CIR vs. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP
CIR vs. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP
CIR vs. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP
162155
August 28, 2007
COMMISIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO as Revenue District No. 049, petitioner
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., respondent
(In relation to Article 13 of the Civil Code)
OBJECTIVE:
- This peti ti on for review on certi orari s e e k s t o s e t a s i d e t h e A u g u s t 1 , 2 0 0 3 decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64782 and its February 9, 2004
- resolution denying reconsideration.
FACTS:
- March 11, 1999. Mr. Gilbert Yap, Vice Chair of Primetown Property Group, filed for the refund or credit
of income tax which he paid in 1997.
- In his petition, he stated that the company slowed down because of the increase of costs in labor and
materials. Because of the suffered losses, the company was not liable for income tax. He paid a total
amount of P26, 318398.32, and therefore the company was entitled to tax refund or credit.
- May 13, 1999. Revenue Officer required the company to submit additional documents to prove their
claims. The respondent complied but it’s claims was not acted upon. On April 14, 2000 they filed a
review for certoriari in the Court of Tax Appeals.
- On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive
period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit as it found that respondent filed its final
adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund or credit commenced on that date.
credit commenced on that date. It invoked the Section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
"SECTION 229. Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected. - No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any
court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to
have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with
the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been
paid under protest or duress.
"In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment
of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment: Provided, however, That the
Commissioner may, even without a written claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return
upon which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid.
ARTICLE 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of
three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and nights from sunset to
sunrise.
SECTION 31. Legal Periods.—”Year” shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; “month” of thirty days,
unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the number of days the
specific month contains; “day,” to a day of twenty-four hours; and “night,” from sunset to sunrise.
ISSUES
- Whether or not Article 13 of the New Civil Code be repealed by EO 292 Sec 31 Chap 8 Book 1 of the
Administrative Code of 1987.
- Whether or not the petition was filed within the 2-yr period.
RULING
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the
same subject matter, the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days
whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of
12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the Civil Code and
the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative
Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.
The respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month from the day
respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the reglementary period.
The petition is DISMISSED. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Tax Appeals which is ordered to expeditiously
proceed to hear C.T.A. Case No. 6113 entitled Primetown Property Group, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
and Arturo V. Parcero.