U.S. Army
Counter Intelligence Corps. Later he was handed to the Commonwealth Government for disposition.
-The People's Court ordered his release but the deportation Board taking his case up, found that having no travel documents,
he was illegally in this country, and consequently referred the matter to the immigration authorities.
-the Board of commissioners of Immigration declared that Mejoff had entered the Philippines illegally in 1944, without
inspection and admission by the immigration officials at a designation port of entry and, therefore, it ordered that he be
deported on the first available transportation to Russia.
-He was then under custody, he having been arrested on March 1948. In May, he was transferred to the Cebu Provincial Jail
together with three other Russians to await the arrival of some Russian vessels.
-In July and August, 2 boats of Russian nationality called at the Cebu Port. But their masters refused to take petitioner and his
companions alleging lack of authority to do so.
-In October 1948 after repeated failures to ship this deportee abroad, the authorities removed him to Bilibid Prison at
Muntinglupa where he has been confined up to the present time, inasmuch as the Commissioner of Immigration believes it is
for the best interests of the country to keep him under detention while arrangements for his departure are being made.
-Court held the petitioner's "temporary detention is a necessary step in the process of exclusion or expulsion of undesirable
aliens and that pending arrangements for his deportation, the Government has the right to hold the undesirable alien under
confinement for a reasonable length of time."
-Over 2yrs having elapsed, the Government has not found means to remove petitioner out of the country.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner should be released from detention?

HELD: Yes. Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of asylum therein, even if they are "stateless," which the
petitioner claims to be. It is no less true however, that foreign nationals, not enemy against whom no charge has been made
other than that their permission to stay has expired, may not indefinitely be kept in detention. The protection against
deprivation of liberty without due process of law and except for crimes committed against the laws of the land is not limited
to Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality. Whether an alien who
entered the country in violation of its immigration laws may be detained for as long as the Government is unable to deport
him, is a point we need not decide. The petitioner's entry into the Philippines was not unlawful; he was brought by the armed
and belligerent forces of a de facto government whose decrees were law during the occupation.

Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of Nation." Under UDHR, "All human beings are born free and equal in degree and rights" (Art. 1); that
"Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status" (Art. 2):
that "Every one has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental
rights granted him by the Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or
exile" (Art. 9); etc.

Since the Philippine law on immigration was patterned after or copied from the American law and practice, we choose to
follow and adopt the reasoning and conclusions in the Staniszewski decision with some modifications.

Petitioner was engaged in subversive activities, and fear was expressed that he might join or aid the disloyal elements if
allowed to be at large. Bearing in mind the Government's allegation in its answer that "the herein petitioner was brought to
the Philippines by the Japanese forces," and the fact that Japan is no longer at war with the US or the Philippines nor
identified with the countries allied against these nations, the possibility of the petitioner's entertaining or committing hostile
acts prejudicial to the interest and security of this country seems remote. Granting for the sake of argument, that such a
possibility exists, still the petitioner's unduly prolonged detention would be unwarranted by law and the Constitution, if the
only purpose of the detention be to eliminate a danger that is by no means actual, present, or uncontrolable.

-order: petitioner be released (with condition) -he be placed under the surveillance of the immigration authorities or their
agents in such form and manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that he keep peace and be available when the
Government is ready to deport him.; He shall put up a bond of P5,000 with sufficient surety or sureties
CAUNCA VS. SALAZAR
-petition for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita who was employed by the Far
Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Salazar.
-An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment agency, for her to work as a maid. However,
Estelita wanted to transfer to another residence, which was disallowed by the employment agency.
-she was detained and her liberty was restrained.
-The employment agency wanted that the advance payment, which was applied to her transportation expense from the
province should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave.
-respondent contend that no physical force has been exerted over Estelita to keep keep her in the house.

ISSUE: whether an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the advance payment it
gave?

HELD: An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or maid, has absolutely
no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of the
respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place
to another, freedom to choose one’s residence.
Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of
an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail
the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place
a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is
illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion.
TAÑADA v. ANGARA
-petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.
-Petitioners question the concurrence of respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement.
-The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its
exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and
uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the
agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO.
-Petitioners viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and
legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading
intervention and that the WTO specifically .intrudes, limits and/or impairs the constitutional powers of Congress and SC.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petition presents a justiciable controversy or involves a political question.
2. Whether or not the provisions of the Agreement contravene Sec. 19, Art II and Secs. 10 and 12, Art. XII, of the
Philippine Constitution.
3. Whether or not the Provisions unduly impair or interfere with Legislative Power.
4. Whether or not the Provisions unduly impair or interfere with Judicial Power.
5. Whether or not the Concurrence of the Senate with the WTO Agreement and its Annexes sufficient and/or valid.

HELD:

Justiciable Controversy
There is a justiciable controversy. The court will only exercise its constitutional duty “to determine whether or not there had
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO
Agreement and its three annexes.”

No Contravention of the Constitution

Art. II or the Declaration of Principles and State Policies is not self-executory. Secs.10 and 12, Art. XII, on the other hand,
laying down general principles relating to the national economy and patrimony, should be read and understood in relation to
the other sections in said article, especially Secs. 1 and 13 thereof which read:

Sec. 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained
increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding
productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the underprivileged.

The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform,
through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and
trade practices.

In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum opportunity to
develop. . . .

Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity.

The Court further stated that the WTO comes with safeguards to protect weaker economies and that the Constitution does not
rule out foreign competition

The WTO Agreement and Legislative Power

A portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines
“adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of . . .
cooperation and amity with all nations.” (Art. II, Sec.2)

The WTO Agreement and Judicial Power

Suffice it to say that the reciprocity clause more than justifies such intrusion, if any actually exists. Besides, Article 34 does
not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement
inherent in our judicial system.
Since the Philippine is a signatory to most international conventions on patents, trademarks and copyrights, the adjustment in
legislation and rules of procedure will not be substantial.

Validity of the Concurrence of the Senate with the WTO Agreement and its Annexes
Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes — but not in the other documents
referred to in the Final Act, namely the Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in
Financial Services — is defective and insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of discretion. They submit that such concurrence
in the WTO Agreement alone is flawed because it is in effect a rejection of the Final Act, which in turn was the document
signed by Secretary Navarro, in representation of the Republic upon authority of the President. They contend that the second
letter of the President to the Senate which enumerated what constitutes the Final Act should have been the subject of
concurrence of the Senate.

“A final act, sometimes called protocol de cloture, is an instrument which records the winding up of the proceedings of a
diplomatic conference and usually includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties, conventions, recommendations and other
acts agreed upon and signed by the plenipotentiaries attending the conference.” It is not the treaty itself. It is rather a
summary of the proceedings of a protracted conference which may have taken place over several years. The text of the “Final
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations” is contained in just one pagein Vol. I
of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. By signing said Final Act, Secretary Navarro as
representative of the Republic of the Philippines undertook:
(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent authorities with a view
to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.

The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from its signatories,
namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement.
The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were deemed adopted without need for ratification. They were approved by the
ministers by virtue of Article XXV: 1 of GATT which provides that representatives of the members can meet “to give effect
to those provisions of this Agreement which invoke joint action, and generally with a view to facilitating the operation and
furthering the objectives of this Agreement.” [Footnotes Omitted]

Disposition: Petition was denied.