Matias Vs RP

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ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, 

Petitioner
vs
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

G.R. No. 230751 April 25, 2018

J. Velasco Jr.

Facts:

April 10, 2012- Estrellita filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of presumptive death of her husband Wilfredo Matias where
she alleged, among others, that

(1) they were married on January 7, 1968,


(2) Wlifredo is a member of the Philippine Constabulary assigned in Araya, Pampanga since August 1967,
(3) Wlifredo never came back from his tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga since 1979 and he never made contact or
communicated with Estrellita nor to his relatives
(4) That according to the service record of Wilfredo issued by the National Police Commission, he was already declared
missing since 1979.

Estrellita constantly pestered the Philippine Constabulary for any news regarding her husband but they had no answer, all they
know is he was assigned to a place frequented by the New People’s Army.

Estrellita never gave up hope but the times had been tough on her especially with a meager source of income coupled with her
age, it is now necessary for her to request for the benefits that rightfully belong to her in order to survive.

In order to claim such benefits, a proof of death or at least a declaration of presumptive death by the Honorable Court was
required. Hence, she filed the petition not for any other purposes but solely to claim the benefits due her.

The RTC granted the petition and declared Wilfredo Matias as absent or presumptively dead under Art 41 of the FC of the
Philippines for purposes of claiming financial benefits due to him as former military officer.

The Republic questioned this decision via certiorari. The CA rendered a decision granting the certiorari and setting aside the
decision of the RTC. The CA held that the RTC erred when it declared Wilfredo presumptively dead on the basis of Art 41 such
that the purpose of the petition was not to remarry. If anything, the petition was invoking the presumption of death established
under Art 390 and 391 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC erred in declaring Wilfredo Matias presumptively dead on the basis of Art 41 of the Civil Code.

RULING:

Yes.

Art 41 provides that A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is a
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Art 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only 2 years
shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

It can be recalled that the RTC, in the fallo of its January 15, 2012 Decision, granted the petitioner’s petition by declaring
Wilfredo presumptively dead “under Article 41 of the FC.” By doing so, the RTC gave the impression that the petition for the
declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner was likewise filed pursuant to Article 41 of the FC. This is wrong. The
petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is not an action that would have warranted the application of
Article 41 of the FC because petitioner was not seeking to remarry. A reading of Article 41 of the FC shows that the
presumption of death established therein is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage under
the said law.

Petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the presumptive death of Wilfredo as a prerequisite for
remarriage. In her petition for the declaration of presumptive death, petitioner categorically stated that the same was filed “not
for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as amended.” Given that her petition for the
declaration of presumptive death was not filed for the purpose of remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on the presumption
of death under either Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code as the basis of her petition. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil
Code express the general rule regarding presumptions of death for any civil purpose, to wit: 

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead
for all purposes, except for those of succession. The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his
succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years
shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four
years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;

(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;

(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for four years.

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